Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

30 The particle by force of the vision of the divine essence has purposely been added to the title, so that it may be denoted that what is treated of here is not a discourse on the vision of God's free acts by some other knowledge, but only by the vision of the blessed; so that that very vision which terminates in the divine essence should, by reason of its perfection, also terminate in the free decrees of the divine will.

§ I. The position of Durand and the others.

The negative part is defended by Durand, in 3. dist. 14. quaest. 2. num. 4. and 5., and in 4. dist. 49. quaest. 3. num. 12. and the following. Vazq. 1. p. disp. 50. cap. 3. num. 23. and Molina on this article, disp. 5. memb. 5. and 6. § ad primam, and § dicendum.

It is proved, first. For although the essence of man, for example, and his will, are known intuitively and quidditatively, indeed even comprehensively, nevertheless the free determinations of the aforesaid will are not for that reason known, or capable of being known, by force of this knowledge: hence, even though the divine essence and its will are seen quidditatively by the blessed, the free decrees of the divine will will not for that reason be seen by force of such a vision. The antecedent is commonly admitted by the theologians in the matter of the angels. There, by many testimonies of Scripture and of the saints, it is shown that although an angel comprehends the human will, he does not nevertheless on that account reach, or be able to reach, by force of such a knowledge, the free acts of that same will.

The consequence, however, is proved. Because the determination of the divine will towards the divine essence, in the reason of the object known, is such as the determination of the human will towards the human essence: hence, just as this is not knowable by force of the knowledge of the essence, so neither is that.

31 Secondly. For if the free decrees of God were seen, or could be seen, by force of the vision of the divine essence, then necessarily all of them would have to be seen by every blessed man: but this is against the common opinion of the theologians, both in the present matter, as the Gloss says. The major is evident. For that the divine decrees should be seen by force of the aforesaid vision could only arise from their being identified with the divine essence, as is established from what we said in the preceding difficulty: but the free decrees of God, either all of them or none of them, must be identified with the divine essence: hence, either none or all of them must be seen.

32 Thirdly, the free determination of the divine will adds nothing real beyond the necessary act, but only a relation of reason: hence it cannot be seen by force of the vision. The antecedent is evident. For if it added anything real, that thing would not be something necessary, otherwise it would not be something added beyond the same necessary act, nor would it be anything real and free, which therefore could be, and not be, in God; otherwise something real which is in God, and is God, could not be in him, and could not be God, which is indeed, as is established, absurd: and therefore that which is added will only be some relation of reason. The consequence, however, is proved. Because relations of reason are not known except by an intellect that fashions them, since their being consists in being fashioned and known: but through the beatific vision a thing is known such as it is, because it is known quidditatively and intuitively: hence no fiction can intervene there, as the means by which the aforesaid relations are reached.

33 Fourthly. For if the free decrees of God were seen, or could be seen, by force of the vision of the divine essence, it would follow that the vision would grow in perfection, from the fact that it was extended to them: but this is repugnant: hence, etc. The sequence seems certain. For the extension to some object, and not just any object, but a divine one, and of infinite purity, such as a free decree of God, could not fail to pour back some perfection into the vision. The minor, moreover, is established. For since the vision of God is a necessary act, it necessarily has all its perfection, independently of the free decree of God.

34 Lastly. Acts of this kind cannot be seen by the virtue of the light of glory, nor of the divine essence, under the reason of an intelligible species: hence in no way are they seen, or can be seen, by force of the vision of the essence. The consequence needs no proof: since nothing can be seen by force of the vision of the divine essence except by the virtue of the light of glory and of that same essence, as it influences under the mode of an intelligible species. The antecedent, however, is proved. First, because otherwise the aforesaid free acts would not be hidden per se with respect to an intellect having the light of glory and the divine essence united to it under the reason of an intelligible species; since each of the two operates under the mode of a necessary cause, and therefore unfolds in its corresponding vision the whole force it has for seeing those things which are in God: but this is false, and against the nature of a free act, which per se is hidden from everyone except the agent who elicits it. Then also: because otherwise, whoever saw any of these acts would have to see them all, as we said above. Since no reason can be given, neither on the part of the light nor on the part of the essence, why some of these acts rather than others should be beheld, when all the lights are of the same species, and the divine essence represents all of them equally.

