Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

6 After we have explained whether there is inequality in the beatific visions, it remains for us to explain what it is, or whether this inequality is not only intensive (that is, consisting in a greater intensity of vision), or also extensive (that is, extending to more objects, at least secondary ones), but also specific and essential. We are speaking, however, not only of the visions of human beings compared with one another precisely, since it is certain that these cannot be essentially distinguished from one another; but of the visions of human beings and Angels compared with one another¹, and of the visions of Angels compared with one another. It is of these latter that we speak, not under every circumstance, but with the supposition of the opinion of D. Thom., asserting that every Angel must necessarily be distinguished essentially in species from another.

§ I. Various opinions are enumerated.

7 The first opinion affirms that the beatific visions of human beings and Angels, compared with one another, and those of Angels compared with one another, are in fact unequal, both in intensity and extension, and in essential perfection, on the ground that all the beatific visions of Angels are distinguished from one another in species, and likewise human visions from Angelic ones. Thus the Major, in 4. dist. 49. quaest. 11.

This opinion, as regards intensive and extensive inequality, seems to follow from the latter part of that same opinion. For, precisely because one beatific cognition would be essentially more perfect than another, it would have to attain God in a better way, and consequently penetrate him more deeply: therefore, for that very reason, it would know him more intensely and more clearly, and would know more things in him as in an object known first. Both consequences are evident. Because a beatific cognition that attains God more perfectly penetrates him more deeply, and the more deeply it penetrates him, the more intense and clear it is, just as more things are known from an object that has been known and penetrated more, insofar as they are contained in it.

8 As regards specific inequality, however, it is proved. For the human intellect and the Angelic intellect are distinguished in species, and likewise the Angelic intelligences are distinguished from one another; therefore the visions proceeding from them ought also to be distinguished in species, and consequently they will be unequal in essential perfection, since species are like numbers. The antecedent is taken for certain. The consequent, however, is proved. Because causes that are distinct in species, as such, must produce effects that are diverse in species.

It is confirmed. Whenever powers are distinguished in species, the acts corresponding to them must also be distinguished in species in the same way; therefore, if the said intellects are distinguished in species, the visions corresponding to them must also be distinguished in species. The consequence is evident. The antecedent, however, is proved. Because, precisely by being distinguished in species, powers tend toward a distinct formal object; therefore, for that very reason, their acts must contemplate a distinct formal object. For powers attain their formal objects only through acts; and consequently the said acts will be distinguished in species, because acts directed toward distinct formal objects cannot but be distinguished in species.

9 Nor does it matter if one says that the visions do not proceed from these intellects insofar as they are distinguished in species, except only materially, because formally they proceed from them insofar as they are one and the same in species, namely insofar as they are elevated by the light of glory, which is of the same species in all of them; and thus they are not distinguished from one another in species, because the acts are not distinguished in species insofar as they regard materially different principles.

Against this it may be said that, precisely because the Angelic and human intellects are distinguished in species, the light that elevates each of them with respect to vision cannot but also be distinguished in species; therefore, the visions of those intellects will not be the same in species. The consequence is sufficiently clear.

The antecedent, however, is proved. First, because the light of glory is the quantity of the power and efficacy of the intellect for seeing God; therefore it must be proportioned and distinguished in species according to the specific distinction of the essential commensurability of the intellects, whose quantity of power it is. Indeed, the efficacy of a power and the power itself must have the greatest proportion between them.

Also, because, precisely insofar as intellect and will are distinguished in species, they cannot be elevated by the same supernatural form according to species, since the power of acting that is in the intellect, as it inclines toward the true, cannot but be distinguished in species from the power that is in the will, which inclines toward the good; therefore, precisely because the Angelic and human intellects differ in species, they cannot be elevated by the same form according to species.

Finally, because if they were elevated by the same form according to species and with respect to acts of the same species, such acts of vision would already be acts of the same species, and would not be contained under the adequate act of any one of those intellects. They would indeed be contained under such an act, as is supposed, but they would not be so, because, as the adequate act of one intellect distinguished in species must also be distinguished in species from the adequate act of another, as the Metaphysicians commonly teach; so acts that are inadequate and contained under that act, insofar as they are contained under the same one, must also be distinguished in species. Otherwise they will not participate in its nature, and consequently will not be contained under it either.

10 Second, principally. For in prophetic cognition there is a distinction and specific inequality, since prophetic cognitions ordinarily concern different objects; therefore, so too in the beatific cognition. The consequence is proved. First, because each cognition has the character of supernatural and clear cognition; therefore, just as one can be multiplied according to species, so too can the other. Also, because God, insofar as he is clearly knowable, is the most eminent object; therefore he can be attained under different modes distinct in species, just as for this reason he can fall under the prophetic light in diverse ways. For the more eminent an object is, the more it can be attained in modes distinct according to species.

Third, one blessed person is essentially more blessed than another, because he had greater essential merit on the way; therefore, he must correspond to him with a greater essential reward, and not only with a reward that is accidentally greater; therefore, he must have a beatific vision essentially more perfect, since the essential reward consists in the said vision.

11 The second opinion agrees with the preceding one insofar as an intensive and extensive inequality is granted in the visions of the blessed; it nevertheless denies that there is in fact a specific distinction and inequality in them, although it admits that this is not contrary to the divine power. Thus Navarrete, in the present controversy, 39. §. 2. This opinion, as regards its first three parts, will be established by what is to be said in support of our opinion concerning those same parts.

As regards the last part, however, it is proved as follows. For if, for some reason, the visions of the blessed could not be distinguished in species and therefore could not be essentially unequal, especially because they all tend toward God as he is in himself; this reason, however, is none; therefore, etc. The Major will be evident from what is to be said in this same Difficulty. The Minor, however, is proved. Because created and uncreated vision differ in species and have an essential inequality, as is clear, and yet both terminate in God as he is in himself; therefore, etc.

It is confirmed first. For the vision by which God sees himself is distinguished in species from the created vision of the blessed, because it is infinitely more immaterial and clearer than theirs; therefore, according as there is a greater or lesser approach to this infinite immateriality and clarity, the visions of the blessed can be distinguished from one another in species and be essentially unequal.

It is confirmed and explained second. For the intellections of the natural order, which Angels have, are distinguished from one another in species according as they possess a greater or lesser immateriality within the same order; therefore, the visions of the blessed can also be distinguished in species according as they possess a greater or lesser immateriality of the supernatural order, and thus according as they have a greater or lesser approach to the infinite immateriality of God. The consequence is evident from the parity of the reason. The antecedent, however, is proved. For Angels are distinguished in species within the natural order because one is more or less intellectual than another, and consequently because one is more immaterial than the other, or has less potentiality, since intellectuality proceeds from immateriality, and greater intellectuality from greater immateriality; therefore, their intellections are also distinguished in species according as they possess greater or lesser immateriality.

§ II. The true Thomistic opinion, and its first foundation.

12 Nevertheless, it must be said that the visions of the blessed can be unequal in intensity and extension, but not in essential perfection; that is, they cannot be distinguished from one another in species. This assertion is sufficiently gathered from D. Thom. in the present and in the places cited above, as will be clear from what is to be said. And indeed, as regards the first two parts, it is very common among theologians; as regards the latter part, however, the disciples of D. Thom. defend it: Caiet. 3. part. quaest. 10. art. 4. Gonzalez, Machin, and others in the present.

It is proved first by a reason drawn from D. Thom. For, as the Saintly Doctor teaches in the present, all inequality in the vision of God—not any kind whatever, but the beatific vision of which we are speaking here—must arise from an inequality in the habit of the light of glory. But this light can be unequal in intensity and extension, but not in essential and specific perfection, so as to give two lights of glory distinct in species; therefore, the visions can be unequal in intensity and extension, but not in essential perfection, so as to be distinguished in species. The Major will be established from what is to be said below and from what was said in the preceding disputation, since the entire proximate power for seeing God is the light of glory; and not in an indefinite way, but in such a way that the diversity of powers and their natural perfection are materially ordered toward eliciting the beatific vision, because natural power does not concur formally as such, but as elevated by a proportionate supernatural power which, in the present case, must be the light of glory, as was shown above. Consequently, any inequality must arise from an inequality of light.

The Minor, as regards its first part, is clear. First, because it is commonly accepted by theologians; then, because the light of glory is a certain habitual quality, and consequently, like other qualities or habits, it can be intended more or less; finally, because since faith is intensible, the light of glory corresponding to it in the homeland will also be able to be increased according to intensity. As regards the second part, namely extension, this follows from the first part of the same Minor, as will be sufficiently clear from those things we shall say immediately in proving the consequence. As regards the third part too, it is clear. For the essence of any habit of the light of glory is to tend permanently toward God as he is in himself, and thus no specific distinction will be given between those lights, and consequently neither will there be the essential inequality just mentioned.

From this too the consequence is sufficiently clear. Because a more intense light is followed by a more intense beatific vision, and from a more extensive vision it follows that the same vision is more extensive and regards more objects, at least secondary ones, as we shall say below. Finally, an equal light according to species must be followed by an equal vision according to species, because, as we said above, the vision and union of the divine essence must, with respect to species, accord with the quantity and mode of the light.

13 Nor does it matter if one says that in the lights of glory there is only a certain generic reason, namely that they are habits of clearly knowing God as he is in himself, but not an atomistic reason. For this consists in the fact that they are more or less immaterial within the supernatural intellectual order, and consequently that they have a greater or lesser approach to the supernatural immateriality of the divine intellect as it is in itself.

Against this it may be said that the greater perfection of the habit of created light of glory, however much it may grow, cannot reach the point of comprehending God, as we shall show in article 7; rather, it reaches only to the point of attaining God, as he is in himself, ever more clearly. But to attain him ever more clearly in such a way as not to reach the aforesaid comprehension, a greater intensity of light within the same species is sufficient. Therefore, although the light can grow in intensity, it cannot grow in specific perfection in the way described.

The Minor is evident. For since the habit of the light of glory has in itself the power to see God clearly, if it grows ever more in intensity in the same way, it cannot but attain him ever more clearly in the way described. Just as supernatural charity is in itself an inclination toward God as he is in himself, the supreme good, if it is increased proportionally in intensity, it cannot but grow ever more in this inclination in the same proportionate way.

14 It is confirmed. For from the fact that Angelic intellects can increase in specific distinction insofar as immateriality is concerned, it follows that the more perfect an intellect is, the fewer species it can use for understanding, and consequently the less potentiality it has. But any habit of the light of glory can use only one, and that the most perfect, species distinguished from it, namely the divine essence. And the more intense it is, the better and more perfectly it will see God through it, as is clear from itself and will become clearer from what is to be said in article 7; therefore, among the habits of the light of glory there cannot be an excess in immateriality that argues for a specific distinction between them.

It is confirmed and explained, and at the same time a certain tacit solution is overturned. For although the divine essence, considered as an intelligible form, has, notwithstanding that it is one and the same, the properties that it is at once most eminent and most universal and equivalent to infinite intelligible species, nevertheless, according to the whole universality that it has with respect to seeing those things that are formally in God, it is united to every blessed intellect, as will be clear from what is to be said in disputation 7, difficulties 1, 2, and 3. And according to the universality that it has for knowing creatures in God himself, the more universally it is united with respect to seeing more creatures in him, the more the aforesaid light increases in intensity. Therefore, there is no reason why the lights of glory could be distinguished in species by a greater and greater immateriality. For this greater immateriality, which indicates an essential distinction, would consist, as we were just saying, in being able to use a more universal species; and for this use, a greater increase of light in intensity is sufficient, as will become clearer from what is to be said in this treatise, in the final disputation, final difficulty.

§ III. Second foundation of the true opinion.

15 Second, the assertion is proved by the reason suggested by D. Thom. in this 1. part. quaest. 118. art. 2., and in 2. dist. 9. quaest. 1. art. 8., and 3. cont. Gent. cap. 53. and 57., which can be proposed in the following form. Since the beatific vision of the soul of our Lord Christ is far more perfect than the beatific vision of any Angel whatsoever, indeed, taken by itself alone it is nobler than all the others taken together; therefore the said vision is more perfect than the other visions in intensity and extension, in such a way that it is not surpassed by them in essential perfection, and consequently, although beatific visions can be unequal in intensive and extensive perfection, they are not unequal in specific and essential perfection, so as to be distinguished in species. The antecedent is that of D. Thom. in the cited places, and is commonly taught by theologians.

The first consequence, as regards intensive and extensive excess, clearly follows from the antecedent. For, as we shall show below, the more perfect a beatific vision is, the more intensely it will attain God, and the more of those things that are virtually contained in him it will know. The second part concerns the excess in extension, and this is considered in the latter point. As regards the second part, namely that the beatific vision of our Lord Christ is not surpassed in specific perfection by the Angelic visions, this too is clear. For otherwise the vision of Christ could never equal the perfection of the Angelic vision. For, when a comparison is made between two beatific visions as such, if they were distinct in species, the excess in essential perfection would be incomparably greater than the excess in accidental perfection; and thus, however much the human vision of our Lord Christ might be increased in intensity or extension, it would remain less perfect than the Angelic vision. The second consequence is likewise evident. For if there could be an essential excess between them, the Angelic vision would surpass the human one, since that excess would not arise from the essential perfection of the light, which is of the same species in all, as was said; but from the greater specific perfection of the intellect. This indeed is clearly not fitting to the intellect of our Lord Christ, but it does fittingly belong to the Angelic intellect.

16 Nor does it matter if one answers first from the doctrine of the Major in the place cited, namely that the vision of the soul of Christ is more perfect by reason of beatitude, and consequently in this respect is not specifically surpassed by the Angelic one, but is in another respect with regard to cognition.

Against this it may be said that the said vision, even insofar as it is beatitude, has the character of cognition; and thus it is not correctly connected that it is nobler in the reason of beatitude, but not in the reason of cognition. Add to this that that excess in cognition cannot arise from the Angelic intellect precisely according to the general reason of intellect, nor according to its surpassing the human intellect by an essential excess. For, as we have already said, and as will become clearer from what is to be said in the following difficulty, this excess is materially ordered toward supernatural acts according to the substance of the beatific vision.

17 Nor does it matter if, second, one answers with the same Major that the vision of our Lord Christ is not more perfect than the Angelic vision insofar as it concerns entity, but only insofar as it concerns the value of the reward and the ordering to the satisfaction of appetite; and thus, although this excess can never equal the Angelic vision in the entitative order, it can nevertheless equal and surpass it in the reason of value and reward. For just as gold is more perfect than silver according to its species and entity, nevertheless, if an addition is made to the latter according to number or magnitude, it can be surpassed by it in value, so the vision of the soul of Christ, which is less noble than the Angelic vision insofar as entity and specific perfection are concerned, can grow through the intensity of the light of glory in the reason of value and reward.

It does not matter, therefore. For either in this solution we are speaking of the value corresponding to a thing according to its merits, taken in itself according to its nature, or of the value that corresponds to it with respect to some extrinsic use and end. Not the former, for otherwise the beatific vision, as such, which surpasses another in specific perfection, could not but be nobler even in value. Indeed, this sort of value corresponds to it by reason of its nature considered in itself and consists in the perfection of the aforesaid species and nature, or flows necessarily from it.

18 The latter, however, cannot be said, because otherwise the perfection of the Angelic vision could not be equated by the intensity of the human vision with respect to value. First, because in that case the aforesaid value does not apply. Indeed, there cannot be any extrinsic end or use with respect to which the human vision would have greater value than the Angelic vision, if the latter once exceeds the human one in essential perfection. Also, because the specific perfection of the Angelic vision could not be surpassed by intensity with respect to the formal reason of beatitude, which consists in possessing the supreme good. For an excess in specific perfection contributes more to the perfection of possession than an excess in intensity.

From this it also follows that the vision of Christ cannot surpass the Angelic vision in the excellence of value consisting in greater sufficiency for satisfying appetite. For when the perfection corresponding to a thing according to its species is greater than the perfection corresponding to it according to intensity, it follows that the excess of specific perfection is more suited to satisfying appetite, since appetite is satisfied by the attainment of goodness and perfection.

From this too it follows that the example introduced concerning silver surpassing gold in value through its increase is irrelevant. For however much silver may be increased, it cannot attain the intrinsic value corresponding to gold, considered according to its nature in itself, although with respect to human contracts or other uses it can have greater extrinsic value, as also happens with iron, stones, and other imperfect and multiplied things. Here, however, value has no application in the present case, as has been explained.

§ IV. The foundations of both opinions are resolved.

19 To the first of the first, it must be answered that there is a failure to prove the point concerning causes distinct in species and consequently unequal in essential perfection, when they concur formally insofar as they are thus unequal; but otherwise, whenever the aforesaid excess is materially ordered toward concurrence, as occurs here.

Through this, too, the confirmation is clear. Therefore, the solution given there must be admitted, understood according to what we have already said. And the objections against it are likewise established from what has been said. For the essential commensurability which the human and Angelic intellects possess with respect to the vision of God as he is in himself is of the same reason. Indeed, the obediential power with respect to it, in which (as was explained above, art. 1. of this question) the aforesaid commensurability consists, cannot but, if it is taken formally, be of the same reason in each. Because in each it regards the same terminus and the same formal act, namely the same active and supernatural power of God, according to which, through the communication of his intellectual light, he can elevate the aforesaid powers to the beatific vision, and they, thus elevated, can elicit the aforesaid vision (which, as is clear from what has been said, is of the same species).

Through this, it is sufficiently clear regarding everything brought forward in the same objection.

20 Pass to the second, and let the antecedent be granted while the consequence is denied. To its first proof, it must be said that the reason is unequal. For although each cognition is supernatural and clear in a way proportionate to itself, nevertheless any habit of the light of glory cannot but have as its formal object that same most perfect object, that most excellent object, namely the divine essence, insofar as it is clearly knowable as it is in itself. And thus any excess between the aforesaid habits of the light of glory can only be accidental, as has been shown.

Moreover, the prophetic light, being far inferior, does not seek always to have the most perfect object that can fall under the prophetic light. Thus, sometimes it can manifest the whatness of the revealed object, but sometimes only the future existence of that object, insofar as it exists, to what extent, and when; likewise, insofar as it is borne toward various objects under the reason of time, it can be varied by the diversity of the objects and by the manner of attaining them.

To the second proof, however, it must be said that from the eminence of God, insofar as he is clearly knowable, it does not follow that he can be attained under this reason by different lights distinct in species. Because God, considered in this way, constitutes only a single formal object within one and the same line. Just as from the fact that God, as attained through faith, is the most eminent object, it does not follow—as many very probably think—that he is attainable under this same reason by lights of faith distinct according to species. Therefore, by reason of his eminence, he has only this: that, considered absolutely, he can be attained by different lights and in different ways, namely through the lights of glory and faith, through the lights of prophecy, through infused knowledge, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and so forth.

21 To the third, it must be answered that although there may be several essential beatitudes in several blessed persons, they are not several beatitudes diverse essentially, or specifically, but only individually. For just as there may be several human essences in several human beings, there are not several essences diverse essentially, but numerically. Consequently, it follows from this only that there are several individuals of essential beatitude, distinguished according to greater or lesser numerical perfection, but not because they differ essentially. Thus, when it is commonly said that one blessed person has a greater essential reward than another, the meaning is that he has the essence of beatitude individually more perfect, indeed even under greater intensity. Because, according to the common mode of speaking among theologians, everything that contributes to attaining God more clearly is counted among those things that belong to essential beatitude. Likewise, everything that on the part of God seen terminates the vision in itself first belongs to their objective beatitude.

22 To the foundation of the second opinion, when the Major is granted, the Minor must be denied. To its proof, it must be said that, within the line of the beatific and supernatural object, there are only two essential distinctions and two modes of attaining God, as he is in himself, diverse in species, namely, attaining him comprehensively and adequately, and attaining him non-comprehensively but inadequately and finitely. God, however, comprehends himself and is infinite; the created intellect, however, attains him inadequately and finitely. Therefore, although each tends toward the divine essence as it is in itself, those visions are nevertheless essentially unequal, because of the different, and already explained, mode of tending. For since all created intellects tend finitely, and consequently in the same way with respect to the beatific vision, as has been shown; therefore, the aforesaid visions cannot be distinguished in species on the part of the formal object.

From this, the first confirmation is sufficiently clear. For an excess in the clarity of seeing God, yet in a finite mode, does not change the mode of tending essentially, but only accidentally, as we showed in the assertion. Likewise, there cannot be among the lights of glory or the visions an excess in immateriality sufficient for a specific distinction, for the reason assigned in the place cited. Therefore, God's communication through the beatific vision reaches the maximum of divine communication insofar as its specific degree of immateriality, according to which God can communicate through created and supernatural gifts to the created intellect. Likewise, communication through sanctifying grace also reaches the maximum of its own communication, which can be made through created gifts of grace. Nor does the example of the greater immateriality of Angels prove anything, as was touched upon in the first reason for the assertion. Through these things too, the second confirmation is sufficiently clear.