Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

44 After we have treated of the necessity of the light of glory with respect to the receiving, or quasi-receiving, of the divine essence, in so far as it has the character of an intelligible form, and also of the necessity of the same for this, that the vision itself be received in the created intellect, it remains to explain whether the intellect so stands in need of the aforesaid light with respect to the same vision being actively elicited that this necessity and this need cannot be supplied by divine power through any influx concomitant with the vision itself.

We have said, By divine power; for concerning ordained power it is certain that the blessed man stands in need of the light of glory with respect to the eliciting of the vision of God. For in the Council of Vienne, and as it is held in the Clementine Ad nostrum on Heretics, the fifth error of the Beguards and Beguines is condemned, who said that the soul does not stand in need of the light of glory elevating it to see God: and yet it is certain that seeing God involves the eliciting of the act of seeing. For since the vision is a vital operation, that intellect alone sees God which actively elicits the vision: and so, if the intellect stands in need of light in order to see, it will certainly stand in need of it in order to elicit the aforesaid vision.

§ I. The First Manner of Speaking Is Referred Back To.

45 The affirming part is held by Suarez, bk. 2 of the Summa Theologiae, ch. 16, nn. 5 and 6. Molina disputes it here, d. 1. Vazquez, d. 46, ch. 2. Arrubal, d. 20, ch. 3. And they cite in support Paludanus, in 4, d. 49, q. 1, a. 3, and Thomas of Argentina, q. 1, a. 1.

This is proved first by the testimony of St. Thomas, On Truth, q. 10, a. 11, where he says: As he made Peter walk on the waters without having bestowed on him the due agility, so he can bring the mind to this, that it be united to the divine essence in the state of the way in that same mode in which it is united to it in the homeland, without being poured all over by the light of glory: therefore it will be possible for the created intellect to elicit the vision by its own bare obediential power, together with the special concurrence of God in the vision itself, but not in the intellect. The consequence is evident. For from that head under which it can see God without the light of glory, it can also elicit the vision without anything superadded to it. For whatever were superadded to it would have the character of light, or (which is the same thing) of the power of sight of God: and in as far as the vision is supernatural, and is elicited by a secondary cause, it cannot be elicited by a purely natural power, but by an obediential one, and with the special, or supernatural, concurrence of God in it.

46 Second. The light of glory is desired only for this, that it supply the efficient virtue which is lacking to the intellect: therefore it will be able to be supplied by God through his divine power. The antecedent follows from what has been said. The consequence, however, is proved. For the virtue which is lacking to the intellect, and which the light supplies, is not a virtue for eliciting the vision, insofar as the vision is vital: both because for this the intrinsic vitality of the intellect, and its vital effort, suffice; and also because the light is demanded only for that vision, insofar as it is supernatural and clear; and finally, because the light comes from without and from outside: whereas the vital principle, and that which influences in a vital manner, must be intrinsic; and therefore a vital act is defined by this, that it be from an intrinsic and conjoined principle: but God can supply every efficient virtue of a secondary cause, provided it be not the efficient virtue of a vital cause as such, as all Philosophers and Theologians commonly admit: therefore he will be able to supply the defect of the light, and its influx, by this, that he himself influence the vision itself immediately and through supernatural concurrence, that is, what had to be supplied through the influx of the light.

47 Third. The light of glory does not influence the vision in the mode of a total virtue with respect to it, but only in the mode of a partial virtue; and so too the intellect will be a partial cause with respect to it: therefore God will be able to supply the efficiency of the light by influencing the vision immediately with that very thing which the light was going to supply. The antecedent is evident, both from what has been said, and also because otherwise the vision would not be a vital act, since it would not proceed actively from a vital power.

The consequence, however, is proved and explained. For whenever two partial causes influence some effect, it is not necessarily demanded that one inform the other, or that intrinsic powers be added to any of them, by reason of which a complete cause would be constituted with respect to such an effect; but it suffices either that the partial cause be assisted in one of these ways, or that another of these partial causes influence the effect simultaneously with the other, without influencing the same cause, as happens in Peter, who has a partial and half power for carrying a certain weight; for then he will be able to carry it; or by virtue of intrinsic, or inherent, powers being added to him, so that the half virtue which he has, and the other half superadded to him, concur in the mode of two partial causes integrating one total cause; or by virtue of Paul, who also has half the power for carrying the aforesaid weight, influencing the same effect together with Peter, without his influencing that same Peter, or superadding to him an intrinsic and inherent virtue.

