Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

10 Although from those things which were said in the preceding doubt it is sufficiently established that God is most understanding, as is clear to one who inspects it: yet since D. Thom. very often, and especially in this article, proves that a thing is cognitive, on the ground that it is immaterial, and hence that it is most cognitive, or most understanding, from the fact that it has the highest immateriality — and this reasoning is not without considerable difficulty — therefore, so that the principal proof which the Holy Doctor adduces here may remain wholly explained, we raise the present doubt for its examination.

§ I. Opinion denying it.

The first opinion denies that it is rightly inferred from the highest immateriality that God is understanding. Thus Gabriel in 1. distinct. 35. quaest. 2.; Aureolus apud Capreolum, in the same place, in the unique quaestio.

It is proved, first. Because there are several entities that are immaterial simpliciter and are not cognitive: therefore nothing cognitive is inferred from immateriality of that kind, and pure spirituality: therefore neither is anything most understanding inferred from the highest immateriality. This last consequence is clear from the preceding. For if that which is most immaterial were for that very reason most understanding; then that which were more immaterial would be more understanding: and consequently that which were immaterial simpliciter, or purely spiritual, would be understanding simpliciter; according to that rule of Aristotle: As a thing stands in more and in less, so it stands in the simple and the simple. The antecedent, however, is proved. For will, and that habit, as well as the agent intellect, are immaterial simpliciter, or purely spiritual, and yet they are not cognitive, as is clear from themselves and as the Philosophers and Theologians teach in common: therefore, and so on. Then again: for intelligible species, intellectual habits, as well as the possible intellect itself, have accidental spirituality, and yet they are cognitive: therefore, if immateriality were the reason of knowing, this immateriality of accidents would have it too: and consequently will, and the agent intellect, which can be equally immaterial as the possible intellect, and its species, would be cognitive in the same way.

11 Nor will it suffice to say that although nothing cognitive is inferred from the immateriality and pure spirituality of accidents, it is nevertheless inferred from the immateriality and pure spirituality of substance: because there is no purely spiritual substance that is not cognitive. Wherefore, since God has the highest substantial immateriality, it is well inferred thence that he is most understanding.

For the contrary is said. Then, because D. Thom. infers that something is more, or less, cognitive from greater, or lesser, immateriality: because immateriality makes the form in which it is found more ample, and less constricted, and according to the greater or lesser amplitude of the form, something is more, or less, cognitive, as we shall say in this same doubt: but this reasoning proceeds equally in substantial and in accidental immateriality: because each of these abstracts from matter, which is the root of constriction, and takes away the amplitude of the form: therefore, and so on.

12 Then finally: because God can create a purely spiritual substance which would not be cognitive, either because it would have no operation, as many corporeal substances do not have it, as D. Thom. teaches concerning the Empyrean heaven in 2. dist. 2. quaest. 2. art. 3., that it was created only for this, that it might be the seat of the blessed: or because its operation would consist only in producing, after the manner of a first and radical principle, and by means of some agent intellect, intelligible species in our possible intellects. For, just as the agent intellect can have this office with respect to the possible intellect rooted in the same soul, so it is not incongruous that by divine power there be given some agent intellect, and some substance, whose office consists only in producing in the possible intellects of all men intelligible species, by which they may be able to understand.

It is confirmed. For the motion which is attributed to the water of Baptism for the production of baptismal grace is spiritual, as our Complutensians teach from D. Thom. in lib. Physic. disp. 12. num. 22.; and yet it is not cognitive, as it seems clear from itself: therefore, and so on.

13 Secondly, and principally. For the rational soul is immaterial, and purely spiritual: and yet from this spirituality it does not follow that it is intelligible in act, or per se, in this state: therefore neither from the same spirituality will it be inferred that it is cognitive simpliciter; and consequently neither from the highest spirituality of God will it be deduced that he is most understanding. This last consequence is clear from the preceding, and from what has just been said. The first, however, seems plainly to follow from the greater and the lesser. Because it is far better for something to be cognitive than to be intelligible; since the reason of the cognitive includes the reason of the most perfect life, namely the intellectual; but the reason of the intelligible, on the contrary, does not: therefore, if from the very fact that a thing is spiritual it does not have what is less perfect in the intelligible order, namely that it is intelligible per se, much less will it have what is most perfect in this order, namely that it is cognitive.

The lesser, however, is expressed by D. Thom. 1. part. quaest. 87. art. 1., where for this reason he teaches that the soul in this state does not understand itself per se, but through the species of material things, and reflexively through its own act, in so far as by knowing that other it comes into the knowledge of itself. The greater, however, is Aristot., 3. de Anima, cap. 4., and it is admitted in common by all Theologians and Philosophers there, and it is proved excellently by our Complutensians in lib. de Anima, disp. 16. num. 4. and following.

14 It is confirmed, first. For our intellect also in this state is purely spiritual: but from this spirituality it does not follow that it is immediately, and per se, intelligible: therefore, by the reason given just now in this second argument and applied here by proportion, much less does it follow from such immateriality that it is immediately, and per se, understanding. The consequence seems certain with the greater. The lesser, however, is also clear. Because the intellect in this state also cannot be known except through the species of material things, as is sufficiently gathered from the place cited from D. Thom., and as N. Compl. teaches in lib. de Anima, disp. 17. num. 24. and following.

