Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

The light of glory is required for the several and diverse offices, in relation to the vision of God and of the divine essence, that are to be received under the form of an intelligible species; and so, in order that we may explain those things from their very roots, we have set up the present disputation.

Although the determination of this Difficulty consists of what was said in art. 2, dub. 1, nevertheless, because Gabriel Vazquez advances certain things worthy of some solution, and others which call for a special refutation, from which the opinion of St. Thomas will shine out more clearly, it has been thought fit to raise this Difficulty.

§ I. A Recent and Singular Opinion.

1 The first opinion asserts that the light of glory concurs with the vision after the manner of an intelligible species, and thus as though it gave the virtue required on the part of the object, but not that which is required on the part of the power. Thus Vazquez, in the above disp. 43, cap. 3 and 7.

It is proved, first. The light of glory does not flow into the beatific vision after the manner of an active intellectual virtue which holds itself on the part of the intellect, and which together with it constitutes one single complete principle of understanding distinct from the object: therefore, either it does not flow into the vision at all, or it flows in only after the manner of an intelligible species standing in for the object, namely the divine essence. The consequence is evident. Because whatever is the cause of the vision together with the intellect must be the cause of it only either after the manner of an intellectual virtue holding itself on the part of that intellect, or after the manner of an intelligible species standing in for the object: and so, if the light of glory is not a cause in the former way, then either it will not be a cause of it, or it will be a cause in the latter way, namely after the manner of an impressed species. The antecedent, however, is proved by Vazquez. Because the intellect on its own part touches the vision only according to the general notion of intellection, and rests there: but for this concurrence nothing is required on the part of the intellect save its own native power, since nothing is more proportioned for eliciting an intellection according to the general notion of intellection and resting there, than the intellect: therefore the light of glory will not flow in, nor will it be required for the beatific vision after the manner of an intellectual virtue required on the part of the intellect.

2 It is confirmed. For if the light of glory does not flow in after the manner of a species, it cannot cause the vision as regards the specific degree of the intellection of such an object: since this degree must be produced by the object, or by the species, insofar as it belongs to the species, or to the object, to modify and determine the intellect to the cognition of that same object; nor would it cause that vision as regards its clarity, on account of which it is called intuitive and quidditative, because the divine essence would then concur after the manner of a species, if once the light does not stand in for it, and it, thus united, moves of itself — as is clear from itself — to its quidditative and clear vision: therefore the light would be superfluous. The consequence is evident. Because in the beatific vision there are only these three reasons, namely that it be an intellection, that it be of such an object, and finally that it be quidditative and clear: therefore, if for the former the intellect taken in itself suffices, as we have already shown, and if for the two latter the light cannot concur, once it does not have the notion of an intelligible species, it follows from this that its concurrence is superfluous for such a vision. Nor can it be said that the vision arises as much from the intellect, as elevated by the light of glory, as from the divine essence itself, insofar as the latter has the notion of the object: so that, according to all the reasons enumerated, it proceeds from each of the two: because they do not concur in any way whatever, but as subordinate to one another.

3 Now against this is the fact that several proximate and proper causes cannot concur toward the same effect, even if they are subordinate to one another, unless there corresponds in the effect to each cause some peculiar reason, for the sake of which its influx is required: but this is not found in the present case, as has been proved: therefore, etc. The minor with its consequent is sufficiently evident. The major, however, is also evident. Because if no peculiar reason corresponds in the effect, demanding a new cause, its concurrence would be employed in vain: since the influx of a new cause can be required only on account of some peculiar reason found in the effect, which cannot be attained by a single cause.

4 Secondly, the same opinion is principally proved. For the light of glory affords that concurrence which the object ought to afford with respect to the vision of God: therefore it concurs after the manner of an intelligible species. The consequence is certain. The antecedent, however, is proved. Because the activity of the object is only to determine the intellect to the species of the act by concurring with it at the same time: and yet the light affords all of this, because it elevates the intellect to see definitively one single object, namely the divine essence, so that by its force creatures cannot be known in their own genus, but only in the previously known divine essence: therefore, etc.

Nor does it matter if you object, with Suárez, tomo 1, in 3. part., disp. 29, sect. 4, that the light of glory does not determine the intellect to see the divine essence alone, but can be the principle of seeing God and certain creatures in their own genus, such as the light of glory itself and other lights like to it, as well as sanctifying grace, from which it arises, and other supernatural qualities which are compared with it after the manner of a property: and so it acts with some determination no less than other indifferent lights with respect to several objects to be perceived, and consequently needs an intelligible species, by which it may be determined to the vision of this object rather than of another, namely the divine essence rather than any other.

So then, this makes no difference. Because the light of glory is a participation of the divine intellect, insofar as it is in itself: therefore, just as the intellect of God has the divine essence as its adequate object, and therefore beholds only that, and what is contained in it insofar as it is inspectable in it, so the same must be said, with proportion, of the light of glory.

§ II. The Common Opinion, and Its Foundation.

5 Nevertheless it must be said that the light of glory does not concur with the vision after the manner of an impressed species, and thus neither as though it gave the virtue required on the part of the object. This is the opinion of St. Thomas in several places, which we have brought forward and expounded above in art. 2, dub. 2: and it is so common among theologians that no one except Gabriel Vazquez denies it. And it seems to be sufficiently indicated in the definition of the Council of Vienne, which is found in the Clementina, ad nostrum de Haereticis, where, against the Begards and Beguins, it is defined that the soul needs the light of glory elevating it to see God: therefore such a light will be required for this, so as to add to the intellect the virtue required on its own part, but not that which is required on the part of the intellect. The consequence is evident.

Because the elevation of a power must hold itself on the part of the elevated power, and the need of elevation signifies a defect, that is, the virtue required on the part of that which is elevated.

6 Next, the assertion is proved by the reason which St. Thomas brings in art. 2 of this question, which can be proposed in this form. Because the light of glory completes the intellect by giving it that activity which is required on the part of the power with respect to a clear vision of God: therefore it does not give that which is required on the part of the object: and consequently it does not have the notion of an intelligible species with respect to the vision. This last consequence follows sufficiently from the preceding. The former, however, is clearly deduced from the antecedent. For the activity on the part of the power must — at least in the reality of the thing — be distinguished from the activity on the part of the object, because the activity of the power is after the manner of the activity of the female: the activity of the object, however, after the manner of the activity of the male, according to the saying of Augustine, commonly received, namely that knowledge is produced from the object and the power. The antecedent, however, is proved. First, because the intellect in itself does not have a virtue proportionate, as to the quantity of virtue, with respect to a clear vision of God, because God, as clearly seen, is an object exceeding the intellect insofar as it is taken in itself, as we said in art. 1: and therefore it requires on its own part some virtue elevating it, by which the activity that is required on the part of that same intellect becomes efficacious and is completed with respect to the aforesaid vision. Then also: because with respect to the other supernatural acts, for example that of faith, besides the species representing the object, a light is required on the part of the intellect holding itself to it, by which the intellect may be strengthened and elevated to believe, because it itself has a virtue disproportionate and of a lower order with respect to such an act: therefore, since vision is no less supernatural than the act of faith, some light will also be required for it, to strengthen and elevate the intellect on its own part with respect to the aforesaid vision.

7 It is confirmed and explained. For the intellect, in order to elicit acts of the natural order, requires both a virtue proportionate to the aforesaid acts and also an intelligible species distinct from this virtue and representing the objects about which it is employed: therefore, even in supernatural acts, besides the impressed species, a virtue proportionate on the part of the power with respect to such acts will be required: and consequently, either it must be asserted that the natural virtue of the intellect is of itself sufficient, proportionate, and complete on its own part with respect to those acts, which is sufficiently absurd, or it must be affirmed that it needs a supernatural virtue, which we call the light of glory, by which it becomes on its own part potent and efficacious for eliciting them.

§ III. The First Solution, and Its Refutation.

8 You will first object to all of these that the light of glory is the most perfect of all lights, and therefore it is no wonder if it is virtually multiple, and that in it are united what in inferior things is scattered, and consequently that it has at once the notion of light and of species: and thus the very same thing, insofar as it is light, strengthens the power, and disposes it toward itself insofar as it is species. Indeed, you will add, with Vazquez, in support of the greater solution of that which is brought from the acts of faith, that there is a disparity between the act of faith and the vision. For in the act of faith there is something that can correspond to light, namely judgment and assent; and something that corresponds to species, namely apprehension: because this act is virtually multiple. But a clear vision of God is the most simple act, and so there is nothing in it that could correspond to an intelligible species distinct from the light of glory.

9 But against the first [objection] lies the fact that, whenever principal agents are really distinguished in esse entitativo, and one influences after the manner of the male and another after the manner of the female, the proximate principles of action cannot be the same in the natural order and entitatively: but the beatific vision arises from the created intellect, as from an intellectual power, or as from an intellectual female, and from God, as from the object, or as from the male, as from principal agents distinguished in esse naturali and entitativo: therefore, since the light of glory is the proximate power of action with respect to the intellect, the very same light entitatively cannot be the proximate principle of action with respect to God as object, and consequently neither can its species: this last consequence is evident. Because the species is the proximate power of the object with respect to its own cognition. The first consequence, however, is evident in itself. The minor, however, is also evident. Because (according to that common saying drawn from Augustine) knowledge is produced from the object and the power, and so one of them, namely the object, has itself after the manner of the male, and the other, namely the intellectual power, after the manner of the female, as the Metaphysicians commonly teach; and not in any way whatever, but as from principal agents distinguished in esse naturali and entitativo: as is evident from itself. And finally the major is clear. Because those things which are now distinguished and concur through concurrences of so diverse a notion cannot concur through one and the same proximate power, which would indeed be the same in esse reali and entitativo: as is seen in the male and the female concurring for the generation, for example, of a human being.

And likewise against what Vazquez adds, it is an obstacle that there is also assent and judgment in the vision of God, as is evident from itself: therefore also there is apprehension, which is essentially presupposed by judgment, at least on the part of our mode of conceiving. It is added that the acts of faith and prophecy are sufficiently simple and indivisible, no less than the act of the vision of God, because they tend toward their object under one single indivisible notion, namely that of divine revelation: therefore the same reasoning holds in every respect both in the vision of God and in the act of faith, as to whether the intellect needs or does not need species distinct from the light: especially since, just as the light of glory determines to one single object in number, so the prophetic light can also determine to that, as is evident from itself and from what the Thomists teach on this point.

§ IV. Vazquez's Other Evasion, and Its Exclusion.

10 You will object, secondly, from the doctrine of Vazq., disp. 43, cap. 4, 5 and 6, that although the intellect and the light concur with the vision of God, insofar as it is in itself, under the notion of a species, they nevertheless concur divisively. For the intellect concurs with it neither of itself nor by an added power, except according to the general notion of intellection, according to which notion the vision is something natural: and so it attains only in the highest degree identically and materially the peculiar notion of it itself, that is, it attains only the general notion of intellection found there, which is at most otherwise identified with its specific and supernatural notion. But the light of glory produces it according to its own specific notion, according to which the vision of God is supernatural, so that it too attains the general notion of intellection only in a proportionate manner. Hence it is no wonder that the intellect from the force of its nature has sufficient proportion and efficacy on its part to elicit it without any other thing, according to the notion already stated, namely which is of the natural order: and consequently, it is no wonder either that the light of glory does not concur as something holding itself on the part of the intellect, as though giving it the virtue required on its own part, but holds itself only on the part of the object after the manner of its species: although it stands with this, that in order that the intellect in reality attain this common degree, it must be united with the activity of the object, to whom the aforesaid vision is given according to the specific degree according to which it is supernatural, and must constitute with it one single complete and total cause.

To that [objection], however, about the supernatural acts of the way, for example of faith, an answer can be given from the doctrine of the same author, that there is a disparity between the act of faith and the vision of God. The proposition of the object, which is required for the act of faith by means of species, is obscure, and so it indeed requires the intellect as regards the species of apprehension, but not as regards the species of assent. Hence a habit or supernatural assistance is required on the part of the power, so that it itself may be sufficiently determined. But the proposition of the object by means of the light of glory with respect to the vision of God is clear and evident, and so the power is of itself sufficiently proportioned so that, the light of glory concurring after the manner of a species, it may apprehend and judge of such an object, namely of the divine essence, insofar as it is in itself.

11 However, this solution contains many falsehoods. For in the first place it is false that, although the vision proceeds according to its whole entity from the intellect and from the light, insofar as the latter has the notion of an intelligible species, nevertheless it is attained only by the intellect as regards the general notion of intellection, and by the light as regards its own specific notion. First, because when intellection, insofar as it is the vision of God by essence, is a vital operation with that peculiar vitality proper to the aforesaid vision, it cannot but arise from a vital principle, and consequently from the intellectual power, insofar as it has vitality. From this, too, it follows that the light of glory holds itself on the part of the intellect and of its vitality: because the vitality of the intellect alone, not elevated through the vitality of the light of glory, which imparts the quantity of vital virtue for seeing God, cannot give the aforesaid vitality. Then also: because when the vision of God, as such, is contained within the range of the adequate act of the intellect, that is, of intellection, so that thus it is necessary that the intellect attain also the ultimate and atomical notion of that same vision: because any power attains the atomical notions of inadequate acts which are contained under its adequate act. From this, too, it is collected that the light is required on the part of that same intellect in order that it elicit the aforesaid vision as regards its atomical notion: indeed, although it has of itself an essential commensurability for eliciting that vision, it does not have the quantity of powers, or that by which it is immediately about to influx.

