Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

Because the Angelic Doctor in the present article sets up the distinction proposed in the title of this difficulty, so as to draw from it at last that God is most highly intelligent, and therefore most highly knowing, the Thomists generally, and other theologians, in their commentaries on this article, ask whether the aforesaid distinction was rightly assigned by the holy Doctor; and we too, for this reason, raise almost the same question about whether it is true of divine knowledge.

§ I. Explanation of the title.

In order that the title may be better understood, it must be noted whether the thing in question is something distinct from its own form, or essence, and therefore has another form distinct from its own form; or whether it is, apart from its own form, of the form of some other thing, or of that form which is the form of another thing (so to speak) subjectively. For the first question, it is enough to observe that it has, besides its own form, or essence, within itself another accidental form, whether that form be communicated to it from something else, or arise from intrinsic principles, and whether it be the very same form and quiddity of some other thing or not. For the second, however, if we speak properly, altogether rigorously, and formally, it is required that it have, besides its own form, or essence, that very form which is in the other; so that there be no diversity on the side of form, even though they may be distinguished from one another on the side of their mode of being. For by the very fact that such a form is not the form which is, in the strict sense, in the other, but a distinct form on the side of form, it can indeed be the form of another thing efficiently; yet not (so to speak) subjectively: because the very same thing, without any distinction on the side of form held by the one, is not held by it as held by the other.

Hence in the title, deliberately, and adhering to the words of the holy Doctor, the question raised was whether it is proper to knowers, insofar as they are distinguished from non-knowers, that they have the form of some other thing; and not whether it is proper to them that they have another form distinct from their own form; so that by this the point intended to be denoted was not that any account be given of their having a form distinct from their own form, but that the very same form which is held by other things should also be in knowers, and that they should be distinguished only on the side of the mode of being, and not on the side of the form held.

2 And therefore, when in the same title it is asked whether it is proper to non-knowers to have their form alone, the word alone is placed to exclude the claim that they do not have the form of another thing: ¹ so that the very same form which is the form of another thing could not, in the strict sense as then imported, be in them together with their own form, precisely from the side of form; and not to denote that they have no form whatsoever distinct from their own, which is also at the same time diverse on the side of form from the form of another thing: as is seen in other material things, which indeed besides their own form can also have other accidental forms, whether flowing from intrinsic principles or communicated to them from elsewhere and extrinsically, as light is seen in air serving as a receptacle, and heat in water serving as a receptacle; yet although the aforesaid forms may be those of another thing, that is, of the Sun or of fire, as efficient causes, they are not nevertheless (so to speak) forms of another thing subjectively; that is, although they are the very same forms as those caused by the Sun or by fire, they are not the very same as those which are subjectively in the Sun or in fire; but on the side of form they are distinct from them. And so the heat of fire is one thing and the heat of water another: and the light of the air one thing, and that of the Sun another. Then it must be noted that, because these forms which are called by the holy Doctor forms of another thing are intentional forms, and it is thus collected that knowers can receive the form of another thing, from the fact that they can have the intentional species of that thing, as may be seen in this article; it follows that what is clear from this, and from what we have said in the treatise on the Vision of God, is the same as asking whether knowers, insofar as they are distinct from non-knowers, can have the form of another thing, as asking whether the species, or intentional forms, which knowers are naturally able to receive, are the very same forms as the objects which are represented through them and are known through those same means; so that although, for example, a man, or some colour, considered on the side of the thing, is distinct from itself as it is in its own intentional species, or is distinct from those species, as it is formally considered in representative being, yet on the side of form they should not be different, but that the very same colour, the same in number, considered on the side of form, which is considered on the side of the thing, should also be in the species, or in the vision by means of the species, even though taken in itself and on the side of the thing it has the natural mode of being; whereas in the vision it has the intentional mode of being.

3 For by the very fact that the species is, in the way explained, of precisely the same nature as the object, it cannot but be proper to knowers, insofar as they are distinguished from non-knowers, that they can have the form of another thing; since indeed they can have intentional forms, which are themselves the very forms and quiddities of another thing. Conversely, if the species are not the forms of another thing, or of a thing having a different mode of being, namely a natural one, then it cannot be proper to knowers that they have the form of another thing; since indeed, as we were saying, other things come to be only through intentional forms. And so it will be the same to ask whether knowers, insofar as they are distinct from non-knowers, can have the form of another thing, as to ask whether the aforesaid species, which knowers can receive, are the very same forms and natures as the objects, though under a different mode of being. And although in the treatise on the Vision of God, article 2, we have touched upon this very point, to show that it involves a contradiction against the granting that there is a created intelligible species proper to God as he is in himself, from the fact that the intelligible species is on the side of form of precisely the same essence as the thing represented through it, so that nothing is lacking to it save only the mode of its having that thing in natural being; and hence, since it involves that something created is of the same nature as God, it will involve also that there be an intelligible species proper to God himself, or his representative species as he is in himself; nevertheless, because we have treated of this there almost in passing, and could not meet with the many difficulties that well up on this and that side against the doctrine of the holy Doctor, we shall therefore discuss it here in its proper place, together with the other interpreters of the holy Doctor.

4 Lastly it must be noted that, although some think that this difficulty is rather about the name than about the thing, from the fact that the holy Doctor and his disciples, asserting that the intentional species are of the same reason and nature as the objects represented by them, are willing that they be of the same nature with them only in representative and intentional being, and that this is nothing else than that the aforesaid species represent those objects, which is indeed in no way denied by the adversaries; nevertheless, if it be examined closely, the aforesaid difficulty will be found to be not about the name, but very much about the thing.

For although the Angelic Doctor and his disciples are willing that the intentional species should represent their object, and intend nothing beyond that and what is involved in it; yet they infer from this very well that the intentional species is of the same nature as its object, though under a different mode of being, namely the representative; because they think that the aforesaid species cannot represent its object intentionally as regards its predicates, for example the quidditative, unless those predicates be univocally, or as being altogether the same and under some real mode of being, in that species and in the object alike, as will be clear from what is to be said in this difficulty; and therefore they assert that, by the very fact that a representative species of God as he is in himself is granted, the real and quidditative predicates of God must be univocally, or as being altogether the same, to be in God and in the species, though under a different real mode of being; and hence with them it is the same for the intentional species to represent its object as to show that object through a mode having the same nature as it, though distinct on the side of the mode of being.

5 On the other hand, the adversaries, although several of them grant that the impressed and the expressed species formally represent their objects; and although some grant this only to the expressed species and not to the impressed one, attributing to the latter only a virtual representation: yet they do not mean by this that, in order that a species may formally represent its object as regards its predicates, for example the quidditative, the very same predicates under some univocal mode, or as being altogether the same, ought to be contained in the object and in the species alike; in that sense indeed proportionate to it, that a man depicted on a wall, although he represents a true and living man, yet the predicates of a true and living man as such are not univocally the same under a real mode of being, both in that painting and in the living man himself, who is true. Hence, although they grant formal representation to the species, they do not grant that the aforesaid nature and the aforesaid predicates are found univocally, or as being altogether the same though under a different mode of being, in both; and in this consists the force of this difficulty.

§ II. The first manner of speaking is referred to.

6 The first manner of speaking is that of certain men who hold that the intentional species which knowers are naturally able to receive are not of the same nature and form as their objects, even though both the species and the object are considered on the side of form, as being distinct from those things which are said to differ only on the side of the mode of being; and therefore that knowers are not distinguished from non-knowers by the fact that they can have the form of another thing; whereas the latter are. Thus Albertus Magnus, On the Soul 2, tractate 9, chapter 11; Toletus, question 34; Rubio, treatise on objects and sensible species, question 4; Fonseca, Metaphysics 2, chapter 2, question 2, section 2; Molina, part 1, question 12, article 1; Vazquez, in the same place, article 2; Suarez, Summa Theologiae volume 3, tractate 3, On the Soul book 3, chapter 2, number 9, and in volume 1 of the Summa Theologiae, book 2, chapter 13, number 20; and many others.

This manner of speaking, as regards its second part, plainly follows from the first, from what we have said in the explanation of the title and in the cited place of the treatise on the Vision of God. As regards the first part, however, it is proved first by the testimony of the holy Doctor, question 8 on truth, article 11, against 3, in these words: It must be said that between the knower and the known no similarity is required of the kind that is according to congruence in nature, but only according to representation. For it is certain that the form of the stone in the soul is of a nature altogether different from that of the stone in matter.