15 It is confirmed, secondly. For the rational soul, while it is united to the body, has a mode of being less immaterial than when it is separated from it, as is clear from itself: since while it is in the body, it abstracts less from matter than when it is outside it: and yet within the body it understands better than outside it: therefore there is a sign that intellectuality is not rightly inferred from immateriality. The consequence seems legitimate. For if intellectuality were rightly deduced from immateriality, that which is less immaterial could not be more understanding; but rather the contrary: that which had greater immateriality would be of greater power for understanding.

The lesser, however, in which the difficulty lies, is proved from D. Thom., then 1. part. quaest. 89. art. 1., where he says that it is better for the rational soul to be in the body, and to understand by conversion to the phantasms, than to be outside the body, and to understand without such conversion. Then also 1. 2. quaest. 54. art. 5. ad 4., where he says that the soul's separation from the body retards it, so that it does not tend with its whole intention to the vision of the divine essence.

16 Thirdly. For if the highest immateriality were the reason of having the highest cognitive power, some immateriality would not fail to be desired for the sake of having any cognitive power at all, as is clear from what has just been said: but this is false: therefore the highest immateriality will not be the reason of the highest cognitive power. The lesser is proved. For brutes have nothing of immateriality, since they are entirely material and corporeal; and yet they have some power of knowing: therefore, and so on.

Nor does it matter if you say that brutes are material in their being, yet in their mode of operation they are raised above matter, and are in some way immaterial, from the fact that they have a mode of operating more elevated than that of the non-knowing: since they operate through forms elevated above matter, namely intentional qualities. For the contrary is said, that the mode of operating follows the mode of being: therefore, if brutes are entirely material, that is, if their being is in no way elevated above matter — which indeed essentially includes it, and depends on it in being made and being preserved — they cannot but be material in respect of operation as well, and of its mode.

17 Fourthly. For materiality could impede, or remove, the power of knowing only on this account, that it removes the amplitude of the form: from the fact that it is proper to matter to limit and constrict it, as is clear from those things which are taught in this article and in 1. sentent. distinct. 35. quaest. 1. art. 1. by D. Thom.: but on this account it cannot remove the power of knowing: therefore, on account of no other: and consequently neither will immateriality put in place the aforesaid power in some way, nor the highest immateriality the highest power of knowing. This last consequence is clear from the preceding. For as often as two things are directly opposed, as happens with materiality and immateriality, then the one cannot put in place by its own force something in a subject which would not be removed by the other, if the other were there: just as because hot and cold, grace and sin are opposed, therefore nothing hot can be placed in the hot which would not be removed by the cold in that in which it is found: and likewise nothing can be placed in the soul which would not be taken away by sin: therefore, if materiality does not remove from that in which it is the power of knowing, neither will immateriality put it in place.

The prior consequence, however, plainly follows from the greater and the lesser. The lesser, however, in which the difficulty lies, is proved. Because matter removes the amplitude of the form only insofar as it is the cause that such a form is this and not that, from the fact that it is the root of the individuation of that same form: but this mode of removing the amplitude of the form does not remove the power of knowing; since even in subsistent forms, such as are the Angels, their individual difference limits them in this way; and yet it does not for that reason remove from them the power of knowing: therefore, and so on.

18 Lastly. For from immateriality the power of knowing cannot be proved a priori, or a posteriori: therefore in no way. The consequence seems legitimate. The antecedent, however, which is the prior part, is proved. Then, because it is prior that a substance should be cognitive than that it be able to receive intentional species, since indeed it is capable of them because, being cognitive, it cannot know without them: therefore it will also be prior that it be cognitive than that it be immaterial: because the same thing it is to be immaterial as to be able to receive intentional species considered formally in the being of species: and therefore brutes are called by D. Thom. (as we shall see below in this doubt) to have the immateriality required for knowing by sensitive cognition, because they can receive sensible species in sensible being, and considered formally, which the same Angelic Doctor, for the reason to be suggested at n. 34, calls forms without matter: therefore the power of knowing will not be able to be proved a priori through immateriality. Then again: because that in God peculiarity repugns is from the fact that his essence consists, most formally speaking, in understanding, and so understanding cannot have another reason a priori by which it may be proved. As for the second part, however, the same antecedent is proved. Because immateriality abstracts from vital immateriality, such as is found in the cognitive power, and from immateriality not in itself vital, which is found in the intelligible species: therefore it is prior than the reason of intellectual life: and consequently, if the power of understanding could be proved in something from it, such a proof would not be a posteriori but a priori.

§ II. The opinion, and the reasoning of D. Thomas, is defended.

19 It must nevertheless be said that the power of knowing is best proved from immateriality; and hence the highest power for the highest understanding is most congruently deduced from the highest immateriality. Thus D. Thom. here, and in 1. dist. 35. quest. 1. art. 1., and in the same place against Anibaldus, 1. cont. Gent. cap. 44., de veritate quest. 2. art. 1., and in the Compendium of Theology, cap. 28. Whom Caietanus, Zumel, Bannez, Nazarenus, Ripa, Gonzal., Machin, Suarez, and others follow here, and Ferrara in the place cited from 1. contra Gent. Capreolus in 1. dist. 35., and in common the Theologians and Philosophers together with Aristotle, 12. Metaphys. cap. 7., and 2. de Anima, textu 26. and 123.

