Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

1 Those things which are contained in God are, some of them, eminently in him, as creatures are; others, however, formally; and again, of these, some freely, such as are the free acts; others, however, exist in him altogether necessarily; and finally, of these, some are absolute, as the attributes; others, however, relative, as the relations of Paternity, Filiation, and so forth. Wherefore, in order that we may explain exactly whether, when God is seen, all things are seen in God, we shall treat in this disputation of all these matters: although as regards those things which are contained in him eminently, we shall not inquire whether all of them, but only some, and which ones, are seen when God is seen; because from what has been said in the preceding disputation it is clear enough that all of those things cannot be seen by the blessed, even when God is seen.

Because in God the absolute, or those that pertain to him as one, are prior to the relative; and those that are absolute and necessary also have being prior to those that are free and absolute; therefore in the first place we investigate the absolute, and what is necessarily in God.

For the negating part, some refer Henry, quodlib. 7, quaest. 4, Godfrey, quodlib. 6, quaest. 3, Vitoria, and his Master Tenorio, as well as Ferrari, 3 cont. Gent., cap. 46.

It is proved, first. For in God there are infinite absolute perfections, virtually distinguished from one another: therefore no blessed one will be able to see them clearly. The antecedent is proved. Because God, according to his absolute, is imitable and communicable in infinite ways, and distinguished in species: therefore he contains infinite absolute perfections, by which he is communicable in infinite ways. The consequence, however, is proved. For to see all these perfections an infinite light is required, since to see one of them some light is required, and so to see two a light twice as great, and so on with the rest, and therefore to see infinite ones a light infinitely intense will be required.

It is confirmed. Because a greater light is required for seeing all those perfections of God than for knowing all possible creatures: since those have more of entity than these, and consequently more of knowability: therefore, since an infinite light is demanded for knowing all possible creatures, it will also be demanded for seeing all the aforesaid perfections; and consequently no creature will be able to see them.

2 Secondly. For in God there are infinite ideas, each of which, per se and in particular, respects of its own accord first and above all that creature of which it is the idea: therefore if any blessed one sees all these ideal perfections, he will see all possible creatures, and consequently will comprehend God. The antecedent is proved. For every possible creature has its own idea, and therefore, so that God may produce a man, he does not use the idea of an angel, or conversely: and since the idea of this creature, and not of another, cannot fail to be terminated of its own accord first upon it, and not upon another, it follows that not only are there distinct ideas in God, but also that any one of them is terminated of its own accord first upon, or respects, its own possible creature. From this also the consequence is evident. For, therefore, when God and his omnipotence have been seen, creatures are seen under the common reason of things that can be made, because omnipotence is of its own accord first terminated upon what can be made, so to speak: therefore if any ideal reason found in God is terminated of its own accord first upon its own possible creature, the consequence will be that, when those are seen, all creatures will be seen as well.

3. It must nevertheless be said that all the blessed see all the absolute and necessary perfections, formally existing in him, with respect to all the reality that they possess in him. Thus D. Thom., art. 7 of this question, and 2. 2, quaest. 2, art. 8, ad 3; and so, commonly, the theologians.

It is proved from the reasoning of D. Thom. in the places cited. For the divine essence, together with all the absolute that are in God formally and necessarily, is as regards the thing itself one simple and indivisible object in itself, and vision by its nature tends to be terminated clearly and immediately upon its object: therefore, according to the nature of this object and of the vision, it is necessary that whoever sees the essence should see all the aforesaid things at the same time. The consequence is evident. Because an undivided and simple object postulates that it not be divided, and vision, as being clear and immediate, postulates that it be terminated upon this object without any distinction: because there cannot be a clear and immediate vision by means of which all things that are entirely the same formally and undivided, as regards the thing itself and in themselves, do not appear. The antecedent, however, as regards the first part, is evident. Because all those things are the same formally, really, with the divine essence. And as regards the second part, it is evident from itself and from what has already been said. Nevertheless, all these things will be more evident from what is to be said in the following difficulty.

4 As to the first, let the antecedent stand and let the consequence be denied: because it is enough that all those perfections are not actually distinct, but only virtually, and so they do not constitute any number that is actually such, but only in potency and in foundation. From this, for the proof of the consequence, it is sufficiently evident that a greater light is not required for seeing two of these perfections than for seeing one, or infinite ones: but that it is enough that the aforesaid perfections are one and the same, formally, as regards the thing itself.

In confirmation of this, that if the aforesaid proof is understood as concerning the knowledge of all possible creatures in God clearly seen, then (as D. Thom. noted in this art. 8, in the solution to 3) although it is greater to see God than all other things, yet it is greater to see God in such a way that all things creatable are known in him, than to see him alone only, or together with only some of the creatures that are contained in him. Because God, as visible in the first manner, is understood to have infinitely more of knowability than when considered in the second manner: and so he demands an infinite light for his own being known. But if the aforesaid proof is understood as concerning creatures in their own genus, and not in God clearly seen, then we confess that an infinite light is required for the vision of them taken together: and so such knowledge does entirely imply the aforesaid light, just as that light implies such knowledge: yet granting the impossible, that all were known together in this manner, then the light of glory, by which God is in fact seen, would be more perfect than that infinite light by which all those creatures would be seen. Because the light of glory is, according to its species, more perfect than all other lights: and so however much the other lights may grow in intensive and accidental perfection, they will never reach the perfection of the aforesaid light: just as however much the accidental perfection of the sensitive power may be increased, it will never reach the perfection of the intellectual power. Whence, although God has, according to those things that are formally in him, more of knowability than all possible creatures to be known in their own genus, yet he can be clearly seen through the light of glory, which is a more perfect light than that infinite light would be.

5 As to the second, it is to be said that if we speak of the divine ideas according to that reality and perfection which they possess in God, then they are not distinguished even virtually, but are one and the same formality, perfection, and attribute. Wherefore according to this reason, an idea does not respect (so to speak) any particular creature of its own accord first and above all, but only in the common: and so the distinction of ideas is only the distinction of one and the same perfection, in that it connotes peculiarly this or that possible creature as a secondary, inadequate concomitant, and therefore for seeing the perfection of the divine ideas, and the one and most simple reality of that perfection, it will not be necessary to know in particular that same perfection, as terminated upon possible creatures in particular, or all its terminations; but it will be enough to know it according to its primary termination (so to speak), and also the possible creatures according to that common reason according to which they are, so to speak, connected of their own accord first and above all with the aforesaid reality.

We have said, as it is terminated upon possible creatures, because here we are not speaking of the ideas of future things as such: for in these the free determination of God is involved: but at present we deal only with those things which are found in God not in any way formally, but absolutely necessarily.

6 The title is understood not only of those things which actually occur, but of the same things by an ordering to divine power; because it is certain among all theologians that in fact all the blessed see God as He is One and Three. Hence in the Council of Florence, in the last session, in the letters of the union of the Church it is defined that the souls which are carried up to heaven clearly behold God Himself, Three and One, as He is. And reason recommends this. For, as D. Thomas noted in art. 7 of this question, the vision of the fatherland corresponds to faith: hence just as on the way we believe the mystery of the Trinity, so in the fatherland we shall clearly behold it, according to the word of the Apostle: We see now through a glass, darkly; but then face to face.

§ I. The Position of Scotus.

Scotus defends the affirming part in 1. dist. 1. quaest. 2, whom the whole school of the Scotists follows. It is proved first, because the relations do not pertain to the primary object of the beatific vision: hence a vision terminated as to the essence, and not as to them, can be given. The consequence is evident. Then, because the vision depends essentially only on its primary object. Then also, because therefore the same vision can be given, not terminated as to creatures, since these do not look to its primary object. The antecedent, however, is proved. For the relations are not seen on account of themselves, according to that relation by which they are distinguished and opposed, but on account of the essence; since they have one and the same relation of visibility and of enjoyment: hence they do not pertain to the primary object of the vision; since the primary object, and those things which pertain to it, are seen on account of themselves, and not on account of something else.

7 It is confirmed first. The eternal Father sees His essence before, in the order of origin, the Son and the Holy Spirit are produced: hence in that prior state He will not see these two persons: hence neither will they pertain to the primary object of His own beatitude, nor of ours, which is of the same reason as His. The first consequence is evident, because in that prior state they are not yet produced, and so they cannot be beheld in that same state; since intuitive vision presupposes the production and the existence of the thing seen. The second consequence, however, also holds. Because if the aforesaid persons pertained to the primary object of beatitude, the Father's vision could not in that prior state terminate as to the essence, and not as to them. The antecedent, however, is proved. Because the Father produces the Son from the knowledge of the divine essence, and therefore first sees the divine essence, than He produces Him, and consequently than He Himself be produced.

It is confirmed second. For if the Son and the Holy Spirit pertained to the primary object of the Father's vision, then the Father would have something from these two persons, and so would not be simply prior to them in the order of origin: but this is false, as the theologians commonly teach; hence, etc. The first sequel is evident. For the primary object of the vision is the principle of that vision: hence, if the Son and the Holy Spirit have being as the primary object of the Father's vision together with the essence, they will be the principle of it, and thus the Father will have it from them.

It is confirmed third. For as often as anything is such from itself, so often will it have that being, even if any other thing whatsoever were not: but the Father is blessed from Himself: hence He would be blessed even if, impossibly, the persons of the Son and the Holy Spirit did not exist: and consequently the vision, by which He is blessed, will terminate only of itself first as to the essence considered in itself, but not as it is in the other persons.

8 Second, and principally. For the divine essence can be communicated and united in the relation of an intelligible species with the blessed intellect, the persons not being united in the relation of the aforesaid species: hence then the essence will be able to be seen without the relations having been seen. The consequence needs no proof: because a vision terminated as to some object cannot be given unless that object is first united in the relation of an intelligible species: hence, if the essence can be united in the relation of species without the relations being united, it will be able to be seen without those having been seen. The antecedent, however, is proved. Because the essence is communicated to the Son by generation, and is united to filiation with the highest identity, so that it subsists by it, yet paternity is not communicated to Him, nor united: hence the essence can also be communicated and united to the blessed intellect in the relation of an intelligible species, without the personal relations being united or communicated: for in this no reason of disparity appears to occur.

It is confirmed and explained. For the reason on account of which, the essence having been seen, the relations would have to be seen, can be none other than this, namely that they are identified with it and are very intrinsic to it, and that the essence is united to the intellect such as it is in itself: but even if the essence be communicated to the Son such as it is in itself, and have the aforesaid identity with the same relations, it is nevertheless communicated and united to that same Son without all the relations being communicated and united: hence in the same way the same essence will be able to be united to the blessed intellect in the relation of an intelligible species, without the relations being united together with it.

9 Third. Since God is understood, the relations having been set aside, to be the first cause of the intellectual creature: hence, those having been set aside, He will be the last end of that creature: hence also under this setting aside He will be able to be the beatific object of the aforesaid creature. The antecedent is evident. Then, because God does not act by reason of the relations; since these are not active forms; then also, because if God, impossibly, did not subsist except by one only absolute subsistence, He would still be the first cause, and could produce exteriorly whatever He produces now. The first consequence, however, also holds. Because the first efficient and the last end coincide, on account of the fact that He cannot act except on account of Himself as on account of the ultimate final reason, and therefore except by ordering all things to Himself, as to the last end. The second consequence, however, also holds. Because, since the beatific vision is the concomitant of the last end, nothing else is required on the part of the beatific object beyond that which is required on the part of it with regard to the relation of the last end.

10 Fourth. For filiation can terminate the humanity of Christ without spiration and paternity terminating it: hence it can also terminate the vision of itself, without the other relations terminating the aforesaid vision together with it: hence the essence too will be able to be seen without those same relations having been seen. The antecedent holds from those things which are commonly taught by the theologians in the matter of the Incarnation. The first consequence, however, also holds: then from the parity of the reason: then also, because filiation can by itself, and in the solid, terminate the humanity, because by the force of its own formal reason, as distinct from the rest, that is, according to its own relative reason, it has the power of terminating; but also according to the same reason it is intelligible per se, since according to it there is something real and true within its own line, and by way of a most pure act: hence it can also terminate in the solid the vision of itself. From which also the second consequence sufficiently holds. For the divine essence has its own intelligibility all the more, insofar as it is virtually distinguished from all the relations: and thus it will be able to terminate in the solid the vision.

§ II. The Common Opinion Is Established by the Testimonies of Scripture and the Fathers.

11 It must nevertheless be said that it involves a contradiction for the divine essence to be seen, such as it is in itself without the persons, or one person without another. Thus Caietanus in 2. 2. quaest. 2. art. 8, Medina in 1. 2. quaest. 11. art. 4, and 3. part. quaest. 3. art. 3, Soto in 4. dist. 49. quaest. 3. art. 3, Cabrera in 3. part. quaest. 10. art. 2. ad 5, Suarez, lib. 2. de Attributis cap. 23, Vazquez in the present disp. 13 and 48, and very many others.

It is proved first from that of John 14: Philip, who sees Me, sees also the Father. For although Tertullian and others explain these words of the vision, or of the knowledge through faith, in such a way that whoever believes in the Son must also believe in the Father, nevertheless Chrysostom in hom. 63. on John, Cyril in lib. 9. on the same, Hilary in 7. de Trinit., Nazianzen in orat. 49, and others, explain them of the clear and intuitive vision: hence, since Philip had asked that it be given to him to see the Father, either with the bodily eyes under some sensible form or with the mind under the obscurity of faith, then Christ, taking occasion from this, answered with the proposed words: by which He signified that it is necessary that whoever sees Himself should see also the Father: and since with regard to this there is the same reason of the divine essence compared with the relations, and conversely, or of any one relation compared with the rest (as we shall weigh immediately), the conclusion will be that, according to these words of Christ the Lord, once the essence has been seen the relations must be seen, and conversely: and likewise, once one person has been seen, the others must be seen.

12 It is confirmed first, and the force of this testimony is explained. For, that Christ might render an account of what He had said, He immediately subjoined: Dost thou not believe that I am in the Father, and the Father in Me? as if He were saying: therefore whoever sees the same Christ ought to behold the Father, because He is in the Father, and the Father in Him: from the fact that the nature of each of the two is one and the same, identified with them by that reason with respect to which the Father is in the Son, and conversely by circuminsession (as the theologians speak). Hence Christ the Lord formed this argument with its force: I am in the Father, and the Father is in Me, because we are the same in one numerically, the divine nature: hence it is necessary that whoever sees Me should see also the Father. Which argument, as will be clear to the one who looks into it, also proves that, whichever relation or formality of God has been seen, the other things formally existing in Him ought to be seen.

