Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

218 This difficulty is rightly raised separately by us. For, just as when treating the impossibility of an imprinted and created species representing God quidditatively, we derived that impossibility both from the arguments expressly adduced in this article by D. Thom. and, separately, from another argument advanced by the same holy Doctor, quoted in the Quodlibetum and likewise in 4. contra Gent. cap. 11., it was fitting that, when treating the impossibility of a created word representing God quidditatively, we should derive it both from the arguments expressly advanced in this article by the holy Doctor, as we did in the preceding difficulty, and also separately from that argument cited in the Quodlibetum and in 4. cont. Gent. cap., advanced by the same holy Doctor but now applied here: namely, from the fact that God is his own intelligible being and understood—or, equivalently, because he not only has in himself and essentially the object motivating the intellect with respect to a quidditative knowledge of himself, but is also the object actually terminating that knowledge; and thus there cannot be a word that represents him quidditatively, as we shall examine more fully in this difficulty.

We have, however, joined the arguments of the present article into a single difficulty, because after assuming what we have said above concerning the impossibility of an imprinted species, nothing peculiar arose concerning them themselves. Thus, the opposite consideration will examine the argument adduced by D. Thom. in the Quodlibetum, whereas in this peculiar difficulty it must be examined because that argument, insofar as it is now applied, appears to involve a somewhat greater difficulty, at least in external appearance.

§ I. The opposing opinion is mentioned.

219 All the Doctors cited in the first and second positions of the preceding difficulty defend the negative position, and it can be proved first from this: for even if a created word representing God quidditatively were granted, it would not thereby be granted to it that it is known by created intellect according to that ratio by which it has from itself and essentially the property of being known by that intellect, or according to that ratio by which it has the property of terminating its intellection. Thus the argument is utterly refuted, and its entire foundation collapses. The consequence therefore seems certain. For the whole force of the argument just discussed consists in this: that if a created word were granted, it would render God actually understood, or place him in the role of the object actually terminating created intellection, even though he has that property essentially. But if the created word did not grant to God that he is quidditatively understood by created intellect according to that ratio according to which it belongs to him from himself and essentially to be understood, it would not grant him what essentially belongs to him; and thus the whole force of this argument would fall.

The antecedent, however, is proved. For being actually understood, or known, belongs essentially to God insofar as he is thus known quidditatively by created intellect alone, while at the same time he is known quidditatively and comprehensively by his own divine intellect. Therefore, his being known quidditatively alone by created intellect, to the exclusion of his being quidditatively and comprehensively understood by divine intellect, is not to be an actually understood being, which is proper to God and essentially belongs to him, as is clear from itself. Yet if a created word representing God quidditatively were granted, it would grant him that he is quidditatively known by created intellect, to the exclusion of his being at the same time quidditatively and comprehensively known by divine intellect according to the said word; for the said word would be in created intellect alone, not in the divine intellect. Thus such a word would not grant God to be understood, or known by created intellect, according to that ratio of being understood which essentially and from itself belongs to God.

220 This objection, however, seems to have even greater force against the argument insofar as it is used to prove the impossibility of a created word representing God quidditatively than against it insofar as it is intended to establish the impossibility of an intelligible species representing him in the same way according as he is in himself. For any intelligible species representing an object quidditatively represents it according as it is in itself, comprehensively; yet not every species expressively representing its object quidditatively must represent it comprehensively. Thus angelic intelligible species comprehensively represent whatever they represent quidditatively; the express species of angels do the opposite, because they can use those intelligible species at will in order to know precisely and quidditatively some object represented through them. The word produced through such knowledge then represents that object only quidditatively, insofar as it is commensurate with the intellection through which it occurs. Hence a created word produced through the vision of the blessed, if that vision touched God only quidditatively, would represent the divine essence only quidditatively, not comprehensively; and thus it could not grant God that he is known quidditatively and comprehensively, or that he terminates knowledge quidditatively and comprehensively with respect to created or divine intellect. Consequently, neither would it grant him that being actually understood which essentially belongs to him.

221 It is proved secondly. For in divine things a word is produced properly and strictly speaking, and yet it is not granted to the divine essence that it is actually understood; for the divine essence has from itself that it is understood, or is the object actually terminating intellection, and therefore it is not granted to it that it is understood. For the same reason, therefore, a created word produced in the beatific vision would not grant the divine essence that which belongs to it essentially, namely, that it terminates the quidditative intellection of itself. The antecedent is universally admitted among theologians. The consequence, however, seems to follow from parity of reason.

§ II. Decision of the difficulty.

222 Nevertheless, it must be said that the impossibility of a created word representing God quidditatively is rightly established by the force of the argument indicated in the heading. This assertion of D. Thom.'s disciples can be proved only better by adducing and explaining the said argument, which can indeed be proposed in the following form. For just as the divine essence is its own intelligible being and its own intellection, so too it is its own actually understood being. Therefore, just as for the former reason—namely, because it is its own intelligible being—it cannot be made intelligible through any other intelligible species, and consequently no created intelligible species can be given that represents it quidditatively, whose proper function is to render intelligible the object represented through it in that way; so too, for this reason, namely, because it is its own actually understood being, it cannot be made the object actually understood through any created form; and consequently there cannot be a created word representatively representing it quidditatively. The antecedent is sufficiently clear. The consequence, namely what is stated in part 1 from what was said in question 4 of this disputation, is clear. For whatever is such from itself and essentially cannot be made such by another: just as, because union is essentially the union of extremes, its union with them cannot be produced through another; so too, if the divine essence is intelligible in itself and essentially quidditatively, there cannot be given an intelligible species representing it quidditatively, since the function of such a species is to render intelligible the object represented through it. From this the same consequence is likewise clear in the second part: since it is proper to the said word to render the object represented through it actually understood.

223 This is confirmed and explained. For if the said created word were granted, it would both place God in the role of what is understood, or that of terminating the beatific vision, and not place him there: hence an evident contradiction would follow. The antecedent is clear in part 1. For, as we shall explain more fully immediately below, to constitute a word distinct in entitative being from the object understood as the said created word would be in relation to God is to constitute it in the role of what is understood. Which, 2.

224 This is confirmed, 2. For an angel needs an express species in order to know himself, rather than a species imprinted by and distinct from himself, because although he is knowable in the first act by reason of his immateriality and actuality, nevertheless, since this is not through the manner of a second act but contains an admixture of potentiality, precisely considered in terms of the force of his own essence he does not have a knowable being in the second act, but only in the first; and consequently he needs an express species through which he may be rendered intelligible in the second act, or, so far as the present question is concerned, through which he may be constituted in the role of the object actually terminating his knowledge. Therefore, since God not only has from himself a knowable being proximately and immediately in the first act, but a knowable being in the second act, or a terminus actually terminating every quidditative knowledge of himself—since he is not only his own intelligible being, but also his own actually understood being, insofar as he is a pure act in this order—it follows that he needs no express species or word in order to be seen quidditatively by the blessed; indeed, he cannot be seen through one.

§ III. Solution of the opponents, and its first refutation.

225 The opponents object that although this pertains to the perfection of the divine essence insofar as it is intelligible by created intellect, it is not actually understood by it. Thus it has the former from itself, but not the latter; and thus it cannot be made intelligible through any created form, but it can nevertheless be made actually understood with respect to created intellect by something created, namely a word.

They confirm this solution both from the fact that, if God were not intelligible by created intellect, he would lack infinite perfection in the role of an intelligible object; whereas even if he were not actually understood by it, and therefore had the same perfection, he would still be seen by some created intellect, or would still be the object actually seen with respect to it. And also because being the object actually understood with respect to created intellect does not belong to him before created intellection or vision, as seems evident from the terms themselves. Thus this is a sign that it does not pertain to God's intrinsic perfection, and consequently does not belong to him from himself; for what pertains to God's intrinsic perfection and belongs to him from himself cannot fail to belong to him antecedently to created intellection. Finally (and this confirms and explains the preceding twofold reason), because it seems rather to follow from this reason, adduced in favor of our assertion, that a created word representing God according as he is in himself must be given in order that he himself may be seen quidditatively. For although the divine essence has essentially that it is understood by God, it is not understood by created intellect. Thus, although for God himself to be understood it requires no produced word, by virtue of which he would be rendered understood by God, for him to be understood by created intellect it does indeed require one.

226 This solution, however, is unsatisfactory. For it is false that being the object actually understood with respect to created and blessed intellect, as such, does not pertain to the intrinsic perfection of the divine essence, if this denotes—which in truth it must denote—that the object, according as it is from itself, is actually understood by that intellect, or, according as it possesses in itself sufficient actuality to terminate created intellection, namely the beatific vision, by itself alone and without the aid of another, we speak here of being understood; this does not pertain to the intrinsic perfection of the essence. The reason is evident. For just as it belongs to the function of the understood object to have the role of a motivating object with respect to intellection, so too it belongs to the function of that same object to possess the role of a terminating object, or, according as it is from itself, actually terminating that intellection. Thus, just as having sufficient immateriality and actuality to possess by itself, by its own reason, and without the intervention of another, the role of a motivating object pertains to the intrinsic perfection of the said object, and much more does its having the role of an object that, according as it is from itself, actually moves with respect to intellection; so too, it will pertain to the intrinsic perfection of that same object that it possess sufficient immateriality and actuality so that, according as it is from itself and without the aid of another, it has the force to terminate intellection actually, or according as it is from itself actually terminate it.

227 This is confirmed and explained. For just as in being the intelligible object a twofold intelligibility is involved: one is an extrinsic denomination arising from intellectual potency, and therefore resides on the potency's side and is referred back to the object itself; the other, however, resides on the object's side and arises from its intrinsic immateriality and actuality, or, if these are lacking, arises from the intelligible species insofar as the latter resides on their side and supplies their defect—so too, in being actually understood there is also involved a twofold being understood: one is an extrinsic denomination arising from intellection, and therefore resides on its side and is referred back to the object itself; the other, however, resides on the object's side and signifies in it such immateriality and actuality that, at least according as it is from itself, it actually terminates intellection and is, so to speak, that upon which the extrinsic denomination arising from that intellection immediately falls. Thus, in order actually to terminate, it needs nothing to supply a defect of its own actuality or immateriality; or, if it does need something, that defect is supplied by the word, insofar as the latter resides on its side. Therefore, although the former being understood does not signify an intrinsic perfection in the object residing primordially on its side, the latter being understood indeed does; just as, although the former being intelligible, arising from intellectual potency, does not signify intrinsic perfection in the object, the latter being intelligible, residing on the object's side, does. The due proportion required between the intelligible and understood object demands this, as will be clearer from itself and from what is to be said below. Indeed—as we shall examine in this same difficulty—the fact that an object is actually understood, insofar as this denotes being understood residing on the object's side, signifies a far greater perfection in the object than being intelligible that is found in it.

§ IV. Second refutation of the opponents' solution.

228 First, this very point can be urged and explained from the fact that whenever a created word is given, it is not needed for intellection as something in which the intellection itself essentially consists, but as something residing on the object's side and supplying its defect, or as an internal object that essentially has being as a terminus actually terminating that intellection and by virtue of which the object represented through it has an ultimate termination. Thus, whenever a word is produced through an intellection, it arises from a defect of the object—that is, from the fact that the object does not possess such actuality and immateriality as to have, from itself and essentially, being actually understood, or, according as it is from itself, to terminate its own intellection. Therefore, that an object from itself alone, and without needing a word, has being actually understood or actually terminates intellection, signifies intrinsic perfection and actuality in it. This second consequence follows plainly from the first. For if the need of a word in order actually to terminate intellection arose from a defect, and therefore from an intrinsic imperfection of the object, it would follow that an object which needs no word in order actually to terminate intellection has intrinsic perfection and actuality in it. Likewise, because an intelligible species is needed as something residing on the object's side in order to have the role of a motivating object and supply its defect and intrinsic potentiality, an object's not needing that species, but having in itself essentially the power to move the intellect, signifies intrinsic actuality and perfection in the same object. The first consequence, however, follows from the antecedent. For if the production of a word through intellection did not arise from a defect of the object, the word would not be needed as something residing on the object's side and supplying its defect, as is stated in the antecedent.

The antecedent, namely that whenever a word produced through created intellection is given, it is not needed as something in which intellection essentially consists, is clear from what was said in the preceding question and from the positions of our Complutensian teachers in lib. de Anima disp. 21, q. 23 and 4, which must altogether be consulted for an exact understanding of this point.

229 With respect, however, to the third part of the consequence just given, namely that a word is required in order that the object represented through it may ultimately be actually terminated by intellection, this is sufficiently clear from the second part of the same antecedent, namely that a word is needed as an internal object that essentially has being as a terminus actually terminating that intellection. Also because, since the word is not an object, which, strictly speaking, it cannot be required as an object actually and essentially terminating intellection unless, through its means, the object represented through it should have that ultimate termination. Moreover, because whatever is essentially such must be such in everything else that shares that property: thus, if the word is essentially an object actually terminating intellection, the object represented through it must have from it its actual termination.

230 With respect, however, to the second part of the consequence just given, the same antecedent is urged. First, because D. Thom. teaches this in 4. contra Gent. cap. 11, where he says that to be the word is to be understood: that is, its being is of such a condition that, among other things, it indispensably has being as the object terminating intellection actually. Thus he says there that a human word cannot be called absolutely and simply a human being, but a human being in a qualified sense, namely, an intelligent human being. Hence this would be false: The human being is the word; but this can be true: The intelligent human being is the word. And q. 4, de verit. art. 2, ad 3, says: The conception of the intellect is the mean between the intellect and the understood thing, because through it the operation of the intellect reaches the thing, and therefore the conception of the intellect is not only that which is understood, but also that by which the thing is understood. Thus the same thing that is understood can be called both the thing itself and the conception of the intellect; likewise, what is said can be called both the thing said through the word and the word itself. But if the word did not intrinsically have being as an object actually understood, or terminating intellection actually, it would not be one thing, as we have just said, by which the thing represented through it is understood, or by which the same intellection is actually terminated, so that the word would terminate immediately and by its own reason, while the thing represented would terminate only mediately and through the word. For what is the first and immediate reason of termination has termination from itself and intrinsically, just as what is the first reason of being white has whiteness from itself and intrinsically, at least insofar as it is the principle by which something is made white.

231 Moreover, because the following proof explains and establishes this sufficiently. For since it is proper to the intellect to understand by drawing its object to itself, and since it has such an object with respect to itself, both as a motivating object and as a terminating object, the object must, according to each relation, be drawn to the intellect whenever the said object is not united to it in itself and with sufficient actuality and immateriality to exercise both functions. Therefore, since an object is drawn to the intellect through an intelligible species only in the role of a motivating object and principle of intellection, but not in the role of a terminating object, or, more properly, of one terminating intellection, it follows that in the stated case there must necessarily be given an express species, or word, through which the understood object is drawn to the intellectual power in the role of an object terminating intellection.

Hence, just as an intelligible species is essentially the principle of intellection, because through it the intelligible thing is drawn to the intellect in the role of a motivating object, and therefore the external object is by its reason the efficient principle with respect to intellection, so too the word will essentially be the intellection understood, or the terminus or internal object whose conception makes the object to be understood, or the object actually terminating intellection; and by virtue of it, the external object, lacking sufficient immateriality and actuality, will ultimately terminate intellection. For through the word the thing is drawn to the intellect in the role of an object actually terminating intellection.

232 Next (a tacit evasion that might have been used against the preceding proof will thus remain refuted). Since the word, or created express species, essentially has what is precisely required because of intellection's need, so that it is given only when that intellection needs it, and otherwise when it does not need it, as is clear from the preceding question and from what N. Complut. teaches in lib. de Anima disp. 21, it must likewise essentially belong to it that it lasts as long as the intellection itself is present, because the latter needs it only then, and that it vanish when the intellection vanishes. For then it is not the intellection that needs it; hence it must also essentially have being actually terminating intellection. The consequence is clear. For what essentially has being as a terminus, or object, of intellection and has an indispensable connection in its being produced and preserved by it cannot fail essentially to have being actually understood through it, or to actually terminate it.

233 Finally, from the difference between intelligible species and word, or express species. For since intelligible species resides on the object's side, it must be commensurate with the object. Thus, just as if the object had in itself the role of an intelligible species strictly so taken, it would have only the role of a motivating object, and would not essentially require that it always be an object actually moving toward intellection and actually influencing it, so too intelligible species has none of this. The word, however, resides on the side of the object and intellection so far as it is so called; and thus, insofar as it resides on the object's side, it is of the same nature as the object, just as an intelligible species representing quidditatively is of the same nature as its object for the same reason. But insofar as it resides on the side of intellection, and not in any respect whatever, but as something produced precisely because of its need, it must, in the role of object, have that actuality which the intellection itself has in the role of intellection. Thus, just as the intellection itself is essentially actual and tends toward the word and, through it, toward the ultimate object, so too the word will essentially be the object actually terminating intellection, by virtue of which the ultimate object terminates it.

Hence for this reason it is commonly said that, although intelligible species and express species are formal likenesses of the object, intelligible species nevertheless represents it habitually, whereas express species represents it most actually. For just as an external image is said actually to represent its prototype to sight when the prototype is actually seen, but not when it is not thus seen, and therefore then represents it only in the first act and by way of a habit, though formally, so too, because actual intellection does not belong to the essence of intelligible species, but does belong to the essence of the word, the former represents it only habitually, whereas the latter represents it most actually, although both are formal likenesses of the same object.

§ V. The opponents' solution does not satisfy the three arguments adduced in its favor at n. 225.

234 Nor do the arguments they advance in its favor support it. For to the first proof it is clear from what has been said that God would not have infinite perfection and actuality if, from himself and without needing a created word distinct from himself, he were not actually understood by created intellect, provided being understood is taken here as we take it, namely, as saying that he has such actuality and immateriality that, according as he is from himself and without needing a distinct word, he terminates created intellection, through which he is seen quidditatively. Thus, the fact that he does not always actually terminate does not arise from a defect of the divine essence, but from a defect of created vision. Yet to these it follows that he would retain the same perfection he now has even if he were not understood by created intellect, provided being understood denotes the extrinsic denomination arising from created intellection. For this being understood arises from intellection and thus neither increases nor diminishes divine perfection. The former being understood, however, resides on the object's side and signifies the greatest actuality and immateriality in it; hence, if it were removed from God, some very great perfection and actuality of his own would necessarily be removed from him.

235 From this, in answer to the second proof, it must be said that although being the object actually understood with respect to created intellect, according as it denotes the said extrinsic denomination arising from the intellection of the blessed, does not belong to God before such intellection, being actually understood with respect to the same created intellect, according as this denotes that former being understood, does belong to him—namely, that, according as he is from himself and by the force of his supreme actuality and immateriality, he actually terminates the said intellection, or has the most actual force to terminate it actually—even though the exercise of this termination is not given except when created intellection actually touches him quidditatively. Hence, his not always actually exercising this terminating function does not arise from a defect of God or of his immateriality and actuality, but from a defect of created vision, which is required as a condition and concomitant. Thus, simply by positing this, God exercises by himself, and without the intervention and need of anything distinct from himself, the said function of actually terminating intellection, insofar as it is his own being actually understood, as has been explained and will shortly be explained further.

236 Thus, also, with respect to the last proof, the antecedent must be denied. For although the divine essence does not essentially have being understood by created intellect, provided that being understood by it denotes the extrinsic denomination arising from created intellection, nevertheless, according as being understood by the same denotes being the object of such actuality that, according as it is from itself, it would actually terminate intellection, the fact that it does not terminate in act arises only from a defect of that intellection, not from a defect of the divine essence. Thus it will not need a word distinct from itself by virtue of which it would be rendered understood with respect to created intellect. For the said word is not needed in order to grant the object being understood according as being understood is taken in that former sense, but in order to grant it being understood according as this denotes actual force to terminate intellection actually, and in order to supply the defect of actuality and immateriality in the object by virtue of which it does not have being essentially understood through any intellection, or does not actually terminate it. Thus, simply because the divine essence is essentially understood by itself, it will not need a created word through which, in the sense just described, it would be rendered actually understood with respect to blessed intellect. Rather, by virtue of its own actuality and being understood, it will be able, without needing any created word, to terminate both uncreated intellection and any beatific and created intellection.

237 All these points can be explained by the example of the person of the divine Word. For just as for his personal being to extend secondarily to terminating the human nature of Christ the Lord, so that on its part that nature is actually terminated by him, it is not required that it belong to his notion actually and in act to terminate that nature; it is enough that he have that very filiation in the abstract through essence and by way of the purest act. Thus only the divine Word, or the other persons of the Most Holy Trinity, can—so to speak—personify a foreign nature. Likewise, for the divine essence to unite itself, or secondarily—that is, after union with the divine intellect—to unite with blessed intellect in the being of an understood object, it is not necessary that being actually understood by it belong to its notion; it is enough that it be the very actual being understood in the abstract through essence and by way of the purest act.

The reason is the same in both cases. Because the subsistence of the Word and the divine essence possess the conditions already stated, they essentially actually terminate what is proper to them and is terminable in the first instance by them; and thus, without any addition, they can extend themselves to what is terminable in the second instance. Their not doing so actually does not arise from a defect in themselves, but from the defect, potentiality, of human nature and created intellection. Hence, just as created subsistence signifies an essential commensurability with created nature, which it terminates, so that it cannot terminate another nature secondarily, whereas uncreated subsistence can; and just as uncreated subsistence, because it terminates divine nature primarily and created nature secondarily, has the property that it always and indispensably terminates the former actually and in act, whereas with respect to secondary termination it has only the property of terminating it according as it is from itself—so too, the notion of a created word requires complete commensurability with the one created intellection that it terminates. This does not belong to the notion of the uncreated word of which we now speak and which is commonly so called. Therefore, it belongs to the notion of that word, namely, a created word, that it must always terminate the intellection that it is fit to terminate. It does not belong to the notion of the uncreated word commonly so called and compared with an intellection that it terminates secondarily, but sometimes terminates actually and in act and sometimes does not terminate it, so that this arises from a defect of the intellection itself, not of the word's actuality. In what sense and by what right we bestow the name Word on the divine essence is clear from what we said in the solution of the last argument in favor of the first position of the preceding question.

§ VI. A noteworthy corollary clarifying what we have said and resolving several arguments.

238 From all of this it follows, first, that what we recently said is further clarified: namely, that the role of an object terminating intellection and not needing a word requires greater immateriality and actuality, and greater intrinsic perfection in the object itself, than does the role of a motivating object. Second, it follows how an object's terminating intellection by itself and without needing a word signifies intrinsic perfection in it distinct from an object that is only potentially terminative of intellection. Finally, it follows how an object terminating intellection by itself and without a distinct word cannot fail essentially to have being actually understood through some intellection, and consequently how this can belong only to the divine essence.

239 The reason for this corollary, as regards its first part, is this. First, because there is given an object which by itself and without need of another can have the role of a motivating object, as appears in the essence of an angel with respect to his own intellect; yet he cannot by himself, by his own reason, and without the intervention and need of a word, actually terminate intellection, as is clear from what has been said. Thus it is a sign that an object's being by itself and by its own reason, without need of a word, the object actually terminating intellection signifies greater perfection and actuality than the perfection required in an object that is by itself and by its own reason a motive of the intellect; otherwise there would be no reason why both should not belong to the angel. Moreover, because the word is more actual than the intelligible species; therefore, since each supplies a defect of the object, it is a sign that the defect supplied in the terminating object is greater than that supplied in the motivating object. Consequently, the terminating object, which does not need to be supplied in it by this defect, is more actual than the motivating object, which likewise does not need a species but moves itself to intellection. Finally—and this confirms and explains the preceding proof—because a thing not needing a word must have that same actuality which the word has as something supplying its defect, just as an object not needing an intelligible species must have that same actuality which the species has as something supplying the object's defect when the object needs it. Therefore, since the word signifies such actuality in the intelligible order that it essentially says to be the object actually understood, or actually terminating intellection, it follows that the object terminating intellection by itself and by its own reason, without need of a word, must have that same actuality. And since this signifies greater actuality in the intelligible order, and therefore the word is something more actual in this order than the intelligible species, as we were just saying, greater actuality and greater immateriality are required for the role of the said object terminating intellection.

240 The reason for the same corollary with respect to its second part, namely that terminating intellection by itself and without need of a word signifies intrinsic perfection in it distinct from an object that is only potentially terminative, is deduced from the first and second proofs advanced for the first part of this corollary, as will be clear to the reader, and also from the third. For just as the word, supplying the defect of the terminating object, intrinsically has being in the word actually terminating, not merely being potentially terminative, and therefore cannot fail to be distinct from that which is only potentially terminative, so too an object not needing a word, but terminating itself, will intrinsically have being actually terminating, not merely being potentially terminative. Consequently, it will be distinct from an object that is only potentially terminative.

From this, also, the reason for the same corollary with respect to its last part is gathered. For, as we were just saying, an object not needing a word in order actually to terminate intellection must have that same actuality which it would have in the word, if one were given, as something supplying its defect. Therefore, since the word supplying the defect of the object must essentially have being as an object actually understood, it follows that the same must belong to an object not needing a word, and consequently it cannot fail essentially to have being actually understood through some intellection, namely through the intellection most connatural to it. And since this can belong only to the divine essence, as is clear from itself, it follows that the divine essence alone can lack a word distinct from itself in order actually to terminate intellection.

§ VII. The arguments of the first position are met.

241 To the first [argument] it is answered by denying the antecedent. For if the said created word were granted, then, although according to what it expresses, it would grant God that he is understood only quidditatively, and not comprehensively, by created and blessed intellect, it would not grant God adequately that whole being understood which he has from himself and essentially; yet it would grant him inadequately that being understood which belongs to him essentially and according to that ratio according to which it belongs to God. This is explained. For it can be understood in two ways that God belongs to being understood quidditatively only by created intellect, and is not at the same time known quidditatively and comprehensively by divine intellect. First, indeed, in a purely restrictive sense, such that by force of that concept alone it is conceived only as known quidditatively, or as terminating, according as it is from itself, only a purely quidditative knowledge with respect to created intellect, and nothing is conceived concerning that being understood quidditatively and comprehensively which he has with respect to divine intellect. And thus, only in this restrictive sense is it said that he does not have being understood quidditatively and comprehensively at the same time by divine intellect, insofar as that being understood, or that power of terminating his own intellection actually which belongs to God from himself, is conceived strictly with respect to the inadequate function of terminating only the quidditative knowledge with respect to created intellect, with no concern for that same inadequate function of terminating both quidditative and comprehensive intellection with respect to his own divine intellect. In a second way, however, in a negative sense: namely, that it be granted to God that he is known only quidditatively by created intellect—or equivalently—that, according as he is from himself, he terminates that cognition by his own reason, while it is denied that he thereby has being actually understood quidditatively and comprehensively with respect to divine intellect.

Although, therefore, being understood only quidditatively, or quidditatively and not comprehensively at the same time by created intellect, with only taken in the negative sense, as denying that he is understood quidditatively and comprehensively at the same time with respect to divine intellect, is not yet an inadequate being understood, or a being understood suitable to the divine essence, yet it is so if only is taken in the purely restrictive sense just explained. For this is proper and peculiar to the divine essence, such that it cannot be shared with any created or creatable essence. For although it is in itself a single, so to speak, atomic essence, it is nevertheless quidditatively and comprehensively knowable and known by God alone, and consequently by any others is only quidditatively knowable and known only in this way whenever created intellect is occupied with it according as it is in itself. Therefore, if a created word granted God that he would be understood, or known, only quidditatively and not comprehensively by created intellect, without denying that he is nevertheless understood by his divine intellect, both quidditatively and comprehensively, this would also by that very reason entail that the said word be given; for nothing can deny or take from God that he is known by himself quidditatively and comprehensively, or, equivalently, that by himself, without the intervention of a word distinct from himself and without need of it, he actually terminates his own quidditative and comprehensive cognition. The consequence would be that such a word grants God an inadequate property which he has from himself and essentially, namely, that he is understood only quidditatively and not comprehensively by created intellect.

From this, too, it would follow—so that the tacit objection is resolved—that the said word, considered according to what it implicitly or adequately would grant God, namely, that he both is and is not quidditatively and comprehensively known by himself, cannot be created. For insofar as it were created, it could not grant this, as is clear from itself. And insofar as it would grant God that inadequate property already stated, which he has from himself and essentially, namely, being understood only quidditatively and not comprehensively by created intellect, it would also, according to what it implicitly and adequately posits, have the force to grant God that he is quidditatively and comprehensively understood by himself, or that he is the object actually terminating that quidditative and comprehensive intellection by which he comprehends himself. For what grants God a property that is essential to him cannot intrinsically involve a limitation; consequently, if taken adequately, it must signify infinity within its own line. But because the said word signifies this infinity and excludes limitation, it could, if taken adequately, grant God that he is the object actually terminating both the quidditative vision by which created intellect sees him and the quidditative and comprehensive vision by which he comprehends himself. