Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem
Collegii Salmanticensis Cursus Theologicus, tomus I
First published 1870
The Cursus Theologicus of the Discalced Carmelites of Salamanca (the 'Salmanticenses'), tomus I, in the 1870 Paris reprint. Contains the Prooemium and the three great treatises of this volume: De principio individuationis (a digression on the principle of individuation), De Visione Dei (in quaest. 12), and De Scientia Dei (in quaest. 14, including the extended rejection of middle knowledge). The edition prints St Thomas's Prima Pars text alongside; that text is not republished here.
Prooemium, and the Division of the whole Work
Quaestio I: On the Simplicity of God
Tractatus I: On the Principle of the Individuation of Material Substance and of Its Accidents
Disputatio I: On the Principle of the Individuation of Material Substance
Dubium I: Whether the substantial form is itself individuated, and the first principle of the individuation and of the purely individual distinction of the whole composite?
Dubium II: Whether matter, taken by itself and precisely, or matter marked by quantity, is the first and radical principle of the individuation of the whole substantial composite
Dubium III: Whether matter marked by quantity, insofar as it is said to constitute a composite of matter and quantity as an inhering and constituting form, is the first root of the individuation of the composite
Dubium IV: Whether matter determined by quantity, insofar as it denotes a certain substantial mode, is by the very nature of the thing distinct from matter and determines it toward having this quantity rather than that, is the first root of the individuation of material substance and of its substantial form?
Dubium V: Whether matter marked by quantity, insofar as it is said to possess by a radical mode this quantity rather than that, is the first root of the completed material substance and therefore of its substantial form
Disputatio II: On the Principle of the Individuation of Accidents
Dubium I: Whether the subject is the first root and principle of the individuation of accidents and of their purely individual distinction
Dubium II: Whether quantity claims for itself a peculiar principle, so that it is individuated from itself as though it were the first root
Dubium III: Whether essential repugnance exists between purely numerical distinction of accidents, as such that two of them differ only numerically in the same subject
Tractatus II: In quaest. 12 of the First Part of St. Thomas: On the Vision of God
Quaestio I: How God is known by us
Disputatio I: On the Possibility and Appetitability of the Vision of God by Essence
Dubium I: Whether the clear vision of God by essence is possible to the created intellect?
Dubium II: Whether the Holy Fathers knew that vision of God by essence is possible to a created intellect
Dubium III: Whether the possibility of vision of God by essence can be clearly known to a created intellect by the light of nature
Dubium IV: Whether the intellectual nature considered by itself has an innate appetite for the vision of God by essence
Dubium V: Whether an elicited and natural appetite is given in the intellectual creature considered by itself with regard to the clear vision of God
Disputatio II: On the Likeness, or Form, Required for a Clear Vision of God
Dubium I: Whether, according to the mind of St Thomas, some created likeness is admitted in order to elicit the clear vision of God
Dubium II: Whether the divine essence is in fact united to the intellect of the blessed man by way of an intelligible species, with a view to the clear vision of God?
Dubium III: Whether the divine essence, as it has the character of an intelligible form, actively concurs to the clear vision of God
Dubium IV: Whether by divine power a created impressed species is possible, through which God may be seen in a quidditative way, such as He is in Himself?
Dubium V: Whether the first reason which D. Thom. adduces in this article sufficiently proves the impossibility of an impressed species representing God quidditatively and clearly?
Dubium VI: Whether from the second reason of St. Thomas the impossibility is sufficiently inferred of an impressed form representing God quidditatively, and clearly, as He is in Himself
Dubium VII: What specially stands against the second reason of St. Thomas, and how it is to be solved
Dubium VIII: Whether the last reason of the article proves the impossibility of a created intelligible species representing God quidditatively: where the arguments also are dissolved which we brought from the opponents in dub. 4 of this disputation?
Dubium IX: Whether in the blessed there is necessarily and indispensably given a word, or expressed form, representing God quidditatively, as He is in Himself
Dubium X: Whether the impossibility of a created word representing God clearly and quidditatively is rightly proved from the fact that God is essentially itself the being quidditatively understood, and thus cannot be quidditatively understood through a created word?
Disputatio III: On the Impossibility of the Vision of God, As He Is in Himself, by Created Powers of the Natural Order, or Such as Are Connatural to Some Created Intellect
Dubium I: Whether by the absolute power of God there is possible some intellect which by the powers proper to it of the natural order could see God as He is in Himself
Dubium II: Whether by divine power there can be possible some substances and some intellects for which the light of glory is connatural, and which can see God by essence by their own powers?
Disputatio IV: On the Necessity of the Light of Glory for Seeing the Divine Essence As It Is in Itself
Dubium I: Whether the light of glory concurs to the vision of God, as He is in Himself, after the manner of an impressed form
Dubium II: Whether the light of glory is a necessary disposition, in order that the divine essence, in the ratio of form or of intelligible species, be united to the intellects of the blessed?
