Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

Whether knowers not only have the form of another thing, but also that other things come to be, through identity, in intelligible being, that is, in representative being?

53 We raise this difficulty for the same reason for which we raised the preceding one. For in truth, in this article, in order to show more plainly and more clearly that God is most highly intelligent, and therefore most highly knowing, the holy Doctor not only says that it is proper to knowers to have the form of another thing, but also, as we shall explain presently, gives us to understand that other things come to be through identity in intelligible being. Therefore, since a more exact account of the mode of having the form of another thing, which is what belongs to knowing things, as well as of many other things pertaining to the order of the knowing and the knowable, depends very much on the decision and the sifting of this difficulty, we therefore raise it here together with the holy Doctor's disciples, and shall endeavour to discuss it accurately. And although in the treatise on the Vision of God we have touched upon some things pertinent to this matter; yet because it was not possible there to meet the many objections brought by the adversaries against the doctrine of the holy Doctor, nor to explain exactly the mind of the same holy Doctor, we must therefore treat of this here, in its proper place.

§ I. Some things are premised for the explanation of the title.

54 But since it is certain that knowers do not need to have the form of a natural thing in entitative and natural being, but in representative or intelligible being, so likewise there can be no doubt that the same knowers do not become things knowable in entitative and natural being, ¹ in so far as this being is distinguished from representative being, that is, from intelligible being; therefore we do not doubt whether knowers absolutely and simply, or in natural and entitative being, become other things, but with this addition, namely in intelligible being.

On the other hand, since it is the same for other things to come to be knowers in intelligible or representative being as for those same things to come to be under that mode of being which they have in the intelligible species, from the fact that it is only under that mode of being which they have in the species that they agree with things known, or knowable, so as to acquire that other, different mode in representative being, that is, in intelligible being; therefore it comes to the same to inquire whether other things come to be knowers in intelligible or representative being; as to ask whether the aforesaid knowers are the very same intentional species themselves, taken in intelligible or representative being, so that not only do they have, in some way, such species, but are so intimately united with them, considered in the way just described, that under the said mode of being they become the very same with them through identity, and consequently that they also become, under the same representative or intelligible mode of being, the very same with the thing known, which otherwise in natural being is outside the intellect.

55 For since such a thing and its intentional species, taken in the way described, are of one and the same nature, or (as we would speak more properly) the intentional species of that thing is the very form and quiddity of such a thing, it comes to the same for knowers to become under a different mode of being the very same intentional species, as regards the represented nature which it bears, and for that same nature to become under the aforesaid mode of being, which otherwise under the natural mode of being is outside the intellect.

Although there be wisdom in this. For the species is that by which the intellect is united with its object, because it is that by which the intelligible is rendered; whereas the object is that which, being united, is intelligible as that which it is, because it is intelligible as that which it is; ² and consequently, if the identity of which the title treats is granted once for all, then such identity will be with the object as with the term, which is its; and with the species it will be (so to speak) as with the term by which, and by whose power; or as the vicegerent of the object, in which its nature is contained, as though in a vicegerent and representative, intelligibly, and in the way explained above.

We have added, however, in the title that particle, In intelligible being, that is, in representative being, because although the Doctors very often confound the one being with the other, and seem to use either name as a synonym, and we too have sometimes taken either being for the same as they have; yet they are not altogether the same, as we touched upon in the treatise on the Vision of God, article 2, and as we have explained more fully from no. 24 to 38 of this disputation.

§ II. The first opinion is referred to.

56 The first opinion denies that things become known by identity with those things, even in representative or intelligible being, or (which is the same) that they become, or are, the same by identity with the intentional species, considered in any way whatsoever. This is held by all whom we named in the preceding difficulty as being of the contrary opinion.

It is proved first by the testimony of the holy Doctor in 1. dist. 35. quaest. 1. art. 1. ad 3, in these words: It must be that this species, which is understood in act, perfect the intellect in potency, from the conjunction of which there results one perfect thing, which is the intellect in act: as from the soul and the body there results one thing, which is man having human operations. Hence, as the soul is not other than the man, so the understood in act is not other than the intellect actually understanding, but the same: yet not so that that species becomes the substance of the intellect, or a part of it, unless a formal part, as likewise the soul does not become the body.

Where, as you see, in the same way he denies that the species of a thing understood, or the thing understood itself, becomes the same with the intellect, as he denies that the soul becomes the body. Therefore, since the soul, considered in any way whatsoever, does not become the body by identity, however much it be united to it, so likewise no species will become the intellect by identity in any respect, and consequently neither can the intellect become by identity the very same species of the thing understood, as is evident from itself.

57 It is confirmed, and explained. For the intelligible species, for example, considered in any way whatsoever, is not united to the intellect except in that way in which an accident, or a form, is united through inherence, or information, with its own subject: therefore the intellect cannot become the same by identity with that same intelligible species, taken in any way whatsoever, and consequently neither can it in any respect become the same by identity with the thing understood. This second consequence is evident from the first, and from those things which we were saying in the explanation of the title, § 1. The first, however, plainly follows from the antecedent.

Since a subject receiving through inherence, or information, some form does not become such a form by identity:

and thus fire, receiving its own heat through inherence, does not become heat, nor does matter

Peter, receiving the very same form by which Peter is constituted, becomes the aforesaid form identically. The antecedent, however, appears plain. For the intelligible species is drawn out of the potency of the intellect according to all that it has; otherwise it would be created according to something of itself: therefore, according to all that is in it, it is united to the intellect in no way other than that in which an accident, or a form, is united with its own subject: since a form, drawn out of the potency of its subject according to all that it has, is not united with it otherwise than in this mode, as is clear by induction.

It is confirmed secondly. For the natural form is more efficacious than the intentional form, since the former has more of entity and perfection than the latter: but the natural form cannot be so intimately united with its own recipient that such a recipient be drawn by it to the point of becoming the form itself, or conversely:

therefore neither will the intentional form be able to be so intimately united with its own recipient that one be made the other: and consequently they will not be made the same by identity in intentional being.

58 It makes no difference if, with Cajetan, in the place cited below, you answer that the species can be considered either in entitative and natural being, or in representative or intelligible being:

and according to the first ground that it inheres, or informs, a subject, and consequently that it cannot be made the same by identity with it on this ground; yet it is otherwise according to the second. For according to the latter, it has accidentally and materially what it is as substance, or as accident.

For it is sometimes an accident, as happens in us, and in any Angel with respect to things distinct from itself; sometimes, however, it is a substance, as appears in the Angelic substance and in the divine essence, which have the character of an intelligible species with respect to themselves: and so, thus considered, it will not have being in the intellect by way of an inhering form, or of one truly informing through information and requiring a real actual distinction between the form actually informing and its own recipient, but by another, higher and more eminent mode, namely by uniting itself with it through identity.

For the contrary is the case. Then, this doctrine cannot be applied to the sensitive powers, and to their intentional species:

because visible species, for example, cannot but be accidents, from the fact that a visible object is not of itself able to be united to the sight, as happens in the Angels with respect to the knowledge of themselves, and in the blessed with respect to the knowledge of God: and so it is necessary that they be united through some quality which acts in their place and immediately influences into the vision, and consequently that they be united through such a quality.

59 Then too; because, still speaking of intelligible species and of our intellect, from this solution one can only gather that the intelligible object, taken formally, does not have it, of the intelligibility itself as it were, to be united to the intellect by inherence, or by a true information excluding union through identity: (since the essence of an Angel is not united through inherence with its own intellect, nor the essence of God with the divine intellect, whether by inhering or by some information excluding identity) yet not that the intelligible, taken formally, is not united to the human intellect through the inherence of intelligible species considered in any way whatsoever: therefore the force of the argument made is not weakened by the strength of this solution.

The consequence is plain, but the antecedent must be proved. For as from the fact that the intelligible species is sometimes infinite, as in

God, and sometimes finite, as in us, it does not follow that the intelligible species connatural to the human intellect is abstracted from finitude, or infinitude, but only that the intelligible species, so taken, abstracts from created and uncreated, and prescinds from this or that, namely from being finite or infinite:

so likewise from the fact that the same species is free in God from any mode of union excluding identity, and does not sometimes import inherence in the Angels, it does not follow that the intelligible species of the human intellect, taken in any way whatsoever, does not seek inherence, since that species has of itself and intrinsically not to be pure acts, as happens in God: and that at least for this standing the substance of the soul is not united with its own intellect by itself, in the character of an intelligible species, as happens in the Angels.

