Prooemium, and the Division of the whole Work

Quaestio I: On the Simplicity of God

Dubium I: Whether by the absolute power of God there is possible some intellect which by the powers proper to it of the natural order could see God as He is in Himself

2 In considering the title, we added that qualification, by God's absolute power. For in fact, whether by God's ordained power or by God's absolute power, all theologians agree that the intellect in question neither exists nor can exist. Yet what we say and investigate concerning the intellect must be understood in an equal and proportionate sense concerning intellectual substance; for whatever belongs to the intellect by its own powers and by the mode of proximate potency must likewise belong to substance in the same proportionate mode, namely, by the mode of a radical principle.

§ I. The recent opinion of Molina.

Molina defends the affirmative position in the article immediately following, Disp. 2, quod vero. Its foundation is this: because the intellect together with the light of glory is something finite, God will therefore be able to produce some intellect of the natural order with such power of understanding as the intellect has together with the light of glory; and consequently the intellect in question will be able by its own powers to do what the intellect with the light can do, namely, see God by essence. The antecedent is certain. The first consequence, however, is proved as follows: because God can produce within the natural order one that is more perfect, and a more perfect intellect, even to infinity; if, therefore, the intellect with the light of glory is of finite perfection, it will be possible to reach some intellect that equals it in perfection, or even surpasses it.

It is confirmed first. God is within the range of the intellect's object; therefore, since greater and greater perfection of intellects can increase even to infinity, there will be possible some intellect able to see God immediately from itself. The consequence is evident, because whatever object lies within the range of the power does not cease to be immediately terminated by that power through a defect of essential commensurability with the object itself, but through a defect of powers and perfection. Therefore, if these powers and this perfection increase more and more, and so to infinity, it will be possible to reach an intellect possessing the aforesaid powers and the perfection needed to see such an object.

It is confirmed second. For that sight can exist which immediately beholds any visible object, however excellent, as it is in itself, because the object is contained under the adequate object of that sight, and because sight itself can grow in natural perfection and efficacy. Hence, although several powers of sight cannot immediately behold the sun as it is in itself without injury, nevertheless, if sight grows in perfection and efficacy, it can behold it in that way, as occurs in eagles; therefore, since God is contained within the range of the adequate object of the intellect, and since, given any intellect, another and another can be found greater in natural perfection, it will follow that it will be possible to reach one able to attain God immediately and as God is in himself.

§ II. The common opinion is established.

3 It must nevertheless be said that not even by divine power can there be an intellect of the natural order able to see God as he is in himself by its own powers. Thus St. Thomas in the present article, in these words: I answer that it is impossible for any created intellect to see God's essence by its natural powers. He is speaking of the impossibility even with respect to divine power, as is clear from the context and from the reasoning that he subjoins. All theologians accordingly follow him, and hence it is unnecessary to cite anyone in particular.

This is proved first by the reasoning of St. Thomas in the present article, which can be reduced to the following form. Precisely because the knower is within the order of nature, knowledge, proceeding from it as such, cannot fail to be within that same order and to be terminated in a natural object; but vision of God by essence is of the supernatural and divine order, as we said above and shall explain more fully below. Therefore, no intellect can elicit the aforesaid vision by the powers of the natural order. The minor, together with the consequence, is sufficiently constant. The major, however, is proved as follows: because knowledge occurs according as the known is in the knower, and the known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower itself; therefore, the knowledge of any knower must be proportionate to it and according to the mode of its nature. Consequently, if the knower as such is within the natural order, its knowledge proportionate to it must also be within that same order and with respect to a natural object.

4 It is confirmed first by the reasoning of the same St. Thomas in this same article, which we touched upon above. For an intellectual power that by its own powers connaturally attains some object insofar as it is what it is and as it is in itself must have the same immateriality as the known object; but it is impossible for a created intellect of the natural order to have the same immateriality as God, who is pure act. Therefore, it will likewise be impossible for the aforesaid intellect to attain God by its own powers insofar as he is what he is and as he is in himself. The minor, together with the consequence, is sufficiently constant. The major, moreover, is evident from what was said in art. 2, where we established it; then, by a general induction in all cognitive powers; and also because the known cannot be wholly connatural to the knower, and therefore neither can the knower, as we explained there in dub. 6, attain that thing by its own powers insofar as it is what it is and as it is in itself, unless both agree in degree of immateriality, such that the known does not exceed the immateriality of the knower, or its degree of immateriality.

It is confirmed second by the reasoning taught by the same St. Thomas in several places. It is impossible for the intellect to be of the natural order and to behold God as he is in himself, such that it can see him by its own powers; therefore, and so forth. The antecedent is proved as follows: just as God is understood to be a supernatural being, that is, above the whole created and creatable nature, insofar as he is in himself—for all the perfections that are in him according to the mode of being that they have in him exceed the whole created and creatable nature, and are therefore supernatural—so an intellect participating in God as he is in himself, and consequently capable of seeing him as he is in himself, would not be something supernatural.

5 Second, the assertion is proved principally by the reasoning of St. Thomas, Contra gentiles, bk. 3, chap. 52. For to know God clearly and intuitively is proper and connatural to God, just as it is proper and connatural to fire to heat and to the sun to illuminate. Therefore, a created intellect cannot by its own natural power see God as he is. The antecedent is evident both because, since it is proper to God to be of intellectual nature by the mode of purest act, it will certainly be proper and most natural for him to know as he is the divine essence itself, which is purest act; and also because to operate by one's own form, and consequently by one's own powers, is alone natural and proper to that in which such a form is innermost and proper, but not to that in which it is extrinsic. Therefore, since vision of God by essence must be elicited through the divine form, namely, through God's essence united in the role of an intelligible form, it cannot be proper and natural to operate through that form by one's own powers except to that whose proper form it is, namely, the divine intellect. The consequence, moreover, is proved as follows: what is proper to a higher nature cannot be attained by a lower nature through its own powers except through the action of the higher nature and by the power of that of which it is proper, as is seen in the examples adduced. Thus nothing can heat except by the power of fire and through participation in it, or in some higher agent.

6 It makes no difference if, against this reasoning, one objects that it follows from it that a created intellect is never the principal cause of the vision of God by essence, but only God is; because whenever an action is proper to a higher nature, it is always attributed to that nature, not as to a universal agent, but as to a particular agent to whom such an action corresponds. Thus illumination is always attributed to the sun as to a particular cause. Therefore, if seeing God is a proper and natural action of a higher nature, namely, the divine essence, it must be attributed to God as principal and particular agent, and consequently not to a creature, except insofar as the creature sustains the reason of acting. This last consequence is evident. It is also evident because for the same reason heating is attributed to a warm body only insofar as it sustains the reason of acting, since that heating must be attributed to fire as principal and particular cause. Likewise, with respect to the same action, two particular agents cannot exist.

For there are two kinds of lower and alien nature to which the proper and connatural action of the higher nature is communicated: one has no power with respect to such an action, even a radical and incipient power; the other, however, has it insofar as the aforesaid action is contained within its adequate object. Thus, although the first kind of nature participating in the action of the higher nature cannot concur in it as principal cause—inasmuch as it is elevated or actuated through the power of the higher nature, as occurs in water with respect to heating—the other kind of nature, having at least a radical power with respect to the aforesaid operation insofar as it is contained under its adequate object, can do otherwise. For just as for this reason they are perfected, so to speak, within their proper line by the power of the higher agent, so, insofar as they can thus be actuated, they can act as principal causes, because they act through an action contained in the manner indicated within the adequate range of their nature.

7 Nor does the twofold proof adduced there stand in the way. Not, indeed, the first: because heating is not contained within the adequate range of actions with respect to which water has any proper and innate power. Nor the second, namely, that two particular agents cannot exist with respect to the same action; because—as our men of Alcalá rightly noted in the Liber de generatione, disp. 9, no. 56—it is not inconsistent for one and the same action to proceed from a twofold particular agent, provided that they touch it under two reasons subordinated to one another, although each is contained within the line of reasons corresponding to particular agents. Thus the first act of the angelic will proceeded from God as from a particular cause, and for this reason such an act could not be sinful; and the very same act also proceeded from the angelic will as from a proximate cause, because it was the vital cause of the latter, although it proceeded from God insofar as it bears the likeness of a property of the angelic will; but from the angel insofar as it was the vital act of his proper will. Hence the same created vision of God by essence, insofar as it is a participation of the uncreated vision as it is in itself and is related to it as to a vision in every way connatural to God, proceeds from God as from a proximate cause, because according to this reasoning it proceeds from the light of glory insofar as this is the power of God himself, and in a certain sense holds itself on God's part as from the efficient cause that elevates the intellect to such a vision. The same vision, insofar as it is vital both with supernatural vitality and with vitality peculiar to itself, since the latter is at least derived inadequately from such a vital power, namely, from the intellect elevated through the light of glory, proceeds from the intellect thus elevated as from a principal cause. It proceeds from such a light insofar as it holds itself on the part of the intellect and, reduplicatively speaking, is intrinsic to it with respect to an operation contained under the adequate object of that same intellect. Likewise, the same vision, insofar as it is an action immediately attaining God as he is in himself and has its most ultimate reason with respect to the last function proper to it, proceeds from the divine essence insofar as it has the role of an intelligible form.

