Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

Although the determination of this Difficulty consists of what was said in art. 2, dub. 1, nevertheless, because Gabriel Vazquez advances certain things worthy of some solution, and others which call for a special refutation, from which the opinion of St. Thomas will shine out more clearly, it has been thought fit to raise this Difficulty.

§ I. A Recent and Singular Opinion.

1 The first opinion asserts that the light of glory concurs with the vision after the manner of an intelligible species, and thus as though it gave the virtue required on the part of the object, but not that which is required on the part of the power. Thus Vazquez, in the above disp. 43, cap. 3 and 7.

It is proved, first. The light of glory does not flow into the beatific vision after the manner of an active intellectual virtue which holds itself on the part of the intellect, and which together with it constitutes one single complete principle of understanding distinct from the object: therefore, either it does not flow into the vision at all, or it flows in only after the manner of an intelligible species standing in for the object, namely the divine essence. The consequence is evident. Because whatever is the cause of the vision together with the intellect must be the cause of it only either after the manner of an intellectual virtue holding itself on the part of that intellect, or after the manner of an intelligible species standing in for the object: and so, if the light of glory is not a cause in the former way, then either it will not be a cause of it, or it will be a cause in the latter way, namely after the manner of an impressed species. The antecedent, however, is proved by Vazquez. Because the intellect on its own part touches the vision only according to the general notion of intellection, and rests there: but for this concurrence nothing is required on the part of the intellect save its own native power, since nothing is more proportioned for eliciting an intellection according to the general notion of intellection and resting there, than the intellect: therefore the light of glory will not flow in, nor will it be required for the beatific vision after the manner of an intellectual virtue required on the part of the intellect.

2 It is confirmed. For if the light of glory does not flow in after the manner of a species, it cannot cause the vision as regards the specific degree of the intellection of such an object: since this degree must be produced by the object, or by the species, insofar as it belongs to the species, or to the object, to modify and determine the intellect to the cognition of that same object; nor would it cause that vision as regards its clarity, on account of which it is called intuitive and quidditative, because the divine essence would then concur after the manner of a species, if once the light does not stand in for it, and it, thus united, moves of itself — as is clear from itself — to its quidditative and clear vision: therefore the light would be superfluous. The consequence is evident. Because in the beatific vision there are only these three reasons, namely that it be an intellection, that it be of such an object, and finally that it be quidditative and clear: therefore, if for the former the intellect taken in itself suffices, as we have already shown, and if for the two latter the light cannot concur, once it does not have the notion of an intelligible species, it follows from this that its concurrence is superfluous for such a vision. Nor can it be said that the vision arises as much from the intellect, as elevated by the light of glory, as from the divine essence itself, insofar as the latter has the notion of the object: so that, according to all the reasons enumerated, it proceeds from each of the two: because they do not concur in any way whatever, but as subordinate to one another.

3 Now against this is the fact that several proximate and proper causes cannot concur toward the same effect, even if they are subordinate to one another, unless there corresponds in the effect to each cause some peculiar reason, for the sake of which its influx is required: but this is not found in the present case, as has been proved: therefore, etc. The minor with its consequent is sufficiently evident. The major, however, is also evident. Because if no peculiar reason corresponds in the effect, demanding a new cause, its concurrence would be employed in vain: since the influx of a new cause can be required only on account of some peculiar reason found in the effect, which cannot be attained by a single cause.

4 Secondly, the same opinion is principally proved. For the light of glory affords that concurrence which the object ought to afford with respect to the vision of God: therefore it concurs after the manner of an intelligible species. The consequence is certain. The antecedent, however, is proved. Because the activity of the object is only to determine the intellect to the species of the act by concurring with it at the same time: and yet the light affords all of this, because it elevates the intellect to see definitively one single object, namely the divine essence, so that by its force creatures cannot be known in their own genus, but only in the previously known divine essence: therefore, etc.

Nor does it matter if you object, with Suárez, tomo 1, in 3. part., disp. 29, sect. 4, that the light of glory does not determine the intellect to see the divine essence alone, but can be the principle of seeing God and certain creatures in their own genus, such as the light of glory itself and other lights like to it, as well as sanctifying grace, from which it arises, and other supernatural qualities which are compared with it after the manner of a property: and so it acts with some determination no less than other indifferent lights with respect to several objects to be perceived, and consequently needs an intelligible species, by which it may be determined to the vision of this object rather than of another, namely the divine essence rather than any other.

So then, this makes no difference. Because the light of glory is a participation of the divine intellect, insofar as it is in itself: therefore, just as the intellect of God has the divine essence as its adequate object, and therefore beholds only that, and what is contained in it insofar as it is inspectable in it, so the same must be said, with proportion, of the light of glory.