60 Secondly, and principally, the same opinion is proved, and at the same time a solution is given which weakens this argument as well as the remaining arguments of this opinion. For the intelligible object, or the object of any power as such, has of itself that which of itself it seeks from the power to be found in it: now the human intellectual power seeks of itself that the object, and consequently the species bearing its place, be not united to it by identity, but by inherence and information: therefore the aforesaid object, and consequently its intelligible species, taken formally and in intelligible being, or in representative being, will have this very thing.

The major, together with the consequence, is acknowledged.

The minor, however, is proved. For our intellect is in the lowest grade of intelligibility:

therefore, since the divine intellect is in no way in a receptive potency with regard to the first act, or the second, namely the intelligible species and the intellection, and the Angelic intellect is in potency with regard to the second act, though not with regard to the first act, from the fact that it has naturally congenitally born in it the intelligible species of all the things of the whole universe, it follows thence that our intellect, which is in the lowest grade of intelligibility, of itself and intrinsically has what it is in a receptive potency with regard to the first act, namely the object, and the intelligible species bearing its place in its stead: and consequently of itself and intrinsically it seeks that the object, and therefore the aforesaid species taken formally, be not united to it by identity, but by way of an inhering and informing form: since it is in a receptive potency really separable from its form, and that which is so in potency seeks of itself to be united with it through the middle of inherence, and not through identity, as is clear by induction.

61 That argument, applied with due proportion, seems likewise to convict the point at issue concerning the Angelic intellect: for its intellect is so related to the intelligible species, naturally congenitally born in it and taken formally and in intelligible or representative being, that it can be separated from them, so taken, at least by the divine power: whereas it is established that there is no argument greater than this for a real distinction between two things united to each other, and consequently for a union not so intimate as to reach identity, than that they can be separated from each other: therefore, and so forth.

It is confirmed first. Because the created intellect, before it is united with the object and with the intelligible species of that object, taken in representative or intelligible being, was really distinct from each of them: therefore, after it has been united with them, it will remain distinct from them: and consequently it is not united with them by identity. The antecedent, and this second consequence, are quite clear. The first, however, follows from the antecedent in part. For things which have once been distinct cannot be so united to one another that they be one and the same by identity, provided that each of the two remains with its own entity, as happens here: for the whole reason on account of which they were formerly distinct was their own entity: and so, if this remains in each of the two, they cannot but remain distinct.

62 It is confirmed secondly. For the intelligible object often does not exist while it is being understood: therefore a true, real union and identity cannot then intervene between it and the understood. The consequence is plain. Because nothing can be united, and much less made identical, with a thing that does not exist.

It is confirmed thirdly. For for this reason the substance of the bread, when the consecration has been performed, becomes the Body of Christ, because the bread does not remain, but is converted into the Body of Christ: therefore, when the union has been made between the intellect and the object, and the intelligible species taken formally, all these remaining with their own entity, the consequence will be that they cannot in any respect be so united that they become one and the same by identity.

63 Thirdly. For however much the intellect be united with the intelligible species, it states a real relation of the third kind towards the intelligible object as such: therefore it cannot become one with it through identity: and consequently neither with the intelligible species of the same, taken formally, which according to this ground is the very quiddity and reason of its object. This last consequence is clear from the first. The first, however, from the antecedent. For a real relation seeks terms really distinct. The antecedent, however, seems certain. For the intellect, however much it be united with the intelligible species taken formally and in the most formal way and in intelligible being, is compared with the intelligible thing as its own intellectual power, and as complete with respect to its own object: and any complete power is referred to its own object by a real relation of the third kind, namely the measurable to its measure: therefore, and so forth.

64 Fourthly. For either the essential predicates of the species, still taken in representative being, become essential predicates of the intellect, or they do not? If the first, then the intellect, which is pure potency in the genus of the intelligible, will be essentially act, and form in this order, which is against the nature of pure potency, to which it cannot befit to be united by way of an essential predicate, so as to include act, or to be an act of that order in which it has the character of pure potency: just as it were repugnant that prime matter be act, or essentially include act in the entitative and substantial order, from the fact that it is itself essentially pure potency in this order. But if it is said to be the second, then the intellect is not made one and the same by identity with the intelligible object, or with its species, still considered in intelligible being: for those things which are one and the same by identity have one and the same essential predicates: for if they had the aforesaid predicates from the nature of different things, they could not be one and the same by identity.

Fifthly. For here there presses the point which we touched upon above, namely that from the opposite it follows that the intellect of Peter and of Paul are identified with each other, which is plainly false. The consequence is plain. Because things which are the same with a third are the same with each other: but each of the two intellects is identified with the same intelligible object, and with the same species taken formally, as happens when each of the two understands the same nature: therefore each of the two will be identified with each other.

65 Lastly. For the divine essence is united with the intellect of the blessed in the character of an intelligible species, and of intelligible being taken formally: and nevertheless the intellect of the blessed is not united with it by identity: therefore the intelligible species, or the intelligible object as such, is not united with the intellect by identity. The consequence and the major are evident from themselves. The minor, however, seems plain. Then, because one and the same cannot be at once, and by identity, created and uncreated, as seems clear from the very terms: otherwise it would be at once finite and infinite, as well as being by essence and by participation. Then too: because it involves that something created have so great perfection; that it represent the divine essence as it is in itself, as is established from what we said in the treatise on the Vision of God, article 2: therefore it will be far more repugnant that it be the same by identity with the divine essence, taken in any way whatsoever: for no less is required for this, that something be the same by identity with the essence of God, than for this, that it represent it as it is in itself: therefore, if the former is above all the capacity of a created thing, the latter, which is subsequent to it, will also exceed its capacity.

§ III. The opinion of Aristotle and of the holy Doctor is chosen.

66 Nevertheless it must be said that things become known by identity with the things known, not indeed in natural and entitative being, and consequently not simply and absolutely, but in some way, or with an addition, and according to something, that is, under another mode of being, namely under representative being, or intelligible being: or (which is the same) that they come to be through identity, and in the way signified above in no. 55 and explained more fully in no. 83 and following of this difficulty, the very same intentional species, not indeed in the being of the thing, but taken in intelligible being, or representative being, according to which ground they say that the object itself is under another mode of being.

Thus Aristotle, 3. de Anima, text. 37, in these words: Now, having recapitulated what has been said about the soul, let us say again that all those things which are are in some way the soul: for they are either sensible things which are, or intelligible things. Now knowledge is, in some way, the things knowable, but sense is the sensible things.

These words the holy Doctor explains as follows, lect. 13: He says therefore first, that now, recapitulating what has been said about the soul, in order to show what was proposed, we say that all things are in some way the soul. For all things which are are either sensible things or intelligible things; but the soul is in some way all the sensible and the intelligible things: because the soul is sense and intellect, or knowledge; but sense is in some way the sensible things themselves, and the intellect the intelligible things.

Where, as you see, both Aristotle and the holy Doctor attribute to sense and to the intellect that, in some way, that is, in intelligible or representative being (which, taken strictly, is being according to something), they become the same by identity with the sensible or intelligible thing: for as is evident from what was said in the preceding section, it holds that when a form is not identified in some way, that is, according to some being, with that to which it is united, then it cannot be said to become that, or to be the very form itself according to some being: just as for this reason matter united to its form, or fire to its heat, are not said to become, or to be, the aforesaid form.

67 The same Aristotle taught this also in text. 38, saying: Now it is necessary that either the things themselves, or the species, be: the things themselves indeed are not. For a stone is not in the soul, but the species is; where the holy Doctor, in the lecture cited, says: He shows that the soul is all things in a different way than the ancients supposed, and he says that if the soul is all things, it is necessary that it be either the things themselves which are knowable and sensible; as Empedocles posited that we know earth by earth and water by water, and so of the others, or that it be their species; but the soul is not the thing itself, as they supposed: because a stone is not in the soul, but through the species of a stone. And in this way it is said that the intellect in act is the understood in act itself, in as far as the species of the thing understood is the species of the intellect in act. That is, in as far as the species of the thing understood, which is the same with it according to nature, is also the species of the intellect in act, identified with it in the character of species.