It is confirmed. Because the intellect of the blessed is not only called understanding but also called seeing God, insofar as he is in himself: therefore the intellect will elicit the same vision as regards its ultimate and specific notion of the vision of God, insofar as it is in itself. The consequence is evident. First, because to see God is the same as to elicit that vision, because the vision, according to its atomical notion, is a vital action, which must necessarily be elicited by a vital power seeing through it: then also, because nothing can be denominated from some action according to some formal notion of itself considered in esse actionis, unless that action, so taken, depends upon it: therefore, if the vision, as regards the notion of the vision of God insofar as it is in itself, does not depend upon the intellect, and consequently is not made by it, the intellect cannot be denominated as seeing God, insofar as he is in himself, through it.

12 Next, it is false that that notion of intellection which is found included in the beatific vision is something natural. First, because when in that vision the notion of intellection and of such intellection are not distinguished, apart from the intellect, but are one and the same most simple entity, it follows that either the whole of it, or none of it, must be of the supernatural and divine order. Then also: because it is one thing to speak of intellection as such, insofar as it has the notion of a genus, and is abstracted by the intellect from all intellections distinct in species; and another thing to speak of that notion of intellection which is contracted to this species of intellection, namely the vision of God by essence. Just as it is one thing to speak of substance as such, insofar as it is the genus of both material and immaterial substance; and another thing to speak of that which is contracted to immaterial substance. Therefore, just as the notion of substance as such need not be immaterial, but abstracts from the material and the immaterial; nevertheless that which is contracted to immaterial substance must be immaterial, and not material: so, although the notion of intellection as such is not supernatural, but abstracts from the natural and the supernatural, nevertheless the intellection contracted to the vision of God by essence, which is a supernatural being, cannot fail to be supernatural, so that it is not at the same time natural.

13 Furthermore, it is false also that the activity corresponding to the intellect from its nature has sufficient proportion and efficacy on its part so that it can concur with the light of glory, as with the species of the divine essence, toward the vision of it. For with respect to the activity which the intellect has from its nature, the activity of the aforesaid species, namely of the light, cannot be connatural; otherwise the aforesaid species would be of the same order as the intellect and its activity: and consequently it would be of the natural order, since what is connatural to an activity of the natural order cannot be supernatural, as we have shown above: therefore, the activity of the aforesaid light, insofar as it has the notion of a species, will be supernatural with respect to the intellect, as is evident from itself: and consequently the native activity of that same intellect will not be of itself sufficient to influx together with the light, as with a species. The consequence is evident. Because otherwise the aforesaid activity of the intellect would not be natural but supernatural: since from its own nature it would be sufficient and proportionate with respect to concurring with a species of the supernatural order; and consequently it would have connaturality with it, which indeed cannot befit a natural activity.

14 It is confirmed. For either the native activity of the intellect is sufficient to concur with the light, as with a species, without anything being superadded to it on its own part, or it is not? If the first, therefore it is altogether proportionate with respect to it, and consequently such a species is owed to it: which indeed cannot be consistent with the fact that such an activity is of the natural order. If, however, the second, therefore beyond the intelligible species something must be added to it on its own part, on account of which it may be proportionate with such an object: and consequently by its own force it will not be proportionate to concur together with the species of it. And since what is added to it cannot be anything other than intellectual light of the divine order holding itself on the part of that same intellect, it follows that such a light does not have the notion of an intelligible species with respect to the vision of the divine essence, insofar as it is in itself.

15 Finally, against that distinction which he assigns between the supernatural acts of the way, for example of faith, and the vision of heaven, there is an obstacle. First, because therefore, for the assent of faith, supernatural light of faith is required on the part of the intellect holding itself to it, because that assent and the formal object of it are something supernatural: and so, if once such an assent were not supernatural, there would be no reason why the light of faith should be required as something holding itself on the part of the intellect: therefore, since the same supernaturality is found in the beatific vision and in its object, there will necessarily be given beyond the species of that same object a light holding itself on the part of the power, so that it may concur together with the aforesaid species, namely the divine essence. Then also: because if once it is asserted that the power is of itself sufficiently proportionate with respect to performing that which is required on its own part for the assent of faith, then that proposition of the object of faith by intelligible species would be sufficient to remove the indeterminacy which it has with respect to the species of assent. For just as in natural things, for the intellect to be determined as regards the species of the act with respect to probable assent, the proposition of the object by intelligible species suffices, assuming however sufficient efficacy and proportion on the part of the intellect; so too with respect to the species of the assent of faith the same would suffice, if once the intellect has of itself sufficient efficacy: especially because the species serving faith are modified in a certain supernatural manner, on account of which they can serve with respect to the species of supernatural assent, as the more approved Thomists are said to testify.

§ V. The Argument of the First Opinion Is Met.

16 To the first [argument], on behalf of the first opinion and of its confirmation, it is well answered there. And the proof to the contrary is evident from what has been said, that the beatific vision, as well as any other intellection, is of such a nature as to require that it arise from some proximate and inadequate principle, as from a female of the intelligible order, and also from another inadequate principle, as from a male of the same order. Hence also corporeal vision, as regards its atomical notion, must arise both from an intrinsic and innate light of sight, because it is proportionate with that vision; and also from the object by a mean species: otherwise, the proportion being preserved, the natural generation of a son, and the son himself, must proceed from one proximate principle, as from a female, and from another, as from a male.

Nor does the contrary of this conclusion gain support from the proof there adduced. For the species on the one part, and the intellect together with the light of glory on the other, do not constitute several proximate total and adequate causes; but one and the same adequate cause of intellection coalescing from them, influencing nevertheless in a diverse manner in its own order, as may be seen in the example of a son in natural things. For, as we said, cognition is of such a nature that it not only requires a virtue in the power itself, as in a female fit and proportionate to give birth in the intelligible order, and consequently with respect to a supernatural birth presupposes a supernatural virtue holding itself on its part; but it also necessarily requires that one similar to the object be presupposed, because cognition takes place through the attraction of the object to the intellect: and consequently the aforesaid power must precede intellection, as actuated and fecundated through the object, or through the likeness and species of it.

17 We have said that the intellect with the light of glory on the one part, and the species on the other, etc. Because the light of glory does not constitute one cause even partial distinct from the intellect, such that the intellect also constitute another, but they constitute one single female in the intelligible order, which is the single inadequate principle together with the object with respect to intelligibly giving birth. For any cause, however partial it may be, signifies both an essential commensurability and also the quantity of virtue and partial efficacy with respect to that action with respect to which it is said to be partial. But the intellect taken by itself signifies only an essential commensurability for seeing God, insofar as he is in himself; the light, however, signifies the quantity of virtue and efficacy with respect to such a vision: and thus each of the two constitutes one and an indivisible cause, even inadequate, which, although in the reality of the thing it may be divisible and composite, yet in esse causae so acts by influxing as if the light of glory and the intellect were identified.

18 From which, to the second [objection], it will be answered that the most powerful reason for which the intellect, with respect to a clear vision of God (the same is to be said of any cognition of any knowing power), needs the activity of the object is not that the intellect be determined by it to the species of the act; but because (as we were saying) the proper notion of cognition, which is a certain intentional birth and a certain vital generation, requires that at least as regards its atomical notion, it proceed from the object after the manner of the male, and from the power after the manner of the female; or (which comes to the same thing) because the proper actual notion of cognition, according to its atomical notion, consists in the actual and vital union of the intellect with its own proper object: and for this the knowing power alone is not sufficient, unless the object also concurs in its own way, not only after the manner of a terminus, but also on the part of a principle. Just as, because willing has from its own nature an inclination following the form apprehended, it is concluded from this that the will is not sufficient for the production of that form, unless the object also, as proposed by the intellect, influx in some way on the part of a principle. Hence St. Thomas gave this reason in the second article of this question, saying: For both sensible and intellectual vision two things are required, namely a seeing power and the union of the seen thing with the sight: for vision does not occur in act unless through this, that the seen thing is in some way in the seer.

19 It makes no difference that it is commonly said that beyond the activity of the power proportionate in its own order to intellection, the activity of the object is required, so that by it the power may be determined to the species of the act. So then, this makes no difference: because such a reason is not assigned as the most powerful, but as more universal and better known with respect to all the cognitions which we have naturally, because no natural knowing power is so determined to a cognition of the same order that it does not have an indeterminacy with respect to several objects, at least material or inadequate ones, toward which it can be terminated, so that it is not bound to attain all of them in some formal object, which previously known.

Add, moreover, and it is further explained, that in the knowing powers a twofold determination is to be distinguished: one holding itself on the part of the power, and another, however, holding itself on the part of the object. Of these, the former is placed in the connaturality of the power with the formal object: and therefore of itself, and from its own notion, it brings a determination of the power toward the aforesaid object, although it can incidentally import a determination toward a material object, or (which comes to the same as the present point) toward this particular object considered in esse entis, because within the range of the formal object no more than a single material object is found. The latter, however, consists in the unity of the material object: whence of itself, and from its own proper conditions, it imports a determination toward a single material object, so that it cannot of itself be carried at first toward another. Therefore, since the determination which the intellect has from the light of glory is of the former, not of the latter, condition, room is therefore left for it to be determined by the latter determination, holding itself on the part of the object: as if God should pour into the will a single habit incidentally, and in the way described inclining it toward a single material object; nevertheless it would still act with a determination proceeding from the object, as proposed to it through the intellect.

Having explained for what the light of glory is not required, it remains that we explain at once for what precisely it is required, so that its nature and necessity may be yet more clearly seen.

§ I. The negative position.

20 The negative part is held by Vazquez in the present disputation, 43, cap. 3. For in the first place he denies that the divine essence is united under the character of an intelligible form with the blessed intellect: this, however, being admitted, he again denies that the light of glory is the disposition necessarily required for such a union. This opinion, as regards the first part, has been examined and refuted above, in art. 2 and in the preceding difficulty.

21 As for the second part (which is what is at issue here), it is proved in the first place. For the hypostatic union, by which the Word is united to the humanity, is greater and more principal than that union by which it is united to the intellects of the blessed under the character of an intelligible form, as the Lord Doctor teaches in 3. part. quaest. 2. art. 9. And yet, for the divine Word to be united to the humanity, no accidental disposition is required, as the same Saintly Doctor attests in the same place, quaest. 7. art. ult. Therefore neither will the light of glory be necessary, as an accidental disposition for such a union, in order that the divine essence be united to the intellects of the blessed.

22 Secondly. For in order that some power be able to receive the species of some object, it is required, and it suffices, that it have of itself a certain power with regard to it, according to the general and objective reason which, taken by itself, it bears toward the thing considered: but the intellect has of itself a certain power with regard to God clearly seen, according to the general and objective reason which, taken by itself, it bears toward the thing considered: therefore it will be able, without any other superadded disposition, to receive the species of that same. The major is proved and explained. For the reason why sight cannot receive the species of a sound is that it has of itself no power with regard to it, according to the general and objective reason which it bears of itself: since indeed a sound is not contained under the reason of the visible; on the contrary, sight can of itself, without anything else, receive the species of anything visible whatever, because it has of itself a certain power in regard to it, taken according to the aforesaid general reason, namely according to the reason of the visible, but not because it has a complete power with regard to it; since indeed the complete power of sight is perfected through the reception of the species of that visible. The minor, too, is evident. For God, as clearly visible, is contained under the general objective reason of the created intellect, namely under the reason of the intelligible being; and therefore the intellect will have a certain power with regard to Him according to the aforesaid reason.

It makes no difference if one says that the major is true when the object is proportioned to the power, but otherwise when it surpasses the power, as happens here. For it is contradicted by the fact that no sense stands in need of being fortified in order to receive the species of some eminent sensible: therefore neither will the intellect need any fortification, by some intermediate disposition, namely the light of glory, in order to receive the divine essence after the manner of an intelligible form. The consequence seems legitimate from the parity of reason. The antecedent, however, is proved by Vazquez both by experience and because no species of any violent sensible is opposed to the temperament of the sensitive power: for intentional being is not opposed to natural being, and so it will rather perfect than harm the sense or its organ.

23 Thirdly. For the created intellect, even when actuated by the light of glory, still remains of a lower order than the divine essence, as it bears the character of an intelligible form: therefore nothing stands in the way of its receiving that, namely that the intellect be something lower, and far more ignoble, than the essence itself: therefore of itself, without anything else, it will be able to receive it. The antecedent is clear. For the intellect together with the light is something finite, and so it is infinitely distant in the grade of immateriality from the divine essence, which bears the character of an intelligible form. From this the first consequence is sufficiently evident. The second, however, seems to follow from the first. For as often as some inferiority of power does not stand in the way of receiving some form in the capacity of power, the sign is that only obediential power is required for receiving it, and not connatural power, which in the capacity of power is not inferior to such a form but is wholly proportioned to it: but taken by itself, obediential power accords to the intellect for the vision of God, as we showed above, and therefore for the form and the intelligible species required for that vision, namely the divine essence: therefore this obediential power alone will suffice for it to be able to receive the aforesaid essence.

24 Fourthly. For the reception of the light of glory, no disposition of a higher order is required in the intellect: therefore none is required either for receiving, or as it were receiving, the divine essence under the character of a species. The antecedent is commonly admitted by the theologians. The consequence, however, is proved: for the light too is a supernatural form, and of the divine order. Hence, if notwithstanding this supernaturality it can be received in the intellect without another disposition, it will follow that the divine essence too can be united to that same intellect without it.

§ II. The true opinion of St Thomas.

25 Nevertheless it must be said that the light of glory is required in the intellect of the blessed in order to receive the divine essence as it bears the character of an intelligible form. Thus St Thomas in this article, where he says: For when some created intellect sees God by essence, the very essence of God becomes the intelligible form of the intellect, whence it is fitting that some supernatural disposition be superadded to it so that it be elevated to such sublimity; and the same teaches in 3. contra Gentes cap. 52 and 53, in opusculo 2. cap. 105, and in 4. dist. 49. quaest. 2. art. 6., de verit. quaest. 8. artic. 3. Whom Caietanus, Bannes, Zumel, Nazarius, and Gonzalez follow here, and Ferrara in the place cited from 3. cont. Gent., and Capreolus in 4. dist. 49. quaest. 4. art. 1. conclus. 2. and art. 3., at the first, in his attack on the second conclusion, and Scotus in the same place, quaest. 2. art. 4., and many others.