The assertion is proved by the reasoning of the Holy Doctor, which was drawn from the Philosopher in the places cited. For immateriality of that kind simpliciter as is that which is found in purely spiritual substances, as in the Angels and in our soul, is the reason of understanding: therefore the highest immateriality will be the reason of the highest understanding: therefore D. Thom. most excellently concluded from the highest immateriality of God that he is most understanding. This last consequence requires no proof. The prior, however, follows from the antecedent. For as that which is most white is therefore most dispersive, because whiteness is dispersive, so if immateriality is the reason of understanding, then whatever is most immaterial will be most understanding.

20 The antecedent, however, in which the difficulty lies, is proved in several ways. Then, by the reasoning of the Angelic Doctor here, and in the first, above, as well as by Arist., 2. de Anima, text. 123., and 3. de Anima, text. 4. up to 7. For plants are not cognitive because they are too material: brutes, however, have some cognitive power because they have something more of immateriality, from the fact that in their operations they depend less on matter and on its conditions, as N. Complut. shows in 1. de anima, disp. 4. n. 7. and following: therefore there is a sign that a more perfect immateriality, by which something is immaterial simpliciter, is a reason for knowing more perfectly than all brutes, and consequently for knowing by intellection. Then again: because among intellectual substances those are more understanding which are, in the way just said, more immaterial, and approach more closely to the divine immateriality: and so the rational soul, because it abstracts less from matter than the lowest Angel, from the fact that although it is spiritual according to its substance, it is nonetheless the true form of the body, for that reason has less of intellectuality than the aforesaid Angel: therefore, and so on.

21 Then again, by the reasoning of the most holy Preceptor in the place cited from the Compendium of Theology. Because material things become intelligible in act through immaterial intentional species, and not through material ones: therefore there is a sign that this immateriality is the reason of the power of understanding. The consequence is clear: because the same intentional species which renders the object intelligible in act renders it also a completely understanding intellect, as we shall say below in this same article: therefore, if immateriality has been called the reason of intelligibility, it will also be the reason of the intellectual power.

And all these proofs can be confirmed and explained by giving a sufficiently deep root for them. First, indeed, by the reasoning drawn from Aristot., 3. de Anima, cap. 4., and D. Thom. in the same place, lect. 6., as well as 1. part. quaest. 75. artic. 2. For the intellectual power can understand every body, whether taken in particular or in the universal: but if the intellectual power were material, and corporeal, it could not thus attain to every body, because what exists within excludes the external: just as a tongue affected with a choleric humour cannot for this reason perceive other flavours, but everything seems bitter to it. Our Complutensians expound this proof at length in 3. de Anima, disp. 16, num. 7. up to 22. and following, and they resolve several objections by which it is usually attacked.

22 The same proofs are confirmed and explained, secondly, by adducing another reason, and a root drawn from divine Thom., 1. part. quaest. 50. artic. 2. ad 2., where he says: that an intelligible form is received in the intellect according to the reason of form, that is, as Bannez well explains there, according to the whole amplitude and universality which it has in intelligible being. For although the species representing the nature of a stone cannot be received in the intellect except as it is individuated and limited in entitative being by that stone, yet in intelligible and representative being it remains as universal as the very reason and nature of such a form requires in its amplitude: and so it represents the nature of a stone taken universally: therefore there is a sign that the intellect receiving it is not material, but ought to be immaterial, and to receive it in an immaterial way: therefore there will also be a sign that from this immateriality of the intellect, and from this mode of receiving, or quasi-receiving, the intelligible species, it is rightly deduced that the intellect having that immateriality, and receiving the species immaterially, has its power of understanding through it. Both consequences are clear. The prior, indeed: because that which is material, and receives a form materially, does not receive it according to the reason of form, that is, with the universality befitting the form, but by individuating and limiting it through the individuation and limitation arising from matter, as from the first principle of limitation and individuation.

23 The second consequence, however, also follows from that prior one. For from the very fact that the intellect ought to be immaterial, and to receive the intelligible form immaterially, so that it may receive it duly, and in the being of the intelligible form, it follows rightly that immateriality is the reason of receiving it in that peculiar mode in which it itself asks to be received, in order to bestow its formal effect, which is to render the intellect completely understanding: therefore from the same immateriality it will also follow that it receives it as something having a power of understanding by the manner of the intellectual power: since the intelligible species, as such, is not received, or quasi-received, in that peculiar mode in which it asks to be quasi-received, except in that which has a power of understanding by the manner of the power, or of the intellectual power, so that nothing other than this power be constituted by it in the being of the completely intellectual power as such.

