Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

The necessity of the created light of glory with respect to the vision of God, and the mode of its influx into the aforesaid vision, depends in the highest degree on the discussion of this difficulty: and therefore, so that we may explain it more thoroughly from the roots, we have raised it.

§ I. The affirming opinion.

63 The first opinion affirms that God is able to be united with the created intellect in the role of light, and that the aforesaid union is therefore sufficient, without a created light and together with the supernatural concurrence of God in the vision, for the created intellect to see him: in the precise mode in which they think it sufficient, namely that God be united by himself in the role of intelligible species without anything else inhering, so that the vision be elicited without a created and inhering species, yet with the supernatural concurrence of God. Thus some, whom Ledesma cites in De perfectione Dei, q. 8, art. 8, in the subarticle, and many others among the later writers: which Vincentius holds probable in the Relection on the grace of Christ, q. 6.

It is proved first. For the divine essence is its own being in every genus: therefore it will be able to be united with the created intellect in the role of the light of glory, in such a way that it constitutes it in the first act for the seeing of that same essence, without any created light of glory being added to it. The antecedent is established from what was said in art. 2 of this question; otherwise the divine essence would not be a pure act in every genus. The consequence, however, is proved. For it is able to be united in the role of species without inherence because it is its own being in the role of intelligible form, as we showed at the place cited: therefore, if in the same way it is its own being in the role of light, and hence possesses in advance every effect which the created light contains together with information and inherence, it will be able, by itself and having fallen most intimately into the intellect, without inhering in it, to communicate the aforesaid effect to it.

64 It is confirmed first. For the light of glory belongs to the intelligible order, as is evident from itself: and God is the purest form in the intelligible order: therefore he will be able to be united with the created intellect in the role of light. The consequence is evident, both because he is able to be united in the role of species because the species belongs to the intelligible order, and also because to be united intelligibly involves no imperfection, but rather the more perfect the form is, the better it can be united in this order: and therefore the Angelic substance, although it is something complete in the genus of substance, can be united with its own intellect in the role of intelligible form.

It is confirmed second. For the divine essence is able to be united in the role of species because the species does not confer the first power for acting; but presupposes the power and completes it, as we showed at the place cited: yet neither does the light confer the first power for seeing God, but presupposes the radical power of the intellect: therefore God will also be able to supply formally by himself the power and the defect of the light of glory.

65 It makes no difference if you say that the species is a complement which holds itself on the part of the object, and therefore extrinsic; whereas the light is a complement which holds itself on the part of the power, and consequently must also be intrinsic and inhering.

For the opposite is the case. For a complement's holding itself on the part of the power is nothing other than that it be intrinsic to the power itself and desired for its strengthening on its own side; but neither of these prevents God from accomplishing this whole thing by himself and in the manner described; and so on. The major seems certain. The minor, as to the first part, that is, as to intrinsicality, is evident. For the union of God's essence through influx is more intimate than the union of a created form through inherence, as we said at the place cited from Divus Thomas: therefore nothing on the score of intimacy stands in the way of God's being able to supply the office of the light of glory in the manner explained. As to the second part, too, it is established, because if the divine essence contains that very thing which is lacking on the part of the created power for the vision, and otherwise no union through inherence is required for the production of such an effect, as has been proved, and hence no imperfection is involved there, there is no reason to deny it of the divine essence, so that it performs this by the mode of form and without imperfections.

66 Second, the same opinion is proved principally. For a created formal cause is in need of information or inherence in order to impart its formal effect, because it is not itself such a formal effect: but the divine essence is its own formal effect in the role of light: therefore it is in need of neither information nor inherence in order to be united with the created intellect in the role of light and to impart to it what, on its own side, makes it efficacious for seeing God, and hence there will be no ground for the aforesaid union to be repugnant. This last consequence is plainly evident from the preceding one. The preceding, however, from both premises. The minor is established from what has been said: for God is infinite in the role of light, and consequently is his own formal effect in the role of light. The major, too, is established. For a created form is in need of information in order to cause and, so to speak, to emit outside itself its formal effect, because the information is itself the causality by which the form newly posits its formal effect in the nature of things: therefore, if that form were its own formal effect, it would be in need of neither information nor causality in order to posit that effect in the nature of things.

