Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

Salmanticenses

Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

Salmanticenses

Collegii Salmanticensis Cursus Theologicus, tomus I

First published 1870

The Cursus Theologicus of the Discalced Carmelites of Salamanca (the 'Salmanticenses'), tomus I, in the 1870 Paris reprint. Contains the Prooemium and the three great treatises of this volume: De principio individuationis (a digression on the principle of individuation), De Visione Dei (in quaest. 12), and De Scientia Dei (in quaest. 14, including the extended rejection of middle knowledge). The edition prints St Thomas's Prima Pars text alongside; that text is not republished here.

Prooemium, and the Division of the whole Work

Quaestio I: On the Simplicity of God

Tractatus I: On the Principle of the Individuation of Material Substance and of Its Accidents

Disputatio I: On the Principle of the Individuation of Material Substance

Dubium I: Whether the substantial form is itself individuated, and the first principle of the individuation and of the purely individual distinction of the whole composite?

Dubium II: Whether matter, taken by itself and precisely, or matter marked by quantity, is the first and radical principle of the individuation of the whole substantial composite

Dubium III: Whether matter marked by quantity, insofar as it is said to constitute a composite of matter and quantity as an inhering and constituting form, is the first root of the individuation of the composite

Dubium IV: Whether matter determined by quantity, insofar as it denotes a certain substantial mode, is by the very nature of the thing distinct from matter and determines it toward having this quantity rather than that, is the first root of the individuation of material substance and of its substantial form?

Dubium V: Whether matter marked by quantity, insofar as it is said to possess by a radical mode this quantity rather than that, is the first root of the completed material substance and therefore of its substantial form

Disputatio II: On the Principle of the Individuation of Accidents

Dubium I: Whether the subject is the first root and principle of the individuation of accidents and of their purely individual distinction

Dubium II: Whether quantity claims for itself a peculiar principle, so that it is individuated from itself as though it were the first root

Dubium III: Whether essential repugnance exists between purely numerical distinction of accidents, as such that two of them differ only numerically in the same subject

Tractatus II: In quaest. 12 of the First Part of St. Thomas: On the Vision of God

Quaestio I: How God is known by us

Disputatio I: On the Possibility and Appetitability of the Vision of God by Essence

Dubium I: Whether the clear vision of God by essence is possible to the created intellect?

Dubium II: Whether the Holy Fathers knew that vision of God by essence is possible to a created intellect

Dubium III: Whether the possibility of vision of God by essence can be clearly known to a created intellect by the light of nature

Dubium IV: Whether the intellectual nature considered by itself has an innate appetite for the vision of God by essence

Dubium V: Whether an elicited and natural appetite is given in the intellectual creature considered by itself with regard to the clear vision of God

Disputatio II: On the Likeness, or Form, Required for a Clear Vision of God

Dubium I: Whether, according to the mind of St Thomas, some created likeness is admitted in order to elicit the clear vision of God

Dubium II: Whether the divine essence is in fact united to the intellect of the blessed man by way of an intelligible species, with a view to the clear vision of God?

Dubium III: Whether the divine essence, as it has the character of an intelligible form, actively concurs to the clear vision of God

Dubium IV: Whether by divine power a created impressed species is possible, through which God may be seen in a quidditative way, such as He is in Himself?

Dubium V: Whether the first reason which D. Thom. adduces in this article sufficiently proves the impossibility of an impressed species representing God quidditatively and clearly?

Dubium VI: Whether from the second reason of St. Thomas the impossibility is sufficiently inferred of an impressed form representing God quidditatively, and clearly, as He is in Himself

Dubium VII: What specially stands against the second reason of St. Thomas, and how it is to be solved

Dubium VIII: Whether the last reason of the article proves the impossibility of a created intelligible species representing God quidditatively: where the arguments also are dissolved which we brought from the opponents in dub. 4 of this disputation?

Dubium IX: Whether in the blessed there is necessarily and indispensably given a word, or expressed form, representing God quidditatively, as He is in Himself

Dubium X: Whether the impossibility of a created word representing God clearly and quidditatively is rightly proved from the fact that God is essentially itself the being quidditatively understood, and thus cannot be quidditatively understood through a created word?

