Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

23 Although the decision concerning this doubt can readily be gathered from what has been said above, nevertheless, so that the opinion of the Angelic Doctor may remain more fully clarified, and the arguments of his opponents may be better met, we therefore raise it anew here; and, rightly enough, we immediately connect this doubt with the preceding one. For after we have explained whether a specific distinction of intellects restores a distinction, and an essential inequality, in the visions, it is rightly asked whether the greater natural perfection of those intellects, whatever it may be, restores some greater accidental and intensive perfection in the beatific visions, so that the greater the said natural perfection is, the more clearly, other things being equal, God is seen through such an intellect?

§ I. The first position, affirming the proposition.

Those who defend the affirmative position are Richard of St Victor in 4. distinct. 49. quaest. 8. art. 2; Major, in quaest. 10; Scotus, dist. 50. quaest. 6; Durandus in 3. dist. 14. quaest. 1, at the end; Holcot in his determinations, quaest. 8. art. 1, ad 4. Molina in the present disputation, 9, and Cajetan, 3. part. quaest. 10. art. 4, ad secundum, are cited for the same view.

It is proved first from the testimony of St Thomas, 3. part. quaest. 10. art. 4, ad 2, where he says: The degree in a vision is considered more according to the order of grace than according to the order of nature. Here the comparative more seems to indicate that the perfection of the vision is considered even according to the order of nature, that is, according to the natural perfection of the intellects, because a comparative supposes its positive.

This is confirmed from the same Holy Doctor in the present question, in the answer to the third objection, where he says: the diversity in seeing will be through a diverse faculty of the intellect, indeed not natural but glorious. Here he attributes the diversity in seeing God not only to the light of glory, but also to the faculty itself as made glorious, so as thus to signify that not only a diversity of light, but also of the intellectual faculty permeated by the light of glory, contributes toward a clearer and more perfect vision.

24 Secondly, it is proved by reasoning. For whenever two causes concur toward one and the same effect, an increase in either produces a greater and more perfect effect: but both the intellect and the light of glory concur toward the vision of God. Therefore, through an increase in either of them, a more intense vision will be elicited; and accordingly, a more perfect intellect with an equal light of glory will see God more perfectly and clearly. The consequence on either side is evident. The major premise, however, seems evident of itself. For the more the total cause grows in perfection, the more perfect an effect it produces; but the total cause grows in the said perfection through an increase in either of the partial causes that constitute it. The minor premise is likewise clear. For if the light did not concur, the vision could not be a supernatural act, nor would the intellect see God as He is in Himself, as has been often stated above. But if the intellect did not have an influx, that action would not be vital, nor would the intellect be said to see God, since the intellect does not understand, or see, except through an intellection, or vision, elicited by it.

This is confirmed. For a more perfect cause with an equal instrument produces a better effect, just as also an equal cause with a more perfect instrument operates more perfectly. Therefore, a more perfect intellect with an equal light of glory will see God more perfectly. The antecedent is sufficiently clear from artificial agents, where we see that a more skilled painter paints better with an equal brush, and that an equally skilled painter produces a more perfect effect with a better brush. The consequent, too, is clear: for the concurrence of a partial and a principal cause contributes more to an effect than the concurrence of an instrumental cause, as is evident of itself. Therefore, if greater perfection in the instrument contributes to a more perfect effect, much more will the greater nobility of the principal and partial cause—the intellect, in relation to the vision, as was shown above—contribute to it.

25 Nor will it suffice to say that this argument and its confirmation possess force only with respect to partial causes, each of which has its own proximate efficacy for acting, distinct from that of the others; for this is not found in the intellect and the light of glory, as was said above.