35 It is confirmed. For if acts of this kind were seen by the virtue of the light of glory and of the divine essence united under the reason of an intelligible species, it could not be that he who is more blessed should not see the same, indeed more free acts, than he who is less blessed: but this is against the common opinion of the theologians: hence etc. The major is proved. For the more blessed would have a greater light, and the divine essence more perfectly united to him: hence, if the aforesaid acts were seen by the virtue of the light and of the essence, it could not be that the more blessed did not see them all, indeed more free acts, than the less blessed. The minor, however, is proved. For according to the commonly received doctrine, more of these acts are known by those blessed for whom more of the effects toward which the acts themselves terminate obtain. Since therefore it can happen that, on making a comparison between two unequally blessed men, more of the aforesaid effects belong to the less blessed man, from the fact that he had a more universal care in the militant Church, as though he had been the founder of some religious order, it will follow that the less blessed man will then have to know more of these free acts than the more blessed man.

§ II. The true opinion.

36 It must be said, however, first, that God's free acts can be seen immediately and in themselves by the blessed by force of the vision of the divine essence, or formally through the aforesaid vision. Thus D. Thom. 3. part. quaest. 10. art. 2. in corpore, and ad 2., and quaest. 8. de veritate art. 4. ad 1., whom the theologians commonly follow, excepting those whom we mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

The assertion is explained. For indeed the particle immediately and in themselves was purposely added to it, so that it might be denoted that the aforesaid acts, taken in the singular, cannot be seen by the blessed in the divine essence immediately, that is, as in a cause, and in an object previously known and penetrated, in the same manner as creatures can be seen in the divine essence, as in a cause, and in an object previously known and penetrated; but immediately and in themselves, as something of the aforesaid essence, in that proportionate manner in which attributes are reached by force of the beatific vision. For although in this they differ from free acts formally taken, in that they are reached in the essence, which was somehow seen before under the mode of the virtual root of those acts, yet the free acts, as such, are different; nevertheless the aforesaid attributes are seen, even immediately in themselves, as something of God: so that even if impossibly they were not reached in the essence, as in a root somehow seen beforehand, the beatific vision would nevertheless terminate in them, from the fact that they are something of God and formally exist in him. Whence the divine essence would concur only to the vision of the free acts, as such, under the mode of an intelligible species, and not at the same time as a cause which, being previously penetrated and known, leads to the knowledge of them under the mode of an object previously seen, such as that which. For it is certain that the free acts of God, taken in the singular, and insofar as they terminate in future creatures, cannot be seen in the divine essence, as in a cause, in the manner explained. Then, because almost all the arguments adduced in the preceding paragraph prove this. Then also: because, in order that anything should be seen by force of the vision of the essence, previously seen in the manner just explained, the same essence, as seen, must have a necessary connection with that which is thus to be seen; but that there is no such connection between the essence and the free acts, considered in the aforesaid manner, is altogether certain.

37 These things being supposed, the assertion is proved by a reason drawn from D. Thom. For God, through the vision by which he beholds himself, reaches his own free decrees of his will, as something belonging to himself: hence the blessed intellect too will be able through the beatific vision to see those same decrees immediately and in themselves, as something of God. The antecedent is evident. For since the aforesaid decrees are real with a divine reality, inasmuch as they are something of God, they will certainly be known immediately and in themselves by God himself, as something belonging to himself, and through the vision by which he beholds himself: as for this reason attributes and relations are seen in this way by God by force of the vision of his essence. The consequence, however, is proved. For since the vision of the blessed is a participation in the vision by which God beholds himself, it will be able to terminate in that very thing in which the uncreated vision terminates, provided that no infinity be desired with respect to it: it is established, however, that no infinity is desired with respect to this vision of the free acts of God, any more than with respect to the beholding of the essence of attributes or of relations, as is evident from what has been said.

