Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

1 Although St. Thomas treats expressly in this question of the knowledge of God, in so far as it has formally the character of knowledge, nevertheless he mixes in much concerning intellection, which is in some way distinguished from knowledge. And so, both because of this reason and also because knowledge cannot belong to anyone unless there be in him an intellectual cognition, we inquire in the first place whether there is formally in God an intellectual cognition, setting aside whether such cognition has the character of knowledge or not.

§ I. Arguments for the negative side.

2 The first is this. For Dionysius, in the book On the Divine Names, cap. 7, speaking in the middle about God, says: For how would he understand anything intelligible, not having intellectual operations? He therefore plainly understands that there is not in God an intellectual cognition, which is the operation of the mind. Second, because in the book On Causes, proposition twenty-second, it is said that when we call God intelligent, we do not name him by a proper name, but by the name of his first caused thing, namely of the intelligence or Angel, who is the first effect of God.

Third. Because imperfection repugning to God is included in intellection: therefore it ought not to be posited in him formally, but only eminently; just as, because being rational includes an imperfection fighting against divine perfection, therefore it is not posited in God formally, but only eminently. The antecedent is proved. Because intellection is a certain suffering, and a motion of the thing understanding, as Aristotle teaches in 3. de Anima; but to suffer and to be moved mean an imperfection repugning to God, because they necessarily include potentiality: therefore, etc.

§ II. Catholic truth.

3 Nevertheless it must be said that there is formally in God an intellectual cognition. This conclusion is of faith, Job, cap. 31: Does he not consider my ways? Psalm 137: The Lord is high, and looks down on the lowly, and knows from afar what is exalted. Since these testimonies are not understood to be of imperfect cognition, namely sensible cognition, which is material from within, they must necessarily be understood to be of perfect cognition, namely intellectual. Likewise Baruch 3, where God is called the fountain of wisdom, and is said to know all things. Ecclesiasticus 1: All wisdom is from the Lord God, and was with him from the beginning. And Psalm 94, where, after he had in verse 7 premised the sentence of the wicked by these words, they have said: The Lord will not see, nor will God understand Jacob; and in verse 8 he rebuked them, asserting: Understand, you simpletons, and you fools, be wise at some time; then in verses 9 and 10 he argues thus: He who planted the ear, will he not hear? or he who formed the eye, will he not consider? He who teaches man knowledge, etc. As if he were to say: it is repugnant that he who gave men the power of understanding and knowing should not be knowing and understanding. Hence this assertion is broadly held by Dionysius, On the Divine Names, cap. 2, Damascene, Parallela, lib. 1, c. 2, St. Thomas in the present question and in 1. dist. 35, qu. 1, art. 1 and 2, and Contra Gentes 1, cap. 44, and De Veritate qu. 2, art. 1; and all the Fathers and Theologians hold the same.

4 Nor is there an obstacle, if along with those whom St. Thomas cites in qu. 2. de verit. art. 1, you say that testimonies of this kind, and the other things usually adduced, are not to be understood in the formal sense, but in the causal or the metaphorical sense, after the manner in which God is said to be angry: because although there is truly no anger in him, nevertheless he punishes as if he were angry.

For against this presses the rule drawn from Augustine and commonly received by the Theologians, namely that the words of Scripture must be understood in the proper and formal sense, whenever no absurdity follows from them; otherwise we should have nothing firm from Scripture. For each person could, as he pleased, explain them in, for example, an improper and metaphorical sense; whereas no absurdity follows from the aforesaid testimonies being understood in the proper and formal sense, as is clear from itself, but rather a great perfection is thereby posited in God, as is clear from itself and will at once be clearer from what is to be said: therefore they are ill taken in the merely metaphorical sense, or in the causal sense alone.

5 Next, against that same solution St. Thomas argues well in 1. dist. 35, qu. 1, art. 1, from a reason drawn from Anselm in the Monologium, cap. 14. Because to be intelligent is a simply simple perfection: therefore it is not among those things which belong to God causally or metaphorically, but among those which are found formally in him. The antecedent is proved. Because that perfection is simply simple which, in whatever it is found, is better than its own absence, and than anything incompatible with it: but in whatever thing being intelligent is found, it is far better than being ignorant and unknowing, as is clear from itself and from the common conception of all: therefore, etc. The consequence from the antecedent is plainly evident: because every simply simple perfection must be found formally in a being most perfect in every way; otherwise it would not be most perfect in every way, since it would lack that perfection which, taken formally, is better in any thing than its own absence: therefore, etc.

It is confirmed, first, by the reason of St. Thomas in 1. dist. 35, qu. 1, art. 2. To Anibaldus in these words: For that which is the principle of all things must be most perfect, because all imperfect things are reduced to something perfect, as to a principle: as the seed to the plant, or to the animal. Now the highest perfection cannot be found except in cognition. For a thing that does not know has its own proper perfection, and the perfections of all other things are lacking to it; whereas a thing that knows has not only its own proper perfection, by which it subsists in its own nature, but also that of others, in so far as other things can be present to the knower through their own forms, and that of all things, if the knowing thing is by nature able to know all things. Which cannot be unless it have intellectual cognition. For sensible cognition does not extend beyond corporeal things. God therefore, who is most perfect and from whom every perfection derives, must have intellectual cognition, which we for the present call knowledge.

6 It is confirmed, second, by another reason drawn from the same Holy Doctor. For as often as anything belongs to God causally or metaphorically, but not formally, so often it is said to belong to him by reason of something else that exists formally in him, and which of itself is proportioned to the production of that effect. As, although there is no act of anger in God, there is nevertheless an act of justice in him, by reason of which he punishes no less than if he were angry; but unless to understand is formally understood to be in God, nothing else could serve for this end, namely to cause the effects which he causes: therefore it is a sign that to understand is not among those things which belong to him only causally or metaphorically. The major, with the consequence, is sufficiently evident.

The minor, however, is proved. For in order that men, for example, should remain predestined, and that the necessary laws should be imposed on them for their direction, and finally that God should be the supreme judge, punishing their crimes and rewarding their good works, nothing else could serve them, if he were once formally not intelligent: for that which is formally ignorant, and does not know the end, cannot destine or direct another towards an end; as likewise that which cannot understand cannot establish laws, or, after the manner of a judge observing the gravity of the fault and the dignity of the deed, punish or bestow a reward: therefore, etc.

From which it also remains that another solution is refuted, which St. Thomas cites in the place referred to, namely that to be intelligent, or knowing, is predicated of God by reason of the negation which it imports, so that it is only meant that God is not ignorant, like a stone; but not because it is positively verified that there is intellection or knowledge in him. For this solution, as will be clear to the one who looks into it, sufficiently collapses from what has been said; and besides, against it presses the reason which the Holy Doctor adduces there in these words: Because every negation concerning some thing is founded upon something existing in the thing, as when it is said that a man is not an ass, the truth of the negation is founded upon man's nature, which does not admit the negated nature. Hence if ignorance is denied to God, it must be by reason of something which is in him, and so the opposite of ignorance must be posited in him.

7 Finally the assertion is proved by another reason from the same Angelic Doctor, adduced in the place cited in nearly these words. Because every agent has some intention and desire of an end, such that some cognition precedes the aforesaid desire, positing the end, and directing towards it those things which are towards the end: therefore the first agent, such as God is, cannot fail to have formally a cognition of the end, and consequently an intellectual cognition, which alone attains the end formally understood, as the Angelic Doctor and his disciples teach in 1. 2. qu. 1, art. 2. The antecedent is clear from itself. The first consequence, however, is proved and explained. For although in some agents the cognition of the end is not conjoined with them, nevertheless in that case such agents must be directed by some prior agent: as an arrow tends towards a determinate place through the determination of the one who shoots it, and all things which act by the necessity of nature without knowing the end are determined by some intellect instituting that nature, according to the saying of the Philosopher in 2. Physic.: The work of nature is the work of intelligence. Therefore the first agent cannot fail to know the end; otherwise it would be directed towards the end by another prior agent, and consequently would not be the first.

It is confirmed by the reason which the same St. Thomas adduces in these words: For that which is found in more things, and more and more in proportion as more things approach it, ought to be found in it in the highest degree, as heat in fire, the more mixed bodies approach it the warmer they are. Now it is found that the more things approach the first being (that is, God), the more nobly they participate in cognition: as men more than brute animals, and Angels more than men. Hence it is fitting that in God is found the most noble cognition.

§ III. Answer to the arguments set out at the beginning.

8 To the first it must be said that the meaning of Dionysius is only that he denies to God a cognition involved with defect, or defects and imperfections, but not a cognition which is through excess, or which surpasses every mode of created cognition, as is clear from the context of Dionysius himself. This solution is taken from St. Thomas in the place cited, from 1. Sent., in the answer to the first, in these words: It must be said that whenever knowledge, or intellect, or anything which pertains to perfection, is denied to God, it is to be understood according to excess, and not according to defect. Hence Dionysius says, c. 7. of the book On the Divine Names, that to be without mind and without feeling is, in God, to be understood according to excess, and not according to defect. For so much is the name of intellect denied to God as properly belonging to him: because he does not understand after the manner of a creature, but more eminently. Which he also taught in 1. part. qu. 13, art. 3, ad 2, where, speaking of these names, wise, understanding, etc., he says: It must be said that the reason why Dionysius says that such names are denied to God is that what is signified by the name does not belong to him in the manner in which the name signifies, but in a more excellent manner. Hence Dionysius says there that he is above all substance, and life.

9 To the second St. Thomas answers in qu. 2. de verit. art. 1, ad 11, in these words: It must be said that the meaning which the name signifies is a definition, as is said in 4. Metaphys., and therefore that is the proper name of some thing of which the signification is a definition; and since no meaning signified by a name defines God himself, no name imposed by us is properly his name, but it is properly the name of a creature, which is defined by the meaning signified by the name; and yet these names, which are names of creatures, are attributed to God according as some likeness of him is represented in creatures.

To the third it will be answered, with St. Thomas, 1. part. qu. 79, art. 2, that that testimony of Aristotle must be understood to be about our understanding, that is, created understanding, and not about divine understanding, which is free from imperfections. But on these matters let our Complutensians be seen, 3. de Anima, disp. 21, num. 8, and what follows there.

10 Although from those things which were said in the preceding doubt it is sufficiently established that God is most understanding, as is clear to one who inspects it: yet since D. Thom. very often, and especially in this article, proves that a thing is cognitive, on the ground that it is immaterial, and hence that it is most cognitive, or most understanding, from the fact that it has the highest immateriality — and this reasoning is not without considerable difficulty — therefore, so that the principal proof which the Holy Doctor adduces here may remain wholly explained, we raise the present doubt for its examination.

§ I. Opinion denying it.

The first opinion denies that it is rightly inferred from the highest immateriality that God is understanding. Thus Gabriel in 1. distinct. 35. quaest. 2.; Aureolus apud Capreolum, in the same place, in the unique quaestio.

It is proved, first. Because there are several entities that are immaterial simpliciter and are not cognitive: therefore nothing cognitive is inferred from immateriality of that kind, and pure spirituality: therefore neither is anything most understanding inferred from the highest immateriality. This last consequence is clear from the preceding. For if that which is most immaterial were for that very reason most understanding; then that which were more immaterial would be more understanding: and consequently that which were immaterial simpliciter, or purely spiritual, would be understanding simpliciter; according to that rule of Aristotle: As a thing stands in more and in less, so it stands in the simple and the simple. The antecedent, however, is proved. For will, and that habit, as well as the agent intellect, are immaterial simpliciter, or purely spiritual, and yet they are not cognitive, as is clear from themselves and as the Philosophers and Theologians teach in common: therefore, and so on. Then again: for intelligible species, intellectual habits, as well as the possible intellect itself, have accidental spirituality, and yet they are cognitive: therefore, if immateriality were the reason of knowing, this immateriality of accidents would have it too: and consequently will, and the agent intellect, which can be equally immaterial as the possible intellect, and its species, would be cognitive in the same way.

11 Nor will it suffice to say that although nothing cognitive is inferred from the immateriality and pure spirituality of accidents, it is nevertheless inferred from the immateriality and pure spirituality of substance: because there is no purely spiritual substance that is not cognitive. Wherefore, since God has the highest substantial immateriality, it is well inferred thence that he is most understanding.

For the contrary is said. Then, because D. Thom. infers that something is more, or less, cognitive from greater, or lesser, immateriality: because immateriality makes the form in which it is found more ample, and less constricted, and according to the greater or lesser amplitude of the form, something is more, or less, cognitive, as we shall say in this same doubt: but this reasoning proceeds equally in substantial and in accidental immateriality: because each of these abstracts from matter, which is the root of constriction, and takes away the amplitude of the form: therefore, and so on.

12 Then finally: because God can create a purely spiritual substance which would not be cognitive, either because it would have no operation, as many corporeal substances do not have it, as D. Thom. teaches concerning the Empyrean heaven in 2. dist. 2. quaest. 2. art. 3., that it was created only for this, that it might be the seat of the blessed: or because its operation would consist only in producing, after the manner of a first and radical principle, and by means of some agent intellect, intelligible species in our possible intellects. For, just as the agent intellect can have this office with respect to the possible intellect rooted in the same soul, so it is not incongruous that by divine power there be given some agent intellect, and some substance, whose office consists only in producing in the possible intellects of all men intelligible species, by which they may be able to understand.

It is confirmed. For the motion which is attributed to the water of Baptism for the production of baptismal grace is spiritual, as our Complutensians teach from D. Thom. in lib. Physic. disp. 12. num. 22.; and yet it is not cognitive, as it seems clear from itself: therefore, and so on.

13 Secondly, and principally. For the rational soul is immaterial, and purely spiritual: and yet from this spirituality it does not follow that it is intelligible in act, or per se, in this state: therefore neither from the same spirituality will it be inferred that it is cognitive simpliciter; and consequently neither from the highest spirituality of God will it be deduced that he is most understanding. This last consequence is clear from the preceding, and from what has just been said. The first, however, seems plainly to follow from the greater and the lesser. Because it is far better for something to be cognitive than to be intelligible; since the reason of the cognitive includes the reason of the most perfect life, namely the intellectual; but the reason of the intelligible, on the contrary, does not: therefore, if from the very fact that a thing is spiritual it does not have what is less perfect in the intelligible order, namely that it is intelligible per se, much less will it have what is most perfect in this order, namely that it is cognitive.

