Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

1 From the incomprehensibility of God by the created intellect, his infinity is gathered more clearly than from other things, as we shall explain in the following difficulty; and therefore D. Thom. particularly investigates this, so that the infinity of the divine essence may thereby be more clearly laid hold of in the reason of the knowable object.

The meaning of comprehension, of which we treat here, being unknown, the things to be said in this doubt cannot be rightly understood: and therefore we must first explain what we mean by the term comprehension.

§ I. Explanation of the title.

For its understanding it must be noted that intellectual comprehension is called such by an order and an analogy with material comprehension. Material comprehension, as D. Thomas attests in the present passage in his solution to the first, can be taken in two ways. First, broadly, insofar as it is opposed to pursuit; and in this way a thing is said to be comprehended when it is already held by the hand, for example: and to this acceptance there corresponds another in spiritual things, namely the attaining of that which was desired, and consequently also the obtaining and the possession of the ultimate end, which in this way is called comprehension. Second, it is taken strictly for the inclusion and the containing, whereby one body quantum contains within itself another body entire, as when the hand so contains an entire globe that nothing of it is outside her: and to this comprehension there corresponds another in intellectual things and in their cognitions, according to which a thing is then said to be comprehended by intellection when it is known so perfectly, and so far, as it is by nature knowable: because when a thing is known in this way, it is as if it were contained, and were shut up whole and totally within the cognition, in that proportional manner in which one body quantum, comprehended by another, is contained according to its whole self, and is totally shut up by it.

Whence D. Augustine, book 20 of The City of God, chapter 8, speaking of this comprehension through cognition, says: Whatever is comprehended by knowledge is bounded by the comprehension of the knower, inasmuch of course nothing is in a thing thus known which lies outside the cognition comprehending it; and in volume 2, letter 112, chapter 9, near the beginning, defining comprehension, he says: that a thing is comprehended wholly by being seen, when it is seen in such a way that nothing of it escapes the one seeing, or that its bounds can be surveyed, or circumscribed. For, as D. Thomas explains in the place cited, the end of a thing is surveyed when one arrives at the end in the manner of knowing it, that is, when such a thing is known so far, or so perfectly, as it is by nature knowable.

2 But by the term of the bounding required for the desired comprehension, and explained in that particular word finitur, a positive bounding is not understood, as though it were necessary for comprehension that the thing known be positively bounded by such a cognition; otherwise God would not be comprehensible even by himself; since for this positive bounding it is required that the object, in the reason of the object as knowable, be bounded in itself. Rather, a negative bounding is understood, by which it is signified only that, although the object is infinite in the reason of knowability, it is nevertheless seen so perfectly that there is nothing in it which is not wholly and totally attained by that cognition; and so that there is no excess between the cognition considered in the reason of cognition, and the knowable object taken in the reason of knowability. And likewise, when the same Augustine says that a thing is comprehended when its bounds are surveyed, or can be circumscribed, this is not understood as a positive circumscription, but a negative one; and accordingly neither of positive bounds of the object, but of negative ones, in the comparison with comprehension; inasmuch as, as we were saying, there is nothing in the known object which is not wholly and totally attained by that cognition, so that there is no excess between it and the object, if the cognition is considered in the reason of cognition and of the aforesaid attainment, and the object in the reason of the object as knowable.

The title of the doubt, therefore, is not understood as concerning comprehension taken in the first way; because, just as it is certain that all the blessed hold and attain their ultimate end through the beatific vision, namely God clearly seen, so it must be certain that all of them comprehend God, with comprehension taken as this (so to speak) intellectual straining after the ultimate end. Whence D. Thomas in this sense explains that text of the Canticles: I have held him, and will not let him go: and likewise that of Paul: So run that you may attain: because comprehension taken in this way is one of the three gifts of the soul, corresponding to hope, just as vision corresponds to faith, and enjoyment to charity.

Wherefore the title is to be understood only of comprehension taken in the second manner, in that it says a cognition so perfect in the reason of cognition that it knows the object so far as it is by nature knowable, and consequently attains it whole and totally. We said by its nature, because for comprehension strictly taken it is not required that the cognition attaining the object to be comprehended be the most perfect of all; otherwise God alone could comprehend any object: but it suffices that it be such in the reason of cognition as is demanded by the object from the merits of its own knowability.

§ II. Reasons for doubting on the affirmative side.

3 These arguments seem to recommend the affirmative side. First indeed. For the created intellect can comprehend the knowledge of the vision of God: therefore also the divine essence. The consequence is evident. For, just as the divine essence is infinite, so also are its attributes: therefore if these, notwithstanding infinity, can be comprehended by the created intellect, the divine essence too will be comprehensible by it: since only infinity can hinder this comprehension. The antecedent, however, is proved. For, as D. Thomas teaches in 3. part. quaest. 10. art. 4., the soul of Christ our Lord sees all those things which God knows with the knowledge of vision. Whence, just as he would comprehend the attribute of the knowledge of simple intelligence if he attained all the possible things to which such knowledge extends, so also he will comprehend the knowledge of vision, by the very fact that he sees all and each of the things to which such knowledge extends: since to comprehend any knowledge it suffices to attain that knowledge itself, and all the objects to which it extends.