We have said that, reduplicatively speaking, it is intrinsic to it, because although the light of glory, insofar as it holds itself on God's part, is also intrinsic to, or inherent in, the intellect, it is nevertheless not the power of God himself nor does it hold itself on God's part. It is intrinsic to that same intellect because it is a participation of God's power with respect to its proper and most connatural operation, but insofar as it holds itself on the part of the power, it at least brings with it, among other things, that it is itself intrinsic to the power, and thus that vitality which is peculiar to it is intrinsic to the intellect and holds itself on the intellect's part.

8 From this, first, it follows that when it is commonly said that an action is proper to some higher nature precisely because it is produced by that nature alone as principal cause, this must be understood with the following limitation: namely, either it is produced by that nature alone in this way, or, if it proceeds from another cause as principal cause, as occurs here, then that cause must not have principal influence unless the higher nature, whose most proper action it is, also exerts principal influx upon the same action according to the reasoning considered above. The other cause, for which such an action is not so proper, must first communicate at least the quantity of power from which, together with the essential commensurability presupposed in the lower nature, one complete total and principal cause is constituted.

In a second way, another objection that can be made against what has been said is answered here, namely, the objection that God is thereby seen to see himself through the created act of seeing by which the blessed man sees him, which nevertheless, as is clear from the common opinion of the Doctors, must be denied. The conclusion is evident. For fire heats through the heating by which an animal is warmed because that action proceeds from fire itself as principal and particular cause. Therefore, if that vision proceeds from God as particular and principal cause, nothing prevents him from seeing himself through that vision, just as for this reason the blessed man beholds him through the same vision.

For the answer is that to see signifies intrinsically and essentially a vital action proceeding from an intrinsic vital principle and influencing in a vital manner. Thus only the aforesaid principle, from which vision proceeds in a vital manner, can see God through it. Hence, since that vision, as it proceeds from God through the light insofar as the light is God's power, does not proceed from him as from an intrinsic vital principle—because it does not proceed from him as from something reduplicatively and most formally speaking intrinsic to the intellect, and therefore does not proceed from him as from a united, or intrinsic, principle of that kind, which is required for the role of a vital principle—it follows that through such a vision only the created intellect filled with the light of glory, from which vision proceeds as from a vital principle, sees God, and not God himself, although in the manner just explained God is its principal and proximate cause. Most of all, because seeing is an immanent action and does not denominate the one who sees unless he is that principle from which it is elicited and in whom it is received. Thus, although God produces the created vision, he does not receive it, and therefore will not be denominated seeing by it.

§ III. The arguments of the first opinion are answered.

9 To the first, the antecedent must be granted and the consequence denied. Even if the antecedent is granted in support of the proof, the consequence must still be denied. For whenever something is of a higher and more eminent order, however much something of a lower order grows and is elevated within that order, it cannot reach the perfection of the higher thing. Thus, however great an ascent occurs in more perfect forms contained under material substance within the natural order, one will never reach a form equaling the angel in specific perfection. Hence, since the intellect filled with the light of glory is of a higher and divine order, no intellect of a lower and natural order can equal its perfection, however great an ascent may occur in the aforesaid intellects; for all of them always remain, as is supposed, within the lower order, namely, the order of intellects belonging to the natural order.

10 To the first confirmation, when the antecedent is granted, the consequence must be denied. With respect to the proof, it must be said that when the object contained under the adequate object of the power is disproportionate and supernatural, the power does not cease to be terminated in it through a defect of any powers whatsoever, but through a defect of supernatural powers of the divine order. Therefore, however much it grows in natural powers, it cannot attain that object until it is supported by supernatural powers. Hence, although God clearly seen is contained under the adequate object of the intellect, he is nevertheless contained under it in the manner of an object that surpasses it and is supernatural. Consequently, until the intellect is perfected by the supernatural light of glory, it cannot see God, however many more natural powers are superadded to it.

An answer to the second confirmation is given for the present by conceding that, if there is an ascent within the range of bodily sight in the natural order, it will be possible to reach a sight able to attain any visible object without injury, because that visible object will always be contained within the natural order, as is now supposed. God clearly seen, however, is not contained within the natural order. Therefore, however great an ascent occurs among intellects of the natural order, one will never reach an intellect able to attain him by its own powers. Hence, if it is true that the clarity of the glorified body is supernatural, then no matter how much the eye of the blessed man grows in natural perfection, it cannot behold that clarity by its own powers.

Dubium II: Whether by divine power there can be possible some substances and some intellects for which the light of glory is connatural, and which can see God by essence by their own powers?

11 Others raise this difficulty in different words: whether, namely, there can be given some substance of the supernatural order and some intellect which, without any elevation superadded to it, has being supernatural. But in truth both ways of putting the question coincide. For the light of glory cannot fail to be connatural to a substance and intellect of the supernatural order, even though that light itself be supernatural; and consequently the aforesaid substance can see God by essence by its own powers. For such a substance would owe, by what is due to connaturality, the supernatural concurrence toward seeing Him, as is clear from itself, from what will be said immediately, and from the common opinion of the Doctors. Although the decision of this difficulty follows almost entirely from what we said in article 2, nevertheless, because several arguments that are not to be despised, and the reasoning of St. Thomas, are brought by the opponents against the opinion, it seemed proper to meet them and leave the reasoning of the Holy Doctor clearly established by treating each separately.

§ I. The first way of arguing is introduced.

12 Major maintains the affirmative position in 4. dist. 49. quaest. 4. at the end, and Molina in the following article, disp. 2. § quod vero, defending it as probable insofar as he holds that the opposite has not been sufficiently proved and therefore can be brought about by God, since nothing may be denied to divine power without sufficient foundation and reason.

Proof, first. For God can produce a supernatural substance and intellect; therefore the light of glory would be connatural to such a substance and intellect; therefore it could see God by essence by its own powers. This final inference is evident. Since the very fact that the light of glory were connatural to it would allow it to see God without that light, although not so easily, as God is in Himself, for a substance and intellect to which any habit is connatural can absolutely and simpliciter attain what it could attain more easily with that habit, although not easily. Thus the human intellect, to which the habit of metaphysics is connatural, can elicit a metaphysical demonstration from itself and without that habit, though with difficulty, which it could elicit easily and delightedly with it.

13 The first inference, however, follows from the antecedent. For when such a substance were of the same supernatural and divine order, there is no reason why the light of glory, which is contained within the aforesaid order, should not be connatural to it. The antecedent is proved as follows. The aforesaid substance is not incompatible either insofar as it is a substance, since the reason for a supernatural substance is found in God; nor insofar as it would be created, since the light of glory and the other accidents of the supernatural order are created; nor, finally, insofar as both reasons are taken together. For, in the first place, a repugnance arising from either side presupposes a repugnance arising from one side. In the second place too, the union is something substantial and created and at the same time supernatural: the union of a created nature with the divine suppositum. Thus there is no repugnance between joining the reason of a created substance with the reason of supernaturality.

Second. For in fact the light of glory is given, and it belongs to the intellectual and supernatural order; therefore at least possibly there can be given a supernatural intellectual substance, and consequently also an intellect of the same order. The antecedent is certain. The first inference is proved as follows: every accident, such as the light of glory, posits an essential and connatural order to some substance, since its being is the being of a being, that is, of a substance. Therefore, since the aforesaid intellectual light cannot look connaturally to a substance of the natural order—otherwise it would not be supernatural and of the highest order—nor to the divine substance, which is incapable of accidents, it follows that it must look connaturally to some created and supernatural substance. Thus such a substance will at least be possible by divine power. From this the second inference also follows. For a supernatural intellectual substance is owed a supernatural intellect, just as a natural intellectual substance is owed a natural intellect; consequently such a supernatural intellect will be possible.