It is proved by a reason drawn from St Thomas here and from 3. cont. Gent. cap. 63, which can be reduced to this form. That which is elevated to some form which is above its own nature must be disposed by some disposition surpassing that same nature: but, in order that the created intellect see God, it is elevated to some form which is above its own nature: therefore it must be disposed by something which is above that same nature: therefore the light of glory must be superadded, by which it is disposed. The major is proved. For a disposition, at least the last one, and the form itself, must be of the same order: therefore, in order that something be elevated to a form which is above nature, it must be disposed by a disposition which is likewise above that same nature. The minor, however, is sufficiently evident. For in the vision of God the created intellect is elevated to receive the divine essence under the character of an intelligible form, as we showed in art. 2; but the divine essence under the character of an intelligible form is something supernatural, and therefore above the nature of the created intellect: therefore, and so on. From which the first consequence is sufficiently evident, and likewise the second. Then because by the name of the light of glory we understand the qualifying disposition for the reception of the divine essence under the character of an intelligible form. Then also: because, the light of glory being a participation of the divine intellect as it is in itself, it follows that if once a disposition is required for receiving the divine essence under the character of an intelligible species, then nothing else besides that one is better adapted to disposing toward such a reception. For as the divine intellect, by the very fact of its being such, is (so to speak) ultimately disposed, at least on the part of our mode of conceiving, in order to have the divine essence united to it under the character of an intelligible form: so the participation of that same intellect, as it is in itself, will be the last disposition in the created intellect with respect to the union of the aforesaid essence with it under the character of an intelligible form.

26 You will object first, from Vazquez, to this reasoning, that although a supernatural form which inheres would indeed require a supernatural disposition on the part of its subject, yet that which neither inheres nor can inhere, such as the divine essence, does not.

On the contrary. Because, although the divine essence does not inhere in the intellect of the blessed, it is nevertheless united to it under the character of an intelligible form; and this indeed suffices for the light of glory to be demanded in that same intellect with respect to such a union. For as a natural form demands its own proportionate disposition, so too does an intelligible form demand its own: especially since the intelligible form of which we are speaking, namely the divine essence, is far more excellent than any other natural form.

Next. For this is proper to an intelligible species taken formally as such, that it cannot be united in this way unless to a power having a sufficiency of power to understand an object of such a species: but the intellect without the light of glory does not have sufficient power to see God as He is in Himself; therefore the divine essence, as it bears the character of an intelligible species with respect to this vision, will not be able to be united to it under the character of a species taken formally, unless it have the aforesaid light. The consequence is transparent. The minor, however, follows from what was said in the preceding difficulty.

The major, however, is proved. Then because, since this union is essentially ordered to the end that the power be able to make use of such a species with respect to apprehending that object, it follows that, precisely because the power cannot make use of it from a defect of sufficient powers for such a use, neither can the aforesaid species be united to it under the character of a species as long as it does not have the sufficient powers required on its own part. Then also: for it is proper to an intelligible species to constitute the intellect as ultimately and completely capable of understanding: but it is repugnant for it to be so constituted without having those things which on its own part are required for understanding: therefore, and so on.

Then finally: for as it would be repugnant for a substantial form to be united after the manner of such a form with prime matter, which (so to speak) would not be prime matter but a half of it within the latitude of the aforesaid matter: so likewise it will be repugnant for an intelligible species, as it bears the character of an intelligible form, to be united with an intellect lacking sufficient powers to understand through such a species, that is, lacking an essential commensurability and a quantity of power: since indeed (as we said above, no. 17) the intellect without the aforesaid powers is only a half-intellect, insofar as the intellect (so to speak) is, on its own part, distinguished as whole from an intelligible form. But concerning these matters let those be seen which we shall say in the following difficulty, nos. 36, 37, and 38.

27 You will object secondly, from the same Vazquez, that although some disposition proportionate to it is always required for a substantial and natural form, yet it is otherwise for a supernatural form, such as the divine essence is as it bears the character of an intelligible species; otherwise, since that disposition would itself be a supernatural form, another disposition of the same order would be required for it, and so on to infinity.

On the contrary. Because the divine essence, as it bears the character of an impressed species, is not just any supernatural form, but within the intelligible order it is the last form among those which are required for constituting the intellect in the first act; and therefore it confers upon it that it have in its intelligible being the nature of God: hence, although for several other supernatural forms no disposition of the same order is required, yet it is well required for the divine essence as it bears the character of an intelligible species. The antecedent seems to follow from itself and from what was said in art. 2, dub. 2. The consequence, however, is proved. Because a form which is the last in some order, and which confers the character of nature within that same order, has this peculiar property, that it demands for itself some disposition: and therefore sanctifying grace, because it is the last form in the supernatural order and confers within that same order a participation of the divine nature, must have some disposition, by reason of which its subject is disposed for receiving it. For at the very least the supernatural habits themselves, which accompany it, dispose toward receiving it, in that although generically as efficient causes they are posterior to it, generically however as material causes they are prior: and thus they are able to dispose toward it: just as heat, accompanying the form of fire, is posterior to it in the genus of efficient cause and prior in the genus of dispositive material cause. But concerning these matters let one see the Complutenses, 1. de Generat. disp. 2.

Although here there is the disparity already hinted at between grace and the divine essence as it bears the character of an intelligible form: for since sanctifying grace confers a participation of the divine nature, from the fact that it confers a radical quantity of power required on the part of the soul for seeing God, it follows that it must of necessity presuppose an essential commensurability in the soul together with its obediential power (whether these two are strictly distinguished from each other or not, as we treat elsewhere); since for the quantity of power required on the part of some power, the aforesaid essential commensurability and its obediential power alone can be necessarily presupposed; although for a sweet and connatural reception its own proper disposition can and must be presupposed, as happens in the reception of grace. But the divine essence, as it bears the character of an intelligible form, is not a quantity of power required on the part of the intellectual power: and so, because it must presuppose the intellect, which on its own part, that is, as it is distinguished from the species and is the partial and inadequate cause of the vision, is (so to speak) a whole intellect and not a half-intellect, it must therefore of necessity require, as its disposition, the aforesaid quantity of power, namely the light of glory.

28 It is confirmed: for the divine essence is so a supernatural form with respect to the intellect of the blessed that the intellect itself, taken by itself, is pure power within the intelligible order with respect to it, and the essence is pure act under the character of an intelligible form: therefore the intellect will not be capable of receiving, or as it were receiving, the aforesaid essence as it bears the character of a most perfectly actual intelligible form, unless it be first actuated and disposed by the light of glory. The antecedent is evident of itself. The consequence, however, is proved. For (as the Complutenses state, 1. Phys. disp. 9. num. 72) prime matter cannot receive existence except in its totality, and therefore cannot receive it unless it first receive a form, by reason of which it is as it were disposed for existing; because, since it is pure potentiality in the genus of being, it cannot be capable of the actuality of existence, which is most perfect, unless another actuality of essence be first presupposed, which in the character of actuality is lesser, and is a way to it, from the fact that it belongs to the same order of act and has an actuality mixed with greater potentiality: therefore, since the created intellect with respect to seeing God as He is in Himself is pure potentiality in the genus of the intelligible, and the divine essence itself, as it bears the character of an impressed species, is the most perfect and pure act, there will not be a sufficient proportion in the intellect for receiving such a species, unless it be first disposed and proportioned by the light of glory, which also reaches the divine order and has within that same order an actuality mixed with potentiality.

§ III. The arguments of the first position are answered.

29 To the first, let the major and the minor be granted, but the consequence denied. And the reason for the disparity is drawn from the different conditions of each union. For the union of the humanity with the Word is a union in the same person, and therefore through it the subsistence and the existence of the Word is communicated to the humanity; and so it does not have to presuppose in it either another substantial existence, as is clear from what the Complutenses teach in lib. Phys. disp. 3., or any accidental disposition, because it is prior for the humanity to have simple being, which indeed is communicated to it by the aforesaid union, than to have being secundum quid, that is, accidental being: as the same Complutenses show very well, lib. 1. de Generat. disp. 2. But the union of the divine essence under the character of an intelligible form is not a union for subsisting or existing by the subsistence or existence of God, but it presupposes the created intellect with its own existence, at least in the being of the thing, and with a defect of efficacy for understanding through the aforesaid species, if the aforesaid intellect is considered precisely according to what is proper to it, as has been shown. And so, insofar as it is presupposed as existing, it is capable of the aforesaid accidental disposition, namely of the light of glory: and insofar as it does not have the aforesaid efficacy, it cannot receive the divine essence under the character of a species unless it be disposed by the aforesaid light, by which it is able on its own part to see God: since, as we said in the assertion, an intelligible species is not united formally under the character of a species except to an intellect that is potentially able to understand through it.

30 From which, as to the second, the major must be denied. For in order that some power be able to receive a species representing some object as it is in itself, it is not enough that it have of itself some power with respect to understanding it according to the general and objective reason. Because from this, at most, it follows that the power can understand it with respect to the aforesaid reason, and therefore that it has an essential commensurability with a view to being elevated with respect to seeing it as it is in itself; but further it is required that it have the power and the efficacy required on its own part for understanding it as it is in itself. Nor does the opposite of this follow from the proof of the major adduced there. For sight alone can receive without fortification the species of those visible things with respect to which it has sufficient efficacy on its own part; but otherwise with respect to others. We said on its own part, because, as is clear from what has been said above, the species of an object does not complete sight with the complement required on the part of sight, but with the complement desired on the part of the object, which of necessity presupposes that complement first.

By which also, as to what is brought against the solution given there, it is clear that the antecedent must be denied. And as to the first proof, the antecedent must also be denied: as to the second, however, it must be said that although we granted that the organ of the sense is not harmed by the species of a violent sensible (the contrary of which the Complutenses show very well and at length in lib. de Anima disp. 9. from num. 62 to 77, out of Aristotle and St Thomas), nevertheless the sense would stand in need of fortification for the reception of the aforesaid species under the character of a species, because of the disproportion which exists between itself and such an object. Hence, as without such fortification it could not perceive it either absolutely or perfectly, so without the same it will not be able to receive its species in a proportionate manner. We said either absolutely or perfectly, because sometimes a violent sensible is not absolutely disproportionate with respect to a sense, so that in no way it can be perceived by it, as is evident in our vision with respect to the sun when looked at directly. Sometimes, however, it is absolutely disproportionate, as happens with the vision of the owl with respect to that same sun. Hence in us a fortification is required with respect to the reception of the species of the solar body, insofar as it perfectly represents it; and in the owl a fortification is required for the reception of that same species, so that it may represent it absolutely.

31 To the third, the answer is that, although the intellect elevated by the light of glory is of a lower order than the divine essence, because it does not accord with it in the grade of immateriality, nevertheless it is of the same divine order as it, because the light is a certain participation of the divine intellect as it is in itself. Hence the aforesaid inferiority does not stand in the way of the divine essence being able to be united to an intellect elevated in this way, even as the inferiority which the intellect taken by itself has with respect to the divine essence stands in the way of that same essence being united to it under the character of an intelligible form: then because of what has been said; then also because the proper species of some intellect of a higher order is united to none but the intellect of which it is proper, or to the one who has a participation of the aforesaid intellect as it is in itself: yet the intellect taken by itself has not that participation; it is well, however, pervaded with the light of glory.

Therefore, the antecedent and the first consequence having been granted in the argument, since the inferiority of the intellect already spoken of at once has suitability in the divine and supernatural order, and also a participation of the divine intellect as it is in itself, the second consequence must be denied. For the proof of it, the major must be denied. And to the proof included in it, namely that a power which is not obediential but connatural with respect to some form is not inferior to it in the capacity of power, the answer is that this is true when the power is entirely connatural to the form, for then the power is not inferior in the capacity of power, that is, then the power is as great in the capacity of power as the form is in the capacity of form. But the intellect with the light of glory, although it is not compared with the divine essence after the manner of a pure obediential power, is nevertheless not compared with the same after the manner of a power entirely connatural, because a power, that is, an intellectual virtue entirely connatural with respect to the divine essence, must be an intellect that is not elevated, and therefore does not coalesce from the intellectual power and the elevation: but an intellect which by the manner of a simple and total power is able to be united with the divine essence as it bears the character of an intelligible species, as we said above, disp. 2. num. 170: and this, as is clear from what has been said there, belongs to the divine intellect alone.

32 As to the fourth, the antecedent being granted, the consequence must be denied. And as for its proof, it is clear from what has been said. For the light of glory is not of the manner of a last form conferring a participation of the divine nature: and therefore it is not necessary that any disposition be given to it, except at most insofar as it is of the likeness of a property, or as it were of a property of consummated grace: and thus the disposition which is required for it will serve also for the reception of the light. But the divine essence has the character of a last form in the manner explained, and confers upon the intellect that it have a divinized being, that is, the divine nature in its intelligible being: and therefore it is no wonder that it demands of itself some proper disposition of the divine order, namely the light of glory; especially because the aforesaid light completes the intellect in the character of an intellect, so that without it there still remains on its own part, as it were, a half-capacity with respect to understanding God as He is in Himself. Hence, without it, it is as if there were no intellect at all with respect to the aforesaid union.

From which also remains solved the objection which a certain Junior raises, namely that the divine essence is not of the manner of a last form in the intelligible order, because intellection is the last form in this order: and therefore that the light of glory is not required as a disposition with respect to the divine essence as it bears the character of a species, but well with respect to the intellection, that is, the vision of God.

