Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

Is God's knowledge an attribute of him?

Since D. Thom. in this article, in the answer to the second objection, teaches that God's knowledge is an attribute of him, we therefore rightly inquire into this point in this first disputation; especially because we shall not so much explain what the divine knowledge is as whether it is his in the manner of an attribute, that is, whether these things are found in God as an attribute of him? And so to treat of it according to this consideration belongs to the disputation on divine knowledge insofar as whether it is his.

§ I. Arguments for the negative side.

60 First. Since God's understanding pertains to the intrinsic constitutive principle of the divine nature: therefore the knowledge of it does too: therefore such knowledge will not be an attribute of God. This last consequence is clear from what precedes. Since, as we shall say from Damascene in this difficulty, an attribute has itself after the manner of a property of the divine nature: and therefore that which belongs to the intrinsic constitutive principle of that nature cannot have the character of an attribute.

The first consequence, however, is clear from the antecedent. Since God's understanding, considered as pertaining to the intrinsic constitutive principle of the divine essence, must be most perfect within the line and genus of understanding, as is clear from itself: therefore it must be scientific understanding: since an understanding which does not reach the point of being scientific is not most perfect within the line and genus of understanding. The antecedent, however, will be clear from what is to be said in this treatise, disp. 4, num. 43, and tract. 4, disp. 2, num. 57.

61 Confirmed, first. Since understanding, insofar as it constitutes the divine nature, must be comprehensive of God: therefore it must have the character of knowledge: and therefore knowledge will not be able to have itself after the manner of a property, or attribute, of God. The antecedent is clear. Then, because the aforesaid understanding agrees with God in the degree of immateriality, as is clear from itself: but understanding agreeing with some essence in the degree of immateriality is comprehensive of it, as is commonly said above, q. 12, art. 2. Then also: because the intellection constitutive of God is as great in the line of intellection as God is in the line of the intelligible object; otherwise it would not constitute him in his essence and intelligibility: as is clear from what was said above, q. 12, art. 8, that for intellectual comprehension it is enough that the intellection be as great in the line of intellection as the essence is which is understood in the line of the intelligible object.

The first consequence, however, is also clear. Because understanding comprehensive of God reaches, in him as in the cause, or in the formal reason a priori, all attributes, and also all possible creatures: and therefore according to its formal character it will be a knowledge of attributes, and of possible creatures through their cause, or reason a priori: and consequently according to its most formal character it will be knowledge: since this is nothing other than the knowledge of a thing through its cause.

62 Confirmed, second. For either understanding, constitutive of God, taken in itself, and precisely so taken, reaches everything that is in him, both formally and eminently, and as in a cause — or it does not. If the first, then, taken in itself and precisely considered, it will have the character of knowledge, as is clear from what we have just said. If, however, the second is said, then the aforesaid understanding will be finite and limited: and consequently it cannot be constitutive of God. Both consequences are clear. Because an intellection by which God is not reached according to everything he has, both formally and eminently, is finite, as is clear in the visions of the blessed, which for this reason are finite in the line of the vision of God, as is commonly said above, q. 12, art. 8: and a finite intellection cannot be constitutive of God.

63 Second. Because in us to be radical and potential knowers does not have the character of a property, but pertains to the intrinsic constitutive principle of our essence: therefore in God to be knowing in act second will not have itself after the manner of a property, or attribute, of him, but will pertain to the concept of the divine essence, as distinct from its attributes and properties.

The antecedent is obvious. Because the essence of man cannot be adequately understood unless it be understood together with a radical potency for knowing: and so being radical and potential knower pertains to its intrinsic concept: just as, for this reason, being radical and intellectual, or admirable, pertains to its quiddity.

The consequence, however, clearly follows from the antecedent. Because whatever imports a perfection simply pertains to the quiddity of an intellectual creature, must, with the imperfections with which it is involved excluded, constitute the nature of God in the manner of a most pure act, excluding all potentiality: because such a character is of itself constitutive of nature: and so, if it be purged of all imperfections, it cannot constitute anything other than the nature of God: therefore, if in us being radical and potential knowers signifies a perfection simply, yet involved with imperfections and pertaining to the quiddative concept of our essence, the consequence will be that being actually knowing in the manner of a most pure act, excluding all imperfection and potentiality, pertains to the quiddative concept of the divine essence.

64 Third. Because the potency that God has to create is not distinguished from the potency which is in him to transmute one thing into another, or from a potency to effect any miracle whatever; but all these constitute one and the same indivisible omnipotence without any virtual distinction: therefore for the same reason there will not be in God a multiplied virtually intellectual understanding, but that very understanding which is constitutive of God, without any virtual distinction, will be scientific understanding: and consequently intellection, as scientific, will not be an attribute: since an attribute must be virtually distinguished from the divine essence, as it has the character of essence, and from its constitutive principle, namely divine intellection. The antecedent needs no proof. Because as in us the intellectual potency signifies one most simple potency without any virtual distinction, by which we can understand whatever is intelligible: and therefore the potency for understanding substance is not distinguished from the intellectual potency of an accident, so in God omnipotence signifies one most simple potency without any virtual distinction, by which he can produce everything doable: and therefore the potency to create cannot be virtually distinguished from the transubstantiating potency, or from a potency to effect any miracle.