And lastly the Angelic Doctor teaches this very thing in this article, and in De veritate, quaest. 2. art. 2, and 1. contra Gent. cap. 44, and often elsewhere. And thus they follow this opinion: Cajetan in this article and in quaest. 79. art. 2; Zumel, and Bannez in the present question, whom he cites, and whom Gonzalez follows in the present disputation 34, sect. 2, no. 13; the same opinion is also held by Nazarius in this same article, and by our most learned Magister Petrus of Corneto, the most brilliant luminary of the Carmelite family, in the present disputation 1, dub. 4, no. 23; and lastly the younger and more approved Thomists teach this very thing in common.

68 The assertion is explained. For we mean with the holy Doctor only this much: that since there are in the intentional species those two genera of being, explained in the preceding difficulty, namely entitative and natural being, and intentional being taken formally and in intelligible being: thence it is that the aforesaid species is united with the power in a twofold manner according to this double being. Indeed, in such a way that according to the former it is united either through inherence, or in that way in which a substantial subject is united with its accident, as happens in the Angelic substance with respect to its own intellect: but according to the latter being it is united with that same intellect so intimately that they remain identified with each other, and in the proportionate way in which, in the probable opinion of many, motion is so intimately united with its term that, by this very fact of affecting it as it were, it remains identified with it. Although there is a great diversity between the example and the thing of which we are speaking, as will be evident from what is said below: and therefore we shall bring forward, at no. 87, another example well suited, and (so to speak) expressing this thing to the life.

§ IV. The true opinion of the Philosopher and of the holy Doctor is supported by a fundamental ground.

69 The first and fundamental ground of this assertion, however, has been touched upon above, and is hinted at by the holy Doctor in this article and in 1. part. quaest. 50. art. 2. ad 2, and in other places cited. It can be reduced to this form. For knowers ought to be united with the things known, as they have being in the intelligible species taken formally, and under that mode of being which they have in it, or (which is the same, although it was hinted at above in no. 55) with the aforesaid species so accepted, by an immaterial and more elevated union, at least according to something, than is the union by which natural forms are united with their objects: therefore things known, as they have intelligible being in the intelligible species and under the aforesaid mode of being, or the species themselves taken formally and in the way described, are not united with the knowers by means of inherence or information: therefore they are united with them in a certain way through identity, and with such an addition, namely in representative being, that is, in intelligible being.

This last consequence is plain from the former. For a form, as united formally, in the character of a form (as happens here, from the fact that the species is united with the intellect in the character of an intelligible form) is not united except by a union which is either through inherence or information, or is at length such as to reach union through identity. For from the very fact that a real actual distinction intervenes there in some order, true inherence or information cannot be absent from it: since that form truly communicates itself through the mode of a form to its own recipient, and such a recipient truly receives it, and these things cannot be exercised between the form and its recipient, which remain really and actually distinct, without there being there the true and proper causality of the form, and true and proper inherence or information, as is evident from itself and by induction: therefore, if a form, or an intelligible species, is not united with the knowers through inherence or information, it is united with them through identity: and since such a union is not in entitative and natural being, but in representative being, that is, in intelligible being, which is a being after a manner and according to something, namely in the intelligible order, it will follow that such a union is not through identity simply and absolutely, but through a certain such identity, namely within the line of representative being, or of intelligible being.

70 The first consequence, however, is evident from the antecedent. For that greater elevation, by which a thing, or an intelligible species, is united with a knower, consists in this, that it is so united with it that the knower does not limit and constrict it to the point of its being in intelligible being, this, and not the very form which in natural being is in the thing known, as is clear from what was said in the preceding disputation, no. 22, and from what is to be said from the number following to 84 of this disputation: and therefore, if such a species represents any nature fully and universally, according as in potency it embraces all individuals, it does not restrict it to the point of its being, as regards the nature, according as it is under that representative being, this and individual, as is evident from what was said in disput. 1, no. 23 to 26: therefore it is a sign that this union is not through inherence or information: since, as we said there, a form which is united through inherence or information is limited to the point of its being this, and not that very thing which is in another, and likewise to the point of its being this and individual, as regards the nature it bears.

The antecedent, however, is sufficiently clear from what was said in the place just cited, no. 20, and following. For as knowers as such are immaterial, and elevated above the conditions of matter, so they ought to be united with the things, or forms, which are knowable, by an immaterial and more elevated union, which is above the conditions of union through the mode of matter, and of a subject taken formally.

71 This is explained by the ground which the holy Doctor hints at in that quaest. 2. de veritate, in the article cited. For intentional being, that is, intelligible being, is a being elevated in the way described, and ample and indeterminate of itself, in so far as it does not prevent the form under it from being the very same which is in another under natural being: and so the aforesaid being is provided by nature as a remedy for natural and entitative being, which indeed is so constricted and limited that according to it the same form cannot be in more than one: therefore that which is united of itself and directly to intentional being, if it is considered formally and in the being of the term of this union, must not have concurrence with it through the mode of subject and matter, but through another, more elevated mode, and consequently must be identifiable as a term with the form with which it is united.

The antecedent is evident from what was said above in the place just cited. The first consequence, however, seems to follow from the antecedent. For just as the form itself abstracts from its being from the conditions arising from the character of matter and of a subject as such, namely from the determination and limitation already described, and consequently, in a peculiar manner, and more than other natural forms, is elevated above it and its conditions, so it demands that that to which it is united should in a peculiar manner abstract from the character of subject, of matter, and of a power taken formally: and consequently that it should not have concurrence through the mode of subject and of power, as happens with respect to the other spiritual forms, and those taken in natural being: although otherwise, materially and accidentally, it can have the character of subject or of power, so as to be able to receive that same species and intelligible form taken in entitative and natural being.

The second consequence, however, is evident from the former. For as we were saying above, although something can be united through the mode of a pure term, and not be united through information, inherence, or identity, as is evident in the subsistent Word united in the character of a term with the humanity of our Lord Christ; yet nothing can be united with another in the character of a form, whether natural or intelligible, and consequently in the character of the power of acting, without being united either by inhering or by informing, or by a union so intimate that it reaches at the same time union through identity in the way explained, as we touched upon in the treatise on the Vision of God, art. 2: but the intelligible species does not seek to be united purely in the character of a term, both because this union, if it be at all pure of all information, asserts infinity, as is evident in the aforesaid union of the Word with humanity; and also because the intelligible species is united in the character of the power of acting: therefore it must necessarily be united through the aforesaid union through identity which is demanded by an intelligible form, that is, by an intentional form as such.

72 It makes no difference if you object that a sensible species, such as the species of whiteness united to the sight, is singular and individual not only in natural being, but also in representative being, that is, in sensible being, as is evident from itself: therefore, according to either being, it ought to be united to the sight as to a subject and as to a power. The consequence is plain: because a subject is the reason of the individuation of forms.

For the answer is given by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence, if it is understood of forms that can be seen, such as are under the intentional or intelligible mode of being: for these, so taken, are individuated from the object represented, which exists outside: and so whenever they represent the very same object, they are numerically the same in intelligible being, that is, in representative being, or (which for the present comes to the same) as regards the nature contained there. And therefore all sensible species representing this one whiteness, which in this one wall resides according to natural being, are on the side of form and of nature one and the same species numerically: just as the nature of whiteness which is found in all of them is one and the same under the aforesaid being, as has been explained.

73 From this also a greater confirmation of our ground is deduced. For if several species represent one and the same individual only, then all those species, as regards the nature contained there, are numerically the same, as we were just asserting; and if they represent two individuals differing only numerically, then as regards those same natures intelligibly contained in the same species, they are diverse only in number; otherwise those species would not be altogether of the same character on the side of form and of nature: therefore it is a sign that such species, as regards the natures intelligibly contained there, and as they are under that mode of immateriality indispensably required by the force of their own line in order to unite the object with the power, are not received in the intellect as though in a subject; otherwise they would be individuated from it, and the earlier of those species received, or united, in different times could not be numerically diverse, nor could the later ones be at the same time in the same intellect: for, as is clear from what we said in the treatise on the principle of individuation, disput. 2, no. 57, two forms, accidents, or natures differing only in number cannot be in the same subject as such, from the fact that they are individuated from it so taken: therefore it will also be a sign that the aforesaid species, taken as regards the nature and the intelligible mode of being which they assert as indispensable, are so united with the intellect that they are united with it through identity, not indeed absolutely and simply such an identity, and consequently not in entitative being, but with an addition, namely in the intelligible order: for as is clear from what has been said, no other union remains over and above this one.

§ V. The same opinion of Aristotle and of the holy Doctor is established by another ground.

