Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

6 The title is understood not only of those things which actually occur, but of the same things by an ordering to divine power; because it is certain among all theologians that in fact all the blessed see God as He is One and Three. Hence in the Council of Florence, in the last session, in the letters of the union of the Church it is defined that the souls which are carried up to heaven clearly behold God Himself, Three and One, as He is. And reason recommends this. For, as D. Thomas noted in art. 7 of this question, the vision of the fatherland corresponds to faith: hence just as on the way we believe the mystery of the Trinity, so in the fatherland we shall clearly behold it, according to the word of the Apostle: We see now through a glass, darkly; but then face to face.

§ I. The Position of Scotus.

Scotus defends the affirming part in 1. dist. 1. quaest. 2, whom the whole school of the Scotists follows. It is proved first, because the relations do not pertain to the primary object of the beatific vision: hence a vision terminated as to the essence, and not as to them, can be given. The consequence is evident. Then, because the vision depends essentially only on its primary object. Then also, because therefore the same vision can be given, not terminated as to creatures, since these do not look to its primary object. The antecedent, however, is proved. For the relations are not seen on account of themselves, according to that relation by which they are distinguished and opposed, but on account of the essence; since they have one and the same relation of visibility and of enjoyment: hence they do not pertain to the primary object of the vision; since the primary object, and those things which pertain to it, are seen on account of themselves, and not on account of something else.

7 It is confirmed first. The eternal Father sees His essence before, in the order of origin, the Son and the Holy Spirit are produced: hence in that prior state He will not see these two persons: hence neither will they pertain to the primary object of His own beatitude, nor of ours, which is of the same reason as His. The first consequence is evident, because in that prior state they are not yet produced, and so they cannot be beheld in that same state; since intuitive vision presupposes the production and the existence of the thing seen. The second consequence, however, also holds. Because if the aforesaid persons pertained to the primary object of beatitude, the Father's vision could not in that prior state terminate as to the essence, and not as to them. The antecedent, however, is proved. Because the Father produces the Son from the knowledge of the divine essence, and therefore first sees the divine essence, than He produces Him, and consequently than He Himself be produced.

It is confirmed second. For if the Son and the Holy Spirit pertained to the primary object of the Father's vision, then the Father would have something from these two persons, and so would not be simply prior to them in the order of origin: but this is false, as the theologians commonly teach; hence, etc. The first sequel is evident. For the primary object of the vision is the principle of that vision: hence, if the Son and the Holy Spirit have being as the primary object of the Father's vision together with the essence, they will be the principle of it, and thus the Father will have it from them.

It is confirmed third. For as often as anything is such from itself, so often will it have that being, even if any other thing whatsoever were not: but the Father is blessed from Himself: hence He would be blessed even if, impossibly, the persons of the Son and the Holy Spirit did not exist: and consequently the vision, by which He is blessed, will terminate only of itself first as to the essence considered in itself, but not as it is in the other persons.

8 Second, and principally. For the divine essence can be communicated and united in the relation of an intelligible species with the blessed intellect, the persons not being united in the relation of the aforesaid species: hence then the essence will be able to be seen without the relations having been seen. The consequence needs no proof: because a vision terminated as to some object cannot be given unless that object is first united in the relation of an intelligible species: hence, if the essence can be united in the relation of species without the relations being united, it will be able to be seen without those having been seen. The antecedent, however, is proved. Because the essence is communicated to the Son by generation, and is united to filiation with the highest identity, so that it subsists by it, yet paternity is not communicated to Him, nor united: hence the essence can also be communicated and united to the blessed intellect in the relation of an intelligible species, without the personal relations being united or communicated: for in this no reason of disparity appears to occur.

It is confirmed and explained. For the reason on account of which, the essence having been seen, the relations would have to be seen, can be none other than this, namely that they are identified with it and are very intrinsic to it, and that the essence is united to the intellect such as it is in itself: but even if the essence be communicated to the Son such as it is in itself, and have the aforesaid identity with the same relations, it is nevertheless communicated and united to that same Son without all the relations being communicated and united: hence in the same way the same essence will be able to be united to the blessed intellect in the relation of an intelligible species, without the relations being united together with it.