The consequence is proved. For the aforesaid potencies are not virtually distinguished, because all of them belong to God by one and the same indivisible reason, namely insofar as he is a pure and infinite act, from the fact that each thing acts insofar as it is in act; and consequently, since it is in pure and infinite act, it must be infinitely and most highly active: therefore, since all intellectual knowledge belongs to God under a single and indivisible formal reason, namely because he is most immaterial, the consequence will be that intellections are not multiplied in him, but that any intellection found in him is one and the same most simple intellection without any virtual distinction.

65 Fourth. For if God's understanding, as it is constitutive of him, were distinguished from his knowledge, it would also have to be distinguished from the habit, or quasi-habit, of principles, which is called intelligence: but this is impossible: therefore, etc. The sequel seems clearly to follow from the parity of reason. For just as knowledge is an intellectual virtue, so also is intelligence, as D. Thom. teaches from Arist. 1. 2, q. 57, art. 2. Therefore if understanding, as constitutive of God, cannot reach the point of identifying with itself, without any virtual distinction, one of these virtues, namely knowledge, neither can it reach the point of being identified, without the same virtual distinction, with another intellectual virtue; namely intelligence, or the light of principles.

The falsity of the consequence, however, is also clear. Because, as the Angelic Doctor teaches in the place just cited, intelligence is distinguished from wisdom in that the latter is carried to principles as they are the cause of conclusions; intelligence, however, to principles as they are in themselves: therefore intelligence in God will not be able to be virtually distinguished from understanding, as it is constitutive of the divine essence. The consequence is clear. Because each of the two has the same formal object: since understanding, as constitutive of the divine essence, is carried to it as it is in itself, and since that same essence as it is in itself is the first principle and the cause of all conclusions deducible from it, it follows that intelligence, or the light of principles, found in God, which terminates at the first principle as it is in itself, must terminate at the divine essence as it is taken in itself.

66 Confirmed. For by the same reason God's knowledge would be distinguished from wisdom, from art, from prudence, from the other intellectual virtues, as from Eubulia, or the virtue of good counsel, and from Synesis and Gnome, which are the virtues that pronounce a verdict on things to be done: but this cannot be said: therefore, etc. The sequel seems certain. For knowledge which does not reach the point of constituting the knower in his nature remains within the compass of intellectual virtue as taken strictly; but the intellectual virtue of knowledge, or of wisdom so accepted, must be distinguished from the other intellectual virtues, as D. Thom. teaches 1. 2, q. 57, art. 2.

The falsity of the consequence, however, is proved. For since God's knowledge is most perfect in the line of knowledge, and comprehends the most perfect and highest cause, namely the divine essence, it is not distinguished from wisdom, as D. Thom. teaches in 1, dist. 35, q. 1, art. 1, ad ult., and in the same place against Ambaldus. And likewise, from the very fact that it is most perfect knowledge, it must also be most perfect in the line of practical knowledge: and consequently there must also be existing in God's intellect the most perfect reason, both of all things to be done and of all things to be made: of which the first pertains to prudence, and to the other virtues annexed to it, namely the advisory and the indicative: the second, however, to art, as D. Thom. teaches in q. 57, cited above.

67 Lastly. For in God there is not virtually distinguished a multiplied knowledge, one of metaphysical things, another of physical things, and so of others, but only a single one, which corresponds and is equivalent to all the other inferior sciences: therefore neither will a twofold virtually intellectual understanding be posited in him, one of which is constitutive of the divine essence, and another of which has the character of knowledge. The antecedent is commonly received by theologians, with one or another exception.

The consequence is proved. For a single knowledge without any virtual distinction is sufficient in God, because, since it is infinite within the genus of knowledge, it must embrace all the perfection and knowledge contained within the aforesaid genus; therefore, since God's knowledge is also infinite, both in the line of knowledge and in the line of intellection, it must also embrace without any virtual distinction all the intellection found in God; and consequently be entirely the same as the intellection constitutive of God in his proper essence.

§ II. The true opinion of D. Thomas.