48 Lastly. The supernatural acts of faith and charity can be done without the habits proportionate to them, and without any other influx of God into the cause: therefore in the same way the act of the vision of God will be able, at least through divine power, to be done through the sole influx of God into the same vision, without God imprinting anything preliminary in the intellect. The consequence is evident from the parity of the reason. The antecedent, as to the first part, is established: because the aforesaid acts are dispositions toward their habits, and therefore cannot be done by them, since precisely because they dispose toward them they are presupposed with their own being before them. As to the second part, however, it is evident from what has been said. For that preliminary thing which God would pour into the intellect and will for the eliciting of the aforesaid acts would not be distinct from the habits corresponding to them: since its essence would consist in this, that it has the character of a principle with respect to them, which is indeed proper to the habits of faith and charity.

It makes no difference if one should say that that which God would pour into the intellect and will with respect to the eliciting of the acts of faith and charity is going to be some transient, non-permanent quality, and so is not going to have the character of a habit. From this, therefore, it is inferred to the utmost that the vision of God can be elicited by the created intellect without the habit of the light of glory, but not without something superadded to the entity of the intellect, by which it is strengthened antecedently to the vision and to the influx of God into the same vision.

It makes no difference, therefore. For from the fact that that quality imprinted on the intellect for seeing God lasts only a short time, it does not follow that it differs in species from the quality which is the principle of that same vision and lasts permanently: as from the fact that the vision of God was communicated to Paul in a transient manner, it is not inferred that it differs in species from that same permanent vision of God which the same Paul afterwards had in the homeland. And the reason a priori is that permanent or non-permanent duration cannot distinguish the species of a quality, since it belongs to another predicament.

It is confirmed. For that quality imprinted on the intellect would not be transient, on the ground that it is corrupted by its contrary, as is evident from that very same ground, nor on the ground that it demands this from another source. For since it is the principle of a vision which is intrinsically perpetual, since it is measured by a participated eternity, it has no source from which to demand that it be transient of itself.

§ II. The Opinion of St. Thomas, and Its First Foundation.

49 It must nevertheless be said that the vision of God cannot be made, even by divine power, by the created intellect through its own pure and bare obediential power, with only the supernatural concurrence of God in the vision itself added, but not in the intellect. So St. Augustine and the Angelic Doctor, as is shown, and Nunno follows them in 3, pt., q. 62, a. 6, q. 2, con cl. 1, and Alvarez, On Aids to Grace, bk. 7, d. 67; and so the same Saint Doctor, bk. 2 of the Summa contra Gentiles, ch. 53, and in the same bk. 2, q. 175, a. 3, ad 2, says: That the divine essence cannot be seen by the created intellect except through the light of glory. Which is also taught by Cajetan in the present place, by Capreolus in 4, d. 49, q. 4, at the arguments against the second conclusion, namely at 3 and at 4, by Soto in the same distinction, q. 2, a. 4, by Báñez in the present difficulty 3, by Navarrete, controversy 39, § 1, by Nazarius in this article, and commonly by the Thomists.

50 This is proved first by the testimony of the Council of Vienne adduced in this difficulty, where the light of glory elevating the intellectual power is demanded, not indeed from God's institution alone, but from the very nature of the act and of the power. For just as the heretics said that the intellect can of its own nature attain beatitude, so the Holy Council defines, on the contrary, that it stands in need, from the very nature of the thing, of an elevation and of light on account of the inferiority and insufficiency which it has for seeing God: but by the name of the light of glory the Council in no way understands the vision itself, or the concomitant influx of God into it, which is nothing other than the aforesaid vision, but something preliminary to it: therefore, from the very nature of the thing, neither the act itself, nor the concurrence of God concomitant with the obediential power of the intellect, suffices; but something preliminary is desired to be imprinted on the act itself by God: therefore, even with respect to divine power, this same thing will be desired. This last consequence is evident from the preceding one. For that which is desired from the very nature of the thing on account of the lack of proportion and the intrinsic insufficiency present in the cause with respect to some effect cannot fail also to be required with respect to divine power, so that it holds on the part of that same cause, as we shall explain more fully immediately. The first consequence, however, follows well enough from the two premises. The minor, on the other hand, seems certain. First, because if the Council understood by the light of glory the vision itself, or the concomitant influx of God into it, which is nothing other than the vision itself, then it would be defining nothing against the aforesaid heretics, since they themselves did not deny that for seeing God the vision itself, or the concomitant influx of God into it, is required, which is the same as the aforesaid vision. And also: because the Council takes the light of glory in that sense in which it is commonly taken by theologians; otherwise, if the words of the Council could be twisted to another sense besides that in which they are commonly taken, we should have nothing firm in the definitions of Councils: yet it is certain among theologians that by the name of the light of glory one does not understand the vision itself, but something preliminary to it, and intrinsic to the power, elevating it to the end that it may elicit the vision.