4 Second. Any blessed man can, nay, he ought to, see the divine essence, both according to its whole entity, and according to all the modes that are found in it: therefore he can, and he ought to, comprehend God. The consequence seems legitimate. For by the very fact that a thing is seen according to its whole entity, and according to all its modes, it is seen whole and totally; because there is nothing in it beyond its whole entity and all its modes, and consequently no further knowability remains in it: and for comprehension nothing else is desired save that the thing known be attained whole and totally, and consequently according to all the knowability which it has: therefore, etc. The antecedent, however, is proved. For the whole entity of the divine essence, and all its modes, are one and the same most simple reality: therefore it cannot be seen according to some part of itself, and not seen according to another: since what is most simple is either not attained according to some part of itself, or is attained according to its whole self.

5 It makes no difference if you say that from this it is inferred at the highest that the blessed contemplate God according to those things which are formally in him, and not according to those which he contains eminently; whereas the knowledge of these likewise is desired for comprehension.

For against this it is that those things which are contained eminently in God are not God himself, but creatures: therefore from the fact that they themselves are not seen, it does not follow that the divine essence, seen according to its whole entity and all its modes, is not seen whole and totally.

It makes no difference if you further say that, although the things contained eminently in God are not God himself, nevertheless that eminence in which they are contained is so; but that this, being as it were the most eminent object, and equivalent to infinite objects, cannot be seen by a created and finite intellect.

For against this also it is that this eminence of the divine omnipotence, insofar as it contains the aforesaid creatures, is likewise formally in God, since divine omnipotence is formally the most eminent power of acting, and by reason of this formal and infinite eminence it contains virtually all creatures: therefore the aforesaid eminence will not fail to be seen by all the blessed, and consequently all the creatures contained therein eminently and virtually. The first consequence is evident from what has been said, but the second from the first. For just as it is repugnant that the divine power be known, as being a power formally eminent, containing virtually, for example, a horse, and that the same horse not be known, so it will be repugnant to know it as being a power formally eminent, containing virtually all creatures, unless all of those be known.

6 And the whole of this argument can be confirmed. For when it is said that God is seen by the blessed whole, and with regard to all the perfections and formalities found in him, but not totally: either the term totaliter denotes the manner in which it holds good on the part of the thing seen? and this it does not; since whatever is in God is one and the same most simple formality, and therefore it cannot be seen according to some part of itself and not seen according to another; or it denotes the manner in which it holds good on the part of the one seeing? and this it does not; first, because the power as a whole sees God with all its strength; then also, because for comprehension it is not required that the object be seen in every way in which it holds good on the part of the one seeing; otherwise one creature would not be comprehended by another, but only by God alone; because it is seen in every way, and with every possible perfection, which can hold good on the part of the one seeing, by God alone.

7 Third. The created intellect can, at least by divine power, be elevated to see all those things which are in God formally and eminently: therefore also to comprehend him. The consequence is evident. First because D. Thomas in the following article attributes to that intellect alone the power of comprehending God, who has the power of knowing all those things which are contained in him formally and eminently. Then also from those things which we shall say in this same doubt. The antecedent, as to the first part, that is, as to those things which are in God formally, is commonly admitted by theologians, and it will be evident from what has been said and what will be said. As to the second part, however, that is, as to those things which are contained in him eminently, it is proved as follows. For God, and at the same time all the other things which are contained in him eminently, are not any object absolutely and intensively more perfect than God himself is according to those things which he himself is formally and quidditatively; therefore since the intellect can be elevated to see that object which God is formally and quidditatively, it can also be elevated, at least by divine power, to see that other object which is at the same time God and all the things which are contained in him eminently.

It is confirmed. Because omnipotence is not the productive power of the producible thing as such, but of this and that and the other producible thing in particular; therefore it will be repugnant for it to be known quidditatively, unless the aforesaid creatures be known in particular; therefore since any blessed man sees quidditatively both omnipotence and all those things which are in God formally (as will be evident from those things which we shall say in disp. following, dub. 1.), the result will be that any one of them sees in omnipotence all possible creatures, and comprehends God. This last consequence is evident from what we have just said. The first, however, from the antecedent. Because it is repugnant that omnipotence be known as being productive of these and those creatures in particular, unless such creatures be known. The antecedent, however, is proved. Because omnipotence is (so to speak) a practical productive power: but practical power, just as it cannot produce the producible thing as such, but this and that producible thing, so neither is it the productive force of the producible thing as such, but of this and that producible thing in particular.

8 Fourth. Because God whole and totally, and consequently according to every reason of passive intelligibility which he has, will be contained within the adequate object of the created intellect: therefore he will be able to be elevated to be thus seen, and consequently to his comprehension. This last consequence is evident from what has been said. The first, however, from the antecedent. For any power whatever can be elevated to the knowledge of any thing whatever contained under its adequate object, and in the manner in which it is contained under it: therefore if God, as knowable, will be contained whole and totally under the adequate object of the created intellect, he will be able to be elevated to be thus seen. The antecedent, however, is proved. For the adequate object of the intellect is being in its whole breadth: but under being in this breadth it is certain that any being whatever is contained, and consequently any intelligible whatever considered according to any reason of intelligibility: therefore, etc.

