Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

Having explained for what the light of glory is not required, it remains that we explain at once for what precisely it is required, so that its nature and necessity may be yet more clearly seen.

§ I. The negative position.

20 The negative part is held by Vazquez in the present disputation, 43, cap. 3. For in the first place he denies that the divine essence is united under the character of an intelligible form with the blessed intellect: this, however, being admitted, he again denies that the light of glory is the disposition necessarily required for such a union. This opinion, as regards the first part, has been examined and refuted above, in art. 2 and in the preceding difficulty.

21 As for the second part (which is what is at issue here), it is proved in the first place. For the hypostatic union, by which the Word is united to the humanity, is greater and more principal than that union by which it is united to the intellects of the blessed under the character of an intelligible form, as the Lord Doctor teaches in 3. part. quaest. 2. art. 9. And yet, for the divine Word to be united to the humanity, no accidental disposition is required, as the same Saintly Doctor attests in the same place, quaest. 7. art. ult. Therefore neither will the light of glory be necessary, as an accidental disposition for such a union, in order that the divine essence be united to the intellects of the blessed.

22 Secondly. For in order that some power be able to receive the species of some object, it is required, and it suffices, that it have of itself a certain power with regard to it, according to the general and objective reason which, taken by itself, it bears toward the thing considered: but the intellect has of itself a certain power with regard to God clearly seen, according to the general and objective reason which, taken by itself, it bears toward the thing considered: therefore it will be able, without any other superadded disposition, to receive the species of that same. The major is proved and explained. For the reason why sight cannot receive the species of a sound is that it has of itself no power with regard to it, according to the general and objective reason which it bears of itself: since indeed a sound is not contained under the reason of the visible; on the contrary, sight can of itself, without anything else, receive the species of anything visible whatever, because it has of itself a certain power in regard to it, taken according to the aforesaid general reason, namely according to the reason of the visible, but not because it has a complete power with regard to it; since indeed the complete power of sight is perfected through the reception of the species of that visible. The minor, too, is evident. For God, as clearly visible, is contained under the general objective reason of the created intellect, namely under the reason of the intelligible being; and therefore the intellect will have a certain power with regard to Him according to the aforesaid reason.

It makes no difference if one says that the major is true when the object is proportioned to the power, but otherwise when it surpasses the power, as happens here. For it is contradicted by the fact that no sense stands in need of being fortified in order to receive the species of some eminent sensible: therefore neither will the intellect need any fortification, by some intermediate disposition, namely the light of glory, in order to receive the divine essence after the manner of an intelligible form. The consequence seems legitimate from the parity of reason. The antecedent, however, is proved by Vazquez both by experience and because no species of any violent sensible is opposed to the temperament of the sensitive power: for intentional being is not opposed to natural being, and so it will rather perfect than harm the sense or its organ.

23 Thirdly. For the created intellect, even when actuated by the light of glory, still remains of a lower order than the divine essence, as it bears the character of an intelligible form: therefore nothing stands in the way of its receiving that, namely that the intellect be something lower, and far more ignoble, than the essence itself: therefore of itself, without anything else, it will be able to receive it. The antecedent is clear. For the intellect together with the light is something finite, and so it is infinitely distant in the grade of immateriality from the divine essence, which bears the character of an intelligible form. From this the first consequence is sufficiently evident. The second, however, seems to follow from the first. For as often as some inferiority of power does not stand in the way of receiving some form in the capacity of power, the sign is that only obediential power is required for receiving it, and not connatural power, which in the capacity of power is not inferior to such a form but is wholly proportioned to it: but taken by itself, obediential power accords to the intellect for the vision of God, as we showed above, and therefore for the form and the intelligible species required for that vision, namely the divine essence: therefore this obediential power alone will suffice for it to be able to receive the aforesaid essence.