It is confirmed second by the testimonies of D. Thomas. For in 2. 2. quaest. 2. art. 8. ad 3 he says: The sum of God's goodness, according to the mode in which it is now understood through the affections, can be understood without the Trinity of persons. But according to that in which it is understood in itself, such as it is seen by the blessed, it cannot be understood without the Trinity of persons, and in 3. part. quaest. 3. art. 3 he thus says: The intellect is in a twofold way related to divine things: in one way, so as to know God as He is: and thus it is impossible that anything be circumscribed by the intellect from God, and that something else remain: because all that is in God is one, saving the distinction of the persons. Yet of these one is taken away if the other is taken away: because they are distinguished only by relations, which must exist together. And in art. praeced. of this question, in the solution to 2, he admits what is said in the argument, namely that God, because He is altogether simple, cannot be seen through the essence unless He be seen entire and nothing of His escape the one who sees. Which is also taught by Nazianzen in the place cited, and by Augustine on Psalm 84 and 85, and also tract. 70. on John, and lib. 1. de Trinitate, cap. 8, in these words: Whether therefore we hear, show us the Son, or whether we hear, show us the Father, it avails just as much: because neither can be shown without the other.

From all of which it follows that there is no solution such as some give to the aforesaid testimonies, saying that they are to be understood of those things which actually occur, and not by an ordering to divine power. For the reason which is brought forward in the aforesaid testimonies is, on the one hand, the identity of all divine things in the one and the same essence; on the other hand, the fact that this vision must terminate in God as He is. Hence, since these two things are immutable, even by an ordering to divine power it follows that, by an ordering to divine power, it will likewise be impossible to see the essence without the persons, or one person without another.

§ III. The Same Opinion Is Supported by Reasons.

13 Then the assertion is proved by a reason drawn from D. Thomas in the place cited, from 3. part. For the divine persons are constituted by relations: but these must be simultaneous in nature and in knowledge: hence one cannot be seen clearly and quidditatively unless the others are seen, and consequently unless the nature is also seen. The major holds from those things which are commonly taught by the theologians in this 1. part. quaest. 40 from the Councils and the Fathers. The minor likewise holds from the common consent of the Dialecticians, cap. de relatione. The first consequence, from either of the premises, seems to follow sufficiently. From which also the second consequence remains manifest: since it is impossible for a person to be seen clearly and quidditatively without the essence of that person and its nature having been seen clearly and quidditatively.

14 Nor does it matter what Lorca answers in 1. 2. quaest. 3. disp. 13, namely that from the force of this reason it follows only that the Son cannot be seen without the Father, and conversely; but not without the Holy Spirit, because the Father and the Son are not constituted in the esse of persons through active spiration, through which they look to the Holy Spirit, but through paternity and filiation. Wherefore, just as for knowing their persons it is not necessary, by the force of this reason, to know active spiration, which is not constitutive of them in the esse of persons, so neither will it be necessary to know the Holy Spirit, who is the terminus of active spiration.

The contrary, however, is this: that if the Father and the Son are constituted in the esse of persons by paternity and filiation, as they are in fact constituted, it must needs be involved there that although the Father, for example, is not formally referred by paternity to the Holy Spirit, nevertheless He Himself, constituted through paternity, is the suppositum related as that which is by active spiration, and not by just anything, but as by something formally identified with Him, as in the matter of the Trinity nearly all the theologians commonly teach: hence it is also involved there that He must be seen as something related as that which to the person of the Holy Spirit; and consequently by the force of this reason it is sufficiently proved that all the relations must be seen together. This last consequence needs no proof. The first, however, clearly follows from the antecedent. For, as we said in the preceding doubt, those things which are the same actually and formally, and are seen by clear and immediate vision, must be seen together by the force of that same vision; otherwise that vision will not be clear, and of the thing as it is, since it will not be conformed to the mode of being which the object has in itself, when through it, in the aforesaid object, something is separated from something, namely that which is known from that which is not known, notwithstanding that in the thing known there is identically one and the same formality.

15 It is confirmed. For when by abstractive cognition, which is not of the thing as it is in itself, a simple object, undivided in itself, is known, in such a way that with respect to some things it is attained, and with respect to others it is not attained, then a distinction is not made in it such as it is in itself, but with respect to our concepts: hence, by proportional reasoning, when the same object as it is in itself is known by clear and intuitive cognition, in such a way that with respect to some things it is known, and with respect to others it is not known in the way already described, a distinction will be made in it such as it is in itself: hence it cannot be coherent that that simple formality of paternity and of spiration should be seen such as it is in itself, and yet not be seen through such a vision, in the manner already explained, as regards all that it identifies with itself: otherwise we should most excellently infer from this that paternity and spiration are not identified with one another.

16 Second, the assertion is proved principally by a reason which the same D. Thomas hints at. Because it is repugnant for the divine essence to be seen quidditatively without its quidditative predicates, as is clear from itself: hence it will also be repugnant for it to be seen without the three persons: hence likewise it will involve that one person be seen without another. The first consequence is evident. Because, although the persons are not of the quidditative concept of the essence, but only of the mode, or as it were of an intrinsic mode of it, nevertheless this, that the essence is communicable to the persons of the Trinity by way of a most pure act, is of the quidditative concept of that essence itself: but it cannot be seen quidditatively, such as it is communicable in the manner said to the aforesaid persons, unless such persons are seen: hence, etc. From which also the second consequence holds. Since it is repugnant for any divine person to be seen quidditatively without the divine nature itself being seen quidditatively: hence, if it is repugnant for the essence and the divine nature to be seen without the three persons of the Trinity, it will likewise be repugnant to see one person without another.

17 Nor does it matter, if you say that from hence it follows only that the divine persons must be seen according to the common notion of a divine person. For as, the omnipotence having been seen quidditatively, it is not necessary to see possible creatures, except according to the common notion of a possible creature, because this notion is looked to, as it were, per se and in the first place by it, so, the divine essence having been seen according to that in which it is communicable to the three divine persons, it will not be necessary to see those persons in particular, because the essence, as communicable, only has per se and in the first place, as it were, a regard to them according to the common notion of a divine person.

The contrary, however, is this. Then, that the divine omnipotence is not connected with creatures in particular according to that esse which they have in their own genus, as with those with which it is actually and formally identified; otherwise with the divine persons, even when each of these is considered according to its own. Hence, although, the omnipotence having been seen, it is not necessary to see creatures in particular with which it is connected in no way except secondarily, nevertheless, the essence having been seen, it will be necessary to see the persons according to their own, even if it were only secondarily connected with them according to that reasoning: because, as we said in the preceding reason, it is repugnant for anything, and such as it is in itself, to be seen quidditatively, without everything which is identified with it being seen. Then also: because the divine essence does not secondarily, but per se and in the first place, as it were, look to the divine persons according to their own, because it looks to them, as it were, or is connected with them per se and in the first place, in that they constitute the Trinity, which yet they can constitute only according to their own, and as they are mutually distinct.

18 It is confirmed first. Because of the essence of the divine nature there is not to be any communicability at all, but communicability in an intellectual manner, namely through the intellect and the will, and consequently by generating the Son through the intellect, and by spirating the Holy Spirit through the will, in the manner usually stated in the matter of the Trinity: indeed, in such a way that this must formally and expressly import: hence its communicability cannot be seen quidditatively in particular unless the Holy Spirit and the Son are seen in particular, and consequently unless the Father is also seen.

It is confirmed and explained second. Since it is of the reason of the quidditative vision of God, such as He is in Himself, that through it God should appear, or be perceived, as He is in Himself: hence, since God, as He is in Himself, has an express and formal connection with His own formalities, according to their own character, and any personality has the same connection with the essence, it must needs be that through the vision of God, such as He is in Himself, all these things should appear, such as they are expressly and formally in Him.

19 It is confirmed third. For the connection which God has with possible creatures, considered according to their particular reasons, is in Him only implicitly, and not expressly, and therefore it will not be necessary that through the vision of God, such as He is in Himself, the aforesaid creatures should be seen expressly in particular, but only implicitly, insofar as that in which they are implicitly contained is seen: hence, precisely because the divine essence and the personalities are in Him expressly and formally, it must needs be that through His vision, such as He is in Himself, they should be known expressly and formally. The consequence seems certain. The antecedent, however, as regards the second part, holds from what has been said in the preceding disputation, and also from the first part of that same antecedent. As regards the first part, however, it is also evident. Since that connection is expressly only with creatures according to the general notion of things that can be made; and because under this notion those very creatures are implicitly contained according to their particular reasons, therefore the divine essence is also implicitly connected with them when taken in particular.

20 There is added, finally, that precisely because the hypostatic union, for example, of the humanity to the Word terminates immediately in the Word, such as He is in Himself, it must have every essential perfection which can be given within the latitude of the hypostatic union to the Word; and likewise, precisely because the divine essence, such as it is in itself, is immediately united with the blessed intellect in the relation of an intelligible species, that union must have every essential, though not accidental, perfection which can be conceived within the line of such a union with the created intellect (which is the same that we say of the union of that same essence, such as it is in itself, in the relation of the word, or of the object actually seen): hence, precisely because the quidditative and intuitive vision of God terminates immediately in God, such as He is in Himself, it must have every essential perfection which can be conceived within the latitude of the created vision of God, such as He is in Himself: hence, since the created vision of God, having every essential perfection of its latitude, can and must terminate in God with respect to the whole reality and formality which He actually and formally has in Himself, as is evident in the vision which is in fact given in the least blessed, it must needs be that any vision of God itself, precisely because it terminates immediately in God, such as He is in Himself, should have this perfection and mode of attaining.

§ IV. The Arguments of the First Opinion Are Met.

21 To the first, let the antecedent pass, but the consequence must be denied. And to the first proof it is answered that, although the vision depends only on the primary object, as on the reason which is as it were specificative of it, nevertheless it can be necessarily connected with the secondary object: from the fact that the primary and the secondary object have between them a necessary connection in the relation of an object quidditatively and clearly knowable; then on account of the identity which they have; then also, from the fact that this connection is of such a condition that the primary object cannot fail to express that precisely by being seen quidditatively and as it is in itself, as has been explained. Hence, although in the vision of the divine essence possible creatures are only the secondary object, nevertheless, because the aforesaid essence has the connection just indicated with them according to the common notion of possibles, therefore it cannot be seen unless the aforesaid creatures are seen according to the reason already explained. And likewise, although in a corporeal vision color is the primary object and quantity the secondary, nevertheless, because color, in the relation of the order of the object of corporeal vision, has a necessary connection with quantitative extension, and also with regard to place, in such a way that it cannot express it: therefore it is very probable that it cannot be, even by the absolute power of God, without that force: and thus the body of Christ under the sacramental species is not visible to the bodily eye, as D. Thomas teaches in 3. part. quaest. 76. art. 7, because it lacks the aforesaid extension.

Or, second, it can be answered for the present probably, by denying the antecedent. For although the divine essence is the primary object quo, the persons are the primary object quod, terminating that same vision. For as it is of the reason of the divine persons that they are three and have one and the same nature, so into their reason it is necessarily included that they are a triple object quod of the vision, with, however, a single reason of terminating. Hence, although that they terminate by reason of the essence takes from them the reason of the object quo, it does not yet take from them that of the object quod.

22 To the first confirmation it is to be said that, although the eternal Father, even while He is prior in origin than the Son, sees His essence and is blessed, nevertheless He is not prior in beatitude in the order of origin than the Son and the Holy Spirit are produced, because beatitude is one of the essential predicates: and thus, according to it, the Father is not prior in the order of origin than the Son. And the reason is this. Because a prior and a posterior cannot be found according to some order, unless such an order is found. Wherefore, since between the Father and the Son, as regards essential things, there is no order of origin, any more than there is as regards producing and being produced, the conclusion will be that neither there, as regards the same essential things, is there a prior and a posterior in the order of origin.

And to the proof it is to be said that it is false that the Father produces the Son from the knowledge of the divine essence, if it is understood of active production: because by that expression the order of origin is denoted between the Father's knowledge and the active production of the Son, which yet is false, since the Father's knowledge itself is the actual active production of the Son without any virtual distinction, although with this it stands that it be distinguished from the passive production of that same Son: and thus it is true that the Son is produced from the Father's knowledge of the essence. From this, however, it is not permitted to infer that the Father sees the essence without the person of the Son and the Holy Spirit being seen: because this priority is not a priority in which there is also knowledge. For since the person of the Father has a necessary connection with the person of the Son, for example, there is no sign in which the person of the Father is and the person of the Son is not, or in which the Father is producing and the Son produced, or finally in which the person of the Father can be understood, such as it is in itself, without the person of the Son being understood; but in whatever sign in which one is seen, the other must be seen: although the one (namely the Father) as producing, and the other (namely the Son) as produced.

23 To the second confirmation both sequels must be denied. And to the proof of the first it is answered that, if once it were true that the relations do not pertain to the primary object of beatitude, it is sufficiently clear how from the fact that the Father necessarily sees the essence together with the person of the Son and the Holy Spirit, He does not therefore have His vision from the secondary object, but only from the primary: but if the persons pertain to the primary object of beatitude, they will surely look to it as the terminating object, and not as the motivating object: because the divine essence alone has the reason of the motivating object of the intellect with respect to the vision.

Now the purely terminating object is not the principle of the vision, but the motivating object: because it is in this way alone that it is united to the intellect in the relation of an intelligible species, and thus in the relation of a principle with respect to the vision as we now understand it. But on these matters, let them be seen in what will be said in the following treatise, disp. 3. num. 36, where we shall explain whether the divine relations pertain to the primary and specificative object of the divine intellect; then also what will be said in this doubt, num. 29.

To the third confirmation the major is to be granted, and the minor along with the first consequence, but the second is to be denied. Because, just as in the case of the first consequence the Father would be blessed through the vision of the essence, such as it is in itself: and consequently, just as He would be without the aforesaid persons, so now He must be blessed as He is in fact in Himself: and because in fact the essence is formally identified with them in the three persons, therefore it must be seen as it is in them. Add, for a fuller explanation, that the major of this argument is true only of those things which have being of that sort and are not necessarily connected with others; but as the eternal Father, whether He be from Himself or not from another, is God and is blessed, nevertheless His nature has an indispensable connection with the other two persons; so too His beatitude, as it now is, has also an indispensable connection with the vision of the other persons, from the fact that His nature must be seen such as it is in itself. We have said, as it now is, because if once the other divine persons were involved, then just as the nature of the Father would be other than it now is, so also would His beatitude, and consequently it would then be sufficiently necessary to see the divine essence in the single person, namely in that which is now the person of the Father.