For the answer is drawn from what has been said, that the vision of God is not among the forms required on the part of the first act, because it does not confer the power of seeing; but it is itself the second act of seeing: and therefore the divine essence has the character of a last form in the intelligible order, and within the range of those things which are required for the first act: and so, just as on account of this reason some disposition is required for receiving sanctifying grace, so too is one required for receiving the divine essence under the character of an intelligible form. Add that vision is the very existence within the intelligible order: as we shall say in tract. 4. disput. 1. num. 21: now the existence of some order demands the same disposition which the form of that same order demands. Nor does it prevent that the form to which vision follows should demand its own disposition, and the same as itself (due proportion, however, being observed), as is evident in the existence of the natural order. But concerning these matters let those be seen which we shall assert in the places cited.

33 So that the complete causality which the light of glory has within the genus of material cause may be understood exactly, there remains only to be explained whether it also concurs materially with the vision of God; and consequently whether it is necessarily required for its reception. And so, to explain this, we raise the present Difficulty.

§ I. The negative opinion.

The negative part is held by Scotus in 4. dist. 49. quaest. 45. and in 3. dis. 14., by Vazquez in the present work, disp. 43., and by others among the later theologians. It is proved, first. For a habit is not a disposition for receiving an act, but rather the contrary: therefore the light of glory is not desired as a disposition for receiving the beatific vision. The consequence is evident, since they are compared as habit and act. The antecedent is likewise evident. Then, because a habit is made through an act, and so is presupposed to have been received in the potency before it is a habit, and so the habit does not dispose for its reception: then also, because in supernatural habits, such as the habit of grace and of charity, grace does not dispose for the reception of the love of God, but rather that very love is required as a disposition to grace.

34 Second. For whenever a subject is ordered to several forms to be received, it is then ordered above all to the most perfect form, and to that one immediately, and it receives it first: but the vision of God is the most perfect form among all those to which the intellectual creature is ordered: therefore the intellect will be ordered to that form in the highest degree, and will receive it immediately and first; and consequently no other form will be desired for its reception. Both consequences are sufficiently clear. The minor, however, seems to be a matter of common knowledge. For the vision of God is the beatitude of the intellectual creature, and so it will be the most perfect of all the forms which the aforesaid creature can have; since the highest good of that creature consists in its beatitude. The major, however, is clear from the example of prime matter, which, although it regards both substantial and accidental forms, is nevertheless ordered in preference to the former rather than to the latter, and receives those before the accidental forms, as is clear from what the Complutensian doctors, on the common consent of the Thomists, teach in 1. de Generat. disp. 2.

35 Third. The intellect, of itself, is proportionate and fit as a subject for receiving the vision, and the vision itself, of itself, presupposes no light superadded to the entity of the intellect as a reason for being received: therefore on no ground is a light desired in the intellect for the reception of the vision. The consequence is evident, since the necessity of a light in the intellect for this can arise only from the two grounds assigned. The antecedent, as to its first part, is proved. Because the natural entity of the intellect is of itself proportionate for receiving the light of glory, just as also the natural entity of the soul is for receiving grace; and the entity of that same intellect for this, that it should receive within itself the light of faith: therefore it will be proportionate in the same way with respect to the reception of the vision of God, since the disproportion between intellection and vision could arise only (if there were any) from the distance which exists between the natural entity of the intellect and the supernatural entity of the vision; and this same disproportion is found between it and the light of glory, or of faith. As to the second part, moreover, the same antecedent is evident, since the vision is neither something of a light, namely, nor a mode, nor an intensification of it, nor does it receive from it, as from a formal cause, anything necessary to it in order to adhere to the intellect, as material accidents receive from quantity their being extended, and by reason of this adhere to substance: therefore the vision, of itself, has nothing on account of which it presupposes in the intellect the light of glory, as the mean by which it adheres to it.

Fourth. For otherwise the intellect would act upon the light of glory, if indeed it were to elicit the vision which is to be received in it; but this is false: for an agent that is inferior cannot act upon a thing of a higher order; for just as this thing is superior, so it cannot be subject to that one.

§ II. The opinion of the Thomists is preferred.

36 Nevertheless, it must be said that the light of glory is necessarily required in the intellect for this, that it receive the vision of God by essence. D. Thomas sufficiently indicates this assertion both in the places cited above, in the preceding Difficulty, and also in others to be brought forward at once. He is followed by Palud. in 4. disp. 49. quaest. 1., by Caiet. and Gonzal. in the present work, by Petrus de Ledes. de divina perfect. quaest. 8. art. 8., on the difficulty which he raises after the third conclusion; and, in general, by the younger disciples of St. Thomas, as Gonzalez testifies in the place cited. The same is held by Maior in 3. dist. 14. quaest. 2. dub. 2., and in 4. disput. 49. quaest. 4.; by Marsilius in 3. quaest. 10. art. 3.; by Ricardus dist. 14. quaest. 1. art. 2.; by Valentia in the present work, disp. 1. punct. 3.; and by many others.

So that we may lay down the fundamental reason, it must be noted first, from D. Thomas in 4. dist. 4. quaest. 1. art. 1. in the body, that this is the distinction between habit, or disposition, and potency: namely that a habit or disposition is given for the ability to do something well or badly, or for the ability to do it promptly and easily; whereas a potency is given for the ability to do something simpliciter; and thus without a habit or disposition we can do something simpliciter; but otherwise without a potency we cannot. Whence the holy Doctor concludes: This seems to be the difference between habit and potency, because a potency is that by which we can do something simpliciter; a habit, however, is that by which we can do it well or badly: as the intellect, by which we consider, knowledge, by which we consider well, the concupiscible appetite, by which we desire, temperance, by which we desire well, and intemperance, by which we desire badly, and so likewise it is of a disposition.

37 Second, it must be noted, from the same holy Doctor in the place cited, in 4. sentent. and in quaest. 24. de verit. art. 4. ad 9., that supernatural habits, or dispositions, agree with the natural ones in part, but differ from them in part. They do indeed agree, because they also incline and make easy the fact that a potency can act well and with pleasure, as can be seen in the habit of charity; and so they presuppose a radical and remote potency; but they do not confer it, so as to be able to communicate to it the facility of operating. They differ, however, because, although they are something most supreme among habits and dispositions, from the fact that they belong to the supreme order, namely to the divine, they have something admixed of the proper nature of a potency, because in fact they confer posse simpliciter, such that without them posse simpliciter is not given with respect to supernatural operations of divine order; but only a remote and radical posse, or a commensurability that is only essential with respect to them. For, as Dionysius teaches, and D. Thomas repeats in various places, the supreme of the lowest reaches the lowest of the supreme; and so the supreme habit, namely the supernatural one, will reach to the order of the powers, conferring posse simpliciter.

The reason for which the same holy Doctor touched there, saying that as within the natural order proper operations are given, and therefore proper powers, required per se for the posse of those operations, must be assigned; so also within the supernatural order proper supernatural operations are given; and thus proper powers must be given with respect to them, which confer posse simpliciter; it is certain, however, that supernatural habits, or dispositions, have in their own way the role of powers within the supernatural order, or confer posse simpliciter together with natural powers that concur radically and remotely. For, as is clear from what was said in art. 2. and 4., this involves the positing of a supernatural power, for example an intellectual one, which should tend toward God as He is in Himself by the mode of a simple and total power, and should consequently elicit the supernatural act of vision: otherwise, as we proved there, it would agree with God in the degree of immateriality and actuality, which is involved. And therefore the power that is simply intellectual within the supernatural order necessarily coalesces from the natural entity of the intellect, or from the supernatural obediential power of the same (as others say) and from the elevation which is made through the habit, or supernatural assistance already mentioned; and so that elevation has both the role of habit, or disposition, since it presupposes at least a radical posse, and then also, in the way indicated, the role of potency, insofar as it confers posse simpliciter. Whether, however, the aforesaid dispositions conferring posse simpliciter differ from habits on the part of form, or rather on the part of the mode of having it, since assuredly they have the same essence on the part of form, although a habit has it by the mode of the permanent, whereas a disposition conferring posse simpliciter does so by the mode of the transient: that is another question, to be discussed elsewhere.

38 From this, therefore, and from what the holy Doctor teaches in 1. part. quaest. 18. art. 3. ad 1. and quaest. 23. art. 2. ad 1. and quaest. 54. art. 1. ad 3., the fundamental reason for the assertion is drawn, which can be reduced to the form of the vision. For with respect to a vital and immanent action, it is perfect that it be received in the same proximate power from which it is elicited; hence corporeal vision is received in sight, by which it is made; and audition in hearing, and so of the rest; but the created intellect, unless flooded with the light of glory, is not the proximate power eliciting the vision of God by essence, as has been shown: therefore it will not receive that vision unless it be elevated by the same light.

It is confirmed. For angelic intellection as such, just as it cannot be elicited except by the angelic intellect, from the fact that it is a vital action seeking to arise from this determinate principle of life, namely the intellect of the angel, so it cannot be received except in the angelic intellect; and the same is true of human intellection as such, and so of the rest; therefore the created vision of God, which is supernatural and of divine order, just as it can be elicited only by a power that is proximately intellectual, by the created intellect, deified, or of divine order by participation, so it will be able to be received only in that same intellect thus elevated.

It is confirmed, second. For although intellection, as it is a vital immanent act, does not seek to be received in the adequate principle eliciting it, and so ought not to be received in an intelligible species, it is nevertheless required that it be subjected in that in which it holds itself on the part of potency, and it concurs by the mode of potency: therefore, since the intellect alone does not hold itself by the mode of potency, but the intellect as elevated, it follows that the intellect alone, thus elevated, is capable of receiving it. The connection follows from itself. The antecedent is likewise evident both by a general induction from all vital immanent acts, and also because: although the object and the intellectual power concur in intellection, the power nevertheless inflows by the mode of a woman giving birth, whereas the object does so by the mode of a man begetting it. Hence, because the fetus is not received, or remains, in the man, although it ought to proceed actively from him, but is received well in the woman; therefore intellection, which whether alone or together with the word, when it is produced through it, is a kind of intellectual fetus (in the way, however, explained above) and not just any kind, but immanent, so that in this matter, and in the reception of such a birth, it is consummated, it ought not to be received, or to remain, in the object, or in an intelligible species, but well in the potency. Therefore, since the intellect is not an intellectual power, or an intellectual woman, with respect to the vision of God as it is in itself, unless elevated by the light of glory, as has been proved, but well together with that same light, it follows that it can be received in it thus elevated, and in no other way.

39 Second, the assertion is principally proved by the reason touched at num. 32 above by D. Thomas. Since intelligere is the formal secondary effect of the intelligible form, from the fact that it has being by the mode of existence in the intelligible order: therefore that very thing which is required for the reception, or quasi-reception, of the species will be desired for the reception of the intellection: therefore, since the light of glory is required for this, that the intellect receive, or be united with, the divine essence, as it has the role of an intelligible form with respect to the vision of God, as is clear from what has been said, it will also be desired for the reception of that same vision. The antecedent is clear from what we shall say in tract. 4. disp. 1. num. 21. and following: where we shall show that, just as the existence of the natural, or entitative, order is the formal secondary effect of the form taken in the same way, so intelligere, because it is the existence of the intelligible order, from the fact that it is the ultimate actuality of this order, will be the formal secondary effect of the form of that same order, namely of the impressed species; and consequently, since the species, as it possesses esse entitative and natural, and exists through the existence of this order, causes intellection in the genus of an efficient cause: yet insofar as it belongs to the intelligible order, and is the first act of that order, it also causes the aforesaid intelligere in the genus of a formal cause, and as its formal secondary effect.

The first conclusion, however, is clear. Since the same disposition which is required for the reception of any form is desired for the esse of an existence flowing from it, as is clear by induction in all forms: hence too it will follow that the light of glory is desired on a twofold ground for the reception of the vision. First indeed, because it constitutes the intellectual power in the esse of a power that is simply able to see God. Second, because it is desired by the mode of a disposition to the union, or reception, of the divine essence, as it has the role of an intelligible form, and consequently in its own way, and at least mediate, for the union with the vision itself, which is the ultimate form, or actuality, of the created power of seeing God.

§ III. The arguments of the negative opinion are met.

40 To the first it will be answered that the antecedent is true at its highest with regard to acquired habits, but not with regard to infused habits, and to those which constitute the potency in the esse of potency. For just as, for the reception of the aforesaid acts, a proximate power eliciting them is required, so also that by which such a potency is constituted in the esse of a proximate potency is required. Therefore, since the habit of the light of glory is infused per se, and constitutes the potency in the esse of the proximate potency of seeing God according to what is required on the part of potency, it follows that the aforesaid light is desired for the reception of its proper act, namely the vision of God.

This is clear from what has just been said, with regard to the first proof. As to the second, however, it must be said that the love of God and justifying grace have a mutual causality with respect to the reception of either of them in its proper subject, although this belongs to them in different ways. For the act of love is required for the reception of grace by the mode of a proper cause and, taken strictly, a disposing cause; grace, on the other hand, is desired for the receiving of the love of God, not indeed by the mode of a proper cause and, taken strictly, a disposing cause, but by the mode of constituting its subject first and absolutely, at least as a subject connatural to it. For just as, for the reception of natural love, the soul concurs, for example, by the mode of a subject that is radical and absolutely first, and the will by the mode of the subject quo, yet neither inflows by the mode of a proper disposition taken strictly; so, for the reception of the supernatural acts of love, the will inflows as elevated by a supernatural habit, and the soul as elevated by grace: the former indeed by the mode of the subject quo, the latter, however, as the subject quod; yet neither by the mode of a proper disposition taken strictly, although, using the name of disposition in a broad sense, it can be said that grace and charity dispose for the aforesaid reception of the love of God.

