Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

That the understanding of the title is sufficiently established from what was said in the preceding Difficulty is clear.

§ I. The prior opinion is set out.

68 The negative part is upheld by Vazquez at the place cited. It is proved, first, in the following way. Because the divine essence has no necessary connection with possible creatures: therefore it cannot be the reason of their being seen: therefore neither will the aforesaid creatures be able to be seen from the force of the vision of the divine essence. This last consequence is clear from the previous one: because it is the same for creatures to be seen from the force of the vision of the divine essence as for that same essence to be the reason and the means by which the intellect is led to the knowledge of them. But the first consequence follows plainly from the antecedent. Because those things which have no necessary connection with regard to being cannot have such a connection with regard to being known, so as to be at once the reason and the means leading to the knowledge of another. Now the antecedent is proved. Because whatever is necessarily connected with something has a necessary relation to it, as is clear in the powers when compared with their objects: but the divine essence cannot be said to have a necessary relation to possibles, otherwise by that relation it would be specified by them: therefore, etc.

It is confirmed. For even if no creature were possible, the divine essence and omnipotence would still remain: therefore it is a sign that it has no necessary connection with them. The consequence is clear: for as often as things are necessarily connected, so often the removal of one takes away the other. But the antecedent is evident. Because the essence and omnipotence of God are beings more necessary than the possibility of creatures, since they are uncreated beings and exist through themselves: but if by the removal of possible creatures the essence and omnipotence of God were to be taken away, they would not be more necessary than the aforesaid creatures.

69 Secondly. Because neither on the part of the divine essence nor on the part of the light can a reason be assigned, on account of which these creatures rather than those are seen: therefore, since they cannot all be seen, otherwise God would be comprehended, as is clear from what has been said, it follows that none of them will be seen from the force of the vision. The consequence is clear. Because for some of them to be able to be seen and not all, there would have to be assigned, on the part of those things which concur in the vision, some reason, on account of which these creatures rather than those are seen: and since only the light, or the intellect filled with it, and the divine essence concur in such a vision, it is necessary that from one of these two some reason be assigned, on account of which these creatures rather than those are seen.

But the antecedent is proved as regards the first part. For the divine essence contains and represents all creatures equally, since it does not contain or represent one through another, but all equally and immediately. As regards the second part, however, it is proved as follows. Because every light of glory is of the same species with another, since all of them are terminated to the same formal object, namely to God as He is in Himself: therefore this diversity cannot arise on the part of the lights: because those things which are the same in the reason of the principle of seeing cannot be the reason of a diversity which is in the vision.

70 You will say that the lights of glory are diverse and unequal both in intensity and in individual perfection: and thus that the reason of a diversity of intensity, or of individual perfection, could be the root of seeing these creatures rather than others.

But against that: for a greater or lesser intensity, although it be the reason of knowing the same object in a more perfect way, is not however the reason of knowing this object rather than that, as is evident in the habits of the natural sciences: in which a greater intensity is not the reason of assenting to more conclusions, or to these rather than those contained within the same science, but of assenting more perfectly to the same conclusion: as also a greater or lesser individual perfection, taken precisely, cannot be the reason of attaining this object rather than that, as is seen in the same scientific habits.

71 Thirdly. Because otherwise, the divine essence having been seen, infinite possible creatures distinct according to species could be seen: but this is impossible; therefore, etc. The falsity of the consequence is clear. Because in order to see one possible creature from the force of the vision, something of the light of glory is required; and in order to see another more perfect and distinct according to species, something of a greater light is needed, and so, therefore, in order for infinite possible creatures distinct according to species to be seen, an infinite light would be needed, which yet implies that it exists.

The sequel is, however, proved. Because beneath any possible creature, and even any determinate one, infinite others of lesser and lesser perfection can be produced, as above any determinate creature infinite others of greater and greater essential perfection can be produced, as N. Compl. expounds in the book Physics: therefore, whoever has seen any determinate creature will be able to see those infinite ones which are of less perfection than it. The consequence is clear. For just as by the fact that the divine essence contains such a creature, it does not therefore contain more perfect creatures by force of such a containment, and consequently those are not to be known on the account of that one being known; so, because the divine essence contains such a creature, it ought also to contain those which are below it, it would follow that when this one is seen, those other infinite and less perfect creatures would have to be seen.

§ II. The knot of the Difficulty is unravelled according to the mind of D. Thom..

72 It must nevertheless be said that, although all possible creatures cannot be seen from the force of the blessed vision, some can nevertheless be seen, so that according to the greater or lesser perfection of the light, more or fewer are known. Thus D. Thom. in this article and in the passages to be cited immediately: whom nearly all the Theologians follow, and for that reason we abstain from naming them in particular.