It is confirmed. The blessed vision, since it is a vital act, cannot fail to be connatural to some vital power; therefore such a power must be connatural to some living substance; therefore there will be given some living substance for which that vision, and likewise the light desired for it, are connatural. The final inference is sufficiently clear. The first, however, is also evident. Every vital power belongs to a living substance after the manner of a passion and flows connaturally from it, and therefore will be connatural to it. The antecedent is clear because a vital act must arise from some intrinsic and connatural vital principle, since it cannot arise from an extrinsic principle, but from an internal one, and consequently from a connatural one.

14 Third. The other perfections that exist in God can be participated by a creature not only through participation in the natural order, but also through supernatural participation; therefore the reason of substance can also be participated not only naturally, but supernaturally; and consequently such a substance will belong to the supernatural order, and the light of glory can be connatural to it. The second inference follows legitimately from the first. The first, however, follows from the antecedent. There is no reason why the other perfections of God should be participable by a creature in both ways, namely, naturally and supernaturally, but the reason of substance should not be. The antecedent is proved inductively. God's intelligibility can be participated through supernatural faith and through the light of glory; His love through charity; His knowledge and wisdom through the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which belong to the divine order. In turn, all these things can also be participated naturally, as is clear from themselves, and so on for the rest. Therefore, and so on.

It is confirmed. Otherwise, participation in the most perfect order, namely the supernatural order, would be very imperfect. This, however, does not seem admissible. Therefore, and so on. The inference is evident. For it would remain strictly within the range of accidental participation. Just as participation in the natural order would be sufficiently imperfect if it remained only in the participation of accidents and did not extend to substantial participation, so participation in the supernatural order will be very imperfect if it must remain only in the participation of supernatural accidents. The falsity of the consequent is evident. The more perfect the order participated, the more perfect the participation must be, and therefore the freer it must be from the defects of participation.

15 Finally. From the supposition that a supernatural substance were given, it would not follow that it would be of the same nature as God or infinite; therefore it will be possible. The inference is evident. Unless it were obstructed by the fact that such a substance would be of the same nature as God, or would necessarily have to be infinite, there is no reason why the conclusion drawn from itself and from what follows below would involve a contradiction. The antecedent is proved as follows. From the fact that God, as first being, communicates Himself essentially to a creature, it does not follow that the creature itself will be infinite, either within the genus of created being or essentially infinite as God is; but only that it is being by participation. Thus, likewise, from the fact that God, as a supernatural substance, communicates Himself substantially and ad extra, it does not follow that the aforesaid substance will be God or infinite.

It is confirmed. The reason of a supernatural substance is not conceived after our manner as the specific or numerical reason of God. Indeed, both the reason of substance and that of supernaturality abstract from created and uncreated. Hence, just as the other reasons found in God in a quasi-generic way, because of a similar abstraction, are not conceived after our manner as the specific or numerical reason in God, and therefore their communication does not imply that the effect produced is infinite or is God, so by parity of reasoning we must philosophize concerning the reason of supernatural substance found in Him and its communication.

§ II. The common and true opinion, and its first foundation.

16 Nevertheless, it must be said that it involves a contradiction for there to be given any created substance or intellect to which the light of glory is connatural; consequently, a supernatural substance or intellect would be involved. Thus St. Thomas in this article and in 3. cont Gent. cap. 52, as well as in the following article, ad 3, in these words: The light of glory cannot be natural to a creature unless the creature were of divine nature, which is impossible. All theologians commonly follow him, both his disciples and outsiders, except those whom we mentioned in favor of the first opinion; hence we refrain from discussing them individually.

Proof, first, by the fundamental reasoning drawn from St. Thomas, which can be reduced to this form. To have the divine essence as a connatural intelligible form cannot be connatural to any created or creatable substance or intellect, but only to God; therefore the light of glory also cannot be connatural to the aforesaid substance and intellect except in God; and consequently it is repugnant for any substance or intellect of the supernatural order to be given. This final inference is evident from itself and from what has already been said. The substance and intellect to which the light of glory would be connatural cannot fail to be of the supernatural order. Conversely, the light of glory cannot fail to be connatural to a supernatural intellect and substance, since, when that substance were something complete and of such perfection, it could not fail to belong to the intellectual order; hence the light of glory, which together with them belongs to the intellectual and supernatural order, could not fail to be connatural to it and its intellect. Thus, if a substance and intellect to which the light of glory is connatural are once repugnant, it will certainly be repugnant for them to be supernatural and of the divine order. The first inference is also clear. The light of glory has the character of a disposition toward having the divine essence as a connatural form, in the manner explained above. A disposition, however, is not connatural except to that whose connatural form is that toward which it disposes. Just as a disposition toward the form of fire is not naturally appropriate except to that for whom the form of that same fire is appropriate in the same way, so if the divine essence cannot be connatural to any created substance or intellect, neither can the light of glory be connatural to them.

The antecedent is proved as follows. The divine essence is of infinite perfection, actuality, and immateriality, and therefore can be connatural to God alone, who is of the same perfection and purity, since, as we showed above, there must be a correspondence in degree of immateriality and purity between an intelligible form and the intellect to which it is connatural. In the second place, it follows from what has been said: just as having the form of fire cannot be connatural except to fire, so having the nature and essence of God connaturally cannot be connatural except to God.

17 First, Valencia raises an objection in the present disputation, 1. quaest. 12. punct. 3: although a physical disposition toward a form in the being of a thing cannot be connatural to anything unless that form is also connatural to it, the disposition toward having a form in intelligible being, such as the light of glory, is only a disposition toward having the divine essence under the form of being in intelligible being, not in the being of a thing. Thus, although the divine essence cannot be connatural except to God, the light of glory can naturally be appropriate to something else, namely to some creatable substance or intellect.

On the contrary. In the first place, this answer does not undermine what we have often said, namely that the intellect, the intelligible form, the light, or the intellectual habit is always of the same purity and immateriality whenever the intellect attains its intelligible object from itself and connaturally. Hence the light of glory will not be connatural to the aforesaid intellect unless the intelligible form is also connatural to it; or, if this is not connatural, neither is the light of glory, since connaturality in the intelligible order is assessed by correspondence in the degree of immateriality and purity, as we showed above.

18 Secondly. The light of glory is not any kind of disposition, but the ultimate disposition toward having the divine essence under the reason of an intelligible form. Yet in whatever order the ultimate disposition is connatural to something, the form toward which it disposes cannot fail to be connatural. Therefore, if the light of glory can be connaturally appropriate to a created substance or intellect, the divine essence also can be connatural to it under the reason of an intelligible form; or, if this cannot be connaturally appropriate, neither can the light of glory.

The major is clear. The angelic intellect is ultimately disposed toward having its own substance united to it under the reason of an intelligible form precisely because it has the angelic intellectual light: through such a light it has the efficacy, on the part of power, required to attain such a substance connaturally. The intellect of God is also (so to speak) disposed toward having the divine essence under the form of intelligible being precisely because it has the divine intellectual light. That light brings the efficacy on the part of the intellect required to attain God quidditatively and as He is in Himself. Thus, because the light of glory posits an efficacy on the part of the intellect holding it in order to see the divine essence as it is in itself, it will be the ultimate disposition toward having the aforesaid essence under the reason of an intelligible form.

The minor of the same first syllogism is proved as follows. In whatever order there is something to which a disposition is naturally owed, the form toward which it is naturally and ultimately disposed is also connatural, otherwise the recipient would not be ultimately disposed toward it. Thus, in whatever order the ultimate disposition is connatural to something, the form toward which such a disposition tends will also be connatural, because the form naturally owed to a recipient naturally disposed toward it cannot fail to be connatural to that recipient.

19 Secondly, others object that although the divine essence, as it is the natural form in the being of a thing and constitutes God in this order, cannot be connatural to anything except God, it may nevertheless be well adapted as an intelligible form, since it makes no difference whether there is given by divine power some created intellect that is connaturally God, not indeed in the being of a thing, but in intelligible being.

On the contrary. In whatever order a form connatural to something is given as that thing's proper receptive subject, the receptive subject must be proper and receptive per se and presupposed by the form. Yet it is repugnant for anything other than God to be the proper, per se receptive, and presupposed term of the divine essence considered under the reason of an intelligible form. Therefore it is likewise repugnant for this to be connatural to anything except God. The major seems evident from itself. The minor is also clear. Just as what is proper and per se presupposed by the angelic substance under the reason of an intelligible form, which it possesses or seeks through itself and its own proper merits, cannot be anything other than the proper angelic suppositum together with its intellect, so what is proper and per se presupposed by the divine essence under the reason of an intelligible form, which it possesses or seeks through itself and its own proper merits, cannot be anything other than God Himself together with His divine intellect. Consequently, it cannot be communicated to any created intellect. Moreover, what is proper and per se presupposed by any connatural form cannot of itself be surpassed in the degree of purity and immateriality, as is evident inductively in all forms. Therefore it is repugnant for anything other than God to be proper and per se presupposed by the divine essence under the reason of an intelligible form, since He alone is of the same perfection and purity as it.