68 It must nevertheless be said that God's knowledge, taken properly and strictly, is a divine attribute: and therefore does not pertain to the intrinsic constitutive principle of the divine essence, as [that essence is] distinct from its properties, or attributes. Thus D. Thom., in the prologue to this question, which we saw above, says: What, after the consideration of those things which pertain to the divine substance, remains to be considered is that which pertains to its operation, that is, those things which pertain to the operation that does not constitute God's essence and substance: and among these he reckons knowledge; and therefore he holds that knowledge does not pertain to the divine substance, or essence; but is something consequent to it, in the manner of a quasi-property, or attribute, of it. The same he also teaches, both in this article in the answer to the second [objection], as we shall set out in the proof of the assertion. And also in 1, dist. 35, q. 1, art. 1, in the answer to the second, in these words: When God is named to be being, nothing is expressed except what pertains to his perfection, and not his whole perfection. And likewise when he is said to be knowing and willing, and such like. And so it is clear that all these things are one in God according to the thing, but differ according to reason: and this difference is not only in the intellect, but is founded in the truth and perfection of the thing: and just as God is properly said to be being, so he is properly said to be knowing and willing, and such like; nor is there any plurality, or addition, or order in the thing there, but only in the reason. Where, as you see, the Sacred Doctor distinguishes, by a distinction of reason founded in the thing, or virtual distinction, the character of being found in God, namely being by essence, from the character of knowledge and volition; and therefore he holds that [knowledge] does not pertain to the intrinsic concept of the divine essence, as that concept is understood with attributes. Because what is constitutive of the divine essence cannot be virtually distinguished from the character of being by essence, which essentially pertains to the concept of the divine essence; from the fact that all things which in God pertain to one and the same line, whether of essence or of property, must be one and the same formality, without any virtual distinction, as we shall state more fully in the treatise on the Will of God, disp. 2.

69 The same opinion is held by Chrysostom, hom. 1, on the incomprehensibility of the divine nature, around the middle; where, having said that it is the utmost madness to wish to know what the substance of God is, in order to show this, he distinguishes God's substance from his wisdom, saying: For substance is not from wisdom, but wisdom from substance: and he adds: but since the Prophets are not able fully to perceive it (namely God's wisdom) to what extent do those rave who think that substance itself can be subjected to their reasonings. Behold, where he manifestly teaches that the wisdom of God arises from God's very substance; and consequently is an attribute of it. Which also Damascene teaches, lib. 1, de Fide, cap. 4, at the end, where: Thus, whether one wishes to say good, or just, or wise, or whatever, one is at length speaking not of the nature of God, but of what is contained in nature, you explain. Whence this assertion is commonly held by theologians: Henry of Ghent, in his Summa Theologiae, q. 2, num. 27; Aegidius, tom. 1, de beatudine, lib. 5, q. 4, art. 8, referring all theologians for it. Gonzalez, in the present difficulty, ult., disp. 34, sect. 4; Granado, 1, part, tract. 2, disp. 9; and all those who assert that the divine essence is not constituted by understanding in act second, but by this, that it is radical and intellectual, whom we shall mention below in art. 4.

§ III. The opinion of the Angelic Doctor, drawn from himself and from Damascene, is established.

70 Now, in order that we may set out the fundamental reason of this assertion, drawn from Damascene, lib. 1, de Fide, cap. 12, and from D. Thom. in the places cited, it must be supposed first that an attribute is nothing other than — as it is taken from Damascene and commonly admitted by theologians — a certain absolute reason existing necessarily and formally in God, and following, in our way of understanding, or (which amounts to the same for the present) virtually, upon his essence, as something constituted in a certain quasi-atomic species. It is said, then, first, that an attribute must be a certain absolute reason, so that in this way the divine relations are excluded, which, though they are formally and necessarily in God and follow upon his essence in our way of understanding, are nevertheless, because they are not absolute reasons but relative, not attributive properties of the divine essence, but personal, or constitutive, or consecutive: constitutive indeed, as is clear from Paternity, Filiation, and passive Spiritation, which constitute the persons; consecutive, however, as is seen in active spiration, which supposes the persons of the Father and the Son as constituted, and follows upon them insofar as they are so constituted.

71 It is added, then, that such an absolute reason must exist formally and necessarily in God, so that by the first part those things are rejected which are contained in him only virtually, and by the second part those which are in him only freely. And so neither the possible creatures contained virtually in God, nor God's free volition, insofar as it is such, which exists formally in him, has the character of an attribute.

It is asserted further, that attributes must follow, in our way of understanding, upon the constituted essence of God, so that in this way that same essence is excluded from the character of an attribute: since, although the divine essence may have the other conditions formerly demanded, as is clear from itself, it still cannot also follow, in our way of understanding, upon itself as already constituted.

And lastly it is said to be constituted as something in a certain quasi-atomic species, so that in this way it is distinguished from common, or transcendent, reasons, which are included in these same attributes or in other divine reasons, and likewise from the quasi-differential reasons of those same attributes: because although these two reasons concur in constituting the attribute, neither of them, taken by itself, has the character of an attribute.

