Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

Although the decision of this difficulty consists of what we said in the preceding difficulty, nevertheless, since Gabriel Vazquez and some others advance, as regards this point, arguments worthy of solution and refutation, we shall examine the present difficulty point by point, so that the doctrine of St. Thomas may remain more fully elucidated.

Now that particle ex vi visionis divinae essentiae introduced in the title is not taken radically, so as to yield this sense, namely, that from the vision of the aforesaid essence there arises another knowledge, through which these effects are attained, whether that knowledge is given through divine revelation or through the proper species of such effects; but it is taken formally, such that the vision of the essence itself is also the vision of the aforesaid effects, not indeed accidentally, and through something competing with it beyond its proper line, but by reason of its own perfection, that is, of what belongs to it within its own line.

§ I. Opinion denying this.

49 They defend the denying part, at least with regard to future and present effects, Durand, in 3. distinc. 14. quaest. 2. num. 4, and in 4. dist. 49. quaest. 3. num. 15 and the following, and with him Molina, art. 8 of the present question, disput. 5. num. 2. And with regard to those same effects, and even the past effects, they hold the same opinion: Gabriel, in 3. dist. 14. quaest. 1. art. 1. notabili 3. Maior quaest. 3, and Vazquez, tom. 3, in 1. part. disp. 50.

It is proved, first. For the aforesaid effects are represented freely in the divine essence: therefore they cannot be seen from the force of the vision of the divine essence. The antecedent is evident. Because they are represented in the way in which they are contained; but they are contained in the divine essence freely, that is, by the free determination of the divine will: therefore they will also be represented freely. The consequence, however, is proved. Because those things which are seen from the force of the vision of the divine essence, or from the force of its own perfection, must necessarily be seen, and necessarily represented: from the fact that, just as the proper perfection of the vision belongs to it necessarily, so too it sees all those things which it can attain by the force of its proper perfection.

50 Second. For otherwise, the aforesaid effects would also be seen from the force of the vision of the divine essence, as possible: but this destroys the nature of the beatific vision: therefore, etc. The consequence seems certain from the parity of reason. The minor, however, is proved. For then the aforesaid vision would be one vision, and would not be the same according to its species: it would indeed be such as is supposed, but it would not be so, because it would terminate toward future things, and possible things, under a formally diverse reason: toward those indeed insofar as they are contained in the free decree; toward these, however, insofar as they are foreknown precisely in omnipotency, antecedently to the decrees.

It is confirmed. For if both future things and possible things were seen from the force of the vision, then this same vision would be intuitive, and would not be abstractive, and so would not be one and the same. The first consequence is evident. Because it would terminate, both toward things as existing and present in eternity, namely, toward future things; and also toward things abstracted from the aforesaid existence and presentiality, namely, toward possible things as such. From this also the second consequence follows. For then the vision would be one, as we suppose, since indeed, by the force of the perfection that belongs to it within its own proper line, it would attain both; and yet at the same time it would not be one, because intuitive knowledge and abstractive knowledge adequately divide knowledge, just as rational and irrational adequately divide an animal: from the fact that all knowledge must terminate either toward a thing as present, and hence intuitively, or as absent, or abstracted from presentiality, and consequently abstractively: therefore, just as for that reason the same animal cannot be at once rational and irrational, so the same vision cannot be at once intuitive and abstractive.

§ II. The first assertion, in favor of the opinion of St. Thomas, is established.

51 Nevertheless, it must be said first that effects existing in some difference of time can very well be seen from the force of the vision of the divine essence, and consequently formally through it. Thus the holy Doctor, 3. cont. Gent. cap. 59, where he says: By the vision itself of the divine essence the blessed naturally know the species, and by the knowledge of the species the individuals existing under them. And art. 8 of this question, where, speaking of those things which are seen through the vision of the divine essence, he teaches: But by so much does anyone know more things that God does or can do, as he sees God more perfectly. Now the holy Doctor clearly understands by those things which God does, effects existing in some difference of time: for he distinguishes them from things that are precisely possible. And in 3. part. quaest. 10. art. 2. ad secundum, speaking of those things which the soul of Christ knows in the Word, or (which is the same thing) from the force of the vision of the divine essence, about which that argument had been proposed, he says: The soul of Christ therefore knows all things that God knows in Himself through the science of vision: but not all things that God knows in Himself through the science of simple intelligence. Which he also teaches in 2. 2. quaest. 83. artic. 4. ad secundum. Hence the holy Doctor is commonly followed by his disciples, Capreolus in 4. dist. 49. quest. 6. art. 3, in his solution of the arguments of Durand against the first conclusion, and of the arguments of Aureolus against the second, Soto quest. 3. art. 3, Ferrara 3. contra Gent. cap. 59. § circa praedicta, Caietanus in this article, if the explanation of the title is compared with the explanation of the conclusion, and 3. part. quest. 10. art. 2 and the passage cited from 2. 2., Bannez, Zumel, Nazarius, Ripa, Zanardus, Gonzalez in the present question, and, from others, almost all the more recent theologians.