24 Fourthly. For the reception of the light of glory, no disposition of a higher order is required in the intellect: therefore none is required either for receiving, or as it were receiving, the divine essence under the character of a species. The antecedent is commonly admitted by the theologians. The consequence, however, is proved: for the light too is a supernatural form, and of the divine order. Hence, if notwithstanding this supernaturality it can be received in the intellect without another disposition, it will follow that the divine essence too can be united to that same intellect without it.

§ II. The true opinion of St Thomas.

25 Nevertheless it must be said that the light of glory is required in the intellect of the blessed in order to receive the divine essence as it bears the character of an intelligible form. Thus St Thomas in this article, where he says: For when some created intellect sees God by essence, the very essence of God becomes the intelligible form of the intellect, whence it is fitting that some supernatural disposition be superadded to it so that it be elevated to such sublimity; and the same teaches in 3. contra Gentes cap. 52 and 53, in opusculo 2. cap. 105, and in 4. dist. 49. quaest. 2. art. 6., de verit. quaest. 8. artic. 3. Whom Caietanus, Bannes, Zumel, Nazarius, and Gonzalez follow here, and Ferrara in the place cited from 3. cont. Gent., and Capreolus in 4. dist. 49. quaest. 4. art. 1. conclus. 2. and art. 3., at the first, in his attack on the second conclusion, and Scotus in the same place, quaest. 2. art. 4., and many others.

It is proved by a reason drawn from St Thomas here and from 3. cont. Gent. cap. 63, which can be reduced to this form. That which is elevated to some form which is above its own nature must be disposed by some disposition surpassing that same nature: but, in order that the created intellect see God, it is elevated to some form which is above its own nature: therefore it must be disposed by something which is above that same nature: therefore the light of glory must be superadded, by which it is disposed. The major is proved. For a disposition, at least the last one, and the form itself, must be of the same order: therefore, in order that something be elevated to a form which is above nature, it must be disposed by a disposition which is likewise above that same nature. The minor, however, is sufficiently evident. For in the vision of God the created intellect is elevated to receive the divine essence under the character of an intelligible form, as we showed in art. 2; but the divine essence under the character of an intelligible form is something supernatural, and therefore above the nature of the created intellect: therefore, and so on. From which the first consequence is sufficiently evident, and likewise the second. Then because by the name of the light of glory we understand the qualifying disposition for the reception of the divine essence under the character of an intelligible form. Then also: because, the light of glory being a participation of the divine intellect as it is in itself, it follows that if once a disposition is required for receiving the divine essence under the character of an intelligible species, then nothing else besides that one is better adapted to disposing toward such a reception. For as the divine intellect, by the very fact of its being such, is (so to speak) ultimately disposed, at least on the part of our mode of conceiving, in order to have the divine essence united to it under the character of an intelligible form: so the participation of that same intellect, as it is in itself, will be the last disposition in the created intellect with respect to the union of the aforesaid essence with it under the character of an intelligible form.

26 You will object first, from Vazquez, to this reasoning, that although a supernatural form which inheres would indeed require a supernatural disposition on the part of its subject, yet that which neither inheres nor can inhere, such as the divine essence, does not.

On the contrary. Because, although the divine essence does not inhere in the intellect of the blessed, it is nevertheless united to it under the character of an intelligible form; and this indeed suffices for the light of glory to be demanded in that same intellect with respect to such a union. For as a natural form demands its own proportionate disposition, so too does an intelligible form demand its own: especially since the intelligible form of which we are speaking, namely the divine essence, is far more excellent than any other natural form.

Next. For this is proper to an intelligible species taken formally as such, that it cannot be united in this way unless to a power having a sufficiency of power to understand an object of such a species: but the intellect without the light of glory does not have sufficient power to see God as He is in Himself; therefore the divine essence, as it bears the character of an intelligible species with respect to this vision, will not be able to be united to it under the character of a species taken formally, unless it have the aforesaid light. The consequence is transparent. The minor, however, follows from what was said in the preceding difficulty.