9 Third. Since God is understood, the relations having been set aside, to be the first cause of the intellectual creature: hence, those having been set aside, He will be the last end of that creature: hence also under this setting aside He will be able to be the beatific object of the aforesaid creature. The antecedent is evident. Then, because God does not act by reason of the relations; since these are not active forms; then also, because if God, impossibly, did not subsist except by one only absolute subsistence, He would still be the first cause, and could produce exteriorly whatever He produces now. The first consequence, however, also holds. Because the first efficient and the last end coincide, on account of the fact that He cannot act except on account of Himself as on account of the ultimate final reason, and therefore except by ordering all things to Himself, as to the last end. The second consequence, however, also holds. Because, since the beatific vision is the concomitant of the last end, nothing else is required on the part of the beatific object beyond that which is required on the part of it with regard to the relation of the last end.

10 Fourth. For filiation can terminate the humanity of Christ without spiration and paternity terminating it: hence it can also terminate the vision of itself, without the other relations terminating the aforesaid vision together with it: hence the essence too will be able to be seen without those same relations having been seen. The antecedent holds from those things which are commonly taught by the theologians in the matter of the Incarnation. The first consequence, however, also holds: then from the parity of the reason: then also, because filiation can by itself, and in the solid, terminate the humanity, because by the force of its own formal reason, as distinct from the rest, that is, according to its own relative reason, it has the power of terminating; but also according to the same reason it is intelligible per se, since according to it there is something real and true within its own line, and by way of a most pure act: hence it can also terminate in the solid the vision of itself. From which also the second consequence sufficiently holds. For the divine essence has its own intelligibility all the more, insofar as it is virtually distinguished from all the relations: and thus it will be able to terminate in the solid the vision.

§ II. The Common Opinion Is Established by the Testimonies of Scripture and the Fathers.

11 It must nevertheless be said that it involves a contradiction for the divine essence to be seen, such as it is in itself without the persons, or one person without another. Thus Caietanus in 2. 2. quaest. 2. art. 8, Medina in 1. 2. quaest. 11. art. 4, and 3. part. quaest. 3. art. 3, Soto in 4. dist. 49. quaest. 3. art. 3, Cabrera in 3. part. quaest. 10. art. 2. ad 5, Suarez, lib. 2. de Attributis cap. 23, Vazquez in the present disp. 13 and 48, and very many others.

It is proved first from that of John 14: Philip, who sees Me, sees also the Father. For although Tertullian and others explain these words of the vision, or of the knowledge through faith, in such a way that whoever believes in the Son must also believe in the Father, nevertheless Chrysostom in hom. 63. on John, Cyril in lib. 9. on the same, Hilary in 7. de Trinit., Nazianzen in orat. 49, and others, explain them of the clear and intuitive vision: hence, since Philip had asked that it be given to him to see the Father, either with the bodily eyes under some sensible form or with the mind under the obscurity of faith, then Christ, taking occasion from this, answered with the proposed words: by which He signified that it is necessary that whoever sees Himself should see also the Father: and since with regard to this there is the same reason of the divine essence compared with the relations, and conversely, or of any one relation compared with the rest (as we shall weigh immediately), the conclusion will be that, according to these words of Christ the Lord, once the essence has been seen the relations must be seen, and conversely: and likewise, once one person has been seen, the others must be seen.

12 It is confirmed first, and the force of this testimony is explained. For, that Christ might render an account of what He had said, He immediately subjoined: Dost thou not believe that I am in the Father, and the Father in Me? as if He were saying: therefore whoever sees the same Christ ought to behold the Father, because He is in the Father, and the Father in Him: from the fact that the nature of each of the two is one and the same, identified with them by that reason with respect to which the Father is in the Son, and conversely by circuminsession (as the theologians speak). Hence Christ the Lord formed this argument with its force: I am in the Father, and the Father is in Me, because we are the same in one numerically, the divine nature: hence it is necessary that whoever sees Me should see also the Father. Which argument, as will be clear to the one who looks into it, also proves that, whichever relation or formality of God has been seen, the other things formally existing in Him ought to be seen.