41 To the second it will be answered that the major is true when those forms are so compared with one another that one of them is substantial and the rest accidental; otherwise when all of them are accidental and of a higher order. For then that which constitutes the potency in the role of a potency with respect to the others cannot fail to be received first: otherwise the others would not be received in their corresponding subject. Therefore, since the light of glory and the vision are accidental forms, and the light constitutes the intellect in the role of a potency with respect to the vision of God, it cannot fail to be received in it before the vision, and the vision itself is received by reason of the light, even if we granted (of which elsewhere) that the vision is more perfect than the light. The reason, however, for which, after a comparison between the substantial form and the accidental forms, the former must necessarily be received at the instant of substantial generation before the latter, is this: because, as our Complutensian doctors show in 1. de Generat. disp. 3. following D. Thomas, matter cannot have esse secundum quid unless it first has esse simpliciter. Hence, since the latter comes to it from the substantial form, whereas the former comes from the accidental forms, it follows that it is incapable of receiving the accidental forms unless nature first has the substantial form.

42 To the third, the antecedent is to be denied with regard to each of its two parts (in the way, however, to be explained at once). And having granted the antecedent of the first proof, the conclusion is to be denied. Because the light is infused by God alone, as by a principal cause; whereas the vision is made by the created intellect by the mode of a vital operation which seeks as its subject that very same proximate vital power from which it is elicited, as has been shown: and so, since the light constitutes the intellect in the role of the proximate power eliciting the vision, in the way already indicated, it confers upon it also that it be receptive of that same vision. Hence what is said there is false, namely, that the disproportion between the intellect, from which it is taken, and the vision, on account of which the intellect thus accepted cannot receive it, arises only from the distance in the role of natural and supernatural being which intervenes between the two: because in truth it does not arise from precisely this ground, but from that which we have already explained.

As to the proof, however, of the second part of that same antecedent, it must be said that the vision seeks, as the subject quo, or as the reason for being received, the light of glory, not indeed on account of those things which are enumerated there, but because, since it is a vital immanent act, it seeks to be received in that same proximate power from which it is elicited, or it seeks to be received in the power of seeing God: the intellect, however, of itself without the light of glory is not a power of seeing God, even though it has an essential commensurability with the vision.

43 To the fourth, the consequence is to be denied. Because the intellect and the light are not reckoned as two partial causes, each of which has the proximate force of acting, like two persons carrying a stone; but as one and the same indivisible cause in the esse of a cause. Because a single cause in the esse of a cause, even a partial one, seeks an essential commensurability with respect to its action, and over and above a quantity of power and efficacy; but the intellect of itself has the essential commensurability with respect to the vision, and the quantity of power from the light of glory: and so, from the fact that the vision is received in the intellect elevated by the light of glory, it does not follow that the intellect acts upon the light; but that the intellect, elevated by the light of glory, acts upon itself, which is not inconvenient, but rather necessary for the role of an agent through a vital and immanent action. For just as together with the light it is the active principle, and constitutes one and the same indivisible principle eliciting the vision, so also it is one and the same indivisible principle receptive of it.

44 After we have treated of the necessity of the light of glory with respect to the receiving, or quasi-receiving, of the divine essence, in so far as it has the character of an intelligible form, and also of the necessity of the same for this, that the vision itself be received in the created intellect, it remains to explain whether the intellect so stands in need of the aforesaid light with respect to the same vision being actively elicited that this necessity and this need cannot be supplied by divine power through any influx concomitant with the vision itself.

We have said, By divine power; for concerning ordained power it is certain that the blessed man stands in need of the light of glory with respect to the eliciting of the vision of God. For in the Council of Vienne, and as it is held in the Clementine Ad nostrum on Heretics, the fifth error of the Beguards and Beguines is condemned, who said that the soul does not stand in need of the light of glory elevating it to see God: and yet it is certain that seeing God involves the eliciting of the act of seeing. For since the vision is a vital operation, that intellect alone sees God which actively elicits the vision: and so, if the intellect stands in need of light in order to see, it will certainly stand in need of it in order to elicit the aforesaid vision.

§ I. The First Manner of Speaking Is Referred Back To.

45 The affirming part is held by Suarez, bk. 2 of the Summa Theologiae, ch. 16, nn. 5 and 6. Molina disputes it here, d. 1. Vazquez, d. 46, ch. 2. Arrubal, d. 20, ch. 3. And they cite in support Paludanus, in 4, d. 49, q. 1, a. 3, and Thomas of Argentina, q. 1, a. 1.

This is proved first by the testimony of St. Thomas, On Truth, q. 10, a. 11, where he says: As he made Peter walk on the waters without having bestowed on him the due agility, so he can bring the mind to this, that it be united to the divine essence in the state of the way in that same mode in which it is united to it in the homeland, without being poured all over by the light of glory: therefore it will be possible for the created intellect to elicit the vision by its own bare obediential power, together with the special concurrence of God in the vision itself, but not in the intellect. The consequence is evident. For from that head under which it can see God without the light of glory, it can also elicit the vision without anything superadded to it. For whatever were superadded to it would have the character of light, or (which is the same thing) of the power of sight of God: and in as far as the vision is supernatural, and is elicited by a secondary cause, it cannot be elicited by a purely natural power, but by an obediential one, and with the special, or supernatural, concurrence of God in it.

46 Second. The light of glory is desired only for this, that it supply the efficient virtue which is lacking to the intellect: therefore it will be able to be supplied by God through his divine power. The antecedent follows from what has been said. The consequence, however, is proved. For the virtue which is lacking to the intellect, and which the light supplies, is not a virtue for eliciting the vision, insofar as the vision is vital: both because for this the intrinsic vitality of the intellect, and its vital effort, suffice; and also because the light is demanded only for that vision, insofar as it is supernatural and clear; and finally, because the light comes from without and from outside: whereas the vital principle, and that which influences in a vital manner, must be intrinsic; and therefore a vital act is defined by this, that it be from an intrinsic and conjoined principle: but God can supply every efficient virtue of a secondary cause, provided it be not the efficient virtue of a vital cause as such, as all Philosophers and Theologians commonly admit: therefore he will be able to supply the defect of the light, and its influx, by this, that he himself influence the vision itself immediately and through supernatural concurrence, that is, what had to be supplied through the influx of the light.

47 Third. The light of glory does not influence the vision in the mode of a total virtue with respect to it, but only in the mode of a partial virtue; and so too the intellect will be a partial cause with respect to it: therefore God will be able to supply the efficiency of the light by influencing the vision immediately with that very thing which the light was going to supply. The antecedent is evident, both from what has been said, and also because otherwise the vision would not be a vital act, since it would not proceed actively from a vital power.

The consequence, however, is proved and explained. For whenever two partial causes influence some effect, it is not necessarily demanded that one inform the other, or that intrinsic powers be added to any of them, by reason of which a complete cause would be constituted with respect to such an effect; but it suffices either that the partial cause be assisted in one of these ways, or that another of these partial causes influence the effect simultaneously with the other, without influencing the same cause, as happens in Peter, who has a partial and half power for carrying a certain weight; for then he will be able to carry it; or by virtue of intrinsic, or inherent, powers being added to him, so that the half virtue which he has, and the other half superadded to him, concur in the mode of two partial causes integrating one total cause; or by virtue of Paul, who also has half the power for carrying the aforesaid weight, influencing the same effect together with Peter, without his influencing that same Peter, or superadding to him an intrinsic and inherent virtue.

48 Lastly. The supernatural acts of faith and charity can be done without the habits proportionate to them, and without any other influx of God into the cause: therefore in the same way the act of the vision of God will be able, at least through divine power, to be done through the sole influx of God into the same vision, without God imprinting anything preliminary in the intellect. The consequence is evident from the parity of the reason. The antecedent, as to the first part, is established: because the aforesaid acts are dispositions toward their habits, and therefore cannot be done by them, since precisely because they dispose toward them they are presupposed with their own being before them. As to the second part, however, it is evident from what has been said. For that preliminary thing which God would pour into the intellect and will for the eliciting of the aforesaid acts would not be distinct from the habits corresponding to them: since its essence would consist in this, that it has the character of a principle with respect to them, which is indeed proper to the habits of faith and charity.

It makes no difference if one should say that that which God would pour into the intellect and will with respect to the eliciting of the acts of faith and charity is going to be some transient, non-permanent quality, and so is not going to have the character of a habit. From this, therefore, it is inferred to the utmost that the vision of God can be elicited by the created intellect without the habit of the light of glory, but not without something superadded to the entity of the intellect, by which it is strengthened antecedently to the vision and to the influx of God into the same vision.

It makes no difference, therefore. For from the fact that that quality imprinted on the intellect for seeing God lasts only a short time, it does not follow that it differs in species from the quality which is the principle of that same vision and lasts permanently: as from the fact that the vision of God was communicated to Paul in a transient manner, it is not inferred that it differs in species from that same permanent vision of God which the same Paul afterwards had in the homeland. And the reason a priori is that permanent or non-permanent duration cannot distinguish the species of a quality, since it belongs to another predicament.

It is confirmed. For that quality imprinted on the intellect would not be transient, on the ground that it is corrupted by its contrary, as is evident from that very same ground, nor on the ground that it demands this from another source. For since it is the principle of a vision which is intrinsically perpetual, since it is measured by a participated eternity, it has no source from which to demand that it be transient of itself.

§ II. The Opinion of St. Thomas, and Its First Foundation.

49 It must nevertheless be said that the vision of God cannot be made, even by divine power, by the created intellect through its own pure and bare obediential power, with only the supernatural concurrence of God in the vision itself added, but not in the intellect. So St. Augustine and the Angelic Doctor, as is shown, and Nunno follows them in 3, pt., q. 62, a. 6, q. 2, con cl. 1, and Alvarez, On Aids to Grace, bk. 7, d. 67; and so the same Saint Doctor, bk. 2 of the Summa contra Gentiles, ch. 53, and in the same bk. 2, q. 175, a. 3, ad 2, says: That the divine essence cannot be seen by the created intellect except through the light of glory. Which is also taught by Cajetan in the present place, by Capreolus in 4, d. 49, q. 4, at the arguments against the second conclusion, namely at 3 and at 4, by Soto in the same distinction, q. 2, a. 4, by Báñez in the present difficulty 3, by Navarrete, controversy 39, § 1, by Nazarius in this article, and commonly by the Thomists.

50 This is proved first by the testimony of the Council of Vienne adduced in this difficulty, where the light of glory elevating the intellectual power is demanded, not indeed from God's institution alone, but from the very nature of the act and of the power. For just as the heretics said that the intellect can of its own nature attain beatitude, so the Holy Council defines, on the contrary, that it stands in need, from the very nature of the thing, of an elevation and of light on account of the inferiority and insufficiency which it has for seeing God: but by the name of the light of glory the Council in no way understands the vision itself, or the concomitant influx of God into it, which is nothing other than the aforesaid vision, but something preliminary to it: therefore, from the very nature of the thing, neither the act itself, nor the concurrence of God concomitant with the obediential power of the intellect, suffices; but something preliminary is desired to be imprinted on the act itself by God: therefore, even with respect to divine power, this same thing will be desired. This last consequence is evident from the preceding one. For that which is desired from the very nature of the thing on account of the lack of proportion and the intrinsic insufficiency present in the cause with respect to some effect cannot fail also to be required with respect to divine power, so that it holds on the part of that same cause, as we shall explain more fully immediately. The first consequence, however, follows well enough from the two premises. The minor, on the other hand, seems certain. First, because if the Council understood by the light of glory the vision itself, or the concomitant influx of God into it, which is nothing other than the vision itself, then it would be defining nothing against the aforesaid heretics, since they themselves did not deny that for seeing God the vision itself, or the concomitant influx of God into it, is required, which is the same as the aforesaid vision. And also: because the Council takes the light of glory in that sense in which it is commonly taken by theologians; otherwise, if the words of the Council could be twisted to another sense besides that in which they are commonly taken, we should have nothing firm in the definitions of Councils: yet it is certain among theologians that by the name of the light of glory one does not understand the vision itself, but something preliminary to it, and intrinsic to the power, elevating it to the end that it may elicit the vision.

§ III. The Second Foundation of the Opinion of St. Thomas Is Proposed.

51 Secondly, the assertion is proved principally by a reason drawn from the aforesaid place of St. Thomas in bk. 3 of the Summa contra Gentiles, which can be reduced to the following form. A cause which of itself is insufficient for some higher operation cannot elicit it unless either an intensification of its own power be superadded to it, if that action exceeds its efficacy only in intensity, or some other virtue distinct in species be superadded, if such an operation be more eminent, and distinct in species, from that which the same cause can elicit: but the vision of God is an operation more eminent, and distinct in species, from that which the created intellect can elicit through its own innate power: therefore some higher and more eminent virtue, distinct in species from the entity of the intellect and from its obediential power, must be superadded to it, by which it may be elevated with respect to such an action: therefore such a virtue must be distinct both from the aforesaid obediential power, or the intensification of it, and from the special and concomitant concurrence by which God influences the aforesaid vision.

St. Thomas explains and proves the major by the examples of a mitigated hot body and of a transparent body illuminating. The first of these needs only an intensification of heat in order to elicit an intense heating, because the aforesaid heating exceeds its power only in intensity; the second, namely the transparent body, needs a form distinct from it in species in order to illuminate, because illumination is an action more eminent, and distinct in species, from that which the transparent body, taken in itself, can elicit.

52 And then it can be proved from the proportion between the efficient virtue and the operation elicited by it, a proportion which indeed, as will be evident to the one who considers, cannot be observed unless a higher active virtue, distinct in species, correspond to an action higher and more eminent, and distinct in species, from those which the active power of itself can elicit: as it is also demanded, to the same proportion, that for an action exceeding precisely in intensity, there be superadded on the part of the cause only an intensification of the power present in it.