§ II. The Common Opinion, and Its Foundation.

5 Nevertheless it must be said that the light of glory does not concur with the vision after the manner of an impressed species, and thus neither as though it gave the virtue required on the part of the object. This is the opinion of St. Thomas in several places, which we have brought forward and expounded above in art. 2, dub. 2: and it is so common among theologians that no one except Gabriel Vazquez denies it. And it seems to be sufficiently indicated in the definition of the Council of Vienne, which is found in the Clementina, ad nostrum de Haereticis, where, against the Begards and Beguins, it is defined that the soul needs the light of glory elevating it to see God: therefore such a light will be required for this, so as to add to the intellect the virtue required on its own part, but not that which is required on the part of the intellect. The consequence is evident.

Because the elevation of a power must hold itself on the part of the elevated power, and the need of elevation signifies a defect, that is, the virtue required on the part of that which is elevated.

6 Next, the assertion is proved by the reason which St. Thomas brings in art. 2 of this question, which can be proposed in this form. Because the light of glory completes the intellect by giving it that activity which is required on the part of the power with respect to a clear vision of God: therefore it does not give that which is required on the part of the object: and consequently it does not have the notion of an intelligible species with respect to the vision. This last consequence follows sufficiently from the preceding. The former, however, is clearly deduced from the antecedent. For the activity on the part of the power must — at least in the reality of the thing — be distinguished from the activity on the part of the object, because the activity of the power is after the manner of the activity of the female: the activity of the object, however, after the manner of the activity of the male, according to the saying of Augustine, commonly received, namely that knowledge is produced from the object and the power. The antecedent, however, is proved. First, because the intellect in itself does not have a virtue proportionate, as to the quantity of virtue, with respect to a clear vision of God, because God, as clearly seen, is an object exceeding the intellect insofar as it is taken in itself, as we said in art. 1: and therefore it requires on its own part some virtue elevating it, by which the activity that is required on the part of that same intellect becomes efficacious and is completed with respect to the aforesaid vision. Then also: because with respect to the other supernatural acts, for example that of faith, besides the species representing the object, a light is required on the part of the intellect holding itself to it, by which the intellect may be strengthened and elevated to believe, because it itself has a virtue disproportionate and of a lower order with respect to such an act: therefore, since vision is no less supernatural than the act of faith, some light will also be required for it, to strengthen and elevate the intellect on its own part with respect to the aforesaid vision.

7 It is confirmed and explained. For the intellect, in order to elicit acts of the natural order, requires both a virtue proportionate to the aforesaid acts and also an intelligible species distinct from this virtue and representing the objects about which it is employed: therefore, even in supernatural acts, besides the impressed species, a virtue proportionate on the part of the power with respect to such acts will be required: and consequently, either it must be asserted that the natural virtue of the intellect is of itself sufficient, proportionate, and complete on its own part with respect to those acts, which is sufficiently absurd, or it must be affirmed that it needs a supernatural virtue, which we call the light of glory, by which it becomes on its own part potent and efficacious for eliciting them.

§ III. The First Solution, and Its Refutation.

8 You will first object to all of these that the light of glory is the most perfect of all lights, and therefore it is no wonder if it is virtually multiple, and that in it are united what in inferior things is scattered, and consequently that it has at once the notion of light and of species: and thus the very same thing, insofar as it is light, strengthens the power, and disposes it toward itself insofar as it is species. Indeed, you will add, with Vazquez, in support of the greater solution of that which is brought from the acts of faith, that there is a disparity between the act of faith and the vision. For in the act of faith there is something that can correspond to light, namely judgment and assent; and something that corresponds to species, namely apprehension: because this act is virtually multiple. But a clear vision of God is the most simple act, and so there is nothing in it that could correspond to an intelligible species distinct from the light of glory.

9 But against the first [objection] lies the fact that, whenever principal agents are really distinguished in esse entitativo, and one influences after the manner of the male and another after the manner of the female, the proximate principles of action cannot be the same in the natural order and entitatively: but the beatific vision arises from the created intellect, as from an intellectual power, or as from an intellectual female, and from God, as from the object, or as from the male, as from principal agents distinguished in esse naturali and entitativo: therefore, since the light of glory is the proximate power of action with respect to the intellect, the very same light entitatively cannot be the proximate principle of action with respect to God as object, and consequently neither can its species: this last consequence is evident. Because the species is the proximate power of the object with respect to its own cognition. The first consequence, however, is evident in itself. The minor, however, is also evident. Because (according to that common saying drawn from Augustine) knowledge is produced from the object and the power, and so one of them, namely the object, has itself after the manner of the male, and the other, namely the intellectual power, after the manner of the female, as the Metaphysicians commonly teach; and not in any way whatever, but as from principal agents distinguished in esse naturali and entitativo: as is evident from itself. And finally the major is clear. Because those things which are now distinguished and concur through concurrences of so diverse a notion cannot concur through one and the same proximate power, which would indeed be the same in esse reali and entitativo: as is seen in the male and the female concurring for the generation, for example, of a human being.