20 Third, some object that the light of glory would not dispose a created intellect for which it is connatural toward having the divine essence as its first receptive principle, but as a secondary principle, because the aforesaid essence is essentially united first and only to God, and only secondarily and almost accidentally to intellectual creatures. Although even in intelligible being the form is connatural to that for which the ultimate disposition toward having it as first receptive principle is connatural, it is not connatural to that for whom it is naturally appropriate to be ultimately disposed toward having it as a secondary receptive principle, as occurs here. Thus a created substance and intellect can indeed be given for which the light of glory is connatural, but not the divine essence under the reason of an intelligible form.

On the contrary. Although to an intellect elevated by the light of glory, from which these two constitute, so to speak, one intellect possessing the efficacy to attain God as He is in Himself, the divine essence corresponds only as a secondary receptive principle, insofar as it has the reason of an intelligible form, since the aforesaid intellect is not of the character of a simple intellectual power. Thus, as we said above in disp. 2. nn. 170 and 191, the vision of God or the intelligible species cannot be perfectly connatural to it, but only imperfectly. Nevertheless, precisely because the intellect is of the character of a simple and total power to see God as He is in Himself, the proper species of such an object cannot fail to correspond to it as its first and per se receptive principle. First, because, as we have often said, a power that tends connaturally toward an object after the manner of a simple and total power must be of the same immateriality as that object, and therefore can itself also be the first and per se receptive principle of the object in the intelligible order. Second, because the species of an object toward which an integral intellectual power, complete through itself and its own proper merits, can naturally terminate, must be owed to that power as its first receptive principle. Third, because precisely by being an integral and complete power from itself and without elevation, it has every kind of connaturality with the aforesaid species, as we said above in disp. 2. n. 155 and afterward; thus it is the first and per se receptive term of that species.

21 Finally, an objection can be drawn from Molina's false supposition that in this reasoning the light of glory is taken to be connatural to God alone. Since it is an accident, it cannot be connatural to God, otherwise it could affect Him connaturally. Thus it remains only that it could be connatural to some intellect at least capable of being created.

This answer, however, will easily fall once the reasoning of St. Thomas is properly understood. The Holy Doctor intends only that the light of glory, considered in itself, is a simply simple perfection, which according to its formal reason abstracts from created and uncreated, from substance and accident, and is found formally in God. It is not so found in every respect, but at least it has the character of a connatural property of the divine nature alone, because it is connaturally proper to God alone to have the divine essence united to Him under the reason of an intelligible form, and the aforesaid light is an ultimate disposition toward that union. From this it follows that even when the light is involved in imperfections and under an imperfect mode of being, namely an accidental mode, it cannot be connatural to a created intellect or substance according to what these possess through their own proper merits. For what it possesses on the part of the form that it presents is proper to the divine nature as it is in itself, distinct from everything else, and therefore cannot be owed, and consequently cannot be connatural, to any created substance or intellect according to its own proper merits, even though the mode of being involves imperfections. At most, by the action and influx of God, it can accidentally and gratuitously be appropriate to another, as we said in the preceding difficulty.

§ III. The second foundation of the true opinion is proposed.

22 Secondly, the assertion is proved by a reason drawn from the doctrine of St. Thomas in various places, namely 1. 2. quaest. 110 and 1. part. quaest. 7. For if there were given a substance to which the light of glory and the vision of God as He is in Himself were connatural, then such a substance would be subsistent grace itself; therefore it would be created, as is presupposed, and would not be created, but uncreated, and God. The antecedent seems certain. For the nature of each thing is known from its first property; but from such a substance there would flow an intellect that of itself and connaturally tends to God clearly seen, and consequently the light of glory (as the opponents admit), just as now such light in some way flows from grace while grace is in the perfect state; therefore such substance and nature would be subsistent grace itself. This consequence is clear. For from whatever head the light of glory would flow from it, it would be grace itself; and from whatever head not only the light but also an intellect able of itself to see God would arise from it, it would be subsistent grace itself, and consequently having the reason of an integral and complete substance: because only from an integral, complete, and per se subsisting substance can there flow an intellect after the manner of a simple and total power, able to see God as He is in Himself, and possessing connaturality with the light of glory, that light granting it facility for such vision.

The consequence, as to its first part, is clear from itself; as to its second part, it is also evident. For grace participates in the divine nature according to its own constitutive, as theologians commonly teach; therefore, if this be found unreceived and per se subsisting in some substance, it will be altogether unlimited, uncreated, and God. Hence grace is limited and finite because it is limited by the subject; and the other perfections, such as wisdom and knowledge, although they can be participated under an accidental mode of being and limited by the subject, can nevertheless belong in the reason of substance to God alone, as is clear from themselves; and this will be plainer from what we shall say in the last foundation of the assertion.

23 It is confirmed, first, and at the same time a certain tacit evasion that could have been brought against this reasoning is cut off. For if such a substance could be given, to which the light of glory and the vision of God by essence were connatural, such a vision could not fail to be the principal cognition of that substance to which its intellect would be determined; but this is repugnant if it is a created substance; therefore, etc. The inference is clear. First, because God, as clearly visible, would be its most connatural object. Second, because such a substance would be a formal participation of the divine nature, just as grace itself is ¹; and thus it would look upon God, as clearly visible, as its first and most principal object no less than the divine nature itself and grace itself do. The minor, or the falsity of the consequent, seems certain. For every intellect is primarily and principally born determined to know the substance from which it arises, as its most connatural object; therefore the intellect of this substance would either not look primarily and principally to God, or it would arise from the divine substance itself, as from its own proper essence in which it would be rooted; and consequently it would be repugnant for it to be a created substance and to look to God in the aforesaid way.

We said that every intellect is primarily and principally born determined to know the substance from which it arises; but not every power belonging to the intellectual order, such as the light of glory, is born determined to know the radical principle from which it flows, namely grace — granting that such a light truly arises from grace after the manner of a true and physical property of it, a matter we discuss elsewhere. For this is proper only to the intellect, or (which comes to the same thing) to the power or faculty that is simple and total, as is known from an induction made in all created intellects, both of separated souls, where the intellectual force is not impeded, and of the Angels; and also in the divine intellect, insofar as on the part of the mode of conceiving it is distinguished from the divine essence and seems to flow from it. But it is not proper to the elevations and quantities of supernatural powers, such as the light of glory. And the reason is. Since grace and the light of glory are in the manner of elevations that raise the created nature to an operation proper to God, it must be that, just as the operation proper to God, as He is in Himself, tends per se first to God and is determined to this, so also grace and the light of glory have this same thing.

This same point is confirmed and further explained. For if the intellect of the aforesaid substance were to look to that substance first and principally as its object, it could not attain God as He is in Himself by its own cognition and by its own proper merits; therefore the light of glory would be, and would not be, connatural to it. The antecedent is clear. For the cognition of one's own essence is the measure of the other cognitions that are effected by an intellectual nature from its own proper merits, as we touched on above in art. 1, dub. 1, and this is clear in the Angels and in separated souls, because the activity of the intellect does not exceed the essence from which it arises; therefore such an intellect could not attain God by its own proper power: because God, both in the reason of the object and in the reason of immateriality, would stand at an infinite distance from such an essence, which would be the measure of the cognitions to be elicited from it. From which also the consequence is clear. For the light of glory would be connatural to such a substance, as is presupposed, and it would not be connatural, since the aforesaid substance could not see God by essence by its own powers — which, however, cannot cohere with a substance to which the light of glory would be connatural, as is clear from what has been said.

§ IV. The last foundation of our assertion.

24 Third, the assertion is proved in principal fashion, while supposing two things from the common opinion of theologians. The first is that the divine essence and all its perfections and attributes, if they are considered according to the mode in which they are found in God, are something supernatural, that is, above the whole created and creatable nature. The reason for this is. For all those things, as they are found in God, have being from themselves and the reason of the purest act, and therefore infinity within their own proper line; but to have being with the aforesaid conditions so elevated cannot belong to any created or creatable nature, but is above the whole created and creatable nature; since such a nature, precisely by being such, must have being from another, mingled with potentiality, and consequently finite and limited.