72 Secondly, it must be supposed that God's knowledge agrees with the earlier parts, and also with the last part, of this definition, or quasi-definition: since it is clear from itself that it is an absolute reason, and not something formally relative. And likewise that it is something existing formally and necessarily in God, as is clear from what was said in the preceding difficulty. And lastly that it is something constituted in a certain quasi-atomic species, as will be clearer from itself and from what we shall immediately add. The whole difficulty, therefore, is whether there is anything virtually distinct from the divine essence, as that essence is understood with attributes, and consequently virtually distinct from divine intellection, as constitutive of God. For by the very fact that it is distinguished from the latter in the aforesaid way, it cannot fail to follow virtually upon it, as will be more fully explained, and consequently to have all the conditions required for the character of an attribute.

73 Now, in order to show this virtual distinction of knowledge from understanding, it must be supposed, thirdly, what in tract. de Voluntate Dei, disp. 2, num. 31, we shall bring forward in a like case to prove the virtual distinction between the divine will and its affective virtues; namely, that the most powerful proof of this virtual distinction between understanding constitutive of God and divine knowledge is to be drawn from the common consent of philosophers and theologians, who assert that the proper act of knowledge, abstracted from created and uncreated, is to know a thing through its causes, or formal reasons, and consequently that its formal and adequate object is the thing as knowable in this peculiar and determinate way, namely through its causes, or through the aforesaid reasons.

74 The reason, however, for which we have recourse, in the present case, to this common consent of theologians and philosophers, is that formal and adequate objects have the character of first principles with respect to powers, or virtues, whether affective or intellectual, from the fact that their whole character is drawn from the objects as from a first root: first principles, however, are not so much to be proved as to be accepted from the common consent of the Doctors. Especially, since in the present case there is a peculiar reason on account of which the common verdict must be upheld, otherwise powers or virtues distinct from one another would easily be confused, by assigning to them in place of the proper one a single and same more universal formal reason, terminating in which they are one and the same power or virtue, nor could the opposite easily be shown by reason.

75 These things having been supposed, it will not be difficult to reduce to this form the fundamental reason for the assertion suggested by D. Thom. and Damascene. Since it is certain that knowledge is found in God properly and formally: therefore it looks to its own proper formal and adequate object, its own proper knowable, as such, that is, in this determinate way, namely as knowable through its causes, or formal reasons: therefore such knowledge will be virtually distinguished from God's understanding, as this constitutes his essence, and will be a true attribute with respect to it. The antecedent is clear from what was said in the second supposition. The first consequence, however, [follows] from what we said in the third supposition. For any virtue, potency, or act looks to its own proper formal and adequate object: therefore, since the formal and adequate object of knowledge is its own proper knowable as such, or as it is knowable in this determinate way, namely through its causes, or formal reasons, the consequence is that divine knowledge looks to this formal and adequate object.

From this also the second consequence is clear as regards its first part, namely the virtual distinction between God's understanding, as constitutive of his essence, and knowledge. For the aforesaid understanding looks to a distinct formal and adequate object, namely the essence, or divine being, under a broader reason, namely insofar as it is (let us say so) being, or divine intelligible, as we have said — but yet not insofar as it is intelligible in this determinate way, namely through a cause, or reason a priori. Then, because even in creatures the intellectual nature does not look, as its formal and adequate object, to its intelligible, as intelligible in this determinate way, namely through causes. Then also: because the divine essence, at least insofar as it is to itself the reason of passive intelligibility, according to which reason it is at least in the first place, and principally, the object of divine intellection, as constitutive of God, is not knowable through a cause, or reason a priori, as is clear from itself.

76 And lastly the same consequence, as regards its second part, namely that knowledge is a true attribute of God as constituted by his understanding, clearly follows from the first part of that same consequence and from the second supposition. Because that which is virtually distinguished from the divine essence cannot pertain to its intrinsic concept, as that concept is understood with attributes: from the fact that whatever pertains to the concept of the aforesaid essence constitutes only a single line of essence, and that which pertains to a single line, precisely, is one and the same most simple formality, without any virtual distinction, as we said in the treatise on the Vision of God, disp. 2, and as we shall assert more fully in the treatise on the Will of God, disp. 2, dub. 2: and consequently that which is virtually distinguished from that same essence cannot fail to follow upon it, as is clear from itself: and consequently, if it be an absolute reason existing formally and necessarily in God, as knowledge is, according to what we said in the second supposition, it cannot fail to have the character of an attribute, as is clear from the definition of an attribute brought forward in the second supposition.

It is confirmed. For in order that divine understanding, constitutive of God, be infinite and a pure act within its own line, or order, it is required, and is sufficient, that it be being by essence, and that of itself most formally it have the character of an intellectual virtue and of intellection tending to the essence, or to the divine being according to the general reason of its amplitude: that is, insofar as it is (let us put it so) divine intelligible, as we have said; even though it do not identify with itself, without virtual distinction, the knowledge of God: therefore, in order to constitute God, it is not necessary that it identify with itself, without the same distinction, divine knowledge: and consequently this will be an attribute with respect to it.