The fundamental reason of this assertion, as regards both parts already treated above by us, is given by D. Thom. in the place cited and in 4. dist. 49, q. 2, art. 5, and in 3. On the Angels, ch. 55 and 56; and as regards the first part of the assertion to be proved, it can be proposed in this form. Because that intellect alone knows, the cause being known, all the effects contained in it which penetrates it altogether, and so comprehends it: but the divine intellect alone, and not any other, penetrates altogether and comprehends the divine essence, which is the cause of creatures: therefore that intellect alone, that same essence having been seen, knows all the possible effects contained in it. The minor does not need proof, given what we have said in the preceding article. The major is also evident. Because effects are not seen from the force of the vision of the cause unless it be penetrated: therefore that intellect alone will know all the effects lying latent in some cause, which has penetrated it, and all its folds, as it were, altogether.

73 From which also the second part of the same assertion is proved by the same reason of the same Holy Doctor. Because although some vision does not penetrate the cause altogether, and so neither sees all the effects contained in it, nevertheless once the cause has been seen, the effects that lie hidden in it can be seen, or known, from the force of that vision, so that more or fewer are seen according to the greater or lesser perfection of a light which does not penetrate it altogether: therefore, although the created vision is not sufficient to penetrate altogether the divine essence, which is the cause of creatures, nevertheless from that vision, that same essence having been seen, more or fewer effects will be known according to the greater or lesser perfection of the light. The consequence does not need proof. But the antecedent is clear from the example of one who has a more elevated intellect. For here, a single demonstrative principle having at once been proposed, he infers from it more conclusions according to the greater or lesser elevation of his intellect, although the principle itself does not penetrate, nor comprehend it altogether; which yet does not happen in one who is of weaker intelligence; but the individual conclusions must be explained to him: therefore, etc.

§ III. An answer is given to the first argument of the opposing opinion.

74 To the first argument the antecedent must be denied. And to the proof it is answered that, although those things which are necessarily connected with others must have a relation to them and be specified by them, as occurs in the examples proposed in the argument, this is not however universally necessary: and thus the objects of the sciences, insofar as they are such, are necessarily connected with their sciences, and yet do not express a real relation to them, whether predicationary or transcendental, as is commonly taught by Dialecticians and Metaphysicians. Whence, although the divine essence and omnipotence are necessarily connected with possible creatures, it does not follow that they therefore really have a relation to them, or that they are specified by them: because by reason of its own eminence the divine essence is altogether free and absolute with respect to every respect and relation, being of itself terminated first to creatures.

75 To the confirmation it is answered that, given that hypothesis, the divine essence and omnipotence would at least not remain such as they now are, and so the antecedent must at least be denied in this sense.

To its proof, in order to answer it, we must suppose what we shall touch on in the Treatise on the Will of God, namely, that although from the implication of the creatures there follows, at least in the sense just explained, the destruction of the divine essence and omnipotence, and that given the destruction of the divine essence and of divine omnipotence there follows the destruction of the possibility of creatures, yet in one way and in another; for from the impossibility of creatures the destruction of the divine essence and omnipotree already explained is gathered only a posteriori; that is, from the force of such an implication that destruction does not follow: but it is a sign that it had been destroyed first: as from the absence of light in this hemisphere the absence of the Sun from it follows only a posteriori: and therefore from the force of the absence of light the absence of the Sun is not posited, but only follows, or is gathered, that the Sun was previously absent from the aforesaid hemisphere before the light was absent: since the light is absent, which ought to have been caused from the presence of the Sun in it.

Moreover, from the destruction, or impossibility, of the divine essence and omnipotence there follows a priori the destruction of the possibility of creatures; and from the force of the positing of those, the aforesaid possibility and the necessity of these are posited, as from the presence of the Sun the presence of light is posited, due proportion being preserved.

Hence, then, the proof of the aforesaid antecedent is sufficiently established. For since the necessity of existing which the divine omnipotence and essence have is the cause of the necessity of the possibility of creatures, and from the destruction of it the necessity of their possibility follows a priori, as from the destruction of its own cause, whereas from the destruction of the possibility of creatures the destruction of the essence and omnipotence of God is gathered only a posteriori, in the manner explained, the consequence is that the essence and omnipotence of God are beings more necessary: because as often as two things are necessary and mutually connected, so often the thing which is the cause of the other's necessity has the greater necessity in itself, according to that Aristotelian axiom: That on account of which each such thing is, that exists the more.

§ IV. The second argument of the same opposing opinion is dissolved.