Disputatio III: On the Impossibility of the Vision of God, As He Is in Himself, by Created Powers of the Natural Order, or Such as Are Connatural to Some Created Intellect

Dubium I: Whether by the absolute power of God there is possible some intellect which by the powers proper to it of the natural order could see God as He is in Himself

Dubium II: Whether by divine power there can be possible some substances and some intellects for which the light of glory is connatural, and which can see God by essence by their own powers?

Disputatio IV: On the Necessity of the Light of Glory for Seeing the Divine Essence As It Is in Itself

Dubium I: Whether the light of glory concurs to the vision of God, as He is in Himself, after the manner of an impressed form

Dubium II: Whether the light of glory is a necessary disposition, in order that the divine essence, in the ratio of form or of intelligible species, be united to the intellects of the blessed?

Dubium III: Whether the light of glory is necessarily desired for the receiving of the vision of God?

Dubium IV: Whether by the absolute power of God the created intellect can, without the light of glory, by its own obediential power alone, though with a concomitant influx superadded in the vision, but not by any other previous [influx], elicit that vision in the same intellect

Dubium V: Whether by divine power the divine essence can be united, in the ratio of light, to the created intellect, and thus constitute it, without a created light, in the first act for seeing God as He is in Himself?

Disputatio V: On the Quality and Inequality of the Visions in the Blessed

Dubium I: Whether an inequality is found among the beatific visions

Dubium II: Whether the inequality found among the beatific visions is not only intensive and extensive, but also essential and specific

Dubium III: Whether an intellectual power that is better, with equal light of glory, sees the divine essence more clearly

Disputatio VI: On the Incomprehensibility of God to the Created Intellect

Dubium I: Whether by divine power the created intellect can comprehend God?

Disputatio VII: On Those Things Which, God Having Been Seen, Are Seen in Him, or Can Be Seen

Dubium I: Whether those who see God see everything absolutely which is formally and of necessity contained in Him

Because in God the absolute, or those that pertain to him as one, are prior to the relative; and those that are absolute and necessary also have being prior to those that are free and absolute; therefore in the first place we investigate the absolute, and what is necessarily in God.

For the negating part, some refer Henry, quodlib. 7, quaest. 4, Godfrey, quodlib. 6, quaest. 3, Vitoria, and his Master Tenorio, as well as Ferrari, 3 cont. Gent., cap. 46.

It is proved, first. For in God there are infinite absolute perfections, virtually distinguished from one another: therefore no blessed one will be able to see them clearly. The antecedent is proved. Because God, according to his absolute, is imitable and communicable in infinite ways, and distinguished in species: therefore he contains infinite absolute perfections, by which he is communicable in infinite ways. The consequence, however, is proved. For to see all these perfections an infinite light is required, since to see one of them some light is required, and so to see two a light twice as great, and so on with the rest, and therefore to see infinite ones a light infinitely intense will be required.

It is confirmed. Because a greater light is required for seeing all those perfections of God than for knowing all possible creatures: since those have more of entity than these, and consequently more of knowability: therefore, since an infinite light is demanded for knowing all possible creatures, it will also be demanded for seeing all the aforesaid perfections; and consequently no creature will be able to see them.

2 Secondly. For in God there are infinite ideas, each of which, per se and in particular, respects of its own accord first and above all that creature of which it is the idea: therefore if any blessed one sees all these ideal perfections, he will see all possible creatures, and consequently will comprehend God. The antecedent is proved. For every possible creature has its own idea, and therefore, so that God may produce a man, he does not use the idea of an angel, or conversely: and since the idea of this creature, and not of another, cannot fail to be terminated of its own accord first upon it, and not upon another, it follows that not only are there distinct ideas in God, but also that any one of them is terminated of its own accord first upon, or respects, its own possible creature. From this also the consequence is evident. For, therefore, when God and his omnipotence have been seen, creatures are seen under the common reason of things that can be made, because omnipotence is of its own accord first terminated upon what can be made, so to speak: therefore if any ideal reason found in God is terminated of its own accord first upon its own possible creature, the consequence will be that, when those are seen, all creatures will be seen as well.