74 Secondly, the assertion is proved by another ground, which we also hinted at above, and which is hinted at by the same holy Doctor in the present question. For a species, for example an intelligible one, if it be taken formally and with strictness as to what lies within its own line, then it has only accidentally and materially what it is as substance, or as accident, in entitative and natural being: therefore it will also have only materially and accidentally that it be united through inherence or information, which is able to effect a real actual distinction between the form and the thing informed, or that it be united with the intellect through the mode of a substantial subject sustaining it: therefore, if we attend to the union which strictly belongs to it within its own line, it will be only through identity within that same line, namely in intelligible being. This second consequence plainly follows from the former, as is clear from what we were just saying.

The first, however, is evident from the antecedent. For that which is to inhere belongs of itself only to a form which is of itself an accident in entitative being: as also that which is to inform through a true and proper information, requiring a distinction between the form and the thing informed, and different from inherence when taken strictly, or to sustain the intellect through the mode of a substantial subject, belongs only to forms, or to natures, which are substantial in entitative being: and therefore these forms alone, whether accidental or substantial, are limited, as we were saying in this disputation, no. 71, and in the preceding one, no. 22, by those things in which they are received; and those substantial natures alone, such as they are in entitative being, limit the forms which they receive: from the fact that forms are limited only by a subject to which they inhere, or which in the way described they inform; and consequently, if these alone are limited, they alone also will inhere, or will inform in the way described: therefore, if the intelligible species is only accidentally and materially an accident, or a substance, in entitative being, the consequence will be that it inheres or informs in the way described only accidentally and materially.

75 The antecedent, however, is proved. Then, because the intelligible species is sometimes a substance, sometimes, however, an accident, in entitative and natural being; yet so that the species which is an accident in entitative being can be of the same whole nature as that which, in the character of an intelligible species, it shares with a species which is a substance in entitative being, if it represents the same object: as with the substance of the Angel Gabriel, which has the character of an intelligible species with respect to its own intellect, and with an intelligible species which is an accident in entitative being and represents that same Gabriel, and exists in the intellect of Michael, as we were saying in no. 34. And therefore, if it were granted that the substance of Gabriel were united of itself, in the character of species, with the intellect of Michael, just as it is united of itself with its own intellect, then Michael would understand in the same way, and would elicit the same and entire intellection according to reason, with such a substantial species, as he does now when he comes to know Gabriel through a species which is an accident in entitative being.

76 Then too: because although a natural being, as it is distinguished from the intentional, is divided of itself, and contracted by being of itself, or in another, in entitative being; nevertheless intelligible being, taken formally, and considered purely within its own line, is not contracted or divided of itself by these two modes of being of itself, or in another, in the entitative order, or by reason of the substance, or of the accident of this order, but according to a greater or lesser immateriality of itself, and intrinsically demanded from it, and according to a different object considered of itself in the first place, or contained there.

And the reason is. For just as intelligible being imports, formally speaking, only that it is immaterial being and able to be united in the character of the object with the intellectual power; so likewise, of itself, it is divided only according to a greater or lesser immateriality, already described, and according to a distinct object considered of itself in intelligible being and united with the aforesaid intellectual power; but not according to the character of being of itself, or in another, in the entitative order.

§ VI. The first argument of the first opinion is resolved together with its confirmations.

77 The arguments of the former opinion touch upon several matters in the way of the holy Doctor which are sufficiently subtle, and not without difficulty, if they are not taken exactly; and they bring with them therefore a longer discourse and explanation, so that the wondrous doctrine of the Angelic Doctor, which they put forward for its solution, may be understood exactly: and therefore each of these arguments, whose solution requires the greater part of this explanation, will be resolved separately in its own particular section.

To the first, therefore, which is sought from the words of the holy Doctor, it is plain from what we have often said in this and the preceding difficulty, namely that a species, an intelligible species, for example, belongs to two orders according to the different formalities it has, namely to the entitative and natural order, in so far as it is distinguished from the intelligible or representative order, and at the same time to the intelligible order; and that according to the former ground it can inhere or inform, or at length be informed by its own intellect, as may be seen in the essence of an Angel when joined with its own intellect and taken in entitative being. On the other hand, if it be considered in the character of an intelligible species, in so far as it strictly pertains to the intelligible order, then it does not seek the aforesaid modes of union which accompany it accidentally and materially, but a more elevated mode of union, and one so intimate that in a certain way, that is, in intelligible being, it remains identified with the intellect to which it is united. Hence the holy Doctor, attending to these different modes of union which belong to the intelligible species, sometimes asserts that it is united through inherence and information, and that the species so united remains distinct from the intellect in which it is, and which it informs, as in the place cited, in the argument, and in this quaest. art. 2, and quaest. 55. art. 1. ad 2, quaest. 85. art. 2. ad 1, quaest. 87. art. 1. ad 3, in 2. dist. 3. quaest. 3. art. 4, in 4. dist. 49. quaest. 2. art. 1. ad 10, de verit. quaest. 8. art. 6, de spiritualibus creaturis, art. 8. ad 14, quodl. 11. art. 2; sometimes, however, that it is the same with the intellect, and that the thing understood, through its union with that species, becomes the very species in the way described, and the thing understood itself, as is clear from the places cited in no. 63 and 64.

78 Indeed, because an intelligible form, at least a created one, is not united in the character of an intelligible form with the intellect without first being united with it in some entitative being by one of the assigned modes, from the fact that the aforesaid union is as it were the road to that more intimate union in intelligible being; therefore the holy Doctor sometimes says that an intelligible form, or a thing understood, is not united with the intellect, or is the same with it, except in so far as it is actuated and informed through it: for, as we were saying, that union is not reached except in so far as there is a passage through this one.

From this also it is understood how rightly Aristotle and the holy Doctor, 3. de Anima, text. 38, compare the soul to the hand: because just as the hand, in the words of the Angelic Doctor there, lect. 3, is the organ of organs, because the hands have been given in place of all the organs which have been given to the other animals for defence, or attack, or covering; for a man prepares for himself all these things by his hand, so likewise the soul has been given to man in place of all forms, so that man may be in a certain way the whole being, in as far as through it, and through the reception of the intelligible forms taken in entitative being, man arrives at this, that he be united with his own intelligible forms, and with the things understood, through that closer and more intimate union which is made through identity in intelligible being: and consequently he arrives at this, that he be all things intelligibly.

79 From this, with respect to the first confirmation, it is plain that the antecedent must be denied. And with respect to the proof it must be said that an intelligible form, which is an accident in entitative being, is not drawn out of the potency of its subject of itself, in so far as it is an intelligible form and has the pure or strict character of such a form: but that it is only drawn forth together with the drawing forth of itself taken in entitative and natural being: and for this it is enough that it be identified with the aforesaid entitative and natural being, which is what is said of it materially. Hence it is not necessary that it be created according to something of itself, or that it be united to the intellect through inherence according to intelligible being taken formally: because, in order that it be produced both as regards entitative being and as regards intelligible being, it is enough that it be drawn out with respect to the former, and be drawn out together with it by reason of it: and for this co-drawn-forth it is not required that it inhere in intelligible being; but it is enough that, in the way hinted at, the entitative being and intelligible being of the aforesaid species be identified.

80 With respect to the second confirmation, it is likewise plain from what has been said how, although as regards union through inherence or information the natural form is more efficacious than the intelligible one; yet as regards that kind of union through identity in a certain way, that is, in intelligible being, the intelligible form is more efficacious than the natural one, and that this efficacy does not belong to the form by reason of a greater entity, but by reason of suchness (so to speak) of the very same form, consisting in this, that it be an intelligible form as such.

Hence the solution given there for this first argument, and its confirmations, must be admitted, understood in accordance with what we have said both in this and in the preceding difficulty: and thus the Thomists are rightly of one mind in saying that in the union of any intelligible species, at least a created one, there intervenes there a twofold union: one in entitative being; the other, however, in intelligible being: and that with respect to the former union the intellect has concurrence through the mode of a subject, properly and formally taken: but otherwise with respect to the latter, as we shall explain more fully in no. 83 and following; for as we were saying above, through the former union the intelligible form is limited as regards entitative being to the point of its being this, and not that: but through the latter, which is made according to intelligible being, the aforesaid form is not limited to the point of its being this and not that, or to the point of its being involved in intelligible being together with individuating conditions; as happens when the aforesaid species represents a universal nature, and one taken universally.