67 Third. For other inferior causes, from their conjunction and subordination to superior causes, without anything inhering in them, or informing them in entitative being, being superadded, can be shown to be sufficient in the first act with respect to an effect which they could not attain without such conjunction and subordination: therefore also the intellect, from its conjunction and subordination to God, insofar as it holds the role of uncreated light and as it assists him, can be constituted in the first act with respect to the vision, without another light intrinsic to it and inhering in it being communicated to it. The consequence is evident, both from parity of reason and also because the aforesaid superior causes do not assist the inferiors so intimately as God intimately assists the created intellect. The antecedent, however, is proved. For colors, from their subordination to light assisting them extrinsically, are made visible and sufficient in the first act for altering vision: the phantasm too, from its conjunction with the agent intellect, without anything intrinsic being superadded to it, becomes able to produce an intelligible species: and finally the cogitative power is made sufficient in the same way, by subordination to the possible intellect, for having some discourse.

68 It is confirmed from D. Thomas, 1st part, q. 106, art. 1, where he speaks thus: As the power of a lower body is strengthened by the positional proximity of a more perfect one, and a less hot thing grows hotter from the presence of a hotter one, so the intellectual power of a lower angel is confirmed by the conversion of a higher angel to it: therefore much more will the intellect be strengthened by the intimate assistance and the influx of God into it in the role of the light of glory — which is a kind of peculiar conversion of God to it — and be made able with respect to attaining actively an effect disproportioned to such a conversion, which, as is established, can be none other than the vision of God himself as he is in himself.

§ II. The prior assertion is proposed.

69 Nevertheless it must be said first that it involves a contradiction for God to be united with the created intellect in the role of the light of glory, and consequently that the aforesaid intellect, without a created light inhering in it, cannot even by divine power elicit the beatific vision. This assertion is sufficiently gathered from D. Thomas at the places cited in the preceding difficulty, and from what he teaches in this article and in art. 2, as we shall examine more at once: and thus Caietanus, Bannez, Zumel in the present case, Sotus, Capreolus, and the Thomists in general follow the Holy Doctor, as Gonzalez reports in this article, disput. 27, sect. 3.

Now, in order to set out the fundamental reason drawn from the same Holy Doctor, we must presuppose from him, in art. 2 of this question, that which we have often said, namely that the light of glory is distinguished in this from the intelligible species: for this holds itself on the part of the object, whereas the light holds itself on the part of the power, because it constitutes the intellect in the role of God's visive power: just as the intelligible species, from the fact that it holds itself on the part of the object, renders that intelligible. From this it also follows that, for this reason, the species must in like manner be measured against the perfection which it has in the role of species with respect to the object, so as not to be itself the very being of infinite perfection and immateriality in the role of object, but rather the intelligible species: and therefore, because God, as he is in himself, has infinite perfection and immateriality in the role of object, even the species representing him, as he is in himself, cannot fail to be in the role of species infinite in perfection and immateriality: likewise, because the light of glory holds itself on the part of the power, and is an elevation of the intellect in the order of vision, and hence the power without it does not hold the role of God's visive power, it too, as regards those things which are required of it on its own side, as distinguished from the object, must therefore be measured in the same proportional way, as regards its own entity and perfection in the role of light, with the aforesaid power. For a power which holds itself on the part of the operative power, elevating it and constituting it in the first act, means an essential ordering with respect to that same power, and is on account of it, as will be more established from what is to be said at once: and therefore it must be measured with that power, inasmuch as, although it is more perfect than the power itself — since it elevates it to a higher order — it nevertheless cannot fail to be bounded and narrowed according to its own entity and perfection through that power.