24 This same root is explained and confirmed further by an elegant discourse, which Arist., 2. de Anima, text. 121., and Ang. Doct. ibid. lect. 24., and here in this article and elsewhere often, suggest. Because the formal reason of a cognitive and intellectual nature consists in this, that the aforesaid nature not only be itself, but also be able to become all other things by means of intelligible species: and so the Philosopher, 3. de Anima, text. 17., says that the possible intellect, insofar as it can know all things, can also become all things; and the Angelic Doctor teaches in the places cited that the perfection of the knower, insofar as it is knower, consists in this, that the perfection which is proper to one thing be found in another, as we shall say more fully below in this same article: therefore such a nature cannot but be immaterial simpliciter, and receive in an immaterial way the forms and the perfections of other things by the aforesaid species. The consequence is clear. Because this, that a nature, or a form, can become all things, says the greatest amplitude and unlimitedness, as is clear from itself: therefore for that very reason it must abstract greatly from matter, which is the root of the limitation and constriction of that same form.

25 Above all, because from the very fact that an intellectual nature becomes all things which it understands by means of species, it is necessary that, just as when it understands some nature with regard to its character and its essence taken precisely, it then in that way becomes that nature which it understands, and so receives the form according to the reason of form, as we were saying just now; so also, when it perceives that same nature with regard to what is essential and numerical in it, it must needs be that the same intellect also becomes that very nature with regard to the specific and numerical perfection of it, as is clear from the parity of the reason, and as will be made clearer below in this article: and consequently it will receive from this side also the aforesaid form and perfection according to the reason of form, as we have already explained: therefore it will also be necessary that the aforesaid nature, receiving by means of the intelligible species — by which it becomes one with its object — such a form and the same perfection according to number, be immaterial, and receive the same in an immaterial way: because matter limits and distinguishes form according to number, so that forms which were found in diverse matters must be distinguished numerically. And so, if the same perfection numerically which is in the thing understood is in the intellectual nature by means of the intelligible species and the intellection of such an object, such a nature will not be able not to be immaterial, and to receive it in an immaterial way; indeed it will not be able not to receive the aforesaid form according to the reason of form, that is, not commingling with it that which is proper to the effect of matter, namely limiting, individuating, and distinguishing the aforesaid form according to number: which mode of receiving a form is in some way to receive it, so to speak, in a pure act, so far as it lies on the part of that reception.

We have said, in a pure act (so to speak), and so on, in order to signify that although imperfections are really involved there, nevertheless this peculiar imperfection of limiting the intelligible form with respect to the amplitude that it has with it is not what is meant. Which is so universally true that not only in intelligible forms that are purely spiritual, and so tending to the office already mentioned, having in the cognitive power spirituality of that kind simpliciter; but also, in proportion, in whatever intentional species, even sensible ones, the same way of philosophising must be observed. And so, although the sensitive and cognitive powers are not purely spiritual, nonetheless, because they do not limit intentional species in this way when considered formally in sensible being, because they are not compared to them so taken by the manner of a true subject, but by another higher manner, as we shall explain in disp. 2. a num. 72. up to 84., when they are united to them, therefore they are said to receive them, or quasi-receive them, or (as we had better say) to be united to them according to what they have of the reason of form and (so to speak) of a pure act.

§ III. The arguments of the first opinion are answered.

26 To the first it must be said that immateriality of every kind, or pure spirituality not including corporeity in its own reason, is the reason of understanding, whether elicitive and receptive at once; or only elicitive, or only consecutive, or finally as required for understanding; yet in such a way that all of these pertain to the intellectual part, taken adequately. Now, although the aforesaid immateriality ought to be the reason of understanding in one of these ways; nevertheless in substances it always, and necessarily, at least speaking according to their natural bent, must be the reason of understanding elicitive and receptive, and in no mere way, but as quod, that is, in such a way that the aforesaid substance elicits the intellection, and receives, or quasi-receives, it itself: and consequently it really understands through it. In accidents, however, it will suffice that it be the reason of understanding in one of the assigned ways; although it can also be sometimes the reason of understanding elicitive, or even receptive, not indeed as quod, but as quo. And therefore immateriality in the will is the reason of understanding consecutive, that is, it holds itself by the manner of an intellectual inclination, which both necessarily presupposes that thing and in some way follows upon it. The same, proportion being preserved, we say of the habits of the will. And then the intellect is the reason of understanding, as quo, elicitive and receptive at once, as is clear from itself. And likewise the intelligible species is also the reason of understanding elicitive, as quo, by the manner of the reason of that which holds itself on the part of the object, although it does not receive the intellection into itself, as is clear from those things which we have said in the treatise On the Vision of God. And finally the agent intellect is also the reason of understanding by the manner of what is required for understanding, as something producing the intelligible species by which the intellection is to be elicited.