The lesser, however, is expressed by D. Thom. 1. part. quaest. 87. art. 1., where for this reason he teaches that the soul in this state does not understand itself per se, but through the species of material things, and reflexively through its own act, in so far as by knowing that other it comes into the knowledge of itself. The greater, however, is Aristot., 3. de Anima, cap. 4., and it is admitted in common by all Theologians and Philosophers there, and it is proved excellently by our Complutensians in lib. de Anima, disp. 16. num. 4. and following.

14 It is confirmed, first. For our intellect also in this state is purely spiritual: but from this spirituality it does not follow that it is immediately, and per se, intelligible: therefore, by the reason given just now in this second argument and applied here by proportion, much less does it follow from such immateriality that it is immediately, and per se, understanding. The consequence seems certain with the greater. The lesser, however, is also clear. Because the intellect in this state also cannot be known except through the species of material things, as is sufficiently gathered from the place cited from D. Thom., and as N. Compl. teaches in lib. de Anima, disp. 17. num. 24. and following.

15 It is confirmed, secondly. For the rational soul, while it is united to the body, has a mode of being less immaterial than when it is separated from it, as is clear from itself: since while it is in the body, it abstracts less from matter than when it is outside it: and yet within the body it understands better than outside it: therefore there is a sign that intellectuality is not rightly inferred from immateriality. The consequence seems legitimate. For if intellectuality were rightly deduced from immateriality, that which is less immaterial could not be more understanding; but rather the contrary: that which had greater immateriality would be of greater power for understanding.

The lesser, however, in which the difficulty lies, is proved from D. Thom., then 1. part. quaest. 89. art. 1., where he says that it is better for the rational soul to be in the body, and to understand by conversion to the phantasms, than to be outside the body, and to understand without such conversion. Then also 1. 2. quaest. 54. art. 5. ad 4., where he says that the soul's separation from the body retards it, so that it does not tend with its whole intention to the vision of the divine essence.

16 Thirdly. For if the highest immateriality were the reason of having the highest cognitive power, some immateriality would not fail to be desired for the sake of having any cognitive power at all, as is clear from what has just been said: but this is false: therefore the highest immateriality will not be the reason of the highest cognitive power. The lesser is proved. For brutes have nothing of immateriality, since they are entirely material and corporeal; and yet they have some power of knowing: therefore, and so on.

Nor does it matter if you say that brutes are material in their being, yet in their mode of operation they are raised above matter, and are in some way immaterial, from the fact that they have a mode of operating more elevated than that of the non-knowing: since they operate through forms elevated above matter, namely intentional qualities. For the contrary is said, that the mode of operating follows the mode of being: therefore, if brutes are entirely material, that is, if their being is in no way elevated above matter — which indeed essentially includes it, and depends on it in being made and being preserved — they cannot but be material in respect of operation as well, and of its mode.

17 Fourthly. For materiality could impede, or remove, the power of knowing only on this account, that it removes the amplitude of the form: from the fact that it is proper to matter to limit and constrict it, as is clear from those things which are taught in this article and in 1. sentent. distinct. 35. quaest. 1. art. 1. by D. Thom.: but on this account it cannot remove the power of knowing: therefore, on account of no other: and consequently neither will immateriality put in place the aforesaid power in some way, nor the highest immateriality the highest power of knowing. This last consequence is clear from the preceding. For as often as two things are directly opposed, as happens with materiality and immateriality, then the one cannot put in place by its own force something in a subject which would not be removed by the other, if the other were there: just as because hot and cold, grace and sin are opposed, therefore nothing hot can be placed in the hot which would not be removed by the cold in that in which it is found: and likewise nothing can be placed in the soul which would not be taken away by sin: therefore, if materiality does not remove from that in which it is the power of knowing, neither will immateriality put it in place.

The prior consequence, however, plainly follows from the greater and the lesser. The lesser, however, in which the difficulty lies, is proved. Because matter removes the amplitude of the form only insofar as it is the cause that such a form is this and not that, from the fact that it is the root of the individuation of that same form: but this mode of removing the amplitude of the form does not remove the power of knowing; since even in subsistent forms, such as are the Angels, their individual difference limits them in this way; and yet it does not for that reason remove from them the power of knowing: therefore, and so on.

18 Lastly. For from immateriality the power of knowing cannot be proved a priori, or a posteriori: therefore in no way. The consequence seems legitimate. The antecedent, however, which is the prior part, is proved. Then, because it is prior that a substance should be cognitive than that it be able to receive intentional species, since indeed it is capable of them because, being cognitive, it cannot know without them: therefore it will also be prior that it be cognitive than that it be immaterial: because the same thing it is to be immaterial as to be able to receive intentional species considered formally in the being of species: and therefore brutes are called by D. Thom. (as we shall see below in this doubt) to have the immateriality required for knowing by sensitive cognition, because they can receive sensible species in sensible being, and considered formally, which the same Angelic Doctor, for the reason to be suggested at n. 34, calls forms without matter: therefore the power of knowing will not be able to be proved a priori through immateriality. Then again: because that in God peculiarity repugns is from the fact that his essence consists, most formally speaking, in understanding, and so understanding cannot have another reason a priori by which it may be proved. As for the second part, however, the same antecedent is proved. Because immateriality abstracts from vital immateriality, such as is found in the cognitive power, and from immateriality not in itself vital, which is found in the intelligible species: therefore it is prior than the reason of intellectual life: and consequently, if the power of understanding could be proved in something from it, such a proof would not be a posteriori but a priori.

§ II. The opinion, and the reasoning of D. Thomas, is defended.

19 It must nevertheless be said that the power of knowing is best proved from immateriality; and hence the highest power for the highest understanding is most congruently deduced from the highest immateriality. Thus D. Thom. here, and in 1. dist. 35. quest. 1. art. 1., and in the same place against Anibaldus, 1. cont. Gent. cap. 44., de veritate quest. 2. art. 1., and in the Compendium of Theology, cap. 28. Whom Caietanus, Zumel, Bannez, Nazarenus, Ripa, Gonzal., Machin, Suarez, and others follow here, and Ferrara in the place cited from 1. contra Gent. Capreolus in 1. dist. 35., and in common the Theologians and Philosophers together with Aristotle, 12. Metaphys. cap. 7., and 2. de Anima, textu 26. and 123.

The assertion is proved by the reasoning of the Holy Doctor, which was drawn from the Philosopher in the places cited. For immateriality of that kind simpliciter as is that which is found in purely spiritual substances, as in the Angels and in our soul, is the reason of understanding: therefore the highest immateriality will be the reason of the highest understanding: therefore D. Thom. most excellently concluded from the highest immateriality of God that he is most understanding. This last consequence requires no proof. The prior, however, follows from the antecedent. For as that which is most white is therefore most dispersive, because whiteness is dispersive, so if immateriality is the reason of understanding, then whatever is most immaterial will be most understanding.

20 The antecedent, however, in which the difficulty lies, is proved in several ways. Then, by the reasoning of the Angelic Doctor here, and in the first, above, as well as by Arist., 2. de Anima, text. 123., and 3. de Anima, text. 4. up to 7. For plants are not cognitive because they are too material: brutes, however, have some cognitive power because they have something more of immateriality, from the fact that in their operations they depend less on matter and on its conditions, as N. Complut. shows in 1. de anima, disp. 4. n. 7. and following: therefore there is a sign that a more perfect immateriality, by which something is immaterial simpliciter, is a reason for knowing more perfectly than all brutes, and consequently for knowing by intellection. Then again: because among intellectual substances those are more understanding which are, in the way just said, more immaterial, and approach more closely to the divine immateriality: and so the rational soul, because it abstracts less from matter than the lowest Angel, from the fact that although it is spiritual according to its substance, it is nonetheless the true form of the body, for that reason has less of intellectuality than the aforesaid Angel: therefore, and so on.

21 Then again, by the reasoning of the most holy Preceptor in the place cited from the Compendium of Theology. Because material things become intelligible in act through immaterial intentional species, and not through material ones: therefore there is a sign that this immateriality is the reason of the power of understanding. The consequence is clear: because the same intentional species which renders the object intelligible in act renders it also a completely understanding intellect, as we shall say below in this same article: therefore, if immateriality has been called the reason of intelligibility, it will also be the reason of the intellectual power.

And all these proofs can be confirmed and explained by giving a sufficiently deep root for them. First, indeed, by the reasoning drawn from Aristot., 3. de Anima, cap. 4., and D. Thom. in the same place, lect. 6., as well as 1. part. quaest. 75. artic. 2. For the intellectual power can understand every body, whether taken in particular or in the universal: but if the intellectual power were material, and corporeal, it could not thus attain to every body, because what exists within excludes the external: just as a tongue affected with a choleric humour cannot for this reason perceive other flavours, but everything seems bitter to it. Our Complutensians expound this proof at length in 3. de Anima, disp. 16, num. 7. up to 22. and following, and they resolve several objections by which it is usually attacked.

22 The same proofs are confirmed and explained, secondly, by adducing another reason, and a root drawn from divine Thom., 1. part. quaest. 50. artic. 2. ad 2., where he says: that an intelligible form is received in the intellect according to the reason of form, that is, as Bannez well explains there, according to the whole amplitude and universality which it has in intelligible being. For although the species representing the nature of a stone cannot be received in the intellect except as it is individuated and limited in entitative being by that stone, yet in intelligible and representative being it remains as universal as the very reason and nature of such a form requires in its amplitude: and so it represents the nature of a stone taken universally: therefore there is a sign that the intellect receiving it is not material, but ought to be immaterial, and to receive it in an immaterial way: therefore there will also be a sign that from this immateriality of the intellect, and from this mode of receiving, or quasi-receiving, the intelligible species, it is rightly deduced that the intellect having that immateriality, and receiving the species immaterially, has its power of understanding through it. Both consequences are clear. The prior, indeed: because that which is material, and receives a form materially, does not receive it according to the reason of form, that is, with the universality befitting the form, but by individuating and limiting it through the individuation and limitation arising from matter, as from the first principle of limitation and individuation.

23 The second consequence, however, also follows from that prior one. For from the very fact that the intellect ought to be immaterial, and to receive the intelligible form immaterially, so that it may receive it duly, and in the being of the intelligible form, it follows rightly that immateriality is the reason of receiving it in that peculiar mode in which it itself asks to be received, in order to bestow its formal effect, which is to render the intellect completely understanding: therefore from the same immateriality it will also follow that it receives it as something having a power of understanding by the manner of the intellectual power: since the intelligible species, as such, is not received, or quasi-received, in that peculiar mode in which it asks to be quasi-received, except in that which has a power of understanding by the manner of the power, or of the intellectual power, so that nothing other than this power be constituted by it in the being of the completely intellectual power as such.

24 This same root is explained and confirmed further by an elegant discourse, which Arist., 2. de Anima, text. 121., and Ang. Doct. ibid. lect. 24., and here in this article and elsewhere often, suggest. Because the formal reason of a cognitive and intellectual nature consists in this, that the aforesaid nature not only be itself, but also be able to become all other things by means of intelligible species: and so the Philosopher, 3. de Anima, text. 17., says that the possible intellect, insofar as it can know all things, can also become all things; and the Angelic Doctor teaches in the places cited that the perfection of the knower, insofar as it is knower, consists in this, that the perfection which is proper to one thing be found in another, as we shall say more fully below in this same article: therefore such a nature cannot but be immaterial simpliciter, and receive in an immaterial way the forms and the perfections of other things by the aforesaid species. The consequence is clear. Because this, that a nature, or a form, can become all things, says the greatest amplitude and unlimitedness, as is clear from itself: therefore for that very reason it must abstract greatly from matter, which is the root of the limitation and constriction of that same form.

25 Above all, because from the very fact that an intellectual nature becomes all things which it understands by means of species, it is necessary that, just as when it understands some nature with regard to its character and its essence taken precisely, it then in that way becomes that nature which it understands, and so receives the form according to the reason of form, as we were saying just now; so also, when it perceives that same nature with regard to what is essential and numerical in it, it must needs be that the same intellect also becomes that very nature with regard to the specific and numerical perfection of it, as is clear from the parity of the reason, and as will be made clearer below in this article: and consequently it will receive from this side also the aforesaid form and perfection according to the reason of form, as we have already explained: therefore it will also be necessary that the aforesaid nature, receiving by means of the intelligible species — by which it becomes one with its object — such a form and the same perfection according to number, be immaterial, and receive the same in an immaterial way: because matter limits and distinguishes form according to number, so that forms which were found in diverse matters must be distinguished numerically. And so, if the same perfection numerically which is in the thing understood is in the intellectual nature by means of the intelligible species and the intellection of such an object, such a nature will not be able not to be immaterial, and to receive it in an immaterial way; indeed it will not be able not to receive the aforesaid form according to the reason of form, that is, not commingling with it that which is proper to the effect of matter, namely limiting, individuating, and distinguishing the aforesaid form according to number: which mode of receiving a form is in some way to receive it, so to speak, in a pure act, so far as it lies on the part of that reception.

We have said, in a pure act (so to speak), and so on, in order to signify that although imperfections are really involved there, nevertheless this peculiar imperfection of limiting the intelligible form with respect to the amplitude that it has with it is not what is meant. Which is so universally true that not only in intelligible forms that are purely spiritual, and so tending to the office already mentioned, having in the cognitive power spirituality of that kind simpliciter; but also, in proportion, in whatever intentional species, even sensible ones, the same way of philosophising must be observed. And so, although the sensitive and cognitive powers are not purely spiritual, nonetheless, because they do not limit intentional species in this way when considered formally in sensible being, because they are not compared to them so taken by the manner of a true subject, but by another higher manner, as we shall explain in disp. 2. a num. 72. up to 84., when they are united to them, therefore they are said to receive them, or quasi-receive them, or (as we had better say) to be united to them according to what they have of the reason of form and (so to speak) of a pure act.

§ III. The arguments of the first opinion are answered.