38 It is confirmed. Because the intellectual light of one angel can reach the free acts of another, for example of Gabriel, as something of that other, provided Gabriel orders them to the first, since by that very fact they have whatever was lacking to them in order that they might be the proportionate object of the aforesaid light: hence the light of a created intellect, and therefore through the light of glory, and consequently through the created and beatific vision, will also be able to reach the free decrees of God, provided God orders them to the aforesaid intellect. The antecedent is commonly admitted by the theologians in the matter of the angels. The consequence, however, is proved. Because just as the intellectual light of an angel is of itself proportionate for seeing, in the manner explained, the free acts of another angel, from the fact that it has the same proportion towards the beholding of that angel's essence, so the light of glory, having of itself a proportion towards the beholding of God's essence as it is in itself, will also be proportionate for seeing, in the same manner, the decrees of the divine will, that is, if God orders them to an intellect filled with such a light.

39 It must be said, secondly, that no blessed man sees de facto, or is able to see, all the free decrees of God as they terminate in created effects in the singular: although each one sees by force of the vision those decrees which concern the effects pertaining to his own state. This assertion, as to its first part, is established from what we shall say in the treatise on the divine will, disp. 5. dub. 3.: where we shall show that the divine will could not have remained suspended as to whether any creature would be future or not future; and thus that it has decreed about all of them its being, or not being: and consequently that the divine decrees extend to all possible creatures, deciding as to future ones their future existence, and as to non-future ones a positive (so to speak) non-future existence. Since therefore the created light of glory cannot extend to all possible creatures, neither will it be able to extend to all the free decrees of God insofar as they terminate in them in the singular.

As to the second part, however, it is D. Thom. 3. part. quaest. 10. art. 2. and 3. cont. Gent. cap. 59., whom his disciples commonly follow, and almost all the theologians; and it is gathered from the Council of Sens, where it is held that the blessed see whatever concerns them.

40 The fundamental reason for this second part, however, is drawn from D. Thom. at the place cited. Because every blessed man naturally desires to know those things which pertain to his own state, as it appears from itself: but perfect beatitude fills by itself the natural and ordered desire of knowing which the blessed man has, otherwise it would not be perfect beatitude: hence every one of them will see through the beatific vision all future effects, or positively non-future effects, which pertain to his own state, and consequently the free decrees of God which concern them. This last consequence is evident. For through the beatific vision the aforesaid effects cannot be known except insofar as they have a connection with the divine essence: it is established, however, that the aforesaid effects, as to their future existence or non-future existence, have no connection with the divine essence except by reason of the decrees of his will.

§ III. The arguments of the negative part are met.

41 To the first it will be answered that the blessed do not see some free decrees of God, taken in the singular, by force of the vision of the essence, in the same manner in which they see possible creatures, that is, in the essence itself, as in a cause previously seen and penetrated, but indeed in that proportionate manner in which attributes and relations are beheld, as something of that same essence. For for their vision in the essence, as in a cause, a necessary connection of those acts with that same essence was required; but that this connection is not found, in the manner accepted just explained, between them and the divine essence, is certain. Moreover, for their vision immediately in themselves, and as something of God, it is enough that they are truly found in God, and that the divine will orders them to the intellect of the blessed man, as we said in the similar case of the free acts of an angel's will compared with the intellectual light of another angel.