Then it is proved by reason. Because the divine essence has the most perfect reason of an intelligible species with respect to creatures; and yet it is not of the same nature as they are, otherwise God would be of created nature: therefore it is not proper to an intelligible species to be the same form, or nature, as its object.

7 It is confirmed firstly. For if the divine essence, since it has the reason of an intelligible species with respect to creatures, were of the same nature as the creatures represented, it would be similar to them; since indeed things that are of the same nature must be similar to one another; but this is against that of Isaiah 40, where it is said: And to whom have you made him like. Neither is it against the doctrine of the holy Doctor, question 4, article against 4, ergo, etc.

It is confirmed secondly. Because the species of the highest Angels are the most universal in representing, so that they represent several specific natures essentially distinct from one another, as the theologians commonly teach about Angels in matter: therefore the aforesaid species cannot be of the same nature as the objects represented; therefore neither will the other species be the same in nature as their objects. This latter consequence is clear from the previous one. The previous one, however, follows from what precedes. Because a single and the same intelligible species cannot have so many complete natures pertaining to its intrinsic reason, nor can so many complete and entire natures constitute one and the same intelligible species.

Thirdly. Because two accidents otherwise could be at once diverse only as to number in the same subject; but this is repugnant, as we have said in tractate 1 on the principle of individuation, disputation 2, number 57: ergo, etc. The consequence seems clear. Because two species of two whitenesses cannot be distinguished more than numerically, if once they have the same numerical nature as their object, and yet these are received at once in the eye. That argument presses even harder in the case of intelligible species, which are such as to be made intermediaries by the intellection of singulars, as our Complutensians teach very well in their book on the Soul, disputation 18, numbers 77 and 99; and yet if these represent a twofold man, and are of the same numerical nature as their objects, they cannot be distinguished according to this reason more than numerically, and since they are received in the same spiritual subject, that is, in the intellect, they cannot but be received in precisely the same subject.

8 Fourthly. For sensible species, which are received in a medium or in a mirror, are not of the same essence as their objects: therefore neither are those which are received in the sensitive powers; and consequently neither is the intelligible species. This last consequence is clear from the parity of reason. The previous one, however, follows from what precedes. Because sensible species diffused from the sensible object into the power through a medium are of the same essence both in the medium and in the sensitive power: just as heat diffused from fire into the hand through a medium is of the same essence in the medium and in the hand; and likewise light communicated to the eye from the Sun, by means of a transparent body, is of the same nature in the intermediate transparent body and in the eye.

9 The antecedent, moreover, is clear. Because the intentional species which are in a medium do not confer on it that it have the form of another thing; because knowers alone are naturally able to have the aforesaid form: therefore it is a sign that the aforesaid species are not the forms of another thing, that is, of their own objects, or (which is the same for the present) that they are not of the same nature on the side of form and essence with them: since indeed any form, at least speaking naturally, communicates to its subject whatever it has in itself as that by which it has it; and so a form which does not confer on the subject that it communicate in the same nature, in the way explained, with another thing, is a sign that it is not of the same nature as that thing in the sense explained.

10 Fifthly. Because the intelligible species is a certain spiritual accident, whereas its object is often a substance: likewise the sensible species does not impede sensation, even though it be in the organ and in the sensitive power; whereas a sensible object placed above the sense does impede sensation: and finally a sensible species, for example that of sight, cannot be seen; yet the visible object can be seen well: therefore it is a sign that the species and its objects are not of the same nature and essence; otherwise those things which agree with the objects could not be repugnant to their species.

It is confirmed. For whiteness and blackness are contrary to one another, and therefore cannot be composed in one and the same subject; but the sensible species of these qualities do not have contrariety between them, and so they can be at once in the same part of a medium, or in the same visual power, as the philosophers commonly admit: therefore the aforesaid species and their objects do not have the same nature. The consequence is clear: because things which do not have the same properties do not share in the same nature; therefore, since the sensible species of whiteness and of blackness do not have their properties, that is, of being mutually opposed to one another, neither will they share in the very same nature with them.

11 It makes no difference if you meet with the position that species and objects are diverse on the side of the mode of being, though not on the side of form, in order that the species be an accident and the object have the reason of a substance; and likewise in order that the objects be contrary to one another, and, being placed above the sense, impede sensation, but the species not; because all these predicates do not agree with the natures of objects, unless they are under a determinate mode of being, that is, under a natural mode of being.

For against this is the fact that the intentional species cannot be diverse in reason from the objects on the side of the mode of being without also differing from them on the side of form and nature: ergo, etc. The antecedent is proved. For the mode of being in which they differ from the objects is that of being representative of them, as the philosophers commonly admit, and as will be clear from what is to be said in support of our opinion: but the proper differential and constitutive reason of the intentional species is that it be representative of its object; and so it was instituted by itself primarily for the sake of representing that object, as our Complutensians expound, On the Soul 3, disputation 18, number 28: therefore they cannot be distinguished from the objects on the side of the mode of being, or in representative being, without being distinguished on the side of form.

12 There is added, firstly, that when it is said that the species is of the same reason as the object, or that it is the same object under a different mode of being, either this different mode of being pertains to the nature of the species itself, taken formally, as the essential reason, or as its proper passion, or as a real accident of it? If the first or the second is said, the aforesaid species cannot but be essentially distinguished from the object: since whatever includes something essential which another does not include, or entails some proper passion which another does not bring, cannot but be essentially distinguished from it. The third, however, cannot be said. For just as the object is identified with its natural mode of being, and such a mode of being is more interior to it than any other proper passion of it, and therefore it cannot be compared with it after the manner of a real accident, so also the species will be identified altogether with its intentional mode of being, and this mode of being will be more interior to it than any other property of it, and so it cannot hold itself with respect to it after the manner of a real accident.

There is added, secondly. That if the intentional species and its object were distinguished on the side of the mode of being, but not on the side of nature and form, there would fall down that axiom most noted in the light of nature and universally true in created things, namely: that things which are the same to a third are the same with one another; but this cannot be admitted, as is clear from itself: ergo, etc. The consequence is proved. For then whatever the intentional species imported on the side of form would be identified with the mode of being of those same species, and likewise with the natural mode of being of the objects; and yet those modes of being themselves, that is, the intentional being of the species and the natural being of the objects, with which that nature would be identified, would not be identified with one another.

13 There is added, finally, that if there were altogether the same nature on the side of nature in the intentional species and in the object, then something more wonderful would be seen in created things than in the uncreated and what it is in itself; but this cannot be said, as is clear from itself: ergo, etc. The consequence seems certain. Because in the uncreated what is seen is only this, that the divine nature is the same in number in the three divine persons, and in each under a different relative mode of being; but if there were the same nature in the intentional species and in the object, then the very same nature would be in the object and in numberless intentional species; and what would be more wonderful still, not only would the same nature in number, taken in itself, be in them, but as supposed and terminated by its proper subsistence, as will be clear from what is said below; yet this cannot be found in the uncreated and what it is in itself: since indeed the divine nature, as it is in the Father and as terminated by Paternity, cannot be in the Son.

§ III. The opinion of Aristotle and of the holy Doctor is referred to, together with the testimonies of the most approved authors.

14 It must be said that the intentional species are of precisely the same nature, on the side of form and of nature, as their objects, and differ from them only in the mode of being, or that they are the very same essence as their objects under a different mode of being; and consequently that knowers are distinguished in this respect from non-knowers in that they can have the form of another thing, whereas the latter cannot.

This assertion, as regards its second part, plainly follows from the previous one, as is clear from what we said in numbers 2 and 3. Because knowers alone can receive the intentional species as being species, and taken formally, as will be clear from what is said immediately after: therefore, once the intentional species are the very forms and quiddities of their objects, the consequence follows that knowers alone can have the form of another thing. The consequence is clear: because among created things the same form and nature of another thing cannot be had except through intentional species. And so all who teach the same thing as regards the first part, and whom we shall refer to in number 17, hold this assertion as regards its second part.