The second is that the supernaturality befitting creatures must belong to them through participation and communication from God, who has supernatural being; and since it cannot be communicated to them so as to be formally and intrinsically a being from Himself and after the manner of the purest and infinite act, as is clear from itself, it follows that the supernaturality communicated to them consists only in this: that all these things be communicated to them in the form of a relation, that is, according to some being elevated and eminent of such a condition that by reason of it they have a relation to God as He is in Himself, as to a specifying object or a connatural end of theirs, as will become clearer from what will be said below.

From this, therefore, the following reason is drawn. Nothing can be supernatural unless it have supernaturality either by essence and from itself, or by participation from the first supernatural being; but a created substance cannot have supernaturality in either of these ways; therefore it is repugnant for it to be given, and consequently for some substance to be given to which the light of glory can be connatural. Both inferences with the major need no proof; indeed neither does the minor, namely from 1. part., that a created substance cannot be supernatural by essence and from itself, otherwise it would not be created. As to the second part, it is proved. For since a substance is a being per se, and not a being of a being, as accidents are, it cannot (as our Complutensians explain more at length in lib. Phys. disp. 10, quaest. 4) have its being by an order to something extrinsic and outside its own category, which it essentially looks to, as to an object, terminus, or end — which indeed is required for the reason of a supernatural being by participation. Let our Complutensians be consulted in the cited place, and also lib. 5, Physic. disp. 23, n. 17.

§ V. A twofold evasion of the opponents, and its exclusion.

25 First you will meet the opponents with the point that from this at most it can be concluded that a complete supernatural substance cannot be given, but an incomplete one can, such as matter and form; because for these it is not repugnant to be specified by something extrinsic.

On the contrary, an incomplete substance in the manner of an essential part is not specified except through a relation to the other part, as matter through its relation to form, and form through the relation by which it looks to matter; and thus it is repugnant for a substance in the manner of an essential part to posit such a relation to God as He is in Himself, or as He is above the whole created and creatable nature; because in it, however it be considered, the reason of a formal part is repugnant, and much more the reason of a material part, as St. Thomas shows above, quaest. 3, art. 8.

From which it also appears why it is not repugnant that the substantial mode of the human nature, or of any other substantial nature, be predicated of the person of the Word, who is supernatural. For since this mode is not a complete substance but an incomplete one, it can be specified by something extrinsic; and since it is not a mode of the union of matter to form, but of a created nature to the divine suppositum as He is in Himself, it can have as its specifier the same divine suppositum as He is in Himself, and therefore be supernatural.

26 Secondly, you will meet them with the point that it is not against the reason of a complete substance to posit an intrinsic and essential relation to something extrinsic, provided it does not posit a relation to it as to a subject: for by the fact that it essentially looked to something extrinsic that does not have the reason of a subject, it would not be taken away from it that it is a being per se, that is, not in another as in a subject; and consequently that supernatural and created substance could well look essentially to God as its proper specifier; for it would not thereby look to Him as a subject on which it would rest.

And this answer can be confirmed from the fact that every created substance, however complete, posits an essential relation to God as its creator, and consequently looks to Him as He is a supernatural being; for, inasmuch as He has being as a being by essence and infinite, He has the reason of a creator, and by reason of the aforesaid being, infinite and by essence, He is the first supernatural being; and thus the created substance, through its relation to Him so taken, would be a supernatural substance, or at least by reason of this head taken precisely would include some substantial and supernatural reason — if the argument made for the assertion proved anything.

27 On the contrary. For in this the category of substance differs from the other categories, that it, as the most perfect of all, has its being complete in every way in the reason of a category and within its own proper line, whereas the others are otherwise: and so, while these others do not have all their essential complement, or what pertains to their specification, within their own proper line, that one does; and therefore the others can essentially look to something lying outside their own line and category, but that which suits the category of substance cannot. ²

It is confirmed, first: For that a thing does not essentially look to something outside its own category, and that it does not intrinsically perfect it within its own line, does not say infinite perfection; for a thing that would be free of the aforesaid essential relation could be limited from elsewhere. Therefore it must belong to the most perfect of all categories, which is the category of substance, and which has the most perfect mode of being, namely being in itself and per se subsisting.

28 It is confirmed, secondly. For accidents can look to something outside their own category either as something essentially looked at, or as their specifier, because they are beings of a being and affections of a substance, and are not simply beings; therefore what is a simply being, and consequently what is not of another as its subject, such as a complete substance, by that very fact cannot have the aforesaid specifier, nor essentially look to something outside its own category. The consequence seems legitimate. The antecedent is proved. For just as accidents, precisely by being such, are of so weak a being that they have the being of a being, and therefore need something extrinsic of another category, of which they are affections and on which they lean — so it is no wonder that from this it arises that they can be of so weak an essence and specification that they need something extrinsic of another category, to which they have an essential relation, either as to a terminus essentially looked at, or as to their proper specifier, according to the need of the substance which they serve and of which they are affections.

29 Nor does what is adduced in this solution as a confirmation of it establish the point. For, in the first place, it is false that a created substance looks to God as its creator in such a way that this pertains to its intrinsic and quidditative concept, even though this relation cannot fail to accompany it very intimately, and even to be identified with it quite intimately. Hence St. Thomas says in 3. dist. 11, quaest. 1, art. 2, ad 2, that for something to be created — not indeed insofar as it says a being in itself, finite and composed of genus and difference, but insofar as it says something that can be made by God through creation — is not an essential and quidditative predicate, e.g., with respect to man. And so, when the Holy Doctor had objected to himself in the aforesaid argument as follows: Whatever is predicated of the lower is also predicated of the higher: but creature is higher than man: therefore, since man is predicated of Christ, creature will be predicated of Him. He answers in these words. To the second it must be said that creature is not higher than man, because creation looks more to being than to nature, and being is not a genus, nor is it included in the signification of any genus, as Avicenna says, since the things that are in one genus do not agree in one being, but in a common nature; or it must be said that creature is not higher than man, signifying what man is: because creation does not look to nature or essence except through the medium of the act of being, which is the first terminus of creation; but the human nature in Christ has no other perfect being than the being of a hypostasis, which is the being of the divine person, and therefore, speaking simply, it cannot be called a creature, because it would be understood that the perfect being of the hypostasis of Christ was acquired by creation. But if it is true that in man the being that can be made by God through creation does not pertain to his intrinsic concept, it clearly seems to follow from this that to look to God as the efficient cause of him, and as operating in a way other than by creation, will not pertain to his quiddity, as anyone who considers it will see.

30 Wherefore, when our Complutensians say in 2. Physicorum, disp. 9, n. 40, that the dependence of man on God is intimately imbibed in the nature and entity of man, they are not speaking of an inclusion after the manner of a quidditative predicate, but of the inclusion of some predicate that behaves after the manner of a mode or a quasi-mode that transcends, which intimately accompanies quidditative predicates and the transcendent essential reasons, although such a mode or quasi-mode does not pertain to the quidditative concept of the thing; by that very reasoning, indeed (with due proportion preserved), in which the reason of the true is a mode, or a certain quasi-mode transcending all the reasons of man, not indeed as a quidditative predicate, but as an intimate mode or quasi-mode of the essential categories, affecting them so intimately that it always accompanies them in whatever things they are transcended; and therefore these modes or quasi-modes are usually called the transcendent predicates intimately imbibed in every thing.

31 Moreover, although according to this doctrine we admit that a created substance looks to God as its creator by reason of this mode that intimately affects it, it does not follow from this what, according to this solution that we are attacking, it was intended to follow — namely, that if the argument adduced proves anything, it certainly establishes that a created substance is supernatural, or at least, by force of this head taken precisely, includes some substantially and formally supernatural reason. For although any substance, precisely by depending on God as its creator, or as the first being, posits a relation to Him, and the reason looked at is God Himself, as He is a being from Himself, pure act, and infinite, and therefore as He is above the whole order of nature; yet the reason of looking is not that: because it is not the divine being most formally, as it is in itself, that is looked to, but that very being which He has in Himself insofar as it can shine in creatures in their own proper mode, and not in His own proper mode; and consequently such a relation will not suffice to place the creature so looking within the supernatural order.

This is explained, while supposing first that, although what it is for God to be a being from Himself and after the manner of the purest and infinite act is participated by creatures only through a supernatural participation according to that relation — not indeed one that transcends every substance, but according to the other particular one mentioned above — nevertheless, as we said above, in this very thing it is intimately imbibed that the being proper to God is participated, as He is a being from Himself and pure act, by reason of which He is looked to formally as one who is above the whole created and creatable nature. Hence, because God, as He is a being from Himself and pure act, has (as is clear from what was said in art. 2) both that He tends to Himself as a connatural object, understanding and loving Himself as He is in Himself, and also that He tends in an infinite mode, so that it is proper to God alone, considered according to this reason, that He attain Himself in one of these modes as He is in Himself, and that this can belong to others only through a communication from God, as from one who has that as His own proper being, in the proportional way in which it belongs to fire to be hot by nature, and to other things not except by participation from fire — it follows from this that, in order for the creature to participate in the being proper to God, by reason of which it may have the aforesaid peculiar relation, it must participate in a being of such a condition that by reason of it it has, whether mediately or immediately, to attain God through intellect and will as a connatural object and as He is in Himself; not indeed so that by reason of the aforesaid being it attains Him infinitely, but only finitely.