26 To the first it must be said that immateriality of every kind, or pure spirituality not including corporeity in its own reason, is the reason of understanding, whether elicitive and receptive at once; or only elicitive, or only consecutive, or finally as required for understanding; yet in such a way that all of these pertain to the intellectual part, taken adequately. Now, although the aforesaid immateriality ought to be the reason of understanding in one of these ways; nevertheless in substances it always, and necessarily, at least speaking according to their natural bent, must be the reason of understanding elicitive and receptive, and in no mere way, but as quod, that is, in such a way that the aforesaid substance elicits the intellection, and receives, or quasi-receives, it itself: and consequently it really understands through it. In accidents, however, it will suffice that it be the reason of understanding in one of the assigned ways; although it can also be sometimes the reason of understanding elicitive, or even receptive, not indeed as quod, but as quo. And therefore immateriality in the will is the reason of understanding consecutive, that is, it holds itself by the manner of an intellectual inclination, which both necessarily presupposes that thing and in some way follows upon it. The same, proportion being preserved, we say of the habits of the will. And then the intellect is the reason of understanding, as quo, elicitive and receptive at once, as is clear from itself. And likewise the intelligible species is also the reason of understanding elicitive, as quo, by the manner of the reason of that which holds itself on the part of the object, although it does not receive the intellection into itself, as is clear from those things which we have said in the treatise On the Vision of God. And finally the agent intellect is also the reason of understanding by the manner of what is required for understanding, as something producing the intelligible species by which the intellection is to be elicited.

27 The reason, however, on account of which we must philosophise in this diverse way in substances and in accidents, is drawn from the nature of each, and is suggested by N. Complut. in 2. Phys. disp. 10. quaest. 4. and 5. For an immaterial substance is absolutely, and immaterial simpliciter, as quod, that is, by the manner of a subsisting thing, in such a way that it is not immaterial on account of some other thing which is more prior and more principal, as accidents have it: and therefore if its immateriality is the reason of understanding, it must be the reason of understanding absolutely, and simpliciter, and consequently of understanding as quod, elicitive and receptive. But immaterial accidents, such as are the entities of a being, which of themselves can have no immateriality as quod, or by the manner of subsisting things, are so on account of the need of the substance, to which immateriality belongs more primarily: and therefore they are measured by their own immateriality in proportion to this need, in such a way that they serve it with respect to the various and diverse effects for which the substance itself, immaterial, by reason of its own immateriality and of its cognitive power — which is such as quod — has need. Hence, because the substance sometimes has need of a vital and immaterial power, which makes material objects intelligible in act, producing intelligible species by which the aforesaid objects become intelligible in act, it follows that the aforesaid power must be given to it, namely the agent intellect, which by reason of its own immateriality is able to perform this office. And likewise, because the aforesaid created and immaterial substance can be only radically cognitive, as is clear from those things which N. Complut. teaches in 2. Physic. disp. 10., already cited, num. 22. and following; therefore it needs another immaterial power, which by reason of its own immateriality is the proximate power for understanding. And finally, because the knower as such naturally desires the intellectual good, and the substance itself cannot be the proximate principle of this inclination, therefore an immaterial power is given to it, which by reason of its immateriality is unlimited, and consequently able to tend to every good, and so of the rest.

28 Wherefore the solution given there, and understood according to the manner just stated, is the best. And to the first and second proof to the contrary it is clear from what has just been said how immateriality in accidents is also the reason of amplitude and of illumination: yet in such a way that, according to the diverse nature of substance and of accident, as well as according to the diverse need of the substance, this immateriality is modified diversely in substances and in accidents, in which it is imbued by the manner of an accident, and according to the nature of each. And so immateriality in a substance will bestow the amplitude of such a condition as is required in order that, in the manner explained, it be the reason of understanding. And likewise in accidents it will bestow that unlimitedness upon them, so modified that all of those things be the reason of understanding in one of the ways already stated, and, according to the diverse need according to which the intellectual substance in which they are has need of them, they be the reason of understanding in diverse ways.

To the last proof, however, the antecedent must be denied. For just as that substance, by reason of its own immateriality, would be above all sensitive substances, which are not purely spiritual as it is, so likewise it would have to have life, at least radical, and consequently intellectual life at the radical level. Hence, although it be admitted that the Empyrean heaven (of which there is also the testimony of D. Thom. elsewhere), which is not a living body, can be without any operation of which it is the root, nevertheless this cannot be affirmed of the aforesaid substance. Hence it will be false what is added there, namely that there can be given some created substance which has only, by the manner of a radical principle, the production of intelligible species in the intellects of men. For from the very fact that such a substance is living with a life more elevated than all sensible substances, its operation cannot but be, at least speaking per se, immanent, in the very same suppositum that operates. For a vital action, speaking per se, demands that it remain at least in the suppositum eliciting it, from the fact that it is the proper office of life to move itself. But if that production of species were received in the aforesaid substance, it would already have, or at least demand, the possible intellect, in which it might be proximately received: and so such a substance would be cognitive.

To the confirmation it is clear from what has been said. For since that motion is a certain accident, it is enough that it be ordered to something of the intellectual order, namely to the production of sanctifying grace, which is a certain participation of the divine intellectuality.

29 To the second, an answer is given from Caiet., 3. de Anima, cap. 1., at the end of the fifth text, that the soul is intelligible in the same way in which it is cognitive, and conversely. Hence, just as the soul in this state is intelligible in potency, and thus is rendered actually, and completely, intelligible through the intelligible species, so also it is cognitive, not actually and completely, but in potency, because it is cognitive by the manner of pure radical power in the intelligible order: and it is rendered in act, and is completed, through the form of this order, namely through the intelligible species, as also through the intellect, which is proximately cognitive by the manner of potency.

Now, although the soul in this state is said to be cognitive in potency, or by the manner of potency: and likewise in a proportional way it is intelligible: nevertheless it is intelligible in potency in a different way from that in which material things are intelligibly in potency. For the soul in this state is so intelligible in potency that that potency is within the intelligible order, or genus, participating in its immateriality, and consequently in some reason pertaining intrinsically to such a genus. Just as although prime matter is pure potency in the genus of substance, it is nevertheless a potency contained within this genus, and participating in the true reason of substance. But material things, insofar as they are intelligible in potency, do not participate in the immateriality of the intelligible order, nor in any reason pertaining intrinsically to such an order: because the intelligible order begins extrinsically with the intelligibility in potency of material things, according as they are proximately to be stripped of their materiality, and intrinsically with the intelligibility in potency of spiritual things, such as is the soul in this state, and other like things. Wherefore, when it is said that the soul is intelligible in potency, the aforementioned particle in potentia is not added in order to exclude the soul from the intelligible order as something not intrinsically contained in it, but to signify the manner in which it differs from certain other things that look intrinsically to the same order, and according to which it pertains, in the manner just said, to the aforesaid intelligible order.

30 Secondly, it is answered, that the rational soul has more of intellectuality in this state than of intelligibility: because, in order that it be intellectual, in as far as intellectual being is distinguished from intelligible being, it is not necessary that it be completed except by something that is borne away from it by its own merits, namely by the intellect flowing from it: but in order that it be rendered an object actually, or intelligible per se, it is required that something be added on its part in the being of an object, holding itself there, which comes from elsewhere, namely an intelligible species.

Now, nothing follows from this against us. For since a thing can be intelligible in three ways: either so that it is only actually, or per se intelligible, but not cognitive by the manner of the intellectual power, or of anything holding itself on its part; or so that it is not actually, or per se intelligible, but is only actually cognitive, that is, having in act whatever is required on the part of the intellectual power, but not yet what is desired on the part of the object, as we have said happens in our soul in this state; or finally so that it is at once actually intelligible, and also actually cognitive, in the manner just said.

We say, therefore, that that which is precisely intelligible in act, or which renders an object intelligible in act, is more perfect secundum quid with respect to what is actually cognitive, in as far as it sharpens it, and is compared to it by the manner of form; yet it is simpliciter more ignoble than that, because it is not necessary that it live so perfectly the intellectual life, which bears a certain maximum perfection before it; which perfection of life, however, what is actually cognitive seeks. Now, that which is at once cognitive and intelligible in act is, with respect to this reason, more noble than that which is only cognitive in act, as is clear from itself. Wherefore, although the rational soul, through lack of perfection and through that simpliciter excess by which it is surpassed by those things which would at once have the reason of things both intelligible and cognitive in act, be not actually intelligible and cognitive; nevertheless it can have the reason of being actually cognitive, in the manner explained. Just as also, by reason of that simpliciter excess according to which it surpasses things which are precisely intelligible in act and not cognitive, from the lack of immateriality, in the vital manner just said, of which they are devoid; and by reason of the excess by which it is surpassed secundum quid by those things which are only intelligible in act, it cannot be of the number of those things which are precisely intelligible in act; but of the number of those which have intelligibility in potency, already explained, together with actuality in the intellectual order.

31 Hence, as to the form of the argument, the greater and the lesser having been granted, both consequences must be denied. And to the proof of the prior, upon which the proof of the posterior depends, the answer is given by distinguishing the antecedent: It is far better for something to be cognitive than to be intelligible — cognitive with such perfection of intellectuality that it is also itself actually intelligible — is to be granted; cognitive with precision, so that it is not at once actually intelligible, the antecedent must again be distinguished, and granted of the simpliciter excess of the cognitive, so taken as surpassing what is actually intelligible, with the secundum quid excess of that same intelligible also compatible surpassing the aforesaid cognitive: but it must be denied of the simpliciter excess of the cognitive itself, which excludes the secundum quid excess of what is actually intelligible over the cognitive itself. And then the consequence must be denied on account of the reason given just now in this solution.

To the first confirmation it is answered, first, that the intellect, according to the preceding solution of the argument, is intelligible and cognitive in this state in the same way and proximately. For as it is not proximately cognitive except dependently on the phantasms, so neither is it proximately and per se intelligible except with the same dependence. Although, because the aforesaid dependence is of a different reason, on account of its peculiar nature on the part of that by which it is cognitive, and that by which it is intelligible, it demands that it be proximately cognitive by the manner of a potency that the phantasy can and ought to produce simultaneously, its own phantasm about some object connected with, or having an affinity to, that which is then understood by the intellect: but for it to be proximately intelligible, it is requisite that the possible intellect, dependently on that same phantasm, produce an intelligible species, through which the intellect itself becomes in some way actually intelligible in this state. Or, secondly, to the same confirmation one may have recourse in the same way, proportion being preserved, in which we had recourse in the second place to the second argument immediately preceding.

32 To the second confirmation the lesser must be denied. And to the first testimony it must be said that the Holy Doctor wills only that for the soul, as a part of man, it be better to understand by conversion to the phantasms, and to be united to the body, than to understand without such conversion, and to be separated from it. For since every part, as such, is best situated when it is in its whole, hence it follows that for the soul according to the reason of a part, it is better to understand through that conversion than without it, and to be within the body than outside it. Yet it does not follow that such a mode of understanding, taken in itself, is a nobler mode of understanding than that which it has outside the body, as the same Holy Doctor teaches in this very testimony in the body of the article. We have said, taken in itself: because, as Caiet. well noted there, although the mode of understanding without conversion to the phantasms is, taken in itself, or from its genus, nobler than the mode of understanding by conversion to them, nevertheless that mode, as modified and qualified to the human intellect, because it is in some way disproportionate with respect to it, as the same Caiet. excellently explains in the place cited, is, in so far as it is thus taken, more ignoble than the mode of understanding by conversion to the phantasms.

Yet nothing follows from this against us. For although greater immateriality, and a more immaterial mode of operating, argue, speaking per se, a better mode of understanding; nevertheless it is not incongruous that what happens, as is seen here, by accident, or by reason of some impediment, and of some disproportion between the intellect so operating and that mode of greater immateriality, should befall as its opposite. For, as N. Complut. noted in lib. de Anima disp. 2. num. 55., the mode of being outside the body is not so connatural to the soul, and understanding by conversion to higher intelligible things, or independently of the body, is in some way disproportionate with respect to the human intellect: and therefore by reason of this impediment, or disproportion, the human intellect when separated cannot understand so perfectly without conversion to the phantasms as with conversion to them.

Hence (as Caietan. well observes) when D. Thom. said that that mode of understanding without conversion to the phantasms is nobler in itself, and absolutely, yet not for the soul, the meaning is not that the aforesaid mode retains its greater nobility in the soul; but that in the soul it is not posited absolutely, but conditioned, and modified by a condition and modification diminishing it, namely with some disproportion and defect of commensurability of the species to the intellect, in as far as the human intellect has an order to the body, and that body, and their union per se: whereas the aforesaid species, and so they are, are more universal, and more abstract, than species which befit the soul united to the body.

Wherefore the Holy Doctor, in this same article, after he had said that the mode of understanding by conversion to the intelligible simpliciter, or without conversion to the phantasms, which are intelligible in potency, is better simpliciter than that by conversion to the phantasms, immediately added that that prior mode, insofar as it is possible to the soul, is more imperfect than this one, in order to signify by this that that mode, from its genus and without adjuncts from elsewhere imperfections, is nobler; yet considered as it is in the soul, and as it is modified and qualified there.

33 To the second testimony, from 1, 2. quest. 4. art. 5. ad 4., the answer is given that the Angel. Doctor wills only that the soul, as separated, be retarded, or impeded, from the extensive perfection of beatitude, from the fact that its beatitude does not overflow into the body, so long as it is separated: but not that it be retarded from the intensive perfection, which cannot grow except in proportion to the greater or lesser amount of the light of glory received in the soul, whether separated or united, which before and after the resurrection is of the same intensity, as D. Thom. teaches there in ad 4., and as is clear from those things said in the treatise On the Vision of God. Hence that phrase, so as not to tend with its whole intention, and so on, is understood to refer to the whole intention that has all the extensive perfection, already explained, which can agree with it.