  1. It must nevertheless be said that all the blessed see all the absolute and necessary perfections, formally existing in him, with respect to all the reality that they possess in him. Thus D. Thom., art. 7 of this question, and 2. 2, quaest. 2, art. 8, ad 3; and so, commonly, the theologians.

It is proved from the reasoning of D. Thom. in the places cited. For the divine essence, together with all the absolute that are in God formally and necessarily, is as regards the thing itself one simple and indivisible object in itself, and vision by its nature tends to be terminated clearly and immediately upon its object: therefore, according to the nature of this object and of the vision, it is necessary that whoever sees the essence should see all the aforesaid things at the same time. The consequence is evident. Because an undivided and simple object postulates that it not be divided, and vision, as being clear and immediate, postulates that it be terminated upon this object without any distinction: because there cannot be a clear and immediate vision by means of which all things that are entirely the same formally and undivided, as regards the thing itself and in themselves, do not appear. The antecedent, however, as regards the first part, is evident. Because all those things are the same formally, really, with the divine essence. And as regards the second part, it is evident from itself and from what has already been said. Nevertheless, all these things will be more evident from what is to be said in the following difficulty.

4 As to the first, let the antecedent stand and let the consequence be denied: because it is enough that all those perfections are not actually distinct, but only virtually, and so they do not constitute any number that is actually such, but only in potency and in foundation. From this, for the proof of the consequence, it is sufficiently evident that a greater light is not required for seeing two of these perfections than for seeing one, or infinite ones: but that it is enough that the aforesaid perfections are one and the same, formally, as regards the thing itself.

In confirmation of this, that if the aforesaid proof is understood as concerning the knowledge of all possible creatures in God clearly seen, then (as D. Thom. noted in this art. 8, in the solution to 3) although it is greater to see God than all other things, yet it is greater to see God in such a way that all things creatable are known in him, than to see him alone only, or together with only some of the creatures that are contained in him. Because God, as visible in the first manner, is understood to have infinitely more of knowability than when considered in the second manner: and so he demands an infinite light for his own being known. But if the aforesaid proof is understood as concerning creatures in their own genus, and not in God clearly seen, then we confess that an infinite light is required for the vision of them taken together: and so such knowledge does entirely imply the aforesaid light, just as that light implies such knowledge: yet granting the impossible, that all were known together in this manner, then the light of glory, by which God is in fact seen, would be more perfect than that infinite light by which all those creatures would be seen. Because the light of glory is, according to its species, more perfect than all other lights: and so however much the other lights may grow in intensive and accidental perfection, they will never reach the perfection of the aforesaid light: just as however much the accidental perfection of the sensitive power may be increased, it will never reach the perfection of the intellectual power. Whence, although God has, according to those things that are formally in him, more of knowability than all possible creatures to be known in their own genus, yet he can be clearly seen through the light of glory, which is a more perfect light than that infinite light would be.

5 As to the second, it is to be said that if we speak of the divine ideas according to that reality and perfection which they possess in God, then they are not distinguished even virtually, but are one and the same formality, perfection, and attribute. Wherefore according to this reason, an idea does not respect (so to speak) any particular creature of its own accord first and above all, but only in the common: and so the distinction of ideas is only the distinction of one and the same perfection, in that it connotes peculiarly this or that possible creature as a secondary, inadequate concomitant, and therefore for seeing the perfection of the divine ideas, and the one and most simple reality of that perfection, it will not be necessary to know in particular that same perfection, as terminated upon possible creatures in particular, or all its terminations; but it will be enough to know it according to its primary termination (so to speak), and also the possible creatures according to that common reason according to which they are, so to speak, connected of their own accord first and above all with the aforesaid reality.

We have said, as it is terminated upon possible creatures, because here we are not speaking of the ideas of future things as such: for in these the free determination of God is involved: but at present we deal only with those things which are found in God not in any way formally, but absolutely necessarily.