70 From this, therefore, the following reason is deduced. For it is repugnant for God to be united in the role of a form, or of any other thing, of itself and from within, that it be bounded and limited with respect to its own entity and perfection by that in which it is received; otherwise God would thus be united according to his entity at once infinite and finite: but the light of glory, elevating the power of a lower order so that it be on its own side proximally visive of God, demands of itself and from within to be measured with the created intellect and to be bounded and limited through it: therefore it will be repugnant for God to be united with it in the role of light with respect to the vision, and consequently for that vision to be elicited without a created light inhering in that same intellectual power.

This last consequence is evident. Because, as is established from what was said in the preceding difficulty, the concomitant influx of God into the vision itself is not sufficient, but it is required that God should influence something preliminary upon the intellect, and consequently something having the role of the light of glory, or of God's proximally visive power, which alone is lacking to the aforesaid intellect.

71 It is confirmed and explained first. It is repugnant for God to be united with the created intellect, or with any other creature whatever, in the role of a natural form, as we said above, art. 2, dub. 2: but by the very fact of being united in the role of the light of glory, he would be united in the role of a natural form: therefore it is repugnant that he be united in the role of light: and consequently that the intellect see God without a created and inhering light. The minor, in which alone lies the difficulty, is proved. For the intellect, if it is considered precisely together with the elevating light, has only the role of pure power in the intelligible order with respect to the divine essence and its own vision: therefore the light elevating the intellect has the role of a form only in entitative and natural being, and not in intelligible being: and hence God, as united in the role of light, will have the role of a form only in the entitative and natural order; but otherwise in the intelligible order, in which according to this reasoning he would be pure power.

72 It is confirmed second. For God is able to be united with the created intellect in the role of intelligible species, as with a secondary perfectionable; and likewise he can in the same way, that is, as with a secondary perfectionable, be united in the role of existence, or of subsistence, with human nature: because, just as he holds the role of intelligible form with respect to the created intellect, and the role of term with respect to human nature, so he is compared by the mode of intelligible form with respect to his own intellect, and by the mode of term with respect to his own essence and nature: but the divine essence cannot hold the role of a natural form with respect to God, as we showed at the place cited: therefore he cannot be united with the created intellect as with a secondary perfectionable through the mode of the aforesaid form: therefore, since a union in the role of light includes a union in the role of a natural form: as we were saying, the divine essence will not be able to be united in the role of light with the created intellect, even as with a secondary perfectionable. The major, which alone needs proof, is argued as follows. For although it is not necessary that a secondary perfectionable be perfected as the primary is, it must nevertheless be regarded by that which perfects it, or be regarded as it were, under the same formal relation as the primary perfectionable is regarded: for the whole reason for regarding a secondary perfectionable is that it be regarded by the primary: therefore the divine essence can regard, for example, through the mode of intelligible form, the created intellect as a secondary perfectionable, because in the same way, that is, through the mode of intelligible form, he regards the divine intellect as primary perfectionable.

73 It is confirmed third. Because the light of glory indispensably demands both that it pertain to the intelligible order and that it belong to the natural and entitative order: therefore God will not be able to be united with the created intellect in the role of light. The antecedent as to the first part is proved. For just as the intellect, with its natural quantity of power and with respect to natural and proportionate objects, is compared by the mode of pure power in the intelligible order with respect to the first form of this order, that is, with respect to the intelligible species, and according to this reasoning belongs to this order as pure power within it; so also the same intellect, with its supernatural quantity of power, that is, with the light of glory, and with respect to the supernatural object, namely God clearly seen, holds itself by the mode of pure power in the intelligible order with respect to the first supernatural and intelligible form, namely the divine essence, insofar as it holds the role of intelligible species: and therefore according to this reasoning it cannot fail to pertain to the intelligible order. As to the second part, the same antecedent is argued as follows. Because the intellect, with the light of glory and elevated through it, must actively influence, by the mode of power, the clear and quidditative vision of God, it cannot fail to have the role of an act and of a form in entitative and natural being: since according to this reasoning it must influence the intellection in accordance with that which the aforesaid intellection has of entitative and natural being. The consequence, however, is evident from what we have just said, namely that the divine essence cannot be united in the role of a natural form, although it can be united in the role of an intelligible form.

