Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

After we have shown that there is in God an intellection taken properly and formally, it remains that we explain whether such an intellection at the same time has the reason of knowledge taken properly and formally, or whether it is distinguished virtually from the intellection such as it is precisely in God, or only on the part of our mode of conceiving, as is said below.

§ I. Two opinions are set out.

40 The first opinion denies to God the reason of knowledge taken properly and formally. Thus some, whom D. Thom. reports in 1. dist. 35. art. 1. For that opinion argues as follows, first. For knowledge, of which we are speaking, is the habit of the conclusion, just as the intellect is the habit of principles, as the Philosopher teaches, 6. Ethic. cap. 3. 5. and 6.; but God does not know anything by the manner of a conclusion; because in that way his intellect would descend from principles to conclusions, which Dionysius also removes from the Angels, 7. de divinis nominibus: therefore knowledge is not formally in God.

The Holy Doctor confirms this same point, de verit. quaest. 2. art. 1. For everything which is known by knowledge must be known by something more known: but nothing is more, and less, known to God, but all things are equally most known to him: therefore there cannot be knowledge in him.

Secondly, he argues in the place cited from 1. sententiarum. To what is most simple, and first, nothing befits which presupposes something to itself, and which is added to a pre-existing thing: but knowledge presupposes life, and essence, and says that something is added to them, as is said in the principle of the book On Causes: therefore, since God is a most simple, and first, being, knowledge cannot be found in him.

41 Thirdly, the Holy Doctor proves this very point. Nothing which requires plurality is found in that which is most one: but knowledge requires a certain plurality, namely of the knower, of the knowing, and of the known: therefore it will not befit God, who is most one.

Nor does it matter if you say that the distinction between the knower and the known is not necessary to the reason of knowledge: but that the two can coincide in the same.

For the contrary is said (D. Thom. says) that nothing can be said to be like itself, as Hilary says; nor does anything receive, or contain, itself: but according to the Philosopher, 1. de Anima text. 25., knowledge is the assimilation of the knower to the thing known, and knowledge is according to the reception of the known in the knower: therefore it seems that the same thing cannot be both knower and known.

Lastly, it is proved. For the cognition of God, taken first and per se, terminates in his own essence, and, being thus known there, reaches the attributes and the creatures: therefore there is not knowledge in God, taken properly and formally. The antecedent is clear from those things which we have said in the treatise On the Vision of God, and it will be clearer still from what is to be said below, and it is admitted in common by the Theologians. The consequence, however, is proved. Because in this does knowledge differ from the knowledge of principles, which is called understanding, that the latter turns about the conclusion first and per se, whereas the latter tends first and per se to the principles and causes of conclusions: therefore, if all divine cognition turns about its own essence first and per se, which has the reason of principle and cause, or quasi-cause, of its attributes and of creatures, the consequence will be that all divine cognition is a cognition of principles, and none scientific, if we are speaking of scientific cognition properly and formally.

42 The second opinion admits knowledge in God, taken properly and formally; it denies it, however, with respect to his attributes, and to the other created truths, which are altogether necessary. Thus, as to each part, Durandus in 1. dist. 35. quaest. 4., and Ferrara, reported by Gonzalez in the present disputation 34. n. 4. And as to the latter, Democritus, and Herveus, quodlib. 2. quaest. 2.

The foundation is. Because all scientific cognition must be through a cause: but neither those things which are formally in God, such as the attributes, nor the aforesaid truths of creatures have a cause of their own: therefore the cognition of God reaching those things will not have the true reason of knowledge. The greater with the consequence is clear. The lesser, however, as to the prior part, is also clear. Because whatever is caused cannot fail to be created. As to the second part, however, it is also clear. Because that which cannot fail to be cannot have a cause of its own: because a cause is desired in order that a thing be produced and be: but the aforesaid truths, precisely because they are altogether necessary, cannot fail to be such: therefore they cannot have a cause of their own.

§ II. The true opinion is explained by two conclusions.