24 To the second it is answered that the antecedent is true if it is understood of the union of the relations taken immediately in themselves, but otherwise of the union of them also as mediated, and by reason of the essence. For the divine essence has the reason of an intelligible species both with respect to itself and with respect to the relations, because these are the personal properties of it. And to the proof on the contrary it is to be said that the reason is dissimilar. For paternity and filiation are opposed relatively, and hence are incompossible in the relation of what is communicable to one and the same person: and therefore it is not surprising, nay it is necessary, that the divine essence communicated to the Son should not be communicated to Him as paternity, and that the aforesaid communication should demand precisely this. Now the divine essence and all its personal properties are not incompossible in the relation of things simultaneously visible by one and the same vision. Then, because otherwise in fact they would not be seen in that way, whose opposite, as was assumed at the beginning of this doubt and proved. Then also, because just as a nature demanding only one single personality can be seen together with that one, so a nature demanding a triple personality will be able to be seen together with all of them, nay not only will it be able, but it will be obliged so to be considered on account of the reasons given for our assertion.

25 Unless it be that the divine essence, as it has the reason of an intelligible species with respect to itself and with respect to the relations, is not yet virtually distinguished, nor requires a greater light in order that, according to each of the two reasons, it be united as distinguished only on the part of the mode of being conceived, than in order that it be united according to the one. Hence, just as it is impossible to give an intellect perfused with the light of glory and not having the divine essence united to it in the relation of an intelligible species, so, if once a greater light is not required in order that the divine essence be united by way of an intelligible species with respect to itself and with respect to the relations, it will not be able to be united according to that former reason, as distinguished only on the part of the mode of our conceiving, without being united according to this one, and consequently without being seen one with its personalities, as has been explained. Now the divine essence and paternity are virtually distinguished, and therefore it is not surprising that the essence, when communicated, should not be communicated as a relation: since the virtual distinction which is between the essence and paternity is equivalent to a real actual distinction; especially since such a distinction, owing to its peculiar reason, arises in some way from the incompossibility and real opposition which is between paternity and filiation, which yet several other virtual distinctions found in God do not have: and therefore such a distinction cannot fail to be sufficient for it to be possible that the essence be communicated to the Son without paternity being communicated.

26 If, however, you ask why it is repugnant for the intellect to be perfused with the light of glory and not to have the divine essence united to it? It will be answered that this arises from the fact that this union, through which the divine essence, which is always most intimately present to every created intellect, is united anew to it in the relation of species, ought not to begin anew by something being added to the divine essence and changing it: but by something being added to the created intellect, which has the reason of something connoted with respect to the aforesaid union, and by which the aforesaid intellect is changed, as is clear from what has been said. And thus, precisely because such a connoted thing is posited, the aforesaid union cannot fail to be given: just as the mode of the hypostatic union, on the part of the humanity of Christ, holding to it, is the connoted thing required for the union of the Word with the humanity, and changing it, therefore such a connoted thing cannot be given unless the Word is united with the humanity. Wherefore, since the connoted thing necessary in order that the divine essence be united in the relation of intelligible form is the light of glory changing the intellect, the conclusion is that it involves this being present in the intellect, and that the union of the divine essence with it in the relation of intelligible form be not given at the same time.

27 From which, to the confirmation it is answered that the reason on account of which the divine essence cannot be seen without the relations being seen is this, because it is united, such as it is in itself, not in just any way, but such as it is in itself, visible: and its visibility, such as it is in itself, and consequently through a clear, immediate, and quidditative vision, requires that the nature not be seen without the persons, or one person without another, as has been shown. Now from the fact that the same divine essence is communicated to the Son such as it is in itself, that is, such as it is in itself communicable to Him by way of nature, it does not follow that the essence is to be communicated together with paternity: because, since paternity and filiation, in the relation of what is communicable, although not in the relation of things simultaneously visible, are incompossible, it must needs be that, although the divine essence is communicated to the Son such as it is in itself communicable through natural generation, paternity is not therefore communicated, nay rather that this is repugnant.

Wherefore, although the most formal concept of the union, or of the communication, of the divine essence, such as it is in itself considered according to its general reason, is not the same as the concept of the union and communication of that same essence, such as it is in itself absolutely, that is, simply, namely, with respect to the whole reality which it actually and formally has; nevertheless the peculiar concept of the union of the divine essence, such as it is visible in itself, coincides entirely with the concept of its visibility, according to which it is absolutely and simply in itself, that is, according to the whole reality which it formally has in itself: since (as we have already said) and as has been shown by reasons, it is repugnant for one who sees God not to see all these things.

Add that the reason on account of which, the essence having been seen, the relations are to be seen is not any kind of identity, but that identity which is asked of the same essence, as it has the reason of a subject which is to be united with respect to itself and to the relations, and which excludes even the virtual distinction: since the divine essence, as it has the reason of an intelligible species with respect to itself and to the relations, is not virtually distinguished: on account of the fact that all this pertains to the line of the intelligible species.

28 To the third, let the antecedent pass, and both consequences are denied. Because, although the first efficient and the last end are the same really, the formal reason of that one as first efficient and as last end of the intellectual creature is nevertheless different: and therefore, although we grant that as first efficient it does not involve, as far as is on the part of the effect, the relations, nevertheless, as last end it also involves the same relations on the part of the vision: because the vision must terminate in Him, such as He is in Himself.

29 To the fourth it is answered from what has been said, granting the antecedent and denying both consequences, and to the first proof of the antecedent the parity there adduced is to be denied. To the second proof, however, the major is to be granted and the minor denied. Since the divine relations cannot of themselves and by their own reason be united in the relation of an intelligible species, nor terminate the vision by their own reason, but only by reason of the divine essence, which is the primary formal reason, motivating and terminating with respect to the clear and quidditative vision of God, because a divine relation, although it is a pure act within its own line, does not have the reason of that one, but only by reason of the essence has such actuality and immateriality as is required in order that it be able of itself most formally to terminate the vision, and be united in the relation of an intelligible species with respect to that same vision: since for this it was required that it have its own existere without any virtual distinction, as we have said in this treatise, disp. 2. n. 116, and as we shall say in the treatise on the knowledge of God, disp. 3. num. 36. From which, to the proof of the second consequence it is to be said that, although the divine essence has its own intelligibility, nevertheless its intelligibility is that by reason of which the personalities are seen, and are clearly understood, as will be more fully explained in the place cited, and it cannot be united in the relation of species with respect to itself clearly seen, without being united in the same way with respect to the relations, nor can it be united by way of species with respect to one person without being united in the same way with respect to the others, as has been shown.

30 The particle by force of the vision of the divine essence has purposely been added to the title, so that it may be denoted that what is treated of here is not a discourse on the vision of God's free acts by some other knowledge, but only by the vision of the blessed; so that that very vision which terminates in the divine essence should, by reason of its perfection, also terminate in the free decrees of the divine will.

§ I. The position of Durand and the others.

The negative part is defended by Durand, in 3. dist. 14. quaest. 2. num. 4. and 5., and in 4. dist. 49. quaest. 3. num. 12. and the following. Vazq. 1. p. disp. 50. cap. 3. num. 23. and Molina on this article, disp. 5. memb. 5. and 6. § ad primam, and § dicendum.

It is proved, first. For although the essence of man, for example, and his will, are known intuitively and quidditatively, indeed even comprehensively, nevertheless the free determinations of the aforesaid will are not for that reason known, or capable of being known, by force of this knowledge: hence, even though the divine essence and its will are seen quidditatively by the blessed, the free decrees of the divine will will not for that reason be seen by force of such a vision. The antecedent is commonly admitted by the theologians in the matter of the angels. There, by many testimonies of Scripture and of the saints, it is shown that although an angel comprehends the human will, he does not nevertheless on that account reach, or be able to reach, by force of such a knowledge, the free acts of that same will.

The consequence, however, is proved. Because the determination of the divine will towards the divine essence, in the reason of the object known, is such as the determination of the human will towards the human essence: hence, just as this is not knowable by force of the knowledge of the essence, so neither is that.

31 Secondly. For if the free decrees of God were seen, or could be seen, by force of the vision of the divine essence, then necessarily all of them would have to be seen by every blessed man: but this is against the common opinion of the theologians, both in the present matter, as the Gloss says. The major is evident. For that the divine decrees should be seen by force of the aforesaid vision could only arise from their being identified with the divine essence, as is established from what we said in the preceding difficulty: but the free decrees of God, either all of them or none of them, must be identified with the divine essence: hence, either none or all of them must be seen.

32 Thirdly, the free determination of the divine will adds nothing real beyond the necessary act, but only a relation of reason: hence it cannot be seen by force of the vision. The antecedent is evident. For if it added anything real, that thing would not be something necessary, otherwise it would not be something added beyond the same necessary act, nor would it be anything real and free, which therefore could be, and not be, in God; otherwise something real which is in God, and is God, could not be in him, and could not be God, which is indeed, as is established, absurd: and therefore that which is added will only be some relation of reason. The consequence, however, is proved. Because relations of reason are not known except by an intellect that fashions them, since their being consists in being fashioned and known: but through the beatific vision a thing is known such as it is, because it is known quidditatively and intuitively: hence no fiction can intervene there, as the means by which the aforesaid relations are reached.

33 Fourthly. For if the free decrees of God were seen, or could be seen, by force of the vision of the divine essence, it would follow that the vision would grow in perfection, from the fact that it was extended to them: but this is repugnant: hence, etc. The sequence seems certain. For the extension to some object, and not just any object, but a divine one, and of infinite purity, such as a free decree of God, could not fail to pour back some perfection into the vision. The minor, moreover, is established. For since the vision of God is a necessary act, it necessarily has all its perfection, independently of the free decree of God.

34 Lastly. Acts of this kind cannot be seen by the virtue of the light of glory, nor of the divine essence, under the reason of an intelligible species: hence in no way are they seen, or can be seen, by force of the vision of the essence. The consequence needs no proof: since nothing can be seen by force of the vision of the divine essence except by the virtue of the light of glory and of that same essence, as it influences under the mode of an intelligible species. The antecedent, however, is proved. First, because otherwise the aforesaid free acts would not be hidden per se with respect to an intellect having the light of glory and the divine essence united to it under the reason of an intelligible species; since each of the two operates under the mode of a necessary cause, and therefore unfolds in its corresponding vision the whole force it has for seeing those things which are in God: but this is false, and against the nature of a free act, which per se is hidden from everyone except the agent who elicits it. Then also: because otherwise, whoever saw any of these acts would have to see them all, as we said above. Since no reason can be given, neither on the part of the light nor on the part of the essence, why some of these acts rather than others should be beheld, when all the lights are of the same species, and the divine essence represents all of them equally.

35 It is confirmed. For if acts of this kind were seen by the virtue of the light of glory and of the divine essence united under the reason of an intelligible species, it could not be that he who is more blessed should not see the same, indeed more free acts, than he who is less blessed: but this is against the common opinion of the theologians: hence etc. The major is proved. For the more blessed would have a greater light, and the divine essence more perfectly united to him: hence, if the aforesaid acts were seen by the virtue of the light and of the essence, it could not be that the more blessed did not see them all, indeed more free acts, than the less blessed. The minor, however, is proved. For according to the commonly received doctrine, more of these acts are known by those blessed for whom more of the effects toward which the acts themselves terminate obtain. Since therefore it can happen that, on making a comparison between two unequally blessed men, more of the aforesaid effects belong to the less blessed man, from the fact that he had a more universal care in the militant Church, as though he had been the founder of some religious order, it will follow that the less blessed man will then have to know more of these free acts than the more blessed man.

§ II. The true opinion.

36 It must be said, however, first, that God's free acts can be seen immediately and in themselves by the blessed by force of the vision of the divine essence, or formally through the aforesaid vision. Thus D. Thom. 3. part. quaest. 10. art. 2. in corpore, and ad 2., and quaest. 8. de veritate art. 4. ad 1., whom the theologians commonly follow, excepting those whom we mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

The assertion is explained. For indeed the particle immediately and in themselves was purposely added to it, so that it might be denoted that the aforesaid acts, taken in the singular, cannot be seen by the blessed in the divine essence immediately, that is, as in a cause, and in an object previously known and penetrated, in the same manner as creatures can be seen in the divine essence, as in a cause, and in an object previously known and penetrated; but immediately and in themselves, as something of the aforesaid essence, in that proportionate manner in which attributes are reached by force of the beatific vision. For although in this they differ from free acts formally taken, in that they are reached in the essence, which was somehow seen before under the mode of the virtual root of those acts, yet the free acts, as such, are different; nevertheless the aforesaid attributes are seen, even immediately in themselves, as something of God: so that even if impossibly they were not reached in the essence, as in a root somehow seen beforehand, the beatific vision would nevertheless terminate in them, from the fact that they are something of God and formally exist in him. Whence the divine essence would concur only to the vision of the free acts, as such, under the mode of an intelligible species, and not at the same time as a cause which, being previously penetrated and known, leads to the knowledge of them under the mode of an object previously seen, such as that which. For it is certain that the free acts of God, taken in the singular, and insofar as they terminate in future creatures, cannot be seen in the divine essence, as in a cause, in the manner explained. Then, because almost all the arguments adduced in the preceding paragraph prove this. Then also: because, in order that anything should be seen by force of the vision of the essence, previously seen in the manner just explained, the same essence, as seen, must have a necessary connection with that which is thus to be seen; but that there is no such connection between the essence and the free acts, considered in the aforesaid manner, is altogether certain.

37 These things being supposed, the assertion is proved by a reason drawn from D. Thom. For God, through the vision by which he beholds himself, reaches his own free decrees of his will, as something belonging to himself: hence the blessed intellect too will be able through the beatific vision to see those same decrees immediately and in themselves, as something of God. The antecedent is evident. For since the aforesaid decrees are real with a divine reality, inasmuch as they are something of God, they will certainly be known immediately and in themselves by God himself, as something belonging to himself, and through the vision by which he beholds himself: as for this reason attributes and relations are seen in this way by God by force of the vision of his essence. The consequence, however, is proved. For since the vision of the blessed is a participation in the vision by which God beholds himself, it will be able to terminate in that very thing in which the uncreated vision terminates, provided that no infinity be desired with respect to it: it is established, however, that no infinity is desired with respect to this vision of the free acts of God, any more than with respect to the beholding of the essence of attributes or of relations, as is evident from what has been said.