§ III. The Second Foundation of the Opinion of St. Thomas Is Proposed.

51 Secondly, the assertion is proved principally by a reason drawn from the aforesaid place of St. Thomas in bk. 3 of the Summa contra Gentiles, which can be reduced to the following form. A cause which of itself is insufficient for some higher operation cannot elicit it unless either an intensification of its own power be superadded to it, if that action exceeds its efficacy only in intensity, or some other virtue distinct in species be superadded, if such an operation be more eminent, and distinct in species, from that which the same cause can elicit: but the vision of God is an operation more eminent, and distinct in species, from that which the created intellect can elicit through its own innate power: therefore some higher and more eminent virtue, distinct in species from the entity of the intellect and from its obediential power, must be superadded to it, by which it may be elevated with respect to such an action: therefore such a virtue must be distinct both from the aforesaid obediential power, or the intensification of it, and from the special and concomitant concurrence by which God influences the aforesaid vision.

St. Thomas explains and proves the major by the examples of a mitigated hot body and of a transparent body illuminating. The first of these needs only an intensification of heat in order to elicit an intense heating, because the aforesaid heating exceeds its power only in intensity; the second, namely the transparent body, needs a form distinct from it in species in order to illuminate, because illumination is an action more eminent, and distinct in species, from that which the transparent body, taken in itself, can elicit.

52 And then it can be proved from the proportion between the efficient virtue and the operation elicited by it, a proportion which indeed, as will be evident to the one who considers, cannot be observed unless a higher active virtue, distinct in species, correspond to an action higher and more eminent, and distinct in species, from those which the active power of itself can elicit: as it is also demanded, to the same proportion, that for an action exceeding precisely in intensity, there be superadded on the part of the cause only an intensification of the power present in it.

The minor, on the other hand, follows well enough from what has been said in this same article. The first consequence, however, is deduced from the two premises. The second, with respect to both parts, follows from the preceding. As to the first, namely, that such a superadded virtue ought to be more eminent, and distinct in species, from the obediential power of the intellect, or from the intensification of it, this is evident from the same. Because otherwise no virtue would be superadded to it with respect to an action more eminent, and distinct in species, from those which it can elicit of itself. As to the second, namely, that the concomitant influx of God into the vision itself, this too is evident. For that, with respect to which, in order to be produced, a cause stands in need of an elevation, cannot be the elevating virtue itself: as that, with respect to which a productive virtue is given, cannot be the productive force itself, as seems to follow from the very terms: therefore, if in order to elicit the vision of God the intellect stands in need of an elevating virtue, distinct in species from its innate power, such an elevating virtue cannot be the vision itself: therefore, since the concomitant concurrence of God in the vision is the very same thing as the vision is in God, and not something preliminary to it, the intellectual power cannot be elevated by such a concurrence so as to elicit it.

§ IV. The First Solution of the Adversaries, and Its Refutation.

53 This reason is so efficacious that all the solutions which can be applied to it from the doctrine of the adversaries remain refuted by the mere explanation and expansion of it. For in the first place their reply, namely that God can supply through his omnipotence the concurrence of the light, from the ground that all the efficiency of a secondary cause can be supplied by him, falls well enough from what has been said, even though otherwise, if he did not supply it, the activity of such a cause would be demanded.