And likewise against what Vazquez adds, it is an obstacle that there is also assent and judgment in the vision of God, as is evident from itself: therefore also there is apprehension, which is essentially presupposed by judgment, at least on the part of our mode of conceiving. It is added that the acts of faith and prophecy are sufficiently simple and indivisible, no less than the act of the vision of God, because they tend toward their object under one single indivisible notion, namely that of divine revelation: therefore the same reasoning holds in every respect both in the vision of God and in the act of faith, as to whether the intellect needs or does not need species distinct from the light: especially since, just as the light of glory determines to one single object in number, so the prophetic light can also determine to that, as is evident from itself and from what the Thomists teach on this point.

§ IV. Vazquez's Other Evasion, and Its Exclusion.

10 You will object, secondly, from the doctrine of Vazq., disp. 43, cap. 4, 5 and 6, that although the intellect and the light concur with the vision of God, insofar as it is in itself, under the notion of a species, they nevertheless concur divisively. For the intellect concurs with it neither of itself nor by an added power, except according to the general notion of intellection, according to which notion the vision is something natural: and so it attains only in the highest degree identically and materially the peculiar notion of it itself, that is, it attains only the general notion of intellection found there, which is at most otherwise identified with its specific and supernatural notion. But the light of glory produces it according to its own specific notion, according to which the vision of God is supernatural, so that it too attains the general notion of intellection only in a proportionate manner. Hence it is no wonder that the intellect from the force of its nature has sufficient proportion and efficacy on its part to elicit it without any other thing, according to the notion already stated, namely which is of the natural order: and consequently, it is no wonder either that the light of glory does not concur as something holding itself on the part of the intellect, as though giving it the virtue required on its own part, but holds itself only on the part of the object after the manner of its species: although it stands with this, that in order that the intellect in reality attain this common degree, it must be united with the activity of the object, to whom the aforesaid vision is given according to the specific degree according to which it is supernatural, and must constitute with it one single complete and total cause.

To that [objection], however, about the supernatural acts of the way, for example of faith, an answer can be given from the doctrine of the same author, that there is a disparity between the act of faith and the vision of God. The proposition of the object, which is required for the act of faith by means of species, is obscure, and so it indeed requires the intellect as regards the species of apprehension, but not as regards the species of assent. Hence a habit or supernatural assistance is required on the part of the power, so that it itself may be sufficiently determined. But the proposition of the object by means of the light of glory with respect to the vision of God is clear and evident, and so the power is of itself sufficiently proportioned so that, the light of glory concurring after the manner of a species, it may apprehend and judge of such an object, namely of the divine essence, insofar as it is in itself.

11 However, this solution contains many falsehoods. For in the first place it is false that, although the vision proceeds according to its whole entity from the intellect and from the light, insofar as the latter has the notion of an intelligible species, nevertheless it is attained only by the intellect as regards the general notion of intellection, and by the light as regards its own specific notion. First, because when intellection, insofar as it is the vision of God by essence, is a vital operation with that peculiar vitality proper to the aforesaid vision, it cannot but arise from a vital principle, and consequently from the intellectual power, insofar as it has vitality. From this, too, it follows that the light of glory holds itself on the part of the intellect and of its vitality: because the vitality of the intellect alone, not elevated through the vitality of the light of glory, which imparts the quantity of vital virtue for seeing God, cannot give the aforesaid vitality. Then also: because when the vision of God, as such, is contained within the range of the adequate act of the intellect, that is, of intellection, so that thus it is necessary that the intellect attain also the ultimate and atomical notion of that same vision: because any power attains the atomical notions of inadequate acts which are contained under its adequate act. From this, too, it is collected that the light is required on the part of that same intellect in order that it elicit the aforesaid vision as regards its atomical notion: indeed, although it has of itself an essential commensurability for eliciting that vision, it does not have the quantity of powers, or that by which it is immediately about to influx.