38 It is confirmed. Because the intellectual light of one angel can reach the free acts of another, for example of Gabriel, as something of that other, provided Gabriel orders them to the first, since by that very fact they have whatever was lacking to them in order that they might be the proportionate object of the aforesaid light: hence the light of a created intellect, and therefore through the light of glory, and consequently through the created and beatific vision, will also be able to reach the free decrees of God, provided God orders them to the aforesaid intellect. The antecedent is commonly admitted by the theologians in the matter of the angels. The consequence, however, is proved. Because just as the intellectual light of an angel is of itself proportionate for seeing, in the manner explained, the free acts of another angel, from the fact that it has the same proportion towards the beholding of that angel's essence, so the light of glory, having of itself a proportion towards the beholding of God's essence as it is in itself, will also be proportionate for seeing, in the same manner, the decrees of the divine will, that is, if God orders them to an intellect filled with such a light.

39 It must be said, secondly, that no blessed man sees de facto, or is able to see, all the free decrees of God as they terminate in created effects in the singular: although each one sees by force of the vision those decrees which concern the effects pertaining to his own state. This assertion, as to its first part, is established from what we shall say in the treatise on the divine will, disp. 5. dub. 3.: where we shall show that the divine will could not have remained suspended as to whether any creature would be future or not future; and thus that it has decreed about all of them its being, or not being: and consequently that the divine decrees extend to all possible creatures, deciding as to future ones their future existence, and as to non-future ones a positive (so to speak) non-future existence. Since therefore the created light of glory cannot extend to all possible creatures, neither will it be able to extend to all the free decrees of God insofar as they terminate in them in the singular.

As to the second part, however, it is D. Thom. 3. part. quaest. 10. art. 2. and 3. cont. Gent. cap. 59., whom his disciples commonly follow, and almost all the theologians; and it is gathered from the Council of Sens, where it is held that the blessed see whatever concerns them.

40 The fundamental reason for this second part, however, is drawn from D. Thom. at the place cited. Because every blessed man naturally desires to know those things which pertain to his own state, as it appears from itself: but perfect beatitude fills by itself the natural and ordered desire of knowing which the blessed man has, otherwise it would not be perfect beatitude: hence every one of them will see through the beatific vision all future effects, or positively non-future effects, which pertain to his own state, and consequently the free decrees of God which concern them. This last consequence is evident. For through the beatific vision the aforesaid effects cannot be known except insofar as they have a connection with the divine essence: it is established, however, that the aforesaid effects, as to their future existence or non-future existence, have no connection with the divine essence except by reason of the decrees of his will.

§ III. The arguments of the negative part are met.

41 To the first it will be answered that the blessed do not see some free decrees of God, taken in the singular, by force of the vision of the essence, in the same manner in which they see possible creatures, that is, in the essence itself, as in a cause previously seen and penetrated, but indeed in that proportionate manner in which attributes and relations are beheld, as something of that same essence. For for their vision in the essence, as in a cause, a necessary connection of those acts with that same essence was required; but that this connection is not found, in the manner accepted just explained, between them and the divine essence, is certain. Moreover, for their vision immediately in themselves, and as something of God, it is enough that they are truly found in God, and that the divine will orders them to the intellect of the blessed man, as we said in the similar case of the free acts of an angel's will compared with the intellectual light of another angel.

42 To the second (in whose solution we shall linger somewhat, because not a little of this whole difficulty depends on its understanding) it must be said that from the identity of the free acts with the divine essence, it is inferred only that all of them are to be seen by the blessed as to their reality, but not that they terminate in the singular in all creatures, that is, certainly knowing in the singular which of them are future and which are not future, or reaching in general that some are future and some are not future; but only that all creatures (whatever they are) are future, or not future: just as from the fact that omnipotence is identified with the divine essence, it is inferred only that it is to be seen by every blessed man according to its reality, or according to everything positive that it posits in God, but not that possible creatures taken in the singular. We have said: certainly knowing in the singular which of them are future, or which are not future, or reaching in general that some are future and some not future, because, as we shall note in the treatise on the divine will, disp. 5. dub. 3., there is no will in God under the mode of potency, but under the mode of the purest act, and precisely on account of its most pure actuality it cannot remain suspended, but must necessarily terminate in creatures in one of these two ways, namely, by willing their future existence, or by not willing it; hence just as the blessed man, seeing omnipotence, knows it to terminate in the doable, so to speak, so the same blessed man, seeing the reality of the divine will, must see it to terminate in any given creature whatsoever, by willing its future existence, or by not willing it, or (which is the same for the present) by willing its non-future existence, but not by knowing in the singular which of them are future, or which are not future, as is evident from itself and from what has been said, nor by reaching that some are future and some are not future.

43 And the reason is this. For although the divine will has a necessary connection with one of these two terminations already described, taken vaguely and confusedly, it does not have one with any of them taken in the singular: and therefore, for beholding the aforesaid reality, it is enough to know that it terminates in creatures, by willing or not willing their future existence.

Whence (as we may say in passing) for this reason it is not necessary to know, even in general, future creatures, in order that the free acts of divine mercy terminate, for example, in such a way that that same mercy, under the mode of the purest act, may be seen according to its reality: because mercy terminates necessarily only with respect to its primary object, the divine goodness, insofar as this is the reason for relieving created misery; yet in the same treatise on the divine will, disp. 7. num. 63. and afterwards, explaining: and it has no necessary connection with any secondary termination in creatures, as we shall show there; but the very act which per se terminates first in the divine goodness can terminate, and not terminate, in creatures to be relieved of misery, and remain (if it pleases God) without any termination in them; or if the opposite pleases (as in fact it has pleased), remain with termination in them. What the aforesaid termination adds beyond the reality of the act of divine mercy, and how that same reality, connoting this creature rather than that one as an inadequate concomitant of itself, is said to terminate in it, and to be its will, and other things pertaining to this, we shall explain at length in the treatise on the divine will.

44 Add that although, for free acts to be seen immediately and in themselves by force of the vision of the divine essence, insofar as they connote this or that creature in the singular and terminate in it, it is required that they be identified with it; nevertheless in the aforesaid acts, considered in the manner explained, there is a special reason on account of which this is not sufficient: because at least by this reason and the other already explained, they are an object hidden per se, from the fact that every free act of any will of its own nature has being, at least with respect to its termination, an object hidden and disproportionate with respect to any intellect whatsoever, except with respect to the divine intellect and the intellect of that creature which elicits those acts: and therefore unless God orders through his will his free acts rather to the intellect of this blessed man than to that of another, the blessed man will not be able to behold them in the manner explained: not indeed from a defect of intensity of the light precisely, since the same or even a greater intensity of light can be given in another blessed man, and nevertheless those acts are not beheld, but from a defect of the aforesaid ordering towards his intellect.

We have said that free acts, at least with respect to their termination, are hidden per se, because in creatures, in which the entity of the free acts and their termination is free, the aforesaid acts must be free both according to their entity and according to their termination, and therefore hidden per se and in the manner explained, but not so in God: in whom such acts are necessary with respect to their reality, but not with respect to the terminations already explained, as we shall say at length in the treatise on the divine will: and therefore, with respect to their reality they are manifest per se with respect to an intellect seeing God, but not with respect to their termination in some particular creature, etc.

45 To the third it will be answered that it is one thing whether a free act is something real; but another thing whether it adds anything real, whether actually or only virtually, distinct from every necessary act of God. Hence, although a free act, by which God loves creatures with the love of charity, adds nothing virtually distinct from the necessary act by which he loves his own goodness: and likewise, although an act of mercy adds nothing, not even virtually, distinct from the necessary act by which he loves his own goodness, which is the reason for relieving the misery of creatures, which is indeed virtually distinct from the act of charity already mentioned, and so of the rest; nevertheless any free act, as such, is always something real and divine, although this real and divine thing is not distinct, not even virtually, from the reality of any one of the necessary acts: and so it does not add, as constitutive of itself, or as pertaining to it, any relation of reason formally taken. Moreover, it cannot be inferred from this that the aforesaid acts cannot be seen by force of the vision of the divine essence. For just as things are situated with respect to being, so also with respect to being known. Hence, since the aforesaid acts, as regards everything that pertains to the genus of the thing, or of being, with imperfections set aside, are so sufficient as if they imported some reality really actually, or virtually, distinct from any necessary act (because by them God is equally perfectly willing freely, as if they were really actually, or virtually, distinct from any divine reality), it follows that without the aforesaid distinction they are also sufficient with respect to everything that pertains to the genus of a knowable object: and so they will be able to be reached by the blessed intellect immediately and in themselves.

46 As to the fourth, the sequence must be denied. And as to the proof, the antecedent must be denied. For if God's free acts are considered with respect to the reality which they possess in God himself, they must be reached by any vision whatsoever, however small, because whatever vision is intuitive, and terminates in God as he is, and finally the aforesaid acts with respect to this reason are altogether necessary. But if they are taken as they terminate, for example, in some future effect taken in the singular, they cannot be reached except by a vision so perfect and intense that it can extend to that specific species or nature under which such an effect is contained; once, however, the aforesaid perfection has been granted in that vision, no further perfection is required or added to it from the fact that it terminates in some individual, or in some individual contained under such a species, and consequently neither from the fact that it terminates in the free decrees of God concerning those individuals. Because, as we shall say below, a vision which can know some species in God can reach, as far as it is concerned on the part of the light, all the individuals contained under it, or at least as to their possibility, and even as to their future existence, and consequently God's decrees concerning such a future existence; provided that the condition already explained is posited, namely, that the divine will orders the free act of its will, by which it decreed their future existence, to the intellect of that blessed man himself.

47 As to the last, the antecedent must be denied, provided that the aforesaid ordering of its free acts towards the beatific intellect is added on the part of the divine will. For then the free acts will be known by force of the light of glory and of the divine essence, under the reason of an intelligible species. And as to the first proof, the sequence must be denied, understood of these acts according as they terminate in creatures, in the manner already explained: because, as we were saying, for their cognition the ordering so often demanded by us is required, which in a certain manner is of the nature of revelation, and once posited it passes from an object hidden per se to an object manifest with respect to the intellect of the blessed man. Whence, although both the light of glory and the vision unfold all their power in the vision of other things which are in God, nevertheless they do not unfold it in the vision of the free acts, as they terminate in future effects in the manner explained, unless the aforesaid ordering, which is demanded per se, be present. From which also, as to the second proof, it is clear how the free acts, and only those free acts with respect to which the aforesaid ordering is present, can alone be seen by force of the light and of the divine essence.

48 As to the confirmation, the major must be denied. And, the antecedent having been granted for the proof, the consequence must be denied. Because that which is to see more free acts, and consequently the quantity of the ordering or manifestation with respect to more or fewer of them, does not depend on a greater intensity of light and of vision, by which one blessed man is more blessed than another. For whomever of them sees all the species and genera that pertain to this universe, both what is natural being and what is supernatural being of it: and consequently he has of himself a sufficient light and vision to reach all the free acts terminated in all the future individuals of this universe. But the aforesaid quantity of this ordering, or this, that more or fewer free acts are ordered to the intellect of some blessed man, is commensurable with the law laid down by God, by which it is established that only those things which pertain to that man's state are manifested to each blessed man by force of the vision. Whence when it is said that the more blessed man, and consequently the one having a greater light, also has a more perfect vision: and conversely, that that vision is more perfect by which more things are seen in God himself, it is understood of the more excellent vision as regards intensity, and of those things which are seen in God by force of the light of glory taken strictly: and not of the manifestation and ordering already explained, by which those things which are in God must be specially ordered by the divine will to the intellect of the blessed man, as has been said.

Although the decision of this difficulty consists of what we said in the preceding difficulty, nevertheless, since Gabriel Vazquez and some others advance, as regards this point, arguments worthy of solution and refutation, we shall examine the present difficulty point by point, so that the doctrine of St. Thomas may remain more fully elucidated.

Now that particle ex vi visionis divinae essentiae introduced in the title is not taken radically, so as to yield this sense, namely, that from the vision of the aforesaid essence there arises another knowledge, through which these effects are attained, whether that knowledge is given through divine revelation or through the proper species of such effects; but it is taken formally, such that the vision of the essence itself is also the vision of the aforesaid effects, not indeed accidentally, and through something competing with it beyond its proper line, but by reason of its own perfection, that is, of what belongs to it within its own line.

§ I. Opinion denying this.

49 They defend the denying part, at least with regard to future and present effects, Durand, in 3. distinc. 14. quaest. 2. num. 4, and in 4. dist. 49. quaest. 3. num. 15 and the following, and with him Molina, art. 8 of the present question, disput. 5. num. 2. And with regard to those same effects, and even the past effects, they hold the same opinion: Gabriel, in 3. dist. 14. quaest. 1. art. 1. notabili 3. Maior quaest. 3, and Vazquez, tom. 3, in 1. part. disp. 50.

It is proved, first. For the aforesaid effects are represented freely in the divine essence: therefore they cannot be seen from the force of the vision of the divine essence. The antecedent is evident. Because they are represented in the way in which they are contained; but they are contained in the divine essence freely, that is, by the free determination of the divine will: therefore they will also be represented freely. The consequence, however, is proved. Because those things which are seen from the force of the vision of the divine essence, or from the force of its own perfection, must necessarily be seen, and necessarily represented: from the fact that, just as the proper perfection of the vision belongs to it necessarily, so too it sees all those things which it can attain by the force of its proper perfection.

50 Second. For otherwise, the aforesaid effects would also be seen from the force of the vision of the divine essence, as possible: but this destroys the nature of the beatific vision: therefore, etc. The consequence seems certain from the parity of reason. The minor, however, is proved. For then the aforesaid vision would be one vision, and would not be the same according to its species: it would indeed be such as is supposed, but it would not be so, because it would terminate toward future things, and possible things, under a formally diverse reason: toward those indeed insofar as they are contained in the free decree; toward these, however, insofar as they are foreknown precisely in omnipotency, antecedently to the decrees.