43 It must nevertheless be said, first, that there is knowledge in God, taken properly and formally. This assertion seems certain according to faith. Esther. 14. You, Lord, who have the knowledge of all things. Job. 21. Shall anyone teach God knowledge? Psal. 138. Thy knowledge is wonderful to me. Ecclesiast. 42. For the Lord knew all knowledge. Ad Rom. 11. O the height of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God. Ad Colossenses 2. In whom are all the treasures of the knowledge and wisdom of God. Which testimonies, according to the rule of Augustine, dub. 1. of this disputation, adduced, and received in common by the Theologians, must be understood in the proper and formal sense, as is clear from what has been said there. Hence the holy Fathers commonly defend this very point, Dionys. cap. 7. de divinis nominib., August. 1. de doctrina Christiana cap. 8., and lib. 6. de Trinit. cap. 7. tom. 3., and lib. 15. cap. 5. and cap. 6. throughout, D. Thom. in the present place, and 1. cont. Gent. cap. 45., and many others, with whom all the Theologians in common agree.

But in order that we may set out the fundamental reason of this assertion drawn from D. Thom., it is to be noted, with Bannez in the present place, that since knowledge is the cognition of a thing through a cause, it can be understood in two ways how a thing is known through a cause, namely, either through a cause on the part of the knower and of the thing known, or solely through a cause of the thing known. Then something is known through a cause on the part of the knower, when not only is one thing known to be the cause of another, but the cognition of the thing known is also caused by another cognition, through which the cause is known. Then, on the other hand, something is known solely through a cause of the thing known, when the knower knows one thing to be the cause of another, although the cognition of the one is not caused by another cognition of the cause.

44 Hence, then, the fundamental reason is drawn from divine Thomas. Because for the reason of knowledge taken properly and formally it is not required that it be the cognition of a thing through a cause both on the part of the knower and on the part of the thing known, but it suffices that it be the cognition of a thing through a cause holding itself on the part of the thing known: but God knows things most perfectly through their causes, or through causes holding themselves on their part: therefore there will not only be knowledge, taken properly and formally, but the most perfect knowledge. The greater is clear. Then, because to know is nothing other than to know a thing through a cause: but for a thing to be known with certainty through a cause, it is enough that it be known through its own cause, or through a cause holding itself only on its part. Then again: because the Angels have true and proper knowledge, formally taken, as all the Theologians admit in common, and yet they do not know a thing through a cause holding itself on the part of the knower; that is, in such a way that the cognition of the effect be caused by another cognition of the cause, since otherwise they would understand by discourse, and by going from one cognition of some truth to the cognition of another, which indeed plainly conflicts with the proper mode of knowing them, namely by a simple intuition, as D. Thom. teaches, 1. part. quaest. 58. art. 3., and de verit. quaest. 2. art. 1. ad 4., and with him all the Theologians.

The lesser is clear too. Because God knows all created effects, and their causes, most perfectly, and that the aforesaid causes are the causes of such effects, although he attains to all these things by a simple intuition and without discourse: this, however, suffices in order that he may know most perfectly through causes holding themselves on their part: therefore, and so on.

45 It is confirmed. For God knows all creatures most perfectly in his own essence, as in a cause: therefore he has the most perfect knowledge of them. The consequence is clear. The antecedent, however, is clear. Then from those things said in tract. de Visione Dei disp. 7. n. 72. Then also: because, since the divine essence is the cause of creatures, and God penetrates and comprehends it most perfectly, he cannot fail to know in it, as in a cause penetrated and comprehended, all created effects.

Nor does it matter if you object that the knowledge of a thing is the cognition through its own proper cause: but the divine essence is not the own and peculiar cause of a thing, for example of a man, but the common cause of all possible effects: therefore the cognition of a man in the divine essence, as in a cause, will not be scientific cognition.

For it will be answered that the divine essence, as it has the reason of a cause, can be considered in two ways. First, adequately, according as it contains all creatures, not only according to the reasons in which they are gathered together, but also according to the special ones in which they are distinguished. Secondly, inadequately, according as it precisely expresses the containing of some determinate creature (for example a man), far more eminent and perfect than if it were destined only for containing that one.

. We say, therefore, that although the divine essence, taken adequately, is the common cause of all creatures, it is not so if it is taken inadequately: and so although we grant that with respect to the knowledge of a thing it is considered that it is known through its own proper cause, nothing on this account prevents the cognition of some effect in the divine essence, as in a cause, from being true knowledge.