It is confirmed second by the testimonies of D. Thomas. For in 2. 2. quaest. 2. art. 8. ad 3 he says: The sum of God's goodness, according to the mode in which it is now understood through the affections, can be understood without the Trinity of persons. But according to that in which it is understood in itself, such as it is seen by the blessed, it cannot be understood without the Trinity of persons, and in 3. part. quaest. 3. art. 3 he thus says: The intellect is in a twofold way related to divine things: in one way, so as to know God as He is: and thus it is impossible that anything be circumscribed by the intellect from God, and that something else remain: because all that is in God is one, saving the distinction of the persons. Yet of these one is taken away if the other is taken away: because they are distinguished only by relations, which must exist together. And in art. praeced. of this question, in the solution to 2, he admits what is said in the argument, namely that God, because He is altogether simple, cannot be seen through the essence unless He be seen entire and nothing of His escape the one who sees. Which is also taught by Nazianzen in the place cited, and by Augustine on Psalm 84 and 85, and also tract. 70. on John, and lib. 1. de Trinitate, cap. 8, in these words: Whether therefore we hear, show us the Son, or whether we hear, show us the Father, it avails just as much: because neither can be shown without the other.

From all of which it follows that there is no solution such as some give to the aforesaid testimonies, saying that they are to be understood of those things which actually occur, and not by an ordering to divine power. For the reason which is brought forward in the aforesaid testimonies is, on the one hand, the identity of all divine things in the one and the same essence; on the other hand, the fact that this vision must terminate in God as He is. Hence, since these two things are immutable, even by an ordering to divine power it follows that, by an ordering to divine power, it will likewise be impossible to see the essence without the persons, or one person without another.

§ III. The Same Opinion Is Supported by Reasons.

13 Then the assertion is proved by a reason drawn from D. Thomas in the place cited, from 3. part. For the divine persons are constituted by relations: but these must be simultaneous in nature and in knowledge: hence one cannot be seen clearly and quidditatively unless the others are seen, and consequently unless the nature is also seen. The major holds from those things which are commonly taught by the theologians in this 1. part. quaest. 40 from the Councils and the Fathers. The minor likewise holds from the common consent of the Dialecticians, cap. de relatione. The first consequence, from either of the premises, seems to follow sufficiently. From which also the second consequence remains manifest: since it is impossible for a person to be seen clearly and quidditatively without the essence of that person and its nature having been seen clearly and quidditatively.

14 Nor does it matter what Lorca answers in 1. 2. quaest. 3. disp. 13, namely that from the force of this reason it follows only that the Son cannot be seen without the Father, and conversely; but not without the Holy Spirit, because the Father and the Son are not constituted in the esse of persons through active spiration, through which they look to the Holy Spirit, but through paternity and filiation. Wherefore, just as for knowing their persons it is not necessary, by the force of this reason, to know active spiration, which is not constitutive of them in the esse of persons, so neither will it be necessary to know the Holy Spirit, who is the terminus of active spiration.

The contrary, however, is this: that if the Father and the Son are constituted in the esse of persons by paternity and filiation, as they are in fact constituted, it must needs be involved there that although the Father, for example, is not formally referred by paternity to the Holy Spirit, nevertheless He Himself, constituted through paternity, is the suppositum related as that which is by active spiration, and not by just anything, but as by something formally identified with Him, as in the matter of the Trinity nearly all the theologians commonly teach: hence it is also involved there that He must be seen as something related as that which to the person of the Holy Spirit; and consequently by the force of this reason it is sufficiently proved that all the relations must be seen together. This last consequence needs no proof. The first, however, clearly follows from the antecedent. For, as we said in the preceding doubt, those things which are the same actually and formally, and are seen by clear and immediate vision, must be seen together by the force of that same vision; otherwise that vision will not be clear, and of the thing as it is, since it will not be conformed to the mode of being which the object has in itself, when through it, in the aforesaid object, something is separated from something, namely that which is known from that which is not known, notwithstanding that in the thing known there is identically one and the same formality.

15 It is confirmed. For when by abstractive cognition, which is not of the thing as it is in itself, a simple object, undivided in itself, is known, in such a way that with respect to some things it is attained, and with respect to others it is not attained, then a distinction is not made in it such as it is in itself, but with respect to our concepts: hence, by proportional reasoning, when the same object as it is in itself is known by clear and intuitive cognition, in such a way that with respect to some things it is known, and with respect to others it is not known in the way already described, a distinction will be made in it such as it is in itself: hence it cannot be coherent that that simple formality of paternity and of spiration should be seen such as it is in itself, and yet not be seen through such a vision, in the manner already explained, as regards all that it identifies with itself: otherwise we should most excellently infer from this that paternity and spiration are not identified with one another.