As regards its first part, however, that is, that the species formally taken and the object have the same nature, and are distinguished only by reason of the different mode, in as far as that nature is in the object under a natural mode of being, whereas in the intentional species it is under an intentional and representative mode of being, is taught by Aristotle in his book on the Soul 2, text 121, and by the holy Doctor in the same place, lecture 24. Then also in Metaphysics 7, lecture 6, in the holy Doctor's words: Now those things are from art whose species is in the soul; and I mean by species whatever the being of anything was. These words are thus explained by the holy Doctor in the same place: He says therefore firstly that those things are from art whose productive species is in the soul; and by species he explains whatever the being of any thing was that was made through art, as whatever the being of a house was when a house is made.

15 And this very thing is taught by the same holy Doctor in Against the Gentiles 4, chapter 14, in these words: For it is manifest that if God understands himself, the whole fullness of him must be contained in the Word; and yet the substance given to the Son does not cease to be in the Father: because with us too the proper nature does not cease to be in the thing that is understood, from the fact that the word of our intellect has from the thing itself understood the intelligible containing the same nature in number. Then in the Theological Summa 8, article 4, in these words: The intelligible species is a likeness of the very essence of the thing, and is in a certain way the very quiddity and nature of the thing. And in order to explain why it is the quiddity and nature of the thing only in a certain way, and not absolutely and simply, he immediately added that it is such a quiddity according to intelligible being, and not according to natural being, which is in things.

Then in this article, where he shows that knowers have the form of another thing, because they are capable of receiving intentional species; but if these species were not the forms of another thing, the holy Doctor would reason badly when he inferred that knowers can have the form of another thing, because they can have intentional species. Then above, question 12, article 2. For, as we said there, it is collected from this that the intelligible and created species of God involves a contradiction, because the species is of the same nature as its object: so that if the object is pure act, having every perfection, the species must have this too.

16 Then in Against the Gentiles 3, chapter 49, and in question 2, article 1 and 3, when he says that the knower has the form of the known, because it has the species. Then in the Opusculum 42, chapter 7, at the beginning, when he says that the nature, for example, of an animal, taken in itself, is the same as that which is in the individuals and in the intellect by means of an intelligible species, though it be under a different state and mode of being in the intellect and in the individuals. Then in this work, part 1, question 80, article 1.

Then finally, question 2 on truth, article 2, where he teaches both parts of the assertion in these words: It must therefore be understood that a certain thing is found to be perfect in a twofold way. In one way, according to the perfection of its being, which belongs to it according to its own species; but since the specific being of one thing is distinct from the specific being of another thing, in every created thing that has this kind of perfection there is lacking as much of simple perfection as is found of perfection in other species: so that thus the perfection of anything whatever, considered in itself, is imperfect, like a part of the whole perfection of the universe, which arises from the perfections of the single things gathered together. Hence, so that some remedy might be given to this imperfection, another mode of perfection is found in created things, according to which the perfection which is proper to one thing is found in another thing: and this is the perfection of the knower, insofar as it is a knower: because according to this something is known by a knower which itself, the thing known, is in a certain way with the knower. And therefore in On the Soul 3 it is said that the soul is in a certain way all things: because it is naturally able to know all things, and according to this mode it is possible that the perfection of the whole universe exist in one thing.

Where, as you see, the holy Doctor distinguishes the mode of having the perfections of the universe according to the mode by which knowers have them, namely by means of intentional species, from the mode of having them in another way: and consequently according to natural being, or the natural mode; and he says that according to this last mode of being no created thing can have all the perfections of the universe; but otherwise according to that former mode, according to which knowers can have the perfections of others; indeed, if the species should be most perfect, all the perfections of the universe could be in them, insofar as all those can be in them through the mode of the known, or through intentional species, in which all their perfections are contained.

17 Nor do the explanations of these testimonies which the adversaries bring forward have any weight, as will be sufficiently clear to one who looks into them and into what we shall say remissively in the first reason in support of the assertion; and therefore they are deliberately omitted (in order that this may be said in passing).

The holy Augustine holds the same opinion in On Genesis 2, chapter 8, where he says that what is said in Genesis 1 of the firmament and the other things that are related, having been produced, to the effect that they were made twice, is this: that the firmament and the other things of this kind were made once in the angelic mind through their species, and besides in their own natures outside it; and consequently he clearly means that the intentional species of things and the things themselves are of the same nature and quiddity, although, as we were saying, they have a different mode of being.

Hence several, and very weighty, theologians commonly follow both Aristotle and the Angelic Doctor and the holy Augustine: Cajetan in the present place, and On the Soul 2, chapter 11, in the explanation of the first conclusion of Aristotle, § Around the same conclusion this occurs, and in this work, part 1, question 79, article 2, § as to the second. Ferrara, Against the Gentiles 1, chapter 44, and book 3, chapter 49. Durandus in question 2, distinction 49. Bannez, Zumel, Zanardi, Ripa, Nazarenus and Gonzalez in this article. Ledesma, on the perfection of God, question 8, article 4, in the explanation of the first reason for the second conclusion. Our Complutensians in their book on the Soul, disputation 18, number 40. And the Thomists in general.

§ IV. The opinion of Aristotle and of the holy Doctor is established by reasons.

18 The prior and fundamental reason in support of the assertion is drawn from what we brought forward from the Angelic Doctor in the preceding treatise, disputation 2, number 132, to prove that it involves a contradiction to grant that there is a representative species of God as he is in himself; and this can be proposed under this form. Because an intelligible species representing, quidditatively, a man, for example (which is the same thing we say of the expressed species, or of the word about it), represents formally the same man, and is similar to him: therefore it will bear a relation of similarity to him himself, and consequently it will be of the same nature as he is as to that in which it is similar to him, indeed not under a natural mode of being, but under another mode of being, that is, the intentional, or the intelligible. The antecedent is clear from what our Complutensians teach in their book on the Soul, disputation 18, number 26, and what we ourselves taught in the aforesaid treatise on the Vision of God, disputation 2, number 139, from the sources themselves.

The first consequence, however, is clear from the antecedent. Because things which represent another formally and quidditatively are similar to it in that in which they represent it; and things that are similar are said to bear a relation of similarity in that in which they are similar. The second, however, is clear from this. Because the relation of similarity is founded on an identity of nature as to that in which the extremes are similar; and so if an intelligible species representing a man quidditatively is similar to him in this, that it represents him, and this relation must be founded on the identity of that in which the similar things are similar, that is, on the quiddity which the species represents, then they cannot but, in the sense explained, be of the same nature.

And although the adversaries bring forward several and diverse solutions to this reason, since nevertheless, from what we said in the cited place, they remain sufficiently refuted, we shall say no further here. Yet let what was said there be consulted in general: because this reason, together with those we brought forward in the cited place, is confirmed, and is what most persuasively recommends the assertion of the holy Doctor and of ourselves.

19 The second and principal reason is drawn from the same Angelic Doctor, question 80, already cited. In order that it may be better grasped, it must be noted from the doctrine of the holy Doctor in the same place that, although in non-knowers only a single appetite is found, which is called the natural appetite, yet in knowers at least a twofold appetite is given, namely the natural appetite and, besides that, the animal appetite; and in men another, namely the rational, or the will together with the animal appetite. Between these appetites, however, the difference is this: that the natural appetite found in knowers tends only to what is connatural and proper to the thing of which it is such an appetite: as is clear from the natural appetite of weight for the place above, and of fire for the begetting of its like. But the animal or rational appetite is also directed toward other things, as when through this appetite we wish many good things for our neighbours, and many other things for ourselves which are not connatural to our nature.

From this, therefore, the following reason is derived. Because every inclination and appetite necessarily follows toward some form, as is clear by induction; but in non-knowers this appetite is so limited that it tends only to those things which are connatural to the proper form of the thing itself in which such an appetite is; on the contrary, the animal or intellectual appetite is not only directed, in its second act, to what is connatural and proper to the nature in which it is, but also to other things which are apprehended by sense or intellect: therefore it is a sign that non-knowers have only their proper form, whereas knowers have the forms of other things; not indeed in such a way that they have them under a natural mode of being, because this involves a contradiction, as is clear from itself and from what is said immediately after; but under the intentional mode of being, and by means of intentional species, which are the same as the represented object on the side of form and diverse in the aforesaid mode of being.