46 Although it stand (as is clear from itself) that the knowledge of God, by reason of its highest perfection and eminence, cannot terminate in the divine essence taken with precision, as it is the adequate cause of some creature: but it must necessarily terminate at the same time in that same essence, as it is the adequate cause of all, although it terminates in this creature, for example a man, because it contains him in particular, and in the brutes, because it also has them in particular. But on these matters let those things be consulted which we have said in tract. de Visione Dei disp. 6. dub. unico, and let these things be understood according to what was said there.

47 It must be said, secondly, that there is in God true and proper knowledge of his attributes and properties, as well as of whatsoever truths of creatures, although those are necessary. This is against the second opinion adduced at the beginning. Nevertheless it is defended in common by almost all the Theologians, and therefore one should abstain from referring to them in particular.

The reason for this, as to the prior part, which D. Thom. defends in this quaestio, art. 16., saying that God has speculative knowledge of himself, is suggested by the same Angelic Doctor above, quaest. 1. art. 2. Because our Theology is true knowledge demonstrating concerning God his attributes or properties, or quasi-properties, although none of them has strictly speaking a true cause of its own: therefore for the same reason there can be in God true and proper knowledge of those same properties, even if a true cause of them cannot be given. The consequence is clear, and the antecedent from the discourse of the same Angelic Doctor, who deals with it as follows. Because for some cognition to have the true reason of knowledge, it is not necessary that it reach the thing through its own true and proper cause; but it suffices that it reach it through some formal reason of the thing itself, as is clear in the Metaphysics, where the predications of being are shown from being itself, not indeed through a cause strictly speaking, but through the formal reason; since the reason of being, which is not distinguished from the reason of the good, or of the true, cannot be the true and proper cause of them, but only the formal reason: therefore, although the divine attributes have not a cause strictly speaking of their own, but only a formal reason, they can be known by our Theology, and by God through knowledge properly such.

48 It is confirmed by the reason which the Holy Doctor touches on there. Because our Theology is knowledge subalternated with respect to the knowledge of the blessed and the knowledge of God: therefore the principles known by faith, on which Theology rests in order to demonstrate eternity concerning God, for example through his immutability, are known by the blessed, and by God, through true knowledge. The consequence is clear. Because it is of the reason of subalternated knowledge that it be subordinated to another subalternating knowledge which has the true and proper reason of knowledge, as all the Dialecticians and Theologians teach in common.

The antecedent, however, is proved and explained. For some sciences proceed from principles known by the natural light of the intellect, such as Arithmetic, Geometry, and the like. Some, however, proceed from principles known by the light of a superior science, such as Perspective proceeds from principles made known by Geometry; and Music from principles known through Arithmetic, and therefore they are called subalternated sciences: because they have the reason of a science only in so far as they are somehow under the light of another science and are subordinated to it as to a superior light, to which their principles are known. And in this way our Theology is a science, because it proceeds from principles known by the light of a superior science, namely of God and of the blessed. And so, just as Music believes the principles handed to it by Arithmetic, yet does not clearly attain to them; and therefore it is subalternated with respect to Arithmetic: so our Theology, that is, we who in act are actuated by it believe by faith the principles revealed by God, yet does not clearly know them, and therefore it is subalternated with respect to divine knowledge. But on these matters let those things be consulted which N. Complut. teach in their Logica disp. 19. quaest. 3., as well as those which we shall say in this doubt: so that in this way a certain tacit objection, which could have been made against the force of this confirmation, is easily dissolved.

49 The second part of that same assertion, namely that whatsoever truths of creatures, whether creatable, however necessary, are known by God through knowledge properly and strictly speaking called, apart from what is held by D. Thom. art. 5. and 6. of this quaestio, is proved by a reason drawn from D. Thom. in various places to be cited at once, which can be proposed in this form. Because whatsoever creatable truths, however necessary, have a true cause of their necessity and of their truth: therefore they are knowable: therefore they are known by God through his knowledge. This last consequence clearly follows from the preceding. For since the knowledge of God is infinite within its own line, it cannot fail to terminate in everything knowable. The first consequence, however, is clear from the antecedent. Because any necessary truth having a cause of its necessity is knowable: since just as to know is nothing other than to know a thing through a cause, so that which has had a cause, and has become knowable, will certainly be knowable.