The minor, on the other hand, follows well enough from what has been said in this same article. The first consequence, however, is deduced from the two premises. The second, with respect to both parts, follows from the preceding. As to the first, namely, that such a superadded virtue ought to be more eminent, and distinct in species, from the obediential power of the intellect, or from the intensification of it, this is evident from the same. Because otherwise no virtue would be superadded to it with respect to an action more eminent, and distinct in species, from those which it can elicit of itself. As to the second, namely, that the concomitant influx of God into the vision itself, this too is evident. For that, with respect to which, in order to be produced, a cause stands in need of an elevation, cannot be the elevating virtue itself: as that, with respect to which a productive virtue is given, cannot be the productive force itself, as seems to follow from the very terms: therefore, if in order to elicit the vision of God the intellect stands in need of an elevating virtue, distinct in species from its innate power, such an elevating virtue cannot be the vision itself: therefore, since the concomitant concurrence of God in the vision is the very same thing as the vision is in God, and not something preliminary to it, the intellectual power cannot be elevated by such a concurrence so as to elicit it.

§ IV. The First Solution of the Adversaries, and Its Refutation.

53 This reason is so efficacious that all the solutions which can be applied to it from the doctrine of the adversaries remain refuted by the mere explanation and expansion of it. For in the first place their reply, namely that God can supply through his omnipotence the concurrence of the light, from the ground that all the efficiency of a secondary cause can be supplied by him, falls well enough from what has been said, even though otherwise, if he did not supply it, the activity of such a cause would be demanded.

For although God can effect by himself alone whatever secondary causes can, provided the secondary cause does not concur in the mode of a vital principle as such; nevertheless he cannot make it that the aforesaid cause attain such an effect, or elicit some action, without having on its own part sufficient virtue and efficacy with respect to it: therefore, since it has been shown that the intellect of itself does not have sufficient virtue and efficacy to elicit the vision of God, God cannot make it that he elicit it without bestowing on it a virtue proportionate to that end. The consequence follows from itself. The antecedent, however, also seems to be evident, both from the very terms; and also because otherwise that cause could, and could not, elicit that operation: it could indeed, as is supposed; but it could not, because without sufficient virtue and efficacy it cannot elicit it; and finally, because it is repugnant for a secondary cause to issue into a second act unless it be presupposed in its own order in a proportionate first act, since every effect, or operation, must be precontained in its cause, and in the first act of that cause: and consequently, neither by divine power can such a second act issue from it unless it have sufficient force and efficacy, by which it is constituted in the first act.

54 It is confirmed. For the light of glory does not concur precisely in the genus of an efficient cause with respect to the vision, but something of formal causality is intrinsically and indispensably commingled with it: therefore it cannot be supplied by God. The consequence is evident. Because God cannot supply a formal cause and its effect. The antecedent, however, is proved and explained. Because just as the Angelic intellect, insofar as it is a natural power, does not only concur to the Angelic intellection of the same order in the mode of an efficient cause, but something also of a formal, or specifying, cause is commingled there, on the ground that such an intellection denotes an intrinsic order and an indispensable dependence upon the intellect as upon its principle; and therefore God cannot make it that an Angelic intellection occur without the Angelic intellect; so also an intellection of the divine order must proceed from an intellectual power of the divine and supernatural order, not only as from an efficient principle, but in such a way that something of formal causality be commingled; and consequently, with respect to the aforesaid intellect, such an intellection will denote an intrinsic and indispensable relation, and the intellect itself will also have the character of a specifying principle with respect to it: therefore, since the light of glory constitutes the created intellect as a power of the supernatural and divine order, it follows that it not only concurs in the mode of an efficient principle, but something also of formal causality is commingled there.

§ V. The Second Evasion of the Adversaries, and Its Foreclosing.

55 Then, too, another solution which is usually applied from the doctrine of the adversaries falls from what has been said, namely that the intellect has a partial virtue through its own obediential power with respect to eliciting the vision of God as it is in itself, since the light is not the adequate cause of it: and so it suffices that another partial cause, namely God, influence the vision immediately with that simultaneous concurrence: not otherwise than as the power of two which Peter has for carrying a stone that resists, of four, is completed by another power of two, with which Paul influences in order to carry the same stone together with Peter, although the one does not influence the other, but each the effect.

This solution, therefore, no less than the preceding one, falls from the mere explanation of the reason of St. Thomas. For when the Saint Doctor denies to the intellect sufficient power for this, that it may be able to attain God, as he is in himself, without the light of glory, it is not because it has of itself a proximate virtue toward him as thus seen, and this is partial, and so it cannot elicit the vision by itself alone, as happens in the example proposed; but because of itself it has no proximate virtue at all, however partial, with respect to such a vision, but only a remote and radical one, on the ground that a proximate virtue, however partial, attaining some effect, must be of the same order as that effect, as may be seen in the same example adduced; and the intellect of itself is not of the same supernatural and divine order as God, as is clearly seen. Wherefore it will be repugnant that, taken of itself, it should concur even partially, however much God at the same time influence the vision through a purely simultaneous concurrence: since it implies that a cause acts without a proximate power of acting, as all theologians confess.

56 It is confirmed and explained. For on this ground the created intellect and will do not have even a partial proximate virtue for eliciting the supernatural acts of Faith, Hope, and Charity without some preceding grace, even if their obediential power belongs, according to that probable manner of speaking adduced in d. 1 of this treatise, to the supernatural order in the mode of pure capacity: therefore, since the beatific vision is also a supernatural and more excellent act, the intellect, that hypothesis still being granted, will not have the aforesaid virtue with respect to such a vision. The consequence is evident. The antecedent, however, is proved. For in the Council of Trent, sess. 6, canon 3, it is defined that man stands in need of preceding grace with respect to those acts; if, on the other hand, he had a proximate virtue of acting with respect to them, there would be no reason why such a preceding grace should be demanded in the powers eliciting them, but a concomitant grace would suffice.

Then again. For the insufficiency which St. Thomas ascribes to the created intellect, taken of itself, with respect to seeing God is of such a kind that that special and supernatural concurrence, by which God together with it would influence the vision, is not due to it thus taken by a title of connaturality: therefore the aforesaid insufficiency must also be of such a kind that not only can it not, considered of itself, influence the vision on the ground that it has only a partial virtue of acting, though a proximate one, but on the ground that in no wise does it have such a proximate virtue, however partial. The antecedent is evident. Because otherwise that concurrence would not be of the supernatural and divine order, since it would be due, under the title of connaturality, to the natural entity of the intellect. For, as the adversaries confess, its obediential power is not of itself of the supernatural order. The consequence, however, also follows. For to a partial proximate cause is due, under the title of connaturality, a union with another proximate and partial concause; and, being thus united to it, a proportionate concurrence is also due with respect to the action which it is going to elicit.

57 Furthermore. For the insufficiency and ineffectiveness which St. Thomas ascribes to the intellect of itself and without the light with respect to the vision of God arise from its inferiority and imperfection. If, on the other hand, the intellect of itself and through its own pure obediential power had a proximate virtue of acting, even a partial one, with respect to it, such inferiority and imperfection would not be in it: and so forth. The major follows. Because every insufficiency in the genus of an efficient cause arises from imperfection and inferiority: for just as this cause acts insofar as it is in act and perfect in itself, so its insufficiency takes its origin from potentiality, and consequently from inferiority and imperfection.

The minor, however, also follows. Because that which it has of itself, and from its innate virtue, as a proximate and partial power with respect to the supernatural vision, so that nothing concurs with it except that which concurs in the mode of an intellectual female, contains in the supernatural order all the perfection which can belong to it within the range of intellectual power: for the whole range of intellectual power extends only to this, that it can of its own virtue influence by itself, in the mode of a female and in the mode of a partial cause partial as to its cause, the most perfect of all acts, namely the beatific vision: whereas in the case of which we are speaking, the intellect alone would concur in the mode of an intellectual female, and in the mode of a partial cause in this order; otherwise that action, as it is in God, would be vital, and God himself, as concurring in this manner, would stand in need of a special reason in order to be fecundated through the species of a known object, as much in this as in other intellections of the supernatural order: therefore the aforesaid created intellect would contain all the perfection of the range of the created intellect, and consequently it would not be inferior in the character of intellectual power with respect to the beatific vision.

58 Finally, there is added the fact that the intellect, through its own obediential power, cannot have even an instrumental proximate virtue, by which in this order it might precontain in the first act any miraculous work: therefore neither through it can it have a proximate partial virtue with respect to the vision of God. The consequence is evident. Because the vision of God is produced by the intellect as by a principal cause, from the ground that it is contained within the range of its adequate act, namely of intellection. Yet it is certain that some virtue is of itself less proportionate to concurrence in the mode of a principal cause, even a partial one, in a second act according to the substance, supernatural and most perfect of all, such as the vision is, than to concurrence instrumentally in miraculous works: since the whole range of an instrumental cause of some order cannot reach the perfection which is contained in a principal cause, even a partial one, contained within that same order as the instrumental cause.

The antecedent, however, is proved. Because if the intellect had such a virtue, that obediential power of its own would be infinite with respect to the power of containing. For miraculous and supernatural effects transcend one another infinitely in perfection, at least accidentally: and all this perfection must be precontained simultaneously and at once in the physical instrument of which we are speaking, at least in its own order: so that although it be not of equal perfection with the effect, yet from the fact that it contains that effect in its own order, it is inferred that it must have some perfection in itself: and thus if it contains infinite effects, which mutually transcend one another in perfection, it cannot fail to be something infinitely perfect. But on these matters let those who teach what our Complutensians teach in the Physics, d. 12, from no. 14 to 16, be consulted.

§ VI. The Last Reply, and Its Overturning.

59 From all of which it remains that another solution of the adversaries is refuted, namely that the created intellect influences the vision instrumentally alone, and so stands in need of nothing except the sole influx of God into it, but not into the intellect. For since an instrument is not elevated to being, but to operating, it is not necessary that a principal cause imprint anything on it, but it suffices that it operate together with it: yet if something is ever imprinted on it, as happens at present, since the intellect is in fact elevated by the light of glory to see God, this is done only to the end that it may see more sweetly and more connaturally; and not because this also is necessary with respect to divine power.

For against this the reason already set forth presses, considered in this manner. For although we allowed the intellect to concur instrumentally alone in the vision, nevertheless, precisely because it is insufficient on its part with respect to it, and consequently stands in need of elevation in order to operate, it is elevated to the end that at least in its own order, namely in the mode of an instrument, it may contain in nature the same vision before it elicits it, and consequently to the end that it be constituted in the first operative act before the second, as follows from what was said in the preceding no.: therefore something pertaining to the order of being must be imprinted on it, through which it may contain the effect of the principal agent, namely the aforesaid vision, which it did not contain before its elevation. Especially because, as our Complutensians correctly show in 2, Physics, d. 12, q. 1, and as we shall say below in the following difficulty, by the mere subordination to God it cannot be constituted in the first act, even with respect to operating in its own order.

60 Then again, it is false that the intellect concurs instrumentally in the vision of God. For, as we shall say below, it cannot elicit it unless elevated by the light of glory; and thus elevated it attains it in the mode of a principal cause, as we touched upon above, art. 4: and the reason itself suggests this. Then because the beatific vision is an act connatural with respect to the light of glory, as we touched upon above, art. 2: and that same vision, and its object, are not outside the range of the adequate act and object of the intellect; whereas, as follows from what was said above, art. 1, dub. 1, for the character of a principal cause it suffices that it concur through the form under which that operation is connatural to it, and that such an operation and its object be contained under the adequate operation and object of that power.

Then also: because every nature concurs, by the intermediary of its own powers, in the mode of a principal cause to its own operations: but sanctifying grace has the character of a nature in the supernatural and divine order, and its own and connatural operation is to see God: therefore through its power of the divine order, namely through the light of glory, it will attain that same vision as a principal cause, and consequently the soul and the intellect also, as elevated by grace and light, will have this very thing: since, as we were just saying, they are elevated to the act and object contained under their own adequate act and object, and through a form having power in the mode of a principal cause, in the manner explained above, with respect to them. Hence Suarez does not rightly infer from the fact that the intellect concurs as elevated that it influences instrumentally, because elevation, together with the conditions already stated, does not draw the elevated thing out of the character of a principal cause.

§ VII. The Arguments against the Opinion Are Answered.

61 As to the first, it will be evident from what we shall say in the following difficulty, nn. 77 and 86.

As to the second, the antecedent being granted, the consequence is to be denied: both on account of the things which we shall immediately assert in the proofs of that same consequence; and also because, as follows from what has already been said, although God can, with the aforesaid limitation, effect by himself alone whatever is effected through secondary causes; nevertheless he cannot make it that they themselves effect their effects unless they have in the first act power with respect to them: here, however, we are not speaking of a vision produced in any way whatever; but of one produced by the created intellect.

And as to the first proof of that same consequence, the antecedent is to be denied. As to whose first and second proof it is to be said that the light is desired for the vision of God insofar as it is vital, with a vitality not of just any kind, but supernatural, which alone is found in it. For just as within the order of nature its own vitality is given, so also within the supernatural and divine order a supernatural vitality is found, according to that of John, The grace of God is eternal life: and so for this reason also God cannot supply the place of the light of glory through his concurrence. Hence, for the aforesaid vision, insofar as it is supernatural life, the natural vitality of the intellect does not suffice unless elevated through the light of glory.

As to the third proof, on the other hand, the answer is that the light of glory participates, as quo, in the supernatural vitality of the divine intellect, as to the vital efficacy which it enjoys with respect to seeing itself as it is in itself: and at the same time it adheres to the vital power, and thus nothing is lacking to it for the vision to proceed from it as from an intrinsic vital principle.