This last consequence follows from the first, as is clear from what has just been said. The first, however, follows from the antecedent. Since, as is clear from what we shall touch upon in tract. de Voluntate Dei, disp. 2, dub. 2, and as will be clearer from what is to be said in art. 4 of this question, that very thing, and nothing more, is required in order that the degree of understanding be constitutive of your God, which is desired in order that it be infinitely perfect within its own line. For since of itself it is constitutive of nature, as our Complutensians excellently expound from Arist. and D. Thom., lib. 1, de Anima, disp. 4, num. 28, and thereafter, the consequence is that, if it be purged of all imperfections, and consequently be infinitely perfect within its own line, it cannot fail to constitute the divine nature.

77 The antecedent, however, is proved. For just as, in order that created intellectuality, constitutive of created nature, for example the Angelic nature of Michael, may sufficiently constitute it, it is enough that it include the character of being by participation, or that involving potentiality in the character of being, and also the character of life and of a certain intellectuality admixtured with a certain potentiality: and lastly that it look to being in common, involving potentiality, that is, as abstracted from God and from creatures, and consequently taken in its whole amplitude: so, in order that divine intellectuality may sufficiently constitute the divine nature, it will be enough that it state all these things in the manner of a most pure act, and consequently that it state entity not by participation, which involves potentiality in the character of being, but entity by essence, and over and above the character of intellectual life in the manner of a most pure act, which is the same as understanding identified entirely without virtual distinction with the power of understanding; and lastly, that it also look, as by the manner of an adequate object, to being, which has the same purity as that which is taken in its whole amplitude (let us say so), namely the divine essence, or divine being, as we have said. For since the limitation and potentiality of the degree of understanding in created natures is sufficiently gathered from its real distinction from its intellection, it follows that a complete identity of the two, without any real distinction either actual or arising from the nature of the thing, or finally virtual, suffices for infinity and most pure actuality within the same line.

78 Confirmed, second. For from the fact that the will of God looks to the divine goodness in its whole amplitude, we infer that it is virtually distinct from his mercy, which looks to the same goodness in a determinate way, namely, in that it is determinately the reason of relieving misery: and moreover, from this virtual distinction we infer that mercy is, in our way of understanding, posterior to the will, as is clear from what we asserted in tract. de Voluntate Dei, disp. 2, num. 32: therefore also, from the fact that God's understanding, as it constitutes the divine essence, looks to it, or to the divine being, in its whole amplitude, or as it is divine intelligible, as we have said, and that knowledge looks to the same divine being in a determinate way, namely as it is the cause, or the formal reason of others, we infer that the aforesaid knowledge is virtually distinguished from divine understanding, as constitutive of God, and follows virtually upon it.

It is confirmed, lastly, by the final reason which we shall bring forward in favour of our assertion in tract. de Voluntate Dei, disp. 2, num. 34. For that reason, applied as it is in the present case (due proportion being observed), convinces this assertion excellently: and explains, as far as possible, the root of the matter.

§ IV. The arguments brought forward at the outset are met.

79 With the antecedent granted, according to what has been said, both consequences must be denied; and for the proof of the first, on which the proof of the second depends, it must be said that God's understanding, considered as pertaining to the intrinsic constitution of the divine essence, must be most perfect with an eminent and virtual perfection, both within all the lines of understanding and within the other lines besides: from the fact that it is the primordial line, bearing the character of nature, in which all other formalities and lines are rooted, and from which, in our way of understanding, they all flow: it is not, however, necessary that, taken strictly, it be most perfect within every line and the genus of understanding, so as formally to contain all the lines belonging to that genus; but it is enough that it have the highest perfection within its own line of nature, and that it reach the point of being identically, and with virtual distinction alone, scientific understanding.

This is explained. For within the genus, or (let us say so) the amplitude of understanding, there are several and diverse lines, because there are several and distinct formal and adequate objects considered by themselves: any formal and adequate object, however, gives origin, as it were, to one line. Whence something can be said to be most perfect in the genus of understanding in a twofold way: either because it formally comprehends and contains that whole genus, and all the lines of diverse species belonging to it: or because it is only formally, and infinite according to what is proper to it, within a single line according to the species of those several [lines] which are contained within that whole genus, even though if such a thing constituted the primordial line of the order of understanding, namely the line of nature, it would indeed have, not formally but radically and in potency, according to what is proper to it, all the perfection of the other lines.