The major, however, is proved. Then because, since this union is essentially ordered to the end that the power be able to make use of such a species with respect to apprehending that object, it follows that, precisely because the power cannot make use of it from a defect of sufficient powers for such a use, neither can the aforesaid species be united to it under the character of a species as long as it does not have the sufficient powers required on its own part. Then also: for it is proper to an intelligible species to constitute the intellect as ultimately and completely capable of understanding: but it is repugnant for it to be so constituted without having those things which on its own part are required for understanding: therefore, and so on.

Then finally: for as it would be repugnant for a substantial form to be united after the manner of such a form with prime matter, which (so to speak) would not be prime matter but a half of it within the latitude of the aforesaid matter: so likewise it will be repugnant for an intelligible species, as it bears the character of an intelligible form, to be united with an intellect lacking sufficient powers to understand through such a species, that is, lacking an essential commensurability and a quantity of power: since indeed (as we said above, no. 17) the intellect without the aforesaid powers is only a half-intellect, insofar as the intellect (so to speak) is, on its own part, distinguished as whole from an intelligible form. But concerning these matters let those be seen which we shall say in the following difficulty, nos. 36, 37, and 38.

27 You will object secondly, from the same Vazquez, that although some disposition proportionate to it is always required for a substantial and natural form, yet it is otherwise for a supernatural form, such as the divine essence is as it bears the character of an intelligible species; otherwise, since that disposition would itself be a supernatural form, another disposition of the same order would be required for it, and so on to infinity.

On the contrary. Because the divine essence, as it bears the character of an impressed species, is not just any supernatural form, but within the intelligible order it is the last form among those which are required for constituting the intellect in the first act; and therefore it confers upon it that it have in its intelligible being the nature of God: hence, although for several other supernatural forms no disposition of the same order is required, yet it is well required for the divine essence as it bears the character of an intelligible species. The antecedent seems to follow from itself and from what was said in art. 2, dub. 2. The consequence, however, is proved. Because a form which is the last in some order, and which confers the character of nature within that same order, has this peculiar property, that it demands for itself some disposition: and therefore sanctifying grace, because it is the last form in the supernatural order and confers within that same order a participation of the divine nature, must have some disposition, by reason of which its subject is disposed for receiving it. For at the very least the supernatural habits themselves, which accompany it, dispose toward receiving it, in that although generically as efficient causes they are posterior to it, generically however as material causes they are prior: and thus they are able to dispose toward it: just as heat, accompanying the form of fire, is posterior to it in the genus of efficient cause and prior in the genus of dispositive material cause. But concerning these matters let one see the Complutenses, 1. de Generat. disp. 2.

Although here there is the disparity already hinted at between grace and the divine essence as it bears the character of an intelligible form: for since sanctifying grace confers a participation of the divine nature, from the fact that it confers a radical quantity of power required on the part of the soul for seeing God, it follows that it must of necessity presuppose an essential commensurability in the soul together with its obediential power (whether these two are strictly distinguished from each other or not, as we treat elsewhere); since for the quantity of power required on the part of some power, the aforesaid essential commensurability and its obediential power alone can be necessarily presupposed; although for a sweet and connatural reception its own proper disposition can and must be presupposed, as happens in the reception of grace. But the divine essence, as it bears the character of an intelligible form, is not a quantity of power required on the part of the intellectual power: and so, because it must presuppose the intellect, which on its own part, that is, as it is distinguished from the species and is the partial and inadequate cause of the vision, is (so to speak) a whole intellect and not a half-intellect, it must therefore of necessity require, as its disposition, the aforesaid quantity of power, namely the light of glory.