The antecedent, however, is proved. Then, because Aristot., 5. Metaph. text. 6., and 8. Physic. text. 16., proves against Democritus that necessary entities have a cause of their necessity, with which D. Thom. also agrees, below quaest. 44. art. 1. ad 1. Then also: because, as the same Holy Doctor teaches, this truth, for example that a man is a rational animal, is a truth of a thing altogether necessary and of eternal truth, because God necessarily and from eternity has the power to produce a man: and so if there were involved in God a power to produce him, then this truth would also involve it: and the reason of this involvement would be rendered a priori from the involvement of the aforesaid power: because every truth by participation, such as is the aforesaid creatable truth, must be such dependently on the truth, and omnipotence, of the uncreated being, and per essentiam.

50 Then also: because this, that a man is a man, is on account of the divine goodness, as D. Thom. teaches, below quaest. 21. art. 4., and reason itself urges this. Because, since this, that a man is a man, is not an infinite perfection, nor has the reason of the ultimate end with respect to other perfections; the consequence is that it is a finite, and created, perfection; and consequently that it depends on the uncreated perfection of God, and that from its own nature it is ordained to the divine goodness; and so it will already have a final cause, through which it is knowable by God. Then finally: for this truth, a man is a rational animal, has in God a formal, or exemplary, cause: since the idea of the aforesaid truth is in him, as D. Thom. teaches, above quaest. 13.

There is added the fact that this truth, a man is visible, is very necessary, and yet it has a cause through which it is demonstrated in the knowledge of a man by his rationality: therefore this truth also, a man is a rational animal, will be able to have some cause, at least uncreated, through which it can be known by God. The consequence is clear: because a man, and whatever is in a man, has a greater dependence on being per essentiam than the predications of a man have on his essence.

§ III. The arguments of both opinions are satisfied.

51 To the first argument of the first opinion D. Thom. answers, de verit. quaest. 2. art. 1. ad 4., in these words: It must be said that because that which is in God without any imperfection is found in creatures with some defect; for this reason it is necessary that, if something found in creatures is attributed to God, we separate all that which pertains to imperfection, so that only that which pertains to perfection remain: because according to this alone does the creature imitate God. I say, therefore, that the knowledge which is found in us has something of perfection, and something of imperfection: to its perfection belongs its certainty: because what is known is known with certainty: but to its imperfection belongs the discourse of the intellect from principles to conclusions, of which knowledge consists; for this discourse does not occur except according as the intellect, knowing the principles, knows the conclusions only in potency. For if it knew them in act, there would be no discourse there, since motion is nothing else than an exit from potency into act. Knowledge is therefore said to be in God by reason of the certainty about things known, but not by reason of the aforesaid discourse, which is not found even in the Angels, as Dionysius says.

To the confirmation the same Angelic Doctor answers in the same place, in solut. ad 5., where it is thus expressed: It must be said that although nothing is more, and less, known to God, if the manner of the knower be considered, because he sees all things with the same intuition; yet if the manner of the thing known be considered, God knows that some things are more knowable in themselves, and some things less. For among all things his own essence is most knowable, through which indeed he knows all things, not by any discourse, since while seeing his essence he sees all things. Hence, as far as this order is concerned, which can be observed in divine cognition on the part of the things known, the reason of knowledge is also preserved in God; for he himself principally knows all things through a cause.

52 To the second it will be answered with D. Thom., 1. sentent. dist. 35. quaest. 1. art. 1., that although nothing can be added to what is first and most simple, presupposing really something other, from which it is really distinguished, since it also involves composition; yet something can indeed be added to it by addition according to reason, in such a way that that which is added is distinguished from that to which the addition is made, by reason alone, or virtually: as happens in the present case. For knowledge is added to the divine essence by reason alone, from the fact that actually and formally they are one, and the same most simple formality which provides for the proper essence, and for the knowledge of God, no less than if a real actual distinction, or a real and actual addition, intervened there.

To the third it is clear from what has just been said from the Holy Doctor. Hence the solution given there is legitimate, and in answer to its refutation D. Thom., 1. sent. ad Ambaldum, ubi supra, in the solution to the second, says in these words: It must be said that this reason proceeds from knowledge which is taken from things; but such is not the divine knowledge, but rather knowledge that causes things.