9 Fifth. God can communicate to the created intellect the light of glory infinitely intense: therefore the intellect elevated by this light will be able to comprehend God. The consequence seems certain. First from D. Thomas in this article, where he infers from it that the created intellect cannot know God infinitely, as is required for comprehension, because it cannot receive an infinite light of glory: therefore if this can be communicated to it by God, it will be able to comprehend him. Then also by the reason of the same holy Doctor. Because, just as God is infinitely knowable, so the intellect elevated by an infinite light would be infinitely cognitive of God, and consequently the cognitive power of the intellect and the knowability of the object would be equal. The antecedent, however, is proved. Because the light of glory does not demand limitation as to its intensity and efficacy from its own formal reason, since according to this it is the formal participation of the divine light, which is infinite in essence: nor on the part of the efficient cause, namely the divine power, since this too is infinite: nor finally on the part of the subject, namely the intellect; for the intellect is not capable of the light according to natural power, but according to obediential power, which is not determined to any certain degree of light, as is evident from itself.

10 It makes no difference if you say that not every infinity on the part of the light suffices for knowing God infinitely, as is required for comprehension; but that an infinity in essence is moreover required: since God, in the reason of the object as knowable, has not just any infinity, but an infinity in essence.

For against this it is that a created and infinite light would suffice for knowing God according to all the things which are in him, even eminently: therefore for knowing him infinitely with that infinity which is required for comprehension. The consequence is evident from those things which we were just saying. The antecedent, however, is argued as follows. For by a light twice as intense, twice as many possible creatures contained in the divine omnipotence are known by the force of the vision of the divine essence: therefore if this light be twice as intense, twice as many possible creatures will be seen by it by the force of the vision of the divine essence: therefore if it grow infinitely in intensity, and consequently as far as it can grow, infinite possible creatures contained in the divine omnipotence will not fail to be seen by it.

§ III. The Catholic truth is established by the testimonies of Scripture and of the Fathers.

11 Nevertheless it must be said that the created intellect, even flooded with the light of glory, cannot by any power comprehend God. Thus all theologians commonly, with a single exception, Valentia, who in volume 1, disp. 1, quaest. 12, punct. 5, asserts that this proposition is true according to the ordained power of God: and although he defines nothing about it with respect to the divine power, nevertheless he leans rather toward the opposite of our assertion. Hence it will not be necessary to bring forward the other theologians one by one. This proposition, as regards the incomprehensibility of God by the created intellect with respect to the ordained power of God, is proved from the Council of Basel, sess. 22, where it is defined that the proposition of the Roman Augustine, namely that the soul of Christ sees God as perfectly and as clearly as God sees himself, and the other propositions proceeding from this one, are erroneous. Wherefore since from that first proposition it plainly follows, as is evident from what has been said, that the soul of Christ comprehends God, it follows thence that by force of the aforesaid definition this proposition too remains condemned as erroneous, namely that that same soul of Christ comprehends God. The greatest faith is to be given to that definition: because, as Gonzalez well noted in the present disp. 30, sect. 1, that condemnation was made in the year 1435, before the Council was dissolved by the Pontiff in the year 1437, and it was approved by the Bull of Nicholas V, who succeeded Eugene IV, as is found in the summary of the Councils at the end of the Council of Basel.

As for the incomprehensibility of God himself by the created intellect, even with respect to absolute power, it is proved by the testimonies of Scripture, Jeremiah 32: The Lord of hosts is his name, strong, great, mighty, and incomprehensible in thought: and ad Rom. 11, his judgements are called incomprehensible. Now if his operations are called incomprehensible, much more will his essence be incomprehensible. And in the chapter beginning firmiter, on the most holy Trinity and the Catholic faith, it is said of God that he is immense, unchangeable, and incomprehensible: and in chapter 2, which begins damnamus, it is asserted: We therefore, with the approval of the sacred Council, believe and confess with Peter that there is one certain supreme thing, indeed incomprehensible and ineffable. These testimonies are understood by the Fathers and theologians likewise by way of an order to the divine power.

12 It makes no difference if, with Gabriel Vazquez, you say in the present passage that these testimonies are not to be understood of the intellect of one blessed, but of one on the way. For against this it is that the aforesaid testimonies are commonly understood by theologians and by the holy Fathers as concerning the incomprehensibility by any intellect whatever, even a blessed one, as Gonzalez excellently proves in this article, disp. 30, already cited, citing Dionysius, Cyprian, Nazianzenus, Basil, Ambrose, Augustine, Chrysostom, Gregory the Great, Epiphanius, Hilary, Cyril of Jerusalem, Damascene, Theodore, Bede, and others: and so it is not permissible to interpret them otherwise: since no one is allowed to explain the testimonies of Scripture against the unanimous consent of theologians and of the holy Fathers.

Nor do the two points stand in the way, which the same Vazquez, overwhelmed by such a multitude of testimonies against him, adds. The first is, that Chrysostom, Cyril of Jerusalem, Basil, Theodore, Epiphanius, Bede, and the other Greek Fathers are not to be heard in this matter, because he thinks that all of them erred about the ultimate end of our beatitude, denying that God can be seen by the blessed as he is in himself. The second is, that the remaining Fathers are to be understood as concerning the intellect of one on the way, and not of one blessed.