52 Now the fundamental reason of this assertion was touched by St. Thomas in art. 8 of this question and art. 6 of quaest. 14, which can be reduced to this form. For the divine essence, as determined by the free decree of its will, can be the reason, by way of an object first known, and consequently by way of an intelligible species, for knowing creatures existing in some difference of time: therefore they will be able to be seen from the force of the vision of that same essence. The consequence is evident. For from the force of the vision of some essence those things can be seen with respect to which the aforesaid essence can bear the reason of a species and of an object first known, leading on to the knowledge of them. The antecedent, however, is proved. For a cause containing some effect, and possessing sufficient immateriality and union with the intellect, can bear the reason of an intelligible species and of an object first known, leading on to the knowledge of the effects that it contains; and therefore the essence of an Angel is united in this way with its own intellect with respect to the knowledge of the effects that are foreknown in it by nature: but the divine essence, determined by the free decrees of its will, contains by way of cause all effects existing in some difference of time, and possesses infinite immateriality and the most intimate union with the blessed intellect: therefore it will be able to be united with it by way of a species and of an object first known with respect to the vision of those same things.

53 It is confirmed by the reason which the same holy Doctor hints at, and which we have touched upon above. Because God, from the force of the vision of his proper essence, as determined by his free decrees, sees future effects in some difference of time: therefore the blessed man will also be able to see those same effects from the force of the vision of that same essence, determined in the same way. The consequence seems clear from what we said in the preceding difficulty concerning this reason. The antecedent, however, is proved. Because God sees no created effect outside himself, that is, through a species distinct from his proper essence, but beholds them all in that essence itself, as in something in which they are foreknown: but the aforesaid effects are contained in the divine essence, not in just any way, but determined by the decrees of its will: therefore, from the force of the vision of his essence, as determined by such decrees, he will attain them.

54 Vazquez, tom. 1, in 1. part. disp. 50. cap. 3. num. 24, objects, denying that the divine essence can lead on to the knowledge of created effects as a cause and as an object first known; and thus that not even God can behold the aforesaid effects in his essence, as in a cause and as an object first known; but that he attains them in his essence, as in knowledge. For, as he himself explains, disp. 60. cap. 2 and 3, essential knowledge in God is the divine essence itself according to the thing, which with our mode of conceiving has the reason of an impressed species, of the act of the first expressed species, or of the Word, and of the act of the second; and with this respect toward all things that are known by God, whether they be God himself or creatures: and therefore the divine essence serves only for the knowledge of itself and of others, by whichever of these modes, but not by way of cause or of an object first known.

But against this. For in the first place, according to this solution, the proof hinted at by us is not sufficiently met, namely, this very point, that the cause, as eminently containing some effect, and so able to produce it, and determined toward its production, ought by the force of that knowledge to attain such an effect: since it is contrary that the cause should be known as containing, for example, sanctifying grace, and that the same grace should not be known. Therefore, since God and the blessed can know the divine essence as eminently containing grace, and as determined toward its production, then both because of what has been said and because this whole thing belongs to the essence according as it is in itself, by which reason it is the beatific object, it follows that by the force of the knowledge of the divine essence, and in the way stated, the aforesaid effect can be known by God and by the blessed.

55 Next. For this solution is openly against St. Thomas in the passage cited, from quaest. 14, where he shows that God knows all creatures by his proper knowledge, or according to those things which belong to each one, insofar as it differs from the others, because in this way they would be eminently contained in the divine essence; and therefore he does not perfectly attain his proper essence unless he attains creatures in this way; but this reason necessarily involves God's knowing creatures in his essence, as in a cause and as an object first known: therefore, etc. The minor is proved. For to know creatures by their proper knowledge, from the fact that the proper things of those creatures are eminently contained in the divine essence, necessarily involves knowing them in the aforesaid essence, as in something eminently containing them, and consequently in that same essence, as in a cause, because it does not contain them eminently otherwise than by way of cause, and consequently it necessarily also involves knowing them in that same essence, and as an object first known: because a cause leads on to the knowledge of its effects only as an object first known, as is inductively evident in all causes: therefore, that creatures are known in the divine essence from the fact that they are eminently contained in that same essence necessarily imports the knowledge of them in that same essence, as in a cause and as an object first known.