34 To the third, the lesser must be denied. And to the proof it must be said that although brutes are immaterial nothing simpliciter, and corporeal, nevertheless they are not such as to have nothing of immateriality, so much as suffices for it that they be cognitive. The reason for this was adduced by Aristot., lib. 2. de Anima, cap. 3., D. Thom. there in lect. 4., and 1. part. quaest. 78. art. 1., de verit. quaest. 12. art. 2. ad 2., quaest. de Anima, art. 13. For although, both according to being and according to their operations, they depend on matter, nevertheless they are not altogether comprehended by it, nor altogether immersed in it, but are in some way elevated above the conditions of matter. This elevation, however, and this surmounting consists in this, that they have a being of such a nature that they are the roots of operating without motion and passion, in the physical sense, and strictly speaking.

For, as the same Holy Doctor well noted in lib. Physic. and as all philosophers teach in common, to be moved and to suffer through the passion and motion already mentioned is the proper condition of matter; so that it befits it as the first root, and also the others over which it rules considerably, by reason of it. And therefore to operate without the aforesaid motion and passion is to operate through an operation not altogether mixed with the conditions of matter, but considerably elevated above the aforesaid conditions; and to have a being that is the root of this kind of operation is to have a being not altogether comprehended and immersed in matter, but considerably elevated and surmounting its conditions. Hence, when it is said in the argument that brutes are altogether material and corporeal, it must be granted, if the word altogether removes the pure spirituality such as is found in our rational soul: but not if it removes both this and that which is to have the elevation already mentioned. But on these matters let N. Complut. be consulted in lib. Physic. disput. 16. num. 13. and following, and in lib. de Anima, disp. 21. quaest. 1., and especially num. 19., in which places they explain what is required for motion, or mutation, in the instant sense, physically and strictly speaking, and why the intellection of intellectual things, and the sensitive cognition of brutes, do not have the reason of such motions.

35 This elevation of brutes in respect of their forms can also be explained further in this way. For as D. Thom. noted in the places cited, from the very fact that the aforesaid mode of operating is in them, they have a mode of being of such a condition that they are the root of operating, not indeed through mere qualities that are very material, and depend very much on matter, such as are the first qualities and the other second qualities which arise from their mingling, but through higher and more elevated qualities, such as are the intentional species, which Aristotle in 2. de Anima, cap. ultimo, calls forms without matter, by reason of the elevation which they have above matter, from the fact that intentional being is of such a condition that, as we touched on at nn. 24 and 25, and as we shall say below in this same article from the Philosopher and D. Thom., although according to purely natural being, as it is distinguished from intentional being, nothing can have the same perfection numerically that another has; and therefore the aforesaid natural being is a more determinate and constricted being: yet under the manner of intentional being some thing can very well have the same perfection numerically that another has: and therefore the aforesaid being is elevated above the conditions of matter, which of itself is the root of limitation and constriction: and consequently that it be some perfection, or form, that is this and not that, and that it be thus this so that it be not found in that. But on these matters let those things be consulted which N. Complut. teach in 1. de Anima, disp. 4. quaest. 1. and 2., as well as those which we shall say in the following disputation, num. 14. and following.

This is declared further from those things which we were saying in this doubt at nn. 24 and 25. For from the very fact that sensible or intelligible intentional species — if they are taken formally, and with precision, in sensible or intelligible being — are not limited and constricted by those things in which they are received, or quasi-received, according to this being; and consequently that brutes receiving these species, and sensible intentional forms, considered in sensible being, do not limit them, but leave them in their amplitude, and do not prevent the same species numerically in sensible being, which is in this brute, from being in another; it is necessary that the forms of the aforesaid brutes have a being sufficiently elevated above the conditions of matter: since, as we have so often said, it is proper to matter, and consequently to those things over which it rules considerably, to limit and constrict the form, and the power of operating received in it; so that they make it be this and not that; and this, and not indeed that.

36 Nor does it matter, if against this solution you object that if the aforesaid elevation above matter and its conditions were the reason of knowing, then a white wall would be cognitive: because it has a being of such a condition that it can operate without motion and passion, strictly speaking, or without physical motion and passion: as happens when it diffuses its intentional species through the medium: and likewise the Sun illuminating the medium, and the medium itself, for example the air receiving the aforesaid species and transmitting them, would be cognitive, because all these things operate without it being necessary that a passion and motion, strictly speaking, intervene there.

For it will be answered that the mode of operating above the conditions of matter, indicating a cognitive power in the operator, must be not just any, but immanent per se, and consequently vital, because cognition is of itself an act immanent per se, and consequently vital. Hence, because all those things which are recounted in this objection operate through a transient operation, which is a far more ignoble operation, and not through an action immanent per se and vital, therefore that some such mode of elevation which they have is not sufficient for it that they have a cognitive power.

Add that it is false that illumination is motion in the physical sense, strictly speaking, of which there is mention in 3. Physic., as is clear from those things which N. Complut. noted in 3. de Anima disp. 21. num. 19.

37. To the fourth it must be said that the individual difference of the Angel limits him, so that he is here, that he is not the other things in natural being; yet it does not prevent him from being able to be in intentional and intelligible being, as N. Complut. explain in 3. de Anima, disp. 16. a num. 1. up to num. 20.: but matter, comprehending some form altogether immersed in it, or not elevated as much as the forms of brutes, limits and restricts it, so that they are not other things also in intentional and representative being, as is clear from what has been said. Hence it is not every constriction, but that which prevents one form from being able to have the perfections of others in representative being, which removes the amplitude necessarily required in order that it have a cognitive power.

38 To the last it will be answered that the reasoning of D. Thom., in so far as it shows from the highest immateriality of God that he is most understanding, is not properly, and speaking strictly, a priori or a posteriori: because the highest immateriality does not hold, properly and strictly, as the foundation and root of the highest and purest intellectuality of God, but is rather constituted in the highest act of immateriality through the highest act of his most actual intellectuality.

Wherefore this reasoning proceeds only from one inadequate reason found in the divine essence to another found in it, and distinct from it a priori not virtually, but on the part of our mode of conceiving. For these two reasons are so connected with each other that wherever one of them is, the other must necessarily be, and not merely so, but in such a way that they look to one and the same line. And the reason is. For from the very fact that the divine essence says, first and per se and by its own reason, entity through essence by the manner of the purest act: and consequently abstracts from all matter and potentiality, there must needs be in it likewise another inadequate reason of the highest and purest intellectuality in act secundo, pertaining to the same line, as will be sufficiently clear from what has been said in this doubt, and from what is to be said in disp. 4.

Now, when it is granted that, speaking of cognitive and created being, and of its immateriality, created immateriality is the a priori reason with respect to the cognitive being proportionate to it, namely created: but speaking of the intellectual being of God by the manner of the purest act, then its highest immateriality will be, on the part of our mode of conceiving, a certain inadequate prior reason with respect to its purest intellectuality: because these two reasons are not yet distinguished in God virtually, but are only two inadequate offices of the same purest reason, distinct on the part of our mode of conceiving.

39 Hence, as to the form of the argument, the antecedent must be denied as regards the prior part. And to the first proof the greater is to be granted, according to what has been said, and the consequence denied. And to the proof the antecedent must be denied in the most formal sense. For that some substance, and its cognitive power, be immaterial with that immateriality which is desired in order that it have the reason of substance and of cognitive power, is to have a nature so purified from matter, and so elevated, that it remains with sufficient actuality, elevation, and amplitude for it that it follow thence that it be able to receive the desired intentional species for knowing. Hence, in creatures the reason of immateriality so considered pertains to those very creatures insofar as they have the reason of essence, and the reason of receiving species pertains to them insofar as they have the reason of nature: and it is clear that in them the reasons of essence and of nature are virtually distinct, as our Complutensians teach in lib. Phys. disp. 7. num. 15. and in lib. de Anima, disp. 3. num. 16. and following.

To the second proof, however, it will be answered: only that divine understanding, in which the nature of God consists, cannot have another reason virtually prior to it; not however that on the part of our mode of conceiving we cannot distinguish there several inadequate offices of that same most eminent intellection: such that the very same intellection is understood, by reason of its highest immateriality, to have that actuality and amplitude, most pure, which is required in order that by the manner of the purest act it become all things in intelligible being, and by its own reason, as it expresses itself, so that it has formally the reason of an intelligible species with respect to itself, as well as the last and supreme actuality of understanding, so that it may most perfectly and most actually become all things in that same intelligible being.

After we have shown that there is in God an intellection taken properly and formally, it remains that we explain whether such an intellection at the same time has the reason of knowledge taken properly and formally, or whether it is distinguished virtually from the intellection such as it is precisely in God, or only on the part of our mode of conceiving, as is said below.

§ I. Two opinions are set out.

40 The first opinion denies to God the reason of knowledge taken properly and formally. Thus some, whom D. Thom. reports in 1. dist. 35. art. 1. For that opinion argues as follows, first. For knowledge, of which we are speaking, is the habit of the conclusion, just as the intellect is the habit of principles, as the Philosopher teaches, 6. Ethic. cap. 3. 5. and 6.; but God does not know anything by the manner of a conclusion; because in that way his intellect would descend from principles to conclusions, which Dionysius also removes from the Angels, 7. de divinis nominibus: therefore knowledge is not formally in God.

The Holy Doctor confirms this same point, de verit. quaest. 2. art. 1. For everything which is known by knowledge must be known by something more known: but nothing is more, and less, known to God, but all things are equally most known to him: therefore there cannot be knowledge in him.

Secondly, he argues in the place cited from 1. sententiarum. To what is most simple, and first, nothing befits which presupposes something to itself, and which is added to a pre-existing thing: but knowledge presupposes life, and essence, and says that something is added to them, as is said in the principle of the book On Causes: therefore, since God is a most simple, and first, being, knowledge cannot be found in him.

41 Thirdly, the Holy Doctor proves this very point. Nothing which requires plurality is found in that which is most one: but knowledge requires a certain plurality, namely of the knower, of the knowing, and of the known: therefore it will not befit God, who is most one.

Nor does it matter if you say that the distinction between the knower and the known is not necessary to the reason of knowledge: but that the two can coincide in the same.

For the contrary is said (D. Thom. says) that nothing can be said to be like itself, as Hilary says; nor does anything receive, or contain, itself: but according to the Philosopher, 1. de Anima text. 25., knowledge is the assimilation of the knower to the thing known, and knowledge is according to the reception of the known in the knower: therefore it seems that the same thing cannot be both knower and known.

Lastly, it is proved. For the cognition of God, taken first and per se, terminates in his own essence, and, being thus known there, reaches the attributes and the creatures: therefore there is not knowledge in God, taken properly and formally. The antecedent is clear from those things which we have said in the treatise On the Vision of God, and it will be clearer still from what is to be said below, and it is admitted in common by the Theologians. The consequence, however, is proved. Because in this does knowledge differ from the knowledge of principles, which is called understanding, that the latter turns about the conclusion first and per se, whereas the latter tends first and per se to the principles and causes of conclusions: therefore, if all divine cognition turns about its own essence first and per se, which has the reason of principle and cause, or quasi-cause, of its attributes and of creatures, the consequence will be that all divine cognition is a cognition of principles, and none scientific, if we are speaking of scientific cognition properly and formally.

42 The second opinion admits knowledge in God, taken properly and formally; it denies it, however, with respect to his attributes, and to the other created truths, which are altogether necessary. Thus, as to each part, Durandus in 1. dist. 35. quaest. 4., and Ferrara, reported by Gonzalez in the present disputation 34. n. 4. And as to the latter, Democritus, and Herveus, quodlib. 2. quaest. 2.

The foundation is. Because all scientific cognition must be through a cause: but neither those things which are formally in God, such as the attributes, nor the aforesaid truths of creatures have a cause of their own: therefore the cognition of God reaching those things will not have the true reason of knowledge. The greater with the consequence is clear. The lesser, however, as to the prior part, is also clear. Because whatever is caused cannot fail to be created. As to the second part, however, it is also clear. Because that which cannot fail to be cannot have a cause of its own: because a cause is desired in order that a thing be produced and be: but the aforesaid truths, precisely because they are altogether necessary, cannot fail to be such: therefore they cannot have a cause of their own.

§ II. The true opinion is explained by two conclusions.

43 It must nevertheless be said, first, that there is knowledge in God, taken properly and formally. This assertion seems certain according to faith. Esther. 14. You, Lord, who have the knowledge of all things. Job. 21. Shall anyone teach God knowledge? Psal. 138. Thy knowledge is wonderful to me. Ecclesiast. 42. For the Lord knew all knowledge. Ad Rom. 11. O the height of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God. Ad Colossenses 2. In whom are all the treasures of the knowledge and wisdom of God. Which testimonies, according to the rule of Augustine, dub. 1. of this disputation, adduced, and received in common by the Theologians, must be understood in the proper and formal sense, as is clear from what has been said there. Hence the holy Fathers commonly defend this very point, Dionys. cap. 7. de divinis nominib., August. 1. de doctrina Christiana cap. 8., and lib. 6. de Trinit. cap. 7. tom. 3., and lib. 15. cap. 5. and cap. 6. throughout, D. Thom. in the present place, and 1. cont. Gent. cap. 45., and many others, with whom all the Theologians in common agree.

But in order that we may set out the fundamental reason of this assertion drawn from D. Thom., it is to be noted, with Bannez in the present place, that since knowledge is the cognition of a thing through a cause, it can be understood in two ways how a thing is known through a cause, namely, either through a cause on the part of the knower and of the thing known, or solely through a cause of the thing known. Then something is known through a cause on the part of the knower, when not only is one thing known to be the cause of another, but the cognition of the thing known is also caused by another cognition, through which the cause is known. Then, on the other hand, something is known solely through a cause of the thing known, when the knower knows one thing to be the cause of another, although the cognition of the one is not caused by another cognition of the cause.

44 Hence, then, the fundamental reason is drawn from divine Thomas. Because for the reason of knowledge taken properly and formally it is not required that it be the cognition of a thing through a cause both on the part of the knower and on the part of the thing known, but it suffices that it be the cognition of a thing through a cause holding itself on the part of the thing known: but God knows things most perfectly through their causes, or through causes holding themselves on their part: therefore there will not only be knowledge, taken properly and formally, but the most perfect knowledge. The greater is clear. Then, because to know is nothing other than to know a thing through a cause: but for a thing to be known with certainty through a cause, it is enough that it be known through its own cause, or through a cause holding itself only on its part. Then again: because the Angels have true and proper knowledge, formally taken, as all the Theologians admit in common, and yet they do not know a thing through a cause holding itself on the part of the knower; that is, in such a way that the cognition of the effect be caused by another cognition of the cause, since otherwise they would understand by discourse, and by going from one cognition of some truth to the cognition of another, which indeed plainly conflicts with the proper mode of knowing them, namely by a simple intuition, as D. Thom. teaches, 1. part. quaest. 58. art. 3., and de verit. quaest. 2. art. 1. ad 4., and with him all the Theologians.