These things, therefore, do not stand in the way. Not indeed the first. First because above, disputat. 1, dub. 2, we have shown sufficiently that the aforesaid Fathers truly knew, and affirmed, that God is seen by a blessed intellect. Then also because it does not seem modestly put that the holy Fathers erred about our true beatitude; especially since an error about the ultimate end, which in moral matters has the place of a first principle, utterly destroys the whole moral order. Then finally because, if the aforesaid Fathers had placed beatitude in the attainment of some created good, that is, in the vision of some finite light (as Vazquez wills, disp. 37, c. 2, num. 7 and 8), it would follow thence that they neither had faith, as is necessary for salvation, nor even hope, which is a theological virtue; but this is sufficiently absurd, as is evident from itself: therefore, etc. The sequel, as regards the first part, is evident. For, on the testimony of the Apostle, ad Hebraeos 11, To draw near to God it is necessary to believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of those who seek him. D. Thomas understands this testimony as concerning the reward, which is God himself, in the same place, lecture 2. As for the second part, it is likewise evident. For the object of hope is God to be obtained in beatitude, as the Angelic Doctor teaches, 2. 2, quaest. 17, art. 2, saying: That nothing less is to be hoped from him than he himself is, since the goodness by which a good creature communicates is not less than his essence? Whence, by the very fact that the aforesaid Fathers had erred about this object, thinking that God cannot be seen by the created intellect, they would have had no act of the hope of the theological virtue.

From which it is also sufficiently evident that the interpretation which he employs for the other Latin Fathers is not legitimate: since just as the testimonies of Scripture are not to be explained against the explanation of the Fathers, so neither are the testimonies of the Fathers against the common consent and understanding of the Scholastics. Wherefore since all the Scholastics commonly understand the words of the Fathers in the sense set forth in the proposition explained by us, it follows that Gabriel Vazquez has not rightly understood them in another sense, and therefore his interpretation is not to be admitted.

§ IV. The same Catholic truth is proved by reasons.

13 Next, the proposition is proved by a reason drawn from D. Thomas in this article, which can be proposed in the following form. In order that the intellect should comprehend any object, it is required that it know it as perfectly as the aforesaid object by its nature demands to be known: but no created intellect can know God in this way: therefore neither can it comprehend him. The consequence does not require proof. The minor, however, is also evident. Because no created intellect can know God with an infinite cognition in essence, as is evident from itself: but God of himself demands to be known by the aforesaid cognition. First, because he requires a cognition corresponding with himself in the degree of immateriality, in order that he may be known altogether connaturally, and consequently a cognition which is immaterial in the manner of the purest act, and consequently infinite in essence. Then also because God has not less of intelligibility than of intellectuality, since both these relations in him arise, in our manner of understanding, from the same degree of immateriality: but God, in the reason of the intelligible, by his nature demands to be understood by an intellection infinite in essence: therefore also in the reason of the intelligible, by his nature, he requires to be understood by an intellection infinite in essence.

Then finally: because God, in the reason of the knowable, exceeds the created intellectual power, and any intellection of it whatever, by as much as the angelic knowability surpasses the force and the faculty of the human intellect in this state, and any knowledge of it whatever, by as much as the excess in the degree of immateriality, by which God exceeds every created intellect, is infinitely greater than that by which the angelic essence and its knowability surpass the human intellect in its own degree of immateriality: but the Angel by reason of this excess by nature demands to be known with a cognition more perfect than that which can be elicited from the human intellect in this state: therefore much more the divine essence, by reason of the infinite excess by which it surpasses every created intellect, will demand by its nature to be understood through a cognition more perfect than that which can be elicited from any created intellect whatever, and consequently through an intellection infinite in essence.

The major, however, is evident; first from what has been said in num. 1 and 2 of this doubt: then also from the example and the reason adduced by the same holy Doctor: indeed from the example. For he who knows the demonstrable proposition, A triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, only by a probable mean, does not attain it comprehensively: because he does not know it by a cognition so perfect as it by nature demands to be known, that is, by a demonstrative cognition.

14 By reason, however. First because in order that any cognition be comprehensive, it is required that there be the equality already spoken of between the cognition in the reason of cognition and the knowable object in the reason of knowability, as is evident from itself, although in entitative esse they may have inequality: but if the cognition does not attain the knowable object so perfectly as it by nature demands to be known, the aforesaid equality will not obtain between such an object in the reason of knowability and that cognition in the reason of cognition, as is evident from itself: therefore, etc.