74 It makes no difference if it occurs to you that, for God to be united in the role of light, it is not necessary that he be united in the role of a natural form, or in entitative being; but it is enough to be united in the role of an act in this order. Wherefore, since the divine essence is in the aforesaid order the most perfect act, it will be able to be united in that way in which it could be united in the role of a natural form, if it had the true role of a form in this order.

For the opposite is the case in the first place. That, on the force of this solution, it is not clearly met by the proofs we have brought, will be evident to the reader in the second place.

For if the divine essence could be united in the role of the aforesaid act, and so by the mode of light with the created intellect, this union would have to be not in the role of an act considered thus in the entitative order, but in the role of such an act as is evident from itself: an act in entitative being, adequately, is divisible into an act which has the true role of informing form, and into one which has the true role of term: therefore, precisely because the essence cannot be united in the role of an informing form in natural and entitative being, neither will it be able to be united in the role of light.

The consequence is evident. Because the fact that the divine essence considered in natural and entitative being could hold the role of a term contributes nothing toward its being able to be united in the role of light, from the fact that the essence alone, or existence, and not the intellectual light, holds the role of a term in entitative and natural being: therefore, since nothing can be united with another in the role of an act unless in the role of a form or in the role of a term, and since union with a term contributes nothing here, it follows that, precisely because the divine essence cannot be united in the role of a natural form and in entitative being with the created intellect, it is also repugnant for it to be united with it in the role of light. The minor, however, is proved. For the essence of an angel, although it is a true act, nevertheless cannot be united with another angel, or with prime matter, by the mode of an act, because it does not hold the true role either of an informing form or of a term: but this sufficiently indicates that an act able to be united with another in entitative being must be either an informing form or a term in this order.

75 It is confirmed. For theologians labor greatly in explaining how the divine Word can be united with humanity without any imperfection; and in order to explain this, they have recourse, as it were, to the only way of doing it, that the Word is united by the mode of a pure term: but if for the union of God with something in entitative and natural being, by which a third one results, the role of a most perfect act were sufficient in it, there would be no reason for them to insist so anxiously on this point, that the union of the Word with humanity is by the mode of a term, in order to explain why no imperfection in God follows from it: for it would suffice for them to assert that this union is by the mode of a most perfect act: yet that they have recourse not to this but to the sole and pure reason of a term is altogether certain, as will be evident to the reader who considers them.

76 Finally, against the same solution stands the fact that in the intelligible order — which is as potent and as universal as the entitative natural order — nothing can be united by the mode of an act without being united either by the mode of an intelligible or an intellectual form, or by the mode of a term: therefore, likewise in the natural order, insofar as the natural order is distinguished — not indeed against the supernatural order, but against the intentional or intelligible one — nothing will be able to be united with another in the role of an act without being united with it either by the mode of a natural form or by the mode of a term in the same order. The consequence seems to hold from parity of reason. The antecedent, however, is proved. Because nothing can be united with another by the mode of an act in the intelligible order: unless it be either the impressed species itself, which is an intelligible form, or the expressed species, or word, which is an intellectual form, as our Complutenses teach in the books On the Soul, disp. 21, num. 42, and as we ourselves said in this same treatise, or unless it be the last term of this order, such as an intellection purely considered in intelligible being: since according to this reasoning it holds the role of existence in the aforesaid order, as will be evident from what we shall say in the treatise On the knowledge of God, disp. 4, num. 7, and in the treatise On the will of God, disp. 1, num. 21. Hence the other things which in this order are not united by either of these two modes do not have to be united by the mode of an act, but only by the mode of power in the same order, as is established of the intellect and the light of glory, or of other supernatural lights which are united with species and with intellection: just as these same things, insofar as they are united in the entitative and natural order, precisely because they have to be united by the mode of an act in this order, also have to be united by the mode of a natural form in the aforesaid order.