27 The reason, however, on account of which we must philosophise in this diverse way in substances and in accidents, is drawn from the nature of each, and is suggested by N. Complut. in 2. Phys. disp. 10. quaest. 4. and 5. For an immaterial substance is absolutely, and immaterial simpliciter, as quod, that is, by the manner of a subsisting thing, in such a way that it is not immaterial on account of some other thing which is more prior and more principal, as accidents have it: and therefore if its immateriality is the reason of understanding, it must be the reason of understanding absolutely, and simpliciter, and consequently of understanding as quod, elicitive and receptive. But immaterial accidents, such as are the entities of a being, which of themselves can have no immateriality as quod, or by the manner of subsisting things, are so on account of the need of the substance, to which immateriality belongs more primarily: and therefore they are measured by their own immateriality in proportion to this need, in such a way that they serve it with respect to the various and diverse effects for which the substance itself, immaterial, by reason of its own immateriality and of its cognitive power — which is such as quod — has need. Hence, because the substance sometimes has need of a vital and immaterial power, which makes material objects intelligible in act, producing intelligible species by which the aforesaid objects become intelligible in act, it follows that the aforesaid power must be given to it, namely the agent intellect, which by reason of its own immateriality is able to perform this office. And likewise, because the aforesaid created and immaterial substance can be only radically cognitive, as is clear from those things which N. Complut. teaches in 2. Physic. disp. 10., already cited, num. 22. and following; therefore it needs another immaterial power, which by reason of its own immateriality is the proximate power for understanding. And finally, because the knower as such naturally desires the intellectual good, and the substance itself cannot be the proximate principle of this inclination, therefore an immaterial power is given to it, which by reason of its immateriality is unlimited, and consequently able to tend to every good, and so of the rest.

28 Wherefore the solution given there, and understood according to the manner just stated, is the best. And to the first and second proof to the contrary it is clear from what has just been said how immateriality in accidents is also the reason of amplitude and of illumination: yet in such a way that, according to the diverse nature of substance and of accident, as well as according to the diverse need of the substance, this immateriality is modified diversely in substances and in accidents, in which it is imbued by the manner of an accident, and according to the nature of each. And so immateriality in a substance will bestow the amplitude of such a condition as is required in order that, in the manner explained, it be the reason of understanding. And likewise in accidents it will bestow that unlimitedness upon them, so modified that all of those things be the reason of understanding in one of the ways already stated, and, according to the diverse need according to which the intellectual substance in which they are has need of them, they be the reason of understanding in diverse ways.

To the last proof, however, the antecedent must be denied. For just as that substance, by reason of its own immateriality, would be above all sensitive substances, which are not purely spiritual as it is, so likewise it would have to have life, at least radical, and consequently intellectual life at the radical level. Hence, although it be admitted that the Empyrean heaven (of which there is also the testimony of D. Thom. elsewhere), which is not a living body, can be without any operation of which it is the root, nevertheless this cannot be affirmed of the aforesaid substance. Hence it will be false what is added there, namely that there can be given some created substance which has only, by the manner of a radical principle, the production of intelligible species in the intellects of men. For from the very fact that such a substance is living with a life more elevated than all sensible substances, its operation cannot but be, at least speaking per se, immanent, in the very same suppositum that operates. For a vital action, speaking per se, demands that it remain at least in the suppositum eliciting it, from the fact that it is the proper office of life to move itself. But if that production of species were received in the aforesaid substance, it would already have, or at least demand, the possible intellect, in which it might be proximately received: and so such a substance would be cognitive.

To the confirmation it is clear from what has been said. For since that motion is a certain accident, it is enough that it be ordered to something of the intellectual order, namely to the production of sanctifying grace, which is a certain participation of the divine intellectuality.

29 To the second, an answer is given from Caiet., 3. de Anima, cap. 1., at the end of the fifth text, that the soul is intelligible in the same way in which it is cognitive, and conversely. Hence, just as the soul in this state is intelligible in potency, and thus is rendered actually, and completely, intelligible through the intelligible species, so also it is cognitive, not actually and completely, but in potency, because it is cognitive by the manner of pure radical power in the intelligible order: and it is rendered in act, and is completed, through the form of this order, namely through the intelligible species, as also through the intellect, which is proximately cognitive by the manner of potency.

Now, although the soul in this state is said to be cognitive in potency, or by the manner of potency: and likewise in a proportional way it is intelligible: nevertheless it is intelligible in potency in a different way from that in which material things are intelligibly in potency. For the soul in this state is so intelligible in potency that that potency is within the intelligible order, or genus, participating in its immateriality, and consequently in some reason pertaining intrinsically to such a genus. Just as although prime matter is pure potency in the genus of substance, it is nevertheless a potency contained within this genus, and participating in the true reason of substance. But material things, insofar as they are intelligible in potency, do not participate in the immateriality of the intelligible order, nor in any reason pertaining intrinsically to such an order: because the intelligible order begins extrinsically with the intelligibility in potency of material things, according as they are proximately to be stripped of their materiality, and intrinsically with the intelligibility in potency of spiritual things, such as is the soul in this state, and other like things. Wherefore, when it is said that the soul is intelligible in potency, the aforementioned particle in potentia is not added in order to exclude the soul from the intelligible order as something not intrinsically contained in it, but to signify the manner in which it differs from certain other things that look intrinsically to the same order, and according to which it pertains, in the manner just said, to the aforesaid intelligible order.

30 Secondly, it is answered, that the rational soul has more of intellectuality in this state than of intelligibility: because, in order that it be intellectual, in as far as intellectual being is distinguished from intelligible being, it is not necessary that it be completed except by something that is borne away from it by its own merits, namely by the intellect flowing from it: but in order that it be rendered an object actually, or intelligible per se, it is required that something be added on its part in the being of an object, holding itself there, which comes from elsewhere, namely an intelligible species.