For although God can effect by himself alone whatever secondary causes can, provided the secondary cause does not concur in the mode of a vital principle as such; nevertheless he cannot make it that the aforesaid cause attain such an effect, or elicit some action, without having on its own part sufficient virtue and efficacy with respect to it: therefore, since it has been shown that the intellect of itself does not have sufficient virtue and efficacy to elicit the vision of God, God cannot make it that he elicit it without bestowing on it a virtue proportionate to that end. The consequence follows from itself. The antecedent, however, also seems to be evident, both from the very terms; and also because otherwise that cause could, and could not, elicit that operation: it could indeed, as is supposed; but it could not, because without sufficient virtue and efficacy it cannot elicit it; and finally, because it is repugnant for a secondary cause to issue into a second act unless it be presupposed in its own order in a proportionate first act, since every effect, or operation, must be precontained in its cause, and in the first act of that cause: and consequently, neither by divine power can such a second act issue from it unless it have sufficient force and efficacy, by which it is constituted in the first act.

54 It is confirmed. For the light of glory does not concur precisely in the genus of an efficient cause with respect to the vision, but something of formal causality is intrinsically and indispensably commingled with it: therefore it cannot be supplied by God. The consequence is evident. Because God cannot supply a formal cause and its effect. The antecedent, however, is proved and explained. Because just as the Angelic intellect, insofar as it is a natural power, does not only concur to the Angelic intellection of the same order in the mode of an efficient cause, but something also of a formal, or specifying, cause is commingled there, on the ground that such an intellection denotes an intrinsic order and an indispensable dependence upon the intellect as upon its principle; and therefore God cannot make it that an Angelic intellection occur without the Angelic intellect; so also an intellection of the divine order must proceed from an intellectual power of the divine and supernatural order, not only as from an efficient principle, but in such a way that something of formal causality be commingled; and consequently, with respect to the aforesaid intellect, such an intellection will denote an intrinsic and indispensable relation, and the intellect itself will also have the character of a specifying principle with respect to it: therefore, since the light of glory constitutes the created intellect as a power of the supernatural and divine order, it follows that it not only concurs in the mode of an efficient principle, but something also of formal causality is commingled there.

§ V. The Second Evasion of the Adversaries, and Its Foreclosing.

55 Then, too, another solution which is usually applied from the doctrine of the adversaries falls from what has been said, namely that the intellect has a partial virtue through its own obediential power with respect to eliciting the vision of God as it is in itself, since the light is not the adequate cause of it: and so it suffices that another partial cause, namely God, influence the vision immediately with that simultaneous concurrence: not otherwise than as the power of two which Peter has for carrying a stone that resists, of four, is completed by another power of two, with which Paul influences in order to carry the same stone together with Peter, although the one does not influence the other, but each the effect.

This solution, therefore, no less than the preceding one, falls from the mere explanation of the reason of St. Thomas. For when the Saint Doctor denies to the intellect sufficient power for this, that it may be able to attain God, as he is in himself, without the light of glory, it is not because it has of itself a proximate virtue toward him as thus seen, and this is partial, and so it cannot elicit the vision by itself alone, as happens in the example proposed; but because of itself it has no proximate virtue at all, however partial, with respect to such a vision, but only a remote and radical one, on the ground that a proximate virtue, however partial, attaining some effect, must be of the same order as that effect, as may be seen in the same example adduced; and the intellect of itself is not of the same supernatural and divine order as God, as is clearly seen. Wherefore it will be repugnant that, taken of itself, it should concur even partially, however much God at the same time influence the vision through a purely simultaneous concurrence: since it implies that a cause acts without a proximate power of acting, as all theologians confess.

56 It is confirmed and explained. For on this ground the created intellect and will do not have even a partial proximate virtue for eliciting the supernatural acts of Faith, Hope, and Charity without some preceding grace, even if their obediential power belongs, according to that probable manner of speaking adduced in d. 1 of this treatise, to the supernatural order in the mode of pure capacity: therefore, since the beatific vision is also a supernatural and more excellent act, the intellect, that hypothesis still being granted, will not have the aforesaid virtue with respect to such a vision. The consequence is evident. The antecedent, however, is proved. For in the Council of Trent, sess. 6, canon 3, it is defined that man stands in need of preceding grace with respect to those acts; if, on the other hand, he had a proximate virtue of acting with respect to them, there would be no reason why such a preceding grace should be demanded in the powers eliciting them, but a concomitant grace would suffice.