For the contrary is that the radical concurrence proper to the intellect is in fact concurrence in the order of an efficient cause. Therefore, greater perfection in the intellect will contribute to a better vision. The antecedent is clear, since otherwise the intellect would concur only in the manner of a sustaining subject, and not as belonging to the genus of an efficient cause. The consequent, however, is proved. For from the very fact that the intellect is more perfect, the total influx, coalescing from the greater radical influx of the intellect and the proximate influx of the light, would already be more noble; since every order, and whatever thing united within it, grows in perfection insofar as it coalesces from things that are more perfect in themselves in relation to that order and union. Thus, although the substantial form may concur only radically in constituting the whole and the proximate receptive subject of accidents, namely the composite, nevertheless the composite itself is the more perfect receptive subject of those accidents precisely insofar as the form itself is nobler in its radical influx, and it therefore concurs more and seeks nobler accidents. Likewise, although created substance is only radical and not proximately operative, as the Complutensians show in 2. Physic. disp. 10, nevertheless, the more perfect the substance is, the more perfect a radical influx it will provide, and accordingly the better and more perfect effect it will attain, as is evident of itself and is shown in the same place.

This is confirmed. For the reason why greater perfection in water does not contribute to greater heat is that water is related only as a sustaining subject of heat, as the philosophers commonly teach. Therefore, since the intellect concurs radically in the order of an efficient cause, it follows that greater perfection in the intellect will contribute to a more perfect vision. The consequence is evident, since we must attribute more to the intellect with respect to this radical concurrence in the order of vision than to water sustaining heat with respect to heating. Therefore, since greater perfection in water contributes nothing to greater heat, it follows that greater perfection in a radically influencing intellect must contribute at least something, however little, to a better effect.

26 Thirdly, and principally. Since greater perfection in an intellect concurring with an equal light of faith is wont not to contribute little toward eliciting the said acts more perfectly, therefore greater perfection in that intellect will also contribute, together with an equal light of glory, to a nobler vision. The consequence is evident. For in both cases the effect is supernatural, the intellectual potency is of the natural order, and finally the elevating and supernatural light is equal. Thus, in both cases there is an equal reason whether greater perfection in the intellectual potency with an equal light contributes or does not contribute to a greater and more perfect act of the supernatural order, whether of the vision of God or of faith. The antecedent, however, is proved. For a nobler intellect permeated with an equal light of faith is wont to penetrate the mysteries of faith more completely and perfectly than an intellect not so noble, as is seen in the comparison between a faithful man of acute intellect and a faithful rustic.

27 Finally, a more perfect intellect with an equal light of glory can strive more toward the vision than a less perfect intellect. Therefore, it will see God more perfectly and intensely. The antecedent is proved. For an effort toward an operation—or, what is the same, an application toward it—does not belong to a potency considered as a state of its powers, but rather the reverse, because states are subordinate to potencies with respect to acting. Therefore, we can use or not use them indifferently, which indeed they could not be unless an effort, and an application of the potency to act, belonged to it precisely as such and not by reason of its states. The consequent, however, is proved. Since that which by its very nature can strive to act will be able to strive still more if it grows in perfection, it will therefore elicit a more perfect effect, since a nobler operation follows a better effort and application, whether that effort and application be the same as the said operation or presupposed for it.

§ II. The position of St Thomas together with its first foundation.

28 It must nevertheless be said that the beatific vision is altogether commensurate with the light of glory, and consequently that a more perfect natural intellectual potency with an equal light does not see God more perfectly, or clearly. Thus St Thomas says in 4. dist. 49. quaest. 2. art. 4 and 3. contra Gent. cap. 58 and in this article in these words: It must be said that of those who see God through His essence, one will see Him more perfectly than another; but this will occur because one intellect will have a greater power, or faculty, for seeing God than the other. The faculty of seeing God, however, does not belong to a created intellect according to its nature, but through the light of glory, which constitutes the intellect in a certain Deiformity. Therefore, the intellect participating more in the light of glory will see God more perfectly. Here, as you see, the Holy Doctor reduces the diversity and greater perfection of the beatific vision to the diversity of the light alone. And in the answer to the third objection he says thus: The diversity in seeing will be through a diverse faculty of the intellect, indeed not natural but glorious; that is, through a diverse light of glory, as we shall show from the same Holy Doctor in the answer confirming the first argument adduced for the opposite position. Hence the Holy Doctor’s followers are Ferrara, third book against the Gentiles, chapters 55 and 58; Soto in 4. distinct. 49. quaest. 3. artic. 2; Medina, first book of the second part, quaest. 3. artic. 2; Bañez, Zumel, and González in the present question; Navarrete, controversy 42; Álvarez, De auxiliis, disput. 63; and among non-Scholastics, Valencia in this article, disput. 1, punct. 4, at the end; Arrubal, disp. 22; Suárez, vol. 1 of the Summa theologica, book 2, cap. 21; and Vázquez, disp. 47, cap. 7, although these last two differ from the Scholastic school in assigning the reason for this position.