The major is admitted by the philosophers and theologians. The minor, however, is clear from the position set forth, which is also commonly received by them. The consequence, however, plainly seems to follow from the major and the minor. Because otherwise the inclination of a thing would exceed the form which such a thing has; and so it would follow toward that which is supposed, and yet would not follow: since indeed the proper inclination of a thing, following toward some form, cannot exceed that form, as will be clear to one who looks into it. Hence, just as it were repugnant that there be in non-knowers any inclination toward the goods connatural to some form, without that such form being in them in a manner proportionate to them; so likewise it will be repugnant that there be in knowers an inclination toward those things which are the proper goods of another form, unless such form be found in them in the proper mode of the knower, and so in a knowable and intentional way, or (which is the same thing) by means of intentional species.

20 From all of which it is clearer what we indicated above, namely that the intentional species is not so much to be said to be of the same nature as its object, as to be the essence and quiddity of that object under another mode of being, or to be the very object itself under a representative mode of being. For by a thing being said to be of the same nature as another, it is not necessarily removed that two individuals of the same nature be possible, as is clear from a twofold heat; but the species and the object cannot be of the same nature through the mode of a twofold individual participating in the same nature according to the species and diverse according to number.

And the reason is evident. Because if the intentional species represented the nature itself, for example the human, apart from individuating conditions, then, just as such an intentional species represents the nature itself in its fullness, and abstracted from the individuating conditions which divide it, so it cannot under the intentional and representative mode of being have that nature individuated, and by way of one of the individuals participating in such a nature, as is sufficiently clear from itself and from what we said in the cited place in the treatise on the Vision of God. If, however, that intentional species represents an individuated nature, then the very same numerical nature, as such, which is in the object under a natural mode of being, is in the species under another mode of being, namely the intentional, for the reasons stated, that is, because it very often happens that it represents formally not only the nature in some way, but the nature as it is individuated; and by means of that species and intentional form it can be, by itself and in the first instance, in the knowing nature, an appetite and inclination in it toward those things which are connatural and proper to its nature as individuated.

§ V. Observations very much to be noted, for the solution of the arguments of the opposite opinion.

21 In order that the arguments of the contrary opinion may remain far better and with great clarity resolved, it seemed good to point out in advance some things from whose full understanding everything that the adversaries object will easily and clearly collapse. In the first place, therefore, it must be noted that the name of a sensible or intelligible species is imposed to signify the same species, not only according to its own nature and according to what it is of the same reason as the object, but also as it is under a certain mode of being adapted and proportioned for the purpose of uniting the object itself with the power, drawing that object knowably toward the power itself. Just as also the name which is imposed to signify the object of that same species, for example this whiteness, represented by that same species, denotes the whiteness itself not only according to its essence, but also according to the natural and entitative mode of being which it has in itself, which is connatural to it as it is in itself; and therefore whiteness, simply and absolutely speaking, is said to mean the aforesaid whiteness under this natural mode of being, as we shall explain more fully from number 38 to 41 of this difficulty on the authority of Aristotle and the holy Doctor.

We said drawing that object knowably toward the power itself, not indeed in order to denote by this that the object must necessarily, according to its entitative being, be elsewhere outside the knower itself and be drawn through the species toward the knowing power itself; for the opposite of this occurs in the essence of an Angel, which has the reason of an intelligible species with respect to its own intellect, and in the order toward its own intellection; but in order to signify that even then the object and its nature is not united knowably, or in the being of an object, with its own intellect, except by means of the species, or by means of the very essence itself, insofar as it has the reason of an intelligible species; and so to be drawn knowably toward the power itself insofar as it is united with it by a new union, and united by a new relation.

22 Secondly, it must be noted that in the aforesaid sensible or intelligible species two orders of things and two kinds of being are contained: and each of these orders has its own proper constitutive principle; and each of these constitutives also declares its own or its own peculiar modes of being, under which it is. And therefore as many and as diverse predicates as this can be verified of the intelligible species, namely that according to one reason it is of the same nature as its object, as we were saying in number 14; and according to another it is diverse, as will be clear from what is said immediately after; and likewise that according to one consideration it is an accident and a certain quality, as we shall say in the next number; and according to another it can be a substance, as we asserted in the treatise on the Vision of God, disputation 2, number 135, and as will be clear from what is to be brought forward now: as also that according to a certain reason of its own it is limited and narrowed by the intellectual power in which it is received; whereas according to another, or rather according to that same one, it remains so ample, universal, and unlimited as if it were not united with the aforesaid power, as we were saying in the preceding disputation, number 22, and thenceforward; and so of the rest.

23 Thirdly, it must be noted that the first of the things found in the aforesaid species is the entitative and natural order and kind, as distinct from the intentional, or from intelligible being, taken formally; and to this entitative order and kind is assigned its own proper constitutive principle, and also its own proper mode of being, likewise entitative and natural. And so the intelligible species, representative, for example, of a man, considered in entitative being, declares the reason and the natural mode of an entitative and natural accident, and seeks a true inherence, and also its own peculiar individual reason, which although unknown we can describe and explain by this, that it is of such a condition that it has joined to it, after the manner of an inseparable accident, the intentional being of that same intelligible species; and at length it brings its own numerical nature, distinct from the numerical nature which is found in entitative being in any other intentional species whatever. And the reason for this notable fact is evident. Because cognoscible being, taken formally, must be founded on entitative and natural being; and consequently cognoscible being, formally accepted, which is found in the intelligible species, must suppose as its foundation the entitative being, and natural being of that same species: and since the aforesaid entitative being is not a substance but an accident, inasmuch as it is received in the intellect; and since the reason of this accident must be restricted by its own proper differential and individual reason, and also by a numerical nature distinct from any other which is found in another intentional species, as is clear from the terms themselves, it is necessary that the aforesaid species, according to entitative being, should declare the reason of an entitative accident, and also the individual and numerical reasons which we have already indicated. And at length, since the entitative order, beyond its proper constitutive principle, also brings its natural and entitative mode of being, it follows that the aforesaid species, representative, for example, of a man, as belonging to this order, must have its own natural mode of being corresponding to it, through which it is distinguished from that intentional and representative mode of being which the aforesaid quidditative predicates constituting that species would have, in entitative and natural being, in another species (if there were one) representing by itself in the first instance and directly the entitative and natural being of an intelligible species representing, for example, a man.

24 Fourthly, it must be noted that the aforesaid species, beyond this order and entitative being, contains also within itself another order and kind of being, the intentional, or (so to speak better) the order and kind of cognoscible being, taken formally; and with respect to this reason it has its own proper constitutive principle, and besides its own proper mode of being, indispensable and demanded from it by itself in the first instance. Because, as we were saying a moment ago, the name of the species, and the species itself, as it is under this concept, does not denote only its own quiddity and constitutive principle, which, as is clear from what has been said and will be clearer still from what is to be said, is nothing else, strictly and taken formally, save the very nature of the object which it represents; but it also declares a peculiar mode of being, under which the aforesaid nature is. Since, however, the aforesaid indispensable mode of being can scarcely ever be found without having another mode of being mixed with it, of which we shall speak immediately, it will almost always be mixed with that one.

Hence an intelligible species, representative, for example, of a man, considered in this way, declares as its own constitutive principle all the quidditative predicates of that same man which are represented through that same species. And then it brings its own mode of being, demanded of it by itself in the first instance, that is, such or such a degree of immateriality, so modified and purified that the nature of the object, such as it is under this purity so modified, can be drawn toward the intellectual power and united with it. And the reason is this. Since it is proper to the aforesaid intelligible species to draw the nature of the object toward the intellectual power and to unite it knowably with it, it is necessary that the aforesaid species contain within itself both the nature of the object itself and a mode of being so immaterial and modified that it is adapted for the purpose of this union being made; and finally that the aforesaid nature, contained there, be itself the constitutive principle of such a species considered in this way. Then because the species and the object must be the same, strictly and formally taken, as to their constitutive principle, as has been shown. And therefore, in accordance with the nature of the object which they represent, they are, or are not, of the same reason by themselves in the first instance, or diverse, according as that nature is the same or different.

25 Then also, because one must philosophize in the same proportionate way about the object and about its vicegerent, that is, about the species. And so, just as the object, for example a man, brings its own proper nature, and that as its own constitutive principle, and besides its own natural mode of being, so also the intelligible species, bringing the proper nature of a man under the aforesaid mode, will import it as its own constitutive principle, modified, however, by its own indispensable mode: for that mode, and the natural mode of being of the object represented through the species, and also the entitative mode of being which the intelligible species brings from matter, are unequal modes with respect to one and the same nature, for example the human, which, precisely because they are unequal, do not argue a distinction in it on the side of nature; but rather, just as in that conjunction in which the nature is under a natural mode of being, that nature absolutely, and speaking simply, has what it is itself to be primarily and by way of a constitutive principle imported, and that mode alone has, absolutely speaking, the reason of a mode; so, proportion being preserved, in that other conjunction in which the nature is under an intentional mode of being, that is, in a species, for example an intelligible one, one must philosophize.