Dubium II: Whether the divine essence can be seen without the persons, or one person without another?

Dubium III: Whether the blessed can, by the force of the vision of the divine essence, see, and in fact see, the free decrees of God?

Dubium IV: Whether from the force of the vision of the divine essence the effects existing under some difference of time can, or ought to, be seen

Dubium V: Whether by the force of the vision of the divine essence possible creatures can be seen?

Tractatus III: In quaest. 14 of the First Part of the Angelic Doctor: On the Knowledge of God

Quaestio I: De Scientia Dei

Dubium I: Whether those things which St. Thomas teaches in the Prooemium of this question are true

Disputatio I: De scientia Dei, quoad an est?

Dubium I: Whether intellectual knowledge is formally in God?

Dubium II: Whether from the fact that God is most immaterial the Angelic Doctor rightly proves that He is most intelligent?

Dubium III: Whether there is in God knowledge strictly so called and formally, and with respect to things

Dubium IV: Whether the knowledge of God is an attribute of Him?

Disputatio II: On the Twofold Distinction Which D. Thom. Constitutes in This Article Between Things Known and Things Not Known

Dubium I: Whether the first distinction which St. Thomas assigns between things that know and things that do not know is true, namely that these have only their own form, whereas those have also the forms of other things

Dubium II: Whether knowing things have not only the form of another thing, but also become by identity other things in being knowable, that is, representatively?

Disputatio III: On the Intellection and Knowledge of God with Respect to Its Primary Object

Dubium I: Whether God understands Himself primarily

Dubium II: Whether the object per se, first and specificative of the essential intellection of God is the divine essence, as distinguished from the attributes and the relations: or whether all these are formally and expressly meant?

Disputatio IV: On Understanding by God with Respect to the Power It Has to Constitute the Divine Essence and Nature

Dubium I: Whether the constitutive [element] of the divine essence, or nature, is the sole reason of a spiritual substance in itself, or of such by essence, as distinct virtually from the reason of a subsisting intellectual substance, whether radically and in the first act, or in the second act

Dubium II: Whether what constitutes the divine essence, or nature, is the ratio of substance alone, essentially and per essentiam intellectual, as virtually distinct from intellection by essence, or whether without any virtual distinction it is intellection itself?

Disputatio V: On the Knowledge of God with Respect to Its Causality toward Creatures

Dubium I: Whether divine knowledge is in some way the cause of things

Dubium II: What the knowledge of God is as cause of things

Dubium III: Whether just as the knowledge of God, taken formally, is the cause directing toward the production of creatures, so too it is the immediate effective principle and the executor of their production?

Disputatio VI: On Divine Knowledge Collated with Evils

Dubium I: Whether God knows evils?

Dubium II: Whether God necessarily knows evils through created goods?

Disputatio VII: On Whether There Is Knowledge of God with Respect to Absolute Future Contingents, and on Those Things Which Cannot Be Certainly Known by Him

Dubium I: What, and how manifold, the future contingent is

Dubium II: Whether God certainly knows absolutely future contingents?

Dubium III: Whether God certainly knows absolute free future things, by His essence and divine ideas, as they represent the truth of those things antecedently to the decree of His will

Dubium IV: Whether God certainly knows absolutely future contingents in the free decree of His will, not indeed as present, but as future?

Dubium V: Whether God certainly knows absolutely future contingents which in some way depend on created freedom, in the comprehension of secondary causes, antecedently to the free determination of the divine will?

Dubium VI: Whether God certainly knows absolute future contingents in their objective truth, antecedently to the divine decree

Disputatio VIII: On the knowledge of God with respect to absolutely future contingents, as regards those of which He is certainly known to be aware

Dubium I: Whether God certainly knows all absolutely future contingents in the decree put into execution of His will, antecedently to any infallible futurehood of them, or whether they are determined in their essence by such a decree?

Dubium II: Whether according to Scripture and the Fathers, but especially St. Thomas, absolute future contingents are from eternity really and physically present to God in the measure of eternity, and by reason of this presence are certainly known by Him

Dubium III: Whether with a sufficient reason it is proved that absolutely future contingents were from eternity, and are now really and physically present to God in the measure of eternity, and by reason of this presence are certainly known by Him?