56 Finally. For the divine essence does not bear the relation of a species with respect to the knowledge of creatures unless insofar as it is their cause: therefore neither can it lead on to the knowledge of them unless by way of cause and of an object first known. The consequence is evident. For a species serves toward the knowledge of some object in the way in which it contains and represents that object: therefore, if the divine essence bears the relation of a species only by way of cause with respect to creatures, it will not be able to lead on to the knowledge of them unless by way of cause, and consequently unless by way of an object first known: since, as we said above, a cause as such does not lead on to the knowledge of an effect unless as an object first known. The antecedent, however, is proved. For the divine essence cannot bear the reason of a species with respect to creatures in the way in which created species represent their objects, otherwise it would be ordained by its very nature to represent them, and in this its nature would consist: just as created species, which precisely because they do not represent their objects by way of cause do not eminently contain them, have nothing else for their being beyond this, namely, to be ordained to represent them.

57 From this there also follows a greater refutation of what is said in this solution, namely, that creatures cannot be known in the divine essence except as in knowledge, or in an expressed species, but not as in an object first known. For an expressed species that is adequate to an impressed species represents no otherwise than the impressed species does; since the prior and most powerful reason determining, in our mode of understanding, the intellection and the mode of intellection, and also the expressed species, must be the impressed species: therefore, if the divine essence, as it bears the reason of an intelligible species, does not represent itself and creatures equally immediately, but represents itself as a cause and as the primary object, and consequently as prior to be known, and represents creatures as effects, and consequently as the secondary object to be known: it follows that the knowledge and the expressed species do not terminate toward that same essence and toward creatures except under this very same order, such that they terminate toward the essence as toward a cause and an object first known; but toward creatures as toward effects and as secondary objects known by the force of the knowledge of the primary object.

58 From this also there remains solved a certain objection brought by a younger man, namely, that if future effects in some difference of time could be known from the force of the knowledge of the essence, and consequently the divine essence would bear the reason of an intelligible species with respect to them, they would not be known in the way in which we have spoken in this assertion, namely, by knowing the divine essence and the free determination of its will, by which it is determined toward their production: therefore, etc. The antecedent is proved. For the divine essence, as it bears the reason of an intelligible species, together with the existence of the aforesaid effects in their difference of time, would suffice for their knowledge, without the determination of the free will of God being seen; just as, for Angels to see things outside the Word, and through their proper species, effects existing, it suffices that they have representative species of those effects, and that such effects exist, without their knowing the determination of their cause: for those very species, which represent beforehand the aforesaid effects precisely as to their proper essentials, have by their own eminence the power to represent those same things as existing, as the Thomists commonly teach.

59 For it will be answered by denying the antecedent. And with respect to the proof, the antecedent must also be denied. Now the reason of the disparity between Angelic knowledge outside the Word and the beatific vision is this. Because the Angelic species, which they then use with respect to that knowledge, do not represent by way of cause future effects existing in some difference of time eminently contained: and so, for knowing them by the force of the knowledge elicited through the aforesaid species, it is not necessary that that which bears the reason of a species with respect to the knowledge of them be first attained by way of a cause determined toward such effects. Moreover, the divine essence does not bear the relation of an intelligible species with respect to such effects except by way of cause, and of a cause determined with respect to the production of those effects: and so unless the aforesaid essence is known as a determined cause, and consequently together with the free decrees by which it is determined, it cannot lead on to the knowledge of them. Hence, whenever certain effects are known by an Angel through knowledge outside the Word, and not in just any way, but through something that bears the relation of a species with respect to them by way of cause, and consequently by way of an object prior to be known, they cannot be known unless the cause and its determination with respect to the production of those same effects be known beforehand.

60 Nor does it matter if you press the point that this mode of representing cannot cohere with the divine essence. For since, considered in itself, it is infinite in every genus, it will not need anything else for representing the effects existing in some difference of time.