26 Now the aforesaid indispensable mode of such or such a degree of immateriality, so modified that under it the species can sensibly or intelligibly unite the object with the power by drawing that object toward it, is scarcely ever found in creatures, unless that species and its immateriality be under another representative mode, which is a diminished mode of being. And therefore the same species almost always has joined to it the aforesaid representative and diminished mode, which is of such a condition that under it the same numerical Angelic substance, for example that of Michael, which according to its natural being is in Michael himself, may also be under this representative mode of being in the intelligible species of it which is in the intellect of Gabriel; and consequently may also be in that same intellect of the aforesaid Gabriel: yet under a natural mode of being, finite and limited, it cannot be in both. Yet since it is so that this representative and diminished mode of being does not pertain to the concept of an intelligible species in the being of a species formally taken, and is not its indispensable mode; although, as we shall say below in this very difficulty, by the very fact that this diminished mode is granted, it always brings concomitantly the reason of a species, for example an intelligible one, and its indispensable mode.

27 The reason, for which we have said that the immaterial mode of being so purified and purified that it can unite the object with the power by way of a species is scarcely ever found in creatures unless it has at the same time joined to it the representative and diminished mode of being, is this. Because a sensible object, such as it is in itself, has mixed with it much materiality and coarseness. And so it cannot be united with the power unless it be purified of this, and be under the diminished and representative mode, which is subtler and more purified. And likewise a created intelligible object never has immateriality, or an immaterial mode of being so purified and modified that it can, at least speaking naturally, by itself be united in the reason of an object and of an intelligible species, unless it be the very substance of the thinker compared with his own intellect, or the intellect itself and the other accidents of it, and unless all of these be in such a state that they do not depend for their being understood upon phantasms.

28 For although the very substance of the thinker, for example the Angelic substance, is purified from physical matter; nevertheless, because as we said and explained in the treatise on the Vision of God, disputation 2, number 47, it is not its own intelligibility, nor is it pure intelligible form; therefore although it can be united to its own intellect by itself in the order toward its own intellection, yet not with a foreign intellect, except as it is in an intentional species, and except (so to speak) that it be clothed with that representative and diminished mode of being. And so it does not have, according to itself, a mode of being so immaterial and so purified and modified as to have, with respect to any Angelic intellect whatever, for example, the reason of an intelligible species, unless the aforesaid mode of being be mixed in.

Especially because nothing can be united under a natural mode of being with a twofold intellect: because the aforesaid mode of being limits and narrows things, so that that which is the form of this cannot be that of that. And therefore, as we were saying in number 16, a remedy has been provided for this in the intentional being under a representative mode of being: so that the substance, for example the Angelic substance, may inform both its own and a foreign intellect intelligibly: and consequently then the aforesaid diminished and representative mode of being must necessarily be mixed in.

29 Why, however (in order thus to satisfy in passing a certain objection tacitly), it is possible that an intelligible and intentional species representing an Angelic substance, for example Michael's, should not itself be under its own diminished being, intelligibility as it is, and any more than the substance of that same Michael; nevertheless it may unite that same Michael, in the reason of an object, with a foreign intellect, namely Gabriel's; yet since Michael cannot of himself perform this office, it will be clear from what is to be said in the treatise on Angels, and from what we touched upon in the treatise on the Vision of God, disputation 2, number 248, that this is indeed clear. For as, in order that a thing be the very essence and existence without any distinction, it is required that it be pure act in the entitative order; so too, in order that a thing not merely be existence, but also in order that a thing be an object directly and by itself known as that which it is, and having a natural mode of being, and at the same time be an intelligible species of itself, which can be united with a foreign intellect, it is required that it be pure act in the intelligible order; and consequently that it be its own intelligibility, as we said in the aforesaid treatise on the Vision of God, disputation 2, number 47: but as to having precisely the reason of an intelligible species by itself and directly, as occurs in an intentional species having a representative and diminished mode of being, that is another matter.

30 The reason, however, for which we assert that the aforesaid representative and diminished mode of being does not pertain to the quiddital concept of the species in cognoscible being, taken formally, and is not its indispensable mode, is that the intelligible species, taken in the sense explained, demands only that it be the very nature of the object, and that it bring that mode of being so immaterial and modified that under it it can unite the object and its nature with the power, as the holy Doctor teaches above, question 12, article 2; but it is not necessary for this that the nature of the object be united with the power under a representative and diminished mode of being. And so when the object in this way of itself brings these two things, as occurs in the substance of an Angel with respect to its own intellect, then it does not need an intelligible species through which it would be united with the aforesaid intellect under a representative mode of being; but the very substance of the Angel, without this diminished mode of being, has the reason of an intelligible species. When, however, the object cannot of itself be united to the power, because it does not have that mode of immateriality so purified and modified as is required for the aforesaid office, as happens in the same Angelic substance, for example Gabriel's, with respect to the intellect of Michael, for the reasons given in number 28, then another intelligible species is necessary, through which the substance of Gabriel is united with the intellect of Michael under a representative and diminished mode of being; though even then this diminished mode is not indispensable and demanded by itself in the first instance, but in a certain manner by accident, insofar as it is considered with respect to the defect which is found in the mode of being immaterial, demanded by itself in the first instance, and this mode can sometimes be severed and separated from this diminished mode of being.

31 And this very thing can be explained further from the fact that the substance of Gabriel, considered in the being of a species formally, with respect to which reason it is united with its own intellect, and the intentional species of that same Gabriel, which resides in the intellect of Michael, with whom Gabriel cannot be united by his own substance, are of the same reason as to everything that is required for the aforesaid species taken in the sense explained, both on the side of its quiddity and on the side of the mode of being demanded of it as indispensable, as we said in the treatise on the Vision of God, disputation 2, number 107. And therefore, if Gabriel understood himself through an intentional species distinct from him and representing him quidditatively, then that intellection would be of the same species as it is now. And likewise, if a created species representing God as he is in himself quidditatively were admitted, then the beatific vision elicited by means of it would be of the same species as that very vision which is now elicited from the blessed by means of the divine essence through the mode of an intelligible species: and yet if the representative species of Gabriel, which is in the intellect of Michael, is taken according to the representative and diminished mode of being which it brings, it cannot but differ according to this from the mode of being which the substance of Gabriel imports as united with its own intellect in the reason of an intelligible species: for its mode of being cannot be the representative and diminished mode of being: therefore it is a sign that the aforesaid representative and diminished mode does not pertain indispensably to the intelligible species in cognoscible being, taken formally; whether as its quiddity, or as its indispensable mode.

We have said that it does not pertain to the intelligible species in cognoscible being, taken formally: because if it be taken, as is explained by this name and concept of an intentional and representative species, it is usually taken from common use as a species distinct from the object as to the mode of being, and involving a representative and diminished mode of being; and so, thus conceived, and as it is under this reduplication and signification, it must necessarily involve the aforesaid diminished predicate, as is clear from itself.

32 Whether, however, the aforesaid representative and diminished being, although it does not pertain to the concept of an intelligible species, nor is its indispensable mode, may nevertheless be an indispensable mode with respect to a sensible species as such; and whether this occurs because it is demanded by the force of its own line, or from other indispensable heads, though not from the force of its own line; and therefore, if by an impossibility a visible object were given so purified as the visible species itself, as many, whom our Complutensians report in their book on the Soul, disputation 10, number 6, confess of light itself, then, as they themselves also concede, it would be united of itself, without the diminished mode of being, with vision by way of an intelligible species, and in the order toward its own seeing. And so whether one must philosophize about the sensible species as such in this way or in that, is clear from what we have already indicated; and it will be clearer still from what we shall say.