The lesser is clear too. Because God knows all created effects, and their causes, most perfectly, and that the aforesaid causes are the causes of such effects, although he attains to all these things by a simple intuition and without discourse: this, however, suffices in order that he may know most perfectly through causes holding themselves on their part: therefore, and so on.

45 It is confirmed. For God knows all creatures most perfectly in his own essence, as in a cause: therefore he has the most perfect knowledge of them. The consequence is clear. The antecedent, however, is clear. Then from those things said in tract. de Visione Dei disp. 7. n. 72. Then also: because, since the divine essence is the cause of creatures, and God penetrates and comprehends it most perfectly, he cannot fail to know in it, as in a cause penetrated and comprehended, all created effects.

Nor does it matter if you object that the knowledge of a thing is the cognition through its own proper cause: but the divine essence is not the own and peculiar cause of a thing, for example of a man, but the common cause of all possible effects: therefore the cognition of a man in the divine essence, as in a cause, will not be scientific cognition.

For it will be answered that the divine essence, as it has the reason of a cause, can be considered in two ways. First, adequately, according as it contains all creatures, not only according to the reasons in which they are gathered together, but also according to the special ones in which they are distinguished. Secondly, inadequately, according as it precisely expresses the containing of some determinate creature (for example a man), far more eminent and perfect than if it were destined only for containing that one.

. We say, therefore, that although the divine essence, taken adequately, is the common cause of all creatures, it is not so if it is taken inadequately: and so although we grant that with respect to the knowledge of a thing it is considered that it is known through its own proper cause, nothing on this account prevents the cognition of some effect in the divine essence, as in a cause, from being true knowledge.

46 Although it stand (as is clear from itself) that the knowledge of God, by reason of its highest perfection and eminence, cannot terminate in the divine essence taken with precision, as it is the adequate cause of some creature: but it must necessarily terminate at the same time in that same essence, as it is the adequate cause of all, although it terminates in this creature, for example a man, because it contains him in particular, and in the brutes, because it also has them in particular. But on these matters let those things be consulted which we have said in tract. de Visione Dei disp. 6. dub. unico, and let these things be understood according to what was said there.

47 It must be said, secondly, that there is in God true and proper knowledge of his attributes and properties, as well as of whatsoever truths of creatures, although those are necessary. This is against the second opinion adduced at the beginning. Nevertheless it is defended in common by almost all the Theologians, and therefore one should abstain from referring to them in particular.

The reason for this, as to the prior part, which D. Thom. defends in this quaestio, art. 16., saying that God has speculative knowledge of himself, is suggested by the same Angelic Doctor above, quaest. 1. art. 2. Because our Theology is true knowledge demonstrating concerning God his attributes or properties, or quasi-properties, although none of them has strictly speaking a true cause of its own: therefore for the same reason there can be in God true and proper knowledge of those same properties, even if a true cause of them cannot be given. The consequence is clear, and the antecedent from the discourse of the same Angelic Doctor, who deals with it as follows. Because for some cognition to have the true reason of knowledge, it is not necessary that it reach the thing through its own true and proper cause; but it suffices that it reach it through some formal reason of the thing itself, as is clear in the Metaphysics, where the predications of being are shown from being itself, not indeed through a cause strictly speaking, but through the formal reason; since the reason of being, which is not distinguished from the reason of the good, or of the true, cannot be the true and proper cause of them, but only the formal reason: therefore, although the divine attributes have not a cause strictly speaking of their own, but only a formal reason, they can be known by our Theology, and by God through knowledge properly such.

48 It is confirmed by the reason which the Holy Doctor touches on there. Because our Theology is knowledge subalternated with respect to the knowledge of the blessed and the knowledge of God: therefore the principles known by faith, on which Theology rests in order to demonstrate eternity concerning God, for example through his immutability, are known by the blessed, and by God, through true knowledge. The consequence is clear. Because it is of the reason of subalternated knowledge that it be subordinated to another subalternating knowledge which has the true and proper reason of knowledge, as all the Dialecticians and Theologians teach in common.

The antecedent, however, is proved and explained. For some sciences proceed from principles known by the natural light of the intellect, such as Arithmetic, Geometry, and the like. Some, however, proceed from principles known by the light of a superior science, such as Perspective proceeds from principles made known by Geometry; and Music from principles known through Arithmetic, and therefore they are called subalternated sciences: because they have the reason of a science only in so far as they are somehow under the light of another science and are subordinated to it as to a superior light, to which their principles are known. And in this way our Theology is a science, because it proceeds from principles known by the light of a superior science, namely of God and of the blessed. And so, just as Music believes the principles handed to it by Arithmetic, yet does not clearly attain to them; and therefore it is subalternated with respect to Arithmetic: so our Theology, that is, we who in act are actuated by it believe by faith the principles revealed by God, yet does not clearly know them, and therefore it is subalternated with respect to divine knowledge. But on these matters let those things be consulted which N. Complut. teach in their Logica disp. 19. quaest. 3., as well as those which we shall say in this doubt: so that in this way a certain tacit objection, which could have been made against the force of this confirmation, is easily dissolved.

49 The second part of that same assertion, namely that whatsoever truths of creatures, whether creatable, however necessary, are known by God through knowledge properly and strictly speaking called, apart from what is held by D. Thom. art. 5. and 6. of this quaestio, is proved by a reason drawn from D. Thom. in various places to be cited at once, which can be proposed in this form. Because whatsoever creatable truths, however necessary, have a true cause of their necessity and of their truth: therefore they are knowable: therefore they are known by God through his knowledge. This last consequence clearly follows from the preceding. For since the knowledge of God is infinite within its own line, it cannot fail to terminate in everything knowable. The first consequence, however, is clear from the antecedent. Because any necessary truth having a cause of its necessity is knowable: since just as to know is nothing other than to know a thing through a cause, so that which has had a cause, and has become knowable, will certainly be knowable.

The antecedent, however, is proved. Then, because Aristot., 5. Metaph. text. 6., and 8. Physic. text. 16., proves against Democritus that necessary entities have a cause of their necessity, with which D. Thom. also agrees, below quaest. 44. art. 1. ad 1. Then also: because, as the same Holy Doctor teaches, this truth, for example that a man is a rational animal, is a truth of a thing altogether necessary and of eternal truth, because God necessarily and from eternity has the power to produce a man: and so if there were involved in God a power to produce him, then this truth would also involve it: and the reason of this involvement would be rendered a priori from the involvement of the aforesaid power: because every truth by participation, such as is the aforesaid creatable truth, must be such dependently on the truth, and omnipotence, of the uncreated being, and per essentiam.

50 Then also: because this, that a man is a man, is on account of the divine goodness, as D. Thom. teaches, below quaest. 21. art. 4., and reason itself urges this. Because, since this, that a man is a man, is not an infinite perfection, nor has the reason of the ultimate end with respect to other perfections; the consequence is that it is a finite, and created, perfection; and consequently that it depends on the uncreated perfection of God, and that from its own nature it is ordained to the divine goodness; and so it will already have a final cause, through which it is knowable by God. Then finally: for this truth, a man is a rational animal, has in God a formal, or exemplary, cause: since the idea of the aforesaid truth is in him, as D. Thom. teaches, above quaest. 13.

There is added the fact that this truth, a man is visible, is very necessary, and yet it has a cause through which it is demonstrated in the knowledge of a man by his rationality: therefore this truth also, a man is a rational animal, will be able to have some cause, at least uncreated, through which it can be known by God. The consequence is clear: because a man, and whatever is in a man, has a greater dependence on being per essentiam than the predications of a man have on his essence.

§ III. The arguments of both opinions are satisfied.

51 To the first argument of the first opinion D. Thom. answers, de verit. quaest. 2. art. 1. ad 4., in these words: It must be said that because that which is in God without any imperfection is found in creatures with some defect; for this reason it is necessary that, if something found in creatures is attributed to God, we separate all that which pertains to imperfection, so that only that which pertains to perfection remain: because according to this alone does the creature imitate God. I say, therefore, that the knowledge which is found in us has something of perfection, and something of imperfection: to its perfection belongs its certainty: because what is known is known with certainty: but to its imperfection belongs the discourse of the intellect from principles to conclusions, of which knowledge consists; for this discourse does not occur except according as the intellect, knowing the principles, knows the conclusions only in potency. For if it knew them in act, there would be no discourse there, since motion is nothing else than an exit from potency into act. Knowledge is therefore said to be in God by reason of the certainty about things known, but not by reason of the aforesaid discourse, which is not found even in the Angels, as Dionysius says.

To the confirmation the same Angelic Doctor answers in the same place, in solut. ad 5., where it is thus expressed: It must be said that although nothing is more, and less, known to God, if the manner of the knower be considered, because he sees all things with the same intuition; yet if the manner of the thing known be considered, God knows that some things are more knowable in themselves, and some things less. For among all things his own essence is most knowable, through which indeed he knows all things, not by any discourse, since while seeing his essence he sees all things. Hence, as far as this order is concerned, which can be observed in divine cognition on the part of the things known, the reason of knowledge is also preserved in God; for he himself principally knows all things through a cause.

52 To the second it will be answered with D. Thom., 1. sentent. dist. 35. quaest. 1. art. 1., that although nothing can be added to what is first and most simple, presupposing really something other, from which it is really distinguished, since it also involves composition; yet something can indeed be added to it by addition according to reason, in such a way that that which is added is distinguished from that to which the addition is made, by reason alone, or virtually: as happens in the present case. For knowledge is added to the divine essence by reason alone, from the fact that actually and formally they are one, and the same most simple formality which provides for the proper essence, and for the knowledge of God, no less than if a real actual distinction, or a real and actual addition, intervened there.

To the third it is clear from what has just been said from the Holy Doctor. Hence the solution given there is legitimate, and in answer to its refutation D. Thom., 1. sent. ad Ambaldum, ubi supra, in the solution to the second, says in these words: It must be said that this reason proceeds from knowledge which is taken from things; but such is not the divine knowledge, but rather knowledge that causes things.

53 To the last it will be answered by granting the antecedent and distinguishing the consequent: and if it be understood of knowledge which is only knowledge, the consequence is to be granted; but if it be understood of knowledge which formally and eminently is at once knowledge and wisdom, the consequence must be denied. And to the proof it must be said that the antecedent is true of knowledge which is only knowledge, and consequently does not reach the reason of wisdom; but not of that knowledge which, in one and the same most simple reason, without any virtual distinction, is at the same time formally and eminently knowledge and wisdom, as happens in the knowledge of God.

This is explained. For wisdom, which is the most perfect knowledge, formally and eminently contains whatever pertains to the reason of knowledge which is only knowledge, and whatever concerns the habit of first principles, or to understanding, which has only the reason of understanding: because under a certain more common and more eminent reason it comprehends both understanding and knowledge. Wherefore, since to knowledge, to which only the reason of knowledge befits, it cannot belong to turn first and per se about both principles and conclusions: otherwise, I say, it is not so with knowledge which is at once knowledge and wisdom: and consequently it contains at the same time and formally those things which are proper to understanding, with the imperfection and limitation of understanding itself set aside. Wherefore, since the knowledge of God — which is the most perfect knowledge, and reaches all things through the highest causes — has the reason of wisdom, it is not strange that it should terminate first and per se, both in the principles and in the conclusions, that is, in the divine essence, which is the principle, and as it were the cause, of its attributes, and should at the same time terminate first and per se (in the manner, however, explained below in disp. 3. num. 34. and 35.) in its own attributes, which bear themselves to the divine essence as conclusions brought per se primo from the cognition of the essence itself, as of a principle, and quasi-cause, and finally that it should terminate per se secundo in creatures, which are also quasi-conclusions, brought per se secundo from the divine essence, as it is the cause of these.

Now, although divine knowledge has the said eminence, by which it has what is proper to understanding and to knowledge, nonetheless it coheres with these, in such a way that there is also to be given in God another light virtually distinct, which is precisely understanding, and which excludes the imperfection and limitation of the light of created understanding, although it does not have such eminence as wisdom has: as we shall explain further in the following doubt, num. 84.

54 Secondly it will be answered by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. And to the proof it must be said, with D. Thom., 1. 2. quaest. 57. art. 2., that wisdom is not distinguished from understanding, or from the habit, or quasi-habit, of principles, in this, that wisdom in no way turns about the first principles: but in this, that understanding turns about them absolutely, and taken by themselves, as we shall explain further at num. 84.; whereas wisdom terminates in them, in that the conclusions are deduced from them. And so the knowledge of God, which is the most perfect wisdom, will be able to terminate first and per se in the divine essence; because it turns about it as the reason of attaining to creatures: and so also the divine knowledge can turn about, insofar as it is knowledge, or wisdom, the essence of God, as the reason of the attributes; from the fact that the aforesaid attributes bear themselves like conclusions deduced from the divine essence, as from a principle, or as the formal reason of the attributes themselves.

55 To the foundation of the second opinion it will be answered that the greater is true, if its meaning be that all scientific cognition must be through a cause, whether it be a true and formal cause, or only a virtual one, which coincides with the reason a priori. In what way immutability is called a virtual cause of eternity, because it is the reason a priori of eternity. And then the lesser must be denied, as regards both parts. And to the proof against the prior part it must be said that although that which has a true and proper cause formally such is created, it is not the case that whatever has only a virtual cause, or an a priori reason, is created, as happens in eternity, compared with immutability, and in whatever divine attributes are compared with the essence of God.

To the proof, however, of the second part, the greater must be denied. To its proof it must be said that a cause is desired, first, in order that that which is indifferent to being and not-being be produced and be: then also in order that it be a being, and true by participation, however much it may never be produced in act, or exist: or however much it may be according to its own essence of eternal and necessary truth. Because any entity, and any truth by participation, would not be such, nor would it have the aforesaid necessity, unless there were at least some first being, and first truth per essentiam, from which (in the manner suggested above) they would be participable.