29 The fundamental reason is touched upon by St Thomas in this article and can be proposed in the following form. The intellect cannot, by the powers of nature alone, but only when elevated by the powers of grace and the supernatural, attain to the vision of God. Therefore, through greater powers of nature, it cannot attain to a more perfect and clearer vision unless it is elevated through greater powers of grace. The antecedent is clear from what we have said in articles 4 and 5. The consequence follows from the antecedent. For as an operation of the divine order is above the powers of nature and disproportionate to them, and for that reason the intellect cannot break through to it from its powers alone, so a more perfect operation of the divine order surpasses still more perfect powers of nature and is disproportionate to them, and consequently cannot proceed from them unless the intellect is elevated through more perfect powers of the order of grace, since, as is clear from that common rule of the Dialecticians: As a thing is related to another simply, so it is related to it more when both are increased, whenever comparison is made between the same extremes, as occurs here.

This is confirmed. For according to the definition of the Council of Vienne, which we cited above, the created intellect with respect to the vision requires elevation, and consequently it will require a better elevation for a better vision. The consequence is evident both from what has just been said and because its first degree, or almost a more perfect degree of vision, is of the same order as the others. Therefore, the necessity of form for the first degree entails the necessity of an increase of form for the remaining degrees.

§ III. The second reason for the Angelic Doctor's position is examined.

30 Secondly, the assertion is proved principally by a reason which the same Holy Doctor also suggests. Since otherwise the beatific vision would not be allotted to each person in proportion to his merits, which is contrary to faith, etc. The inference is proved. For if of two persons with equal merits one excelled the other in intellectual perfection, an equal light of glory would then be allotted to both, since it corresponds to merits which, as we suppose, are equal in both. Nevertheless, if a more perfect intellect with an equal light contributes to seeing God more perfectly, it cannot be that the person who surpasses the other in intellect does not elicit a more perfect and clearer vision. The minor premise, however, is proved. For in the Council of Florence, in the last session, in the letters on the union of the saints, concerning the souls of the just, which have nothing to be purged, it is said that they are immediately received into heaven and clearly behold God Himself, Trinity and Unity as He is, yet with a diversity of merits one more perfectly than another.

31 First, Molina and others object, conceding that in this case an equal light and an equal vision will be given to both, although one of them has a more excellent intellect than the other. For the one with the less perfect intellect will be given greater actual assistance, sufficient to compensate for the said excess; while to the one who has the more perfect intellect, actual assistance will be given so proportioned that it will not break through into a more intense vision than the other.

But against this. Because actual assistance proportionate to connaturality is due to a cause operating through the natural order, or through the mode of a necessary agent, with such intensity as is the operative power of that cause. Hence, if God did not give the said assistance, it would not operate according to the common laws of nature, but miraculously. Therefore, in the stated case, the person who has equal merits with another but surpasses him in intellect will be given more intense actual assistance by God and will consequently elicit a more intense vision, and a more intense reward will be given to him. This last consequence clearly follows from the preceding one. The prior premise, however, follows from the antecedent. Because God, as a just judge and one who rewards and recompenses merits, operates according to the common laws, and therefore not miraculously. Therefore, if it is true that a more perfect active power arises from an equal light together with a more perfect intellect with respect to seeing God, then one who has an equal light with a more perfect intellect will be given more intense actual assistance. The antecedent, however, is evident of itself. For since actual assistance is due to what is due by connaturality to a complete and unencumbered operative power with all the requisites for acting, it follows that more intense actual assistance is due to a more perfect and unencumbered operative power, seeking to act through the natural order, and consequently of necessity and insofar as it can.