Wherefore, since God's understanding, as it constitutes the divine nature, is not infinite in the genus of understanding, in so far as this denotes comprehending and formally containing that whole genus, or quasi-genus, and all its lines; but is only infinite in the genus of understanding, in so far as this signifies only that it is infinite within a single line, according to the species of those several which are contained within the whole genus of understanding, namely within the line of nature, it follows that it ought formally, and without any virtual distinction, to contain those things which pertain to this line, even though, because this line is the primordial and radical line, it ought, after the manner of a root, virtually to possess in advance the perfection of the other lines; whether those lines are contained under the order and genus of understanding, or under any other order: and consequently it will be necessary that, by the character of its most pure actuality, it identify with itself — with virtual distinction, however — both the line of knowledge and the other lines besides, so that, in the way just explained, it does not identify them, and is their quasi-root and fontal principle: we would conclude excellently that it would not yet be most perfect within its own line of nature; but otherwise if, in the manner of a most pure act, and in the way explained, it possessed the aforesaid.

80 At the first confirmation, the antecedent must be granted, and both consequences denied. And for the proof of the first, upon which the second rests, the antecedent must be distinguished: and if its meaning be that the comprehensive understanding of God requires that it reach, in him as in the cause, or in the formal reason a priori, all the attributes, and also all the possible creatures, so that the most formal reason of reaching all these things be the very essence, as it has the character of a cause, or of a reason a priori, this must be denied: but otherwise if its meaning be that it reaches all these things, and consequently that the essence is the cause, or reason, of them, so that the reason of reaching is another, more universal and more elevated, than we have already indicated. And lastly the consequence must be denied: because, for it to be legitimate, the antecedent would have to be true in the first sense.

It is therefore one thing whether the comprehensive understanding of God, simply by virtue of being such, must reach the divine essence, the attributes, and all the possible creatures, by knowing that the essence is the reason a priori of those and the actual cause of these; and another thing whether the most formal reason of reaching, both the attributes and the creatures, must be the very divine essence, as having the character of a cause and of a reason a priori. The first, indeed, is true: and so God's understanding, as it constitutes his essence, and is comprehensive of it, reaches all these things, from the fact that it is that immaterial thing which the divine essence is constituted by, and consequently it terminates in it with as much cognition as is demanded from the divine essence itself. The second, however, is false: because for the comprehensive understanding of God it is enough that it reach all these things under a more elevated and more universal reason, namely insofar as it terminates in all these things under the reason of the divine essence in its whole amplitude in the line of the intelligible object, or (let us say) insofar as it has the character of the divine intelligible, as we have said.

81 It makes no difference if one objects that the intellection of God, as constitutive of the divine nature, cannot be as great in the line of intellection as the divine essence in the line of the intelligible object, unless, insofar as it is constitutive of it, it be also scientific understanding: therefore, etc. The antecedent seems certain. Because the divine essence, as it is the intelligible object, demands to be known in both of the ways assigned: therefore, unless it be reached in both ways by the intellection constitutive of God as such, and consequently unless such intellection be most formally the knowledge of God itself, the aforesaid intellection will not be as great in the line of cognition as the essence itself in the line of the intelligible.

For we answer by denying the antecedent. And for the proof, the antecedent must be distinguished: insofar as it is the intelligible object, through an intelligibility that is precisely and entirely its first, and constitutes, as it were, the fontal and first line in the line of the intelligible object, is to be denied: insofar as it is the intelligible object, through an intelligibility that is not entirely the first, taken precisely, but [insofar] as it at the same time involves an intelligibility that is, as it were, secondary to it, and constitutes another, as it were secondary, line in the line of the intelligible object, is to be granted. And then, in the same proportional way, the consequent must be distinguished: how great it itself is in the line of the intelligible, through an intelligibility that is entirely primary, and constitutes the first and fontal line in the line of the intelligible object, the consequence is to be denied; through an intelligibility that is not entirely primary, taken precisely, but [insofar] as it involves another intelligibility, and another line already described, it must be granted.

Hence, however, it does not follow that such intellection constitutive of God is not comprehensive of him through an altogether first, per se comprehension, such as the divine essence demands as being first comprehensible; but only that it is not comprehensive of God through a (let us say so) first and second comprehension: this, however, is not inconvenient; nay, it implies the opposite. Because since the divine essence, as it is comprehensible in both ways, pertains to two lines in the line of the object, it cannot be reached through one and the same divine intellection pertaining to one line; but it demands two intellections virtually distinct, and pertaining to diverse lines, and consequently of such a condition that what one reaches through the manner of the reason under which cannot be reached by the other in this way; [what the other reaches] must be known by the first through the manner of the reason which, so that no objection from it may escape it.

At the second confirmation it is clear from what was said in the answer to the first.