76 To the second argument the antecedent must be denied, as regards both parts. For in the first place, in some way it proceeds from the part of the divine essence that these possible creatures rather than those are seen: since the aforesaid diversity can in some way arise from the fact that of the creatures contained in the divine essence, some are less latent in it, while others lie hidden in the same more. Whence D. Thom., q. 8. On Truth, art. 4, ad 12, explains how from this head it can in some way come about that these creatures rather than those are seen by the blessed, thus saying: It must be said that, although the knowledge of creatures in no way pertains to beatitude, it does not however follow that all knowledge of creatures is equally related to the vision of beatitude: for once a certain cause is known, it is easy to see that some effects are known in it, while others lie hidden more: as is evident, for from the principles of a demonstration some conclusions are at once drawn out, while others are not so except through many means: and for the knowledge of these, no one can attain by himself, but he must be led by another. Likewise also the knowledge of the intelligible reasons of the effects with respect to the divine essence: because some are more latent, some more manifest: and therefore from the vision of the divine essence some things are known and some are not. And in like manner the aforesaid diversity can proceed from the part of the light of glory. Whence the same Holy Doctor in this article, after having said that more effects are seen in some cause, and therefore also in the divine essence, the more that aforesaid cause is penetrated, concludes: No created intellect, therefore, by seeing God, can know all the things which God does or can do: for that would be to comprehend His power: but of those things which God does or can do, an intellect knows as many the more as He sees God more perfectly. Wherefore, since God is seen more perfectly the more He is seen with a greater light, as the same Holy Doctor teaches in art. 6 of this question, saying: An intellect participating more of the light of glory will see God more perfectly, the consequence is that in accordance with the doctrine of the Holy Doctor, the more a person has of the light of glory, the more creatures he sees, and therefore these rather than those, as we shall explain more fully shortly.

77 And a sufficient reason for this can be given, from the fact that however unequally knowable a certain object may be, nevertheless an intellect which is occupied with it, if it have no inequality in comparison with other intellects, cannot know it unequally. Whence, since God is unequally knowable by different blessed ones, there must be given on the part of the intellect, and therefore on the part of the light of glory, some inequality, on account of which one may see and penetrate the divine essence more than another.

And in answer to the proof against the first part of the same antecedent it must be said that, although it were granted (which will be stated shortly) that the divine essence contains and represents possible creatures equally, in so far as this signifies that it does not contain them after the manner of a cause, and consequently neither represents one under the reason of another, or through another, so that it cannot otherwise cause and represent them, nevertheless that same essence does not contain and represent all of them equally, in so far as this denotes that all of them are contained and represented by that same essence equally latently: because, as we have just said from D. Thom., of the effects contained in some cause and represented by it, some lie hidden more, some less, while some are in fact almost entirely manifest. Whence, if the divine essence is united under the reason of a species, as it contains the more manifest creatures, these will be seen; but if it is united as it contains the creatures that lie hidden more in it, then these will be beheld: indeed also, as we shall explain more fully shortly, together with them the more manifest creatures, or those not so latent in the divine essence, will be seen as well.

78 The rule, however, for discerning which of the creatures lie hidden more in the divine essence, and which are more manifest in it, seems able to be derived from the greater or lesser possible perfection, and in the potentiality, of those same creatures, so that those creatures will lie hidden more which shall have been more perfect, both as to their essence and as to their mode of existence: conversely, however, those shall be more manifest, and shall not be contained and lie hidden, so to speak, in the inmost and deepest bounds of that same omnipotence, which shall have had less perfection (in the manner, however, just indicated).

And the reason of this can be given. First, because when creatures, insofar as they are contained virtually in God, lie hidden as it were within the folds of His power, those must be said to lie hidden more which are contained in omnipotence as containing virtually a greater grade of actuality than other grades (as others speak), or, according to our opinion, in that same most simple formality, without any virtual distinction of its own, expressing a greater actuality with respect to the production of creatures, perfect in the manner explained. For by the very fact that the divine essence contains them, and is the reason of their being seen, they are attained more difficultly, and therefore they themselves lie hidden more in it. Then too (which follows from the preceding), because by the very fact that omnipotence, as it contains certain creatures, expresses a greater perfection and a greater active force, in the manner explained, it is necessary that it demand a greater light in the intellect attaining it, as is said of the aforesaid perfection, and in particular it contains such creatures as is evident from itself, and as we said in the preceding article: and so it will be necessary also that it be penetrated more by the force of the aforesaid light, in order that those creatures may be beheld in it as in a cause: since, speaking universally, a greater light is demanded for the knowledge of some effect in its cause, because a greater penetration of that same cause is required, so that such an effect may be known in it; and consequently from this as well it follows that the aforesaid effect lies hidden more in that same cause, otherwise that greater penetration of the cause would not be necessary for attaining it.

It is added that this, that creatures are more latent, cannot be taken except from the fact either that they are more perfect as to essence alone, or that they are so both as to essence and as to mode of existence together, or from the fact that they are less perfect as to both, or as to one of these: but not from the fact that they are more perfect as to essence alone, otherwise sanctifying grace would be more latent than another creature, whereas in the highly probable opinion of the Thomists it is more perfect as to essence, though not as to mode of existence, than all other possible creatures, because it is the formal participation of a more perfect reason which is found in God, namely of the divine nature as it is in itself. Since however it is certain that the aforesaid sanctifying grace is seen by all the blessed, and is contained less latently in the divine essence than other possible creatures, as will be clear from what is to be said shortly: nor also is it taken from the fact that it is less perfect as to essence and mode of existence together, or as to one of these two, otherwise one who knew creatures in this less perfect way could and would have to know in that same divine essence all the creatures which, throughout the whole range of being, are more perfect as to essence and mode of existence together: since, as we shall say in this same Difficulty, one who knows in God a more latent creature can attain in Him the more manifest creatures, or those not lying hidden in Him so much: therefore it is necessary that this, that some creature is more latent in God, should proceed from the fact that it is more perfect, both as to essence and as to mode of existence together.