Dubium IV: Whether eternity, and the presentiality of the future already explained in it, is altogether necessary for this, so that God may certainly and infallibly know absolutely future contingents before they are present in their own and adequate measure, or so far as we are concerned?

Disputatio IX: On the Knowledge of Conditioned Future Things, Which God Has in His Efficacious Yet Conditioned Decree

Dubium I: On the multiple division of the future contingent, and which of them belong to the present disputation

Dubium II: Whether according to holy Scripture God certainly knows conditioned future contingents, whether they be disparate, yet depending both as to the condition and as to the event on free causes, or be not disparate, but having only a probable, or conjectural, connection with the condition?

Dubium III: Whether according to the mind of the holy Fathers God knows with perfect certainty and infallibly conditioned future contingents, whether they be disparate in the manner just described, or have a probable connection with the future event

Dubium IV: Whether with a sufficient reason it is shown that God certainly, and altogether infallibly, knows both future contingents that are conditioned and disparate, and those which have only a probable and conjectural connection on the part of the object with the condition?

Dubium V: Whether in God conditioned, positive, and efficacious decrees about all conditioned future contingents are to be posited, and whether, these being set aside, the aforesaid futures can in any case be certainly and infallibly known by God?

Disputatio X: On the Impossibility of Middle, or Conditional, Knowledge Drawn from Authority

Dubium I: Whether according to holy Scripture middle knowledge, or conditional knowledge, is to be admitted?

Dubium II: Whether from St. Augustine's mind, as gathered from His testimonies, it is concluded that middle knowledge, or conditional knowledge, is to be given?

Dubium III: Whether either according to the principles of the opponents, or absolutely and simply speaking, it is inferred from the effects of Augustine's doctrine, or from other signs, that according to his mind middle, or conditional, knowledge is to be rejected

Dubium IV: Whether, according to the mind of the Angelic Doctor as drawn from His testimonies, middle knowledge, or conditional knowledge, is to be given in God?

Dubium V: Whether from certain other signs it is concluded that, according to the mind of St. Thomas, middle knowledge is not to be given?

Dubium VI: Whether middle knowledge has flowed down continually from the time of Augustine to the present, and has been approved by theologians both more recent and more ancient, and especially by those who were present at the Council of Trent

Dubium VII: Whether middle knowledge remained hidden from St. Augustine and the ancient Fathers up to the year 1560 and the older Scholastics, and was drawn forth by the later theologians from the doctrine of those same Fathers, or whether it was known and reprobated by the aforesaid ancient theologians and Scholastics?

Dubium VIII: How from what has been said it may be deduced that the doctrine denying middle knowledge is to be preferred to that asserting it: where in particular the Doctors denying the aforesaid middle knowledge are recounted

Disputatio XI: On the Impossibility of Middle Knowledge from the Defect of Its Necessity, and from Its Incompossibility with the Other Things Presupposed in God

Dubium I: Whether middle knowledge is necessary to God, in order that He may certainly predestinate, or efficaciously predefine the consent of created will without injury to its freedom, or whether it removes both of these?

Dubium II: Whether from yet another head middle knowledge is incompatible with divine predestination with regard to adults?

Disputatio XII: On the Impossibility of Middle Knowledge, Both a Priori, or Quasi a Priori, and Drawn from Various Inconveniences

Dubium I: Whether the impossibility of middle knowledge is sufficiently shown by a priori, or quasi a priori reasoning?

Dubium II: Whether middle knowledge is impossible, from the fact that through it the reason of the first cause and of the first author of grace is removed from God?

Dubium III: Whether middle knowledge is impossible on the ground that it follows from it that God cannot fulfil what He promises concerning the faith, or the conversion, of the rational creature by the power of His omnipotence, but only from the foreknowledge of our future consent

Dubium IV: Whether middle knowledge is repugnant, from the fact that from it is gathered that God concurs to our free acts in a blind and ignorant way, and without intention of them in particular?

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