Then again. For the insufficiency which St. Thomas ascribes to the created intellect, taken of itself, with respect to seeing God is of such a kind that that special and supernatural concurrence, by which God together with it would influence the vision, is not due to it thus taken by a title of connaturality: therefore the aforesaid insufficiency must also be of such a kind that not only can it not, considered of itself, influence the vision on the ground that it has only a partial virtue of acting, though a proximate one, but on the ground that in no wise does it have such a proximate virtue, however partial. The antecedent is evident. Because otherwise that concurrence would not be of the supernatural and divine order, since it would be due, under the title of connaturality, to the natural entity of the intellect. For, as the adversaries confess, its obediential power is not of itself of the supernatural order. The consequence, however, also follows. For to a partial proximate cause is due, under the title of connaturality, a union with another proximate and partial concause; and, being thus united to it, a proportionate concurrence is also due with respect to the action which it is going to elicit.

57 Furthermore. For the insufficiency and ineffectiveness which St. Thomas ascribes to the intellect of itself and without the light with respect to the vision of God arise from its inferiority and imperfection. If, on the other hand, the intellect of itself and through its own pure obediential power had a proximate virtue of acting, even a partial one, with respect to it, such inferiority and imperfection would not be in it: and so forth. The major follows. Because every insufficiency in the genus of an efficient cause arises from imperfection and inferiority: for just as this cause acts insofar as it is in act and perfect in itself, so its insufficiency takes its origin from potentiality, and consequently from inferiority and imperfection.

The minor, however, also follows. Because that which it has of itself, and from its innate virtue, as a proximate and partial power with respect to the supernatural vision, so that nothing concurs with it except that which concurs in the mode of an intellectual female, contains in the supernatural order all the perfection which can belong to it within the range of intellectual power: for the whole range of intellectual power extends only to this, that it can of its own virtue influence by itself, in the mode of a female and in the mode of a partial cause partial as to its cause, the most perfect of all acts, namely the beatific vision: whereas in the case of which we are speaking, the intellect alone would concur in the mode of an intellectual female, and in the mode of a partial cause in this order; otherwise that action, as it is in God, would be vital, and God himself, as concurring in this manner, would stand in need of a special reason in order to be fecundated through the species of a known object, as much in this as in other intellections of the supernatural order: therefore the aforesaid created intellect would contain all the perfection of the range of the created intellect, and consequently it would not be inferior in the character of intellectual power with respect to the beatific vision.

58 Finally, there is added the fact that the intellect, through its own obediential power, cannot have even an instrumental proximate virtue, by which in this order it might precontain in the first act any miraculous work: therefore neither through it can it have a proximate partial virtue with respect to the vision of God. The consequence is evident. Because the vision of God is produced by the intellect as by a principal cause, from the ground that it is contained within the range of its adequate act, namely of intellection. Yet it is certain that some virtue is of itself less proportionate to concurrence in the mode of a principal cause, even a partial one, in a second act according to the substance, supernatural and most perfect of all, such as the vision is, than to concurrence instrumentally in miraculous works: since the whole range of an instrumental cause of some order cannot reach the perfection which is contained in a principal cause, even a partial one, contained within that same order as the instrumental cause.

The antecedent, however, is proved. Because if the intellect had such a virtue, that obediential power of its own would be infinite with respect to the power of containing. For miraculous and supernatural effects transcend one another infinitely in perfection, at least accidentally: and all this perfection must be precontained simultaneously and at once in the physical instrument of which we are speaking, at least in its own order: so that although it be not of equal perfection with the effect, yet from the fact that it contains that effect in its own order, it is inferred that it must have some perfection in itself: and thus if it contains infinite effects, which mutually transcend one another in perfection, it cannot fail to be something infinitely perfect. But on these matters let those who teach what our Complutensians teach in the Physics, d. 12, from no. 14 to 16, be consulted.

§ VI. The Last Reply, and Its Overturning.

59 From all of which it remains that another solution of the adversaries is refuted, namely that the created intellect influences the vision instrumentally alone, and so stands in need of nothing except the sole influx of God into it, but not into the intellect. For since an instrument is not elevated to being, but to operating, it is not necessary that a principal cause imprint anything on it, but it suffices that it operate together with it: yet if something is ever imprinted on it, as happens at present, since the intellect is in fact elevated by the light of glory to see God, this is done only to the end that it may see more sweetly and more connaturally; and not because this also is necessary with respect to divine power.