79 From which, in answer to the proof for the second part of the same antecedent, it is answered by admitting an inequality of the visions, and therefore that these possible creatures are seen rather than those does not arise from the lights of glory considered precisely as to their essence, as the proof made there correctly concludes. Yet this can proceed from an inequality in the intensity of those same lights, so that the more intense the light is, the more creatures it attains, and not just any sort, but, in the manner explained, more perfect ones.

And in answer to the proof on the contrary it must be said that, although a greater intensity of light is not the reason of seeing this object rather than that, when those objects primarily terminate the knowledge, yet when the light of itself is first terminated to some single object, and that object has first been seen and penetrated as a cause, and it then knows the rest, then a greater intensity of light can be the reason why these secondary objects are attained rather than those: because such an intensity is a sufficient reason of a greater penetration of the primary object, and therefore of knowing in it those effects which lie hidden more in it, and consequently also those which are more manifest there, as we shall say shortly.

Nor does it stand in the way, but rather it helps, that what is brought forward in this proof about the habits of acquired sciences is adduced. For a greater intensity of scientific and acquired light can sometimes lead to the effect that in some cause, or conclusion, first known and more penetrated, more effects, or conclusions deduced from it, are known, and to the effect that these are inferred rather than those, according as the intensity of the aforesaid light can reach — yet, as we say elsewhere — to a greater or lesser penetration of the deeper folds of that same cause.

80 From all of which it follows that the adequate reason, on account of which these possible creatures are seen rather than those in the divine essence, is not to be given on the part of the divine essence alone, in so far as it has the reason of a species and of the cause of creatures, nor on the part of the light of glory alone; but on the part of each of the two: because it is repugnant that these creatures rather than those should be known from the force of the blessed vision, unless the divine essence, as it has the reason of an intelligible species, be united with the blessed intellect by a union of such, or such, perfection, and likewise unless that same essence be known under the manner of an object first known, in so far as it has such, or such, an activity, in the manner explained: but it is repugnant for the divine essence to be thus united and thus seen, unless the intellect have such, or such, perfection, or intensity of light, as also it is repugnant for an intellect having such, or such, an intensity of light not to have united to it the divine essence under the reason of an intelligible species, by a union of such, or such, perfection commensurate with the force and intensity of that same light: and consequently the divine essence cannot fail to be seen, at least of itself and speaking from the nature of the thing, insofar as it contains creatures of such perfection.

81 Nor does it matter if you object that the divine essence and omnipotence, insofar as they contain more perfect creatures after the manner of a cause, are not yet virtually distinguished from themselves, insofar as they contain less perfect creatures, and consequently neither are they virtually distinguished from themselves under the reason of an intelligible species with respect to those, as a species is with respect to these: therefore they will not be able to be united with the blessed intellect, as it is the reason of seeing less perfect creatures, without being united also as the reason of seeing more perfect ones: since in order to be united under one reason and not under another, some distinction, at least virtual, would be required in it.

So then this does not matter. Because in order that the divine essence be united as the reason of seeing these creatures rather than those, and that it have activity with respect to these more than with respect to those, it is not necessary that it be virtually distinguished, or that it have different virtual grades of activity; but it is enough that it be an eminent form, and, as will be explained shortly, equivalent to several: as in order that the same essence be united under the reason of an intelligible species with the blessed intellect, but not under the reason of vision, it is not desired that it be virtually distinguished in the reason of its own vision and in the reason of an intelligible species; but the aforesaid eminence and equivalence are enough.

82 And the reason is the same in both cases. Because the eminence of the form is sufficient, in order that it be equivalent to several things actually and really distinct, no less than if it were really and actually distinct; and it is distinguished from those things which have a virtual distinction in this, that things which are virtually distinguished are equivalent to several things pertaining to distinct lines; whereas an eminent form, as such, and insofar as it does not reach to a virtual distinction of itself, is equivalent only to several things looking to the same line.

Wherefore, just as if divine power had in itself a real actual multiplicity of grades, or of powers, it could be united with the blessed intellect according to one grade, or power, and not according to others, so too by its being an eminent form, and equivalent to those really distinct powers aforesaid and pertaining to the same line, it will be able to accomplish this very thing.

§ V. Solution of the third argument of the opposing opinion.

83 To the third argument the sequel must be conceded, if it is understood of infinite possible creatures contained beneath the perfection of some certain, determinate, and finite possible creature, for example beneath man: otherwise, however, if it is understood of infinite possible creatures not contained beneath the perfection of any certain and finite possible creature. Because in order to know infinite creatures of this latter kind from the force of the beatific vision, an infinite light is required: otherwise, however, in order to attain infinite creatures of that former kind from the force of the same vision. For a light which suffices to see in the divine essence the species of man fully and perfectly, and therefore the divine essence itself as expressing that perfection of activity which is required for its production, suffices to attain all creatures of less perfection, as we shall explain more fully shortly.