28 It is confirmed: for the divine essence is so a supernatural form with respect to the intellect of the blessed that the intellect itself, taken by itself, is pure power within the intelligible order with respect to it, and the essence is pure act under the character of an intelligible form: therefore the intellect will not be capable of receiving, or as it were receiving, the aforesaid essence as it bears the character of a most perfectly actual intelligible form, unless it be first actuated and disposed by the light of glory. The antecedent is evident of itself. The consequence, however, is proved. For (as the Complutenses state, 1. Phys. disp. 9. num. 72) prime matter cannot receive existence except in its totality, and therefore cannot receive it unless it first receive a form, by reason of which it is as it were disposed for existing; because, since it is pure potentiality in the genus of being, it cannot be capable of the actuality of existence, which is most perfect, unless another actuality of essence be first presupposed, which in the character of actuality is lesser, and is a way to it, from the fact that it belongs to the same order of act and has an actuality mixed with greater potentiality: therefore, since the created intellect with respect to seeing God as He is in Himself is pure potentiality in the genus of the intelligible, and the divine essence itself, as it bears the character of an impressed species, is the most perfect and pure act, there will not be a sufficient proportion in the intellect for receiving such a species, unless it be first disposed and proportioned by the light of glory, which also reaches the divine order and has within that same order an actuality mixed with potentiality.

§ III. The arguments of the first position are answered.

29 To the first, let the major and the minor be granted, but the consequence denied. And the reason for the disparity is drawn from the different conditions of each union. For the union of the humanity with the Word is a union in the same person, and therefore through it the subsistence and the existence of the Word is communicated to the humanity; and so it does not have to presuppose in it either another substantial existence, as is clear from what the Complutenses teach in lib. Phys. disp. 3., or any accidental disposition, because it is prior for the humanity to have simple being, which indeed is communicated to it by the aforesaid union, than to have being secundum quid, that is, accidental being: as the same Complutenses show very well, lib. 1. de Generat. disp. 2. But the union of the divine essence under the character of an intelligible form is not a union for subsisting or existing by the subsistence or existence of God, but it presupposes the created intellect with its own existence, at least in the being of the thing, and with a defect of efficacy for understanding through the aforesaid species, if the aforesaid intellect is considered precisely according to what is proper to it, as has been shown. And so, insofar as it is presupposed as existing, it is capable of the aforesaid accidental disposition, namely of the light of glory: and insofar as it does not have the aforesaid efficacy, it cannot receive the divine essence under the character of a species unless it be disposed by the aforesaid light, by which it is able on its own part to see God: since, as we said in the assertion, an intelligible species is not united formally under the character of a species except to an intellect that is potentially able to understand through it.

30 From which, as to the second, the major must be denied. For in order that some power be able to receive a species representing some object as it is in itself, it is not enough that it have of itself some power with respect to understanding it according to the general and objective reason. Because from this, at most, it follows that the power can understand it with respect to the aforesaid reason, and therefore that it has an essential commensurability with a view to being elevated with respect to seeing it as it is in itself; but further it is required that it have the power and the efficacy required on its own part for understanding it as it is in itself. Nor does the opposite of this follow from the proof of the major adduced there. For sight alone can receive without fortification the species of those visible things with respect to which it has sufficient efficacy on its own part; but otherwise with respect to others. We said on its own part, because, as is clear from what has been said above, the species of an object does not complete sight with the complement required on the part of sight, but with the complement desired on the part of the object, which of necessity presupposes that complement first.

By which also, as to what is brought against the solution given there, it is clear that the antecedent must be denied. And as to the first proof, the antecedent must also be denied: as to the second, however, it must be said that although we granted that the organ of the sense is not harmed by the species of a violent sensible (the contrary of which the Complutenses show very well and at length in lib. de Anima disp. 9. from num. 62 to 77, out of Aristotle and St Thomas), nevertheless the sense would stand in need of fortification for the reception of the aforesaid species under the character of a species, because of the disproportion which exists between itself and such an object. Hence, as without such fortification it could not perceive it either absolutely or perfectly, so without the same it will not be able to receive its species in a proportionate manner. We said either absolutely or perfectly, because sometimes a violent sensible is not absolutely disproportionate with respect to a sense, so that in no way it can be perceived by it, as is evident in our vision with respect to the sun when looked at directly. Sometimes, however, it is absolutely disproportionate, as happens with the vision of the owl with respect to that same sun. Hence in us a fortification is required with respect to the reception of the species of the solar body, insofar as it perfectly represents it; and in the owl a fortification is required for the reception of that same species, so that it may represent it absolutely.