It is confirmed. Because the intellect of the blessed is not only called understanding but also called seeing God, insofar as he is in himself: therefore the intellect will elicit the same vision as regards its ultimate and specific notion of the vision of God, insofar as it is in itself. The consequence is evident. First, because to see God is the same as to elicit that vision, because the vision, according to its atomical notion, is a vital action, which must necessarily be elicited by a vital power seeing through it: then also, because nothing can be denominated from some action according to some formal notion of itself considered in esse actionis, unless that action, so taken, depends upon it: therefore, if the vision, as regards the notion of the vision of God insofar as it is in itself, does not depend upon the intellect, and consequently is not made by it, the intellect cannot be denominated as seeing God, insofar as he is in himself, through it.

12 Next, it is false that that notion of intellection which is found included in the beatific vision is something natural. First, because when in that vision the notion of intellection and of such intellection are not distinguished, apart from the intellect, but are one and the same most simple entity, it follows that either the whole of it, or none of it, must be of the supernatural and divine order. Then also: because it is one thing to speak of intellection as such, insofar as it has the notion of a genus, and is abstracted by the intellect from all intellections distinct in species; and another thing to speak of that notion of intellection which is contracted to this species of intellection, namely the vision of God by essence. Just as it is one thing to speak of substance as such, insofar as it is the genus of both material and immaterial substance; and another thing to speak of that which is contracted to immaterial substance. Therefore, just as the notion of substance as such need not be immaterial, but abstracts from the material and the immaterial; nevertheless that which is contracted to immaterial substance must be immaterial, and not material: so, although the notion of intellection as such is not supernatural, but abstracts from the natural and the supernatural, nevertheless the intellection contracted to the vision of God by essence, which is a supernatural being, cannot fail to be supernatural, so that it is not at the same time natural.

13 Furthermore, it is false also that the activity corresponding to the intellect from its nature has sufficient proportion and efficacy on its part so that it can concur with the light of glory, as with the species of the divine essence, toward the vision of it. For with respect to the activity which the intellect has from its nature, the activity of the aforesaid species, namely of the light, cannot be connatural; otherwise the aforesaid species would be of the same order as the intellect and its activity: and consequently it would be of the natural order, since what is connatural to an activity of the natural order cannot be supernatural, as we have shown above: therefore, the activity of the aforesaid light, insofar as it has the notion of a species, will be supernatural with respect to the intellect, as is evident from itself: and consequently the native activity of that same intellect will not be of itself sufficient to influx together with the light, as with a species. The consequence is evident. Because otherwise the aforesaid activity of the intellect would not be natural but supernatural: since from its own nature it would be sufficient and proportionate with respect to concurring with a species of the supernatural order; and consequently it would have connaturality with it, which indeed cannot befit a natural activity.

14 It is confirmed. For either the native activity of the intellect is sufficient to concur with the light, as with a species, without anything being superadded to it on its own part, or it is not? If the first, therefore it is altogether proportionate with respect to it, and consequently such a species is owed to it: which indeed cannot be consistent with the fact that such an activity is of the natural order. If, however, the second, therefore beyond the intelligible species something must be added to it on its own part, on account of which it may be proportionate with such an object: and consequently by its own force it will not be proportionate to concur together with the species of it. And since what is added to it cannot be anything other than intellectual light of the divine order holding itself on the part of that same intellect, it follows that such a light does not have the notion of an intelligible species with respect to the vision of the divine essence, insofar as it is in itself.

15 Finally, against that distinction which he assigns between the supernatural acts of the way, for example of faith, and the vision of heaven, there is an obstacle. First, because therefore, for the assent of faith, supernatural light of faith is required on the part of the intellect holding itself to it, because that assent and the formal object of it are something supernatural: and so, if once such an assent were not supernatural, there would be no reason why the light of faith should be required as something holding itself on the part of the intellect: therefore, since the same supernaturality is found in the beatific vision and in its object, there will necessarily be given beyond the species of that same object a light holding itself on the part of the power, so that it may concur together with the aforesaid species, namely the divine essence. Then also: because if once it is asserted that the power is of itself sufficiently proportionate with respect to performing that which is required on its own part for the assent of faith, then that proposition of the object of faith by intelligible species would be sufficient to remove the indeterminacy which it has with respect to the species of assent. For just as in natural things, for the intellect to be determined as regards the species of the act with respect to probable assent, the proposition of the object by intelligible species suffices, assuming however sufficient efficacy and proportion on the part of the intellect; so too with respect to the species of the assent of faith the same would suffice, if once the intellect has of itself sufficient efficacy: especially because the species serving faith are modified in a certain supernatural manner, on account of which they can serve with respect to the species of supernatural assent, as the more approved Thomists are said to testify.

§ V. The Argument of the First Opinion Is Met.