It is confirmed. For if both future things and possible things were seen from the force of the vision, then this same vision would be intuitive, and would not be abstractive, and so would not be one and the same. The first consequence is evident. Because it would terminate, both toward things as existing and present in eternity, namely, toward future things; and also toward things abstracted from the aforesaid existence and presentiality, namely, toward possible things as such. From this also the second consequence follows. For then the vision would be one, as we suppose, since indeed, by the force of the perfection that belongs to it within its own proper line, it would attain both; and yet at the same time it would not be one, because intuitive knowledge and abstractive knowledge adequately divide knowledge, just as rational and irrational adequately divide an animal: from the fact that all knowledge must terminate either toward a thing as present, and hence intuitively, or as absent, or abstracted from presentiality, and consequently abstractively: therefore, just as for that reason the same animal cannot be at once rational and irrational, so the same vision cannot be at once intuitive and abstractive.

§ II. The first assertion, in favor of the opinion of St. Thomas, is established.

51 Nevertheless, it must be said first that effects existing in some difference of time can very well be seen from the force of the vision of the divine essence, and consequently formally through it. Thus the holy Doctor, 3. cont. Gent. cap. 59, where he says: By the vision itself of the divine essence the blessed naturally know the species, and by the knowledge of the species the individuals existing under them. And art. 8 of this question, where, speaking of those things which are seen through the vision of the divine essence, he teaches: But by so much does anyone know more things that God does or can do, as he sees God more perfectly. Now the holy Doctor clearly understands by those things which God does, effects existing in some difference of time: for he distinguishes them from things that are precisely possible. And in 3. part. quaest. 10. art. 2. ad secundum, speaking of those things which the soul of Christ knows in the Word, or (which is the same thing) from the force of the vision of the divine essence, about which that argument had been proposed, he says: The soul of Christ therefore knows all things that God knows in Himself through the science of vision: but not all things that God knows in Himself through the science of simple intelligence. Which he also teaches in 2. 2. quaest. 83. artic. 4. ad secundum. Hence the holy Doctor is commonly followed by his disciples, Capreolus in 4. dist. 49. quest. 6. art. 3, in his solution of the arguments of Durand against the first conclusion, and of the arguments of Aureolus against the second, Soto quest. 3. art. 3, Ferrara 3. contra Gent. cap. 59. § circa praedicta, Caietanus in this article, if the explanation of the title is compared with the explanation of the conclusion, and 3. part. quest. 10. art. 2 and the passage cited from 2. 2., Bannez, Zumel, Nazarius, Ripa, Zanardus, Gonzalez in the present question, and, from others, almost all the more recent theologians.

52 Now the fundamental reason of this assertion was touched by St. Thomas in art. 8 of this question and art. 6 of quaest. 14, which can be reduced to this form. For the divine essence, as determined by the free decree of its will, can be the reason, by way of an object first known, and consequently by way of an intelligible species, for knowing creatures existing in some difference of time: therefore they will be able to be seen from the force of the vision of that same essence. The consequence is evident. For from the force of the vision of some essence those things can be seen with respect to which the aforesaid essence can bear the reason of a species and of an object first known, leading on to the knowledge of them. The antecedent, however, is proved. For a cause containing some effect, and possessing sufficient immateriality and union with the intellect, can bear the reason of an intelligible species and of an object first known, leading on to the knowledge of the effects that it contains; and therefore the essence of an Angel is united in this way with its own intellect with respect to the knowledge of the effects that are foreknown in it by nature: but the divine essence, determined by the free decrees of its will, contains by way of cause all effects existing in some difference of time, and possesses infinite immateriality and the most intimate union with the blessed intellect: therefore it will be able to be united with it by way of a species and of an object first known with respect to the vision of those same things.

53 It is confirmed by the reason which the same holy Doctor hints at, and which we have touched upon above. Because God, from the force of the vision of his proper essence, as determined by his free decrees, sees future effects in some difference of time: therefore the blessed man will also be able to see those same effects from the force of the vision of that same essence, determined in the same way. The consequence seems clear from what we said in the preceding difficulty concerning this reason. The antecedent, however, is proved. Because God sees no created effect outside himself, that is, through a species distinct from his proper essence, but beholds them all in that essence itself, as in something in which they are foreknown: but the aforesaid effects are contained in the divine essence, not in just any way, but determined by the decrees of its will: therefore, from the force of the vision of his essence, as determined by such decrees, he will attain them.

54 Vazquez, tom. 1, in 1. part. disp. 50. cap. 3. num. 24, objects, denying that the divine essence can lead on to the knowledge of created effects as a cause and as an object first known; and thus that not even God can behold the aforesaid effects in his essence, as in a cause and as an object first known; but that he attains them in his essence, as in knowledge. For, as he himself explains, disp. 60. cap. 2 and 3, essential knowledge in God is the divine essence itself according to the thing, which with our mode of conceiving has the reason of an impressed species, of the act of the first expressed species, or of the Word, and of the act of the second; and with this respect toward all things that are known by God, whether they be God himself or creatures: and therefore the divine essence serves only for the knowledge of itself and of others, by whichever of these modes, but not by way of cause or of an object first known.

But against this. For in the first place, according to this solution, the proof hinted at by us is not sufficiently met, namely, this very point, that the cause, as eminently containing some effect, and so able to produce it, and determined toward its production, ought by the force of that knowledge to attain such an effect: since it is contrary that the cause should be known as containing, for example, sanctifying grace, and that the same grace should not be known. Therefore, since God and the blessed can know the divine essence as eminently containing grace, and as determined toward its production, then both because of what has been said and because this whole thing belongs to the essence according as it is in itself, by which reason it is the beatific object, it follows that by the force of the knowledge of the divine essence, and in the way stated, the aforesaid effect can be known by God and by the blessed.

55 Next. For this solution is openly against St. Thomas in the passage cited, from quaest. 14, where he shows that God knows all creatures by his proper knowledge, or according to those things which belong to each one, insofar as it differs from the others, because in this way they would be eminently contained in the divine essence; and therefore he does not perfectly attain his proper essence unless he attains creatures in this way; but this reason necessarily involves God's knowing creatures in his essence, as in a cause and as an object first known: therefore, etc. The minor is proved. For to know creatures by their proper knowledge, from the fact that the proper things of those creatures are eminently contained in the divine essence, necessarily involves knowing them in the aforesaid essence, as in something eminently containing them, and consequently in that same essence, as in a cause, because it does not contain them eminently otherwise than by way of cause, and consequently it necessarily also involves knowing them in that same essence, and as an object first known: because a cause leads on to the knowledge of its effects only as an object first known, as is inductively evident in all causes: therefore, that creatures are known in the divine essence from the fact that they are eminently contained in that same essence necessarily imports the knowledge of them in that same essence, as in a cause and as an object first known.

56 Finally. For the divine essence does not bear the relation of a species with respect to the knowledge of creatures unless insofar as it is their cause: therefore neither can it lead on to the knowledge of them unless by way of cause and of an object first known. The consequence is evident. For a species serves toward the knowledge of some object in the way in which it contains and represents that object: therefore, if the divine essence bears the relation of a species only by way of cause with respect to creatures, it will not be able to lead on to the knowledge of them unless by way of cause, and consequently unless by way of an object first known: since, as we said above, a cause as such does not lead on to the knowledge of an effect unless as an object first known. The antecedent, however, is proved. For the divine essence cannot bear the reason of a species with respect to creatures in the way in which created species represent their objects, otherwise it would be ordained by its very nature to represent them, and in this its nature would consist: just as created species, which precisely because they do not represent their objects by way of cause do not eminently contain them, have nothing else for their being beyond this, namely, to be ordained to represent them.

57 From this there also follows a greater refutation of what is said in this solution, namely, that creatures cannot be known in the divine essence except as in knowledge, or in an expressed species, but not as in an object first known. For an expressed species that is adequate to an impressed species represents no otherwise than the impressed species does; since the prior and most powerful reason determining, in our mode of understanding, the intellection and the mode of intellection, and also the expressed species, must be the impressed species: therefore, if the divine essence, as it bears the reason of an intelligible species, does not represent itself and creatures equally immediately, but represents itself as a cause and as the primary object, and consequently as prior to be known, and represents creatures as effects, and consequently as the secondary object to be known: it follows that the knowledge and the expressed species do not terminate toward that same essence and toward creatures except under this very same order, such that they terminate toward the essence as toward a cause and an object first known; but toward creatures as toward effects and as secondary objects known by the force of the knowledge of the primary object.

58 From this also there remains solved a certain objection brought by a younger man, namely, that if future effects in some difference of time could be known from the force of the knowledge of the essence, and consequently the divine essence would bear the reason of an intelligible species with respect to them, they would not be known in the way in which we have spoken in this assertion, namely, by knowing the divine essence and the free determination of its will, by which it is determined toward their production: therefore, etc. The antecedent is proved. For the divine essence, as it bears the reason of an intelligible species, together with the existence of the aforesaid effects in their difference of time, would suffice for their knowledge, without the determination of the free will of God being seen; just as, for Angels to see things outside the Word, and through their proper species, effects existing, it suffices that they have representative species of those effects, and that such effects exist, without their knowing the determination of their cause: for those very species, which represent beforehand the aforesaid effects precisely as to their proper essentials, have by their own eminence the power to represent those same things as existing, as the Thomists commonly teach.

59 For it will be answered by denying the antecedent. And with respect to the proof, the antecedent must also be denied. Now the reason of the disparity between Angelic knowledge outside the Word and the beatific vision is this. Because the Angelic species, which they then use with respect to that knowledge, do not represent by way of cause future effects existing in some difference of time eminently contained: and so, for knowing them by the force of the knowledge elicited through the aforesaid species, it is not necessary that that which bears the reason of a species with respect to the knowledge of them be first attained by way of a cause determined toward such effects. Moreover, the divine essence does not bear the relation of an intelligible species with respect to such effects except by way of cause, and of a cause determined with respect to the production of those effects: and so unless the aforesaid essence is known as a determined cause, and consequently together with the free decrees by which it is determined, it cannot lead on to the knowledge of them. Hence, whenever certain effects are known by an Angel through knowledge outside the Word, and not in just any way, but through something that bears the relation of a species with respect to them by way of cause, and consequently by way of an object prior to be known, they cannot be known unless the cause and its determination with respect to the production of those same effects be known beforehand.

60 Nor does it matter if you press the point that this mode of representing cannot cohere with the divine essence. For since, considered in itself, it is infinite in every genus, it will not need anything else for representing the effects existing in some difference of time.

So then, this makes no difference. Both because the free determination of the divine will, insofar as it is free, does not add any perfection, even one virtually distinct, above the other perfections necessary to God, as many hold very probably, and as we shall say in tract. de voluntate Dei, art. 3, dub. 8. And also because the free determination is not required in order to give the divine essence, as it bears the reason of an intelligible species, a representative power, but in order to determine, without however any imperfection, the power of representing that it has. For, since effects are representable either according to the being of the exercise of existence in some difference of time, or with the positive exclusion of such exercise, according to all the differences of time, and both cannot be represented at once, as is evident, there must be given something by reason of which the aforesaid effects have, determinately, either the exercise aforesaid or the exclusion of such exercise; and consequently that it determines the divine essence so that it represents rather the exercise of their existence than non-existence; and since this is nothing other than the free determination of the divine will, from which effects have it that they are future or not future, it follows that the aforesaid determination is required in order that that infinite representative force, which is in the divine essence, be determined toward the representation of the aforesaid exercise rather than of non-exercise. Hence, just as in divine power this determination does not take away its infinite force with respect to the reason of power, so neither does it take away from the divine essence the infinite force of representing that belongs to it with respect to the reason of a species.

§ III. The second assertion, for the elucidation of the opinion of the Angelic Doctor, is established.

61 It must be said, second, that although effects existing in some difference of time can be seen from the force of the vision of the divine essence, in the way explained, nevertheless it is not necessary that they be seen in this way, whether in particular or in general; but the divine essence can be seen without the aforesaid effects being seen, taken according to either of the two reasons. This assertion is common among the theologians, and so it will not be necessary to cite anyone in particular for it; and it follows clearly from what has been said, both in this difficulty and in the preceding one. Because these effects cannot be seen from the force of the vision of the divine essence without the free determinations of its will being seen; but it is not necessary that, the divine essence being seen, these free determinations be seen, whether in general or in particular: therefore neither will it be necessary that the aforesaid effects be seen, either in general or in particular. The major, with its consequence, is sufficiently constant. The minor, however, is proved and explained. For although every blessed man must see that God necessarily has with respect to every possible creature some decree taken in a vague way, by which he determines it to fore or non fore, because by reason of the actuality of the divine will he cannot remain undecided concerning the future existence or non-existence of creatures, as we shall say in tract. de voluntate Dei disp. 5, dub. 3; nevertheless it is not necessary that through the vision of the divine essence it be seen determinately either that God determinately wills the future existence of this creature rather than its non-existence, or that God has, with respect to certain creatures, a decree of their future existence rather than of their non-existence, from the fact that the free determinations of the divine will taken in this way are formally free, and consequently are an object hidden in itself, as follows from what was said in the preceding difficulty: therefore, for the vision of the divine essence, it will not be necessary that the aforesaid determinations of the divine will be seen, whether in general and in the way explained, or in particular. The consequence is evident. Because by the fact that it is not necessary that the aforesaid determinations be seen, whether in general or in particular, we understand nothing else than that it is not necessary to see determinately that God wills the future existence of this creature in particular, rather than its non-existence, which is to know the free decrees of God in particular; or that with respect to certain creatures (whatever they may be) God rather has a decree of their future existence than of their non-existence, which is to know those same decrees, not as peculiarly applied to some creature in particular, but taken vaguely or in general.

62 It is confirmed. For it is not necessary, and indispensable, that all effects existing in some difference of time be seen from the force of the vision of the divine essence: therefore neither is it necessary that any one of them be seen from the force of that same vision, whether taken in general or in particular. The consequence is evident. For with respect to the aforesaid necessity of seeing future effects, and consequently of the free decrees, the reason is the same for all and for each one, from the fact that the indispensable necessity of seeing all can arise only from the fact that the free decrees of God, from whose vision they are seen, are formally in God, and so must necessarily be seen from the force of the vision of the divine essence: but this reason, as is evident, proceeds equally both with respect to one of the divine decrees and with respect to all of them: therefore, etc. The antecedent, however, is proved. Both because of the day of judgment it is said, Matthew 24: But of that day and hour no one knows, not even the Angels of heaven, except the Father only. And Mark 13: But of that day or hour no one knows, not even the Angels in heaven, nor the Son, but the Father. Since in both places mention is made of the blessed Angels, it follows that the aforesaid effect is sufficiently signified to be unknown to the blessed. And also because, as the holy Thomas teaches, 3. part. quaest. 10, Christ the Lord alone beholds all future effects from the force of the vision: therefore it is not necessary that this be attributed to every blessed man.