And in answer to the proof on the contrary it must be said that, although for the vision of one of these possible creatures which are distinct according to species and are contained beneath the perfection of man, or do not reach to His nobility, some light is required, and in order to see another of these creatures a greater light is required, and so on without end, yet it will not follow from this that an infinite light is required in order to see all of them together: because the increment of light required to behold a more perfect creature, and again a more perfect creature from among these, does not occur (so to speak) by parts and degrees of a certain and determinate magnitude, and determinate ones, but by parts of an uncertain and indeterminate magnitude, proportionate to one another and sharing in common: and so it does not follow that the whole of that light required for the collection of those creatures to be seen will be infinite: just as neither from a proportional addition, by smaller and smaller parts without end, from any certain and determinate part which is in a finger, ascending from its middle up to the whole itself, does it follow that any actually infinite magnitude results there: because this requires, among other things, an addition by parts of a certain and determinate magnitude.

84 The reason, however, on account of which that increment of light ought not to be by parts, or as it were by a quantity of the virtue's force of a certain and determinate magnitude, can be given, both from the part of the aforesaid creatures, and also, and especially, from the part of the divine essence and omnipotence, insofar as they are the reasons of seeing such creatures. From the part of the creatures, indeed, because they themselves do not surpass one another by an excess of perfection which is of a certain and determinate quantity: so that if the quantity of perfection of one is as one, then that species has in its own manner immediately a perfection of as two, or as one and a half: but it has a perfection of as one and something more: yet in such a way that that something more must not be of any certain and determinate magnitude, or perfection, but of an uncertain and indeterminate one, namely less, and less than any determinate perfection that can be signified. From the part of the divine essence and omnipotence, however, because the essence of God and His omnipotence, insofar as they contain all these creatures, do not surpass themselves by an excess of infinite perfection, as they contain some of them: just as they themselves, insofar as they contain all possible creatures, infinitely surpass themselves, as they contain these or those, that is, they express a perfection infinitely more eminent than that by which they contain these or those.

85 From which also follows that which we touched upon above, namely, that the light of glory which suffices to see in God some created species suffices to see all the possible creatures which, both as to essence and as to mode of existence, are beneath that perfection. First, because a light sufficient to know God as expressing a greater active power is also sufficient to attain Him as expressing a lesser force of acting. Then also: because a power which has the ability of penetrating a cause more, also has the ability of penetrating it less. But in order to know in God more perfect creatures, a greater penetration of the divine essence is required, because the aforesaid creatures are more latent in it: conversely, however, in order to know in Him less perfect creatures, so great a penetration is not necessary, but a lesser one suffices: therefore a light which shall have sufficed to know in God more perfect creatures will suffice to attain in Him less perfect ones.

86 And this can be explained by the example of heat as eight, which by the very fact that it is such can accomplish whatever other less intense heats accomplish: because the greater intensity of radiation, as eight, contains virtually the modes of radiation of a lesser intensity, as N. Complut. shows in 1. On Generation, dist. 4, q. 9. So, therefore, the light of glory having an intensity, for example, of as eight, will be able to accomplish whatever a less intense light accomplishes by reason of its lesser intensity; and consequently, if a light of as five can see these creatures rather than those, a light of as eight will also be able to see them, in so far as it contains virtually an intensity of as five, and over and above some other more excellent creatures, which ought to correspond to it by reason of its greater intensity.

§ VI. Objections against the solution of this last argument, and their unraveling.

87 Nor does it matter if, against those things which we said in the solution of this last argument, you object first, that from them it follows that if a more perfect creature is known, both as to essence and as to mode of existence, then all creatures which are less perfect, as to essence and mode of existence, will be known from the force of that vision; whence it would follow that, grace having been seen, which is more perfect as to essence, though not as to mode of existence, all other creatures should be seen as to essence, though not as to mode of existence. The sequel is clear, both from the parity of the reason, and also for this reason: because therefore, a creature more perfect as to essence and mode of existence being seen, those less perfect as to both are seen: because the divine essence, insofar as it contains a more perfect one, expresses a greater perfection, which the vision cannot pass through except through a lesser one: but that same essence, insofar as it contains grace as to essence, also expresses a greater perfection than that by which it contains other things as to essences, and so the vision cannot reach to that greater perfection unless it makes a passage through a lesser one: therefore, etc.