32 And the reason is. Since to participate is to take a part and (so to speak) to leave a part, and God, as He is a being from Himself and pure act, both connaturally and infinitely knows and loves Himself as He is in Himself, it follows that the creature, precisely by formally participating in the being proper to God as such, must take something from it, namely to be able to tend connaturally, in the manner stated above in art. 2, toward Him as toward a proportionate object and as He is in Himself; and to leave something there that it does not assume, namely to tend infinitely to God Himself, because this mode of tending, as it stands under this concept, is altogether incommunicable to the creature; otherwise the supernatural being of God would not be communicated through the relation alone already explained, but unto equality, which (as is clear from itself) involves an implication.

We said, moreover, that it must participate, whether mediately or immediately, in the aforesaid mode of attaining: because, although it is proper to the Theological Virtues to tend immediately to God, this does not belong to all supernatural things. For the other virtues and many other supernatural aids are called such because they lead to such attainment by their own proper and intrinsic reason, either dispositively, or meritoriously, or by some other reason; and so, although not immediately, they participate mediately in the aforesaid mode of attaining God as He is in Himself.

From this it is therefore sufficiently clear how, although every created substance looks, in the manner stated, to God as creator and first being and as pure act and infinite, nevertheless it does not look to Him by this peculiar relation; and consequently the reason of looking is not the divine being most formally as it is in itself, but that very being which He has in Himself insofar as it can shine in creatures in their own proper mode, and not in His own proper mode; for what is participated in the mode already explained is not, by that very fact, something proper to God as He is in Himself the purest act, by reason of which He would be looked to formally as one who is above the whole created and creatable nature.

33 From all this it follows that it makes no difference if you object that, if it is once required that something proper to God be participated in the proper mode of God Himself, in order for God Himself to be looked to by this peculiar relation, there is no reason why a substance that has supernatural being should not be possible, precisely because it participates in something proper to God in God's own proper mode, even though it does not posit the aforesaid relation to Him; and consequently this last argument in favor of the assertion, resting on the necessity of this relation, will be null. The consequence seems legitimate. The antecedent is also clear. For precisely by the fact that that substance would participate in what is proper to God and in the proper mode of God Himself already explained, it would not be a substance of the natural order; for to have what is proper to God in His own proper mode is above the whole order of nature; therefore such a substance would precisely by this belong to the supernatural order, even though it did not posit the aforesaid relation.

From what has been said, therefore, it is clear that this makes no difference. For it would be impossible for the supernatural substance of which we speak, to which the light of glory would be connatural, to participate in what is proper to God and in the proper mode of God Himself without positing a relation to Him as He is in Himself, or as He is a being above the whole created and creatable nature. And the reason is. For by that very fact it would have God, as He is in Himself, for its specifying object, as is clear from what has been said. But what is specified by something really distinct from itself cannot fail to posit a real relation to it.

34 And this can be explained, first by the example of the divine essence, whose reason lies in this: that it is an intellection of itself, and is quasi-specified by itself, and posits such a relation to itself formally eminently, as one that is clearly and most perfectly knowable. Wherefore, since the aforesaid created supernatural substance, if it were given, would be a participation of the divine essence, it would also have to imply the aforesaid relation: in such a way, however, that it would take a part of it and leave a part. It would take a part insofar as it would also posit a relation to God as He is in Himself; but it would leave a part insofar as that relation would not be formally eminently such, as is the relation of the divine intellection that constitutes the essence of God: because the divine intellection, by reason of its eminence, wholly identifies with itself both the reason of intellection and that of the object, etc. And therefore, although there is there that relation, or the tendency of God to Himself as clearly knowable, and also the reason of the object terminating this same intellection, etc., nevertheless the relation of intellection to its object is not there formally precisely such, but one which is formally eminently such; because this mode of relation and quasi-specification has laid bare that whole identity. But this could not be found in that created supernatural substance (if it were given): for it would be really distinct from its specifying object, namely from God as He is in Himself; and therefore in it the aforesaid relation would not be formally eminently so, but only formally so; and consequently, compared with that relation which the divine essence would posit to itself, it would then, by force of this head, leave a part and take a part of the aforesaid relation. Also by the example of sanctifying grace, which, because it is a participation of the divine nature as He is in Himself and yet is an accident, therefore has in it a peculiar reason because of which it stands in this relation to God after the manner of the first root of the vision of Him as He is in Himself.

§ VI. The final solution of the opponents, and its overthrow.

35 Third, you will meet the opponents by saying that what is supposed in this reasoning is false, namely that the reason of a supernatural being is taken by an order to God as He is a being from Himself and pure and infinite act. For since all this is knowable by the light of nature, it does not take Him from the reason of a natural author, nor does an order to God so taken place the thing within the supernatural order: and so created supernaturality will at most consist in the aforesaid relation to God insofar as He is One and Trinity. For this relation is so elevated that it cannot be attained by the light of nature.

On the contrary, if God were only one, which is impossible, then supernatural acts would have to be admitted, such as the acts of faith and prophecy resting on divine revelation, and the act of the clear vision of God Himself, as also of fruition, and likewise the hypostatic union of a created nature with Him; and consequently not only God as One and Trinity, but also as One and considered in the manner stated, will be a supernatural object.

Moreover, supernatural beings are ordered to God as He is the highest good and last end; therefore they will be ordered to Him formally as He is One, and consequently the reason of a supernatural being belongs to God as He is One. The antecedent and this last consequence are clear from themselves. The first, however, is also evident. For the reason of the highest good belongs to God as He is One, and by reason of His essence, which is one, because either the relations in God do not of themselves say perfection, but all their perfection comes from the essence included in them after the manner of the transcendent; or, whatever perfection they have of themselves, it is not a perfection in every genus, and therefore not in the reason of the highest and infinite good in the genus of being; but they have this from the essence. Whence it also comes that not only God, as He is One and considered in the manner stated, is a supernatural being, but that the reason of a supernatural being belongs to Him as He is One prior to as He is Trinity.

36 Nor does it matter what is adduced in the same solution, namely that God as One, and as a being from Himself and pure act, is known by the light of nature, and therefore, according to this reason, is not a supernatural object. For by the same light it is also known that God sees Himself clearly and intuitively as He is the first cause of natural things, and nevertheless all this is a supernatural object; and so it cannot be communicated to any creature except by elevating it to the aforesaid order. And the reason is the same in both cases. Because, indeed, although the object known is supernatural, it is not attained under the aspect sub qua that is supernatural, but under the natural one: inasmuch as, namely, from creatures and natural effects it is knowable that God has in Himself the aforesaid perfections, because of the nexus which these predicates have in being known with others that are found in creatures. For from the fact that among them there are some intellectual creatures, it evidently follows that God has this intellectuality apart from imperfections, and consequently from Himself and after the manner of the purest act, and therefore that He has Himself as a connatural object clearly and evidently known.

37 Nor does it follow from this (so that another objection remains unanswered) that God can be certainly known by the light of nature as He is a supernatural author. For it is one thing to know that God is in Himself a supernatural being — not indeed with respect to Himself, because whatever is found in Him cannot fail to be most connatural with respect to Him, but with respect to, e.g., us, or with respect to any created or creatable substance — and another thing to know that He is a supernatural author. Hence, although natural reason can attain that God can clearly and intuitively attain Himself as He is One, and that He is the purest act and a being from Himself, according to which reason God is a supernatural being, it does not attain that, according to these reasons, He is communicable to creatures: because such a mode of communication is most elevated and has no nexus in being known with other natural things that can be known by the same natural reason. Not unlike (yet with due proportion preserved) the fact that, although God is self-subsisting in Himself and this is known by the light of nature, yet by the same light it is not known that this substance can be communicated to some creature in such a way that it may subsist through the same subsistence of God. Wherefore, in order for God to be known as a supernatural author, it is required that the possibility of His communication be attained, insofar as He is, in the manner stated, something supernatural, and therefore according to those reasons already explained; therefore, although God is known by the light of nature as He is a supernatural being, yet under the aspect sub qua that is natural, nevertheless even under the aspect sub qua that is natural He is not certainly attained according to the reason of a supernatural author.