§ III. The later assertion is established.

77 It must be said second. The light of glory, which is indispensably required for the vision of God, is not a created light precisely by the mode of habit, but either this light by the mode of habit, or a created light by the mode of disposition, that is, by the mode of what is transient. Thus D. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 175, art. 3, ad 2, where he says: The divine essence cannot be seen by the created intellect except through the light of glory, of which it is said in the Psalm: In thy light we shall see light. Yet this can be participated in two ways. In one way, by the mode of an immanent form: and thus the blessed makes the saints in the homeland. In another way, by the mode of a certain transient passion, as has been said of the light of prophecy: and in this way that light was in Paul, lo, when he was carried up. The Holy Doctor, however, speaks by way of ordering to divine power, because in this article the treatment is of the vision communicated to Paul on the way, which was communicated not according to the common course, but from the absolute power of God. And this very thing is taught by the same Angelic Doctor in On truth, q. 13, art. 2, and q. 20, art. 2. Hence his disciples in general follow him, as we have related in the preceding assertion.

78 The fundamental reason, however, is drawn from this testimony of Divus Thomas, reduced however to this form. For other qualities constituting some power in the first act can be participated either by the mode of habit and permanently, or by the mode of disposition and transiently: therefore also the light of glory, constituting the intellect in the role of a power able to see God, will be able to be participated in both ways. The consequence is evident from parity of reason.

The antecedent, however, is also established. First, because it is commonly received by the Metaphysicians, and thus they distinguish habit from disposition, that is, what holds itself by the mode of habit from that which is like a disposition: for although either quality can turn about the same object, whether considered in the being of the thing or in the being of the object, of which we shall speak below; yet one is given by the mode of the permanent, namely habit, and the other by the mode of the transient, namely disposition, or what is given in its stead. Also, because, as the Thomists also admit, the will, for example, is sometimes constituted in the first act with respect to acts of charity by a habit corresponding to them, as when a just man having charity such as four breaks out into an act of the same intensity: but sometimes by some quality by the mode of what is transient, as when the same just man elicits an act more fervent than the habit of charity which he has. For since that excess is not sufficiently constituted in the first act by the habit, it must be constituted in the first act with respect to that excess by some other quality communicated by the mode of what is transient.

79 It is confirmed. The vision of God can be participated either by the mode of what is transient, as happened in Paul when he saw God while still on the way; or by the mode of what is permanent, as happens in the blessed: therefore, the light of glory also will be able to be communicated in both ways. The consequence is evident. Both from parity of reason, and also because, since the light of glory is the proper principle of the vision of God, it follows that, just as the vision itself can have that twofold mode of being, so also its principle can, since the vision is bound to the light and the light to the vision: and therefore, if the vision is by the mode of what is transient or by the mode of what is permanent, this same light too, proportion however being preserved, will be able to have that.

§ IV. The arguments of the first opinion are untangled.

80 As to the first argument, it is evident from what has been said. For granting the antecedent, the consequence must be denied. And for the proof, one must say that God is able to be united with the created intellect in the role of intelligible species, because he both holds the role of intelligible form and at the same time is his own being in this order. Yet, although God is his own being in the role of light, according to this consideration there does not correspond to him the role of a form proportionate to replacing the office of created light and elevating the intellectual power with respect to seeing God. First, because a light elevating, insofar as such, must necessarily be bounded by the power elevated, as has been said. Also, because, as we have already explained, the office of light cannot be supplied except by something having the role of a natural form in entitative being, all of which, as we showed above, are repugnant to divine perfection. Finally, because that which must elevate the created intellectual power in the role of light must hold in the intelligible order the role of pure proximate power, and render this office to the intellect with respect to the vision of God. Wherefore, since it is repugnant for the divine essence to have the role of pure power in any order, and consequently to communicate this office formally by itself to any creature, it will likewise be repugnant for it by itself to supply the place of the light of glory, and consequently to have the role of a form with respect to this effect. Most of all, because, as we said in dub. 3 of this treatise, num. 36, 37 and 38, the light of glory, and that which can supply its place, must concur in the genus of a material and receptive cause together with the intellect, in order to receive the vision: but the rendering of this office is repugnant to the infinite actuality of God.