It is answered by denying the sequel. And in answer to the first proof the parity must be denied, as will be clear from what is to be said shortly. To the second proof a distinction must be made between the greater, and if it is understood of greater perfection, both in the genus of being and in the genus of object, it must be conceded; otherwise, however, if it is understood of greater perfection precisely in the genus of being, and in like manner the lesser must be distinguished, must be denied in the first part, and must be denied if it is understood of greater perfection in the genus of object; otherwise, however, in the being of the thing. Because the divine essence, insofar as it contains grace, is more perfect in the being of the thing than insofar as it contains a very perfect intellectual creature, such as the most perfect Angel, but not in the being of the object, because it does not require to be known with such a light as that with which it contains this one, as that with which it contains that one, since the former is more manifest in the divine essence than the latter: because, the divine nature being known as it is in itself, it is easier to deduce that it is communicable in the precise mode in which it appears there, namely, by the manner of a root of seeing God, than to deduce that it is communicable in other ways. As when the Trinity and the infinity of persons have been seen, it is easy to deduce the mystery of the Incarnation, which consists in this, that one divine person terminates an alien nature. Whence the second part of the lesser must be denied, and likewise also its consequent, as is clear from what has been said.

88 Nor does it matter either if, against this solution, you press that it follows from it that the ant is more latent in God than an intellectual creature, for example man, and consequently that a greater light is required for it than for him to be seen in God. The sequel is clear. Because it has a greater conformity with God according to those things which are seen formally in Him, namely according to its intellectual nature; and the reason on account of which grace is less latent is that it has a greater likeness to God.

It is answered by denying the sequel. Because grace is not less latent on account of its having some likeness to God, but on account of its having a likeness in some predicate which is in it in the same way in which it is in God as He is in Himself, namely in the power of understanding Himself as He is in Himself: as also other supernatural accidents are less latent in God because, in the manner indicated in dist. 3, dub. 2, § 4 and 5, they participate in something proper to God as He is in Himself. Whence any other likeness does not render the object less latent in God, but according to the rule given in n. 78, namely according as the aforesaid object is more or less perfect, both as to essence and as to mode of existence, it is more or less latent in the divine essence.

89 Nor afterwards does it matter if, against the aforesaid solution, you press that, grace being known, an intellectual creature must be known, and consequently an intellectual creature, which is going to produce it: and so such a creature will not be more hidden than the ant. It is answered, that in the last resort one is convinced that an intellectual creature is to be known as to its obediential potency, which is also supernatural, through which it concurs; and although from this the knowledge of natural potency can be deduced, there is nevertheless some greater difficulty in this: and therefore it is more latent. Add only, that as to whether it is, it can be known from the force of that alone, and precisely of the knowledge of the obediential potency the natural potency, as being that with which it has some connection, and consequently as a terminus, but not quidditatively, and in the same manner as grace; and then it is adduced by reason only of the natural, intellective potency, so to speak.

90 Nor again does it matter if, secondly and principally, you object against the things said in the aforesaid solution in answer to that last argument proposed at the beginning of this Difficulty, that in order for God to contain man it is not necessary that He contain the ant and other creatures which are less perfect as to essence and mode of existence: therefore, in order to lead to the knowledge of man, it is not necessary that He lead to the knowledge of the ant and of the aforesaid creatures. The consequence is clear. First, because He leads by reason of the fact that He contains: therefore, if in order to contain man it is not necessary that He contain the ant, neither will it be necessary in order to lead to the knowledge of man that He lead to the knowledge of the ant. Then too: because the matter stands thus with respect to being as with respect to being known: therefore, those things which are not necessarily connected as to being are not so as to being known either. But the antecedent is proved. Because even if the ant and the other less perfect creatures were implied by man, and consequently if the aforesaid creatures were not contained in God, yet man would not thereby be implied, nor would he cease to be contained in the divine essence and omnipotence.

91 For it must be answered that, even if the antecedent be conceded, the consequence must be denied. And to the first proof, the antecedent having been conceded, the consequence must also be denied. Because although the divine essence, when first seen, may lead to the knowledge of the aforesaid creatures less noble than man, because it contains them, and precisely by the fact that it contains them may lead to their knowledge, so often as man, contained in that same divine essence, is seen in God, and likewise although it is not necessary on the part of the effects that, in order that God contain man, He should contain, for example, the ant, and consequently that man's existence in God should not depend on the fact that the ant is contained in Him, nevertheless, the fact that man is seen in the divine essence can depend on the fact that the same ant, precisely because it is contained in God, must also be seen in Him.

And the reason of the disparity is drawn from the essential subordination which is between the grades of intensity in the light of glory required to see man in the divine essence and those required to see the ant: and from the defect (so to speak) of the subordination, still merely virtual, between the containment by which God contains that same man and the ant, and by which they are contained by Him. For the grade of intensity of the light of glory, for example as five, required to see man in God, and the grade of intensity, for example as two, for beholding the ant in Him, are essentially subordinated by the force of their own line: so that the grade of as five precontains the grade of as two, and a vision of as five of the divine essence precontains in its way a vision of as two of that same essence, and God as visible in a manner of as five holds in the reason of the object in some way Himself as He is visible in a manner of as two: and therefore the blessed man cannot see God through a light and a vision of as five without seeing Him through a light and a vision of as two, found there in a certain eminent way: as there cannot be given a heat and a heating of as five unless there be found there in a certain eminent way a heat and a heating of as two: and therefore a man who asks for a light of as five, for example, in order to be seen in God, cannot avoid being seen in Him at the same time the ant, which demands a light of as two.