Then also: because just as a cognition attaining an object so perfectly as it demands to be attained knows it, both as regards those things which are in it formally and those which are contained in it eminently, from the fact that the object demands no cognition more perfect than that by which, as regards all these things, it is known as exhausting it; so too, if the cognition does not attain the object so perfectly as it by nature demands to be attained, then through it there will not be known all those things which are contained in that object in the esse of the thing, both formally and eminently: and consequently such an object will not be contained, nor shut up whole and totally, in the aforesaid cognition, whose opposite is required for comprehension. Whence, as the same holy Doctor excellently noted, if anyone knows a certain demonstrable proposition by a probable mean, and that it can be demonstrated, then, though he attain the extremes, and their composition, and also that the manner of the composition is necessary, nevertheless he will not perfectly penetrate this manner of composition, considered as yet in the esse of the thing: because from the force of his cognition he knows imperfectly that such a composition is necessary, or in what its necessity consists: for if he penetrated this necessity, he could not fail to know the aforesaid proposition demonstratively.

15 Secondly it is proved by a reason drawn from the same holy Doctor. For as often as any operation belongs to anything by nature and by the force of its own form, it belongs to it perfectly and in the highest degree; but to others, to whom it belongs by participation and by a form in some way extrinsic, it belongs imperfectly and deficiently: but the knowledge of God, as it is in itself, belongs to him by nature and by the force of his own form: to others, however, by participation from God, and by a form in some way extrinsic; therefore it will belong to God perfectly and in the highest degree; to all others, however, imperfectly and deficiently, and consequently in them there will be no comprehensive cognition, whereas in God himself the opposite.

This last consequence is sufficiently clear from the prior. The prior, however, from both of the premises. The minor, however, is evident from itself and from what has been said in art. 4 and 5; as also the major is sufficiently inferred from what is said there. For, as we noted there, fire is most hot by nature, and other things which are hot by participation from it and by a form in some way extrinsic do not have the aforesaid heat in the highest degree, but imperfectly and deficiently, because fire is hot by nature, whereas the rest are hot by participation from fire and by a form in some way extrinsic.

16. Moreover, whenever an operation belongs to anything by nature, it is in it as in a subject altogether connatural, and consequently according to every perfection which it demands from its nature, both the operation itself and the object about which it is conversant: but when it belongs to anything by participation and by a form in some way extrinsic, it is there as in a subject in some way extrinsic, and consequently not according to every perfection which it and its object demand from their nature: therefore, etc.

These two proofs of the major proposition, which D. Thomas adduced in this second reason, have greater efficacy with respect to the present matter, that is, also with respect to the divine power. For, as is evident from what was said in disp. 2 of this treatise, num. 154 and following, in order that any cognition be comprehensive, it is required, first, that the thing known be altogether connatural in the knower; and consequently that the form, or intelligible species, by which he knows it, be altogether connatural to that same knower: then also that the cognition itself be altogether connaturally received in the knower. Wherefore since the divine essence, since it has the reason of an intelligible species, by which the blessed intellect ought to see God, cannot be altogether connatural to the created intellect, however flooded with the light of glory, but is in some way extrinsic to it, as is evident from what was said there, and from what we said in disp. 4, num. 25 and following: and likewise the intuitive vision of God does not occur altogether connaturally in the created intellect, as is evident from what was said in disp. 2, num. 170, the result is that the aforesaid intellect, participating in the vision of God through the aforesaid form in some way extrinsic, and not receiving that same vision altogether connaturally, cannot have the aforesaid vision in the highest degree, that is, in such a way that it be comprehensive, but deficiently, and in a diminished degree, and not reaching all the way to comprehension.

§ V. An answer is given to the arguments adduced at the outset.

17 To the first, the antecedent is to be denied. And to the proof it is answered that the reasoning is disparate. Because the knowledge of simple intelligence, since it is an attribute terminated toward creatures, has for its adequate object, which necessarily corresponds to it and beyond which it cannot extend, all the possible effects: whence whoever by the force of the vision attained all those of them could not fail to attain its adequate and necessary object, beyond which it cannot advance, and consequently could not fail to know it comprehensively. But the knowledge of vision, since it looks to creatures, is freely terminated toward them; and thus it itself, remaining according to its entity unchanged, could be terminated toward several others according to the free will of God, if God had decreed to produce them. Whence from the fact that all those things to which it de facto extends are known, it is not well inferred that the aforesaid knowledge is comprehended; since the very same knowledge could extend to several other objects. Wherefore the knowledge of the vision of creatures under this most formal concept is not an attribute of God; because with respect to this reason it says something free, whereas attributes as such say something necessary. We said with respect to this reason, because the very same, since it is divine knowledge, is an attribute, as is evident from itself and from what will be said below.

18 To the second, the antecedent is to be distinguished as understood of the modes and formalities of the divine essence, which express, or found, the relation to creatures, and it is to be conceded of the aforesaid modes and formalities according to the reality which they express: but it is to be denied of the same with respect to the terminations which they import toward creatures taken in particular. And then the consequence is to be denied, because, in order that the divine essence should be attained whole and totally according to its whole entity and according to any formal reason whatever, it would be necessary that it be seen according to all its formalities and modes, with which it has an indispensable connection; not in any way whatever, but insofar as they express the aforesaid terminations: since those being known according to their reality, a further knowability remains in them; namely with respect to the terminations already explained.