For against this the reason already set forth presses, considered in this manner. For although we allowed the intellect to concur instrumentally alone in the vision, nevertheless, precisely because it is insufficient on its part with respect to it, and consequently stands in need of elevation in order to operate, it is elevated to the end that at least in its own order, namely in the mode of an instrument, it may contain in nature the same vision before it elicits it, and consequently to the end that it be constituted in the first operative act before the second, as follows from what was said in the preceding no.: therefore something pertaining to the order of being must be imprinted on it, through which it may contain the effect of the principal agent, namely the aforesaid vision, which it did not contain before its elevation. Especially because, as our Complutensians correctly show in 2, Physics, d. 12, q. 1, and as we shall say below in the following difficulty, by the mere subordination to God it cannot be constituted in the first act, even with respect to operating in its own order.

60 Then again, it is false that the intellect concurs instrumentally in the vision of God. For, as we shall say below, it cannot elicit it unless elevated by the light of glory; and thus elevated it attains it in the mode of a principal cause, as we touched upon above, art. 4: and the reason itself suggests this. Then because the beatific vision is an act connatural with respect to the light of glory, as we touched upon above, art. 2: and that same vision, and its object, are not outside the range of the adequate act and object of the intellect; whereas, as follows from what was said above, art. 1, dub. 1, for the character of a principal cause it suffices that it concur through the form under which that operation is connatural to it, and that such an operation and its object be contained under the adequate operation and object of that power.

Then also: because every nature concurs, by the intermediary of its own powers, in the mode of a principal cause to its own operations: but sanctifying grace has the character of a nature in the supernatural and divine order, and its own and connatural operation is to see God: therefore through its power of the divine order, namely through the light of glory, it will attain that same vision as a principal cause, and consequently the soul and the intellect also, as elevated by grace and light, will have this very thing: since, as we were just saying, they are elevated to the act and object contained under their own adequate act and object, and through a form having power in the mode of a principal cause, in the manner explained above, with respect to them. Hence Suarez does not rightly infer from the fact that the intellect concurs as elevated that it influences instrumentally, because elevation, together with the conditions already stated, does not draw the elevated thing out of the character of a principal cause.

§ VII. The Arguments against the Opinion Are Answered.

61 As to the first, it will be evident from what we shall say in the following difficulty, nn. 77 and 86.

As to the second, the antecedent being granted, the consequence is to be denied: both on account of the things which we shall immediately assert in the proofs of that same consequence; and also because, as follows from what has already been said, although God can, with the aforesaid limitation, effect by himself alone whatever is effected through secondary causes; nevertheless he cannot make it that they themselves effect their effects unless they have in the first act power with respect to them: here, however, we are not speaking of a vision produced in any way whatever; but of one produced by the created intellect.

And as to the first proof of that same consequence, the antecedent is to be denied. As to whose first and second proof it is to be said that the light is desired for the vision of God insofar as it is vital, with a vitality not of just any kind, but supernatural, which alone is found in it. For just as within the order of nature its own vitality is given, so also within the supernatural and divine order a supernatural vitality is found, according to that of John, The grace of God is eternal life: and so for this reason also God cannot supply the place of the light of glory through his concurrence. Hence, for the aforesaid vision, insofar as it is supernatural life, the natural vitality of the intellect does not suffice unless elevated through the light of glory.

As to the third proof, on the other hand, the answer is that the light of glory participates, as quo, in the supernatural vitality of the divine intellect, as to the vital efficacy which it enjoys with respect to seeing itself as it is in itself: and at the same time it adheres to the vital power, and thus nothing is lacking to it for the vision to proceed from it as from an intrinsic vital principle.

62 As to the third, the antecedent is to be granted according to what has been said above. Namely, in such a way that although the light is not the whole and adequate reason by the exclusion of the radical and remote virtue, yet it is the whole and adequate reason on the part of the power by the exclusion of another proximate virtue held on the part of that same power: because the intellect has of itself only a radical and incipient virtue. And then the consequence is to be denied. As to whose proof it is evident from what has been said that the antecedent is true whenever those causes are partial with the partiality of a proximate cause, so that each has its own proximate partial virtue of acting, as happens in the example adduced there; but otherwise when they are partial with the partiality of cause, in such a way that one is remote in its own order, and the other proximate. For then that which has only a remote and not a proximate virtue of acting in its own order (as happens in the present case) cannot operate unless such a proximate virtue be first bestowed upon it.

Lastly, the antecedent is to be let stand as regards its first part, and is to be denied as regards the second matter. As to whose proof a good answer will be given there. As to the refutation, on the other hand, against the solution given there, it will be evident from what is to be said in nn. 87 and 88.