82 At the second head, the antecedent must be granted: not indeed in such a way that in us it pertain to the concept of nature as being the root of acts of knowing, inasmuch as they are such reductively speaking, but inasmuch as they have the character of acts of understanding. And then the consequence must be denied. And for its proof, I grant the antecedent; the consequence must be denied. For from the fact that in us being radical and potential knowers pertains, in the way said, to the concept of our nature, and from the fact that this same thing, through the manner of a most pure act, must pertain to the concept of the divine nature, it does not follow that being actually and formally knowing be of the concept of that same divine nature, but only that being the root of knowing through the manner of a most pure act pertain to its quiddative concept: because this is what, through the manner of a most pure act, corresponds to our radical and potential virtue for knowing.

Just as from the fact that being radical and potential willing be of the concept of man, and this same thing through that same most pure act must be of the concept of the divine nature, it is not correctly concluded that being actually and formally willing be of its essence; but that being the root, through the manner of a most pure act, of willing — which is nothing other than being intelligent — pertain to the quiddative concept of God. And the reason is the same in both cases. Because neither volition nor knowledge is of the number of those formalities which have the power to constitute nature, but rather they necessarily presuppose nature as constituted: and therefore that which, through the manner of a most pure act, corresponds to our radical virtue for knowing and willing cannot be the actual volition or knowledge itself; but some other most pure act which, in this manner, is the root of these, namely primordial understanding, which constitutes the divine nature.

83 At the third, the antecedent must be granted, and the consequence denied. Because all those potencies, or (let us speak more accurately) all those ratios inadequate to the divine omnipotence, arise from the most pure actuality of the divine essence, and are ordered toward the same formal object. Now, although intellection, as constitutive of God, and as having the character of knowledge, agrees with God by reason of its highest immateriality, in the way, however, indicated above; nevertheless they do not belong to it with respect to the same formal object, as has been explained. And so they must necessarily be virtually distinguished.

84 At the fourth, the sequel must be granted, and the minor denied. And for the proof, I grant the antecedent; the consequence must be denied. For the proof of this consequence it must be said that, although intelligence in God, which corresponds in us to the habit of first principles, and which is an intellectual virtue, as D. Thom. teaches 1. 2, q. 57, art. 2, is carried to the divine essence as it is in itself, as to the reason which, and consequently agrees in this reason with God's understanding as constitutive of the divine nature; nevertheless it tends to it under a formally diverse reason. Because intelligence reaches that very essence as it is known per se. As in general any habit of first principles tends to those principles as they are known per se: and therefore, however perfectly and infinitely God's essence is reached by him through this light, or through intelligence, it yet never by the force of that light, according to what it brings from its quasi-differential reason, attains to the cognition (let us say so) of the conclusions which are, as it were, inferred from the divine essence: because all those things are outside the line of the object of this light, taken in the way just explained, from the fact that the aforesaid conclusions are known through something else, namely through the divine essence. Now God's understanding, as it constitutes him, tends to that same essence under a more universal and more elevated reason than we have already indicated.

We said by the force of it, etc. Because if the aforesaid light of intelligence is taken according to what is common, or according to what it includes in a transcendent manner, and is thus identified with the other divine formalities, it can also extend to the aforesaid conclusions.

85 It makes no difference if one objects that God's understanding, as constitutive of him, is the most perfect cognition and judgment about the divine essence: but it is not the cognition and judgment of it as known through something prior: therefore, as known through itself: and consequently such cognition and judgment will have the character of intelligence.

For we answer from what has been said. That although understanding, as constitutive of God, terminates in the divine essence as it is known per se specifically; it does not terminate in it as it is known per se reductively, that is, it is not known through the aforesaid understanding to be known per se; and again it is not known by it through any medium which is prior to it; nevertheless the most formal reason of knowing it is that it is known per se: because it does not terminate in it as known per se, but under another, more elevated and more universal reason, than we have already explained.

This solution is drawn from D. Thom. in the place cited, in these words: It must be said that the speculative intellectual virtue is that by which the speculative intellect is perfected for considering the true, for this is its good work. Now the true is considerable in a twofold way. In one way, as what is known per se; and in another way, as what is known through something else; but what is known per se has the character of a principle, and is at once perceived by the intellect: and therefore the habit perfecting the intellect for the consideration of such a true is called intellect, which is the habit of principles. Since these words must be taken in the formal sense, as is clear from itself, because in them the matter at hand is the distinction and the formal object of the intellectual virtues, they plainly indicate that the formal reason of the light of principles is to be drawn from the fact that it tends to its object, insofar as reductively and formally it has being known per se.

86 At the confirmation, the sequel must be granted as regards all its parts, except the first: because although God's knowledge is not virtually distinguished from wisdom, it is nevertheless so distinguished from the other intellectual virtues enumerated there. The reason, however, for which wisdom is entirely identified with the knowledge of God is this. First, because, as D. Thom. teaches, wisdom is the same as most perfect knowledge: and it is clear that the knowledge of God is most perfect. Then also: because it is proper to wisdom, on the testimony of the same Sacred Doctor, 1. 2, q. 57, art. 2, to consider the highest causes: and so it judges and orders all things fittingly, because a perfect and universal judgment cannot be had except by resolution to the first causes. Wherefore, since it is proper to divine knowledge to know through the highest causes, namely through the divine essence, as it is the efficient and exemplary cause of all things, whether actual or virtual, it therefore coincides with wisdom: as also in the Metaphysics the reason of knowledge and of wisdom coincide: because this knowledge proceeds through the highest, or most universal, causes.