To the proof, however, of the antecedent, insofar as it seems to fight against this solution, it is to be said that it is not rightly inferred, from the fact that the whole entity and all the modes, or formalities, of the divine essence are one and the same most simple entity and formality, that they ought to be seen with respect to all the terminations which they express toward creatures accepted in particular, though indeed with respect to their own reality. First, because those terminations, at least on the part of the diverse connotations which they involve, are several and diverse, and in order that they be seen in particular they must in this way be seen to be diverse. Then also because these modes or formalities found no relation to creatures in particular terminated by themselves (so to speak), but only to those taken in common: nor do they found the aforesaid relation tending expressly, but only implicitly, to those creatures accepted in particular: nor do they have a connexion (so to speak) by themselves primarily and expressly with those thus accepted, but at most with them in common: and therefore the aforesaid formalities must be seen at most with respect to the termination to creatures in common, and not indeed in particular.

19 Whence both of the solutions given there, and understood according to what we have just said, are legitimate. And to the proof against the first, the first solution adduced there is also excellent, if it is understood according to what we have just said. And to the proof it is to be said that, although creatures, according to the esse which they assert in their own genus, and consequently involved in imperfections, are not formally God himself; nevertheless from the fact that they are not all seen in particular according to the aforesaid esse, it is excellently inferred that the divine essence is not seen whole and totally with respect to all the formalities and modes, and conversely, as has been explained.

To the proof, however, against the second, it is evident from what has been said that the antecedent and the first consequence are to be conceded, if it be understood of that eminence according to its own reality, and the termination to creatures taken in common: but not if it be understood of the terminations toward creatures in particular: and thus the last consequence is to be denied. For although, in order to know the eminence of the divine power, as it contains peculiariter a horse, the same horse must be known: and likewise, in order to know that same eminence, as it contains creatures considered in particular, they must be known according to the terminations toward them, as is evident from itself; nevertheless, in order to know that same eminence, as containing virtually all creatures in common, that is, as being productive of any creature whatever, not implying any in particular, according to that reason alone which it must indispensably be seen by the blessed, it suffices to know the aforesaid eminence according to the termination which it imports toward the producible thing as such.

20 All these things are explained. For if divine omnipotence, for example, were productive of a horse according to one formality, and productive of a lion according to another virtually distinct one, and likewise were terminated toward a horse according to one termination, and toward a lion according to another, distinct also virtually on the part of those things which are found in God, it would not fail to be seen: as it is terminated toward these, and toward all creatures in particular; and consequently the aforesaid creatures would not fail to be seen in the same way: because each of these formalities and terminations found in God would found on its part a peculiar relation to its own creature, and would have a connexion with that creature taken in particular. For its essence would consist in this, that it was productive of this creature and not of another: and thus it could not be known quidditatively without being known according to a formal esse virtually distinct from the esse of the other formalities, and consequently it could not be attained quidditatively unless the aforesaid creature were seen.

But the case is not so; rather, by that same most simple formality, without any virtual distinction, by which it is productive of a horse, it is also productive of a lion; and by that same termination formally found in it, by which it is terminated toward a horse, it is terminated toward a lion; so that that termination, on the part of those things which are found in God, is not virtually multiple: because the terminus (so to speak), inspected in itself primarily by omnipotence, and to which that termination primarily extends, is only the producible thing as such, and not this or that producible thing in particular. For these things are inspected only secondarily, yet indispensably: and therefore it is not necessary that they be inspected through a distinct formality or termination.

21 Wherefore, because in order to know quidditatively any thing according to every formality which it holds on its part in the esse of being, and likewise according to every termination found in it, according to that real and formal which it formally places in it, it suffices to know the object (so to speak) inspected primarily and explicitly by that thing; but not the objects secondarily (so to speak), though indispensable, and inspected only implicitly: therefore, in order that any blessed man may see God according to every formality which he holds on his part in the esse of being, and according to every termination found in him, according to that real which he formally places in him, it is not indispensably necessary to attain the creatures in particular, but only in common, according to the general reason of producible things: because divine omnipotence looks only (so to speak) primarily to the producible thing as such.

And likewise because, in order to know any power, and its termination, insofar as it itself extends without distinction on its part to the objects secondary and indispensable in particular, it is necessary to attain that power, insofar as it connotes the aforesaid objects in the same way, and consequently it is necessary to attain that same termination, insofar as, as it is joined with this connotation in particular, it is distinguished by that reason from itself, as joined with another, and so of the rest; and for this manner of knowing there is required in a power as much cognitive force as there is knowability in the object; and consequently, in order thus to know omnipotence and its terminations, a force infinite in essence is required: therefore only the divine intellect can thus know, and consequently comprehend, that same power, because it alone can thus know it.

22 We have said that divine omnipotence looks only (so to speak) primarily to the producible thing as such, because, as we shall note in the treatise on the divine will, no divine formality looks primarily to anything outside God: because ad intra it has all its own, as it were its specificative. But with this standing, that when a comparison has been made between those things which it looks to secondarily, then some common reason encompassing under itself several unequal objects must be inspected first, as being inspected adequately, so that from the multiplication of the various adequate reasons, and inspected in the manner said, it be inferred a posteriori that there is in God a multiple formality and termination, virtually distinct on its part: otherwise, from the multiplication of unequal objects, with respect to which the aforesaid common reason is, so to speak, primarily inspected.