Now, nothing follows from this against us. For since a thing can be intelligible in three ways: either so that it is only actually, or per se intelligible, but not cognitive by the manner of the intellectual power, or of anything holding itself on its part; or so that it is not actually, or per se intelligible, but is only actually cognitive, that is, having in act whatever is required on the part of the intellectual power, but not yet what is desired on the part of the object, as we have said happens in our soul in this state; or finally so that it is at once actually intelligible, and also actually cognitive, in the manner just said.

We say, therefore, that that which is precisely intelligible in act, or which renders an object intelligible in act, is more perfect secundum quid with respect to what is actually cognitive, in as far as it sharpens it, and is compared to it by the manner of form; yet it is simpliciter more ignoble than that, because it is not necessary that it live so perfectly the intellectual life, which bears a certain maximum perfection before it; which perfection of life, however, what is actually cognitive seeks. Now, that which is at once cognitive and intelligible in act is, with respect to this reason, more noble than that which is only cognitive in act, as is clear from itself. Wherefore, although the rational soul, through lack of perfection and through that simpliciter excess by which it is surpassed by those things which would at once have the reason of things both intelligible and cognitive in act, be not actually intelligible and cognitive; nevertheless it can have the reason of being actually cognitive, in the manner explained. Just as also, by reason of that simpliciter excess according to which it surpasses things which are precisely intelligible in act and not cognitive, from the lack of immateriality, in the vital manner just said, of which they are devoid; and by reason of the excess by which it is surpassed secundum quid by those things which are only intelligible in act, it cannot be of the number of those things which are precisely intelligible in act; but of the number of those which have intelligibility in potency, already explained, together with actuality in the intellectual order.

31 Hence, as to the form of the argument, the greater and the lesser having been granted, both consequences must be denied. And to the proof of the prior, upon which the proof of the posterior depends, the answer is given by distinguishing the antecedent: It is far better for something to be cognitive than to be intelligible — cognitive with such perfection of intellectuality that it is also itself actually intelligible — is to be granted; cognitive with precision, so that it is not at once actually intelligible, the antecedent must again be distinguished, and granted of the simpliciter excess of the cognitive, so taken as surpassing what is actually intelligible, with the secundum quid excess of that same intelligible also compatible surpassing the aforesaid cognitive: but it must be denied of the simpliciter excess of the cognitive itself, which excludes the secundum quid excess of what is actually intelligible over the cognitive itself. And then the consequence must be denied on account of the reason given just now in this solution.

To the first confirmation it is answered, first, that the intellect, according to the preceding solution of the argument, is intelligible and cognitive in this state in the same way and proximately. For as it is not proximately cognitive except dependently on the phantasms, so neither is it proximately and per se intelligible except with the same dependence. Although, because the aforesaid dependence is of a different reason, on account of its peculiar nature on the part of that by which it is cognitive, and that by which it is intelligible, it demands that it be proximately cognitive by the manner of a potency that the phantasy can and ought to produce simultaneously, its own phantasm about some object connected with, or having an affinity to, that which is then understood by the intellect: but for it to be proximately intelligible, it is requisite that the possible intellect, dependently on that same phantasm, produce an intelligible species, through which the intellect itself becomes in some way actually intelligible in this state. Or, secondly, to the same confirmation one may have recourse in the same way, proportion being preserved, in which we had recourse in the second place to the second argument immediately preceding.

32 To the second confirmation the lesser must be denied. And to the first testimony it must be said that the Holy Doctor wills only that for the soul, as a part of man, it be better to understand by conversion to the phantasms, and to be united to the body, than to understand without such conversion, and to be separated from it. For since every part, as such, is best situated when it is in its whole, hence it follows that for the soul according to the reason of a part, it is better to understand through that conversion than without it, and to be within the body than outside it. Yet it does not follow that such a mode of understanding, taken in itself, is a nobler mode of understanding than that which it has outside the body, as the same Holy Doctor teaches in this very testimony in the body of the article. We have said, taken in itself: because, as Caiet. well noted there, although the mode of understanding without conversion to the phantasms is, taken in itself, or from its genus, nobler than the mode of understanding by conversion to them, nevertheless that mode, as modified and qualified to the human intellect, because it is in some way disproportionate with respect to it, as the same Caiet. excellently explains in the place cited, is, in so far as it is thus taken, more ignoble than the mode of understanding by conversion to the phantasms.

Yet nothing follows from this against us. For although greater immateriality, and a more immaterial mode of operating, argue, speaking per se, a better mode of understanding; nevertheless it is not incongruous that what happens, as is seen here, by accident, or by reason of some impediment, and of some disproportion between the intellect so operating and that mode of greater immateriality, should befall as its opposite. For, as N. Complut. noted in lib. de Anima disp. 2. num. 55., the mode of being outside the body is not so connatural to the soul, and understanding by conversion to higher intelligible things, or independently of the body, is in some way disproportionate with respect to the human intellect: and therefore by reason of this impediment, or disproportion, the human intellect when separated cannot understand so perfectly without conversion to the phantasms as with conversion to them.