53 To the last it will be answered by granting the antecedent and distinguishing the consequent: and if it be understood of knowledge which is only knowledge, the consequence is to be granted; but if it be understood of knowledge which formally and eminently is at once knowledge and wisdom, the consequence must be denied. And to the proof it must be said that the antecedent is true of knowledge which is only knowledge, and consequently does not reach the reason of wisdom; but not of that knowledge which, in one and the same most simple reason, without any virtual distinction, is at the same time formally and eminently knowledge and wisdom, as happens in the knowledge of God.

This is explained. For wisdom, which is the most perfect knowledge, formally and eminently contains whatever pertains to the reason of knowledge which is only knowledge, and whatever concerns the habit of first principles, or to understanding, which has only the reason of understanding: because under a certain more common and more eminent reason it comprehends both understanding and knowledge. Wherefore, since to knowledge, to which only the reason of knowledge befits, it cannot belong to turn first and per se about both principles and conclusions: otherwise, I say, it is not so with knowledge which is at once knowledge and wisdom: and consequently it contains at the same time and formally those things which are proper to understanding, with the imperfection and limitation of understanding itself set aside. Wherefore, since the knowledge of God — which is the most perfect knowledge, and reaches all things through the highest causes — has the reason of wisdom, it is not strange that it should terminate first and per se, both in the principles and in the conclusions, that is, in the divine essence, which is the principle, and as it were the cause, of its attributes, and should at the same time terminate first and per se (in the manner, however, explained below in disp. 3. num. 34. and 35.) in its own attributes, which bear themselves to the divine essence as conclusions brought per se primo from the cognition of the essence itself, as of a principle, and quasi-cause, and finally that it should terminate per se secundo in creatures, which are also quasi-conclusions, brought per se secundo from the divine essence, as it is the cause of these.

Now, although divine knowledge has the said eminence, by which it has what is proper to understanding and to knowledge, nonetheless it coheres with these, in such a way that there is also to be given in God another light virtually distinct, which is precisely understanding, and which excludes the imperfection and limitation of the light of created understanding, although it does not have such eminence as wisdom has: as we shall explain further in the following doubt, num. 84.

54 Secondly it will be answered by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. And to the proof it must be said, with D. Thom., 1. 2. quaest. 57. art. 2., that wisdom is not distinguished from understanding, or from the habit, or quasi-habit, of principles, in this, that wisdom in no way turns about the first principles: but in this, that understanding turns about them absolutely, and taken by themselves, as we shall explain further at num. 84.; whereas wisdom terminates in them, in that the conclusions are deduced from them. And so the knowledge of God, which is the most perfect wisdom, will be able to terminate first and per se in the divine essence; because it turns about it as the reason of attaining to creatures: and so also the divine knowledge can turn about, insofar as it is knowledge, or wisdom, the essence of God, as the reason of the attributes; from the fact that the aforesaid attributes bear themselves like conclusions deduced from the divine essence, as from a principle, or as the formal reason of the attributes themselves.

55 To the foundation of the second opinion it will be answered that the greater is true, if its meaning be that all scientific cognition must be through a cause, whether it be a true and formal cause, or only a virtual one, which coincides with the reason a priori. In what way immutability is called a virtual cause of eternity, because it is the reason a priori of eternity. And then the lesser must be denied, as regards both parts. And to the proof against the prior part it must be said that although that which has a true and proper cause formally such is created, it is not the case that whatever has only a virtual cause, or an a priori reason, is created, as happens in eternity, compared with immutability, and in whatever divine attributes are compared with the essence of God.

To the proof, however, of the second part, the greater must be denied. To its proof it must be said that a cause is desired, first, in order that that which is indifferent to being and not-being be produced and be: then also in order that it be a being, and true by participation, however much it may never be produced in act, or exist: or however much it may be according to its own essence of eternal and necessary truth. Because any entity, and any truth by participation, would not be such, nor would it have the aforesaid necessity, unless there were at least some first being, and first truth per essentiam, from which (in the manner suggested above) they would be participable.

56 We have said: unless there were at least some first being, and first truth: because it is not against the reason of necessary truth that it have a created cause of its necessity: and therefore this truth, a man is capable of laughter, which is necessary, has a created cause of its necessity, namely that a man is rational: and so it is demonstrated in the knowledge of a man through it.