23 From which it is also more clearly understood why, in order to know omnipotence quidditatively, it is necessary to know the producible thing as such, and not these and those producible things in particular. First because the divine essence, since it is the reason of making every producible thing as such, quasi specifies omnipotence, and not, since it is the reason of making these or those producible things in particular, although it indispensably has the being of a reason of making those, taken singly and determinately. And thus, if the divine essence, insofar as it specifies omnipotence, were quasi defined, then its nature would be sufficiently explained by this, that it were something inspected by omnipotence, as being the reason of making any producible thing as such, even if one did not descend to these or those producible things in particular: and consequently, in order to know omnipotence quidditatively, as terminated to its specificative, it would be necessary to know the divine essence, since it is the reason of making the producible thing as such, and not since it is the reason of making these or those producible things in particular.

Then also: because although the producible thing as such is not the formal specificative of omnipotence, it nevertheless has something of the virtual specificative, inasmuch as it has as much connexion with omnipotence as this: that if by an impossibility it could be specified by something extrinsic, it would then be specified by the producible thing as such, and not by these or those producible things in particular, and singly. And therefore it cannot now be quasi defined and explained otherwise than by this, that it be productive of any producible thing as such, and consequently neither will omnipotence be able to be known quidditatively unless the producible thing as such be known, nor will the knowledge of these and those producible things in particular be required for this quidditative knowledge: since in order to know any thing quidditatively, it is necessary to know that which has something of a specificative, still virtual, from the fact that the thing specified expressly imports a connexion with it, and by reason of this it cannot be quasi defined and explained otherwise than by this, that it be, for example, productive of it: yet speaking universally, for the aforesaid quidditative knowledge of anything it is not necessary to know those things which have nothing of a specificative, still virtual, and consequently neither have connexion expressly involved and hinted at through the signified thing, although such a thing is joined to them implicitly and secondarily, as happens in omnipotence compared with creatures in particular.

24 From this, in answer to the confirmation, it will be said that the term totaliter does not denote the manner in which it holds good on the part of the thing seen in the esse of being. Because all divine things thus taken are seen by any blessed man, even according to that esse which they formally place in God, insofar as they extend to creatures in particular: since through that same most simple relation, as we were just saying, without any distinction on their part, they look to creatures as such, and to those accepted in particular: and thus those being known, insofar as they extend to creatures in common, they are known according to that very esse which they say, and place in the esse of being, in God, insofar as they are terminated toward those in particular. Wherefore the term totaliter denotes the manner in which it holds good on the part of the object in the genus of object, that is, that that object is not known, with respect to those same formalities, by as much light and as much cognition as it demands from its nature: because precisely insofar as it does not appear to extend to creatures in particular, it is not seen. For the aforesaid formalities, insofar as visible according to this reason, or according to what they express, the aforesaid manner in the genus of object, declare themselves to be visible by such light and such cognition, namely by a light and a vision infinite in essence, and consequently, since they connote the aforesaid light and cognition: and thus unless they are seen in this way, they are not seen in the aforesaid manner, nor as they extend to creatures in particular.

25 To the third, the antecedent is to be denied as regards its second part. And to the proof it is to be said that, although God and those things which are contained in him eminently are not an object more perfect intensively than God, so that creatures would add to him some knowability; nevertheless he himself, as knowable by as much cognition and light as is required to be the reason of knowing all creatures, is an object more perfect intensively in the genus of object than he himself as knowable according to those things which are in him formally, or according to what is the reason of knowing these or those creatures and not others. Whence, although the created intellect may be elevated to see God according to this second reason, and not according to that first one, unless as much light were given to it as is required for this, that is, a light infinite in essence, which nevertheless, as is evident from itself, is impossible.

26 In answer to the confirmation, it is to be said by distinguishing the antecedent. It is not productive of the producible thing as such, of a thing made immediately, actually, and in its execution, is to be conceded: as being that of the reason of making immediately, actually, and in the exercise, this and that producible thing in particular; but of that which it quasi receives first, it is to be denied. And then the consequence must be denied. Because in order to know omnipotence quidditatively it suffices to know it as being the productive force of the producible thing, which is quasi inspected first by omnipotence, and which by way of the reason quasi inspected first is the reason of making any producible things in particular, without expressly determining which and what these producible things are. Whence, because the producible thing as such, according to this universality, is something quasi inspected first by every power, and by its reason it looks to these and those producible things in particular, and consequently it is, by way of something quasi inspected first, the reason of making this and that producible thing in particular; therefore, for the quidditative knowledge of omnipotence it suffices to know the producible thing as such, and it is not required that these and those producible things in particular be known.

27 This is explained more fully. For practical power, or practical faculty, is not distinguished from speculative power, or speculative faculty, in this, that the latter can look first to some object taken universally; whereas the former cannot. For, when material objects, or unequal ones, inspected, or quasi inspected, by a practical power, are not inspected, or quasi inspected, formally, insofar as they are distinct among themselves, it is necessary that they be inspected, or quasi inspected, according to that in which they coincide in some one reason taken universally, which, a comparison having been made with the particular objects, is looked to before those. But the aforesaid powers, or faculties, are distinguished in this, that practical power looks to the aforesaid reason accepted universally, insofar as by way of something inspected first, or quasi inspected, it is the reason of looking to, and making, particular objects, indeed in such a way that it descends from it to these, and has no connexion with those except because it had first that aforesaid connexion with that reason accepted universally, from the fact that it is not joined to the particular objects except because they are contained under that reason accepted in common. But a purely speculative power with respect to its own object looks to no common reason, insofar as by way of something inspected by itself primarily, or quasi inspected, it is the reason of making other particular objects, which are contained under that common object.