56 We have said: unless there were at least some first being, and first truth: because it is not against the reason of necessary truth that it have a created cause of its necessity: and therefore this truth, a man is capable of laughter, which is necessary, has a created cause of its necessity, namely that a man is rational: and so it is demonstrated in the knowledge of a man through it.

That solution is drawn from D. Thom., 1. part. quaest. 44. art. 1. ad 1., in these words: It must be said that although the relation to a cause does not enter into the definition of the being which is caused, it nevertheless follows from those things which are of its reason: because from the fact that something is a being by participation, it follows that it is caused by another. Wherefore a being of this kind cannot be without being caused: just as neither can a man be without being capable of laughter.

What he explained still further in the solution to the second. For when he had objected to himself that in order that something should need a cause, so as consequently to be such that it cannot fail to be, such as are necessary truths, [it follows] that it does not need such a cause, he answers: It must be said that from this reason some were moved to posit that that which is necessary has no cause, but this plainly appears false in the demonstrative sciences, in which necessary principles are causes of necessary conclusions. And therefore Aristotle says in 5. Metaphys. that there are some necessary things which have a cause of their necessity. A cause, therefore, is required not for this alone, because the effect is able not to be, but because the effect would not be if the cause were not: for this conditional is true whether the antecedent and consequent be possible, or impossible.

57 Nor does it matter if you object against this solution that although with respect to ourselves knowledge of God's attributes can be given, because we know that one thing can be the a priori reason of another, and that the essence is also the a priori reason of all of them; nevertheless it is not so with respect to God: from the fact that we distinguish one attribute from another by reason: and so we can know one thing to be the reason of another; but God does not, who reaches those things as they are in himself: and consequently he does not fabricate in them any distinction of reason which is not found in them as they are in themselves: therefore at least on this account the solution given falls.

For it will be answered that although we grant that God, knowing (as elsewhere) himself and his attributes, does not effect a distinction of reason between them except at the last, through the order to the created intellect of one on the way, nonetheless per se and by his own reason he precisely knows the virtual distinction which is between the attributes, both among themselves and as compared with the essence: and this suffices in order that one attribute, for example, be known as the a priori reason of another.

The reason, however, on account of which we attribute to God the knowledge of the aforesaid distinction, in the manner just said, is this: because such a virtual distinction is really found between them, by reason of the highest eminence which that most simple formality of the divine essence and of the attributes has. For just as in creatures the essence and its properties are really distinguished actually and formally, so the divine essence and its attributes are really distinguished virtually: from the fact that that most simple formality no less provides what is proper to a plurality of things pertaining to distinct lines than if there were actually and formally several, in which the reason of a virtual distinction really consists.

58 Nor does it stand in the way, if you press, that the divine intellect cannot know per se and by its own reason the aforesaid virtual distinction without knowing in the same way that distinction of reason: because a virtual distinction is nothing else than the foundation of a distinction of reason: and consequently, what by itself and by its own reason it has attained to, it cannot fail to know in the same way the distinction of reason, indeed to effect it, since its being consists only in being known.

Therefore this does not stand in the way. Because according to this manner of speaking, although we grant that the virtual distinction is at the same time a distinction of a fundamental reason with respect to an intellect which does not reach the thing as it is in itself, or which reaches it through an order to the aforesaid intellect; nevertheless it is not so with respect to the intellect which terminates in the thing as it is in itself, and which is considered under this precision of not reaching it, namely as it is knowable through distinct concepts by an intellect which does not reach it as it is in itself.

And so the most formal concept of a virtual distinction as such is not the most formal concept of the same as it is a distinction of fundamental reason: first, on account of what has been said above. Then also: because if we granted that it involves every intellect of one on the way, that virtual distinction would still remain under the concept of a virtual distinction: since it could provide what is proper to a plurality of things pertaining to distinct lines, no less than if there were several; yet it would not remain under the concept of a fundamental distinction: since, involving an intellect able to distinguish according to reason, it also involves (so to speak) the passive capacity, founding such a distinction.

59 Hence, God can, as he is considered under this precision of reaching himself without an order to the intellect of one on the way, know the virtual distinction of his own attributes without knowing the distinction of reason, which is made, and is known, by the intellect of one on the way, which does not reach God himself as he is in himself: although (because the divine intellect cannot fail to know at the same time that his essence, and his attributes, are attainable by the imperfect intellect of one on the way, and through distinct concepts) he must also know there the aforesaid fundamental distinction: and consequently it is also very probable that through an order, or quasi-order, to the aforesaid created intellect, he should effect that same distinction of reason, as our Didacus a Jesu well explains in his Logica disp. 3. quaest. 3.

Is God's knowledge an attribute of him?

Since D. Thom. in this article, in the answer to the second objection, teaches that God's knowledge is an attribute of him, we therefore rightly inquire into this point in this first disputation; especially because we shall not so much explain what the divine knowledge is as whether it is his in the manner of an attribute, that is, whether these things are found in God as an attribute of him? And so to treat of it according to this consideration belongs to the disputation on divine knowledge insofar as whether it is his.

§ I. Arguments for the negative side.

60 First. Since God's understanding pertains to the intrinsic constitutive principle of the divine nature: therefore the knowledge of it does too: therefore such knowledge will not be an attribute of God. This last consequence is clear from what precedes. Since, as we shall say from Damascene in this difficulty, an attribute has itself after the manner of a property of the divine nature: and therefore that which belongs to the intrinsic constitutive principle of that nature cannot have the character of an attribute.

The first consequence, however, is clear from the antecedent. Since God's understanding, considered as pertaining to the intrinsic constitutive principle of the divine essence, must be most perfect within the line and genus of understanding, as is clear from itself: therefore it must be scientific understanding: since an understanding which does not reach the point of being scientific is not most perfect within the line and genus of understanding. The antecedent, however, will be clear from what is to be said in this treatise, disp. 4, num. 43, and tract. 4, disp. 2, num. 57.

61 Confirmed, first. Since understanding, insofar as it constitutes the divine nature, must be comprehensive of God: therefore it must have the character of knowledge: and therefore knowledge will not be able to have itself after the manner of a property, or attribute, of God. The antecedent is clear. Then, because the aforesaid understanding agrees with God in the degree of immateriality, as is clear from itself: but understanding agreeing with some essence in the degree of immateriality is comprehensive of it, as is commonly said above, q. 12, art. 2. Then also: because the intellection constitutive of God is as great in the line of intellection as God is in the line of the intelligible object; otherwise it would not constitute him in his essence and intelligibility: as is clear from what was said above, q. 12, art. 8, that for intellectual comprehension it is enough that the intellection be as great in the line of intellection as the essence is which is understood in the line of the intelligible object.

The first consequence, however, is also clear. Because understanding comprehensive of God reaches, in him as in the cause, or in the formal reason a priori, all attributes, and also all possible creatures: and therefore according to its formal character it will be a knowledge of attributes, and of possible creatures through their cause, or reason a priori: and consequently according to its most formal character it will be knowledge: since this is nothing other than the knowledge of a thing through its cause.

62 Confirmed, second. For either understanding, constitutive of God, taken in itself, and precisely so taken, reaches everything that is in him, both formally and eminently, and as in a cause — or it does not. If the first, then, taken in itself and precisely considered, it will have the character of knowledge, as is clear from what we have just said. If, however, the second is said, then the aforesaid understanding will be finite and limited: and consequently it cannot be constitutive of God. Both consequences are clear. Because an intellection by which God is not reached according to everything he has, both formally and eminently, is finite, as is clear in the visions of the blessed, which for this reason are finite in the line of the vision of God, as is commonly said above, q. 12, art. 8: and a finite intellection cannot be constitutive of God.

63 Second. Because in us to be radical and potential knowers does not have the character of a property, but pertains to the intrinsic constitutive principle of our essence: therefore in God to be knowing in act second will not have itself after the manner of a property, or attribute, of him, but will pertain to the concept of the divine essence, as distinct from its attributes and properties.

The antecedent is obvious. Because the essence of man cannot be adequately understood unless it be understood together with a radical potency for knowing: and so being radical and potential knower pertains to its intrinsic concept: just as, for this reason, being radical and intellectual, or admirable, pertains to its quiddity.

The consequence, however, clearly follows from the antecedent. Because whatever imports a perfection simply pertains to the quiddity of an intellectual creature, must, with the imperfections with which it is involved excluded, constitute the nature of God in the manner of a most pure act, excluding all potentiality: because such a character is of itself constitutive of nature: and so, if it be purged of all imperfections, it cannot constitute anything other than the nature of God: therefore, if in us being radical and potential knowers signifies a perfection simply, yet involved with imperfections and pertaining to the quiddative concept of our essence, the consequence will be that being actually knowing in the manner of a most pure act, excluding all imperfection and potentiality, pertains to the quiddative concept of the divine essence.

64 Third. Because the potency that God has to create is not distinguished from the potency which is in him to transmute one thing into another, or from a potency to effect any miracle whatever; but all these constitute one and the same indivisible omnipotence without any virtual distinction: therefore for the same reason there will not be in God a multiplied virtually intellectual understanding, but that very understanding which is constitutive of God, without any virtual distinction, will be scientific understanding: and consequently intellection, as scientific, will not be an attribute: since an attribute must be virtually distinguished from the divine essence, as it has the character of essence, and from its constitutive principle, namely divine intellection. The antecedent needs no proof. Because as in us the intellectual potency signifies one most simple potency without any virtual distinction, by which we can understand whatever is intelligible: and therefore the potency for understanding substance is not distinguished from the intellectual potency of an accident, so in God omnipotence signifies one most simple potency without any virtual distinction, by which he can produce everything doable: and therefore the potency to create cannot be virtually distinguished from the transubstantiating potency, or from a potency to effect any miracle.

The consequence is proved. For the aforesaid potencies are not virtually distinguished, because all of them belong to God by one and the same indivisible reason, namely insofar as he is a pure and infinite act, from the fact that each thing acts insofar as it is in act; and consequently, since it is in pure and infinite act, it must be infinitely and most highly active: therefore, since all intellectual knowledge belongs to God under a single and indivisible formal reason, namely because he is most immaterial, the consequence will be that intellections are not multiplied in him, but that any intellection found in him is one and the same most simple intellection without any virtual distinction.

65 Fourth. For if God's understanding, as it is constitutive of him, were distinguished from his knowledge, it would also have to be distinguished from the habit, or quasi-habit, of principles, which is called intelligence: but this is impossible: therefore, etc. The sequel seems clearly to follow from the parity of reason. For just as knowledge is an intellectual virtue, so also is intelligence, as D. Thom. teaches from Arist. 1. 2, q. 57, art. 2. Therefore if understanding, as constitutive of God, cannot reach the point of identifying with itself, without any virtual distinction, one of these virtues, namely knowledge, neither can it reach the point of being identified, without the same virtual distinction, with another intellectual virtue; namely intelligence, or the light of principles.

The falsity of the consequence, however, is also clear. Because, as the Angelic Doctor teaches in the place just cited, intelligence is distinguished from wisdom in that the latter is carried to principles as they are the cause of conclusions; intelligence, however, to principles as they are in themselves: therefore intelligence in God will not be able to be virtually distinguished from understanding, as it is constitutive of the divine essence. The consequence is clear. Because each of the two has the same formal object: since understanding, as constitutive of the divine essence, is carried to it as it is in itself, and since that same essence as it is in itself is the first principle and the cause of all conclusions deducible from it, it follows that intelligence, or the light of principles, found in God, which terminates at the first principle as it is in itself, must terminate at the divine essence as it is taken in itself.

66 Confirmed. For by the same reason God's knowledge would be distinguished from wisdom, from art, from prudence, from the other intellectual virtues, as from Eubulia, or the virtue of good counsel, and from Synesis and Gnome, which are the virtues that pronounce a verdict on things to be done: but this cannot be said: therefore, etc. The sequel seems certain. For knowledge which does not reach the point of constituting the knower in his nature remains within the compass of intellectual virtue as taken strictly; but the intellectual virtue of knowledge, or of wisdom so accepted, must be distinguished from the other intellectual virtues, as D. Thom. teaches 1. 2, q. 57, art. 2.

The falsity of the consequence, however, is proved. For since God's knowledge is most perfect in the line of knowledge, and comprehends the most perfect and highest cause, namely the divine essence, it is not distinguished from wisdom, as D. Thom. teaches in 1, dist. 35, q. 1, art. 1, ad ult., and in the same place against Ambaldus. And likewise, from the very fact that it is most perfect knowledge, it must also be most perfect in the line of practical knowledge: and consequently there must also be existing in God's intellect the most perfect reason, both of all things to be done and of all things to be made: of which the first pertains to prudence, and to the other virtues annexed to it, namely the advisory and the indicative: the second, however, to art, as D. Thom. teaches in q. 57, cited above.

67 Lastly. For in God there is not virtually distinguished a multiplied knowledge, one of metaphysical things, another of physical things, and so of others, but only a single one, which corresponds and is equivalent to all the other inferior sciences: therefore neither will a twofold virtually intellectual understanding be posited in him, one of which is constitutive of the divine essence, and another of which has the character of knowledge. The antecedent is commonly received by theologians, with one or another exception.

The consequence is proved. For a single knowledge without any virtual distinction is sufficient in God, because, since it is infinite within the genus of knowledge, it must embrace all the perfection and knowledge contained within the aforesaid genus; therefore, since God's knowledge is also infinite, both in the line of knowledge and in the line of intellection, it must also embrace without any virtual distinction all the intellection found in God; and consequently be entirely the same as the intellection constitutive of God in his proper essence.

§ II. The true opinion of D. Thomas.