32 Add that this contradictory solution involves granting greater actual assistance, but not a greater light, to the person with the less perfect intellect than to the other, in such a way that at the same time he elicits a more intense vision. For in that event he would both elicit and not elicit a more intense vision: he would indeed elicit one, as is supposed, but he would not do so because it is inconsistent for the second cause to break through into the second act unless the first act, proportionate to such a second act, is presupposed. Yet by more intense actual assistance, or by the more intense influx of God into the vision—which is what the opponents understand in the present by actual assistance—the intellect is not constituted in the first act with respect to a more intense vision, as we showed expressly in the preceding article. Therefore, on this ground it would not elicit a more perfect vision, but rather the vision that was to be elicited from the force of the light and its own quantity.

33 Secondly, Molina objects that in the case of the argument an equal vision must be granted to each of those men, but not an equal light of glory; rather, it must be conceded to the one with the less perfect intellect only a greater intensity of light sufficient for him to elicit a vision as intense as that of the other, who has a more excellent intellect with equal merits. Conversely, this other man must be granted a less intense light, proportioned so that he elicits a vision equal to that of the first. The reason he gives why vision, rather than light, must be proportioned to merits is that, considered in itself, vision has the character of reward and formal beatitude, and therefore of its nature it demands proportion to merits. Light of glory, however, does not suit being a reward or beatitude, but rather an elevating and sustaining disposition of the intellect so that it may obtain the reward. It must therefore be proportioned to the need of the potency with respect to the reward. Hence, because a more perfect potency needs a less intense light to produce a vision equal to that of the other, whose intellect is less perfect, and conversely because the latter needs a more intense light with respect to the said effect, that light must accordingly be granted to him in this proportion.

But against this. For if the light of glory were not granted in proportion to merits and to the quantity of increase in the vision, it would follow that the vision, or reward, would not be granted according to the measure of those same merits. Therefore, equal light must be granted to those having equal merits. The consequence is evident. The antecedent, however, is proved. Since the vision, insofar as some degree of increase in it did not correspond in the person having the more perfect intellect to an increase in the light—he is not granted a light as intense as the vision—but to the native power of the intellect, which, according to Molina’s way of speaking, corresponds to some proximate, though partial, power with respect to the vision, such a vision and reward would not be granted according to the measure of merits. For what is due by natural law and is possessed by one's own power is not granted as a crown, and therefore not in proportion and measure to merits.

34 Accordingly, following this evasion of Molina, if a person with four meritorious works together with one intellect, as with one more perfect intellect, were granted one light, as three, and one vision, as four, the fourth degree of increase would nevertheless not be granted as a reward, and one of those works would remain without reward. The reason is evident. For the said degree would correspond to the native power of the intellect; and thus only three of those works would remain rewarded, and consequently the reward would not be given according to the measure of the works, since granting reward according to the measure and proportion of merits necessarily involves each work having its own peculiar reward corresponding to its proportion and quantity.

This is confirmed. For conversely, it would also follow that that vision, insofar as it is something not supernatural and of divine order, and consequently would not be granted as a crown and in proportion to merits, would receive some degree of increase. The inference as to the first part is proved, because that increase of the vision which corresponded to the native power of the more perfect intellect would be proportionate to it, and consequently of the natural order, not of the supernatural and surpassing order. The second part, however, is also clear, because something of the natural order does not correspond to supernatural merit as a crown or according to its measure, but something of the same order must necessarily correspond to it.

35 Furthermore. For even if we granted that the proportion were preserved, in Molina’s way of speaking, between merits and the vision with an inequality of light, the due proportion could not be preserved between those same merits and the total beatific reward, so that it might be given according to the measure of merits; etc. The antecedent is proved. For one whose merit is four, together with a more perfect intellect, must necessarily have charity fourfold, since grace and charity increase according to the degree of merits. Since the one with the more perfect intellect also has a more perfect will, it follows that afterward he will have a beatific fruition and love fivefold, which likewise pertain to the total and complete reward of beatitude. Therefore, it will not be preserved that the reward corresponds to the merit, and consequently neither will it be preserved that the same reward be given to another with equal merits but a less perfect will.