§ VII. The arguments of the first opinion are answered.

38 To the first, the antecedent must be denied. And to the proof it must be said that the created supernatural substance is repugnant on the part of the conjoined, namely in that it is a supernatural substance and at the same time created. To the former proof brought there it is answered that, just as in a chimera the extremes are not repugnant when taken in themselves, such as a man's head, a goat's tail, etc., but it is repugnant that they be joined so as to constitute one and the same thing, so neither is the reason of a supernatural substance, taken precisely according to this argument, repugnant, nor is that very thing itself repugnant precisely by reason of the general reason of a creature; but it is otherwise when both reasons, taken together, are found in one and the same thing. Because that substance would be, and would not be, created: it would be, as is presupposed, but it would not be, for the reasons we have assigned. To the latter proof concerning the hypostatic union, what was said in the explanation of this last reason at n. 25 is clear.

39 To the second, with the antecedent granted, both inferences must be denied. And to the proof of the first, on which the proof of the second depends, it is answered that, although the light of glory — not indeed according to itself and as it abstracts from the imperfections which it has from the mode of being in creatures, but as it is under a mode of being and imperfections, and which it involves in those same creatures — posits essentially an order to some created substance, and indeed such an order, as it holds on the part of the same light so considered, is connatural to it; yet it does not follow from this that the aforesaid light and its order are connatural to such a substance: since it raises it to a higher order, that is, to the operation proper to God Himself. Wherefore, just as it is most connatural with respect to God to communicate Himself in the hypostatic order to the human nature, otherwise that communication would be supernatural with respect to Him, and consequently above the nature and efficacy of the divine subsistence, and yet such a communication is supernatural with respect to the human nature: so, although it is connatural to the light of glory, as involved in imperfections, to posit an order to an intellectual created substance, nevertheless such an order and such a light will not be connatural or owed to the aforesaid substance: because it is compared with it precisely as a common accident gratuitously communicated to it; not as something owed to it, or as a property flowing from it.

We said: Not according to itself, and as it abstracts from the imperfections which it has from the mode of being in creatures, because if it be considered according to itself and as it abstracts in the manner stated, then it must be formally in God, and be at least a property of the divine nature, and be reduced to it: hence it can belong to others only through participation from it and in a limited mode. For God with respect to such a light is not only the cause by that general reason by which He is the cause of the other creatures of the natural order, which He contains virtually; but by that special reason by which what belongs to something by nature — either as proper to its own nature, or as a property connatural to it — can belong only to it, and to others only through participation from it. Just as, because it belongs to fire to be hot by nature, therefore fire alone is hot; and other things only through participation from the same fire, or at most from some other superior agent which contains fire eminently. But this cannot be found in the present case: for there is nothing which contains the divine nature eminently and after the manner of a higher nature.

40 To the confirmation, the antecedent must be granted if by the name of vital power is meant that composite which is formed from the light of glory and the created intellect, and as to connaturality, not indeed altogether perfect, but only as far as concerns the quantity of the power and the manner explained above in the preceding disputation from n. 190 to n. 193; but otherwise if some other vital power, or an altogether perfect connaturality, is meant. And then the first inference must be denied. To its proof it must be said that a vital power which, after the manner of a simple and total power, tends toward some object, must arise from some created substance; but otherwise it is that power which attains the aforesaid object through elevation, and consequently after the manner of a power formed from elevation and native virtue, or its own obediential power, as occurs in the present case: for this, as thus elevated, must not arise from the intrinsic principles of the created substance. Hence, although a vital act of the natural order must arise from an intrinsic principle, that is, one flowing from the inmost parts of the living substance and consequently connatural with it, yet a vital act of the supernatural order must not: but it is sufficient that, speaking of the essential commensuration of the power, it proceed really from a principle that, in the manner just said, is intrinsic; while, speaking of the quantity of the power and its efficacy, it proceed from it as from an intrinsic principle, that is, one inherent in the power, although that is not connatural with it, indeed must be supernatural with respect to it, even though it has with the vision itself the connaturality explained above.

Wherefore, since the intellect, insofar as it expresses an obediential power and (as we touched on in art. 1, dub. 1) a formally supernatural power in the order of seeing God, arises from the soul as it has an obediential power that is altogether first and likewise supernatural; and the same intellect, insofar as (according to the other way of speaking hinted at there) it expresses an obediential power that is entitatively and formally natural and terminatively supernatural, arises really and in the manner due to it from the same soul, because it is not distinguished from the soul by the nature of the thing as it is a natural power, at least if it be considered according to what it imports in the direct sense — it follows from this that the intellect, on its part, has sufficiently the reason of an intrinsic principle required for a vital and supernatural act, just as the light also has it on its part: since it inheres in the aforesaid power, as will become clearer from itself and from what will be said in the following article.

41 To the third it is answered that the antecedent is true of accidental participation in some accident of the supernatural order, but not of substantial participation; although all things that are in God are substantial. Hence, in the same sense, the reason of substance and of the divine nature can be participated in some accident of the supernatural order: and so sanctifying grace, although it is an accident, participates under an accidental mode of being the substantial nature of God: and supernatural wisdom participates the reason of the wisdom of God, which is a substance, although it does not participate the mode of being substantially.

To the confirmation the inference must be denied. For the reason of perfect participation within the supernatural order is satisfied if whatever within that same order is participable can be participated, and in the way in which it can be participated. Nor is what is objected there about substantial participation within the natural order a similar case. For the participation within that order would be imperfect if it did not reach as far as substantial participation, because in this order such participation involves no such implication. Wherefore, since the aforesaid participation is repugnant, as has been shown, within the supernatural order, it follows that participation within this order is not imperfect, even if it is not a participation of substance and in a substantial mode.

42 Nor does it matter if you say that from this at least it follows that, although the participation of God which takes place within the natural order is not absolutely and simpliciter more perfect, all things considered, than the participation of Him within the supernatural order, nevertheless that natural participation will be more perfect in its own order than this supernatural participation is in its own: but this does not seem admissible, as is clear from itself; therefore, etc. The inference is proved. Because the natural participation takes place within the line of an integral and complete substance, whereas the participation within the supernatural order does not: therefore, although the participation within this order is absolutely and simpliciter more perfect, all things considered, because this order is absolutely and simpliciter more noble; nevertheless the natural participation will be in its own order more noble than the supernatural participation in its own: for within its own natural order it includes the participation of an integral and complete substance, which the supernatural participation does not include within its own supernatural order.

For the inference is answered by denying it. For that some participation of God is, or absolutely and simpliciter and all things considered more perfect than another, or with this limitation — namely, that although it is not absolutely and simpliciter more perfect, it is nevertheless more noble in its own order, namely the natural one, than the other supernatural participation in its own — is not judged by the mode of being under which the participation takes place, that is, that it is participated under the reason of substance or of accident, but by the form participated, which is nobler. Now it is clear that the participated form is the more perfect on the part of the form by how much something more proper to God, and to God as He is in Himself, is participated: and since the participation within the supernatural order is a participation of God as He is in Himself, it follows that the aforesaid participation is in both ways more perfect than the natural participation: so that it is not only absolutely and simpliciter more noble, but also after the limitation that has been brought in this objection.

43 And this can be explained from the fact that the participation of God the natural author takes place under a substantial mode of being because of the imperfection of the passive form participated and because of the imperfection on the part of the form that holds it. But the participation within the supernatural order takes place under an accidental mode of being because of the great perfection on the part of the form that is participated, inasmuch as the aforesaid form on its own part is of such perfection that, precisely by being participated under a substantial mode of being, it would then be participated adequately and infinitely, as would happen (according to what was said above in this same difficulty) in grace participating in the divine nature: whereas no participation that takes place within the natural order is on the part of the form of such perfection within that same order that, precisely by being participated under a substantial mode of being, the aforesaid participation must be adequate and infinite: so that the participated form is taken with all that perfection with which it is in God, as is clear from itself.

Wherefore, just as, notwithstanding that wisdom in creatures has its own proper existence, but not in God, nevertheless created wisdom is not therefore more perfect and more actual, even in its own order, than divine wisdom in its own, because this arises not from perfection but rather from the imperfection of created wisdom, namely from the fact that it is an accident — so in the present case, with due proportion preserved, we must philosophize.

44 To the last, the antecedent must be denied. And to the proof, with the antecedent granted but in accordance with what was said above, the conclusion must be denied for the reasons adduced. Whence, to the confirmation it must be said that the reason of a complete and supernatural substance implies an intrinsic infinity repugnant to a creature: and so, although the reason of substance, as such, is not to be understood as the specific or numerical reason of God, nevertheless the reason of a supernatural substance includes the proper and incommunicable mark of the divine essence, namely to be from Himself and pure and infinite act, and consequently the individual mode, which cannot cohere with a creature, namely to subsist in three persons.