87 The reason, however, on account of which the knowledge of God is distinguished from the other intellectual virtues enumerated there is that it has a formal object distinct from all of them. For art, as D. Thom. says in the question cited, 1. 2, art. 3, is a right reason of things to be made, as also prudence is a right reason of things to be done: yet in such a way that the former, on the testimony of the same Sacred Doctor in the same place, if taken precisely, confers the faculty of a good work, but not a right use of it, because the good of artificial things is not a good of appetite, but a good of the artificial works themselves: and therefore art does not presuppose a right appetite; whereas prudence, namely, not only confers the faculty of a good work, but also its use; or that it be rightly done in the moral order; and so it presupposes a right appetite. Now neither of them tends reductively and formally to its own object, insofar as that object is reachable through its causes, so that this be the most formal reason of reaching it, but only specifically, from the fact that both can reach the causes of the thing about which they are concerned; and [that] in the divine essence, as in the cause, they reach their material object, namely creatures: yet neither according to what is peculiar to it looks to the divine essence, as most formally it has the character of a cause and of a means for knowing the creature, so that in this consists their proper reason: but each one of them, according to what is peculiar to it, looks to the divine essence most formally and reductively speaking, as it has that highest actuality from which it follows that it is the reason of knowing and of being conversant with its material object, namely with creatures: so that this reason, as it were, formalizes the other reasons, and consequently draws out that reason of reaching its own object in the divine essence, as in a cause, from this, that it has the character of its proper knowledge, which seeks the opposite.

88 And then, because, as the same D. Thom. teaches in the question cited, art. 6, three acts of reason are found with regard to things to be done, the first of which is to deliberate, the second to judge, the third to command; therefore for the first act a special virtue is posited, which is called Eubulia, and transferred to God it has to deliberate about means, with the imperfection of inquiry excluded, and to look to the divine essence, as by the manner of an object, or of the reason under which, and in the way just explained, is the reason of deliberating about means. For the second, however, two virtues are posited, namely Synesis and Gnome, as the Angelic Doctor teaches there: yet in such a way that Synesis judges according to common rules, and Gnome beyond those: and consequently both look to the essence of God, according as the reason, which we have already indicated, is the reason of judging in the manner proportionate to each of them. And likewise, because the proper act of prudence is to command, on the testimony of the Angelic Doctor in art. 6, cited above, it therefore looks also to that same essence of God, as in the same proportional way it is the reason of commanding. None, however, of the aforesaid virtues terminates formally and reductively in that same essence, as having the character of a cause, or of a reason a priori, of things to be known: and so all of them are distinguished from knowledge, as also from one another, on account of the distinct formal objects already explained to which they look. But on all these matters let D. Thom. be consulted throughout the question cited, q. 57, and 2. 2, q. 47, art. 4 and 5, and q. 49, as also q. 51, art. 4:

Nor against these does the proof of the minor brought forward there have force. For from the fact that the knowledge of God must be most perfect in the line of practical knowledge, it is inferred at the utmost that there must exist in God's intellect the most perfect reason, both with respect to all things to be done and to all things to be made; but not in the same way, and under the same formal reason under which the intellectual virtues already described have that: because knowledge looks to all these things as they are reachable through the essence of God, as it has the character of a cause, or of a reason a priori of them, but not so the aforesaid virtues. And so, although prudence, for example, is a virtue perfecting the practical intellect, and consequently a practical intellectual virtue, nevertheless, formally speaking, it is not practical knowledge.

89 At the last, with the antecedent granted, the consequence must be denied. And for the proof, the antecedent must be granted, both on account of the reason brought forward there, and also because in God there cannot be physical knowledge, taken formally: because knowing through a medium that concerns sensible matter signifies an imperfection to be banished from God. And then the supposition of the consequence must be denied, namely that the knowledge of God is infinite in the genus of intellection, in the way in which it is infinite in the genus, or within the line, of knowledge: because in the line of knowledge, which is only the single one, it is infinite as comprehending and formally containing all the perfection of that single line: but within the order and genus of understanding, under which several lines are contained, it is not infinite as comprehending and formally containing the whole perfection of all the lines, but as a single line, and as the formal reason contained under that genus. And so within that same genus of understanding there can be given a multiplied intellection contained under that genus, which pertains to diverse lines, as is clear from itself. Although it stand that the line of knowledge is identified with the other lines already mentioned, so that it is only virtually distinguished from them.