Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem
Collegii Salmanticensis Cursus Theologicus, tomus I
First published 1870
The Cursus Theologicus of the Discalced Carmelites of Salamanca (the 'Salmanticenses'), tomus I, in the 1870 Paris reprint. Contains the Prooemium and the three great treatises of this volume: De principio individuationis (a digression on the principle of individuation), De Visione Dei (in quaest. 12), and De Scientia Dei (in quaest. 14, including the extended rejection of middle knowledge). The edition prints St Thomas's Prima Pars text alongside; that text is not republished here.
Prooemium, and the Division of the whole Work
Quaestio I: On the Simplicity of God
Tractatus I: On the Principle of the Individuation of Material Substance and of Its Accidents
Disputatio I: On the Principle of the Individuation of Material Substance
Dubium I: Whether the substantial form is itself individuated, and the first principle of the individuation and of the purely individual distinction of the whole composite?
Dubium II: Whether matter, taken by itself and precisely, or matter marked by quantity, is the first and radical principle of the individuation of the whole substantial composite
Dubium III: Whether matter marked by quantity, insofar as it is said to constitute a composite of matter and quantity as an inhering and constituting form, is the first root of the individuation of the composite
Dubium IV: Whether matter determined by quantity, insofar as it denotes a certain substantial mode, is by the very nature of the thing distinct from matter and determines it toward having this quantity rather than that, is the first root of the individuation of material substance and of its substantial form?
Dubium V: Whether matter marked by quantity, insofar as it is said to possess by a radical mode this quantity rather than that, is the first root of the completed material substance and therefore of its substantial form
Disputatio II: On the Principle of the Individuation of Accidents
Dubium I: Whether the subject is the first root and principle of the individuation of accidents and of their purely individual distinction
Dubium II: Whether quantity claims for itself a peculiar principle, so that it is individuated from itself as though it were the first root
Dubium III: Whether essential repugnance exists between purely numerical distinction of accidents, as such that two of them differ only numerically in the same subject
Tractatus II: In quaest. 12 of the First Part of St. Thomas: On the Vision of God
Quaestio I: How God is known by us
Disputatio I: On the Possibility and Appetitability of the Vision of God by Essence
Dubium I: Whether the clear vision of God by essence is possible to the created intellect?
Dubium II: Whether the Holy Fathers knew that vision of God by essence is possible to a created intellect
Dubium III: Whether the possibility of vision of God by essence can be clearly known to a created intellect by the light of nature
Dubium IV: Whether the intellectual nature considered by itself has an innate appetite for the vision of God by essence
Dubium V: Whether an elicited and natural appetite is given in the intellectual creature considered by itself with regard to the clear vision of God
Disputatio II: On the Likeness, or Form, Required for a Clear Vision of God
Dubium I: Whether, according to the mind of St Thomas, some created likeness is admitted in order to elicit the clear vision of God
Dubium II: Whether the divine essence is in fact united to the intellect of the blessed man by way of an intelligible species, with a view to the clear vision of God?
Dubium III: Whether the divine essence, as it has the character of an intelligible form, actively concurs to the clear vision of God
Dubium IV: Whether by divine power a created impressed species is possible, through which God may be seen in a quidditative way, such as He is in Himself?
Dubium V: Whether the first reason which D. Thom. adduces in this article sufficiently proves the impossibility of an impressed species representing God quidditatively and clearly?
Dubium VI: Whether from the second reason of St. Thomas the impossibility is sufficiently inferred of an impressed form representing God quidditatively, and clearly, as He is in Himself
Dubium VII: What specially stands against the second reason of St. Thomas, and how it is to be solved
Dubium VIII: Whether the last reason of the article proves the impossibility of a created intelligible species representing God quidditatively: where the arguments also are dissolved which we brought from the opponents in dub. 4 of this disputation?
Dubium IX: Whether in the blessed there is necessarily and indispensably given a word, or expressed form, representing God quidditatively, as He is in Himself
Dubium X: Whether the impossibility of a created word representing God clearly and quidditatively is rightly proved from the fact that God is essentially itself the being quidditatively understood, and thus cannot be quidditatively understood through a created word?