Dubium III: Whether the light of glory is necessarily desired for the receiving of the vision of God?
Dubium IV: Whether by the absolute power of God the created intellect can, without the light of glory, by its own obediential power alone, though with a concomitant influx superadded in the vision, but not by any other previous [influx], elicit that vision in the same intellect
Dubium V: Whether by divine power the divine essence can be united, in the ratio of light, to the created intellect, and thus constitute it, without a created light, in the first act for seeing God as He is in Himself?
Disputatio V: On the Quality and Inequality of the Visions in the Blessed
Dubium I: Whether an inequality is found among the beatific visions
Dubium II: Whether the inequality found among the beatific visions is not only intensive and extensive, but also essential and specific
Dubium III: Whether an intellectual power that is better, with equal light of glory, sees the divine essence more clearly
Disputatio VI: On the Incomprehensibility of God to the Created Intellect
Dubium I: Whether by divine power the created intellect can comprehend God?
Disputatio VII: On Those Things Which, God Having Been Seen, Are Seen in Him, or Can Be Seen
Dubium I: Whether those who see God see everything absolutely which is formally and of necessity contained in Him
Dubium II: Whether the divine essence can be seen without the persons, or one person without another?
Dubium III: Whether the blessed can, by the force of the vision of the divine essence, see, and in fact see, the free decrees of God?
Dubium IV: Whether from the force of the vision of the divine essence the effects existing under some difference of time can, or ought to, be seen
Dubium V: Whether by the force of the vision of the divine essence possible creatures can be seen?
Tractatus III: In quaest. 14 of the First Part of the Angelic Doctor: On the Knowledge of God
Quaestio I: De Scientia Dei
Dubium I: Whether those things which St. Thomas teaches in the Prooemium of this question are true
1 Before St. Thomas sets forth the first article of this question, he gives the reason for the order of this question in relation to the preceding ones, as is clear from his words just quoted. Therefore, so that everything which the Holy Doctor teaches in this question may stand explained, we have deemed it right to examine this prologue of the same St. Thomas — brief, yet most profound — in which the reason for the order of this question in relation to the preceding ones is contained.
§ I. Reasons for doubting.
It seems to be false, then, that which he lays down at the outset, namely that he is here treating of those things which belong to the operation of God, after the consideration of those which concern the divine substance. Since divine understanding bears on the substance and essence of God — not in just any way, but as what is proper to it, and its greatest constitutive principle, as we shall say more fully in art. 4 of this question — the discussion of it which is contained in this question will bear on the treatise and the discussion of those things which belong to the substance of God. Add to this that the Holy Doctor, after this question on divine knowledge, treats of the truth and the life of God: yet it is clear that truth does not entail operation, but conformity and consonance with a thing, and that life likewise pertains to the substance itself of a living thing. Consequently, in these questions St. Thomas is treating of many things which belong to the substance of God, according as, in our manner of understanding, it is distinguished from operation. And so it does not seem to have been rightly said that he begins the discussion of those things which belong to the operation of God with this question, 14, those things which concern his substance having been already treated of.
2 Second. The second reason for doubting is derived from the fact that the Holy Doctor said in the place cited, namely that since the operation is twofold, of which one is immanent and the other transient, one must first treat of knowledge and of the will, because to understand is in the one who understands, and to will in the one who wills, and afterwards of power, which is considered as the principle of external effects. For in the first place the Holy Doctor does not seem to have rightly compared these two extremes with one another: for although, the comparison having been made between the immanent and the transient operation, the former is prior and the latter posterior, and therefore the same St. Thomas, after the treatise on the divine processions and on whatever else is necessarily required for them, treated of the operation ad extra, the fact nevertheless remains that if the comparison is made between the immanent operation and the divine power, then the immanent operation is not prior to the divine power, but on the contrary: as, in general, all powers of any kind whatsoever are prior to its immanent operations. Therefore, etc.
3 Third. Next, because God does not act ad extra by a formally transient operation, but by an act of divine dominion, according to that saying: He said, and it was done: he commanded, and it was created. Therefore St. Thomas has wrongly distinguished the order of these questions: from the fact that in some of them the immanent actions of God are treated of, but in others the power which is considered as the principle of the divine operation proceeding into an external effect, and consequently as the principle of a transient action.
It will not be enough, if it be said that although the act of dominion is formally immanent, yet, since it is an act of the intellect, as St. Thomas teaches in 1. 2. qu. 17. art. 4, it is virtually transient; and so he was able to treat of it in the various questions, considered under these various aspects.
For against this stands the fact that, in order to treat of the immanent divine acts, in so far as they are virtually transient, there was no need to institute distinct questions. And therefore in this very question, and in qu. 19, the knowledge and the will of God are treated of, in so far as they are causes of things, and consequently in so far as they are virtually transient.
§ II. Decision of the doubt. § II. Decision of the doubt.