68 It must nevertheless be said that God's knowledge, taken properly and strictly, is a divine attribute: and therefore does not pertain to the intrinsic constitutive principle of the divine essence, as [that essence is] distinct from its properties, or attributes. Thus D. Thom., in the prologue to this question, which we saw above, says: What, after the consideration of those things which pertain to the divine substance, remains to be considered is that which pertains to its operation, that is, those things which pertain to the operation that does not constitute God's essence and substance: and among these he reckons knowledge; and therefore he holds that knowledge does not pertain to the divine substance, or essence; but is something consequent to it, in the manner of a quasi-property, or attribute, of it. The same he also teaches, both in this article in the answer to the second [objection], as we shall set out in the proof of the assertion. And also in 1, dist. 35, q. 1, art. 1, in the answer to the second, in these words: When God is named to be being, nothing is expressed except what pertains to his perfection, and not his whole perfection. And likewise when he is said to be knowing and willing, and such like. And so it is clear that all these things are one in God according to the thing, but differ according to reason: and this difference is not only in the intellect, but is founded in the truth and perfection of the thing: and just as God is properly said to be being, so he is properly said to be knowing and willing, and such like; nor is there any plurality, or addition, or order in the thing there, but only in the reason. Where, as you see, the Sacred Doctor distinguishes, by a distinction of reason founded in the thing, or virtual distinction, the character of being found in God, namely being by essence, from the character of knowledge and volition; and therefore he holds that [knowledge] does not pertain to the intrinsic concept of the divine essence, as that concept is understood with attributes. Because what is constitutive of the divine essence cannot be virtually distinguished from the character of being by essence, which essentially pertains to the concept of the divine essence; from the fact that all things which in God pertain to one and the same line, whether of essence or of property, must be one and the same formality, without any virtual distinction, as we shall state more fully in the treatise on the Will of God, disp. 2.

69 The same opinion is held by Chrysostom, hom. 1, on the incomprehensibility of the divine nature, around the middle; where, having said that it is the utmost madness to wish to know what the substance of God is, in order to show this, he distinguishes God's substance from his wisdom, saying: For substance is not from wisdom, but wisdom from substance: and he adds: but since the Prophets are not able fully to perceive it (namely God's wisdom) to what extent do those rave who think that substance itself can be subjected to their reasonings. Behold, where he manifestly teaches that the wisdom of God arises from God's very substance; and consequently is an attribute of it. Which also Damascene teaches, lib. 1, de Fide, cap. 4, at the end, where: Thus, whether one wishes to say good, or just, or wise, or whatever, one is at length speaking not of the nature of God, but of what is contained in nature, you explain. Whence this assertion is commonly held by theologians: Henry of Ghent, in his Summa Theologiae, q. 2, num. 27; Aegidius, tom. 1, de beatudine, lib. 5, q. 4, art. 8, referring all theologians for it. Gonzalez, in the present difficulty, ult., disp. 34, sect. 4; Granado, 1, part, tract. 2, disp. 9; and all those who assert that the divine essence is not constituted by understanding in act second, but by this, that it is radical and intellectual, whom we shall mention below in art. 4.

§ III. The opinion of the Angelic Doctor, drawn from himself and from Damascene, is established.

70 Now, in order that we may set out the fundamental reason of this assertion, drawn from Damascene, lib. 1, de Fide, cap. 12, and from D. Thom. in the places cited, it must be supposed first that an attribute is nothing other than — as it is taken from Damascene and commonly admitted by theologians — a certain absolute reason existing necessarily and formally in God, and following, in our way of understanding, or (which amounts to the same for the present) virtually, upon his essence, as something constituted in a certain quasi-atomic species. It is said, then, first, that an attribute must be a certain absolute reason, so that in this way the divine relations are excluded, which, though they are formally and necessarily in God and follow upon his essence in our way of understanding, are nevertheless, because they are not absolute reasons but relative, not attributive properties of the divine essence, but personal, or constitutive, or consecutive: constitutive indeed, as is clear from Paternity, Filiation, and passive Spiritation, which constitute the persons; consecutive, however, as is seen in active spiration, which supposes the persons of the Father and the Son as constituted, and follows upon them insofar as they are so constituted.

71 It is added, then, that such an absolute reason must exist formally and necessarily in God, so that by the first part those things are rejected which are contained in him only virtually, and by the second part those which are in him only freely. And so neither the possible creatures contained virtually in God, nor God's free volition, insofar as it is such, which exists formally in him, has the character of an attribute.

It is asserted further, that attributes must follow, in our way of understanding, upon the constituted essence of God, so that in this way that same essence is excluded from the character of an attribute: since, although the divine essence may have the other conditions formerly demanded, as is clear from itself, it still cannot also follow, in our way of understanding, upon itself as already constituted.

And lastly it is said to be constituted as something in a certain quasi-atomic species, so that in this way it is distinguished from common, or transcendent, reasons, which are included in these same attributes or in other divine reasons, and likewise from the quasi-differential reasons of those same attributes: because although these two reasons concur in constituting the attribute, neither of them, taken by itself, has the character of an attribute.

72 Secondly, it must be supposed that God's knowledge agrees with the earlier parts, and also with the last part, of this definition, or quasi-definition: since it is clear from itself that it is an absolute reason, and not something formally relative. And likewise that it is something existing formally and necessarily in God, as is clear from what was said in the preceding difficulty. And lastly that it is something constituted in a certain quasi-atomic species, as will be clearer from itself and from what we shall immediately add. The whole difficulty, therefore, is whether there is anything virtually distinct from the divine essence, as that essence is understood with attributes, and consequently virtually distinct from divine intellection, as constitutive of God. For by the very fact that it is distinguished from the latter in the aforesaid way, it cannot fail to follow virtually upon it, as will be more fully explained, and consequently to have all the conditions required for the character of an attribute.

73 Now, in order to show this virtual distinction of knowledge from understanding, it must be supposed, thirdly, what in tract. de Voluntate Dei, disp. 2, num. 31, we shall bring forward in a like case to prove the virtual distinction between the divine will and its affective virtues; namely, that the most powerful proof of this virtual distinction between understanding constitutive of God and divine knowledge is to be drawn from the common consent of philosophers and theologians, who assert that the proper act of knowledge, abstracted from created and uncreated, is to know a thing through its causes, or formal reasons, and consequently that its formal and adequate object is the thing as knowable in this peculiar and determinate way, namely through its causes, or through the aforesaid reasons.

74 The reason, however, for which we have recourse, in the present case, to this common consent of theologians and philosophers, is that formal and adequate objects have the character of first principles with respect to powers, or virtues, whether affective or intellectual, from the fact that their whole character is drawn from the objects as from a first root: first principles, however, are not so much to be proved as to be accepted from the common consent of the Doctors. Especially, since in the present case there is a peculiar reason on account of which the common verdict must be upheld, otherwise powers or virtues distinct from one another would easily be confused, by assigning to them in place of the proper one a single and same more universal formal reason, terminating in which they are one and the same power or virtue, nor could the opposite easily be shown by reason.

75 These things having been supposed, it will not be difficult to reduce to this form the fundamental reason for the assertion suggested by D. Thom. and Damascene. Since it is certain that knowledge is found in God properly and formally: therefore it looks to its own proper formal and adequate object, its own proper knowable, as such, that is, in this determinate way, namely as knowable through its causes, or formal reasons: therefore such knowledge will be virtually distinguished from God's understanding, as this constitutes his essence, and will be a true attribute with respect to it. The antecedent is clear from what was said in the second supposition. The first consequence, however, [follows] from what we said in the third supposition. For any virtue, potency, or act looks to its own proper formal and adequate object: therefore, since the formal and adequate object of knowledge is its own proper knowable as such, or as it is knowable in this determinate way, namely through its causes, or formal reasons, the consequence is that divine knowledge looks to this formal and adequate object.

From this also the second consequence is clear as regards its first part, namely the virtual distinction between God's understanding, as constitutive of his essence, and knowledge. For the aforesaid understanding looks to a distinct formal and adequate object, namely the essence, or divine being, under a broader reason, namely insofar as it is (let us say so) being, or divine intelligible, as we have said — but yet not insofar as it is intelligible in this determinate way, namely through a cause, or reason a priori. Then, because even in creatures the intellectual nature does not look, as its formal and adequate object, to its intelligible, as intelligible in this determinate way, namely through causes. Then also: because the divine essence, at least insofar as it is to itself the reason of passive intelligibility, according to which reason it is at least in the first place, and principally, the object of divine intellection, as constitutive of God, is not knowable through a cause, or reason a priori, as is clear from itself.

76 And lastly the same consequence, as regards its second part, namely that knowledge is a true attribute of God as constituted by his understanding, clearly follows from the first part of that same consequence and from the second supposition. Because that which is virtually distinguished from the divine essence cannot pertain to its intrinsic concept, as that concept is understood with attributes: from the fact that whatever pertains to the concept of the aforesaid essence constitutes only a single line of essence, and that which pertains to a single line, precisely, is one and the same most simple formality, without any virtual distinction, as we said in the treatise on the Vision of God, disp. 2, and as we shall assert more fully in the treatise on the Will of God, disp. 2, dub. 2: and consequently that which is virtually distinguished from that same essence cannot fail to follow upon it, as is clear from itself: and consequently, if it be an absolute reason existing formally and necessarily in God, as knowledge is, according to what we said in the second supposition, it cannot fail to have the character of an attribute, as is clear from the definition of an attribute brought forward in the second supposition.

It is confirmed. For in order that divine understanding, constitutive of God, be infinite and a pure act within its own line, or order, it is required, and is sufficient, that it be being by essence, and that of itself most formally it have the character of an intellectual virtue and of intellection tending to the essence, or to the divine being according to the general reason of its amplitude: that is, insofar as it is (let us put it so) divine intelligible, as we have said; even though it do not identify with itself, without virtual distinction, the knowledge of God: therefore, in order to constitute God, it is not necessary that it identify with itself, without the same distinction, divine knowledge: and consequently this will be an attribute with respect to it.

This last consequence follows from the first, as is clear from what has just been said. The first, however, follows from the antecedent. Since, as is clear from what we shall touch upon in tract. de Voluntate Dei, disp. 2, dub. 2, and as will be clearer from what is to be said in art. 4 of this question, that very thing, and nothing more, is required in order that the degree of understanding be constitutive of your God, which is desired in order that it be infinitely perfect within its own line. For since of itself it is constitutive of nature, as our Complutensians excellently expound from Arist. and D. Thom., lib. 1, de Anima, disp. 4, num. 28, and thereafter, the consequence is that, if it be purged of all imperfections, and consequently be infinitely perfect within its own line, it cannot fail to constitute the divine nature.

77 The antecedent, however, is proved. For just as, in order that created intellectuality, constitutive of created nature, for example the Angelic nature of Michael, may sufficiently constitute it, it is enough that it include the character of being by participation, or that involving potentiality in the character of being, and also the character of life and of a certain intellectuality admixtured with a certain potentiality: and lastly that it look to being in common, involving potentiality, that is, as abstracted from God and from creatures, and consequently taken in its whole amplitude: so, in order that divine intellectuality may sufficiently constitute the divine nature, it will be enough that it state all these things in the manner of a most pure act, and consequently that it state entity not by participation, which involves potentiality in the character of being, but entity by essence, and over and above the character of intellectual life in the manner of a most pure act, which is the same as understanding identified entirely without virtual distinction with the power of understanding; and lastly, that it also look, as by the manner of an adequate object, to being, which has the same purity as that which is taken in its whole amplitude (let us say so), namely the divine essence, or divine being, as we have said. For since the limitation and potentiality of the degree of understanding in created natures is sufficiently gathered from its real distinction from its intellection, it follows that a complete identity of the two, without any real distinction either actual or arising from the nature of the thing, or finally virtual, suffices for infinity and most pure actuality within the same line.

78 Confirmed, second. For from the fact that the will of God looks to the divine goodness in its whole amplitude, we infer that it is virtually distinct from his mercy, which looks to the same goodness in a determinate way, namely, in that it is determinately the reason of relieving misery: and moreover, from this virtual distinction we infer that mercy is, in our way of understanding, posterior to the will, as is clear from what we asserted in tract. de Voluntate Dei, disp. 2, num. 32: therefore also, from the fact that God's understanding, as it constitutes the divine essence, looks to it, or to the divine being, in its whole amplitude, or as it is divine intelligible, as we have said, and that knowledge looks to the same divine being in a determinate way, namely as it is the cause, or the formal reason of others, we infer that the aforesaid knowledge is virtually distinguished from divine understanding, as constitutive of God, and follows virtually upon it.

It is confirmed, lastly, by the final reason which we shall bring forward in favour of our assertion in tract. de Voluntate Dei, disp. 2, num. 34. For that reason, applied as it is in the present case (due proportion being observed), convinces this assertion excellently: and explains, as far as possible, the root of the matter.

§ IV. The arguments brought forward at the outset are met.

79 With the antecedent granted, according to what has been said, both consequences must be denied; and for the proof of the first, on which the proof of the second depends, it must be said that God's understanding, considered as pertaining to the intrinsic constitution of the divine essence, must be most perfect with an eminent and virtual perfection, both within all the lines of understanding and within the other lines besides: from the fact that it is the primordial line, bearing the character of nature, in which all other formalities and lines are rooted, and from which, in our way of understanding, they all flow: it is not, however, necessary that, taken strictly, it be most perfect within every line and the genus of understanding, so as formally to contain all the lines belonging to that genus; but it is enough that it have the highest perfection within its own line of nature, and that it reach the point of being identically, and with virtual distinction alone, scientific understanding.

This is explained. For within the genus, or (let us say so) the amplitude of understanding, there are several and diverse lines, because there are several and distinct formal and adequate objects considered by themselves: any formal and adequate object, however, gives origin, as it were, to one line. Whence something can be said to be most perfect in the genus of understanding in a twofold way: either because it formally comprehends and contains that whole genus, and all the lines of diverse species belonging to it: or because it is only formally, and infinite according to what is proper to it, within a single line according to the species of those several [lines] which are contained within that whole genus, even though if such a thing constituted the primordial line of the order of understanding, namely the line of nature, it would indeed have, not formally but radically and in potency, according to what is proper to it, all the perfection of the other lines.