81 As to the first confirmation, it is evident from what has just been said, that the light elevating the created power with respect to the vision belongs to the intelligible order by the mode of pure power in this order, and consequently holds the role of a form only in the natural and entitative order, whereas the intelligible species pertains to that order by the mode of a form in this same order: and therefore nothing is necessarily mixed into the species which holds the role of a form in the natural or entitative order, and consequently neither information nor inherence in that same entitative being. Hence the divine essence will be able to be united in the role of species and intelligible form, because this union, if it is pure in the intelligible order, involves no imperfection, as we showed above, art. 2, dub. 2; but otherwise in the role of light. Because, as we proved in this same difficulty, God can neither be united in the role of a natural form, nor have the role of such a form, nor communicate the role of pure power in the intelligible order to anyone by himself.

82 To the second confirmation the answer is given, that the divine essence is not able precisely to be united in the role of intelligible species because it presupposes, along with the first power for seeing God, also the first proximate power with respect to such a vision, or whatever is desired on the part of the visive power, and which indispensably demands to proceed from a natural form, as has been explained. Wherefore, since the light does not presuppose these things but necessarily involves the role of a natural form and moreover the role of pure power in the intelligible order, God cannot be united in the role of light. From these things enough is established regarding everything that is brought in the aforesaid confirmation.

83 As to the second principal proof, the major is to be distinguished: because it is not its own formal effect, taken in any sense, must be denied; and because it is not its own formal effect, in the sense that it is demanded of itself and from within on the part of that same effect not to be its own formal effect which it will render, must be granted. And then the minor also must be granted, according to what is to be said at once, but the consequence must be denied. Because, precisely since it is demanded on the part of the effect, of itself and from within, that the form which will render it not be the aforesaid effect, and consequently be finite and limited, it must be that the divine essence, which is infinite in the role of light, and is both that by which that same essence is seen and that which sees it, and consequently in this sense alone is (so to speak) its own quasi-formal-effect, cannot be a natural form, nor be united with the created intellect in the role of a natural form and by the mode of light. Hence, for the proof of the major, the antecedent is to be distinguished in the same proportional way. For the fact that a form in natural and entitative being is in need of information and causality is something demanded intrinsically by the formal effect, such that such an effect cannot be posited in the nature of things otherwise, nor can it in any other sense hold the role of a formal effect: and therefore, although God is, for example, his own existence, and his own being, and his own power of seeing himself, nevertheless these do not hold in him the role of a formal effect properly and in the strict sense of such, nor does he, so taken, hold the role of a natural form: because they are not united by a true causality and information.

Why, however, a natural form and its formal effect are so related to one another that the effect necessarily demands to arise from it in the aforesaid way, and the form itself unavoidably requires that it be finite and limited, indeed that it be an accidental entity, or that if it were substantial, it be then partial and incomplete, is established from what we said in this treatise, disp. 2, num. 52, and onwards: and therefore the whole breadth of substantial form cannot ascend above the perfection of the rational soul: and precisely because some substantial entity is given which is essentially more perfect, such as the entity of the lowest angel, who is an integral and complete substance, it cannot hold the role of a natural form.