16 Second, the assertion is proved principally by a reason which the same D. Thomas hints at. Because it is repugnant for the divine essence to be seen quidditatively without its quidditative predicates, as is clear from itself: hence it will also be repugnant for it to be seen without the three persons: hence likewise it will involve that one person be seen without another. The first consequence is evident. Because, although the persons are not of the quidditative concept of the essence, but only of the mode, or as it were of an intrinsic mode of it, nevertheless this, that the essence is communicable to the persons of the Trinity by way of a most pure act, is of the quidditative concept of that essence itself: but it cannot be seen quidditatively, such as it is communicable in the manner said to the aforesaid persons, unless such persons are seen: hence, etc. From which also the second consequence holds. Since it is repugnant for any divine person to be seen quidditatively without the divine nature itself being seen quidditatively: hence, if it is repugnant for the essence and the divine nature to be seen without the three persons of the Trinity, it will likewise be repugnant to see one person without another.

17 Nor does it matter, if you say that from hence it follows only that the divine persons must be seen according to the common notion of a divine person. For as, the omnipotence having been seen quidditatively, it is not necessary to see possible creatures, except according to the common notion of a possible creature, because this notion is looked to, as it were, per se and in the first place by it, so, the divine essence having been seen according to that in which it is communicable to the three divine persons, it will not be necessary to see those persons in particular, because the essence, as communicable, only has per se and in the first place, as it were, a regard to them according to the common notion of a divine person.

The contrary, however, is this. Then, that the divine omnipotence is not connected with creatures in particular according to that esse which they have in their own genus, as with those with which it is actually and formally identified; otherwise with the divine persons, even when each of these is considered according to its own. Hence, although, the omnipotence having been seen, it is not necessary to see creatures in particular with which it is connected in no way except secondarily, nevertheless, the essence having been seen, it will be necessary to see the persons according to their own, even if it were only secondarily connected with them according to that reasoning: because, as we said in the preceding reason, it is repugnant for anything, and such as it is in itself, to be seen quidditatively, without everything which is identified with it being seen. Then also: because the divine essence does not secondarily, but per se and in the first place, as it were, look to the divine persons according to their own, because it looks to them, as it were, or is connected with them per se and in the first place, in that they constitute the Trinity, which yet they can constitute only according to their own, and as they are mutually distinct.

18 It is confirmed first. Because of the essence of the divine nature there is not to be any communicability at all, but communicability in an intellectual manner, namely through the intellect and the will, and consequently by generating the Son through the intellect, and by spirating the Holy Spirit through the will, in the manner usually stated in the matter of the Trinity: indeed, in such a way that this must formally and expressly import: hence its communicability cannot be seen quidditatively in particular unless the Holy Spirit and the Son are seen in particular, and consequently unless the Father is also seen.

It is confirmed and explained second. Since it is of the reason of the quidditative vision of God, such as He is in Himself, that through it God should appear, or be perceived, as He is in Himself: hence, since God, as He is in Himself, has an express and formal connection with His own formalities, according to their own character, and any personality has the same connection with the essence, it must needs be that through the vision of God, such as He is in Himself, all these things should appear, such as they are expressly and formally in Him.

19 It is confirmed third. For the connection which God has with possible creatures, considered according to their particular reasons, is in Him only implicitly, and not expressly, and therefore it will not be necessary that through the vision of God, such as He is in Himself, the aforesaid creatures should be seen expressly in particular, but only implicitly, insofar as that in which they are implicitly contained is seen: hence, precisely because the divine essence and the personalities are in Him expressly and formally, it must needs be that through His vision, such as He is in Himself, they should be known expressly and formally. The consequence seems certain. The antecedent, however, as regards the second part, holds from what has been said in the preceding disputation, and also from the first part of that same antecedent. As regards the first part, however, it is also evident. Since that connection is expressly only with creatures according to the general notion of things that can be made; and because under this notion those very creatures are implicitly contained according to their particular reasons, therefore the divine essence is also implicitly connected with them when taken in particular.