36 Nor is that disparity between vision and light, on account of which this solution says that vision must be proportioned to merits and according to their measure, whereas light need not be, of any importance; although by it Vázquez claims, in the cited place, that the force of this argument for our assertion is sufficiently weakened. For eliciting acts that are dispositions proportioned to sanctifying grace, nothing is taken away from the supernatural power required in the first act for those acts, no matter how perfect the powers may be according to their nature, even though that power is that by which potencies are elevated and sustained with respect to the said acts. Therefore, although it suits the light of glory to be an elevating disposition that strengthens the intellect with respect to the vision, no amount will be taken away from the quantity of light according to the measure of the more perfect vision, even if the intellect is more perfect according to its nature. The antecedent is commonly admitted by theologians concerning grace. The consequent, however, is proved. For the entire reason why it is admitted with respect to the said acts of the way is their supernatural character and the proportion that must obtain between them and their elevating principle. This reason has greater force with respect to the vision, which is of the supernatural order and is more excellent.

From all of these considerations it is sufficiently clear that the light of glory also has the character of a reward. First, because it is a gift pertaining of itself to the fatherland and necessary for eliciting the beatific vision. Secondly, because, if a greater intensity of the habit of charity in the way can be the reward of a more intense act of that same way, why can the light of glory, although it is a habit, not be the reward of the works of the way, especially since such light also is not required on the part of the principle of merit?

§ IV. Solution of the arguments opposed to the position.

37 To the first argument, drawn from the testimony of St Thomas, it must be said that there the adverb more has not the force of comparison with an affirmation, but of negation and exclusion with respect to one extreme, and of affirmation with respect to the other; as in Hebrews 11, where the discourse concerns Moses choosing rather to suffer with God’s people than to enjoy the pleasure of temporal sin. For more is taken in that sense, so as to signify that Moses in no way chose the pleasure of temporal sin, but rather with the most willing mind endured suffering with God’s people. Thus here, keeping the proportion, we must reason that in those words of St Thomas only the diversity and inequality of the vision is meant, and that it is taken in no way from the quantity of the natural faculty of the intellect, but from the quantity of the light of glory.

To the confirmation, it is answered that by “glorious faculty” is understood the light of glory, or the intellectual potency insofar as elevated and according to the measure of its elevation. Otherwise, the argument to which this answer is applied would remain unanswered and would fail to prove its point, as will be evident to the reader.

38 To the second argument and its confirmation, a satisfactory answer is given there. And to the argument on the contrary, after granting the antecedent, the consequent must be denied. To prove this denial, it must be said that an intellect otherwise more perfect in natural power of understanding does not also concur radically with respect to the vision insofar as it has the said excess; but it is related to that vision materially, because it has an influx only through obediential potency, which is of the same species in all created intellects. Therefore, its radical and remote influx will also be equal.

Whence here a clear disparity is seen between an intellect concurring radically with respect to supernatural acts and a substance influencing, even radically, with respect to its proper effects. For substance concurs insofar as it has such natural perfection and insofar as it is an elevating, not an elevated, cause; but the intellect is otherwise. Thus, substance concurs so that the equal, or more perfect, perfection of the effect it produces and its greater or lesser perfection must shine forth in the said effect. The intellect, however, influences as a lower agent, capable of elevation, but only as capable of elevation; and therefore, the effect does not have such, or indeed any, perfection except according to the quantity of the elevation. Hence, what is also adduced there concerning substantial form is likewise sufficiently established, keeping the proportion.