63 Nor does it matter if you object to this confirmation, that the prior proof of the antecedent does not seem to have any force for confirming that, since in the aforesaid testimony taken from cap. 13 of Mark it is asserted that not even the Son knows that day of judgment: but with respect to the Son, according to the common interpretation of the Fathers, it is said only that he does not know it, because he does not know it so as to reveal it to others: therefore in the same way, and not in another, will the blessed Angels be ignorant of it. The consequence is evident: because it is said in the same way that the Son and the blessed Angels do not know the aforesaid day.

64 So then, this makes no difference. For although Scripture uses the same mode of speaking, taken materially, to deny the Son the knowledge of that day from the force of the vision of the divine essence, and to deny it to the blessed Angels, nevertheless not formally in the same way. For when it denies Christ the vision of that day, it speaks of the vision with a view to telling it and revealing it to another; but when it denies it to the Angels, it denies it to them absolutely and simply.

And the reason is evident. Both because, according to the rule handed down by Augustine and received by all theologians, the words of Scripture are to be understood in their proper sense, unless something absurd follows from it. Therefore, since from the fact that the words of Mark are understood with respect to the Son as being absolutely and simply ignorant, or as ignorant by the force of the vision, there follows a great absurdity, as is evident from the thing itself and from what has been said, it follows that with respect to the Son they are not to be understood in the proper sense, but according to the explanation given, because the Fathers commonly hand it down. But from the fact that the aforesaid words are understood with respect to the Angels in their proper sense, and consequently in them there is denoted that the blessed Angels are absolutely and simply ignorant of the day of judgment, and consequently do not know it even by the force of the vision, no absurdity follows, since nothing is inferred from it either against faith or against natural reason, and thus with respect to them they must be understood in the proper sense.

65 And also because, when the Fathers expound the aforesaid words, they suppose as certain that the Angels absolutely and simply ignore that day, and they only explain, in the way already stated, how the Son is ignorant of it. Thus Chrysostom, in cap. 24 of Matthew, hom. 78, and in the incomplete work, hom. 50; Cyril, lib. 1, de recta fide ad Reginas, two leaves after the beginning; Athanasius, sermon 4 contra Arianos, near the middle, and in the letter to Amphilochius at the beginning; Theophylus and Euthymius, on the words cited above of Matthew; Augustine, lib. 1, de Genesi contra Manich. c. 22, and lib. 1, de Trinitate c. 12; Jerome, in his exposition of that same testimony in Matthew and in Mark; and Gregory, lib. 8 registi epist. 42. ad Eulogium, citing the explanation of Augustine, thus says: And hence the Father alone is said to know, because the Son, consubstantial with him, has that nature by which he is above all the Angels, and has that which the Angels do not know.

§ IV. Unravelling of the arguments of the first opinion.

66 To the first argument, the antecedent being granted in the sense explained, the consequence must be denied. And with respect to the proof, the antecedent must also be denied. Hence, just as the divine will from the force of its proper perfection wills creatures, and nevertheless wills them freely, notwithstanding that that perfection as such is necessarily found in God, so the blessed man will be able, from the force of the necessary perfection of his vision, to see future creatures, although he need not necessarily see them. And the reason is the same in both cases. For indeed, neither is the divine will specified by the creatures willed, nor is it necessarily connected with them, nor is the beatific vision specified by the aforesaid effects, nor does it have a necessary connection with them: although by reason of its own eminence, and with the manifestation placed on the part of the free determination of God, it can terminate toward them, as was explained above.

67 To the second argument, the consequence must be granted and the minor denied. And with respect to the proof, it must be said that although possible creatures may be seen in omnipotency, and future creatures in that same omnipotency, as determined by the free decrees, nevertheless they would still be seen under the same most formal reason, because the most formal reason of seeing is always something divine containing the aforesaid effects.

To the confirmation, the first consequence must be granted and the second denied. And with respect to the proof, it must be said that although we grant that the reason of intuitive knowledge adequately divides knowledge, or cognition, so that one and the same knowledge of the lower kind cannot have both reasons at once; nevertheless this should not be admitted of the knowledge of the superior and eminent condition: for this, by reason of its own eminence, can formally be at once eminently intuitive and abstractive with respect to diverse objects, as occurs in the present case, and thus the knowledge by which God understands, as it terminates toward the divine essence, is intuitive, and as it terminates toward possible creatures, is abstractive, as the theologians commonly teach.

Nor does the example brought in the argument stand in the way. For to be irrational on account of its own imperfection cannot be united and formally contained in one and the same thing eminently at once with the rational, but one of the two means the exclusion of the other, as is evident from itself.

That the understanding of the title is sufficiently established from what was said in the preceding Difficulty is clear.

§ I. The prior opinion is set out.

68 The negative part is upheld by Vazquez at the place cited. It is proved, first, in the following way. Because the divine essence has no necessary connection with possible creatures: therefore it cannot be the reason of their being seen: therefore neither will the aforesaid creatures be able to be seen from the force of the vision of the divine essence. This last consequence is clear from the previous one: because it is the same for creatures to be seen from the force of the vision of the divine essence as for that same essence to be the reason and the means by which the intellect is led to the knowledge of them. But the first consequence follows plainly from the antecedent. Because those things which have no necessary connection with regard to being cannot have such a connection with regard to being known, so as to be at once the reason and the means leading to the knowledge of another. Now the antecedent is proved. Because whatever is necessarily connected with something has a necessary relation to it, as is clear in the powers when compared with their objects: but the divine essence cannot be said to have a necessary relation to possibles, otherwise by that relation it would be specified by them: therefore, etc.

It is confirmed. For even if no creature were possible, the divine essence and omnipotence would still remain: therefore it is a sign that it has no necessary connection with them. The consequence is clear: for as often as things are necessarily connected, so often the removal of one takes away the other. But the antecedent is evident. Because the essence and omnipotence of God are beings more necessary than the possibility of creatures, since they are uncreated beings and exist through themselves: but if by the removal of possible creatures the essence and omnipotence of God were to be taken away, they would not be more necessary than the aforesaid creatures.

69 Secondly. Because neither on the part of the divine essence nor on the part of the light can a reason be assigned, on account of which these creatures rather than those are seen: therefore, since they cannot all be seen, otherwise God would be comprehended, as is clear from what has been said, it follows that none of them will be seen from the force of the vision. The consequence is clear. Because for some of them to be able to be seen and not all, there would have to be assigned, on the part of those things which concur in the vision, some reason, on account of which these creatures rather than those are seen: and since only the light, or the intellect filled with it, and the divine essence concur in such a vision, it is necessary that from one of these two some reason be assigned, on account of which these creatures rather than those are seen.

But the antecedent is proved as regards the first part. For the divine essence contains and represents all creatures equally, since it does not contain or represent one through another, but all equally and immediately. As regards the second part, however, it is proved as follows. Because every light of glory is of the same species with another, since all of them are terminated to the same formal object, namely to God as He is in Himself: therefore this diversity cannot arise on the part of the lights: because those things which are the same in the reason of the principle of seeing cannot be the reason of a diversity which is in the vision.

70 You will say that the lights of glory are diverse and unequal both in intensity and in individual perfection: and thus that the reason of a diversity of intensity, or of individual perfection, could be the root of seeing these creatures rather than others.

But against that: for a greater or lesser intensity, although it be the reason of knowing the same object in a more perfect way, is not however the reason of knowing this object rather than that, as is evident in the habits of the natural sciences: in which a greater intensity is not the reason of assenting to more conclusions, or to these rather than those contained within the same science, but of assenting more perfectly to the same conclusion: as also a greater or lesser individual perfection, taken precisely, cannot be the reason of attaining this object rather than that, as is seen in the same scientific habits.

71 Thirdly. Because otherwise, the divine essence having been seen, infinite possible creatures distinct according to species could be seen: but this is impossible; therefore, etc. The falsity of the consequence is clear. Because in order to see one possible creature from the force of the vision, something of the light of glory is required; and in order to see another more perfect and distinct according to species, something of a greater light is needed, and so, therefore, in order for infinite possible creatures distinct according to species to be seen, an infinite light would be needed, which yet implies that it exists.

The sequel is, however, proved. Because beneath any possible creature, and even any determinate one, infinite others of lesser and lesser perfection can be produced, as above any determinate creature infinite others of greater and greater essential perfection can be produced, as N. Compl. expounds in the book Physics: therefore, whoever has seen any determinate creature will be able to see those infinite ones which are of less perfection than it. The consequence is clear. For just as by the fact that the divine essence contains such a creature, it does not therefore contain more perfect creatures by force of such a containment, and consequently those are not to be known on the account of that one being known; so, because the divine essence contains such a creature, it ought also to contain those which are below it, it would follow that when this one is seen, those other infinite and less perfect creatures would have to be seen.

§ II. The knot of the Difficulty is unravelled according to the mind of D. Thom..

72 It must nevertheless be said that, although all possible creatures cannot be seen from the force of the blessed vision, some can nevertheless be seen, so that according to the greater or lesser perfection of the light, more or fewer are known. Thus D. Thom. in this article and in the passages to be cited immediately: whom nearly all the Theologians follow, and for that reason we abstain from naming them in particular.

The fundamental reason of this assertion, as regards both parts already treated above by us, is given by D. Thom. in the place cited and in 4. dist. 49, q. 2, art. 5, and in 3. On the Angels, ch. 55 and 56; and as regards the first part of the assertion to be proved, it can be proposed in this form. Because that intellect alone knows, the cause being known, all the effects contained in it which penetrates it altogether, and so comprehends it: but the divine intellect alone, and not any other, penetrates altogether and comprehends the divine essence, which is the cause of creatures: therefore that intellect alone, that same essence having been seen, knows all the possible effects contained in it. The minor does not need proof, given what we have said in the preceding article. The major is also evident. Because effects are not seen from the force of the vision of the cause unless it be penetrated: therefore that intellect alone will know all the effects lying latent in some cause, which has penetrated it, and all its folds, as it were, altogether.

73 From which also the second part of the same assertion is proved by the same reason of the same Holy Doctor. Because although some vision does not penetrate the cause altogether, and so neither sees all the effects contained in it, nevertheless once the cause has been seen, the effects that lie hidden in it can be seen, or known, from the force of that vision, so that more or fewer are seen according to the greater or lesser perfection of a light which does not penetrate it altogether: therefore, although the created vision is not sufficient to penetrate altogether the divine essence, which is the cause of creatures, nevertheless from that vision, that same essence having been seen, more or fewer effects will be known according to the greater or lesser perfection of the light. The consequence does not need proof. But the antecedent is clear from the example of one who has a more elevated intellect. For here, a single demonstrative principle having at once been proposed, he infers from it more conclusions according to the greater or lesser elevation of his intellect, although the principle itself does not penetrate, nor comprehend it altogether; which yet does not happen in one who is of weaker intelligence; but the individual conclusions must be explained to him: therefore, etc.

§ III. An answer is given to the first argument of the opposing opinion.

74 To the first argument the antecedent must be denied. And to the proof it is answered that, although those things which are necessarily connected with others must have a relation to them and be specified by them, as occurs in the examples proposed in the argument, this is not however universally necessary: and thus the objects of the sciences, insofar as they are such, are necessarily connected with their sciences, and yet do not express a real relation to them, whether predicationary or transcendental, as is commonly taught by Dialecticians and Metaphysicians. Whence, although the divine essence and omnipotence are necessarily connected with possible creatures, it does not follow that they therefore really have a relation to them, or that they are specified by them: because by reason of its own eminence the divine essence is altogether free and absolute with respect to every respect and relation, being of itself terminated first to creatures.

75 To the confirmation it is answered that, given that hypothesis, the divine essence and omnipotence would at least not remain such as they now are, and so the antecedent must at least be denied in this sense.

To its proof, in order to answer it, we must suppose what we shall touch on in the Treatise on the Will of God, namely, that although from the implication of the creatures there follows, at least in the sense just explained, the destruction of the divine essence and omnipotence, and that given the destruction of the divine essence and of divine omnipotence there follows the destruction of the possibility of creatures, yet in one way and in another; for from the impossibility of creatures the destruction of the divine essence and omnipotree already explained is gathered only a posteriori; that is, from the force of such an implication that destruction does not follow: but it is a sign that it had been destroyed first: as from the absence of light in this hemisphere the absence of the Sun from it follows only a posteriori: and therefore from the force of the absence of light the absence of the Sun is not posited, but only follows, or is gathered, that the Sun was previously absent from the aforesaid hemisphere before the light was absent: since the light is absent, which ought to have been caused from the presence of the Sun in it.

Moreover, from the destruction, or impossibility, of the divine essence and omnipotence there follows a priori the destruction of the possibility of creatures; and from the force of the positing of those, the aforesaid possibility and the necessity of these are posited, as from the presence of the Sun the presence of light is posited, due proportion being preserved.

Hence, then, the proof of the aforesaid antecedent is sufficiently established. For since the necessity of existing which the divine omnipotence and essence have is the cause of the necessity of the possibility of creatures, and from the destruction of it the necessity of their possibility follows a priori, as from the destruction of its own cause, whereas from the destruction of the possibility of creatures the destruction of the essence and omnipotence of God is gathered only a posteriori, in the manner explained, the consequence is that the essence and omnipotence of God are beings more necessary: because as often as two things are necessary and mutually connected, so often the thing which is the cause of the other's necessity has the greater necessity in itself, according to that Aristotelian axiom: That on account of which each such thing is, that exists the more.

§ IV. The second argument of the same opposing opinion is dissolved.

76 To the second argument the antecedent must be denied, as regards both parts. For in the first place, in some way it proceeds from the part of the divine essence that these possible creatures rather than those are seen: since the aforesaid diversity can in some way arise from the fact that of the creatures contained in the divine essence, some are less latent in it, while others lie hidden in the same more. Whence D. Thom., q. 8. On Truth, art. 4, ad 12, explains how from this head it can in some way come about that these creatures rather than those are seen by the blessed, thus saying: It must be said that, although the knowledge of creatures in no way pertains to beatitude, it does not however follow that all knowledge of creatures is equally related to the vision of beatitude: for once a certain cause is known, it is easy to see that some effects are known in it, while others lie hidden more: as is evident, for from the principles of a demonstration some conclusions are at once drawn out, while others are not so except through many means: and for the knowledge of these, no one can attain by himself, but he must be led by another. Likewise also the knowledge of the intelligible reasons of the effects with respect to the divine essence: because some are more latent, some more manifest: and therefore from the vision of the divine essence some things are known and some are not. And in like manner the aforesaid diversity can proceed from the part of the light of glory. Whence the same Holy Doctor in this article, after having said that more effects are seen in some cause, and therefore also in the divine essence, the more that aforesaid cause is penetrated, concludes: No created intellect, therefore, by seeing God, can know all the things which God does or can do: for that would be to comprehend His power: but of those things which God does or can do, an intellect knows as many the more as He sees God more perfectly. Wherefore, since God is seen more perfectly the more He is seen with a greater light, as the same Holy Doctor teaches in art. 6 of this question, saying: An intellect participating more of the light of glory will see God more perfectly, the consequence is that in accordance with the doctrine of the Holy Doctor, the more a person has of the light of glory, the more creatures he sees, and therefore these rather than those, as we shall explain more fully shortly.