Hence (as Caietan. well observes) when D. Thom. said that that mode of understanding without conversion to the phantasms is nobler in itself, and absolutely, yet not for the soul, the meaning is not that the aforesaid mode retains its greater nobility in the soul; but that in the soul it is not posited absolutely, but conditioned, and modified by a condition and modification diminishing it, namely with some disproportion and defect of commensurability of the species to the intellect, in as far as the human intellect has an order to the body, and that body, and their union per se: whereas the aforesaid species, and so they are, are more universal, and more abstract, than species which befit the soul united to the body.

Wherefore the Holy Doctor, in this same article, after he had said that the mode of understanding by conversion to the intelligible simpliciter, or without conversion to the phantasms, which are intelligible in potency, is better simpliciter than that by conversion to the phantasms, immediately added that that prior mode, insofar as it is possible to the soul, is more imperfect than this one, in order to signify by this that that mode, from its genus and without adjuncts from elsewhere imperfections, is nobler; yet considered as it is in the soul, and as it is modified and qualified there.

33 To the second testimony, from 1, 2. quest. 4. art. 5. ad 4., the answer is given that the Angel. Doctor wills only that the soul, as separated, be retarded, or impeded, from the extensive perfection of beatitude, from the fact that its beatitude does not overflow into the body, so long as it is separated: but not that it be retarded from the intensive perfection, which cannot grow except in proportion to the greater or lesser amount of the light of glory received in the soul, whether separated or united, which before and after the resurrection is of the same intensity, as D. Thom. teaches there in ad 4., and as is clear from those things said in the treatise On the Vision of God. Hence that phrase, so as not to tend with its whole intention, and so on, is understood to refer to the whole intention that has all the extensive perfection, already explained, which can agree with it.

34 To the third, the lesser must be denied. And to the proof it must be said that although brutes are immaterial nothing simpliciter, and corporeal, nevertheless they are not such as to have nothing of immateriality, so much as suffices for it that they be cognitive. The reason for this was adduced by Aristot., lib. 2. de Anima, cap. 3., D. Thom. there in lect. 4., and 1. part. quaest. 78. art. 1., de verit. quaest. 12. art. 2. ad 2., quaest. de Anima, art. 13. For although, both according to being and according to their operations, they depend on matter, nevertheless they are not altogether comprehended by it, nor altogether immersed in it, but are in some way elevated above the conditions of matter. This elevation, however, and this surmounting consists in this, that they have a being of such a nature that they are the roots of operating without motion and passion, in the physical sense, and strictly speaking.

For, as the same Holy Doctor well noted in lib. Physic. and as all philosophers teach in common, to be moved and to suffer through the passion and motion already mentioned is the proper condition of matter; so that it befits it as the first root, and also the others over which it rules considerably, by reason of it. And therefore to operate without the aforesaid motion and passion is to operate through an operation not altogether mixed with the conditions of matter, but considerably elevated above the aforesaid conditions; and to have a being that is the root of this kind of operation is to have a being not altogether comprehended and immersed in matter, but considerably elevated and surmounting its conditions. Hence, when it is said in the argument that brutes are altogether material and corporeal, it must be granted, if the word altogether removes the pure spirituality such as is found in our rational soul: but not if it removes both this and that which is to have the elevation already mentioned. But on these matters let N. Complut. be consulted in lib. Physic. disput. 16. num. 13. and following, and in lib. de Anima, disp. 21. quaest. 1., and especially num. 19., in which places they explain what is required for motion, or mutation, in the instant sense, physically and strictly speaking, and why the intellection of intellectual things, and the sensitive cognition of brutes, do not have the reason of such motions.

35 This elevation of brutes in respect of their forms can also be explained further in this way. For as D. Thom. noted in the places cited, from the very fact that the aforesaid mode of operating is in them, they have a mode of being of such a condition that they are the root of operating, not indeed through mere qualities that are very material, and depend very much on matter, such as are the first qualities and the other second qualities which arise from their mingling, but through higher and more elevated qualities, such as are the intentional species, which Aristotle in 2. de Anima, cap. ultimo, calls forms without matter, by reason of the elevation which they have above matter, from the fact that intentional being is of such a condition that, as we touched on at nn. 24 and 25, and as we shall say below in this same article from the Philosopher and D. Thom., although according to purely natural being, as it is distinguished from intentional being, nothing can have the same perfection numerically that another has; and therefore the aforesaid natural being is a more determinate and constricted being: yet under the manner of intentional being some thing can very well have the same perfection numerically that another has: and therefore the aforesaid being is elevated above the conditions of matter, which of itself is the root of limitation and constriction: and consequently that it be some perfection, or form, that is this and not that, and that it be thus this so that it be not found in that. But on these matters let those things be consulted which N. Complut. teach in 1. de Anima, disp. 4. quaest. 1. and 2., as well as those which we shall say in the following disputation, num. 14. and following.