Wherefore, since God's understanding, as it constitutes the divine nature, is not infinite in the genus of understanding, in so far as this denotes comprehending and formally containing that whole genus, or quasi-genus, and all its lines; but is only infinite in the genus of understanding, in so far as this signifies only that it is infinite within a single line, according to the species of those several which are contained within the whole genus of understanding, namely within the line of nature, it follows that it ought formally, and without any virtual distinction, to contain those things which pertain to this line, even though, because this line is the primordial and radical line, it ought, after the manner of a root, virtually to possess in advance the perfection of the other lines; whether those lines are contained under the order and genus of understanding, or under any other order: and consequently it will be necessary that, by the character of its most pure actuality, it identify with itself — with virtual distinction, however — both the line of knowledge and the other lines besides, so that, in the way just explained, it does not identify them, and is their quasi-root and fontal principle: we would conclude excellently that it would not yet be most perfect within its own line of nature; but otherwise if, in the manner of a most pure act, and in the way explained, it possessed the aforesaid.

80 At the first confirmation, the antecedent must be granted, and both consequences denied. And for the proof of the first, upon which the second rests, the antecedent must be distinguished: and if its meaning be that the comprehensive understanding of God requires that it reach, in him as in the cause, or in the formal reason a priori, all the attributes, and also all the possible creatures, so that the most formal reason of reaching all these things be the very essence, as it has the character of a cause, or of a reason a priori, this must be denied: but otherwise if its meaning be that it reaches all these things, and consequently that the essence is the cause, or reason, of them, so that the reason of reaching is another, more universal and more elevated, than we have already indicated. And lastly the consequence must be denied: because, for it to be legitimate, the antecedent would have to be true in the first sense.

It is therefore one thing whether the comprehensive understanding of God, simply by virtue of being such, must reach the divine essence, the attributes, and all the possible creatures, by knowing that the essence is the reason a priori of those and the actual cause of these; and another thing whether the most formal reason of reaching, both the attributes and the creatures, must be the very divine essence, as having the character of a cause and of a reason a priori. The first, indeed, is true: and so God's understanding, as it constitutes his essence, and is comprehensive of it, reaches all these things, from the fact that it is that immaterial thing which the divine essence is constituted by, and consequently it terminates in it with as much cognition as is demanded from the divine essence itself. The second, however, is false: because for the comprehensive understanding of God it is enough that it reach all these things under a more elevated and more universal reason, namely insofar as it terminates in all these things under the reason of the divine essence in its whole amplitude in the line of the intelligible object, or (let us say) insofar as it has the character of the divine intelligible, as we have said.

81 It makes no difference if one objects that the intellection of God, as constitutive of the divine nature, cannot be as great in the line of intellection as the divine essence in the line of the intelligible object, unless, insofar as it is constitutive of it, it be also scientific understanding: therefore, etc. The antecedent seems certain. Because the divine essence, as it is the intelligible object, demands to be known in both of the ways assigned: therefore, unless it be reached in both ways by the intellection constitutive of God as such, and consequently unless such intellection be most formally the knowledge of God itself, the aforesaid intellection will not be as great in the line of cognition as the essence itself in the line of the intelligible.

For we answer by denying the antecedent. And for the proof, the antecedent must be distinguished: insofar as it is the intelligible object, through an intelligibility that is precisely and entirely its first, and constitutes, as it were, the fontal and first line in the line of the intelligible object, is to be denied: insofar as it is the intelligible object, through an intelligibility that is not entirely the first, taken precisely, but [insofar] as it at the same time involves an intelligibility that is, as it were, secondary to it, and constitutes another, as it were secondary, line in the line of the intelligible object, is to be granted. And then, in the same proportional way, the consequent must be distinguished: how great it itself is in the line of the intelligible, through an intelligibility that is entirely primary, and constitutes the first and fontal line in the line of the intelligible object, the consequence is to be denied; through an intelligibility that is not entirely primary, taken precisely, but [insofar] as it involves another intelligibility, and another line already described, it must be granted.

Hence, however, it does not follow that such intellection constitutive of God is not comprehensive of him through an altogether first, per se comprehension, such as the divine essence demands as being first comprehensible; but only that it is not comprehensive of God through a (let us say so) first and second comprehension: this, however, is not inconvenient; nay, it implies the opposite. Because since the divine essence, as it is comprehensible in both ways, pertains to two lines in the line of the object, it cannot be reached through one and the same divine intellection pertaining to one line; but it demands two intellections virtually distinct, and pertaining to diverse lines, and consequently of such a condition that what one reaches through the manner of the reason under which cannot be reached by the other in this way; [what the other reaches] must be known by the first through the manner of the reason which, so that no objection from it may escape it.

At the second confirmation it is clear from what was said in the answer to the first.

82 At the second head, the antecedent must be granted: not indeed in such a way that in us it pertain to the concept of nature as being the root of acts of knowing, inasmuch as they are such reductively speaking, but inasmuch as they have the character of acts of understanding. And then the consequence must be denied. And for its proof, I grant the antecedent; the consequence must be denied. For from the fact that in us being radical and potential knowers pertains, in the way said, to the concept of our nature, and from the fact that this same thing, through the manner of a most pure act, must pertain to the concept of the divine nature, it does not follow that being actually and formally knowing be of the concept of that same divine nature, but only that being the root of knowing through the manner of a most pure act pertain to its quiddative concept: because this is what, through the manner of a most pure act, corresponds to our radical and potential virtue for knowing.

Just as from the fact that being radical and potential willing be of the concept of man, and this same thing through that same most pure act must be of the concept of the divine nature, it is not correctly concluded that being actually and formally willing be of its essence; but that being the root, through the manner of a most pure act, of willing — which is nothing other than being intelligent — pertain to the quiddative concept of God. And the reason is the same in both cases. Because neither volition nor knowledge is of the number of those formalities which have the power to constitute nature, but rather they necessarily presuppose nature as constituted: and therefore that which, through the manner of a most pure act, corresponds to our radical virtue for knowing and willing cannot be the actual volition or knowledge itself; but some other most pure act which, in this manner, is the root of these, namely primordial understanding, which constitutes the divine nature.

83 At the third, the antecedent must be granted, and the consequence denied. Because all those potencies, or (let us speak more accurately) all those ratios inadequate to the divine omnipotence, arise from the most pure actuality of the divine essence, and are ordered toward the same formal object. Now, although intellection, as constitutive of God, and as having the character of knowledge, agrees with God by reason of its highest immateriality, in the way, however, indicated above; nevertheless they do not belong to it with respect to the same formal object, as has been explained. And so they must necessarily be virtually distinguished.

84 At the fourth, the sequel must be granted, and the minor denied. And for the proof, I grant the antecedent; the consequence must be denied. For the proof of this consequence it must be said that, although intelligence in God, which corresponds in us to the habit of first principles, and which is an intellectual virtue, as D. Thom. teaches 1. 2, q. 57, art. 2, is carried to the divine essence as it is in itself, as to the reason which, and consequently agrees in this reason with God's understanding as constitutive of the divine nature; nevertheless it tends to it under a formally diverse reason. Because intelligence reaches that very essence as it is known per se. As in general any habit of first principles tends to those principles as they are known per se: and therefore, however perfectly and infinitely God's essence is reached by him through this light, or through intelligence, it yet never by the force of that light, according to what it brings from its quasi-differential reason, attains to the cognition (let us say so) of the conclusions which are, as it were, inferred from the divine essence: because all those things are outside the line of the object of this light, taken in the way just explained, from the fact that the aforesaid conclusions are known through something else, namely through the divine essence. Now God's understanding, as it constitutes him, tends to that same essence under a more universal and more elevated reason than we have already indicated.

We said by the force of it, etc. Because if the aforesaid light of intelligence is taken according to what is common, or according to what it includes in a transcendent manner, and is thus identified with the other divine formalities, it can also extend to the aforesaid conclusions.

85 It makes no difference if one objects that God's understanding, as constitutive of him, is the most perfect cognition and judgment about the divine essence: but it is not the cognition and judgment of it as known through something prior: therefore, as known through itself: and consequently such cognition and judgment will have the character of intelligence.

For we answer from what has been said. That although understanding, as constitutive of God, terminates in the divine essence as it is known per se specifically; it does not terminate in it as it is known per se reductively, that is, it is not known through the aforesaid understanding to be known per se; and again it is not known by it through any medium which is prior to it; nevertheless the most formal reason of knowing it is that it is known per se: because it does not terminate in it as known per se, but under another, more elevated and more universal reason, than we have already explained.

This solution is drawn from D. Thom. in the place cited, in these words: It must be said that the speculative intellectual virtue is that by which the speculative intellect is perfected for considering the true, for this is its good work. Now the true is considerable in a twofold way. In one way, as what is known per se; and in another way, as what is known through something else; but what is known per se has the character of a principle, and is at once perceived by the intellect: and therefore the habit perfecting the intellect for the consideration of such a true is called intellect, which is the habit of principles. Since these words must be taken in the formal sense, as is clear from itself, because in them the matter at hand is the distinction and the formal object of the intellectual virtues, they plainly indicate that the formal reason of the light of principles is to be drawn from the fact that it tends to its object, insofar as reductively and formally it has being known per se.

86 At the confirmation, the sequel must be granted as regards all its parts, except the first: because although God's knowledge is not virtually distinguished from wisdom, it is nevertheless so distinguished from the other intellectual virtues enumerated there. The reason, however, for which wisdom is entirely identified with the knowledge of God is this. First, because, as D. Thom. teaches, wisdom is the same as most perfect knowledge: and it is clear that the knowledge of God is most perfect. Then also: because it is proper to wisdom, on the testimony of the same Sacred Doctor, 1. 2, q. 57, art. 2, to consider the highest causes: and so it judges and orders all things fittingly, because a perfect and universal judgment cannot be had except by resolution to the first causes. Wherefore, since it is proper to divine knowledge to know through the highest causes, namely through the divine essence, as it is the efficient and exemplary cause of all things, whether actual or virtual, it therefore coincides with wisdom: as also in the Metaphysics the reason of knowledge and of wisdom coincide: because this knowledge proceeds through the highest, or most universal, causes.

87 The reason, however, on account of which the knowledge of God is distinguished from the other intellectual virtues enumerated there is that it has a formal object distinct from all of them. For art, as D. Thom. says in the question cited, 1. 2, art. 3, is a right reason of things to be made, as also prudence is a right reason of things to be done: yet in such a way that the former, on the testimony of the same Sacred Doctor in the same place, if taken precisely, confers the faculty of a good work, but not a right use of it, because the good of artificial things is not a good of appetite, but a good of the artificial works themselves: and therefore art does not presuppose a right appetite; whereas prudence, namely, not only confers the faculty of a good work, but also its use; or that it be rightly done in the moral order; and so it presupposes a right appetite. Now neither of them tends reductively and formally to its own object, insofar as that object is reachable through its causes, so that this be the most formal reason of reaching it, but only specifically, from the fact that both can reach the causes of the thing about which they are concerned; and [that] in the divine essence, as in the cause, they reach their material object, namely creatures: yet neither according to what is peculiar to it looks to the divine essence, as most formally it has the character of a cause and of a means for knowing the creature, so that in this consists their proper reason: but each one of them, according to what is peculiar to it, looks to the divine essence most formally and reductively speaking, as it has that highest actuality from which it follows that it is the reason of knowing and of being conversant with its material object, namely with creatures: so that this reason, as it were, formalizes the other reasons, and consequently draws out that reason of reaching its own object in the divine essence, as in a cause, from this, that it has the character of its proper knowledge, which seeks the opposite.

88 And then, because, as the same D. Thom. teaches in the question cited, art. 6, three acts of reason are found with regard to things to be done, the first of which is to deliberate, the second to judge, the third to command; therefore for the first act a special virtue is posited, which is called Eubulia, and transferred to God it has to deliberate about means, with the imperfection of inquiry excluded, and to look to the divine essence, as by the manner of an object, or of the reason under which, and in the way just explained, is the reason of deliberating about means. For the second, however, two virtues are posited, namely Synesis and Gnome, as the Angelic Doctor teaches there: yet in such a way that Synesis judges according to common rules, and Gnome beyond those: and consequently both look to the essence of God, according as the reason, which we have already indicated, is the reason of judging in the manner proportionate to each of them. And likewise, because the proper act of prudence is to command, on the testimony of the Angelic Doctor in art. 6, cited above, it therefore looks also to that same essence of God, as in the same proportional way it is the reason of commanding. None, however, of the aforesaid virtues terminates formally and reductively in that same essence, as having the character of a cause, or of a reason a priori, of things to be known: and so all of them are distinguished from knowledge, as also from one another, on account of the distinct formal objects already explained to which they look. But on all these matters let D. Thom. be consulted throughout the question cited, q. 57, and 2. 2, q. 47, art. 4 and 5, and q. 49, as also q. 51, art. 4:

Nor against these does the proof of the minor brought forward there have force. For from the fact that the knowledge of God must be most perfect in the line of practical knowledge, it is inferred at the utmost that there must exist in God's intellect the most perfect reason, both with respect to all things to be done and to all things to be made; but not in the same way, and under the same formal reason under which the intellectual virtues already described have that: because knowledge looks to all these things as they are reachable through the essence of God, as it has the character of a cause, or of a reason a priori of them, but not so the aforesaid virtues. And so, although prudence, for example, is a virtue perfecting the practical intellect, and consequently a practical intellectual virtue, nevertheless, formally speaking, it is not practical knowledge.

89 At the last, with the antecedent granted, the consequence must be denied. And for the proof, the antecedent must be granted, both on account of the reason brought forward there, and also because in God there cannot be physical knowledge, taken formally: because knowing through a medium that concerns sensible matter signifies an imperfection to be banished from God. And then the supposition of the consequence must be denied, namely that the knowledge of God is infinite in the genus of intellection, in the way in which it is infinite in the genus, or within the line, of knowledge: because in the line of knowledge, which is only the single one, it is infinite as comprehending and formally containing all the perfection of that single line: but within the order and genus of understanding, under which several lines are contained, it is not infinite as comprehending and formally containing the whole perfection of all the lines, but as a single line, and as the formal reason contained under that genus. And so within that same genus of understanding there can be given a multiplied intellection contained under that genus, which pertains to diverse lines, as is clear from itself. Although it stand that the line of knowledge is identified with the other lines already mentioned, so that it is only virtually distinguished from them.