81 Wherefore, with respect to the first objection brought against the solution given there, it must be said that it is one thing that a sensible species cannot but be an accident and a quality in entitative being; and it is another thing whether, considered strictly, in so far as it pertains to the sensible or knowable order, and taken in the most formal sense in the character of a species, it is a formal and per se accident in entitative being: and although the former of these is true (whether this be laid down of itself, through the mode of the material reason, and as the foundation of those things which pertain to the line of a sensible species; or be sought from other headings, of which we treat elsewhere), the latter, however, is otherwise. From this latter, indeed, it follows very well that although absolutely speaking it inheres and is united through inherence; yet not that, with this addition, that is, in the sensible or knowable order, taken strictly, it is not united through identity, and in the way described with the sense.

With respect to the second objection, however, the antecedent must be denied. And with respect to its proof, the antecedent having been granted, the consequence must be denied. And the reason for the difference of this is drawn from what has been said. For an intelligible species, by the fact that it is finite or infinite through its essence, is varied in the character of a species taken in the most formal sense, as is evident from itself: because it is necessary that the grade of immateriality demanded of it of itself be varied: but by the fact that it is a substance, or an accident representing, or showing, the same object, and in the same grade of immateriality, it is not varied essentially in the character of an intelligible species, as is clear from what was said in no. 31: from the fact that, as is clear in the treatise on the Vision of God, disp. 2, no. 107, it is not necessary that the grade of immateriality demanded of it of itself be varied. Which indeed sufficiently indicates that an intelligible species is only materially and accidentally a substance, or an accident, and is united through inherence. And so, if it were granted as impossible that there should be, in this same difficulty which we were touching upon, a created species representing God as he is in himself, which were an accident and at the same time had infinite immateriality; then, these two impossibilities being granted, such an intelligible species would not be specifically distinguished in the character of a species from the divine essence, which is an intelligible form.

82 Nor does it tell against this that it is added there, namely that a species connatural to the human intellect can neither be a pure act (which we willingly admit) nor even be the very substance of the soul, at least for this standing, and consequently that it must of necessity be an accident and be united through inherence.

This therefore does not tell against it. For from this it follows only that the species connatural to man must necessarily, for this standing, have inherence in entitative being joined to it; but not that they inhere in intelligible being, taken formally: indeed, not even that this inherence and the accidental entitative being are demanded of themselves by the intelligible being of the same species; but that they are sought from one source and from other headings. And therefore the soul when separated can understand itself of itself, and consequently the intelligible being proper to its own substance, such as it has of itself the character of a species; it does not seek on this ground that it have an accidental entitative being as something joined to it and identified with it, but rather this is repugnant to it thus considered.

§ VII. The second argument of the first opinion is dissolved together with its confirmations.

The second argument no less than the preceding one touches upon the doctrine in the way of the holy Doctor, which is sufficiently subtle and requires a longer discourse; and therefore it is dissolved separately in this section 7.

83 To the second, therefore, the principal one, the answer must be given by granting the major and denying the minor, understood with respect to the intelligible species of the human intellect, taken formally in intelligible being of species. And with respect to the proof, the antecedent must be granted, as also the first consequence understood with respect to the aforesaid species in the being of the thing. And then the second consequence must be denied in the sense already described. For its proof, it is clear from what has been said how the human intellect, properly and formally speaking, is not in a receptive potency as such with respect to intelligible species formally considered, and considered precisely in so far as they pertain to the intelligible line; but is compared to them so taken as a term identifiable with another term, with which it is born to be identified; with this limitation at least, however, that as regards created species, if these are once united according to entitative being by an entitative union excluding identity according to this being, then they can be united intelligibly, and through the identity already explained, according to intelligible being. But these things are explained from the root in the solution which follows.

84 With respect, however, to what is added in this same argument, namely that the point at issue is also proved in the Angelic intellect, the major must be granted and the minor, understood universally, denied. For from the fact that some things can be separated from each other it does not universally follow that they were really and actually distinct before the separation in every order in which they are separable; and consequently neither is it universally collected that they are not actually and really identified in every order by an identity excluding a real actual distinction within the aforesaid order: but it is only universally collected either that a real actual distinction intervenes there, and before the separation, in every order, if the intellect is set aside; or that there is such a distinction in one order, and in another a real potential distinction: and consequently an identity of such a condition in that order, that it be compatible with the aforesaid distinction: and thus those things which were formerly identified by this lowest mode of identification may afterwards be found not to be identified, if they are once separated from each other.

Wherefore, from the fact that the human intellect naturally, and the Angelic intellect supernaturally, can be without intelligible species and objects, even if all these things are considered in intelligible being taken formally, it is not rightly collected that in the intelligible order such intellects are not identified with intelligible species and objects in the way explained, but that this identity is only the lowest identity within this intelligible order, and compatible at the same time both with a real actual distinction in the entitative order, and also with a real potential distinction within the intelligible order, and consequently with the condition that, the separation having been made, such an identity should perish.

85 This very point is explained from the root. For as our men of Complutum, in the book on Generation, disp. 5, no. 67 and 68, deduce from Aristotle and the holy Doctor, and as they expound in no. 71 and 72, beyond the virtual real distinction, such as that which is found between the animal and the rational, and beyond the real actual distinction such as that by which two waters discontinuous from each other are distinguished, another real potential distinction must necessarily be admitted in the way of the holy Doctor, namely of those things which, though actually and really they are the same, are nevertheless really potentially distinct: because they can be separated from each other, and, the separation having been made, remain actually and really diverse. And likewise, beyond the identity excluding virtual real distinction, such as is found in the more common opinion of the theologians between the intellect and the divine intellection, and beyond the identity admitting only the virtual distinction such as is seen between the animal and the rational, the lowest identity of all in the character of identity must necessarily be given, namely the real potential one, which consists in this, that although the terms be really and actually distinguished, they are nevertheless really potentially the same.

86 To the point at hand, therefore, the intellect, united with the intelligible object by means of its species, becomes the same with them through identity, not indeed in entitative and natural being, but with an addition, that is, in the intelligible order the lowest of all in the character of identity: and thus it becomes the same with them through an identity which excludes a real actual distinction within the intelligible order, and arising from this same order; but not a real actual distinction in the entitative order, nor a real potential distinction in the intelligible order. For from the reasons given above from no. 69 to no. 77, it cannot but be actually identified with them in the intelligible order, and because they are separable from each other, they must be identified through an identity which is compatible with a real potential distinction, and which, when they are actually separated, perishes, so that a real actual distinction must remain, even in the intelligible order, between them, and a real potential identity in this same order between them themselves. As also, for the reasons we have often indicated, they cannot but be actually, and with the intellect set aside, distinct in entitative being.

87 Hence, from the fact that the Angelic intelligible species can be separated supernaturally from its intellect, and that human species are separated naturally from the intellect of the name, it does not follow that they are not actually identified in the intelligible order, and in the way described, with their own intellects while they are joined with them, but that this identity, still in the intelligible order, has the conditions already explained.

And all these things can be elucidated by a well-suited example, that of a material substance, for example the form of water, which, although in its whole it has a distinction of entitative parts arising from quantity, as from an intrinsic formal cause, or an inhering one; yet within the line of the substance, taken strictly, that is (which is the same), of itself it does not formally have the aforesaid distinction of parts: and consequently neither the parts, which would be formally the substance, as Aristotle and the holy Doctor and a very large number of his disciples hold, nor the reasons drawn from the same Aristotle and Angelic Doctor, do our men of Complutum show in the book on Generation, in the disputation cited, from no. 32 to 47.

88 And so, the two waters having been divided, their substantial forms are then quantitative and substantial, and consequently in fact diverse both within the line of quantity and of substance, although they are then still in potency, to the end of being the same through identity within the line of substance alone, but not within the line of quantity, as the same Complutenses explain from no. 69 to no. 73; and then, the aforesaid waters having afterwards been joined together by a single and the same quantity, then although they must always, however much they be joined, be themselves accidentally distinguished, and their substantial forms by reason of quantity, and within its line, and consequently by reason of it there must intervene a distinction of integral parts, or of the same character; nevertheless, as the aforesaid Complutenses expound in the disputation cited from no. 67 to 69 and following, from the very fact that those waters and their forms are joined according to quantities, and are sealed by one and the same quantity, their substance, and the form of each of the two, according to those things which they call substantial, and consequently strictly taken within the line of substance, cannot but become one and the same through identity; so that they are not distinguished by a real actual distinction, and one formal and substantial, or arising from a substantial principle, but nominally, and by quantity: otherwise, as is proved there, the form of that water would have entitative parts which would be formally the substance, whose opposite is supposed here, and is shown in the place cited.