39 To the confirmation of the same objection, it is answered by denying the antecedent if the word therefore gives an adequate cause. For the fact that greater perfection in something need not necessarily shine in the produced intellect can arise either from the reason adduced there, or from the fact that it has only a remote and radical concurrence in the way just explained, and influences only as elevated to the higher order, as occurs here. Therefore, although more must be ascribed to the intellect with respect to the vision than to water with respect to heat, it is not because the vision grows in proportion to the greater natural perfection of the intellect, but because the intellect itself, as elevated and permeated by the light of glory, has the character of a principal cause with respect to the vision, for the reason assigned above; whereas hot water does not have this character with respect to heat. For with respect to this operation, the entire reason for acting is heat, and therefore the said heating is not contained under the act corresponding to water. It is otherwise with the intellect: and thus, as we said in article 1, the vision is enclosed under its corresponding object and act.

40 It makes no difference if, against what we said in answering this second argument, and therefore its confirmation, one objects that although it can be defended, according to the way of speaking that we adduced in disput. 1 of this treatise, no. 13—namely, that the obediential potency of the intellect with respect to the vision of God is something supernatural and is formally, or according to the nature of the thing, distinct from the same intellect considered according to its essence and natural power of understanding—it can be defended that the said obediential potency of the angelic and human intellects is of the same species, and consequently that the excess whereby the angelic intellect surpasses the human one subsists only materially, since they influence the vision of God only through the said obediential potencies, nevertheless it cannot be defended or be reconciled with the other way of speaking that we adduced in the cited place, no. 14—namely, that the angelic and human intellects, taken formally according to their essences, see God, and that the said obediential potency is not, according to its primary meaning, formally distinct from the essences of the said intellects, but only imports their essences while connoting the lack of proximate efficacy, or quantity of power for acting. Thus, at least according to this way of speaking, a better and more perfect intellect, such as the angelic intellect would be, will see God better and more perfectly than the human intellect, if an equal light of glory were granted to each. The consequence seems evident. The antecedent, as to its first part, is clear from what has been said. As to the second part, however, it is proved. For from the very fact that the said obediential potency, through which the created intellect together with the light of glory has its influx, is not distinct from the essences of the human and angelic intellects, it must follow both that they surpass one another in the said obediential potency, since they surpass one another in the essences of their intellects, which are distinct in species, and that this excess does not subsist materially and accidentally with respect to the influx of the said obediential potency, since that influx belongs to it of itself and indispensably insofar as it is such.

41 It is answered, indeed, by denying the antecedent as to the second part of it. To prove this denial, it must be said that when in disp. 1 of this treatise, no. 15, we stated that the obediential potency of the created intellect for seeing God is the very essence of that intellect, while connoting its lack of proximate efficacy, or quantity of power for the said vision, we were speaking of the created intellect according to the general notion of created intellect, but not of that intellect insofar as it is, for example, angelic or human. For just as sight does not belong to man because he is man, but precisely because he is an animal, and therefore the sight of man and lion is not distinct in species, so obediential power of seeing God does not belong to that same man or angel because he is man or an angel, but because they are of created intellectual nature. Therefore, these potencies are not distinct in species; any excess found in their intellects subsists accidentally and materially with respect to the said obediential potency, and consequently with respect to the influx that the intellect, as permeated by the light of glory, exercises. Whence what is said in this argument is false—namely, that the said obediential potency, taken still in its primary sense, is not distinct from the essences of the human and angelic intellects insofar as the former is human and the latter angelic—just as it would be false to say that the radical power of sight possessed by man and horse is not distinct from their essences insofar as they are distinct in species. Therefore, although the human and angelic intellects may surpass one another in essential perfection, they can be of the same perfection in the obediential powers for seeing God, which are distinguished in them numerically alone.

42 From this it follows that it makes no difference if one presses the argument. First, because if the human and angelic intellects, precisely insofar as they have the character of intellect, influence the vision together with the light of glory, it would follow that the vision, which in the case of each proceeds from their intellects, would not be one in an atomic species, since the intellect considered under this character is not one in an atomic species, and the principle of an operation ought not to have less unity than the operation itself when the latter is specified by it. Above all, because each thing operates according to what it is in act, the principle of an operation cannot be something so potential and undetermined as the generic degree, constituting the subaltern difference, and of itself not seeking existence until it is actualized through the atomic difference.