4 Nevertheless it must be said that what St. Thomas taught in this prologue is true, and that he has accordingly observed the best method and the most beautiful order in the treatment of these questions. So do his disciples in common, and very many others. The first part of this assertion will be made sufficiently clear from what is to be said below and from the solutions of the reasons for doubting. The latter, however, follows from the former. For what is principally contained in the prologue of St. Thomas is the aforesaid order and method. And then this same part is proved nowhere better than from the reason for the order which the same author adduced in the opening of his question, which can thus be set out more fully.
For in the first place he treated of the divine being and of the other (let us say so) entitative attributes which belong to God's substance in the manner of a property, such as infinitude, immutability, eternity, invisibility to the created intellect by its own proper powers; and finally, in the immediately preceding question, he explained how all these ought to be expressed and signified by words and names. Since therefore the (let us say so) entitative attributes are prior to the operative attributes, or the divine operations, as is clear from itself, it follows that he was deservedly to have treated of them in the first place; and since among operations the immanent are prior to the transient, because these are directed by those towards their end, and since among the immanent, cognition, or knowledge, is prior to volition, it was with the best right that he treated of divine knowledge in the first place, after the (let us say so) entitative attributes.
§ III. Solution of the reasons for doubting set out at the beginning.
5 Hence, as to what we objected in the first place against the prologue of this question, it must be said that although to understand (taken in the sense explained below in art. 4) pertains to the intrinsic concept of God, as the differential reason and the ultimate constitutive principle of it, nevertheless the title of this question is not of it, taken in this sense, but under the formality of knowledge, with respect to which, in our manner of understanding, it does not pertain to the intrinsic constitutive principle of God, as we shall say in this same treatise, disp. 1, num. 68. As to what is further alleged from the questions on the truth and the life of God, it must be said that in those questions on the operative attributes St. Thomas treated of truth because, as he himself notes in the prologue of this question, knowledge is of truths; and therefore he had to treat of truth and falsity, just as to understand and to know are a certain living, and therefore, as the Angelic Doctor says there, after the consideration of divine knowledge, the divine life must be considered. Nor does it matter that it is said there that life pertains to the concept of the substance and essence of God: just as in us also life bears on the quiddative concept of our substance and essence. Therefore the Holy Doctor should rather have treated of the life of God in the preceding question on the knowledge of God than in those that follow it. For it will be answered that life can pertain both to the concept of essence and to the concept of powers and of vital actions, as is clear from what St. Thomas teaches in qu. 18 of this Part 1, and from what the Complutensians assert in 1. de Anima. And therefore the Holy Doctor could treat of the life of God in a special manner after this question on the knowledge of God. The reason, however, for which he treated of the life of the vital operations of God, and of those flowing as it were from his essence, in a special and more explicit manner, is this: because with us the reason of life is above all found among all other things, so that it is recognized by the operation of life, or by the fact that something is moved of itself. So true is this that even those things which seem to be moved of themselves, although in truth they are not so moved, are wont to be marked by us with the name of life, as quicksilver, running water, etc.
Nor does it matter either, if one presses the point that, still speaking of the life of the vital operations which do not pertain to the essence, the Holy Doctor seems to have had to treat of the life of God before of its knowledge, since that reason of life is more common and more universal, and consequently prior, than the reason of knowledge.
For it will be answered that knowledge, which treats of some species as of its adequate object, ought not to treat first of the more remote and more universal, as happens in the Theology, whose adequate object is God himself.
6 To the second it will be answered that although in creatures the immanent operations of the intellect and the will are not prior to their operative power, but rather posterior, nevertheless in God they are in a certain way prior according to our manner of conceiving: because the immanent acts of his intellect and will, in so far as they are virtually transient, and have the efficacy to produce whatever pleases him, assume the character of omnipotence; and because in these acts it is, in our manner of understanding, prior that they are immanent acts of understanding and of willing than that they have the aforesaid efficacy and virtual force of acting transiently, as we have already explained. Therefore in this question and in qu. 19 of this Part 1, they are treated of first according to the former consideration rather than according to this latter one.
From which it is clear as to the third reason for doubting. For we say that the solution given there is legitimate. And to the proof, namely that although one may treat of the immanent acts of the divine intellect and will, in so far as they are virtually transient, in the manner of directing and intending future effects, this belongs to this question, because that is proper to the intellect and the will as they are distinguished from the executing power, nevertheless to treat of the same acts, in so far as they are identical with omnipotence, as will be said below, and consequently in so far as they are virtually transient in the manner of executing in time that which from eternity is directed by divine knowledge, and intended and foredetermined by the divine will, does not unjustly also bear on a distinct question, since, as we shall see below, God influences through these acts in one way according to that former consideration, and in another way according to this latter one.
First conclusion. Knowledge is found in God.
Second conclusion, which the Holy Doctor indicates in the answer to the second. The knowledge of God is an attribute of it.
Third conclusion. In this respect knowing things are distinguished from things that do not know, in that knowing things have their own form and that of other things, and become things known; whereas things that do not know have only their own form.