16 To the first [argument], on behalf of the first opinion and of its confirmation, it is well answered there. And the proof to the contrary is evident from what has been said, that the beatific vision, as well as any other intellection, is of such a nature as to require that it arise from some proximate and inadequate principle, as from a female of the intelligible order, and also from another inadequate principle, as from a male of the same order. Hence also corporeal vision, as regards its atomical notion, must arise both from an intrinsic and innate light of sight, because it is proportionate with that vision; and also from the object by a mean species: otherwise, the proportion being preserved, the natural generation of a son, and the son himself, must proceed from one proximate principle, as from a female, and from another, as from a male.

Nor does the contrary of this conclusion gain support from the proof there adduced. For the species on the one part, and the intellect together with the light of glory on the other, do not constitute several proximate total and adequate causes; but one and the same adequate cause of intellection coalescing from them, influencing nevertheless in a diverse manner in its own order, as may be seen in the example of a son in natural things. For, as we said, cognition is of such a nature that it not only requires a virtue in the power itself, as in a female fit and proportionate to give birth in the intelligible order, and consequently with respect to a supernatural birth presupposes a supernatural virtue holding itself on its part; but it also necessarily requires that one similar to the object be presupposed, because cognition takes place through the attraction of the object to the intellect: and consequently the aforesaid power must precede intellection, as actuated and fecundated through the object, or through the likeness and species of it.

17 We have said that the intellect with the light of glory on the one part, and the species on the other, etc. Because the light of glory does not constitute one cause even partial distinct from the intellect, such that the intellect also constitute another, but they constitute one single female in the intelligible order, which is the single inadequate principle together with the object with respect to intelligibly giving birth. For any cause, however partial it may be, signifies both an essential commensurability and also the quantity of virtue and partial efficacy with respect to that action with respect to which it is said to be partial. But the intellect taken by itself signifies only an essential commensurability for seeing God, insofar as he is in himself; the light, however, signifies the quantity of virtue and efficacy with respect to such a vision: and thus each of the two constitutes one and an indivisible cause, even inadequate, which, although in the reality of the thing it may be divisible and composite, yet in esse causae so acts by influxing as if the light of glory and the intellect were identified.

18 From which, to the second [objection], it will be answered that the most powerful reason for which the intellect, with respect to a clear vision of God (the same is to be said of any cognition of any knowing power), needs the activity of the object is not that the intellect be determined by it to the species of the act; but because (as we were saying) the proper notion of cognition, which is a certain intentional birth and a certain vital generation, requires that at least as regards its atomical notion, it proceed from the object after the manner of the male, and from the power after the manner of the female; or (which comes to the same thing) because the proper actual notion of cognition, according to its atomical notion, consists in the actual and vital union of the intellect with its own proper object: and for this the knowing power alone is not sufficient, unless the object also concurs in its own way, not only after the manner of a terminus, but also on the part of a principle. Just as, because willing has from its own nature an inclination following the form apprehended, it is concluded from this that the will is not sufficient for the production of that form, unless the object also, as proposed by the intellect, influx in some way on the part of a principle. Hence St. Thomas gave this reason in the second article of this question, saying: For both sensible and intellectual vision two things are required, namely a seeing power and the union of the seen thing with the sight: for vision does not occur in act unless through this, that the seen thing is in some way in the seer.

19 It makes no difference that it is commonly said that beyond the activity of the power proportionate in its own order to intellection, the activity of the object is required, so that by it the power may be determined to the species of the act. So then, this makes no difference: because such a reason is not assigned as the most powerful, but as more universal and better known with respect to all the cognitions which we have naturally, because no natural knowing power is so determined to a cognition of the same order that it does not have an indeterminacy with respect to several objects, at least material or inadequate ones, toward which it can be terminated, so that it is not bound to attain all of them in some formal object, which previously known.

Add, moreover, and it is further explained, that in the knowing powers a twofold determination is to be distinguished: one holding itself on the part of the power, and another, however, holding itself on the part of the object. Of these, the former is placed in the connaturality of the power with the formal object: and therefore of itself, and from its own notion, it brings a determination of the power toward the aforesaid object, although it can incidentally import a determination toward a material object, or (which comes to the same as the present point) toward this particular object considered in esse entis, because within the range of the formal object no more than a single material object is found. The latter, however, consists in the unity of the material object: whence of itself, and from its own proper conditions, it imports a determination toward a single material object, so that it cannot of itself be carried at first toward another. Therefore, since the determination which the intellect has from the light of glory is of the former, not of the latter, condition, room is therefore left for it to be determined by the latter determination, holding itself on the part of the object: as if God should pour into the will a single habit incidentally, and in the way described inclining it toward a single material object; nevertheless it would still act with a determination proceeding from the object, as proposed to it through the intellect.