20 There is added, finally, that precisely because the hypostatic union, for example, of the humanity to the Word terminates immediately in the Word, such as He is in Himself, it must have every essential perfection which can be given within the latitude of the hypostatic union to the Word; and likewise, precisely because the divine essence, such as it is in itself, is immediately united with the blessed intellect in the relation of an intelligible species, that union must have every essential, though not accidental, perfection which can be conceived within the line of such a union with the created intellect (which is the same that we say of the union of that same essence, such as it is in itself, in the relation of the word, or of the object actually seen): hence, precisely because the quidditative and intuitive vision of God terminates immediately in God, such as He is in Himself, it must have every essential perfection which can be conceived within the latitude of the created vision of God, such as He is in Himself: hence, since the created vision of God, having every essential perfection of its latitude, can and must terminate in God with respect to the whole reality and formality which He actually and formally has in Himself, as is evident in the vision which is in fact given in the least blessed, it must needs be that any vision of God itself, precisely because it terminates immediately in God, such as He is in Himself, should have this perfection and mode of attaining.

§ IV. The Arguments of the First Opinion Are Met.

21 To the first, let the antecedent pass, but the consequence must be denied. And to the first proof it is answered that, although the vision depends only on the primary object, as on the reason which is as it were specificative of it, nevertheless it can be necessarily connected with the secondary object: from the fact that the primary and the secondary object have between them a necessary connection in the relation of an object quidditatively and clearly knowable; then on account of the identity which they have; then also, from the fact that this connection is of such a condition that the primary object cannot fail to express that precisely by being seen quidditatively and as it is in itself, as has been explained. Hence, although in the vision of the divine essence possible creatures are only the secondary object, nevertheless, because the aforesaid essence has the connection just indicated with them according to the common notion of possibles, therefore it cannot be seen unless the aforesaid creatures are seen according to the reason already explained. And likewise, although in a corporeal vision color is the primary object and quantity the secondary, nevertheless, because color, in the relation of the order of the object of corporeal vision, has a necessary connection with quantitative extension, and also with regard to place, in such a way that it cannot express it: therefore it is very probable that it cannot be, even by the absolute power of God, without that force: and thus the body of Christ under the sacramental species is not visible to the bodily eye, as D. Thomas teaches in 3. part. quaest. 76. art. 7, because it lacks the aforesaid extension.

Or, second, it can be answered for the present probably, by denying the antecedent. For although the divine essence is the primary object quo, the persons are the primary object quod, terminating that same vision. For as it is of the reason of the divine persons that they are three and have one and the same nature, so into their reason it is necessarily included that they are a triple object quod of the vision, with, however, a single reason of terminating. Hence, although that they terminate by reason of the essence takes from them the reason of the object quo, it does not yet take from them that of the object quod.

22 To the first confirmation it is to be said that, although the eternal Father, even while He is prior in origin than the Son, sees His essence and is blessed, nevertheless He is not prior in beatitude in the order of origin than the Son and the Holy Spirit are produced, because beatitude is one of the essential predicates: and thus, according to it, the Father is not prior in the order of origin than the Son. And the reason is this. Because a prior and a posterior cannot be found according to some order, unless such an order is found. Wherefore, since between the Father and the Son, as regards essential things, there is no order of origin, any more than there is as regards producing and being produced, the conclusion will be that neither there, as regards the same essential things, is there a prior and a posterior in the order of origin.

And to the proof it is to be said that it is false that the Father produces the Son from the knowledge of the divine essence, if it is understood of active production: because by that expression the order of origin is denoted between the Father's knowledge and the active production of the Son, which yet is false, since the Father's knowledge itself is the actual active production of the Son without any virtual distinction, although with this it stands that it be distinguished from the passive production of that same Son: and thus it is true that the Son is produced from the Father's knowledge of the essence. From this, however, it is not permitted to infer that the Father sees the essence without the person of the Son and the Holy Spirit being seen: because this priority is not a priority in which there is also knowledge. For since the person of the Father has a necessary connection with the person of the Son, for example, there is no sign in which the person of the Father is and the person of the Son is not, or in which the Father is producing and the Son produced, or finally in which the person of the Father can be understood, such as it is in itself, without the person of the Son being understood; but in whatever sign in which one is seen, the other must be seen: although the one (namely the Father) as producing, and the other (namely the Son) as produced.