From which also there remains solved a certain objection which perhaps might deter others, namely, that the intelligible species of its own accord and indispensably, from the force of its own line, declares the nature of the object with such or such a degree of immateriality, so modified and purified that it can unite the object with the power: therefore if representative and diminished being is required (as we were just saying) in order that the essence of Gabriel be united intelligibly with the intellect of Michael, it will follow that the representative and diminished mode of being of itself pertains to the concept of an intelligible species, coalescing (as we said in number 21) from the nature of the intelligible object and from the mode of immateriality required in order to unite the object with the intellectual power.

33 From what has been said, therefore, this objection remains solved. For just as in the opinion of some, a material substance, for example prime matter, has its entitative parts, and qualities also have theirs; and nevertheless these parts, considered in the being of parts, are not formally distinguished, but only materially, and by accident: because for the reason of entitative parts formally taken, only this is required, that one not be the other, and that they constitute a single integral, or quasi integral, entitative whole; whether this be of a material substance, or a quality, etc.; so also what is said of the formal, that indispensable mode which the intelligible species brings, is such or such a degree of immateriality, so purified and modified that it can unite the object with the power. But that this immateriality is brought, from the fact that the species brings a representative and diminished mode of being, or some other mode of being, for example a substantial one, is said of matter, and by accident. And therefore, as we were saying a moment ago, the intelligible species remains the same, and under the mode of being of immateriality already described, whether it be under the diminished mode of being or not; and the aforesaid mode of being of immateriality, as to the formal, which it brings when considered precisely, is of the same species and reason both in an intelligible species which is a substance and in an intelligible species which is an accident: and it has a diminished mode of being as often as the aforesaid species unite one and the same object, as is clear from what has been said.

34 Lastly it must be noted that, although on an reckoning of all the modes of being which, beyond the nature of the object, are found in the intelligible species, there are almost always at least the three already enumerated, nevertheless the Doctors frequently, while professing the natural and entitative mode of being, do not distinguish so precisely and under the names already mentioned that indispensable mode of being demanded from that same species; but they sometimes somehow confound it with intentional being, and a representative mode of being; yet they frequently also profess that both modes of being are in some way distinct from one another. And therefore they say what we were just saying, namely that the substance of Gabriel, insofar as it has the reason of an intelligible species with respect to its own intellect, is of the same reason as to everything that is demanded as indispensable for an intelligible species, as the intelligible species representing that same Gabriel and residing in Michael; although the substance of Gabriel does not have the aforesaid representative and diminished mode of being, yet it does have that due immaterial mode of being already explained, in which that indispensable mode consists.

And then, because each of the two modes of being is contained both under the intentional mode of being and also under the representative mode of being, they frequently assign beyond the natural mode of being only one of these two.

35 The reason, however, for which each of the two modes is included under the intentional mode of being, and therefore, when this being is assigned, both the modes already mentioned are assigned as well, is this. Because when the intentional mode of being declares the mode of the intelligible species, or of the word, corresponding to them formally and peculiarly, as they serve for the cognition, intention, or attention of the intellect (for all these amount to the same thing for the present), and the aforesaid species according to that mode of being demanded by itself in the first instance serves peculiarly and by itself in the first instance for the aforesaid attention, and according to the representative mode of being is also, in the way explained, peculiarly destined for it in that order: therefore each of the two modes of being is comprehended under the intentional mode of being.

Hence the aforesaid mode of being is wont to be formally distinguished in itself, taken in intentional being and in intelligible being, with respect to which reason it is wont to denote that mode of being demanded by itself and indispensably; and in itself, according to those things which it involves in some way by accident and materially; and with respect to this reason, it is wont among other things to denote the diminished and representative mode of being: which is almost always required, because otherwise the object could not be united in the reason of an object on account of the conjunction which it has with other reasons that prevent this union, although the aforesaid conjunction does not of itself and indispensably belong to it from the force of its own line, but from the force of other lines.

36 And likewise the reason, for which each of the two modes is involved under the representative mode of being, is this. Because representative being can be taken in a twofold way. Firstly indeed for the diminished, representative and ostensive mode of being, whose office it is that the species under it should have, by way of a principle by which to represent or show to the knowing power the object which is contained in it under it, and by this means of representation to unite that object with the same power. Or for a mode of being which is indeed not diminished, but of such a condition that the species under it should also have in some way to represent, by way of a principle by which, the object itself to the power, according as under it it has to show that object to the power itself, and to unite that same object with it, still more perfectly than if it were united by means of a representative mode of being, as occurs in an Angelic standing substance, which has the reason of an intelligible species with respect to its own intellect, and does not bring that representative mode of being. Wherefore, since under representative being both modes of representing, or of showing, are comprehended, it follows that, the representative mode of being being assigned, without restricting it to the diminished mode of being, these two modes of being, in a certain way distinct from the natural mode of being, are also involved there.

37 Fifthly, each of the two is found under the representative and diminished mode of being. Because although the indispensable intentional mode of being already explained is not always and indispensably conjoined with the representative and diminished mode of being, on the other hand this representative mode of being is conjoined with the indispensable mode of being of immateriality, and not just anyhow, but in such a way that the representative and diminished mode of being of itself in the first instance demands this conjunction: and therefore under the representative mode of being each of the two modes of being is intimated and included. Hence such a mode of being, taken adequately and not with precision, with respect to which reason it declares itself as identifying both the diminished being and that indispensable mode, declares of the formal, and more principally, the indispensable mode; though taken with precision, with respect to which reason it is usually more frequently signified under this name of the representative and diminished mode of being, it denotes only that diminished mode: and therefore the representative mode of being, adequately accepted, is also wont to be distinguished in itself according to what it imports of the formal, and according to what it does not bring of the formal. Just as also (in order to say this in passing) under intentional being there is also included and involved that nature of the object which is under that mode, and likewise under representative being: because although that nature can be without these modes, yet the modes cannot be without it: and therefore, if they are taken adequately, and according to what they demand by themselves in the first instance, then they more principally declare the nature than the aforesaid modes.

Wherefore for this reason we shall often use not only the names signifying natural being, and intentional being, and representative being, but likewise the names denoting a natural, intentional and representative mode of being: because under these are contained all the things that pertain in any way to the species; and from what has just been said it is clear what is contained under these names, and in what sense.

§ VI. The arguments of the contrary opinion are resolved apart from the last one.

38 To the first, which was taken from the testimony of the holy Doctor, an answer is given from what was said in the preceding §. As to how the holy Doctor speaks of the intelligible species, not indeed in intentional being and representative, as to the nature which he brings under this being, but of that in natural being, and entitative, with respect to which reason it has a quiddity distinct from itself, taken in the first way, and from the object represented through it.

Add that for the species to be of the same nature as the object in representative being is to be the same with it not absolutely and simply, but with an addition, and with a condition diminishing the mode of having such a nature, that is, in representative being, or (as the holy Doctor speaks) according to representation. Hence the holy Doctor rightly, speaking absolutely and simply, said that the species of the stone which is in the soul is of a nature altogether different from that of the stone itself: because in order that it be absolutely and simply of the same nature, it would have been required that it have the aforesaid nature under a natural mode of being, from the fact that intentional being, as distinct from natural being, is diminished being, and according to what, and with an addition; whereas natural and entitative being is otherwise. And therefore to be such a thing entitatively and naturally is to be absolutely and simply such; but to be such only intentionally, and under a representative mode of being, is to be such according to what, and with an addition, that is, intentionally such and representatively such. By which also it is sufficiently clear regarding the other testimonies which could have been brought from the holy Doctor.

39 It makes no difference if you say that intentional being is being more elevated than natural being, and entitative: therefore, once the intentional species is the very quiddity of its object under intentional being, and representative, then knowers, which receive the aforesaid species in themselves, will not only have the nature of the object absolutely and simply, but under a nobler mode of being than if they had it under a natural and entitative mode of being. The consequence seems legitimate. The antecedent, however, is clear from what has been said above. Because intentional being is less material, and consequently freer from matter, which is the root of potentiality and imperfection.

For the answer must be given that intentional being, taken precisely, is nothing except a more perfect and more elevated being according to what than natural being, and entitative; and therefore by reason of this greater elevation it can be extended to certain other effects which entitative being cannot reach. Nor does the opposite of this refute the proof of the antecedent. Because being which is freer from matter is, other things being equal, nobler than that which is more material; but otherwise when the other things are not equal, as occurs here. Hence although a spiritual accident be less material than a material substance, it is not therefore absolutely and simply nobler than it, from the fact that the other things are not equal.