To the fourth it is to be said that God clearly seen is contained under the adequate object of the created intellect, not indeed as infinitely knowable, but only as finitely attainable, and consequently not as comprehensible: because its object is being, or the intelligible as such, insofar as it is finitely attainable.

28 To the fifth the antecedent is to be denied. And to the proof to the contrary it is to be said that an infinite created light infinitely intense is repugnant. First on the part of the light itself: because when it denotes a finite essence, it cannot be capable of infinite intensity, otherwise that essence would be infinite. Whence, although it participates the divine light, which is infinite, it must participate it in a finite way. Then also on the part of the subject: because a finite subject is not capable of an accident which actually has infinity in act, although it is capable of an accident infinitely intense with infinity in potency. But on these matters let them see what our Complutensians teach, 3. Phys. disp. 18, quaest. 1 and 6.

Add that the solution given there is excellent. And to the proof to the contrary it is to be said that, although it were admitted that there are to be seen infinite possible creatures, mutually exceeding one another in essential perfection, by an intellect flooded with infinitely intense light ¹; nevertheless not all those which are contained in the divine power would be seen: because in it there are several other infinite series of infinite possible creatures, and all of these cannot be seen by such a light. Whence, since given one infinitely intense light another could be given still more intense, because one infinite can be greater than another, according to what our Complutensians teach in the cited disputation, last question, therefore by this more intense light more possible creatures could be seen than by that former light, although by either infinite ones would be seen.

29 It makes no difference if you say that, once the possibility of lights having infinite intensity is admitted, it follows at least that the comprehension of God by the created intellect is possible, if all the degrees of infinite intensity which can be communicated to all the lights were communicated to one and the same light, because then there would be as many degrees of intensity in that light as there are creatures contained in the divine power; since God is not less powerful to produce a greater, and a greater multitude of, degrees of intensity in a created light than to produce a greater, and a greater multitude of, other creatures: and thus all possible creatures could be known through such a light.

It is answered, however, that, the possibility of the light of glory infinite as to intensity having been granted, but not conceded, it is not therefore to be admitted that there is a possibility of one and the same infinite light, having as many (so to speak) infinities of degrees of intensity as there are possible creatures mutually exceeding one another in essential perfection: because otherwise that light would be and would not be created. It indeed would be, as is supposed: but it would not, because, as we have already shown, a light having the efficacy to see God as far as he is visible, or (which comes to the same) to see him according to all those things which he contains formally and eminently, cannot fail to be a light infinite in essence. From which it also follows that it not only implies that there is given one and the same light having the whole of the aforesaid intensity, but even that all those infinite lights taken collectively would have actually as many degrees of intensity as there are possible creatures, seeking a greater light for their own vision in the word, in such a way that all those would be united with respect to eliciting one and the same vision: otherwise no greater knowability would be found in God than would be the cognitive force in all those lights taken together: and consequently all those, taken collectively, would be and would not be something created, as is evident from the reasoning just made.

30 Nor does it make a difference if you urge that there are now possible as many degrees of intensity of the light of glory as there are possible creatures seeking a greater intensity of light, in order that they may be seen in God: therefore, once it is gratuitously admitted that this does not imply one, or several, infinite lights in act, then neither will it imply that there are possible as many degrees of intensity, in the manner said, in the aforesaid lights as there are the aforesaid possible creatures. The consequence seems to hold from the parity of the reasoning. The antecedent, however, is proved. Because none of the aforesaid creatures is such that it cannot be seen singly and divisively in God: since such a vision does not require infinity in the light: therefore none will be visible in God for which there does not correspond some degree of intensity of light, and consequently there will be as many possible degrees of intensity in it as there are the aforesaid possible creatures.

It is answered, however, that the reasoning is disparate. For all those infinite degrees, by which any creature taken divisively can be seen in God, are not possible as something infinite in act; but only as something infinite in potency: so that whatever degrees have in fact occurred must be finite; and those which can be made are several, and several without end. Whence from the possibility of all these it does not follow that there can ever actually be, and in exercise, as much cognition of the whole created light, and of the possible, as is the knowability of God: nor conversely that there be as much cognitive force in all the lights, and their degrees taken together, as divine knowability demands: because divine knowability, being infinite in act, demands a cognitive force infinite in act, and consequently able to break out into a cognition infinite in the same way. But if all the aforesaid degrees were possible, as being simultaneously possible in act, and consequently as something infinite in act, and able to elicit one and the same vision infinite in the same way, then such a light would be and would not be created, and would equal, and would not equal, the divine knowability, as has been explained.

First conclusion. No created intellect, seeing God by essence, sees in him all the things which God does, and can do.

Second conclusion. Of those things which God does or can do, the created intellect knows as many more as he sees God more perfectly.