23 To the second confirmation both sequels must be denied. And to the proof of the first it is answered that, if once it were true that the relations do not pertain to the primary object of beatitude, it is sufficiently clear how from the fact that the Father necessarily sees the essence together with the person of the Son and the Holy Spirit, He does not therefore have His vision from the secondary object, but only from the primary: but if the persons pertain to the primary object of beatitude, they will surely look to it as the terminating object, and not as the motivating object: because the divine essence alone has the reason of the motivating object of the intellect with respect to the vision.

Now the purely terminating object is not the principle of the vision, but the motivating object: because it is in this way alone that it is united to the intellect in the relation of an intelligible species, and thus in the relation of a principle with respect to the vision as we now understand it. But on these matters, let them be seen in what will be said in the following treatise, disp. 3. num. 36, where we shall explain whether the divine relations pertain to the primary and specificative object of the divine intellect; then also what will be said in this doubt, num. 29.

To the third confirmation the major is to be granted, and the minor along with the first consequence, but the second is to be denied. Because, just as in the case of the first consequence the Father would be blessed through the vision of the essence, such as it is in itself: and consequently, just as He would be without the aforesaid persons, so now He must be blessed as He is in fact in Himself: and because in fact the essence is formally identified with them in the three persons, therefore it must be seen as it is in them. Add, for a fuller explanation, that the major of this argument is true only of those things which have being of that sort and are not necessarily connected with others; but as the eternal Father, whether He be from Himself or not from another, is God and is blessed, nevertheless His nature has an indispensable connection with the other two persons; so too His beatitude, as it now is, has also an indispensable connection with the vision of the other persons, from the fact that His nature must be seen such as it is in itself. We have said, as it now is, because if once the other divine persons were involved, then just as the nature of the Father would be other than it now is, so also would His beatitude, and consequently it would then be sufficiently necessary to see the divine essence in the single person, namely in that which is now the person of the Father.

24 To the second it is answered that the antecedent is true if it is understood of the union of the relations taken immediately in themselves, but otherwise of the union of them also as mediated, and by reason of the essence. For the divine essence has the reason of an intelligible species both with respect to itself and with respect to the relations, because these are the personal properties of it. And to the proof on the contrary it is to be said that the reason is dissimilar. For paternity and filiation are opposed relatively, and hence are incompossible in the relation of what is communicable to one and the same person: and therefore it is not surprising, nay it is necessary, that the divine essence communicated to the Son should not be communicated to Him as paternity, and that the aforesaid communication should demand precisely this. Now the divine essence and all its personal properties are not incompossible in the relation of things simultaneously visible by one and the same vision. Then, because otherwise in fact they would not be seen in that way, whose opposite, as was assumed at the beginning of this doubt and proved. Then also, because just as a nature demanding only one single personality can be seen together with that one, so a nature demanding a triple personality will be able to be seen together with all of them, nay not only will it be able, but it will be obliged so to be considered on account of the reasons given for our assertion.

25 Unless it be that the divine essence, as it has the reason of an intelligible species with respect to itself and with respect to the relations, is not yet virtually distinguished, nor requires a greater light in order that, according to each of the two reasons, it be united as distinguished only on the part of the mode of being conceived, than in order that it be united according to the one. Hence, just as it is impossible to give an intellect perfused with the light of glory and not having the divine essence united to it in the relation of an intelligible species, so, if once a greater light is not required in order that the divine essence be united by way of an intelligible species with respect to itself and with respect to the relations, it will not be able to be united according to that former reason, as distinguished only on the part of the mode of our conceiving, without being united according to this one, and consequently without being seen one with its personalities, as has been explained. Now the divine essence and paternity are virtually distinguished, and therefore it is not surprising that the essence, when communicated, should not be communicated as a relation: since the virtual distinction which is between the essence and paternity is equivalent to a real actual distinction; especially since such a distinction, owing to its peculiar reason, arises in some way from the incompossibility and real opposition which is between paternity and filiation, which yet several other virtual distinctions found in God do not have: and therefore such a distinction cannot fail to be sufficient for it to be possible that the essence be communicated to the Son without paternity being communicated.