Moreover, the containment by which God contains the ant is not yet virtually, excluding imperfections, subordinated to the containment by which He contains man. Because, although the ant were implied, it would not be necessary through the intrinsic place at least that man be implied, and conversely: yet if a light of as two were implied, a light of as five would be implied. Because, although man ought not to prehave the perfection of the ant, yet a light of as five cannot fail to contain eminently the perfection of a light of as two, accomplishing that which the aforesaid light of as two would accomplish. By which the second proof is clear.

92 Secondly, it is answered that, although it is not necessary that a more perfect creature be contained virtually, and eminently less perfect creatures, nevertheless the divine essence, which precontains all of them, must precontain less perfect creatures, in order that it precontain superior ones. And the reason is this. Because creatures of different species surpass one another in essential perfection, and for this excess it is not necessary that one precontain the perfection of the other, but it is enough that it have another, better perfection, which surpasses the perfection of the less noble creature. Moreover, the divine essence and omnipotence, because of their eminence, must precontain all the perfections of all creatures; in such a way indeed that they require a greater, and (so to speak) more intense perfection, the more perfect the creatures are: and consequently in order to contain a perfect creature of as five they demand a perfection, or intensity, for example of as five. Wherefore, since a perfection of as five cannot be connaturally given in one who has at the same time a perfection of as three, unless he has first that same perfection of as three, it follows that the divine essence and omnipotence, containing all the perfection of all the creatures, and consequently the effective power of the same, cannot contain more perfect creatures unless they first, in our manner of conceiving, contain less perfect ones. And this can be explained by the example of the grades of intensity in the opinion of those who say that intensity comes about by the addition of grade to grade, and that these grades are heterogeneous: so that a grade of heat of as eight does not precontain a grade of heat of as six. For according to this manner of speaking, it is enough for a heat of as eight that it declare a nobler grade, even though such a grade may not connaturally be found anywhere, or in one who has all the grades, unless that very subject which is hot to a degree of eight has first other heterogeneous grades of heat of as six or as five, etc. So, therefore, in the present case, due proportion being preserved, we must philosophize.

93 Nor let anything stand in the way, if, thirdly and principally, you object that if, a more noble creature being known, both as to essence and as to mode of existence together, creatures which are less perfect as to both must be known; whence it would follow that, grace and the supernatural accidents having been known, all the possible accidents of the natural order would be known, and consequently all possible substances to which such accidents are connatural: yet this ought not to be admitted, lest any blessed person who sees grace and the other supernatural accidents in God should also see in Him all possible creatures. The sequel as regards the first part seems clear. Because grace and the supernatural accidents are more perfect as to essence than the other accidents of the natural order, as is evident from itself, and they are not less perfect as to mode of existence, but rather more perfect, since although they have their mode of existence in another, as do the other natural accidents, nevertheless such a mode of existence is of the divine order. As regards the second part, however, the same sequel seems certain. Because a light which suffices to see in God the natural accidents which are connatural to some substance suffices to see in Him that same substance. And therefore a light which suffices to behold in God the properties of the essence of man will also suffice to behold in Him the aforesaid essence: therefore, if, grace and the other supernatural accidents having been seen, all the natural accidents must be seen, as is clear from the proof of the first part of this consequence, the consequence will be that all created and creatable substances, to which the aforesaid accidents are connatural, must also be seen,

94 It must be answered, then, by denying the sequel as regards both parts. And in answer to the proof of the first, on which the proof of the second depends, it must be said that that rule which we have adduced, namely, that a blessed person who sees in God creatures more perfect as to essence and mode of existence together will also see creatures less noble as to both, must be understood of more perfect creatures which express some complete nature: so that they not only bring a quantity of power and of proximate efficacy with respect to some operation, but also give to themselves an essential commensurability with respect to the aforesaid operation. Wherefore, since grace and the other supernatural accidents do not express some complete nature, but only a quantity of power and of proximate efficacy — the former indeed by the manner of a root with respect to seeing God, the latter by the manner of a disposition of that same order, leading and disposing in some way to that same vision and grace — it follows that, grace and the other supernatural accidents having been seen, all the other natural accidents must not be seen. The reason, however, on account of which that rule must be understood of integral and complete natures, which of themselves express both an essential commensurability and a quantity of power with respect to their proper operations, and not of accidents which import only a quantity of power with respect to seeing God, or with respect to some supernatural effect in some way leading to or disposing toward this, has already been touched upon in this same Difficulty, when we said that grace and the other supernatural accidents, having something after the manner of a property, or of a quasi-property, with respect to that, have by reason of their special condition that they are less latent in the divine essence. Wherefore, since all these things, because of their own peculiar reason too, express only a quantity of power and of proximate efficacy with respect to the effects already stated, and do not express a quantity of power and an essential commensurability together, and consequently that sanctifying grace brings a quantity of power and of proximate efficacy by the manner of a root with respect to that same vision; and the light of glory imports a quantity of the power of proximate potency for beholding God — it follows that the rule already stated must not be understood of those creatures of the supernatural order which express only a quantity of power, for example with respect to seeing God, but of integral and complete natures which of themselves and by their own proper characteristics express both an essential commensurability and a quantity of power with respect to their proper operations.