40 And this can be explained and confirmed from the fact that the intentional form, although it be of the same reason as the form which is under natural being, or rather be itself under another mode of being, nevertheless does not simply denominate the subject, as the intelligible species, or the sensible species of whiteness, does not simply denominate that subject white. Then because this is what Aristotle teaches in On the Soul 2, text 121, saying: that the intentional species of a certain thing is the same essence as that of which it is the species, not insofar as it is called such, but insofar as it is such. Which is the same thing as to assert that the aforesaid species is the same as the form of which it is the species, yet does not absolutely and simply denominate as that form does. Then also, because a denomination is made from a form according to its own proper and connatural perfection; but the form in an intentional species does not have the conditions owed to its own proper and connatural mode of existing, that is, the natural mode, but those proportioned to the mode of being of knowers: and therefore it neither denominates the subject, nor is it itself so denominated absolutely and simply speaking, but with an addition, that is, in cognoscible or intentional being: therefore it is a sign that the form, as it is under the aforesaid intentional being, and consequently the aforesaid being, is surpassed absolutely in perfection by natural being, and is being what is diminished. For a form under a mode of being that is not diminished, especially if it be permanent, cannot but simply denominate that subject, and be denominated such.

41 To the second, the major and the minor having been granted, the consequent must be distinguished: and the consequence must be granted if it is understood of the species taken together with its primary object; but it must be denied if it is understood of the same species compared with its secondary object, which the aforesaid species represents after the manner of a cause, as occurs in the divine essence. Wherefore, although a species representing something as a primary object must be the same as it as to the form represented, it is not necessary that it be the same in this way with the secondary object. For when it represents the primary object by itself, and by its own reason, and as it is such, it must be of the same nature as it, though under another mode of being. But when it represents the secondary object aforesaid by the reason of another object represented by itself in the first instance, it need not be of the same nature as that object, but with the object by whose reason it represents the secondary one. Add that, at the very least, it is enough for the reason of the species that it should contain eminently, or virtually, the nature of its secondary object, as is seen in the divine essence with respect to creatures, although this aforesaid containment is not always necessary.

42 To the first confirmation, it is clear from what has just been said. Because, as Ferrara noted well in Against the Gentiles 2, chapter 98, when a form is eminent and contains eminently the form and nature of another thing, it is not of the same reason as it, nor ought it to be properly and speaking rigorously to be similar to it; whereas on the other hand an inferior form contained in it can have a similarity with it; and so although creatures may be similar to the divine essence, the divine essence is nevertheless not similar to creatures.

And this the holy Doctor explained very well in question 1, article 2, in the body of distinction 19, saying that a form is said to belong to a thing when it has it fully and according to every reason; and so when two things have some form fully, then both are similar to one another. But if the form be full in one and diminished in the other, then the thing which participates in such a form in a diminished way is similar to the other, and not conversely; just as a painting is similar to a man, but not conversely. But the form in which and by which God understands all things, that is, his essence, is full and perfect only in God himself; in other things, however, it is found only in a diminished and minute way, and according to an analogous participation or imitation; and therefore created things are said to be similar to him in the same way, although God is not similar to any creature.

43 To the second confirmation, for now the answer is given by conceding that the intentional species of the highest Angels represent, distinctly and formally, several and diverse specific natures: yet so that these have themselves after the manner of a secondary object, and that the other, more universal reason, in which all those agree and under which they are contained, has itself after the manner of an object represented by itself in the first instance, as Nazarenus noted well in volume 3, in part 1, question 55, article 3, controversy 1, notable 6, referring to Cajetan and Ferrara. For since the aforesaid intentional species are of a higher and more eminent order, and are said in a peculiar sense to be participations of the divine essence, as having the reason of an intelligible species, it follows that, just as the divine essence, from the fact that it is most perfect in the reason of an intelligible species, can represent several and diverse secondary objects, diverse in species and as to their own, although its own primary object is only one, so also the aforesaid intentional species can, in a proportionate way, have several and diverse secondary objects, and have their primary object be one only.

Now it does not follow from this that these intentional species are formally of the same quiddity as each of the natures represented by them, and as they are distinct from one another, but that they are of the same nature as that reason which is represented by itself in the first instance, in which all agree; and besides that they contain eminently and in a surpassing way those natures which are diverse in species, or (which is the same thing) that they are a reason surpassing them: because although they represent them according to their own, they nevertheless represent them in a secondary way, and by the reason of another thing represented by itself in the first instance. But we shall return to these matters in the treatise on Angels.

44 To the third, the answer is given that if we speak of the intelligible or sensible species, whether as to representative being, or (so to speak better) as to the representative mode of being taken with precision, or as to its material and natural being, it is already clear from what we said in tractate 1, disputation 2, numbers 73 and 74, and from what our Complutensians teach in their book on the Soul, disputation 18, question 6, what is to be said, and how that mode of being and the entitative being of the aforesaid species are essentially distinguished, as Cajetan taught and proved learnedly in part 3, question 35, article 5.

If, however, we speak precisely of the numerical nature, as it emerges under the indispensable mode of being in the intentional species, then it is not incongruous that two natures diverse only as to number be in the same subject, or intellect: because, as we touched upon in the preceding disputation from number 22 to 26, and as we shall say here from number 72 to 84, sense and intellect are not compared with the aforesaid species, at least thus taken, as a subject in the strict sense, nor is the intellect itself individuated from them according to this reason, but from the represented nature itself, not just anyhow, but connoting that it is under a natural mode of being. Why a nature thus taken should radically individuate a sensible species accepted in the sense explained, is clear from what we said in number 21 and from number 38 to 41.

45 To the fourth, the answer is given by denying the antecedent. And as to the proof, the antecedent having been granted, the consequence must be denied. For although we grant that any form communicates to a connatural and capable subject whatever it has in itself as that by which it has it, it is not therefore necessary that it communicate to a subject which it regards rather as a medium than as a subject, and which for that very reason is not capable of all the formal reasons that are found in the aforesaid form, as occurs here. For sensible species received in a medium or in a mirror regard it rather after the manner of a medium than after the manner of a subject, and inhere in it not in order to be established there, but in order that they may be able to reach their own connatural subject, or quasi subject. And therefore the aforesaid species are received in a medium, not indeed according to intentional being, and representative, of which it is not capable, but only according to natural being, and entitative: and consequently they do not confer on it that it have the form of another thing. The reason, however, for which the aforesaid medium is not capable of receiving the intentional and representative being of a species, is that it comes to the same thing to unite the species according to this being and to constitute that which it is joined to in the first complete act, on the side of the object required, in the order toward knowing the aforesaid object.

Nor is there wanting some example by which this very thing may be made clearer. For in a moral act, for example the paying of a debt owed, there is found an order of nature, as distinct from the moral, and at the same time a moral order: and each of these orders has its own proper specificator; and according to the probable opinion of many, such an act can remain such an act as pertains to the natural order without remaining so as it pertains to the moral order, as when it is done without any deliberation. If, therefore, the aforesaid act can persevere as it regards one order without remaining the same as it regards the other order, why could the same intentional species, as it pertains to the entitative and natural order, as distinct from the intentional, not inform some medium according to this reason, without informing it as it pertains to the aforesaid intentional order; and bring its proper nature of its object, from the fact that the aforesaid medium is incapable, on its own part, of this latter union, but not of the former?

§ VII.

The last argument is resolved.

46 To the last, which needs a fuller solution, the antecedent must be granted as to all its parts: yet so that as to the first, in which it is said that the intelligible species is a certain spiritual accident, and that its object is often a substance, it be understood of the intelligible species in entitative being, and natural, and not in intelligible being, and representative. And then the consequence must be denied. In proof of which it must be said that things which agree with objects on the side of form and nature cannot be repugnant to intentional species; but those things which agree with them as they are under a material and entitative mode of being, as occurs here, are repugnant. For that a sensible object placed above the sense should impede sensation, or should be able to be felt as an object, that which belongs to it not just anyhow, but as it is under its own material and natural mode of being. And so it is no wonder that it does not agree with a sensible species, which under a different mode of being is the form and nature of the aforesaid object.

By which also it is sufficiently clear regarding the confirmation. For whiteness and blackness are not qualities contrary to one another unless they are under a material and entitative mode of being, and not precisely by reason of the nature and form imported; nor indeed by reason of a representative mode of being: and therefore their intentional species are not incomposable in the same subject or medium.