42 To the second (in whose solution we shall linger somewhat, because not a little of this whole difficulty depends on its understanding) it must be said that from the identity of the free acts with the divine essence, it is inferred only that all of them are to be seen by the blessed as to their reality, but not that they terminate in the singular in all creatures, that is, certainly knowing in the singular which of them are future and which are not future, or reaching in general that some are future and some are not future; but only that all creatures (whatever they are) are future, or not future: just as from the fact that omnipotence is identified with the divine essence, it is inferred only that it is to be seen by every blessed man according to its reality, or according to everything positive that it posits in God, but not that possible creatures taken in the singular. We have said: certainly knowing in the singular which of them are future, or which are not future, or reaching in general that some are future and some not future, because, as we shall note in the treatise on the divine will, disp. 5. dub. 3., there is no will in God under the mode of potency, but under the mode of the purest act, and precisely on account of its most pure actuality it cannot remain suspended, but must necessarily terminate in creatures in one of these two ways, namely, by willing their future existence, or by not willing it; hence just as the blessed man, seeing omnipotence, knows it to terminate in the doable, so to speak, so the same blessed man, seeing the reality of the divine will, must see it to terminate in any given creature whatsoever, by willing its future existence, or by not willing it, or (which is the same for the present) by willing its non-future existence, but not by knowing in the singular which of them are future, or which are not future, as is evident from itself and from what has been said, nor by reaching that some are future and some are not future.

43 And the reason is this. For although the divine will has a necessary connection with one of these two terminations already described, taken vaguely and confusedly, it does not have one with any of them taken in the singular: and therefore, for beholding the aforesaid reality, it is enough to know that it terminates in creatures, by willing or not willing their future existence.

Whence (as we may say in passing) for this reason it is not necessary to know, even in general, future creatures, in order that the free acts of divine mercy terminate, for example, in such a way that that same mercy, under the mode of the purest act, may be seen according to its reality: because mercy terminates necessarily only with respect to its primary object, the divine goodness, insofar as this is the reason for relieving created misery; yet in the same treatise on the divine will, disp. 7. num. 63. and afterwards, explaining: and it has no necessary connection with any secondary termination in creatures, as we shall show there; but the very act which per se terminates first in the divine goodness can terminate, and not terminate, in creatures to be relieved of misery, and remain (if it pleases God) without any termination in them; or if the opposite pleases (as in fact it has pleased), remain with termination in them. What the aforesaid termination adds beyond the reality of the act of divine mercy, and how that same reality, connoting this creature rather than that one as an inadequate concomitant of itself, is said to terminate in it, and to be its will, and other things pertaining to this, we shall explain at length in the treatise on the divine will.

44 Add that although, for free acts to be seen immediately and in themselves by force of the vision of the divine essence, insofar as they connote this or that creature in the singular and terminate in it, it is required that they be identified with it; nevertheless in the aforesaid acts, considered in the manner explained, there is a special reason on account of which this is not sufficient: because at least by this reason and the other already explained, they are an object hidden per se, from the fact that every free act of any will of its own nature has being, at least with respect to its termination, an object hidden and disproportionate with respect to any intellect whatsoever, except with respect to the divine intellect and the intellect of that creature which elicits those acts: and therefore unless God orders through his will his free acts rather to the intellect of this blessed man than to that of another, the blessed man will not be able to behold them in the manner explained: not indeed from a defect of intensity of the light precisely, since the same or even a greater intensity of light can be given in another blessed man, and nevertheless those acts are not beheld, but from a defect of the aforesaid ordering towards his intellect.

We have said that free acts, at least with respect to their termination, are hidden per se, because in creatures, in which the entity of the free acts and their termination is free, the aforesaid acts must be free both according to their entity and according to their termination, and therefore hidden per se and in the manner explained, but not so in God: in whom such acts are necessary with respect to their reality, but not with respect to the terminations already explained, as we shall say at length in the treatise on the divine will: and therefore, with respect to their reality they are manifest per se with respect to an intellect seeing God, but not with respect to their termination in some particular creature, etc.

