Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

2 In considering the title, we added that qualification, by God's absolute power. For in fact, whether by God's ordained power or by God's absolute power, all theologians agree that the intellect in question neither exists nor can exist. Yet what we say and investigate concerning the intellect must be understood in an equal and proportionate sense concerning intellectual substance; for whatever belongs to the intellect by its own powers and by the mode of proximate potency must likewise belong to substance in the same proportionate mode, namely, by the mode of a radical principle.

§ I. The recent opinion of Molina.

Molina defends the affirmative position in the article immediately following, Disp. 2, quod vero. Its foundation is this: because the intellect together with the light of glory is something finite, God will therefore be able to produce some intellect of the natural order with such power of understanding as the intellect has together with the light of glory; and consequently the intellect in question will be able by its own powers to do what the intellect with the light can do, namely, see God by essence. The antecedent is certain. The first consequence, however, is proved as follows: because God can produce within the natural order one that is more perfect, and a more perfect intellect, even to infinity; if, therefore, the intellect with the light of glory is of finite perfection, it will be possible to reach some intellect that equals it in perfection, or even surpasses it.

It is confirmed first. God is within the range of the intellect's object; therefore, since greater and greater perfection of intellects can increase even to infinity, there will be possible some intellect able to see God immediately from itself. The consequence is evident, because whatever object lies within the range of the power does not cease to be immediately terminated by that power through a defect of essential commensurability with the object itself, but through a defect of powers and perfection. Therefore, if these powers and this perfection increase more and more, and so to infinity, it will be possible to reach an intellect possessing the aforesaid powers and the perfection needed to see such an object.

It is confirmed second. For that sight can exist which immediately beholds any visible object, however excellent, as it is in itself, because the object is contained under the adequate object of that sight, and because sight itself can grow in natural perfection and efficacy. Hence, although several powers of sight cannot immediately behold the sun as it is in itself without injury, nevertheless, if sight grows in perfection and efficacy, it can behold it in that way, as occurs in eagles; therefore, since God is contained within the range of the adequate object of the intellect, and since, given any intellect, another and another can be found greater in natural perfection, it will follow that it will be possible to reach one able to attain God immediately and as God is in himself.

§ II. The common opinion is established.

3 It must nevertheless be said that not even by divine power can there be an intellect of the natural order able to see God as he is in himself by its own powers. Thus St. Thomas in the present article, in these words: I answer that it is impossible for any created intellect to see God's essence by its natural powers. He is speaking of the impossibility even with respect to divine power, as is clear from the context and from the reasoning that he subjoins. All theologians accordingly follow him, and hence it is unnecessary to cite anyone in particular.

This is proved first by the reasoning of St. Thomas in the present article, which can be reduced to the following form. Precisely because the knower is within the order of nature, knowledge, proceeding from it as such, cannot fail to be within that same order and to be terminated in a natural object; but vision of God by essence is of the supernatural and divine order, as we said above and shall explain more fully below. Therefore, no intellect can elicit the aforesaid vision by the powers of the natural order. The minor, together with the consequence, is sufficiently constant. The major, however, is proved as follows: because knowledge occurs according as the known is in the knower, and the known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower itself; therefore, the knowledge of any knower must be proportionate to it and according to the mode of its nature. Consequently, if the knower as such is within the natural order, its knowledge proportionate to it must also be within that same order and with respect to a natural object.

4 It is confirmed first by the reasoning of the same St. Thomas in this same article, which we touched upon above. For an intellectual power that by its own powers connaturally attains some object insofar as it is what it is and as it is in itself must have the same immateriality as the known object; but it is impossible for a created intellect of the natural order to have the same immateriality as God, who is pure act. Therefore, it will likewise be impossible for the aforesaid intellect to attain God by its own powers insofar as he is what he is and as he is in himself. The minor, together with the consequence, is sufficiently constant. The major, moreover, is evident from what was said in art. 2, where we established it; then, by a general induction in all cognitive powers; and also because the known cannot be wholly connatural to the knower, and therefore neither can the knower, as we explained there in dub. 6, attain that thing by its own powers insofar as it is what it is and as it is in itself, unless both agree in degree of immateriality, such that the known does not exceed the immateriality of the knower, or its degree of immateriality.

It is confirmed second by the reasoning taught by the same St. Thomas in several places. It is impossible for the intellect to be of the natural order and to behold God as he is in himself, such that it can see him by its own powers; therefore, and so forth. The antecedent is proved as follows: just as God is understood to be a supernatural being, that is, above the whole created and creatable nature, insofar as he is in himself—for all the perfections that are in him according to the mode of being that they have in him exceed the whole created and creatable nature, and are therefore supernatural—so an intellect participating in God as he is in himself, and consequently capable of seeing him as he is in himself, would not be something supernatural.