This is declared further from those things which we were saying in this doubt at nn. 24 and 25. For from the very fact that sensible or intelligible intentional species — if they are taken formally, and with precision, in sensible or intelligible being — are not limited and constricted by those things in which they are received, or quasi-received, according to this being; and consequently that brutes receiving these species, and sensible intentional forms, considered in sensible being, do not limit them, but leave them in their amplitude, and do not prevent the same species numerically in sensible being, which is in this brute, from being in another; it is necessary that the forms of the aforesaid brutes have a being sufficiently elevated above the conditions of matter: since, as we have so often said, it is proper to matter, and consequently to those things over which it rules considerably, to limit and constrict the form, and the power of operating received in it; so that they make it be this and not that; and this, and not indeed that.

36 Nor does it matter, if against this solution you object that if the aforesaid elevation above matter and its conditions were the reason of knowing, then a white wall would be cognitive: because it has a being of such a condition that it can operate without motion and passion, strictly speaking, or without physical motion and passion: as happens when it diffuses its intentional species through the medium: and likewise the Sun illuminating the medium, and the medium itself, for example the air receiving the aforesaid species and transmitting them, would be cognitive, because all these things operate without it being necessary that a passion and motion, strictly speaking, intervene there.

For it will be answered that the mode of operating above the conditions of matter, indicating a cognitive power in the operator, must be not just any, but immanent per se, and consequently vital, because cognition is of itself an act immanent per se, and consequently vital. Hence, because all those things which are recounted in this objection operate through a transient operation, which is a far more ignoble operation, and not through an action immanent per se and vital, therefore that some such mode of elevation which they have is not sufficient for it that they have a cognitive power.

Add that it is false that illumination is motion in the physical sense, strictly speaking, of which there is mention in 3. Physic., as is clear from those things which N. Complut. noted in 3. de Anima disp. 21. num. 19.

37. To the fourth it must be said that the individual difference of the Angel limits him, so that he is here, that he is not the other things in natural being; yet it does not prevent him from being able to be in intentional and intelligible being, as N. Complut. explain in 3. de Anima, disp. 16. a num. 1. up to num. 20.: but matter, comprehending some form altogether immersed in it, or not elevated as much as the forms of brutes, limits and restricts it, so that they are not other things also in intentional and representative being, as is clear from what has been said. Hence it is not every constriction, but that which prevents one form from being able to have the perfections of others in representative being, which removes the amplitude necessarily required in order that it have a cognitive power.

38 To the last it will be answered that the reasoning of D. Thom., in so far as it shows from the highest immateriality of God that he is most understanding, is not properly, and speaking strictly, a priori or a posteriori: because the highest immateriality does not hold, properly and strictly, as the foundation and root of the highest and purest intellectuality of God, but is rather constituted in the highest act of immateriality through the highest act of his most actual intellectuality.

Wherefore this reasoning proceeds only from one inadequate reason found in the divine essence to another found in it, and distinct from it a priori not virtually, but on the part of our mode of conceiving. For these two reasons are so connected with each other that wherever one of them is, the other must necessarily be, and not merely so, but in such a way that they look to one and the same line. And the reason is. For from the very fact that the divine essence says, first and per se and by its own reason, entity through essence by the manner of the purest act: and consequently abstracts from all matter and potentiality, there must needs be in it likewise another inadequate reason of the highest and purest intellectuality in act secundo, pertaining to the same line, as will be sufficiently clear from what has been said in this doubt, and from what is to be said in disp. 4.

Now, when it is granted that, speaking of cognitive and created being, and of its immateriality, created immateriality is the a priori reason with respect to the cognitive being proportionate to it, namely created: but speaking of the intellectual being of God by the manner of the purest act, then its highest immateriality will be, on the part of our mode of conceiving, a certain inadequate prior reason with respect to its purest intellectuality: because these two reasons are not yet distinguished in God virtually, but are only two inadequate offices of the same purest reason, distinct on the part of our mode of conceiving.

39 Hence, as to the form of the argument, the antecedent must be denied as regards the prior part. And to the first proof the greater is to be granted, according to what has been said, and the consequence denied. And to the proof the antecedent must be denied in the most formal sense. For that some substance, and its cognitive power, be immaterial with that immateriality which is desired in order that it have the reason of substance and of cognitive power, is to have a nature so purified from matter, and so elevated, that it remains with sufficient actuality, elevation, and amplitude for it that it follow thence that it be able to receive the desired intentional species for knowing. Hence, in creatures the reason of immateriality so considered pertains to those very creatures insofar as they have the reason of essence, and the reason of receiving species pertains to them insofar as they have the reason of nature: and it is clear that in them the reasons of essence and of nature are virtually distinct, as our Complutensians teach in lib. Phys. disp. 7. num. 15. and in lib. de Anima, disp. 3. num. 16. and following.

To the second proof, however, it will be answered: only that divine understanding, in which the nature of God consists, cannot have another reason virtually prior to it; not however that on the part of our mode of conceiving we cannot distinguish there several inadequate offices of that same most eminent intellection: such that the very same intellection is understood, by reason of its highest immateriality, to have that actuality and amplitude, most pure, which is required in order that by the manner of the purest act it become all things in intelligible being, and by its own reason, as it expresses itself, so that it has formally the reason of an intelligible species with respect to itself, as well as the last and supreme actuality of understanding, so that it may most perfectly and most actually become all things in that same intelligible being.