45 To the third it will be answered that it is one thing whether a free act is something real; but another thing whether it adds anything real, whether actually or only virtually, distinct from every necessary act of God. Hence, although a free act, by which God loves creatures with the love of charity, adds nothing virtually distinct from the necessary act by which he loves his own goodness: and likewise, although an act of mercy adds nothing, not even virtually, distinct from the necessary act by which he loves his own goodness, which is the reason for relieving the misery of creatures, which is indeed virtually distinct from the act of charity already mentioned, and so of the rest; nevertheless any free act, as such, is always something real and divine, although this real and divine thing is not distinct, not even virtually, from the reality of any one of the necessary acts: and so it does not add, as constitutive of itself, or as pertaining to it, any relation of reason formally taken. Moreover, it cannot be inferred from this that the aforesaid acts cannot be seen by force of the vision of the divine essence. For just as things are situated with respect to being, so also with respect to being known. Hence, since the aforesaid acts, as regards everything that pertains to the genus of the thing, or of being, with imperfections set aside, are so sufficient as if they imported some reality really actually, or virtually, distinct from any necessary act (because by them God is equally perfectly willing freely, as if they were really actually, or virtually, distinct from any divine reality), it follows that without the aforesaid distinction they are also sufficient with respect to everything that pertains to the genus of a knowable object: and so they will be able to be reached by the blessed intellect immediately and in themselves.

46 As to the fourth, the sequence must be denied. And as to the proof, the antecedent must be denied. For if God's free acts are considered with respect to the reality which they possess in God himself, they must be reached by any vision whatsoever, however small, because whatever vision is intuitive, and terminates in God as he is, and finally the aforesaid acts with respect to this reason are altogether necessary. But if they are taken as they terminate, for example, in some future effect taken in the singular, they cannot be reached except by a vision so perfect and intense that it can extend to that specific species or nature under which such an effect is contained; once, however, the aforesaid perfection has been granted in that vision, no further perfection is required or added to it from the fact that it terminates in some individual, or in some individual contained under such a species, and consequently neither from the fact that it terminates in the free decrees of God concerning those individuals. Because, as we shall say below, a vision which can know some species in God can reach, as far as it is concerned on the part of the light, all the individuals contained under it, or at least as to their possibility, and even as to their future existence, and consequently God's decrees concerning such a future existence; provided that the condition already explained is posited, namely, that the divine will orders the free act of its will, by which it decreed their future existence, to the intellect of that blessed man himself.

47 As to the last, the antecedent must be denied, provided that the aforesaid ordering of its free acts towards the beatific intellect is added on the part of the divine will. For then the free acts will be known by force of the light of glory and of the divine essence, under the reason of an intelligible species. And as to the first proof, the sequence must be denied, understood of these acts according as they terminate in creatures, in the manner already explained: because, as we were saying, for their cognition the ordering so often demanded by us is required, which in a certain manner is of the nature of revelation, and once posited it passes from an object hidden per se to an object manifest with respect to the intellect of the blessed man. Whence, although both the light of glory and the vision unfold all their power in the vision of other things which are in God, nevertheless they do not unfold it in the vision of the free acts, as they terminate in future effects in the manner explained, unless the aforesaid ordering, which is demanded per se, be present. From which also, as to the second proof, it is clear how the free acts, and only those free acts with respect to which the aforesaid ordering is present, can alone be seen by force of the light and of the divine essence.

48 As to the confirmation, the major must be denied. And, the antecedent having been granted for the proof, the consequence must be denied. Because that which is to see more free acts, and consequently the quantity of the ordering or manifestation with respect to more or fewer of them, does not depend on a greater intensity of light and of vision, by which one blessed man is more blessed than another. For whomever of them sees all the species and genera that pertain to this universe, both what is natural being and what is supernatural being of it: and consequently he has of himself a sufficient light and vision to reach all the free acts terminated in all the future individuals of this universe. But the aforesaid quantity of this ordering, or this, that more or fewer free acts are ordered to the intellect of some blessed man, is commensurable with the law laid down by God, by which it is established that only those things which pertain to that man's state are manifested to each blessed man by force of the vision. Whence when it is said that the more blessed man, and consequently the one having a greater light, also has a more perfect vision: and conversely, that that vision is more perfect by which more things are seen in God himself, it is understood of the more excellent vision as regards intensity, and of those things which are seen in God by force of the light of glory taken strictly: and not of the manifestation and ordering already explained, by which those things which are in God must be specially ordered by the divine will to the intellect of the blessed man, as has been said.