47 Hence the holy Doctor, in the last lecture of On Sense and Sensible, near the middle, solves this very same confirmation from Aristotle in these words: This objection, however, Aristotle removes in his book on the Soul, when he says: And it is impossible for white and black to be at once, and therefore neither can the species suffer them. And he hints at the solution by this, that it belongs to this, namely to sense, and to intelligence, or the intellect. From which it can be understood that it does not hold altogether in sense and intellect as it does in natural bodies. For a natural body receives forms according to natural and material being, according as they have contrariety in themselves. And therefore the same body cannot receive whiteness and blackness at once; but sense and intellect receive the forms of things spiritually and immaterially, according to a certain intentional being, since they do not have contrariety. Hence sense and intellect can receive at once the species of contrary sensible things: something like which can be seen in the transparent, which in one and the same part of itself is altered by white and by black: because the alteration is not material, according to natural being, as has been said above.

Where it is also to be considered (in order to say this in passing, and at the same time to show how rightly these things cohere with what we said in the answer to the third), that the holy Doctor deliberately said only that the alteration which takes place in a medium through white and black can be in the same part of the medium, from the fact that that alteration is not material according to natural being; but he did not add that it is according to cognoscible being, representative, taken formally. Because, as we were saying in the cited place, species are not received in a medium formally in cognoscible being, and as they are representative, whether according to the nature which they represent; but only in entitative being: although not in the material and coarse entitative being which the sensible objects themselves have; but according to a more elevated immaterial being, that concerns matter less, and finally of such a condition that it does not conflict in the same medium, and also subject, with the being which is still entitative and natural, and elevated from matter, which the species of blackness brings with it.

48 And this composability of intentional species representing diverse natures, which according to the natural mode of being which they have between themselves are incomposable, can be further elucidated by the discourse which the holy Doctor adduces in the place recently cited, and also Aristotle in Metaphysics 7, where the holy Doctor also, lecture 6. For after the Philosopher had put forth the words related above by us, that is: Now those things are from art whose species is in the soul; and I mean by species whatever the being of anything was, he immediately explained how, although certain artificial forms are incomposable with one another, as they are under a natural mode of being in themselves, yet not as they are in the intellect; although there also is the quiddity of such forms, which are otherwise incomposable with one another, he added: For in a certain way the species of contradictories is the same, that of privation, namely, which is the substance of the opposite, such as health of sickness, for sickness is shown to be the absence of that.

49 Which words the holy Doctor thus explains in the same place. He says therefore firstly that those things are made by art whose productive species is in the soul. And by species he explains whatever the being of any thing was that was made through art, etc., and so he immediately subjoins: But this form, which is in the soul, differs from the form which is in matter. For the forms of contradictories in matter are diverse and contrary; in the soul, however, there is in a certain way one species of contradictories: and this because the forms in matter are properly being of the things formed. But the forms in the soul are according to the mode of the cognoscible and the intelligible; and the being of one contrary is removed by the being of the other; but the cognition of one opposite is not removed by the cognition of the other; rather it is aided. Hence the forms of opposites in the soul are not opposed; nay rather the substance, that is, whatever the being of privation was, is the same with the substance of the opposite (understand this after the manner of a surpassing reason, which of itself in the first place brings the nature of the positive opposite, although it hints at and representatively signifies the privation itself, as is clear from what we said from the same holy Doctor, articles 9 and 10 of this question, and in this very difficulty). Just as the same (the holy Doctor continues) is the reason in the soul of health and of sickness. For sickness is known through the absence of health. But health, which is in the soul, is a certain reason, through which health and sickness are known.

Wherefore the solution given there, both for this last argument and for its confirmation, understood in the way explained, is the best possible. And as to the proof to the contrary, the antecedent must be denied. In proof of which, the major having been granted, in accordance nonetheless with what we said in the preceding §, the minor must be denied, if it be understood of the species in the reason of a species formally taken, and of representative being, as it calls the diminished mode of being, or according to which it is distinguished from the form which is contained there under that mode of being: because, as is clear from what has been said, the form and the nature contained there is what is established as the constitutive principle of the aforesaid species.

50 Nor does the point touched upon there stand in the way of this, namely that the intentional species are instituted by themselves in the first instance for the sake of representing. For, as our Complutensians teach in the cited place, it must be understood of the same species insofar as they declare the nature represented, and under a representative mode of being.

From which, as to what is added in the first place, it must be said that this representative mode of being neither pertains to the nature of the object, nor to its intelligible species formally considered in cognoscible being, as something essential, or as a proper passion; but as a mode of being of it: which is compared to it, taken in itself, after the manner of an accident predicated of it, virtually distinct from it: since indeed, as we were just saying, the very same nature of whiteness, or of light existing on a wall under a natural mode of being, is not there under a representative and diminished mode of being, and is in an intentional species under the aforesaid representative mode of being, and not under a natural mode of being.

Hence the aforesaid light, on the side of form and nature, and taken with precision, abstracts from this, that it is being under a natural, intentional and representative mode of being, and declares the essential predicates of light insofar as they abstract from this, that it is being itself and an act outside of the transparent, as the transparent is (by which the proper reason of the light, as it is under a natural mode of being, is explained); or from this, that the very same predicates are being intelligibly or sensibly the act of the transparent; or from this, that the very same predicates are contained there as the principle of sensing or understanding that same light, as it is an act of the transparent outside itself.

51 Nor is there an obstacle in the point adduced there, to prove that this mode of being cannot be compared, after the manner of an accident, with the nature in the intentional species representing it. And the reason is this. For although this representative mode of being is in a certain way more interior than the proper passions of such a nature, according as it is less distinguished from it, as often as the aforesaid nature is under it; yet it falls short of the reason of a proper passion on account of what we were just saying, that is, because a nature can altogether be connatural in something without it: as when it is under a natural mode of being, but not under a representative one.

To that, however, which is added in the second place, the answer is given that that axiom is maximally and universally true in created things, as often as certain things are identified with a certain third thing, as it is under a natural, finite and limited mode of being; but not as often as they are identified with a third thing according as it prescinds from a mode of being both natural and intentional and representative. For as it is proper to the divine essence, because it is divine, that the three divine persons should be identified with it, according as it declares its own natural mode of being, and yet should not be identified with one another, so it is proper to any nature that, according as it prescinds from these diverse modes of being, its own proper natural mode of being and the representative mode of being should be able to be identified with it; although these are not identified with one another. And the reason is this. Then because, as we were saying from the holy Doctor, as it is proper to the divine nature to be in the three persons, so it is proper to any nature that it can be in itself and outside itself, and at the same time in the intellect by means of a species; and as the divine persons are opposed to one another, so in created things the natural mode of being of the object represented through the species and the representative mode of being have between them their own incomposability.

52 Then also, because, as we were saying from the holy Doctor, question 1 on truth, article 2, this intentional and representative being, diminished, has been provided as a remedy for the defect and the limitation which natural being, and the mode of being of it, import in created things, insofar as according to the aforesaid being the very same form and nature, according to what it says on the side of form, cannot be precisely in itself and in knowers diverse from itself; yet well under the intentional and representative mode of being, and consequently just as the aforesaid form, when it is in itself and under a natural mode of being, is identified with that mode of being, so when it is in the species and under the intentional and representative mode of being, it must be identified with it: yet the aforesaid modes of being, which that nature has in the species and retains in itself, are not so far identified with one another, as is clear from itself.

We said so far, in order to denote that the natural mode of being also, as it holds itself on the side of the thing represented, and is represented together with the nature through the species, and so as it is under the representative mode of being, emerging in the intentional species, can also be identified with the representative mode of being, as will be clear to one who looks into it: yet then it holds itself more after the manner of a represented object than after the manner of the pure and precise mode of being.

To that, however, which is added in the last place, the consequence must be denied. And in proof of which it must be said that it is far more wonderful that the very same nature, as it is under its own natural mode of being, should be identified in the three persons with them, according as they have a natural mode of being, than that any nature, according as it prescinds from a mode of being both natural and intentional, should be identified with the natural mode of being and with numberless other intentional and representative modes of being, however individuated and supposed such a nature may be, provided that a nature so individuated and supposed be considered under the said precision. And the reason is this. Because the former requires an infinity in the nature; whereas the latter does not, as is sufficiently clear from what has been said.