Also, because if the human intellect, insofar as it is an intellect, has as its corresponding object being qua such, and consequently God is included there as clearly visible, and likewise the angelic intellect, then the human intellect, insofar as it is human, will have the same being qua such as its corresponding object, insofar as it is attainable in a special manner, and it will be terminated in God as clearly visible, in the same way that the said intellect is capable of attaining Him in its own peculiar manner. Likewise, the angelic intellect, insofar as it is angelic, will have the said being qua such as its corresponding object, and God as clearly visible will also be included there, insofar as all these things are attainable in the other special manner proper to the angelic intellect. It will therefore also be necessary that the clear visions of God by the human and angelic intellects be distinguished in species according to that peculiar manner in which each of these intellects attains them. The consequence seems evident. The antecedent, however, is proved. For just as the angelic and human intellects have the character of intellect and, moreover, determine it to the character and special manner of understanding, so they must also have the property of tending toward the whole breadth of the object of the intellect, and of determining this tendency toward that whole breadth in such a way that, by this or that special manner proper to each intellect, it tends toward any intellection contained within that same breadth.

43 From what has been said, therefore, it is clear that these two arguments make no difference. Not the first, indeed, as is clear from the example of human sight and human vision, which arise from man insofar as he is an animal, and yet are of the same atomic species as the sight of a lion. The reason is the same in both cases. For although an animal, considered in the being of an entity and as a certain potential whole, does not have an essence and an atomic species, it is otherwise if it is considered as an actual whole and as the radical power of sight. Just as immateriality and purification from physical matter signify in the being of the thing the generic reason of the angelic intellects, and in the being of a degree import an atomic reason, so too, since neither an animal nor the said intellects, according to the reasons already explained, can be further determined, they express peculiar reasons ultimately constituted, as we explained more fully in disp. 2, no. 166.

But the assertion that the generic degree, and consequently the subaltern difference constituting it, does not seek existence until it is actualized through the atomic difference, is clear from what the Complutensians teach at length in 1. de Generat. disp. 2, no. 112 and afterward; namely, that the opposite must be said.

44 The second argument, too, clearly makes no difference according to what has been said. For from the very fact that the said obediential powers are of the same species, they cannot have those diverse modes of tending toward God clearly seen that were suggested there, and consequently neither with respect to being qua such. And in answer to the argument on the contrary, it must be said that the created intellect, insofar as such, consists essentially in the fact that it can tend toward being qua such, but in a finite mode of attainment, and consequently that it can extend itself to God clearly seen. Considered according to its essence, however, it abstracts both from the fact that it can tend toward the said being qua such in the natural manner, and consequently tends only toward God as clearly visible—not quidditatively, as He is in Himself, and formally, as clearly visible, but in the mode by which, among creatures, it can be known naturally to be in any way and insofar as whether it is to be clearly visible; and also from the fact that it can tend toward the same being in a supernatural manner, and consequently toward God formally as such clearly visible, and so as to see Him as He is in Himself. This potentiality and indeterminacy, which the created intellect qua such possesses, is not adequately removed in the angelic or human intellect by their own essential differences, but partly by accidental differences in which they agree in accidental species and differ numerically. For the indifference with respect to natural attainment is removed by differences that essentially contract the intellect qua such. With respect, however, to supernatural attainment, it is removed by accidental differences, namely by the addition of the light of glory, since supernatural reasons cannot essentially contract the created intellect, as is clear from what we said in disp. 3, no. 16 and the following, lest there be a created intellect of the supernatural order, and consequently a complete supernatural substance.

Therefore, since the light of glory of which we speak is of the same species in all created intellects, as we showed in this disputation, no. 12, and consequently is received in them because they are created intellects, it follows that the proper differences of the human and angelic intellects determine the intellect qua such only with respect to the special, specifically distinct natural manner of attaining being qua such and God as clearly visible, when the word ut is taken only specifically; but not with respect to the manner of attaining all these things supernaturally, and consequently God as clearly visible, when ut is taken reduplicatively. Rather, this latter determination must be made through the accidental determination of the light of glory, which is of the same species in all created intellects. For a created intellect qua such, which according to its essential tendency abstracts from the fact that it tends supernaturally toward its object, has this property: that, because its essences have already been said to be permeated by supernatural light, it tends supernaturally toward being qua such; and because the light of glory is communicated to them, it is supernaturally and clearly terminated in God as He is in Himself, as clearly seen. Likewise, because it is contracted through essential differences—for example, through the difference of the human intellect—it tends toward its proper natural object and in the proper natural manner that belongs to it.