62 As to the third, the antecedent is to be granted according to what has been said above. Namely, in such a way that although the light is not the whole and adequate reason by the exclusion of the radical and remote virtue, yet it is the whole and adequate reason on the part of the power by the exclusion of another proximate virtue held on the part of that same power: because the intellect has of itself only a radical and incipient virtue. And then the consequence is to be denied. As to whose proof it is evident from what has been said that the antecedent is true whenever those causes are partial with the partiality of a proximate cause, so that each has its own proximate partial virtue of acting, as happens in the example adduced there; but otherwise when they are partial with the partiality of cause, in such a way that one is remote in its own order, and the other proximate. For then that which has only a remote and not a proximate virtue of acting in its own order (as happens in the present case) cannot operate unless such a proximate virtue be first bestowed upon it.

Lastly, the antecedent is to be let stand as regards its first part, and is to be denied as regards the second matter. As to whose proof a good answer will be given there. As to the refutation, on the other hand, against the solution given there, it will be evident from what is to be said in nn. 87 and 88.

The necessity of the created light of glory with respect to the vision of God, and the mode of its influx into the aforesaid vision, depends in the highest degree on the discussion of this difficulty: and therefore, so that we may explain it more thoroughly from the roots, we have raised it.

§ I. The affirming opinion.

63 The first opinion affirms that God is able to be united with the created intellect in the role of light, and that the aforesaid union is therefore sufficient, without a created light and together with the supernatural concurrence of God in the vision, for the created intellect to see him: in the precise mode in which they think it sufficient, namely that God be united by himself in the role of intelligible species without anything else inhering, so that the vision be elicited without a created and inhering species, yet with the supernatural concurrence of God. Thus some, whom Ledesma cites in De perfectione Dei, q. 8, art. 8, in the subarticle, and many others among the later writers: which Vincentius holds probable in the Relection on the grace of Christ, q. 6.

It is proved first. For the divine essence is its own being in every genus: therefore it will be able to be united with the created intellect in the role of the light of glory, in such a way that it constitutes it in the first act for the seeing of that same essence, without any created light of glory being added to it. The antecedent is established from what was said in art. 2 of this question; otherwise the divine essence would not be a pure act in every genus. The consequence, however, is proved. For it is able to be united in the role of species without inherence because it is its own being in the role of intelligible form, as we showed at the place cited: therefore, if in the same way it is its own being in the role of light, and hence possesses in advance every effect which the created light contains together with information and inherence, it will be able, by itself and having fallen most intimately into the intellect, without inhering in it, to communicate the aforesaid effect to it.

64 It is confirmed first. For the light of glory belongs to the intelligible order, as is evident from itself: and God is the purest form in the intelligible order: therefore he will be able to be united with the created intellect in the role of light. The consequence is evident, both because he is able to be united in the role of species because the species belongs to the intelligible order, and also because to be united intelligibly involves no imperfection, but rather the more perfect the form is, the better it can be united in this order: and therefore the Angelic substance, although it is something complete in the genus of substance, can be united with its own intellect in the role of intelligible form.

It is confirmed second. For the divine essence is able to be united in the role of species because the species does not confer the first power for acting; but presupposes the power and completes it, as we showed at the place cited: yet neither does the light confer the first power for seeing God, but presupposes the radical power of the intellect: therefore God will also be able to supply formally by himself the power and the defect of the light of glory.

65 It makes no difference if you say that the species is a complement which holds itself on the part of the object, and therefore extrinsic; whereas the light is a complement which holds itself on the part of the power, and consequently must also be intrinsic and inhering.

For the opposite is the case. For a complement's holding itself on the part of the power is nothing other than that it be intrinsic to the power itself and desired for its strengthening on its own side; but neither of these prevents God from accomplishing this whole thing by himself and in the manner described; and so on. The major seems certain. The minor, as to the first part, that is, as to intrinsicality, is evident. For the union of God's essence through influx is more intimate than the union of a created form through inherence, as we said at the place cited from Divus Thomas: therefore nothing on the score of intimacy stands in the way of God's being able to supply the office of the light of glory in the manner explained. As to the second part, too, it is established, because if the divine essence contains that very thing which is lacking on the part of the created power for the vision, and otherwise no union through inherence is required for the production of such an effect, as has been proved, and hence no imperfection is involved there, there is no reason to deny it of the divine essence, so that it performs this by the mode of form and without imperfections.

66 Second, the same opinion is proved principally. For a created formal cause is in need of information or inherence in order to impart its formal effect, because it is not itself such a formal effect: but the divine essence is its own formal effect in the role of light: therefore it is in need of neither information nor inherence in order to be united with the created intellect in the role of light and to impart to it what, on its own side, makes it efficacious for seeing God, and hence there will be no ground for the aforesaid union to be repugnant. This last consequence is plainly evident from the preceding one. The preceding, however, from both premises. The minor is established from what has been said: for God is infinite in the role of light, and consequently is his own formal effect in the role of light. The major, too, is established. For a created form is in need of information in order to cause and, so to speak, to emit outside itself its formal effect, because the information is itself the causality by which the form newly posits its formal effect in the nature of things: therefore, if that form were its own formal effect, it would be in need of neither information nor causality in order to posit that effect in the nature of things.

67 Third. For other inferior causes, from their conjunction and subordination to superior causes, without anything inhering in them, or informing them in entitative being, being superadded, can be shown to be sufficient in the first act with respect to an effect which they could not attain without such conjunction and subordination: therefore also the intellect, from its conjunction and subordination to God, insofar as it holds the role of uncreated light and as it assists him, can be constituted in the first act with respect to the vision, without another light intrinsic to it and inhering in it being communicated to it. The consequence is evident, both from parity of reason and also because the aforesaid superior causes do not assist the inferiors so intimately as God intimately assists the created intellect. The antecedent, however, is proved. For colors, from their subordination to light assisting them extrinsically, are made visible and sufficient in the first act for altering vision: the phantasm too, from its conjunction with the agent intellect, without anything intrinsic being superadded to it, becomes able to produce an intelligible species: and finally the cogitative power is made sufficient in the same way, by subordination to the possible intellect, for having some discourse.

68 It is confirmed from D. Thomas, 1st part, q. 106, art. 1, where he speaks thus: As the power of a lower body is strengthened by the positional proximity of a more perfect one, and a less hot thing grows hotter from the presence of a hotter one, so the intellectual power of a lower angel is confirmed by the conversion of a higher angel to it: therefore much more will the intellect be strengthened by the intimate assistance and the influx of God into it in the role of the light of glory — which is a kind of peculiar conversion of God to it — and be made able with respect to attaining actively an effect disproportioned to such a conversion, which, as is established, can be none other than the vision of God himself as he is in himself.

§ II. The prior assertion is proposed.

69 Nevertheless it must be said first that it involves a contradiction for God to be united with the created intellect in the role of the light of glory, and consequently that the aforesaid intellect, without a created light inhering in it, cannot even by divine power elicit the beatific vision. This assertion is sufficiently gathered from D. Thomas at the places cited in the preceding difficulty, and from what he teaches in this article and in art. 2, as we shall examine more at once: and thus Caietanus, Bannez, Zumel in the present case, Sotus, Capreolus, and the Thomists in general follow the Holy Doctor, as Gonzalez reports in this article, disput. 27, sect. 3.

Now, in order to set out the fundamental reason drawn from the same Holy Doctor, we must presuppose from him, in art. 2 of this question, that which we have often said, namely that the light of glory is distinguished in this from the intelligible species: for this holds itself on the part of the object, whereas the light holds itself on the part of the power, because it constitutes the intellect in the role of God's visive power: just as the intelligible species, from the fact that it holds itself on the part of the object, renders that intelligible. From this it also follows that, for this reason, the species must in like manner be measured against the perfection which it has in the role of species with respect to the object, so as not to be itself the very being of infinite perfection and immateriality in the role of object, but rather the intelligible species: and therefore, because God, as he is in himself, has infinite perfection and immateriality in the role of object, even the species representing him, as he is in himself, cannot fail to be in the role of species infinite in perfection and immateriality: likewise, because the light of glory holds itself on the part of the power, and is an elevation of the intellect in the order of vision, and hence the power without it does not hold the role of God's visive power, it too, as regards those things which are required of it on its own side, as distinguished from the object, must therefore be measured in the same proportional way, as regards its own entity and perfection in the role of light, with the aforesaid power. For a power which holds itself on the part of the operative power, elevating it and constituting it in the first act, means an essential ordering with respect to that same power, and is on account of it, as will be more established from what is to be said at once: and therefore it must be measured with that power, inasmuch as, although it is more perfect than the power itself — since it elevates it to a higher order — it nevertheless cannot fail to be bounded and narrowed according to its own entity and perfection through that power.

70 From this, therefore, the following reason is deduced. For it is repugnant for God to be united in the role of a form, or of any other thing, of itself and from within, that it be bounded and limited with respect to its own entity and perfection by that in which it is received; otherwise God would thus be united according to his entity at once infinite and finite: but the light of glory, elevating the power of a lower order so that it be on its own side proximally visive of God, demands of itself and from within to be measured with the created intellect and to be bounded and limited through it: therefore it will be repugnant for God to be united with it in the role of light with respect to the vision, and consequently for that vision to be elicited without a created light inhering in that same intellectual power.

This last consequence is evident. Because, as is established from what was said in the preceding difficulty, the concomitant influx of God into the vision itself is not sufficient, but it is required that God should influence something preliminary upon the intellect, and consequently something having the role of the light of glory, or of God's proximally visive power, which alone is lacking to the aforesaid intellect.

71 It is confirmed and explained first. It is repugnant for God to be united with the created intellect, or with any other creature whatever, in the role of a natural form, as we said above, art. 2, dub. 2: but by the very fact of being united in the role of the light of glory, he would be united in the role of a natural form: therefore it is repugnant that he be united in the role of light: and consequently that the intellect see God without a created and inhering light. The minor, in which alone lies the difficulty, is proved. For the intellect, if it is considered precisely together with the elevating light, has only the role of pure power in the intelligible order with respect to the divine essence and its own vision: therefore the light elevating the intellect has the role of a form only in entitative and natural being, and not in intelligible being: and hence God, as united in the role of light, will have the role of a form only in the entitative and natural order; but otherwise in the intelligible order, in which according to this reasoning he would be pure power.

72 It is confirmed second. For God is able to be united with the created intellect in the role of intelligible species, as with a secondary perfectionable; and likewise he can in the same way, that is, as with a secondary perfectionable, be united in the role of existence, or of subsistence, with human nature: because, just as he holds the role of intelligible form with respect to the created intellect, and the role of term with respect to human nature, so he is compared by the mode of intelligible form with respect to his own intellect, and by the mode of term with respect to his own essence and nature: but the divine essence cannot hold the role of a natural form with respect to God, as we showed at the place cited: therefore he cannot be united with the created intellect as with a secondary perfectionable through the mode of the aforesaid form: therefore, since a union in the role of light includes a union in the role of a natural form: as we were saying, the divine essence will not be able to be united in the role of light with the created intellect, even as with a secondary perfectionable. The major, which alone needs proof, is argued as follows. For although it is not necessary that a secondary perfectionable be perfected as the primary is, it must nevertheless be regarded by that which perfects it, or be regarded as it were, under the same formal relation as the primary perfectionable is regarded: for the whole reason for regarding a secondary perfectionable is that it be regarded by the primary: therefore the divine essence can regard, for example, through the mode of intelligible form, the created intellect as a secondary perfectionable, because in the same way, that is, through the mode of intelligible form, he regards the divine intellect as primary perfectionable.

73 It is confirmed third. Because the light of glory indispensably demands both that it pertain to the intelligible order and that it belong to the natural and entitative order: therefore God will not be able to be united with the created intellect in the role of light. The antecedent as to the first part is proved. For just as the intellect, with its natural quantity of power and with respect to natural and proportionate objects, is compared by the mode of pure power in the intelligible order with respect to the first form of this order, that is, with respect to the intelligible species, and according to this reasoning belongs to this order as pure power within it; so also the same intellect, with its supernatural quantity of power, that is, with the light of glory, and with respect to the supernatural object, namely God clearly seen, holds itself by the mode of pure power in the intelligible order with respect to the first supernatural and intelligible form, namely the divine essence, insofar as it holds the role of intelligible species: and therefore according to this reasoning it cannot fail to pertain to the intelligible order. As to the second part, the same antecedent is argued as follows. Because the intellect, with the light of glory and elevated through it, must actively influence, by the mode of power, the clear and quidditative vision of God, it cannot fail to have the role of an act and of a form in entitative and natural being: since according to this reasoning it must influence the intellection in accordance with that which the aforesaid intellection has of entitative and natural being. The consequence, however, is evident from what we have just said, namely that the divine essence cannot be united in the role of a natural form, although it can be united in the role of an intelligible form.

74 It makes no difference if it occurs to you that, for God to be united in the role of light, it is not necessary that he be united in the role of a natural form, or in entitative being; but it is enough to be united in the role of an act in this order. Wherefore, since the divine essence is in the aforesaid order the most perfect act, it will be able to be united in that way in which it could be united in the role of a natural form, if it had the true role of a form in this order.

For the opposite is the case in the first place. That, on the force of this solution, it is not clearly met by the proofs we have brought, will be evident to the reader in the second place.

For if the divine essence could be united in the role of the aforesaid act, and so by the mode of light with the created intellect, this union would have to be not in the role of an act considered thus in the entitative order, but in the role of such an act as is evident from itself: an act in entitative being, adequately, is divisible into an act which has the true role of informing form, and into one which has the true role of term: therefore, precisely because the essence cannot be united in the role of an informing form in natural and entitative being, neither will it be able to be united in the role of light.