So then, this makes no difference. Both because the free determination of the divine will, insofar as it is free, does not add any perfection, even one virtually distinct, above the other perfections necessary to God, as many hold very probably, and as we shall say in tract. de voluntate Dei, art. 3, dub. 8. And also because the free determination is not required in order to give the divine essence, as it bears the reason of an intelligible species, a representative power, but in order to determine, without however any imperfection, the power of representing that it has. For, since effects are representable either according to the being of the exercise of existence in some difference of time, or with the positive exclusion of such exercise, according to all the differences of time, and both cannot be represented at once, as is evident, there must be given something by reason of which the aforesaid effects have, determinately, either the exercise aforesaid or the exclusion of such exercise; and consequently that it determines the divine essence so that it represents rather the exercise of their existence than non-existence; and since this is nothing other than the free determination of the divine will, from which effects have it that they are future or not future, it follows that the aforesaid determination is required in order that that infinite representative force, which is in the divine essence, be determined toward the representation of the aforesaid exercise rather than of non-exercise. Hence, just as in divine power this determination does not take away its infinite force with respect to the reason of power, so neither does it take away from the divine essence the infinite force of representing that belongs to it with respect to the reason of a species.

§ III. The second assertion, for the elucidation of the opinion of the Angelic Doctor, is established.

61 It must be said, second, that although effects existing in some difference of time can be seen from the force of the vision of the divine essence, in the way explained, nevertheless it is not necessary that they be seen in this way, whether in particular or in general; but the divine essence can be seen without the aforesaid effects being seen, taken according to either of the two reasons. This assertion is common among the theologians, and so it will not be necessary to cite anyone in particular for it; and it follows clearly from what has been said, both in this difficulty and in the preceding one. Because these effects cannot be seen from the force of the vision of the divine essence without the free determinations of its will being seen; but it is not necessary that, the divine essence being seen, these free determinations be seen, whether in general or in particular: therefore neither will it be necessary that the aforesaid effects be seen, either in general or in particular. The major, with its consequence, is sufficiently constant. The minor, however, is proved and explained. For although every blessed man must see that God necessarily has with respect to every possible creature some decree taken in a vague way, by which he determines it to fore or non fore, because by reason of the actuality of the divine will he cannot remain undecided concerning the future existence or non-existence of creatures, as we shall say in tract. de voluntate Dei disp. 5, dub. 3; nevertheless it is not necessary that through the vision of the divine essence it be seen determinately either that God determinately wills the future existence of this creature rather than its non-existence, or that God has, with respect to certain creatures, a decree of their future existence rather than of their non-existence, from the fact that the free determinations of the divine will taken in this way are formally free, and consequently are an object hidden in itself, as follows from what was said in the preceding difficulty: therefore, for the vision of the divine essence, it will not be necessary that the aforesaid determinations of the divine will be seen, whether in general and in the way explained, or in particular. The consequence is evident. Because by the fact that it is not necessary that the aforesaid determinations be seen, whether in general or in particular, we understand nothing else than that it is not necessary to see determinately that God wills the future existence of this creature in particular, rather than its non-existence, which is to know the free decrees of God in particular; or that with respect to certain creatures (whatever they may be) God rather has a decree of their future existence than of their non-existence, which is to know those same decrees, not as peculiarly applied to some creature in particular, but taken vaguely or in general.

62 It is confirmed. For it is not necessary, and indispensable, that all effects existing in some difference of time be seen from the force of the vision of the divine essence: therefore neither is it necessary that any one of them be seen from the force of that same vision, whether taken in general or in particular. The consequence is evident. For with respect to the aforesaid necessity of seeing future effects, and consequently of the free decrees, the reason is the same for all and for each one, from the fact that the indispensable necessity of seeing all can arise only from the fact that the free decrees of God, from whose vision they are seen, are formally in God, and so must necessarily be seen from the force of the vision of the divine essence: but this reason, as is evident, proceeds equally both with respect to one of the divine decrees and with respect to all of them: therefore, etc. The antecedent, however, is proved. Both because of the day of judgment it is said, Matthew 24: But of that day and hour no one knows, not even the Angels of heaven, except the Father only. And Mark 13: But of that day or hour no one knows, not even the Angels in heaven, nor the Son, but the Father. Since in both places mention is made of the blessed Angels, it follows that the aforesaid effect is sufficiently signified to be unknown to the blessed. And also because, as the holy Thomas teaches, 3. part. quaest. 10, Christ the Lord alone beholds all future effects from the force of the vision: therefore it is not necessary that this be attributed to every blessed man.