45 For the third, it must be said that in the act of faith two things can be distinguished: the first is the apprehension and explanation of the mysteries; the second is the assent of faith itself. From these, the former can be possessed more perfectly through greater perfection of the intellect, since it is something proportionate to its native power and is an act of its natural order. The second, however, does not grow in proportion to the quantity of the natural perfection of the intellect, since it is something supernatural and of the divine order, but only in proportion to the quantity of the supernatural power that elevates, through which the intellect is rendered efficacious and proportionate with respect to eliciting such an assent.

46 To the fourth, it is answered by denying the antecedent. For the effort of the powers, of which the argument speaks, is not something distinct from their acts. Hence, just as the powers cannot operate more in the supernatural order unless they are elevated and according to the quantity of the elevation, so neither can they strive more. Above all, because supernatural states constitute the powers in which they exist with respect to the supernatural order. Hence, just as a power cannot strive in the natural order except according to the quantity of natural perfection, on account of which it has being as a power in this order, so neither can it strive in the supernatural order except according to the quantity of the states, or of the power that elevates and grants what a state would grant through a transient mode and a permanent mode respectively.

To the argument, the antecedent must be denied. For according to the mode by which natural states constitute the powers in their first act, they grant them the ability to strive. As we have said, this effort, or application proceeding actively from them, is not distinguished from their operation. Hence, because natural states do not grant the ability to act simply, but only the ability to act easily and with delight, the powers therefore have the ability to strive only in proportion to them by reason of those states. But supernatural states grant the ability to act simply; therefore, they also grant the ability to strive simply.

Nor does it undermine the position that it is there adduced that states are subordinate to the powers with respect to acting, and that the powers can use or not use them indifferently. For in the first place, although natural states are subordinate to the powers because they presuppose the powers as constituted in the character of powers, supernatural states do not have this property, at least in the sense intended by the argument. Rather, they have the power to elevate the powers and constitute them in the character of supernatural powers. Hence, just as a power is not properly and strictly speaking subordinate to itself, so neither is a supernatural state, for example that of the intellectual potency, subordinate to that potency considered in itself, since it cannot make use of it unless elevated through the said state.

47 Furthermore, the fact that a power can and cannot use the said states does not prove that it has by its very nature any effort distinct from their supernatural operation, through which it is applied to act. Just as it does not follow from the fact that the same power can, according to its native freedom, use or not use itself in the natural order, that it has any active effort distinct from its operation, through which it applies itself to act; it is sufficient either that the power be free and therefore, when elevated according to its proper nature through a state, cannot operate freely without elevation in the supernatural order, or that, if it be not free, it be subordinate, together with its supernatural states—though in another sense, as said elsewhere—to a power free and elevated with respect to the use of those states. Although this last point does hold in the way, it does not hold in the fatherland, where the opposite occurs with respect to at least the first act of those states which of themselves pertain to the blessed state, as can be seen in the light of glory.

48 We have said that the effort, or active application of the powers proceeding from them, is not distinguished from their operation. For whether beyond this active determination another determination, or passive application, is required through which they are applied by God to their proper operations, whether natural or supernatural, is not relevant here.

Nevertheless, this application by God, if it is granted once—for regarding which we now wish to conform more closely to the decree of the most holy Pope Paul V—exists in natural operations according to the quantity of an unencumbered natural power, if we speak of necessary agents, and of free agents according to the prescription of the divine will. Just as in supernatural operations, it cannot surpass the quantity of the state, or of the elevating power, and is of the supernatural and divine order, as can be sufficiently clear from what has been said.

Conclusion: It is impossible for any created intellect to comprehend the divine essence.