The consequence is evident. Because the fact that the divine essence considered in natural and entitative being could hold the role of a term contributes nothing toward its being able to be united in the role of light, from the fact that the essence alone, or existence, and not the intellectual light, holds the role of a term in entitative and natural being: therefore, since nothing can be united with another in the role of an act unless in the role of a form or in the role of a term, and since union with a term contributes nothing here, it follows that, precisely because the divine essence cannot be united in the role of a natural form and in entitative being with the created intellect, it is also repugnant for it to be united with it in the role of light. The minor, however, is proved. For the essence of an angel, although it is a true act, nevertheless cannot be united with another angel, or with prime matter, by the mode of an act, because it does not hold the true role either of an informing form or of a term: but this sufficiently indicates that an act able to be united with another in entitative being must be either an informing form or a term in this order.

75 It is confirmed. For theologians labor greatly in explaining how the divine Word can be united with humanity without any imperfection; and in order to explain this, they have recourse, as it were, to the only way of doing it, that the Word is united by the mode of a pure term: but if for the union of God with something in entitative and natural being, by which a third one results, the role of a most perfect act were sufficient in it, there would be no reason for them to insist so anxiously on this point, that the union of the Word with humanity is by the mode of a term, in order to explain why no imperfection in God follows from it: for it would suffice for them to assert that this union is by the mode of a most perfect act: yet that they have recourse not to this but to the sole and pure reason of a term is altogether certain, as will be evident to the reader who considers them.

76 Finally, against the same solution stands the fact that in the intelligible order — which is as potent and as universal as the entitative natural order — nothing can be united by the mode of an act without being united either by the mode of an intelligible or an intellectual form, or by the mode of a term: therefore, likewise in the natural order, insofar as the natural order is distinguished — not indeed against the supernatural order, but against the intentional or intelligible one — nothing will be able to be united with another in the role of an act without being united with it either by the mode of a natural form or by the mode of a term in the same order. The consequence seems to hold from parity of reason. The antecedent, however, is proved. Because nothing can be united with another by the mode of an act in the intelligible order: unless it be either the impressed species itself, which is an intelligible form, or the expressed species, or word, which is an intellectual form, as our Complutenses teach in the books On the Soul, disp. 21, num. 42, and as we ourselves said in this same treatise, or unless it be the last term of this order, such as an intellection purely considered in intelligible being: since according to this reasoning it holds the role of existence in the aforesaid order, as will be evident from what we shall say in the treatise On the knowledge of God, disp. 4, num. 7, and in the treatise On the will of God, disp. 1, num. 21. Hence the other things which in this order are not united by either of these two modes do not have to be united by the mode of an act, but only by the mode of power in the same order, as is established of the intellect and the light of glory, or of other supernatural lights which are united with species and with intellection: just as these same things, insofar as they are united in the entitative and natural order, precisely because they have to be united by the mode of an act in this order, also have to be united by the mode of a natural form in the aforesaid order.

§ III. The later assertion is established.

77 It must be said second. The light of glory, which is indispensably required for the vision of God, is not a created light precisely by the mode of habit, but either this light by the mode of habit, or a created light by the mode of disposition, that is, by the mode of what is transient. Thus D. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 175, art. 3, ad 2, where he says: The divine essence cannot be seen by the created intellect except through the light of glory, of which it is said in the Psalm: In thy light we shall see light. Yet this can be participated in two ways. In one way, by the mode of an immanent form: and thus the blessed makes the saints in the homeland. In another way, by the mode of a certain transient passion, as has been said of the light of prophecy: and in this way that light was in Paul, lo, when he was carried up. The Holy Doctor, however, speaks by way of ordering to divine power, because in this article the treatment is of the vision communicated to Paul on the way, which was communicated not according to the common course, but from the absolute power of God. And this very thing is taught by the same Angelic Doctor in On truth, q. 13, art. 2, and q. 20, art. 2. Hence his disciples in general follow him, as we have related in the preceding assertion.

78 The fundamental reason, however, is drawn from this testimony of Divus Thomas, reduced however to this form. For other qualities constituting some power in the first act can be participated either by the mode of habit and permanently, or by the mode of disposition and transiently: therefore also the light of glory, constituting the intellect in the role of a power able to see God, will be able to be participated in both ways. The consequence is evident from parity of reason.

The antecedent, however, is also established. First, because it is commonly received by the Metaphysicians, and thus they distinguish habit from disposition, that is, what holds itself by the mode of habit from that which is like a disposition: for although either quality can turn about the same object, whether considered in the being of the thing or in the being of the object, of which we shall speak below; yet one is given by the mode of the permanent, namely habit, and the other by the mode of the transient, namely disposition, or what is given in its stead. Also, because, as the Thomists also admit, the will, for example, is sometimes constituted in the first act with respect to acts of charity by a habit corresponding to them, as when a just man having charity such as four breaks out into an act of the same intensity: but sometimes by some quality by the mode of what is transient, as when the same just man elicits an act more fervent than the habit of charity which he has. For since that excess is not sufficiently constituted in the first act by the habit, it must be constituted in the first act with respect to that excess by some other quality communicated by the mode of what is transient.

79 It is confirmed. The vision of God can be participated either by the mode of what is transient, as happened in Paul when he saw God while still on the way; or by the mode of what is permanent, as happens in the blessed: therefore, the light of glory also will be able to be communicated in both ways. The consequence is evident. Both from parity of reason, and also because, since the light of glory is the proper principle of the vision of God, it follows that, just as the vision itself can have that twofold mode of being, so also its principle can, since the vision is bound to the light and the light to the vision: and therefore, if the vision is by the mode of what is transient or by the mode of what is permanent, this same light too, proportion however being preserved, will be able to have that.

§ IV. The arguments of the first opinion are untangled.

80 As to the first argument, it is evident from what has been said. For granting the antecedent, the consequence must be denied. And for the proof, one must say that God is able to be united with the created intellect in the role of intelligible species, because he both holds the role of intelligible form and at the same time is his own being in this order. Yet, although God is his own being in the role of light, according to this consideration there does not correspond to him the role of a form proportionate to replacing the office of created light and elevating the intellectual power with respect to seeing God. First, because a light elevating, insofar as such, must necessarily be bounded by the power elevated, as has been said. Also, because, as we have already explained, the office of light cannot be supplied except by something having the role of a natural form in entitative being, all of which, as we showed above, are repugnant to divine perfection. Finally, because that which must elevate the created intellectual power in the role of light must hold in the intelligible order the role of pure proximate power, and render this office to the intellect with respect to the vision of God. Wherefore, since it is repugnant for the divine essence to have the role of pure power in any order, and consequently to communicate this office formally by itself to any creature, it will likewise be repugnant for it by itself to supply the place of the light of glory, and consequently to have the role of a form with respect to this effect. Most of all, because, as we said in dub. 3 of this treatise, num. 36, 37 and 38, the light of glory, and that which can supply its place, must concur in the genus of a material and receptive cause together with the intellect, in order to receive the vision: but the rendering of this office is repugnant to the infinite actuality of God.

81 As to the first confirmation, it is evident from what has just been said, that the light elevating the created power with respect to the vision belongs to the intelligible order by the mode of pure power in this order, and consequently holds the role of a form only in the natural and entitative order, whereas the intelligible species pertains to that order by the mode of a form in this same order: and therefore nothing is necessarily mixed into the species which holds the role of a form in the natural or entitative order, and consequently neither information nor inherence in that same entitative being. Hence the divine essence will be able to be united in the role of species and intelligible form, because this union, if it is pure in the intelligible order, involves no imperfection, as we showed above, art. 2, dub. 2; but otherwise in the role of light. Because, as we proved in this same difficulty, God can neither be united in the role of a natural form, nor have the role of such a form, nor communicate the role of pure power in the intelligible order to anyone by himself.

82 To the second confirmation the answer is given, that the divine essence is not able precisely to be united in the role of intelligible species because it presupposes, along with the first power for seeing God, also the first proximate power with respect to such a vision, or whatever is desired on the part of the visive power, and which indispensably demands to proceed from a natural form, as has been explained. Wherefore, since the light does not presuppose these things but necessarily involves the role of a natural form and moreover the role of pure power in the intelligible order, God cannot be united in the role of light. From these things enough is established regarding everything that is brought in the aforesaid confirmation.

83 As to the second principal proof, the major is to be distinguished: because it is not its own formal effect, taken in any sense, must be denied; and because it is not its own formal effect, in the sense that it is demanded of itself and from within on the part of that same effect not to be its own formal effect which it will render, must be granted. And then the minor also must be granted, according to what is to be said at once, but the consequence must be denied. Because, precisely since it is demanded on the part of the effect, of itself and from within, that the form which will render it not be the aforesaid effect, and consequently be finite and limited, it must be that the divine essence, which is infinite in the role of light, and is both that by which that same essence is seen and that which sees it, and consequently in this sense alone is (so to speak) its own quasi-formal-effect, cannot be a natural form, nor be united with the created intellect in the role of a natural form and by the mode of light. Hence, for the proof of the major, the antecedent is to be distinguished in the same proportional way. For the fact that a form in natural and entitative being is in need of information and causality is something demanded intrinsically by the formal effect, such that such an effect cannot be posited in the nature of things otherwise, nor can it in any other sense hold the role of a formal effect: and therefore, although God is, for example, his own existence, and his own being, and his own power of seeing himself, nevertheless these do not hold in him the role of a formal effect properly and in the strict sense of such, nor does he, so taken, hold the role of a natural form: because they are not united by a true causality and information.

Why, however, a natural form and its formal effect are so related to one another that the effect necessarily demands to arise from it in the aforesaid way, and the form itself unavoidably requires that it be finite and limited, indeed that it be an accidental entity, or that if it were substantial, it be then partial and incomplete, is established from what we said in this treatise, disp. 2, num. 52, and onwards: and therefore the whole breadth of substantial form cannot ascend above the perfection of the rational soul: and precisely because some substantial entity is given which is essentially more perfect, such as the entity of the lowest angel, who is an integral and complete substance, it cannot hold the role of a natural form.

84 As to the third, one must grant that the inferior cause is perfected by its conjunction with the superior: but thence something intrinsic, or inhering, is derived from the superior cause into the inferior. Hence color receives something real from light, as Aristotle admits in On the Soul 2, text 70, and as Cajetan admits in the same place, where he says that from a participation of light and of separated substances it receives the power to emit intentional species: and similarly the phantasm and the cogitative power receive something by which, elevated by the agent intellect, they can instrumentally influence toward the production of intelligible species; but these, from a participation of something derived to them by the possible intellect, become able to discourse in some way about singulars proportionate to them, as Capreolus well noted in 2, dist. 11, q. 2, art. 3.

85 To the confirmation the answer is given, with Báñez, in the same place, that the illumination of the lower angel by the higher, on account of which the higher angel is said to be converted to the lower, takes place by the mode of teaching, by proposing an object proportionate to that lower angel: and therefore it is not necessary that he imprint upon it any quality or light. Yet the peculiar conversion of God to the intellect of the blessed, by strengthening it and making it able with respect to the vision, is not by the mode of teaching, but by the mode of one giving the power required on the part of the power, as has been shown: and therefore it must be by the imprinting of some inhering power, as is evident from what has been said.

§ V. The arguments left over from the preceding difficulty are met.

86 As to the first, then, which was brought in favour of the first opinion in num. 45, it is established from what has been said. For Divus Thomas at the place cited wishes only that the light of glory not be indispensably necessary by the mode of habit for the vision of God, and not that it not be desired at least by the mode of what is transient. And this solution can be confirmed by the example adduced there by the Holy Doctor. For a certain quality was communicated to Peter, that he might walk upon the waters, by the mode of a transient disposition, on account of which he was able to perform that effect: this quality, however, as D. Thomas teaches in 3, part., q. 45, art. 2, was in a certain sense of the same reason as the essence with the dowry of the agility of the glorified body, although it differs from it in this, that it is not given by the mode of what is permanent, as the dowry under the conception of a dowry is given; but by the mode of what is transient.

87 To the last, left over from the same difficulty and brought in num. 48, a good answer is given there, as we said in num. 62. And to the proof to the contrary it is answered that, although it does not change the species whether it lasts little or much by accident, nevertheless to have such a nature as to demand of itself and from within that it last briefly, indicates some essential distinction from that which, from within, demands that it last long and have permanent being: the light of glory, however, communicated by the mode of what is transient, means a quality by the mode of disposition; communicated, on the contrary, in such a way that it has permanent being, it imports a quality by the mode of habit: and so it is demanded from within that that should last little and transiently, and this much and permanently: and therefore, although they are in a certain sense of the same reason on the part of form, insofar as each is the principle of the beatific vision, nevertheless they cannot fail to enjoy some essential distinction.

Nor does that which is adduced there about the vision of God stand in the way. For in this mode of speaking, the vision communicated to Paul on the way and that which he has in the homeland are essentially distinguished: because the former was in itself easily transient, since it did not take Paul out of the way; whereas the latter is in itself permanent, since it constitutes him in the relation and state of the blessed, and has an inseparable connection in the very nature of things with the light of glory by the mode of habit: wherefore the latter is of itself measured by a participated eternity; but the former is not.

88 It makes no difference if you object that the vision which is permanent in itself does not seem to belong to any species of quality: because not to disposition, since this is not permanent in itself; nor to habit, as is evident from itself; nor to any other species, as is evident from what our Complutenses teach in Disputationes de Logica 15: therefore such a vision will be impossible. For, as is established from what was said above, art. 2, it must necessarily belong to the predicament of quality.

It is answered that Aristotle knew only the qualities of the natural order, and not the qualities of the supernatural and divine order, and so it is not universally necessary that they belong to the predicament of quality, or to any of its species, in the way in which other natural qualities belong. Wherefore, although the vision is a true quality, yet by reason of its eminence it has something of disposition, namely actuality, and something of habit, namely permanence, and accordingly it is a certain eminent disposition consisting in a quality which is in itself most actual and permanent.

The conclusion is affirmative.