26 If, however, you ask why it is repugnant for the intellect to be perfused with the light of glory and not to have the divine essence united to it? It will be answered that this arises from the fact that this union, through which the divine essence, which is always most intimately present to every created intellect, is united anew to it in the relation of species, ought not to begin anew by something being added to the divine essence and changing it: but by something being added to the created intellect, which has the reason of something connoted with respect to the aforesaid union, and by which the aforesaid intellect is changed, as is clear from what has been said. And thus, precisely because such a connoted thing is posited, the aforesaid union cannot fail to be given: just as the mode of the hypostatic union, on the part of the humanity of Christ, holding to it, is the connoted thing required for the union of the Word with the humanity, and changing it, therefore such a connoted thing cannot be given unless the Word is united with the humanity. Wherefore, since the connoted thing necessary in order that the divine essence be united in the relation of intelligible form is the light of glory changing the intellect, the conclusion is that it involves this being present in the intellect, and that the union of the divine essence with it in the relation of intelligible form be not given at the same time.

27 From which, to the confirmation it is answered that the reason on account of which the divine essence cannot be seen without the relations being seen is this, because it is united, such as it is in itself, not in just any way, but such as it is in itself, visible: and its visibility, such as it is in itself, and consequently through a clear, immediate, and quidditative vision, requires that the nature not be seen without the persons, or one person without another, as has been shown. Now from the fact that the same divine essence is communicated to the Son such as it is in itself, that is, such as it is in itself communicable to Him by way of nature, it does not follow that the essence is to be communicated together with paternity: because, since paternity and filiation, in the relation of what is communicable, although not in the relation of things simultaneously visible, are incompossible, it must needs be that, although the divine essence is communicated to the Son such as it is in itself communicable through natural generation, paternity is not therefore communicated, nay rather that this is repugnant.

Wherefore, although the most formal concept of the union, or of the communication, of the divine essence, such as it is in itself considered according to its general reason, is not the same as the concept of the union and communication of that same essence, such as it is in itself absolutely, that is, simply, namely, with respect to the whole reality which it actually and formally has; nevertheless the peculiar concept of the union of the divine essence, such as it is visible in itself, coincides entirely with the concept of its visibility, according to which it is absolutely and simply in itself, that is, according to the whole reality which it formally has in itself: since (as we have already said) and as has been shown by reasons, it is repugnant for one who sees God not to see all these things.

Add that the reason on account of which, the essence having been seen, the relations are to be seen is not any kind of identity, but that identity which is asked of the same essence, as it has the reason of a subject which is to be united with respect to itself and to the relations, and which excludes even the virtual distinction: since the divine essence, as it has the reason of an intelligible species with respect to itself and to the relations, is not virtually distinguished: on account of the fact that all this pertains to the line of the intelligible species.

28 To the third, let the antecedent pass, and both consequences are denied. Because, although the first efficient and the last end are the same really, the formal reason of that one as first efficient and as last end of the intellectual creature is nevertheless different: and therefore, although we grant that as first efficient it does not involve, as far as is on the part of the effect, the relations, nevertheless, as last end it also involves the same relations on the part of the vision: because the vision must terminate in Him, such as He is in Himself.

29 To the fourth it is answered from what has been said, granting the antecedent and denying both consequences, and to the first proof of the antecedent the parity there adduced is to be denied. To the second proof, however, the major is to be granted and the minor denied. Since the divine relations cannot of themselves and by their own reason be united in the relation of an intelligible species, nor terminate the vision by their own reason, but only by reason of the divine essence, which is the primary formal reason, motivating and terminating with respect to the clear and quidditative vision of God, because a divine relation, although it is a pure act within its own line, does not have the reason of that one, but only by reason of the essence has such actuality and immateriality as is required in order that it be able of itself most formally to terminate the vision, and be united in the relation of an intelligible species with respect to that same vision: since for this it was required that it have its own existere without any virtual distinction, as we have said in this treatise, disp. 2. n. 116, and as we shall say in the treatise on the knowledge of God, disp. 3. num. 36. From which, to the proof of the second consequence it is to be said that, although the divine essence has its own intelligibility, nevertheless its intelligibility is that by reason of which the personalities are seen, and are clearly understood, as will be more fully explained in the place cited, and it cannot be united in the relation of species with respect to itself clearly seen, without being united in the same way with respect to the relations, nor can it be united by way of species with respect to one person without being united in the same way with respect to the others, as has been shown.