95 From which also another objection, which could be made here, remains solved, namely, that all possible creatures are less perfect than sanctifying grace as to essence, and moreover, considered according to their own essence, they abstract from a substantial, or accidental, mode of existence, and so can have an accidental mode of existence in the intelligible species through which they are represented: therefore, grace having been seen in God, the essences of other possible creatures would be seen, either in themselves, or at least as having being in their intelligible species, in which their proper nature is, but under another, accidental, mode of existence, as we shall say in the Treatise on the Knowledge of God, dist. 2, dub. 2.

From what has been said, therefore, this objection remains solved: namely, if a comparison is made between the integral and total nature of possible creatures, and between accidents which express only the quantity of power already explained. To these it may also be added that it is enough that the essences of creatures without end, possible and, for example, substantial, do not abstract from the natural and entitative mode of existing in themselves, and from the mode of existing in another which they have in their accidental species representing them, and which does not transcend their perfection, so that they are not necessarily seen in God simply because their essences, which do not abstract from those two modes of existing in themselves and in another, are beheld in it: and so, grace created and sanctifying having been seen, which under the concept of created grace does not abstract from the mode of existing substantially in itself and in another, but must necessarily be an accident, it is not necessary that other creatures without end, possible, be seen.

Conclusion.

Creatures seen in the divine essence are not seen through any created species, but through the divine essence itself united under the reason of an intelligible species.

Concerning this conclusion, let what we said in art. 2 and 8 of this question be seen.

The conclusion is affirmative.

Against it, however, several things are usually brought forward, to prove that it is impossible that infinite things should be understood at the same time and distinctly; and consequently that the blessed should see at the same time all the things which they see in God: because these things can be infinite. Nevertheless, all these things remain solved by what we said in art. 8.

Conclusion.

God cannot be seen by essence by a pure man, unless he be separated from this mortal life. The assertion is understood, however, according to the ordinary law of God, that is, without a miracle, by which the intellect of a man living in this life is elevated so that, independently of the senses, it can understand, as is clear from what D. Thom. teaches in the solution to the second.

It was, however, deliberately said in the conclusion, by a pure man, in order that the Lord Christ be excepted, who, precisely because by reason of the union He was about to claim to be a comprehensor, was able, without any new miracle, to understand even by an intellection of the natural order, without conversion to phantasms, as can be seen in D. Thom., 3. Part, q. 11, art. 2.

Whether this miracle was in fact done in certain others, so that they were raised up even to the vision of the divine essence, is not now to be disputed: first, because neither side conflicts with the conclusion of this article; and also because as regards what Moses did in this matter, D. Thom., 2-2, q. 174, art. 4, and as regards Paul, q. 145, art. 3. It is established, however, that it is only with respect to Moses and Paul that there is this special difficulty among the Theologians.

Concerning that which is found with the Holy Doctor in the proof of this conclusion, namely, that in dreams, and when a person is alienated from the senses, he will perceive divine revelations more readily, let Caietanus be consulted, who explains this well, saying that it must be understood of sleep, in which the internal senses remain unbound, and of the revelations as regards their reception: for this is done the better the less distraction the mind has about sensible things; but not as regards the judgment about the things revealed: because, since this can help much, the resolution of the agreement with the external senses.

It must be noted, however, that when a person is alienated from the senses by divine power, whether only the external senses, or also the internal ones at the same time by means of ecstasy or rapture, the judgment about the things revealed is not usually impeded by reason of the fact that, just as the mind is alienated from the senses by divine power so as to be made more apt to receive supernatural illuminations, so likewise it is usually elevated so that it can elicit the most perfect judgment without needing that resolution to the external senses. See D. Thom., 2-2, q. 173, art. 3, saying that the mind alienated from the senses is elevated for contemplating more sublime things: where by the act of contemplating he understands judgment: and therefore this judgment cannot, on account of its imperfection, be insufficient for this, namely so that the will remain free with the freedom required for merit, as D. Thom. teaches in the same place, concerning which Caietanus may also be consulted in the same place.

Conclusion.

God, as He is in Himself, that is, quidditatively, cannot be known by natural reason; but He is well known as to whether He is, and as to those things which necessarily pertain to Him, such as that He is the first cause of all things, that He contains all creatures, that He differs from all of them, and that He is more excellent than they are, etc.

The conclusion is affirmative.

Whether this knowledge ought to be more excellent as regards the intentional species; or only as regards the light, and the other things pertaining to this manner of excess, is usually explained elsewhere: and therefore we deliberately omit it here.