The conclusion is affirmative.

Prooemium, and the Division of the whole Work

Quaestio I: On the Simplicity of God

Tractatus I: On the Principle of the Individuation of Material Substance and of Its Accidents

Disputatio I: On the Principle of the Individuation of Material Substance

Dubium I: Whether the substantial form is itself individuated, and the first principle of the individuation and of the purely individual distinction of the whole composite?

Dubium II: Whether matter, taken by itself and precisely, or matter marked by quantity, is the first and radical principle of the individuation of the whole substantial composite

Dubium III: Whether matter marked by quantity, insofar as it is said to constitute a composite of matter and quantity as an inhering and constituting form, is the first root of the individuation of the composite

Dubium V: Whether matter marked by quantity, insofar as it is said to possess by a radical mode this quantity rather than that, is the first root of the completed material substance and therefore of its substantial form

Disputatio II: On the Principle of the Individuation of Accidents

Dubium I: Whether the subject is the first root and principle of the individuation of accidents and of their purely individual distinction

Dubium II: Whether quantity claims for itself a peculiar principle, so that it is individuated from itself as though it were the first root

Dubium III: Whether essential repugnance exists between purely numerical distinction of accidents, as such that two of them differ only numerically in the same subject

Tractatus II: In quaest. 12 of the First Part of St. Thomas: On the Vision of God

Quaestio I: How God is known by us

Disputatio I: On the Possibility and Appetitability of the Vision of God by Essence

Dubium I: Whether the clear vision of God by essence is possible to the created intellect?

Dubium II: Whether the Holy Fathers knew that vision of God by essence is possible to a created intellect

Dubium III: Whether the possibility of vision of God by essence can be clearly known to a created intellect by the light of nature

Dubium IV: Whether the intellectual nature considered by itself has an innate appetite for the vision of God by essence

Dubium V: Whether an elicited and natural appetite is given in the intellectual creature considered by itself with regard to the clear vision of God

Disputatio II: On the Likeness, or Form, Required for a Clear Vision of God

Dubium I: Whether, according to the mind of St Thomas, some created likeness is admitted in order to elicit the clear vision of God

Dubium II: Whether the divine essence is in fact united to the intellect of the blessed man by way of an intelligible species, with a view to the clear vision of God?

Dubium III: Whether the divine essence, as it has the character of an intelligible form, actively concurs to the clear vision of God

Dubium IV: Whether by divine power a created impressed species is possible, through which God may be seen in a quidditative way, such as He is in Himself?

Dubium V: Whether the first reason which D. Thom. adduces in this article sufficiently proves the impossibility of an impressed species representing God quidditatively and clearly?

Dubium VI: Whether from the second reason of St. Thomas the impossibility is sufficiently inferred of an impressed form representing God quidditatively, and clearly, as He is in Himself

Dubium VII: What specially stands against the second reason of St. Thomas, and how it is to be solved

Dubium VIII: Whether the last reason of the article proves the impossibility of a created intelligible species representing God quidditatively: where the arguments also are dissolved which we brought from the opponents in dub. 4 of this disputation?

Dubium IX: Whether in the blessed there is necessarily and indispensably given a word, or expressed form, representing God quidditatively, as He is in Himself

Dubium X: Whether the impossibility of a created word representing God clearly and quidditatively is rightly proved from the fact that God is essentially itself the being quidditatively understood, and thus cannot be quidditatively understood through a created word?

Disputatio III: On the Impossibility of the Vision of God, As He Is in Himself, by Created Powers of the Natural Order, or Such as Are Connatural to Some Created Intellect

Dubium I: Whether by the absolute power of God there is possible some intellect which by the powers proper to it of the natural order could see God as He is in Himself

Dubium II: Whether by divine power there can be possible some substances and some intellects for which the light of glory is connatural, and which can see God by essence by their own powers?

Disputatio IV: On the Necessity of the Light of Glory for Seeing the Divine Essence As It Is in Itself

Dubium I: Whether the light of glory concurs to the vision of God, as He is in Himself, after the manner of an impressed form

Dubium II: Whether the light of glory is a necessary disposition, in order that the divine essence, in the ratio of form or of intelligible species, be united to the intellects of the blessed?

Dubium III: Whether the light of glory is necessarily desired for the receiving of the vision of God?

Dubium IV: Whether by the absolute power of God the created intellect can, without the light of glory, by its own obediential power alone, though with a concomitant influx superadded in the vision, but not by any other previous [influx], elicit that vision in the same intellect

Dubium V: Whether by divine power the divine essence can be united, in the ratio of light, to the created intellect, and thus constitute it, without a created light, in the first act for seeing God as He is in Himself?

Disputatio V: On the Quality and Inequality of the Visions in the Blessed

Dubium I: Whether an inequality is found among the beatific visions

Dubium II: Whether the inequality found among the beatific visions is not only intensive and extensive, but also essential and specific

Dubium III: Whether an intellectual power that is better, with equal light of glory, sees the divine essence more clearly

Disputatio VI: On the Incomprehensibility of God to the Created Intellect

Dubium I: Whether by divine power the created intellect can comprehend God?

Disputatio VII: On Those Things Which, God Having Been Seen, Are Seen in Him, or Can Be Seen

Dubium I: Whether those who see God see everything absolutely which is formally and of necessity contained in Him

Dubium II: Whether the divine essence can be seen without the persons, or one person without another?

Dubium III: Whether the blessed can, by the force of the vision of the divine essence, see, and in fact see, the free decrees of God?

Dubium IV: Whether from the force of the vision of the divine essence the effects existing under some difference of time can, or ought to, be seen

Dubium V: Whether by the force of the vision of the divine essence possible creatures can be seen?

Tractatus III: In quaest. 14 of the First Part of the Angelic Doctor: On the Knowledge of God

Quaestio I: De Scientia Dei

Dubium I: Whether those things which St. Thomas teaches in the Prooemium of this question are true

Disputatio I: De scientia Dei, quoad an est?

Dubium I: Whether intellectual knowledge is formally in God?

Dubium II: Whether from the fact that God is most immaterial the Angelic Doctor rightly proves that He is most intelligent?

Dubium III: Whether there is in God knowledge strictly so called and formally, and with respect to things

Dubium IV: Whether the knowledge of God is an attribute of Him?

Disputatio II: On the Twofold Distinction Which D. Thom. Constitutes in This Article Between Things Known and Things Not Known

Dubium I: Whether the first distinction which St. Thomas assigns between things that know and things that do not know is true, namely that these have only their own form, whereas those have also the forms of other things

Dubium II: Whether knowing things have not only the form of another thing, but also become by identity other things in being knowable, that is, representatively?

Disputatio III: On the Intellection and Knowledge of God with Respect to Its Primary Object

Dubium I: Whether God understands Himself primarily

Dubium II: Whether the object per se, first and specificative of the essential intellection of God is the divine essence, as distinguished from the attributes and the relations: or whether all these are formally and expressly meant?

Disputatio IV: On Understanding by God with Respect to the Power It Has to Constitute the Divine Essence and Nature

Dubium I: Whether the constitutive [element] of the divine essence, or nature, is the sole reason of a spiritual substance in itself, or of such by essence, as distinct virtually from the reason of a subsisting intellectual substance, whether radically and in the first act, or in the second act

Dubium II: Whether what constitutes the divine essence, or nature, is the ratio of substance alone, essentially and per essentiam intellectual, as virtually distinct from intellection by essence, or whether without any virtual distinction it is intellection itself?

Disputatio V: On the Knowledge of God with Respect to Its Causality toward Creatures

Dubium I: Whether divine knowledge is in some way the cause of things

Dubium II: What the knowledge of God is as cause of things

Dubium III: Whether just as the knowledge of God, taken formally, is the cause directing toward the production of creatures, so too it is the immediate effective principle and the executor of their production?

Disputatio VI: On Divine Knowledge Collated with Evils

Dubium I: Whether God knows evils?

Dubium II: Whether God necessarily knows evils through created goods?

Disputatio VII: On Whether There Is Knowledge of God with Respect to Absolute Future Contingents, and on Those Things Which Cannot Be Certainly Known by Him

Dubium I: What, and how manifold, the future contingent is

Dubium II: Whether God certainly knows absolutely future contingents?

Dubium III: Whether God certainly knows absolute free future things, by His essence and divine ideas, as they represent the truth of those things antecedently to the decree of His will