Disputatio III: On the Impossibility of the Vision of God, As He Is in Himself, by Created Powers of the Natural Order, or Such as Are Connatural to Some Created Intellect
Dubium I: Whether by the absolute power of God there is possible some intellect which by the powers proper to it of the natural order could see God as He is in Himself
Dubium II: Whether by divine power there can be possible some substances and some intellects for which the light of glory is connatural, and which can see God by essence by their own powers?
Disputatio IV: On the Necessity of the Light of Glory for Seeing the Divine Essence As It Is in Itself
Dubium I: Whether the light of glory concurs to the vision of God, as He is in Himself, after the manner of an impressed form
Dubium II: Whether the light of glory is a necessary disposition, in order that the divine essence, in the ratio of form or of intelligible species, be united to the intellects of the blessed?
Dubium III: Whether the light of glory is necessarily desired for the receiving of the vision of God?
Dubium IV: Whether by the absolute power of God the created intellect can, without the light of glory, by its own obediential power alone, though with a concomitant influx superadded in the vision, but not by any other previous [influx], elicit that vision in the same intellect
Dubium V: Whether by divine power the divine essence can be united, in the ratio of light, to the created intellect, and thus constitute it, without a created light, in the first act for seeing God as He is in Himself?
Disputatio V: On the Quality and Inequality of the Visions in the Blessed
Dubium I: Whether an inequality is found among the beatific visions
1 It must first be said that there must be inequality among the visions of the blessed. Thus it is stated in John 14: In my Father's house there are many dwelling places: where Christ the Lord speaks openly of the heavenly glory toward which he himself was tending, and of which he said: I am going to prepare a place for you. And so in 1 Corinthians 15: For star differs from star in brightness, and thus the resurrection of the dead. That testimony to the inequality of the glory of bodies, and consequently to the inequality of the soul's glory, which overflows into the body, is expounded by the Holy Fathers Jerome, in book 2 of Against Jovinian; Augustine, in book On Holy Virginity, chapter 26; Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Oecumenius, Primasius, and Bede, on that same passage of Paul; and likewise on 2 Corinthians 9: He who sows sparingly will reap sparingly; and he who sows in blessings, will reap in blessings. Where the abundant reward corresponds to abundant merit, and the lesser to the lesser, it is nevertheless certain, according to faith, that the future reward corresponding to present merit is the beatific vision.
This truth was then defined against Jovinian (Gonzalez says, disputation 29, first section) in the Council of Pella under Pope Sergius, in the letter of the Council to Jovinian itself, namely letter 81 among those written by Saint Ambrose, who took part in that Council. Likewise, it is set forth in the Council of Florence under Eugene IV in the Letters of Union, where it is stated that, according to the distinction of merits, even the essence of God is variously seen by the blessed. The Holy Fathers thus commonly hold this very view, as do the theologians who expound the aforementioned passages of Scripture. Vázquez must therefore be rejected, because he weakens these testimonies by rejecting them, or by accepting them only as probable grounds that, according to faith, certainly establish the inequality of the visions. For testimonies of Scripture commonly accepted by the Holy Fathers and theologians to prove some truth establish it not only, as Vázquez wishes, probably, but most effectively.
2 Finally, the assertion is proved by a reason drawn from St. Paul, 2 Timothy 4, and from St. Thomas on the same passage. For the beatific vision is bestowed upon adults after the manner of a crown. Therefore, in bestowing it, the principle of justice must be preserved, so that it is bestowed in proportion to merits. Therefore, since it is certain that the just are unequal in their merits, it is certain that they will also be unequal in the beatific vision, which is the crown corresponding to them. Both conclusions follow from the antecedent. The antecedent, however, follows from the cited passage of Paul, where he says: The crown of righteousness awaits me, and the Lord, the just Judge, will give it to me on that day, not only to me, but also to all those who love his appearing.