63 Nor does it matter if you object to this confirmation, that the prior proof of the antecedent does not seem to have any force for confirming that, since in the aforesaid testimony taken from cap. 13 of Mark it is asserted that not even the Son knows that day of judgment: but with respect to the Son, according to the common interpretation of the Fathers, it is said only that he does not know it, because he does not know it so as to reveal it to others: therefore in the same way, and not in another, will the blessed Angels be ignorant of it. The consequence is evident: because it is said in the same way that the Son and the blessed Angels do not know the aforesaid day.

64 So then, this makes no difference. For although Scripture uses the same mode of speaking, taken materially, to deny the Son the knowledge of that day from the force of the vision of the divine essence, and to deny it to the blessed Angels, nevertheless not formally in the same way. For when it denies Christ the vision of that day, it speaks of the vision with a view to telling it and revealing it to another; but when it denies it to the Angels, it denies it to them absolutely and simply.

And the reason is evident. Both because, according to the rule handed down by Augustine and received by all theologians, the words of Scripture are to be understood in their proper sense, unless something absurd follows from it. Therefore, since from the fact that the words of Mark are understood with respect to the Son as being absolutely and simply ignorant, or as ignorant by the force of the vision, there follows a great absurdity, as is evident from the thing itself and from what has been said, it follows that with respect to the Son they are not to be understood in the proper sense, but according to the explanation given, because the Fathers commonly hand it down. But from the fact that the aforesaid words are understood with respect to the Angels in their proper sense, and consequently in them there is denoted that the blessed Angels are absolutely and simply ignorant of the day of judgment, and consequently do not know it even by the force of the vision, no absurdity follows, since nothing is inferred from it either against faith or against natural reason, and thus with respect to them they must be understood in the proper sense.

65 And also because, when the Fathers expound the aforesaid words, they suppose as certain that the Angels absolutely and simply ignore that day, and they only explain, in the way already stated, how the Son is ignorant of it. Thus Chrysostom, in cap. 24 of Matthew, hom. 78, and in the incomplete work, hom. 50; Cyril, lib. 1, de recta fide ad Reginas, two leaves after the beginning; Athanasius, sermon 4 contra Arianos, near the middle, and in the letter to Amphilochius at the beginning; Theophylus and Euthymius, on the words cited above of Matthew; Augustine, lib. 1, de Genesi contra Manich. c. 22, and lib. 1, de Trinitate c. 12; Jerome, in his exposition of that same testimony in Matthew and in Mark; and Gregory, lib. 8 registi epist. 42. ad Eulogium, citing the explanation of Augustine, thus says: And hence the Father alone is said to know, because the Son, consubstantial with him, has that nature by which he is above all the Angels, and has that which the Angels do not know.

§ IV. Unravelling of the arguments of the first opinion.

66 To the first argument, the antecedent being granted in the sense explained, the consequence must be denied. And with respect to the proof, the antecedent must also be denied. Hence, just as the divine will from the force of its proper perfection wills creatures, and nevertheless wills them freely, notwithstanding that that perfection as such is necessarily found in God, so the blessed man will be able, from the force of the necessary perfection of his vision, to see future creatures, although he need not necessarily see them. And the reason is the same in both cases. For indeed, neither is the divine will specified by the creatures willed, nor is it necessarily connected with them, nor is the beatific vision specified by the aforesaid effects, nor does it have a necessary connection with them: although by reason of its own eminence, and with the manifestation placed on the part of the free determination of God, it can terminate toward them, as was explained above.

67 To the second argument, the consequence must be granted and the minor denied. And with respect to the proof, it must be said that although possible creatures may be seen in omnipotency, and future creatures in that same omnipotency, as determined by the free decrees, nevertheless they would still be seen under the same most formal reason, because the most formal reason of seeing is always something divine containing the aforesaid effects.

To the confirmation, the first consequence must be granted and the second denied. And with respect to the proof, it must be said that although we grant that the reason of intuitive knowledge adequately divides knowledge, or cognition, so that one and the same knowledge of the lower kind cannot have both reasons at once; nevertheless this should not be admitted of the knowledge of the superior and eminent condition: for this, by reason of its own eminence, can formally be at once eminently intuitive and abstractive with respect to diverse objects, as occurs in the present case, and thus the knowledge by which God understands, as it terminates toward the divine essence, is intuitive, and as it terminates toward possible creatures, is abstractive, as the theologians commonly teach.

Nor does the example brought in the argument stand in the way. For to be irrational on account of its own imperfection cannot be united and formally contained in one and the same thing eminently at once with the rational, but one of the two means the exclusion of the other, as is evident from itself.