That solution is drawn from D. Thom., 1. part. quaest. 44. art. 1. ad 1., in these words: It must be said that although the relation to a cause does not enter into the definition of the being which is caused, it nevertheless follows from those things which are of its reason: because from the fact that something is a being by participation, it follows that it is caused by another. Wherefore a being of this kind cannot be without being caused: just as neither can a man be without being capable of laughter.

What he explained still further in the solution to the second. For when he had objected to himself that in order that something should need a cause, so as consequently to be such that it cannot fail to be, such as are necessary truths, [it follows] that it does not need such a cause, he answers: It must be said that from this reason some were moved to posit that that which is necessary has no cause, but this plainly appears false in the demonstrative sciences, in which necessary principles are causes of necessary conclusions. And therefore Aristotle says in 5. Metaphys. that there are some necessary things which have a cause of their necessity. A cause, therefore, is required not for this alone, because the effect is able not to be, but because the effect would not be if the cause were not: for this conditional is true whether the antecedent and consequent be possible, or impossible.

57 Nor does it matter if you object against this solution that although with respect to ourselves knowledge of God's attributes can be given, because we know that one thing can be the a priori reason of another, and that the essence is also the a priori reason of all of them; nevertheless it is not so with respect to God: from the fact that we distinguish one attribute from another by reason: and so we can know one thing to be the reason of another; but God does not, who reaches those things as they are in himself: and consequently he does not fabricate in them any distinction of reason which is not found in them as they are in themselves: therefore at least on this account the solution given falls.

For it will be answered that although we grant that God, knowing (as elsewhere) himself and his attributes, does not effect a distinction of reason between them except at the last, through the order to the created intellect of one on the way, nonetheless per se and by his own reason he precisely knows the virtual distinction which is between the attributes, both among themselves and as compared with the essence: and this suffices in order that one attribute, for example, be known as the a priori reason of another.

The reason, however, on account of which we attribute to God the knowledge of the aforesaid distinction, in the manner just said, is this: because such a virtual distinction is really found between them, by reason of the highest eminence which that most simple formality of the divine essence and of the attributes has. For just as in creatures the essence and its properties are really distinguished actually and formally, so the divine essence and its attributes are really distinguished virtually: from the fact that that most simple formality no less provides what is proper to a plurality of things pertaining to distinct lines than if there were actually and formally several, in which the reason of a virtual distinction really consists.

58 Nor does it stand in the way, if you press, that the divine intellect cannot know per se and by its own reason the aforesaid virtual distinction without knowing in the same way that distinction of reason: because a virtual distinction is nothing else than the foundation of a distinction of reason: and consequently, what by itself and by its own reason it has attained to, it cannot fail to know in the same way the distinction of reason, indeed to effect it, since its being consists only in being known.

Therefore this does not stand in the way. Because according to this manner of speaking, although we grant that the virtual distinction is at the same time a distinction of a fundamental reason with respect to an intellect which does not reach the thing as it is in itself, or which reaches it through an order to the aforesaid intellect; nevertheless it is not so with respect to the intellect which terminates in the thing as it is in itself, and which is considered under this precision of not reaching it, namely as it is knowable through distinct concepts by an intellect which does not reach it as it is in itself.

And so the most formal concept of a virtual distinction as such is not the most formal concept of the same as it is a distinction of fundamental reason: first, on account of what has been said above. Then also: because if we granted that it involves every intellect of one on the way, that virtual distinction would still remain under the concept of a virtual distinction: since it could provide what is proper to a plurality of things pertaining to distinct lines, no less than if there were several; yet it would not remain under the concept of a fundamental distinction: since, involving an intellect able to distinguish according to reason, it also involves (so to speak) the passive capacity, founding such a distinction.

59 Hence, God can, as he is considered under this precision of reaching himself without an order to the intellect of one on the way, know the virtual distinction of his own attributes without knowing the distinction of reason, which is made, and is known, by the intellect of one on the way, which does not reach God himself as he is in himself: although (because the divine intellect cannot fail to know at the same time that his essence, and his attributes, are attainable by the imperfect intellect of one on the way, and through distinct concepts) he must also know there the aforesaid fundamental distinction: and consequently it is also very probable that through an order, or quasi-order, to the aforesaid created intellect, he should effect that same distinction of reason, as our Didacus a Jesu well explains in his Logica disp. 3. quaest. 3.