89 So, then, in the present case, proportion being preserved, we must philosophize concerning the species and the intelligible object when compared with the intellect. For, if they are once separated, they remain in each order, namely both in the entitative and in the intelligible order actually diverse, but in potency, or (as we would say better) capable, so that in the intelligible order, but not however in the natural order, they are identified: yet if they are actually united in the natural order, then although they are still united, they remain in this order really and actually distinct; yet by that very fact they are united intelligibly, and remain the same through identity in the intelligible order.

This can further be elucidated by the example of motion and its term, which in the probable opinion of many, whom the Complutenses mention in the book of the Physics, disp. 16, no. 24, are distinguished only actually and virtually while they are united, and yet even then they differ really and potentially, by at least a real negative distinction on the side of one term and a positive one on the side of the other, as many will have it: for they can be separated really, so that the term remains while the motion perishes, and then they differ by the aforesaid actual distinction; and likewise, when they thus differ, they are one and the same, not indeed really and actually, but really and potentially, in as far as from the very fact that motion and term are given in act, they are immediately identified with each other.

90 With respect to the first confirmation, it is plain from what has been said that the antecedent must be granted and the consequence denied, if it be understood of a real actual distinction. And with respect to the proof, the antecedent, understood universally, must be denied: because there are several things of such a condition as to preserve identity in potency together with a real actual distinction in some order, from the fact that they are afterwards unifiable in such a way that they can be identified.

Nor does the proof there adduced in the opposite sense convict the opposite. For the entity of the aforesaid terms is only the reason of the actual distinction between them as long as they are separated: and so, strictly by reason of their own entities taken materially, they are not distinguished actually and really, but by reason of theirs, in so far as they are separable from each other in the intelligible order. Hence their entities, separated really and actually from each other, are positively distinguished. On the other hand, if they be united intelligibly, or if the intelligible species give to the intellect that it intelligibly have the form of the thing understood, and consequently if the intellect in the oblique line bring to bear this close assistance and communication of the intelligible form, it must be identified with that same form taken in the direct line: just as from the very fact that a living being and its pre-existing matter connote that new matter acquired by nutrition and sealed to the same numerical quantity which the aforesaid living being has, the pre-existing matter is identified in it, in the way explained, with that new matter taken in the direct line, which it acquires through nutrition. Which is the same, with due proportion, that we say of motion and its term in that probable opinion; although for the present, that is, as regards the identification of the intellect and the species in the intelligible order, it is necessary that in created things, in the way touched upon above, this be sought through a mode which is as it were a road, demanded from other headings, so that they be united by a real natural union excluding identity in this order, and this union being supposed, straightway that other more intimate union follows.

91 And this very thing can be explained by the example already adduced, of the duplication of water actually divided from another. For their forms are not distinguished numerically by their entities taken materially and strictly accepted: for these, taken materially, remain after they have been identified, but by those same forms formally accepted, that is, according as they are sealed to a distinct quantity, as the Complutenses explain in the disputation cited from no. 69 to 73. And so, as they expound there, from the very fact that they are joined, and are first sealed to one and the same quantity, they can be identified substantially, and strictly as regards substantial things.

Hence it makes no difference if you object that these things do not hang together with those which our Complutenses teach universally in the book of the Physics, disp. 16, no. 28, namely that those things which can be really separated must be distinguished with the intellect set aside: and therefore they say there that motion differs from the term with the intellect set aside, because the term remains while the motion perishes.

For the answer is given, in the first place, by saying that there is a special reason in motion and its term, on account of which in them that rule is universally true: namely, that whenever one can be without the other, an actual distinction there intervenes, with the intellect set aside, between them: either because the terms, formally and taken in themselves, differ with the intellect set aside, as happens in motion and its term; or because they necessarily and indispensably involve something, by reason of which they must actually be distinguished with the intellect set aside, although formally, the union having been made between them, they do not have such an actual distinction, but indeed a potential one: as happens both in the intelligible species, which by reason of entitative being, which it necessarily involves, must really differ from the intellect, and also in nutrition, where that of matter, for example, which is united anew with the living being and is identified within the substantial line, and strictly as regards substantial things with the pre-existing matter, involves a new part of quantity, by reason of which it is really distinguished from the pre-existing matter.

92 With respect to the second confirmation, let it be answered that although the intelligible object often does not exist in itself, it always exists in its species, which is its power and its representative, in which it is intelligibly contained. And therefore this union is made in the species taken formally, as in the term by which of the union and identification; but in the object as in the term which: just as for fire, for example, to act, as the term which, and as heat, as the term by which, it is enough that it have left in it its own power, and that the fire itself in that very thing, as in its own power, remain. For by that very fact it has (so to speak) union with its effect, and produces it: just as a principal cause is united with its own effect, and attains it.

93 With respect to the third confirmation, it is clear from what our Complutenses teach in the place cited, no. 73, that the antecedent is true with respect to that peculiar mode of becoming other through identity by which bread becomes the Body of our Lord Christ: but not if it be understood universally of any mode of becoming other through identity, and in intelligible being. Thus something can become other through identity in a twofold manner. In one manner, transubstantiation, that is, conversion, in the way in which such a transubstantiation and conversion is made in the Sacrament of the Eucharist. In another way, however, by pure identity without conversion: from the fact that although the same entities as before, which were distinct, may remain materially, yet not formally: because they have again something, by reason of which they can be identified either in natural being or in intelligible being, as we said happens in the twofold form of water formerly distinct and divided, and afterwards joined together under the same quantity, and considered in the cognitive potency and in its object as existing in intelligible being.

§ VIII. An answer is made to the remaining arguments of the former opinion, except the last.

94 With respect to the third, the antecedent is to be let stand, and both consequences denied. And with respect to the proof of the first, on which the force of the second depends, it must be said that it is enough that the intellect, united with the intelligible species, as well as the intelligible species itself, be really distinguished from the object according to the diverse modes of being which they possess, and which pertain to the line of nature; in order that it may be said of it in a real sense: we have said, pertaining to the line of nature, because if such modes belonged to another line, they would not suffice for the aforesaid relation, just as because the personal property in divine things does not pertain to the line of nature, but to another line, the divine persons, in which the same nature is, do not have in it a real relation of similarity. The reason, however, on account of which those modes which nature has in itself, and in the intelligible species, pertain to the line of nature, is clear from what is found in divine things: where the reason of divine nature, in so far as it has the natural and intelligible mode of being, pertains to the same line, and therefore these things are not there even virtually distinguished, as will be more clear from what is to be said in the following disputation. Hence, just as from the fact that intellection and intellect pertain in divine things to the same line, and consequently are not virtually distinguished, we conclude that although in created things they are really distinguished, they nevertheless constitute there only two parts of the same line, that is, two partial lines, from the fact that in those same created things that line is involved with imperfections; so the same thing, proportion being preserved, will have to be said here.

Add, moreover, that it can also be said that just as between two created persons subsisting in the twofold human nature there is a real relation of similarity in the aforesaid natures: because the reason for founding this relation is a distinct one, namely a nature diverse in number, which is in them; and otherwise it is between two divine persons subsisting in the divine nature, on account of the greatest identity in nature which they have. So likewise between the object and the representative species of that object, for example between this whiteness and its species, there is no real relation of the measurable to the measure: just as neither is there a real relation of similarity; but only a relation of reason, whether of the measurable or of similarity, as happens in divine things: because the nature which is in each of the two is, on the side of form and of nature, one and the same. Hence from this heading, and from the absence of the aforesaid real relation, but not of the relation of reason, the identity in nature between the species and the object, already explained, is proved more than diversity in it.

95 With respect to the fourth, let it be answered that when the union already described has been made between the species and the intelligible object on the one hand, and between the intellect on the other, then neither do the essential predicates of the intellect become essentially essential predicates of the intelligible species, nor conversely: because by this manner of speaking it is denoted that one passes into the nature of the other, or that one most formally becomes another, which nevertheless does not happen here; but they are only the same identically, retaining a virtual and a real potential distinction, which is not at all inconvenient for the present, as has been explained.