5 Second, the assertion is proved principally by the reasoning of St. Thomas, Contra gentiles, bk. 3, chap. 52. For to know God clearly and intuitively is proper and connatural to God, just as it is proper and connatural to fire to heat and to the sun to illuminate. Therefore, a created intellect cannot by its own natural power see God as he is. The antecedent is evident both because, since it is proper to God to be of intellectual nature by the mode of purest act, it will certainly be proper and most natural for him to know as he is the divine essence itself, which is purest act; and also because to operate by one's own form, and consequently by one's own powers, is alone natural and proper to that in which such a form is innermost and proper, but not to that in which it is extrinsic. Therefore, since vision of God by essence must be elicited through the divine form, namely, through God's essence united in the role of an intelligible form, it cannot be proper and natural to operate through that form by one's own powers except to that whose proper form it is, namely, the divine intellect. The consequence, moreover, is proved as follows: what is proper to a higher nature cannot be attained by a lower nature through its own powers except through the action of the higher nature and by the power of that of which it is proper, as is seen in the examples adduced. Thus nothing can heat except by the power of fire and through participation in it, or in some higher agent.

6 It makes no difference if, against this reasoning, one objects that it follows from it that a created intellect is never the principal cause of the vision of God by essence, but only God is; because whenever an action is proper to a higher nature, it is always attributed to that nature, not as to a universal agent, but as to a particular agent to whom such an action corresponds. Thus illumination is always attributed to the sun as to a particular cause. Therefore, if seeing God is a proper and natural action of a higher nature, namely, the divine essence, it must be attributed to God as principal and particular agent, and consequently not to a creature, except insofar as the creature sustains the reason of acting. This last consequence is evident. It is also evident because for the same reason heating is attributed to a warm body only insofar as it sustains the reason of acting, since that heating must be attributed to fire as principal and particular cause. Likewise, with respect to the same action, two particular agents cannot exist.

For there are two kinds of lower and alien nature to which the proper and connatural action of the higher nature is communicated: one has no power with respect to such an action, even a radical and incipient power; the other, however, has it insofar as the aforesaid action is contained within its adequate object. Thus, although the first kind of nature participating in the action of the higher nature cannot concur in it as principal cause—inasmuch as it is elevated or actuated through the power of the higher nature, as occurs in water with respect to heating—the other kind of nature, having at least a radical power with respect to the aforesaid operation insofar as it is contained under its adequate object, can do otherwise. For just as for this reason they are perfected, so to speak, within their proper line by the power of the higher agent, so, insofar as they can thus be actuated, they can act as principal causes, because they act through an action contained in the manner indicated within the adequate range of their nature.

7 Nor does the twofold proof adduced there stand in the way. Not, indeed, the first: because heating is not contained within the adequate range of actions with respect to which water has any proper and innate power. Nor the second, namely, that two particular agents cannot exist with respect to the same action; because—as our men of Alcalá rightly noted in the Liber de generatione, disp. 9, no. 56—it is not inconsistent for one and the same action to proceed from a twofold particular agent, provided that they touch it under two reasons subordinated to one another, although each is contained within the line of reasons corresponding to particular agents. Thus the first act of the angelic will proceeded from God as from a particular cause, and for this reason such an act could not be sinful; and the very same act also proceeded from the angelic will as from a proximate cause, because it was the vital cause of the latter, although it proceeded from God insofar as it bears the likeness of a property of the angelic will; but from the angel insofar as it was the vital act of his proper will. Hence the same created vision of God by essence, insofar as it is a participation of the uncreated vision as it is in itself and is related to it as to a vision in every way connatural to God, proceeds from God as from a proximate cause, because according to this reasoning it proceeds from the light of glory insofar as this is the power of God himself, and in a certain sense holds itself on God's part as from the efficient cause that elevates the intellect to such a vision. The same vision, insofar as it is vital both with supernatural vitality and with vitality peculiar to itself, since the latter is at least derived inadequately from such a vital power, namely, from the intellect elevated through the light of glory, proceeds from the intellect thus elevated as from a principal cause. It proceeds from such a light insofar as it holds itself on the part of the intellect and, reduplicatively speaking, is intrinsic to it with respect to an operation contained under the adequate object of that same intellect. Likewise, the same vision, insofar as it is an action immediately attaining God as he is in himself and has its most ultimate reason with respect to the last function proper to it, proceeds from the divine essence insofar as it has the role of an intelligible form.