84 As to the third, one must grant that the inferior cause is perfected by its conjunction with the superior: but thence something intrinsic, or inhering, is derived from the superior cause into the inferior. Hence color receives something real from light, as Aristotle admits in On the Soul 2, text 70, and as Cajetan admits in the same place, where he says that from a participation of light and of separated substances it receives the power to emit intentional species: and similarly the phantasm and the cogitative power receive something by which, elevated by the agent intellect, they can instrumentally influence toward the production of intelligible species; but these, from a participation of something derived to them by the possible intellect, become able to discourse in some way about singulars proportionate to them, as Capreolus well noted in 2, dist. 11, q. 2, art. 3.

85 To the confirmation the answer is given, with Báñez, in the same place, that the illumination of the lower angel by the higher, on account of which the higher angel is said to be converted to the lower, takes place by the mode of teaching, by proposing an object proportionate to that lower angel: and therefore it is not necessary that he imprint upon it any quality or light. Yet the peculiar conversion of God to the intellect of the blessed, by strengthening it and making it able with respect to the vision, is not by the mode of teaching, but by the mode of one giving the power required on the part of the power, as has been shown: and therefore it must be by the imprinting of some inhering power, as is evident from what has been said.

§ V. The arguments left over from the preceding difficulty are met.

86 As to the first, then, which was brought in favour of the first opinion in num. 45, it is established from what has been said. For Divus Thomas at the place cited wishes only that the light of glory not be indispensably necessary by the mode of habit for the vision of God, and not that it not be desired at least by the mode of what is transient. And this solution can be confirmed by the example adduced there by the Holy Doctor. For a certain quality was communicated to Peter, that he might walk upon the waters, by the mode of a transient disposition, on account of which he was able to perform that effect: this quality, however, as D. Thomas teaches in 3, part., q. 45, art. 2, was in a certain sense of the same reason as the essence with the dowry of the agility of the glorified body, although it differs from it in this, that it is not given by the mode of what is permanent, as the dowry under the conception of a dowry is given; but by the mode of what is transient.

87 To the last, left over from the same difficulty and brought in num. 48, a good answer is given there, as we said in num. 62. And to the proof to the contrary it is answered that, although it does not change the species whether it lasts little or much by accident, nevertheless to have such a nature as to demand of itself and from within that it last briefly, indicates some essential distinction from that which, from within, demands that it last long and have permanent being: the light of glory, however, communicated by the mode of what is transient, means a quality by the mode of disposition; communicated, on the contrary, in such a way that it has permanent being, it imports a quality by the mode of habit: and so it is demanded from within that that should last little and transiently, and this much and permanently: and therefore, although they are in a certain sense of the same reason on the part of form, insofar as each is the principle of the beatific vision, nevertheless they cannot fail to enjoy some essential distinction.

Nor does that which is adduced there about the vision of God stand in the way. For in this mode of speaking, the vision communicated to Paul on the way and that which he has in the homeland are essentially distinguished: because the former was in itself easily transient, since it did not take Paul out of the way; whereas the latter is in itself permanent, since it constitutes him in the relation and state of the blessed, and has an inseparable connection in the very nature of things with the light of glory by the mode of habit: wherefore the latter is of itself measured by a participated eternity; but the former is not.

88 It makes no difference if you object that the vision which is permanent in itself does not seem to belong to any species of quality: because not to disposition, since this is not permanent in itself; nor to habit, as is evident from itself; nor to any other species, as is evident from what our Complutenses teach in Disputationes de Logica 15: therefore such a vision will be impossible. For, as is established from what was said above, art. 2, it must necessarily belong to the predicament of quality.

It is answered that Aristotle knew only the qualities of the natural order, and not the qualities of the supernatural and divine order, and so it is not universally necessary that they belong to the predicament of quality, or to any of its species, in the way in which other natural qualities belong. Wherefore, although the vision is a true quality, yet by reason of its eminence it has something of disposition, namely actuality, and something of habit, namely permanence, and accordingly it is a certain eminent disposition consisting in a quality which is in itself most actual and permanent.

The conclusion is affirmative.