Hence, although pure potency in the genus of being cannot become the very substantial form which it receives, so as to remain the same with it either essentially or identically, as is rightly said in this argument, it is otherwise with pure potency in the intelligible genus, which is called pure by reason of the arguments made, because it does not essentially include acts and forms, that is, intelligible species, not however because it does not yet have, in this order taken strictly, adequately and in the way touched upon from no. 100 to 102, the character of a form, or because it cannot be the same with them by the identity already described, admitting the distinctions explained.

96 Wherefore, if, once for all, as we touched upon above, the matter is to be spoken of in the formal sense, and per se, the intellectual power, when compared with the object and with the intelligible species, is not united with it in intelligible being as a receptive potency with an act, and a form properly and strictly receivable; otherwise it would limit it, the opposite of which we have shown in the preceding disputation, no. 22, and in this one from no. 71 to 84; but as an intellectual power with its object and intelligible form, demanding from itself another more intimate union than that which is made through the aforesaid reception, and as one term identifiable of itself with another, which demands to be united with it according to this pure reason; or as an imperfect form, existing in imperfect being, which becomes the very same under perfect being by an identity compatible with the distinctions already described.

97 And the reason is. For just as the intellect is not adequately, and in perfect being, an intellect as long as it has within itself the species of its object, because it is not adequately, and in perfect being, such, as long as it is completely intellectual, and it does not have this as long as it is united with the species, so as long as it is not united with it, it will not be adequately, and in perfect being, an intellect: and because it is not united with the aforesaid species in intelligible being except in a mode more immaterial and more elevated than that by which natural forms are united in natural and entitative being, therefore, as we brought in from no. 69 to 72, it is united with it through the identity already described in intelligible being, and consequently, and in the very way in which a form in imperfect being becomes the very same in perfect being.

Not otherwise, proportion being preserved, than happens in the form of a plant, which does not have sufficient quantity, nor (so to speak) sufficient substantial portions of that same form identified with each other, so as to be under the due quantity in order to operate, and it acquires them through nutrition. For then, as the Complutenses explain in the place cited, no. 47 and 48, and in other places cited there, the pre-existing form is not united with that substantial thing which comes anew to it as a receptive potency with its own act, nor as an integral part with its co-part, if we attend strictly to that union according to what it has within the genus of substance; but as a term identifiable with another term, and it becomes that, in the way in which the imperfect form, which did not previously identify that substantial thing which it acquires, becomes the perfect form identifying what was lacking to it.

98 We have said, if the matter is to be spoken of in the formal sense, and per se, on account of those things which we said above in no. 67 and 78. We have added, however, the words per se: partly on account of the things which we were just saying. Also in order to denote that if the species were so elevated that it did not demand, in the way described in the number just cited, namely in entitative being and through the mode of act and potency, that union which happens in the divine essence, then even then they would not be compared materially with each other through the mode of a power properly receptive and of an act properly received in entitative being; but the intellect would be compared with it in the way in which an imperfect form (that is, not having the perfection of which it is capable, in the character of a form) is compared with that with which it becomes the perfect form, and as a term identifiable in the intelligible order with another term: and in the last place (as many hold probably, of which we treat elsewhere) they would be compared with each other in entitative being through the mode of a pure term and of a terminable thing: from the fact that the species in entitative being prescinds from the character of a form or of a term, although in the character of species in intelligible being it must obtain the true and proper character of an intelligible form, because it is the reason of acting that specifies the intellection. Although, as we have often said, this character of a form does not demand information which draws an actual distinction in intelligible being, but a union so intimate, or a mode of informing and actuating so elevated and so intimate, that it be really identified in this order with that term with which it is formally united:

99 With respect to the fifth, the consequence must be denied. Because it is argued from the identification of the terms with some one thing in intelligible being to the identification of those same terms in natural being: a manner of arguing which is still of no avail in created things; although from the identification of two things with some third thing under natural being it is rightly customary to argue in created things to the identification of those same things with each other. For as we touched upon above, just as the divine nature is of itself common, and communicable to many, in natural being, so likewise, for example, the human nature is of itself common, and communicable to many intellects, taken under intelligible being: from the fact that by them it can be understood itself. And just as, because the divine nature is common in the way described to many persons, none of these taken individually is adequately identified with it, and for the same reason none of them is identified with the other persons with whom the divine nature is identified, so for this very reason no one of those intellects will be adequately identified with the human nature under intelligible being: and therefore neither will the intellects themselves remain identified with each other.

100 It makes no difference if you object that if the intellect is compared to the form, or to the intelligible species, as though it were the very form, it is compared with it under perfect being, as we were saying in no. 96, then the intellect will also be a form in intelligible being, and thus from the identification of two intellects with the intelligible species it will rightly be collected that such intellects are identified with each other: because we do not pass over to another genus, namely from intelligible being to natural being; but we always stay within the intelligible order, that is, among the forms pertaining to this order.

For the answer is given by saying that the intelligible order can be taken either generally, according as it embraces the whole intellectual order, and those things which are demanded of it per se and formally, whether they be species, or intellect and intellection, or object, and so forth. Secondly, more strictly, according as it includes only those things which pertain to the intelligible order on the side of the object, that is, the intentional entities alone; but not those which on the side of the power and of the cognitive faculty hold their ground.

If, therefore, the intelligible order is taken in the former way, then it is as it were integrated from things pertaining to the entitative and natural order, in so far as they have the power of understanding, and from things looking to the intelligible order, according as that order says only those things which on the side of the object hold their ground: although these two things, of which such an order is integrated, are of such a condition that they can be identified with each other. But if it is taken only in the latter way, then it says only intelligible being, that is, intentional being, in so far as it is distinguished from natural being.

101 On the other hand, because the intellect, in so far as it is adequately an intellect, that is, in so far as it completely has the character of a perfect form in the intelligible order, denotes a perfect form contained under the intelligible order in the former way, which is identically the very intelligible species, and the very power of understanding; and consequently it denotes a form which has something of the entitative and natural order, namely that which on the side of the power is required for understanding, and something of the intentional or intelligible order, in so far as it is distinguished from the natural; therefore, as often as it is deduced that the intellect is identified as regards the powers of understanding which hold their ground on the side of the intellect, from the fact that they are made one with some third thing, namely as regards the species and the understood nature, so often it is argued from the identification in intentional being, and in intelligible being taken strictly, in so far as it is distinguished from natural being, to the identification in natural being: a manner of arguing which is defective, as has been shown.

Nor does it tell against this either if you press the point that if the intellect, as it is a certain term of this identification, denotes natural and entitative being, in so far as this being is distinguished from intentional and intelligible being, and the species, as it is the other term, denotes intentional and intelligible being, in so far as it is distinguished from natural being, there is no reason why this union and identity should be in the intelligible order rather than in natural being: for as it were it is integrated from two terms, of which one pertains to the natural order, and the other to the intelligible order taken strictly.

For the answer is given by granting that this union and identity is natural on the side of one term, and intentional and intelligible on the side of the other; but because the root of this identification is that intelligible term, namely the intelligible species, therefore this union and identification is in the intelligible order.

§ IX. An answer is made to the last argument of the opposed opinion.

102 With respect to the last, let the major be granted, but the minor denied. And with respect to the first proof, let it be said that although nothing can be at once created and uncreated through identity in natural being, that is, being by essence and by participation, nor conversely can it have that identically, yet even in intelligible being this is not so while excluding the real potential distinction between the two, because this is proper to God alone; otherwise, however, in intelligible being together with the aforesaid real potential distinction.

The reason for which is. Then, because a created thing to be in this way through identity something uncreated is to be that very thing by participation, from the fact that the divine essence is united to it gratuitously in the character of an intelligible species: and this, however, is not at all inconvenient, as is evident from itself.

103 Then too: because this union through identity, now explained, is, all things considered, less, and of less perfection, than the personal union, and that in natural being, according to which the divine Word is personally united to humanity, although this union is not through identity in the aforesaid natural being, but through composition of term and terminable thing. Therefore, just as it is not inconvenient that that composite be something created as regards the human nature taken strictly, and something uncreated as regards the person, so neither will it be repugnant that the intellect, having been made the same intelligibly with the divine essence and taken adequately, be at once something created as regards that which it has of itself, and something uncreated as regards the intelligible form to which it is united, with which it is identified intelligibly.

