Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

1 Although St. Thomas treats expressly in this question of the knowledge of God, in so far as it has formally the character of knowledge, nevertheless he mixes in much concerning intellection, which is in some way distinguished from knowledge. And so, both because of this reason and also because knowledge cannot belong to anyone unless there be in him an intellectual cognition, we inquire in the first place whether there is formally in God an intellectual cognition, setting aside whether such cognition has the character of knowledge or not.

§ I. Arguments for the negative side.

2 The first is this. For Dionysius, in the book On the Divine Names, cap. 7, speaking in the middle about God, says: For how would he understand anything intelligible, not having intellectual operations? He therefore plainly understands that there is not in God an intellectual cognition, which is the operation of the mind. Second, because in the book On Causes, proposition twenty-second, it is said that when we call God intelligent, we do not name him by a proper name, but by the name of his first caused thing, namely of the intelligence or Angel, who is the first effect of God.

Third. Because imperfection repugning to God is included in intellection: therefore it ought not to be posited in him formally, but only eminently; just as, because being rational includes an imperfection fighting against divine perfection, therefore it is not posited in God formally, but only eminently. The antecedent is proved. Because intellection is a certain suffering, and a motion of the thing understanding, as Aristotle teaches in 3. de Anima; but to suffer and to be moved mean an imperfection repugning to God, because they necessarily include potentiality: therefore, etc.

§ II. Catholic truth.

3 Nevertheless it must be said that there is formally in God an intellectual cognition. This conclusion is of faith, Job, cap. 31: Does he not consider my ways? Psalm 137: The Lord is high, and looks down on the lowly, and knows from afar what is exalted. Since these testimonies are not understood to be of imperfect cognition, namely sensible cognition, which is material from within, they must necessarily be understood to be of perfect cognition, namely intellectual. Likewise Baruch 3, where God is called the fountain of wisdom, and is said to know all things. Ecclesiasticus 1: All wisdom is from the Lord God, and was with him from the beginning. And Psalm 94, where, after he had in verse 7 premised the sentence of the wicked by these words, they have said: The Lord will not see, nor will God understand Jacob; and in verse 8 he rebuked them, asserting: Understand, you simpletons, and you fools, be wise at some time; then in verses 9 and 10 he argues thus: He who planted the ear, will he not hear? or he who formed the eye, will he not consider? He who teaches man knowledge, etc. As if he were to say: it is repugnant that he who gave men the power of understanding and knowing should not be knowing and understanding. Hence this assertion is broadly held by Dionysius, On the Divine Names, cap. 2, Damascene, Parallela, lib. 1, c. 2, St. Thomas in the present question and in 1. dist. 35, qu. 1, art. 1 and 2, and Contra Gentes 1, cap. 44, and De Veritate qu. 2, art. 1; and all the Fathers and Theologians hold the same.

4 Nor is there an obstacle, if along with those whom St. Thomas cites in qu. 2. de verit. art. 1, you say that testimonies of this kind, and the other things usually adduced, are not to be understood in the formal sense, but in the causal or the metaphorical sense, after the manner in which God is said to be angry: because although there is truly no anger in him, nevertheless he punishes as if he were angry.

For against this presses the rule drawn from Augustine and commonly received by the Theologians, namely that the words of Scripture must be understood in the proper and formal sense, whenever no absurdity follows from them; otherwise we should have nothing firm from Scripture. For each person could, as he pleased, explain them in, for example, an improper and metaphorical sense; whereas no absurdity follows from the aforesaid testimonies being understood in the proper and formal sense, as is clear from itself, but rather a great perfection is thereby posited in God, as is clear from itself and will at once be clearer from what is to be said: therefore they are ill taken in the merely metaphorical sense, or in the causal sense alone.

5 Next, against that same solution St. Thomas argues well in 1. dist. 35, qu. 1, art. 1, from a reason drawn from Anselm in the Monologium, cap. 14. Because to be intelligent is a simply simple perfection: therefore it is not among those things which belong to God causally or metaphorically, but among those which are found formally in him. The antecedent is proved. Because that perfection is simply simple which, in whatever it is found, is better than its own absence, and than anything incompatible with it: but in whatever thing being intelligent is found, it is far better than being ignorant and unknowing, as is clear from itself and from the common conception of all: therefore, etc. The consequence from the antecedent is plainly evident: because every simply simple perfection must be found formally in a being most perfect in every way; otherwise it would not be most perfect in every way, since it would lack that perfection which, taken formally, is better in any thing than its own absence: therefore, etc.

It is confirmed, first, by the reason of St. Thomas in 1. dist. 35, qu. 1, art. 2. To Anibaldus in these words: For that which is the principle of all things must be most perfect, because all imperfect things are reduced to something perfect, as to a principle: as the seed to the plant, or to the animal. Now the highest perfection cannot be found except in cognition. For a thing that does not know has its own proper perfection, and the perfections of all other things are lacking to it; whereas a thing that knows has not only its own proper perfection, by which it subsists in its own nature, but also that of others, in so far as other things can be present to the knower through their own forms, and that of all things, if the knowing thing is by nature able to know all things. Which cannot be unless it have intellectual cognition. For sensible cognition does not extend beyond corporeal things. God therefore, who is most perfect and from whom every perfection derives, must have intellectual cognition, which we for the present call knowledge.