31 To the third, the answer is that, although the intellect elevated by the light of glory is of a lower order than the divine essence, because it does not accord with it in the grade of immateriality, nevertheless it is of the same divine order as it, because the light is a certain participation of the divine intellect as it is in itself. Hence the aforesaid inferiority does not stand in the way of the divine essence being able to be united to an intellect elevated in this way, even as the inferiority which the intellect taken by itself has with respect to the divine essence stands in the way of that same essence being united to it under the character of an intelligible form: then because of what has been said; then also because the proper species of some intellect of a higher order is united to none but the intellect of which it is proper, or to the one who has a participation of the aforesaid intellect as it is in itself: yet the intellect taken by itself has not that participation; it is well, however, pervaded with the light of glory.

Therefore, the antecedent and the first consequence having been granted in the argument, since the inferiority of the intellect already spoken of at once has suitability in the divine and supernatural order, and also a participation of the divine intellect as it is in itself, the second consequence must be denied. For the proof of it, the major must be denied. And to the proof included in it, namely that a power which is not obediential but connatural with respect to some form is not inferior to it in the capacity of power, the answer is that this is true when the power is entirely connatural to the form, for then the power is not inferior in the capacity of power, that is, then the power is as great in the capacity of power as the form is in the capacity of form. But the intellect with the light of glory, although it is not compared with the divine essence after the manner of a pure obediential power, is nevertheless not compared with the same after the manner of a power entirely connatural, because a power, that is, an intellectual virtue entirely connatural with respect to the divine essence, must be an intellect that is not elevated, and therefore does not coalesce from the intellectual power and the elevation: but an intellect which by the manner of a simple and total power is able to be united with the divine essence as it bears the character of an intelligible species, as we said above, disp. 2. num. 170: and this, as is clear from what has been said there, belongs to the divine intellect alone.

32 As to the fourth, the antecedent being granted, the consequence must be denied. And as for its proof, it is clear from what has been said. For the light of glory is not of the manner of a last form conferring a participation of the divine nature: and therefore it is not necessary that any disposition be given to it, except at most insofar as it is of the likeness of a property, or as it were of a property of consummated grace: and thus the disposition which is required for it will serve also for the reception of the light. But the divine essence has the character of a last form in the manner explained, and confers upon the intellect that it have a divinized being, that is, the divine nature in its intelligible being: and therefore it is no wonder that it demands of itself some proper disposition of the divine order, namely the light of glory; especially because the aforesaid light completes the intellect in the character of an intellect, so that without it there still remains on its own part, as it were, a half-capacity with respect to understanding God as He is in Himself. Hence, without it, it is as if there were no intellect at all with respect to the aforesaid union.

From which also remains solved the objection which a certain Junior raises, namely that the divine essence is not of the manner of a last form in the intelligible order, because intellection is the last form in this order: and therefore that the light of glory is not required as a disposition with respect to the divine essence as it bears the character of a species, but well with respect to the intellection, that is, the vision of God.

For the answer is drawn from what has been said, that the vision of God is not among the forms required on the part of the first act, because it does not confer the power of seeing; but it is itself the second act of seeing: and therefore the divine essence has the character of a last form in the intelligible order, and within the range of those things which are required for the first act: and so, just as on account of this reason some disposition is required for receiving sanctifying grace, so too is one required for receiving the divine essence under the character of an intelligible form. Add that vision is the very existence within the intelligible order: as we shall say in tract. 4. disput. 1. num. 21: now the existence of some order demands the same disposition which the form of that same order demands. Nor does it prevent that the form to which vision follows should demand its own disposition, and the same as itself (due proportion, however, being observed), as is evident in the existence of the natural order. But concerning these matters let those be seen which we shall assert in the places cited.