Lastly, then; because the intellect also is not identified infinitely with the divine essence in intelligible being, but finitely; for it is not constituted through it in the first act in order to see it infinitely, but finitely: and although it is repugnant for the finite to be identified infinitely with the infinite, it is not so for it to be identified finitely. Just as it cannot be united infinitely with it; it can, however, be united finitely, and consequently have all those things which follow from such a union, among which for the present the aforesaid identity is counted, as has been shown.

104 With respect to the second proof, however, the antecedent must be granted and the consequence denied. For its proof it must be said that although, in order that something in intelligible being be the same with the divine essence through an identity excluding a real distinction in potency, or through an identity through which it is united infinitely with it, that is, is identified infinitely, no less is required than for this, that it represent that essence quiddatively through the mode of an intelligible species; because infinite immateriality and having being by essence are required for both.

On the other hand, for this, that something be intelligibly the same, in the way just explained, with the essence of God, less is required than for this, that it be able to have the character of an intelligible species with respect to it. Because for the latter thing, a correspondence in the grade of immateriality and being by essence are required, as we said in the treatise on the Vision of God, art. 2; but not for the former, only that the divine essence be united in a finite manner and separably, at least by the divine power, with the created intellect in the character of an intelligible species, for which infinite immateriality is not required in the aforesaid intellect, but it is enough that it be elevated by the light of glory, as we explained in the place cited.

105 It makes no difference if you object that, according to what is to be said in tract. 4. disp. 1. no. 21, intelligere is the very existence in the intelligible order both of the intellect and of the intelligible species: therefore, if the created intellect is the same through identity with the divine essence in the intelligible order, the intellection, that is, the blessed vision, will not be able to be the existence of the intellect in this order, and not to be an existence in the same order with respect to the divine essence identified with it: because things which are the same must exist through the same existence: therefore, since it is repugnant for the divine essence to exist through created being, it will also be repugnant that it be united through identity in the intelligible order with that same intellect.

For the answer is given by saying that the antecedent is to be understood when that intelligible species is not infinite, and is not presupposed as existing perfectly in that same order: the opposite of which happens here.

Thus it is one thing for an intelligible species to have to exist in the intelligible order through intellection; and it is another thing for it to have to exist through whatever intellection is actively elicited by it, so as to receive within itself its formal effect. For the former is universally true: and so likewise the divine essence in the character of an intelligible species exists through the uncreated intellection of God himself: but the latter is not to be admitted universally, when the species is of such a condition that it always and incessantly has one intellection adequate to it, and of the same immateriality, elicited from it of itself in the first place, through which it exists, and which it then influences into other intellections, inadequate to it and of lower immateriality, secondarily and, as it were, accidentally: because what is presupposed as existing adequately in some order cannot have another existence in the aforesaid manner in that order. Wherefore, since the divine essence is compared in this way through the mode of a species with the vision of the blessed, it cannot exist through it in this manner.

106 On the other hand, since it holds that the same essence is in some way the reason of the created intellect in order that it exist intelligibly through the blessed vision, from the fact that unless it were united with it the aforesaid intellect could not exist through that intellection: because any form of any order must either give to its recipient, or quasi-recipient, the existence which it has, or, if it does not give it, because the recipient is a secondary recipient and incapable of it, from the fact that such an existence is a vital operation demanding infinite power for eliciting it, and nothing can exist vitaliter through it without eliciting it, as happens here; then the aforesaid form must be in some way the reason of another existence, through which its secondary subject, or quasi-subject, exists in that order.

And this can be explained by the example of a subsistent, which, although while it is finite, is not only the reason of receiving immanent operations which arise as from a principle, by which the nature it terminates is constituted; but also, according to the probable opinion, are received in it itself, as in a subject; yet if such a subsistent is infinite, as happens in our Lord Christ, then human operations, to which the aforesaid subsistent has concurrence secondarily, are not received in it, but in the nature: although the nature would not receive them unless it were terminated by such a subsistent; and consequently, in a certain way, and in the sense described, it is the reason of their being received. So, then, here, proportion being preserved, we must philosophize with respect to the divine essence as it has the character of an intelligible species, and of the vision of the blessed, as it is the existence of the intelligible order. We have said: to which the aforesaid subsistent has concurrence secondarily, because through the former it has the influx into the other operations, which are not proper to the human nature, but to the divine, from the fact that through the former it terminates it.

107 Nor does it tell against this that it is added in this objection, namely that the created intellect in the intelligible order is the same with the divine essence, and thus that both cannot but exist through the same existence. For from what has been said it is clear: because this identity is not adequate, and consequently is compatible with a real potential distinction between them: but a real potential distinction is sufficient (at least in the most eminent form, which of itself transcends and is inseparable from its own existence) in order that, notwithstanding the identity, it may be the reason of the intellect's existing through another existence, that is, through the blessed intellection, even though it itself cannot exist through it, that is, receive its formal effect, on account of the incapacity which it has for such an existence and formal effect to be received.

108 Nor does it tell against this either if you press the point further, that at least from this it follows that the divine essence in the character of an intelligible species exists identically through the vision of the blessed: which, however, does not seem to be admissible.

For the answer is given by saying that it can be understood in a twofold way that the divine essence exists identically through the vision of the blessed. In the first way, so that it is denoted that the reason of existing is identity alone, even though in reality the divine essence itself receives within itself the effect of such an existence, as happens in the obediential potency, and the hypostatic union, which the humanity of any man has, in order that it be assumed by the Word; which, as we have set out in the treatise on the Vision of God, is of the hypostatic order, and is formally distinguished from the human nature, in so far as it has the natural potency to subsist through its own subsistent. For this potency exists identically through the natural existence of such a humanity. Because although the whole reason of so existing is that identification, yet in reality it receives within itself secondarily such an existence, and it itself participates in its effect; and therefore it does not need another existence through which it exists.

In the second way, so that it is signified only that it is identified intelligibly with the created intellect existing through such a vision, even though in no way does it itself, either per se or accidentally, either primarily or secondarily, either by reason of the aforesaid identity or by any other reason, exist through such an intellection, or receive within itself the formal effect of this intelligible existence, but with respect to this, the mode of existing through it and of receiving such an effect within itself is the same as if it were not there: and this sense is true, and must necessarily be granted. We must however speak cautiously, and admit this with the aforesaid limitation expressly introduced, so that it may not seem to be granted that former mode of existing identically through such a vision, which must be rejected altogether, since it openly conflicts with the utmost purity of the divine essence. Hence, absolutely speaking, the consequence must be denied, from the fact that the former mode of identification is hinted at in the absolute mode of expression.

109 Nor does it matter either if at length you press the point that if the divine essence, as it has the character of an intelligible species with respect to the intellect of the blessed, does not exist through the same intelligible existence through which the intellect himself exists, then they would not constitute one and the same in the intelligible order: which, however, seems false; because they make one more than matter and substantial form do, as the Philosophers hold in common, following Averroes: therefore, and so forth. The consequence seems certain. Because things which make one and the same of themselves exist through the same existence in that order in which they constitute one; and therefore from humanity and the divine Word there coalesces one and the same of itself, because they exist through the same existence.

For the answer is given by distinguishing the consequence: They would not constitute one and the same in the intelligible order, understood of an identity of that kind, must be denied; that it be of that kind formally, it passes: but those things which are thus one can exist with a multiple existence. Nor does the proof of the minor tell against this: because this unity in intelligible being is only according to something and is greater than the unity of the whole which matter and form constitute: it is clear, however, that for this it is enough that it be the union through identity already explained.

110 Add, moreover, that the consequence can also be denied, understood with respect to a unity of itself, taken even formally. Because for this union it is enough that one term be not united to the other as it is existing, and conversely, and that one be to the other, in the way explained, the reason of existing, and finally, that that which has been the reason of existing to the other should exist in some way mediate and remote through that existence. Not indeed because it receives within itself such an existence through another, and its effect, in the way in which a middle substance receives accidents through quantity, or an obediential potency through a natural thing with which it is identified, and exists through its existence; but because that term, which is the reason of existing to the other, in reality actuates and informs the other term, and it cannot exist otherwise than by so acting. Just as, as we were just saying, the subsistent of the Word terminating humanity receives accidents remotely, not because it receives them within itself, as the created subsistent receives them according to the probable opinion; but because humanity can receive the aforesaid accidents only when thus terminated: and therefore humanity and the Word constitute one and the same of themselves in the character of the receptive term of the accidents.

Conclusion. God understands himself by himself.