This is confirmed. For when God punishes sins in the life to come, he then preserves the principle of justice, so that he inflicts a greater punishment on greater sinners. Therefore, even when he bestows the beatific vision after the manner of a crown, he will preserve the principle of justice and the proportion to the unequal merits of the just.
3 But one may object with the parable that Jovinian adduced as contrary to this view, as Saint Jerome attests in book 2 of Against Jovinian, as do Augustine in Haeresis 82 and St. Thomas in Opusculum 19, on Matthew, chapter 10. There, after the day's labour had ended, a single day's wage was granted to everyone working in the Lord's vineyard: so that equality of reward might be signified by this; and thus the workers who had come earlier to labour complained, saying, You made those who carried the day's burden and heat equal with us.
To this objection Vázquez admits that, according to the common understanding of the Fathers, by this day's wage the reward of beatitude is to be understood as distributed unequally, in proportion to the inequality of merits; yet he none the less impugns both this explanation and the Fathers individually, and adduces another peculiar interpretation violently imposed upon the text, which Gonzalez vigorously refutes in the present argument, as do Suárez, Summa, book 1, chapter 10, number 11, and the younger theologians generally.
Nevertheless, to counter his attack, it is enough for us that the Council of Trent, in its fourth session, in the decree concerning the edition and use of sacred books, decreed that no one should dare to expound Scripture concerning matters of faith—such as this one is, as the Fathers and Vázquez himself admit—or concerning morals against the unanimous consent of the Fathers.
Having rejected this interpretation, therefore, it must be said that, as St. Thomas notes here and in Summa 1-2, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1, and as others note from the Fathers, by the term day's wage formal beatitude is not understood, namely the vision of God, but objective beatitude, that is, the divine essence seen by the blessed, in which all are equal. For all, insofar as they see it in itself, are equal, even though they are not equal in the vision itself, which has the character of formal beatitude.
4 To the objection drawn from the workers' complaint, it must be said that it is not necessary for the individual words in parables to be accommodated. Rather, it is enough that their principal intention be preserved, and that the words of the parable be accommodated with reference to it. The principal intention of this parable, as the Fathers commonly teach, is to show that the reward of beatitude is to be measured not strictly by the antiquity of the calling or the duration of the labour, but by the merit of the works themselves, which flows from charity, and according to their fervour and intensity. Thus it often happens that, through the more abundant and efficacious grace of God, there is greater merit in a shorter time, and consequently a greater reward for those called later. This is especially clear from a comparison between the workers of the Old and the New Testaments, in which grace is bestowed more abundantly through Christ. The conclusion of this parable, therefore, is that the last will be first, and the first last; that is, for receiving the reward it makes no strict difference that one was called earlier, because those called later can, by God's grace, attain a greater reward on account of greater merit.
5 It must be said, secondly, that the beatific visions need not necessarily be unequal, but can be, and must often be, equal. This assertion is explained and proved in the case of children baptized before the use of reason who die before attaining it. Just as they are equal in every respect in the effect of Baptism, so too they are equal in the grace and glory corresponding to them as an inheritance. The same assertion can also be found among adults whose merits are altogether equal, as the Fathers and theologians commonly admit.
Nor does it tell against this that some Catholics, among whom is Paludanus in book 4, distinction 4, question 4, object that human beings were elected to restore the seats of angels who had fallen. For just as all those angels, if they had not fallen, would have had unequal degrees of beatitude, as the theologians commonly teach, so too all blessed human beings ought to have inequality in the vision.
It must be answered, therefore, that those seats can be restored sufficiently even if perfect commensurability in every respect is not preserved, and consequently neither is the aforementioned inequality preserved. For it is enough that, when comparison is made between the whole accumulation of glory that was to be bestowed upon the whole company of those angels and the accumulation of glory that will be bestowed upon all human beings, these be equal. But if this much suffices for the aforementioned restoration, far more will what is actually found in it suffice: namely, that the glory corresponding to the whole mass of humankind is far greater than the glory that would have had to be bestowed upon the aforementioned angels gathered into one, as the younger theologians note in the present argument.