We have said that, reduplicatively speaking, it is intrinsic to it, because although the light of glory, insofar as it holds itself on God's part, is also intrinsic to, or inherent in, the intellect, it is nevertheless not the power of God himself nor does it hold itself on God's part. It is intrinsic to that same intellect because it is a participation of God's power with respect to its proper and most connatural operation, but insofar as it holds itself on the part of the power, it at least brings with it, among other things, that it is itself intrinsic to the power, and thus that vitality which is peculiar to it is intrinsic to the intellect and holds itself on the intellect's part.

8 From this, first, it follows that when it is commonly said that an action is proper to some higher nature precisely because it is produced by that nature alone as principal cause, this must be understood with the following limitation: namely, either it is produced by that nature alone in this way, or, if it proceeds from another cause as principal cause, as occurs here, then that cause must not have principal influence unless the higher nature, whose most proper action it is, also exerts principal influx upon the same action according to the reasoning considered above. The other cause, for which such an action is not so proper, must first communicate at least the quantity of power from which, together with the essential commensurability presupposed in the lower nature, one complete total and principal cause is constituted.

In a second way, another objection that can be made against what has been said is answered here, namely, the objection that God is thereby seen to see himself through the created act of seeing by which the blessed man sees him, which nevertheless, as is clear from the common opinion of the Doctors, must be denied. The conclusion is evident. For fire heats through the heating by which an animal is warmed because that action proceeds from fire itself as principal and particular cause. Therefore, if that vision proceeds from God as particular and principal cause, nothing prevents him from seeing himself through that vision, just as for this reason the blessed man beholds him through the same vision.

For the answer is that to see signifies intrinsically and essentially a vital action proceeding from an intrinsic vital principle and influencing in a vital manner. Thus only the aforesaid principle, from which vision proceeds in a vital manner, can see God through it. Hence, since that vision, as it proceeds from God through the light insofar as the light is God's power, does not proceed from him as from an intrinsic vital principle—because it does not proceed from him as from something reduplicatively and most formally speaking intrinsic to the intellect, and therefore does not proceed from him as from a united, or intrinsic, principle of that kind, which is required for the role of a vital principle—it follows that through such a vision only the created intellect filled with the light of glory, from which vision proceeds as from a vital principle, sees God, and not God himself, although in the manner just explained God is its principal and proximate cause. Most of all, because seeing is an immanent action and does not denominate the one who sees unless he is that principle from which it is elicited and in whom it is received. Thus, although God produces the created vision, he does not receive it, and therefore will not be denominated seeing by it.

§ III. The arguments of the first opinion are answered.

9 To the first, the antecedent must be granted and the consequence denied. Even if the antecedent is granted in support of the proof, the consequence must still be denied. For whenever something is of a higher and more eminent order, however much something of a lower order grows and is elevated within that order, it cannot reach the perfection of the higher thing. Thus, however great an ascent occurs in more perfect forms contained under material substance within the natural order, one will never reach a form equaling the angel in specific perfection. Hence, since the intellect filled with the light of glory is of a higher and divine order, no intellect of a lower and natural order can equal its perfection, however great an ascent may occur in the aforesaid intellects; for all of them always remain, as is supposed, within the lower order, namely, the order of intellects belonging to the natural order.

10 To the first confirmation, when the antecedent is granted, the consequence must be denied. With respect to the proof, it must be said that when the object contained under the adequate object of the power is disproportionate and supernatural, the power does not cease to be terminated in it through a defect of any powers whatsoever, but through a defect of supernatural powers of the divine order. Therefore, however much it grows in natural powers, it cannot attain that object until it is supported by supernatural powers. Hence, although God clearly seen is contained under the adequate object of the intellect, he is nevertheless contained under it in the manner of an object that surpasses it and is supernatural. Consequently, until the intellect is perfected by the supernatural light of glory, it cannot see God, however many more natural powers are superadded to it.

An answer to the second confirmation is given for the present by conceding that, if there is an ascent within the range of bodily sight in the natural order, it will be possible to reach a sight able to attain any visible object without injury, because that visible object will always be contained within the natural order, as is now supposed. God clearly seen, however, is not contained within the natural order. Therefore, however great an ascent occurs among intellects of the natural order, one will never reach an intellect able to attain him by its own powers. Hence, if it is true that the clarity of the glorified body is supernatural, then no matter how much the eye of the blessed man grows in natural perfection, it cannot behold that clarity by its own powers.