6 It is confirmed, second, by another reason drawn from the same Holy Doctor. For as often as anything belongs to God causally or metaphorically, but not formally, so often it is said to belong to him by reason of something else that exists formally in him, and which of itself is proportioned to the production of that effect. As, although there is no act of anger in God, there is nevertheless an act of justice in him, by reason of which he punishes no less than if he were angry; but unless to understand is formally understood to be in God, nothing else could serve for this end, namely to cause the effects which he causes: therefore it is a sign that to understand is not among those things which belong to him only causally or metaphorically. The major, with the consequence, is sufficiently evident.

The minor, however, is proved. For in order that men, for example, should remain predestined, and that the necessary laws should be imposed on them for their direction, and finally that God should be the supreme judge, punishing their crimes and rewarding their good works, nothing else could serve them, if he were once formally not intelligent: for that which is formally ignorant, and does not know the end, cannot destine or direct another towards an end; as likewise that which cannot understand cannot establish laws, or, after the manner of a judge observing the gravity of the fault and the dignity of the deed, punish or bestow a reward: therefore, etc.

From which it also remains that another solution is refuted, which St. Thomas cites in the place referred to, namely that to be intelligent, or knowing, is predicated of God by reason of the negation which it imports, so that it is only meant that God is not ignorant, like a stone; but not because it is positively verified that there is intellection or knowledge in him. For this solution, as will be clear to the one who looks into it, sufficiently collapses from what has been said; and besides, against it presses the reason which the Holy Doctor adduces there in these words: Because every negation concerning some thing is founded upon something existing in the thing, as when it is said that a man is not an ass, the truth of the negation is founded upon man's nature, which does not admit the negated nature. Hence if ignorance is denied to God, it must be by reason of something which is in him, and so the opposite of ignorance must be posited in him.

7 Finally the assertion is proved by another reason from the same Angelic Doctor, adduced in the place cited in nearly these words. Because every agent has some intention and desire of an end, such that some cognition precedes the aforesaid desire, positing the end, and directing towards it those things which are towards the end: therefore the first agent, such as God is, cannot fail to have formally a cognition of the end, and consequently an intellectual cognition, which alone attains the end formally understood, as the Angelic Doctor and his disciples teach in 1. 2. qu. 1, art. 2. The antecedent is clear from itself. The first consequence, however, is proved and explained. For although in some agents the cognition of the end is not conjoined with them, nevertheless in that case such agents must be directed by some prior agent: as an arrow tends towards a determinate place through the determination of the one who shoots it, and all things which act by the necessity of nature without knowing the end are determined by some intellect instituting that nature, according to the saying of the Philosopher in 2. Physic.: The work of nature is the work of intelligence. Therefore the first agent cannot fail to know the end; otherwise it would be directed towards the end by another prior agent, and consequently would not be the first.

It is confirmed by the reason which the same St. Thomas adduces in these words: For that which is found in more things, and more and more in proportion as more things approach it, ought to be found in it in the highest degree, as heat in fire, the more mixed bodies approach it the warmer they are. Now it is found that the more things approach the first being (that is, God), the more nobly they participate in cognition: as men more than brute animals, and Angels more than men. Hence it is fitting that in God is found the most noble cognition.

§ III. Answer to the arguments set out at the beginning.

8 To the first it must be said that the meaning of Dionysius is only that he denies to God a cognition involved with defect, or defects and imperfections, but not a cognition which is through excess, or which surpasses every mode of created cognition, as is clear from the context of Dionysius himself. This solution is taken from St. Thomas in the place cited, from 1. Sent., in the answer to the first, in these words: It must be said that whenever knowledge, or intellect, or anything which pertains to perfection, is denied to God, it is to be understood according to excess, and not according to defect. Hence Dionysius says, c. 7. of the book On the Divine Names, that to be without mind and without feeling is, in God, to be understood according to excess, and not according to defect. For so much is the name of intellect denied to God as properly belonging to him: because he does not understand after the manner of a creature, but more eminently. Which he also taught in 1. part. qu. 13, art. 3, ad 2, where, speaking of these names, wise, understanding, etc., he says: It must be said that the reason why Dionysius says that such names are denied to God is that what is signified by the name does not belong to him in the manner in which the name signifies, but in a more excellent manner. Hence Dionysius says there that he is above all substance, and life.

9 To the second St. Thomas answers in qu. 2. de verit. art. 1, ad 11, in these words: It must be said that the meaning which the name signifies is a definition, as is said in 4. Metaphys., and therefore that is the proper name of some thing of which the signification is a definition; and since no meaning signified by a name defines God himself, no name imposed by us is properly his name, but it is properly the name of a creature, which is defined by the meaning signified by the name; and yet these names, which are names of creatures, are attributed to God according as some likeness of him is represented in creatures.

To the third it will be answered, with St. Thomas, 1. part. qu. 79, art. 2, that that testimony of Aristotle must be understood to be about our understanding, that is, created understanding, and not about divine understanding, which is free from imperfections. But on these matters let our Complutensians be seen, 3. de Anima, disp. 21, num. 8, and what follows there.