77 And a sufficient reason for this can be given, from the fact that however unequally knowable a certain object may be, nevertheless an intellect which is occupied with it, if it have no inequality in comparison with other intellects, cannot know it unequally. Whence, since God is unequally knowable by different blessed ones, there must be given on the part of the intellect, and therefore on the part of the light of glory, some inequality, on account of which one may see and penetrate the divine essence more than another.

And in answer to the proof against the first part of the same antecedent it must be said that, although it were granted (which will be stated shortly) that the divine essence contains and represents possible creatures equally, in so far as this signifies that it does not contain them after the manner of a cause, and consequently neither represents one under the reason of another, or through another, so that it cannot otherwise cause and represent them, nevertheless that same essence does not contain and represent all of them equally, in so far as this denotes that all of them are contained and represented by that same essence equally latently: because, as we have just said from D. Thom., of the effects contained in some cause and represented by it, some lie hidden more, some less, while some are in fact almost entirely manifest. Whence, if the divine essence is united under the reason of a species, as it contains the more manifest creatures, these will be seen; but if it is united as it contains the creatures that lie hidden more in it, then these will be beheld: indeed also, as we shall explain more fully shortly, together with them the more manifest creatures, or those not so latent in the divine essence, will be seen as well.

78 The rule, however, for discerning which of the creatures lie hidden more in the divine essence, and which are more manifest in it, seems able to be derived from the greater or lesser possible perfection, and in the potentiality, of those same creatures, so that those creatures will lie hidden more which shall have been more perfect, both as to their essence and as to their mode of existence: conversely, however, those shall be more manifest, and shall not be contained and lie hidden, so to speak, in the inmost and deepest bounds of that same omnipotence, which shall have had less perfection (in the manner, however, just indicated).

And the reason of this can be given. First, because when creatures, insofar as they are contained virtually in God, lie hidden as it were within the folds of His power, those must be said to lie hidden more which are contained in omnipotence as containing virtually a greater grade of actuality than other grades (as others speak), or, according to our opinion, in that same most simple formality, without any virtual distinction of its own, expressing a greater actuality with respect to the production of creatures, perfect in the manner explained. For by the very fact that the divine essence contains them, and is the reason of their being seen, they are attained more difficultly, and therefore they themselves lie hidden more in it. Then too (which follows from the preceding), because by the very fact that omnipotence, as it contains certain creatures, expresses a greater perfection and a greater active force, in the manner explained, it is necessary that it demand a greater light in the intellect attaining it, as is said of the aforesaid perfection, and in particular it contains such creatures as is evident from itself, and as we said in the preceding article: and so it will be necessary also that it be penetrated more by the force of the aforesaid light, in order that those creatures may be beheld in it as in a cause: since, speaking universally, a greater light is demanded for the knowledge of some effect in its cause, because a greater penetration of that same cause is required, so that such an effect may be known in it; and consequently from this as well it follows that the aforesaid effect lies hidden more in that same cause, otherwise that greater penetration of the cause would not be necessary for attaining it.

It is added that this, that creatures are more latent, cannot be taken except from the fact either that they are more perfect as to essence alone, or that they are so both as to essence and as to mode of existence together, or from the fact that they are less perfect as to both, or as to one of these: but not from the fact that they are more perfect as to essence alone, otherwise sanctifying grace would be more latent than another creature, whereas in the highly probable opinion of the Thomists it is more perfect as to essence, though not as to mode of existence, than all other possible creatures, because it is the formal participation of a more perfect reason which is found in God, namely of the divine nature as it is in itself. Since however it is certain that the aforesaid sanctifying grace is seen by all the blessed, and is contained less latently in the divine essence than other possible creatures, as will be clear from what is to be said shortly: nor also is it taken from the fact that it is less perfect as to essence and mode of existence together, or as to one of these two, otherwise one who knew creatures in this less perfect way could and would have to know in that same divine essence all the creatures which, throughout the whole range of being, are more perfect as to essence and mode of existence together: since, as we shall say in this same Difficulty, one who knows in God a more latent creature can attain in Him the more manifest creatures, or those not lying hidden in Him so much: therefore it is necessary that this, that some creature is more latent in God, should proceed from the fact that it is more perfect, both as to essence and as to mode of existence together.

79 From which, in answer to the proof for the second part of the same antecedent, it is answered by admitting an inequality of the visions, and therefore that these possible creatures are seen rather than those does not arise from the lights of glory considered precisely as to their essence, as the proof made there correctly concludes. Yet this can proceed from an inequality in the intensity of those same lights, so that the more intense the light is, the more creatures it attains, and not just any sort, but, in the manner explained, more perfect ones.

And in answer to the proof on the contrary it must be said that, although a greater intensity of light is not the reason of seeing this object rather than that, when those objects primarily terminate the knowledge, yet when the light of itself is first terminated to some single object, and that object has first been seen and penetrated as a cause, and it then knows the rest, then a greater intensity of light can be the reason why these secondary objects are attained rather than those: because such an intensity is a sufficient reason of a greater penetration of the primary object, and therefore of knowing in it those effects which lie hidden more in it, and consequently also those which are more manifest there, as we shall say shortly.

Nor does it stand in the way, but rather it helps, that what is brought forward in this proof about the habits of acquired sciences is adduced. For a greater intensity of scientific and acquired light can sometimes lead to the effect that in some cause, or conclusion, first known and more penetrated, more effects, or conclusions deduced from it, are known, and to the effect that these are inferred rather than those, according as the intensity of the aforesaid light can reach — yet, as we say elsewhere — to a greater or lesser penetration of the deeper folds of that same cause.

80 From all of which it follows that the adequate reason, on account of which these possible creatures are seen rather than those in the divine essence, is not to be given on the part of the divine essence alone, in so far as it has the reason of a species and of the cause of creatures, nor on the part of the light of glory alone; but on the part of each of the two: because it is repugnant that these creatures rather than those should be known from the force of the blessed vision, unless the divine essence, as it has the reason of an intelligible species, be united with the blessed intellect by a union of such, or such, perfection, and likewise unless that same essence be known under the manner of an object first known, in so far as it has such, or such, an activity, in the manner explained: but it is repugnant for the divine essence to be thus united and thus seen, unless the intellect have such, or such, perfection, or intensity of light, as also it is repugnant for an intellect having such, or such, an intensity of light not to have united to it the divine essence under the reason of an intelligible species, by a union of such, or such, perfection commensurate with the force and intensity of that same light: and consequently the divine essence cannot fail to be seen, at least of itself and speaking from the nature of the thing, insofar as it contains creatures of such perfection.

81 Nor does it matter if you object that the divine essence and omnipotence, insofar as they contain more perfect creatures after the manner of a cause, are not yet virtually distinguished from themselves, insofar as they contain less perfect creatures, and consequently neither are they virtually distinguished from themselves under the reason of an intelligible species with respect to those, as a species is with respect to these: therefore they will not be able to be united with the blessed intellect, as it is the reason of seeing less perfect creatures, without being united also as the reason of seeing more perfect ones: since in order to be united under one reason and not under another, some distinction, at least virtual, would be required in it.

So then this does not matter. Because in order that the divine essence be united as the reason of seeing these creatures rather than those, and that it have activity with respect to these more than with respect to those, it is not necessary that it be virtually distinguished, or that it have different virtual grades of activity; but it is enough that it be an eminent form, and, as will be explained shortly, equivalent to several: as in order that the same essence be united under the reason of an intelligible species with the blessed intellect, but not under the reason of vision, it is not desired that it be virtually distinguished in the reason of its own vision and in the reason of an intelligible species; but the aforesaid eminence and equivalence are enough.

82 And the reason is the same in both cases. Because the eminence of the form is sufficient, in order that it be equivalent to several things actually and really distinct, no less than if it were really and actually distinct; and it is distinguished from those things which have a virtual distinction in this, that things which are virtually distinguished are equivalent to several things pertaining to distinct lines; whereas an eminent form, as such, and insofar as it does not reach to a virtual distinction of itself, is equivalent only to several things looking to the same line.

Wherefore, just as if divine power had in itself a real actual multiplicity of grades, or of powers, it could be united with the blessed intellect according to one grade, or power, and not according to others, so too by its being an eminent form, and equivalent to those really distinct powers aforesaid and pertaining to the same line, it will be able to accomplish this very thing.

§ V. Solution of the third argument of the opposing opinion.

83 To the third argument the sequel must be conceded, if it is understood of infinite possible creatures contained beneath the perfection of some certain, determinate, and finite possible creature, for example beneath man: otherwise, however, if it is understood of infinite possible creatures not contained beneath the perfection of any certain and finite possible creature. Because in order to know infinite creatures of this latter kind from the force of the beatific vision, an infinite light is required: otherwise, however, in order to attain infinite creatures of that former kind from the force of the same vision. For a light which suffices to see in the divine essence the species of man fully and perfectly, and therefore the divine essence itself as expressing that perfection of activity which is required for its production, suffices to attain all creatures of less perfection, as we shall explain more fully shortly.

And in answer to the proof on the contrary it must be said that, although for the vision of one of these possible creatures which are distinct according to species and are contained beneath the perfection of man, or do not reach to His nobility, some light is required, and in order to see another of these creatures a greater light is required, and so on without end, yet it will not follow from this that an infinite light is required in order to see all of them together: because the increment of light required to behold a more perfect creature, and again a more perfect creature from among these, does not occur (so to speak) by parts and degrees of a certain and determinate magnitude, and determinate ones, but by parts of an uncertain and indeterminate magnitude, proportionate to one another and sharing in common: and so it does not follow that the whole of that light required for the collection of those creatures to be seen will be infinite: just as neither from a proportional addition, by smaller and smaller parts without end, from any certain and determinate part which is in a finger, ascending from its middle up to the whole itself, does it follow that any actually infinite magnitude results there: because this requires, among other things, an addition by parts of a certain and determinate magnitude.

84 The reason, however, on account of which that increment of light ought not to be by parts, or as it were by a quantity of the virtue's force of a certain and determinate magnitude, can be given, both from the part of the aforesaid creatures, and also, and especially, from the part of the divine essence and omnipotence, insofar as they are the reasons of seeing such creatures. From the part of the creatures, indeed, because they themselves do not surpass one another by an excess of perfection which is of a certain and determinate quantity: so that if the quantity of perfection of one is as one, then that species has in its own manner immediately a perfection of as two, or as one and a half: but it has a perfection of as one and something more: yet in such a way that that something more must not be of any certain and determinate magnitude, or perfection, but of an uncertain and indeterminate one, namely less, and less than any determinate perfection that can be signified. From the part of the divine essence and omnipotence, however, because the essence of God and His omnipotence, insofar as they contain all these creatures, do not surpass themselves by an excess of infinite perfection, as they contain some of them: just as they themselves, insofar as they contain all possible creatures, infinitely surpass themselves, as they contain these or those, that is, they express a perfection infinitely more eminent than that by which they contain these or those.

85 From which also follows that which we touched upon above, namely, that the light of glory which suffices to see in God some created species suffices to see all the possible creatures which, both as to essence and as to mode of existence, are beneath that perfection. First, because a light sufficient to know God as expressing a greater active power is also sufficient to attain Him as expressing a lesser force of acting. Then also: because a power which has the ability of penetrating a cause more, also has the ability of penetrating it less. But in order to know in God more perfect creatures, a greater penetration of the divine essence is required, because the aforesaid creatures are more latent in it: conversely, however, in order to know in Him less perfect creatures, so great a penetration is not necessary, but a lesser one suffices: therefore a light which shall have sufficed to know in God more perfect creatures will suffice to attain in Him less perfect ones.

86 And this can be explained by the example of heat as eight, which by the very fact that it is such can accomplish whatever other less intense heats accomplish: because the greater intensity of radiation, as eight, contains virtually the modes of radiation of a lesser intensity, as N. Complut. shows in 1. On Generation, dist. 4, q. 9. So, therefore, the light of glory having an intensity, for example, of as eight, will be able to accomplish whatever a less intense light accomplishes by reason of its lesser intensity; and consequently, if a light of as five can see these creatures rather than those, a light of as eight will also be able to see them, in so far as it contains virtually an intensity of as five, and over and above some other more excellent creatures, which ought to correspond to it by reason of its greater intensity.

§ VI. Objections against the solution of this last argument, and their unraveling.

87 Nor does it matter if, against those things which we said in the solution of this last argument, you object first, that from them it follows that if a more perfect creature is known, both as to essence and as to mode of existence, then all creatures which are less perfect, as to essence and mode of existence, will be known from the force of that vision; whence it would follow that, grace having been seen, which is more perfect as to essence, though not as to mode of existence, all other creatures should be seen as to essence, though not as to mode of existence. The sequel is clear, both from the parity of the reason, and also for this reason: because therefore, a creature more perfect as to essence and mode of existence being seen, those less perfect as to both are seen: because the divine essence, insofar as it contains a more perfect one, expresses a greater perfection, which the vision cannot pass through except through a lesser one: but that same essence, insofar as it contains grace as to essence, also expresses a greater perfection than that by which it contains other things as to essences, and so the vision cannot reach to that greater perfection unless it makes a passage through a lesser one: therefore, etc.

It is answered by denying the sequel. And in answer to the first proof the parity must be denied, as will be clear from what is to be said shortly. To the second proof a distinction must be made between the greater, and if it is understood of greater perfection, both in the genus of being and in the genus of object, it must be conceded; otherwise, however, if it is understood of greater perfection precisely in the genus of being, and in like manner the lesser must be distinguished, must be denied in the first part, and must be denied if it is understood of greater perfection in the genus of object; otherwise, however, in the being of the thing. Because the divine essence, insofar as it contains grace, is more perfect in the being of the thing than insofar as it contains a very perfect intellectual creature, such as the most perfect Angel, but not in the being of the object, because it does not require to be known with such a light as that with which it contains this one, as that with which it contains that one, since the former is more manifest in the divine essence than the latter: because, the divine nature being known as it is in itself, it is easier to deduce that it is communicable in the precise mode in which it appears there, namely, by the manner of a root of seeing God, than to deduce that it is communicable in other ways. As when the Trinity and the infinity of persons have been seen, it is easy to deduce the mystery of the Incarnation, which consists in this, that one divine person terminates an alien nature. Whence the second part of the lesser must be denied, and likewise also its consequent, as is clear from what has been said.

88 Nor does it matter either if, against this solution, you press that it follows from it that the ant is more latent in God than an intellectual creature, for example man, and consequently that a greater light is required for it than for him to be seen in God. The sequel is clear. Because it has a greater conformity with God according to those things which are seen formally in Him, namely according to its intellectual nature; and the reason on account of which grace is less latent is that it has a greater likeness to God.

It is answered by denying the sequel. Because grace is not less latent on account of its having some likeness to God, but on account of its having a likeness in some predicate which is in it in the same way in which it is in God as He is in Himself, namely in the power of understanding Himself as He is in Himself: as also other supernatural accidents are less latent in God because, in the manner indicated in dist. 3, dub. 2, § 4 and 5, they participate in something proper to God as He is in Himself. Whence any other likeness does not render the object less latent in God, but according to the rule given in n. 78, namely according as the aforesaid object is more or less perfect, both as to essence and as to mode of existence, it is more or less latent in the divine essence.

89 Nor afterwards does it matter if, against the aforesaid solution, you press that, grace being known, an intellectual creature must be known, and consequently an intellectual creature, which is going to produce it: and so such a creature will not be more hidden than the ant. It is answered, that in the last resort one is convinced that an intellectual creature is to be known as to its obediential potency, which is also supernatural, through which it concurs; and although from this the knowledge of natural potency can be deduced, there is nevertheless some greater difficulty in this: and therefore it is more latent. Add only, that as to whether it is, it can be known from the force of that alone, and precisely of the knowledge of the obediential potency the natural potency, as being that with which it has some connection, and consequently as a terminus, but not quidditatively, and in the same manner as grace; and then it is adduced by reason only of the natural, intellective potency, so to speak.

90 Nor again does it matter if, secondly and principally, you object against the things said in the aforesaid solution in answer to that last argument proposed at the beginning of this Difficulty, that in order for God to contain man it is not necessary that He contain the ant and other creatures which are less perfect as to essence and mode of existence: therefore, in order to lead to the knowledge of man, it is not necessary that He lead to the knowledge of the ant and of the aforesaid creatures. The consequence is clear. First, because He leads by reason of the fact that He contains: therefore, if in order to contain man it is not necessary that He contain the ant, neither will it be necessary in order to lead to the knowledge of man that He lead to the knowledge of the ant. Then too: because the matter stands thus with respect to being as with respect to being known: therefore, those things which are not necessarily connected as to being are not so as to being known either. But the antecedent is proved. Because even if the ant and the other less perfect creatures were implied by man, and consequently if the aforesaid creatures were not contained in God, yet man would not thereby be implied, nor would he cease to be contained in the divine essence and omnipotence.

91 For it must be answered that, even if the antecedent be conceded, the consequence must be denied. And to the first proof, the antecedent having been conceded, the consequence must also be denied. Because although the divine essence, when first seen, may lead to the knowledge of the aforesaid creatures less noble than man, because it contains them, and precisely by the fact that it contains them may lead to their knowledge, so often as man, contained in that same divine essence, is seen in God, and likewise although it is not necessary on the part of the effects that, in order that God contain man, He should contain, for example, the ant, and consequently that man's existence in God should not depend on the fact that the ant is contained in Him, nevertheless, the fact that man is seen in the divine essence can depend on the fact that the same ant, precisely because it is contained in God, must also be seen in Him.

And the reason of the disparity is drawn from the essential subordination which is between the grades of intensity in the light of glory required to see man in the divine essence and those required to see the ant: and from the defect (so to speak) of the subordination, still merely virtual, between the containment by which God contains that same man and the ant, and by which they are contained by Him. For the grade of intensity of the light of glory, for example as five, required to see man in God, and the grade of intensity, for example as two, for beholding the ant in Him, are essentially subordinated by the force of their own line: so that the grade of as five precontains the grade of as two, and a vision of as five of the divine essence precontains in its way a vision of as two of that same essence, and God as visible in a manner of as five holds in the reason of the object in some way Himself as He is visible in a manner of as two: and therefore the blessed man cannot see God through a light and a vision of as five without seeing Him through a light and a vision of as two, found there in a certain eminent way: as there cannot be given a heat and a heating of as five unless there be found there in a certain eminent way a heat and a heating of as two: and therefore a man who asks for a light of as five, for example, in order to be seen in God, cannot avoid being seen in Him at the same time the ant, which demands a light of as two.

Moreover, the containment by which God contains the ant is not yet virtually, excluding imperfections, subordinated to the containment by which He contains man. Because, although the ant were implied, it would not be necessary through the intrinsic place at least that man be implied, and conversely: yet if a light of as two were implied, a light of as five would be implied. Because, although man ought not to prehave the perfection of the ant, yet a light of as five cannot fail to contain eminently the perfection of a light of as two, accomplishing that which the aforesaid light of as two would accomplish. By which the second proof is clear.

92 Secondly, it is answered that, although it is not necessary that a more perfect creature be contained virtually, and eminently less perfect creatures, nevertheless the divine essence, which precontains all of them, must precontain less perfect creatures, in order that it precontain superior ones. And the reason is this. Because creatures of different species surpass one another in essential perfection, and for this excess it is not necessary that one precontain the perfection of the other, but it is enough that it have another, better perfection, which surpasses the perfection of the less noble creature. Moreover, the divine essence and omnipotence, because of their eminence, must precontain all the perfections of all creatures; in such a way indeed that they require a greater, and (so to speak) more intense perfection, the more perfect the creatures are: and consequently in order to contain a perfect creature of as five they demand a perfection, or intensity, for example of as five. Wherefore, since a perfection of as five cannot be connaturally given in one who has at the same time a perfection of as three, unless he has first that same perfection of as three, it follows that the divine essence and omnipotence, containing all the perfection of all the creatures, and consequently the effective power of the same, cannot contain more perfect creatures unless they first, in our manner of conceiving, contain less perfect ones. And this can be explained by the example of the grades of intensity in the opinion of those who say that intensity comes about by the addition of grade to grade, and that these grades are heterogeneous: so that a grade of heat of as eight does not precontain a grade of heat of as six. For according to this manner of speaking, it is enough for a heat of as eight that it declare a nobler grade, even though such a grade may not connaturally be found anywhere, or in one who has all the grades, unless that very subject which is hot to a degree of eight has first other heterogeneous grades of heat of as six or as five, etc. So, therefore, in the present case, due proportion being preserved, we must philosophize.

93 Nor let anything stand in the way, if, thirdly and principally, you object that if, a more noble creature being known, both as to essence and as to mode of existence together, creatures which are less perfect as to both must be known; whence it would follow that, grace and the supernatural accidents having been known, all the possible accidents of the natural order would be known, and consequently all possible substances to which such accidents are connatural: yet this ought not to be admitted, lest any blessed person who sees grace and the other supernatural accidents in God should also see in Him all possible creatures. The sequel as regards the first part seems clear. Because grace and the supernatural accidents are more perfect as to essence than the other accidents of the natural order, as is evident from itself, and they are not less perfect as to mode of existence, but rather more perfect, since although they have their mode of existence in another, as do the other natural accidents, nevertheless such a mode of existence is of the divine order. As regards the second part, however, the same sequel seems certain. Because a light which suffices to see in God the natural accidents which are connatural to some substance suffices to see in Him that same substance. And therefore a light which suffices to behold in God the properties of the essence of man will also suffice to behold in Him the aforesaid essence: therefore, if, grace and the other supernatural accidents having been seen, all the natural accidents must be seen, as is clear from the proof of the first part of this consequence, the consequence will be that all created and creatable substances, to which the aforesaid accidents are connatural, must also be seen,

94 It must be answered, then, by denying the sequel as regards both parts. And in answer to the proof of the first, on which the proof of the second depends, it must be said that that rule which we have adduced, namely, that a blessed person who sees in God creatures more perfect as to essence and mode of existence together will also see creatures less noble as to both, must be understood of more perfect creatures which express some complete nature: so that they not only bring a quantity of power and of proximate efficacy with respect to some operation, but also give to themselves an essential commensurability with respect to the aforesaid operation. Wherefore, since grace and the other supernatural accidents do not express some complete nature, but only a quantity of power and of proximate efficacy — the former indeed by the manner of a root with respect to seeing God, the latter by the manner of a disposition of that same order, leading and disposing in some way to that same vision and grace — it follows that, grace and the other supernatural accidents having been seen, all the other natural accidents must not be seen. The reason, however, on account of which that rule must be understood of integral and complete natures, which of themselves express both an essential commensurability and a quantity of power with respect to their proper operations, and not of accidents which import only a quantity of power with respect to seeing God, or with respect to some supernatural effect in some way leading to or disposing toward this, has already been touched upon in this same Difficulty, when we said that grace and the other supernatural accidents, having something after the manner of a property, or of a quasi-property, with respect to that, have by reason of their special condition that they are less latent in the divine essence. Wherefore, since all these things, because of their own peculiar reason too, express only a quantity of power and of proximate efficacy with respect to the effects already stated, and do not express a quantity of power and an essential commensurability together, and consequently that sanctifying grace brings a quantity of power and of proximate efficacy by the manner of a root with respect to that same vision; and the light of glory imports a quantity of the power of proximate potency for beholding God — it follows that the rule already stated must not be understood of those creatures of the supernatural order which express only a quantity of power, for example with respect to seeing God, but of integral and complete natures which of themselves and by their own proper characteristics express both an essential commensurability and a quantity of power with respect to their proper operations.

95 From which also another objection, which could be made here, remains solved, namely, that all possible creatures are less perfect than sanctifying grace as to essence, and moreover, considered according to their own essence, they abstract from a substantial, or accidental, mode of existence, and so can have an accidental mode of existence in the intelligible species through which they are represented: therefore, grace having been seen in God, the essences of other possible creatures would be seen, either in themselves, or at least as having being in their intelligible species, in which their proper nature is, but under another, accidental, mode of existence, as we shall say in the Treatise on the Knowledge of God, dist. 2, dub. 2.

From what has been said, therefore, this objection remains solved: namely, if a comparison is made between the integral and total nature of possible creatures, and between accidents which express only the quantity of power already explained. To these it may also be added that it is enough that the essences of creatures without end, possible and, for example, substantial, do not abstract from the natural and entitative mode of existing in themselves, and from the mode of existing in another which they have in their accidental species representing them, and which does not transcend their perfection, so that they are not necessarily seen in God simply because their essences, which do not abstract from those two modes of existing in themselves and in another, are beheld in it: and so, grace created and sanctifying having been seen, which under the concept of created grace does not abstract from the mode of existing substantially in itself and in another, but must necessarily be an accident, it is not necessary that other creatures without end, possible, be seen.

Conclusion.

Creatures seen in the divine essence are not seen through any created species, but through the divine essence itself united under the reason of an intelligible species.

Concerning this conclusion, let what we said in art. 2 and 8 of this question be seen.

The conclusion is affirmative.

Against it, however, several things are usually brought forward, to prove that it is impossible that infinite things should be understood at the same time and distinctly; and consequently that the blessed should see at the same time all the things which they see in God: because these things can be infinite. Nevertheless, all these things remain solved by what we said in art. 8.

Conclusion.

God cannot be seen by essence by a pure man, unless he be separated from this mortal life. The assertion is understood, however, according to the ordinary law of God, that is, without a miracle, by which the intellect of a man living in this life is elevated so that, independently of the senses, it can understand, as is clear from what D. Thom. teaches in the solution to the second.

It was, however, deliberately said in the conclusion, by a pure man, in order that the Lord Christ be excepted, who, precisely because by reason of the union He was about to claim to be a comprehensor, was able, without any new miracle, to understand even by an intellection of the natural order, without conversion to phantasms, as can be seen in D. Thom., 3. Part, q. 11, art. 2.

Whether this miracle was in fact done in certain others, so that they were raised up even to the vision of the divine essence, is not now to be disputed: first, because neither side conflicts with the conclusion of this article; and also because as regards what Moses did in this matter, D. Thom., 2-2, q. 174, art. 4, and as regards Paul, q. 145, art. 3. It is established, however, that it is only with respect to Moses and Paul that there is this special difficulty among the Theologians.

Concerning that which is found with the Holy Doctor in the proof of this conclusion, namely, that in dreams, and when a person is alienated from the senses, he will perceive divine revelations more readily, let Caietanus be consulted, who explains this well, saying that it must be understood of sleep, in which the internal senses remain unbound, and of the revelations as regards their reception: for this is done the better the less distraction the mind has about sensible things; but not as regards the judgment about the things revealed: because, since this can help much, the resolution of the agreement with the external senses.

It must be noted, however, that when a person is alienated from the senses by divine power, whether only the external senses, or also the internal ones at the same time by means of ecstasy or rapture, the judgment about the things revealed is not usually impeded by reason of the fact that, just as the mind is alienated from the senses by divine power so as to be made more apt to receive supernatural illuminations, so likewise it is usually elevated so that it can elicit the most perfect judgment without needing that resolution to the external senses. See D. Thom., 2-2, q. 173, art. 3, saying that the mind alienated from the senses is elevated for contemplating more sublime things: where by the act of contemplating he understands judgment: and therefore this judgment cannot, on account of its imperfection, be insufficient for this, namely so that the will remain free with the freedom required for merit, as D. Thom. teaches in the same place, concerning which Caietanus may also be consulted in the same place.

Conclusion.

God, as He is in Himself, that is, quidditatively, cannot be known by natural reason; but He is well known as to whether He is, and as to those things which necessarily pertain to Him, such as that He is the first cause of all things, that He contains all creatures, that He differs from all of them, and that He is more excellent than they are, etc.

The conclusion is affirmative.

Whether this knowledge ought to be more excellent as regards the intentional species; or only as regards the light, and the other things pertaining to this manner of excess, is usually explained elsewhere: and therefore we deliberately omit it here.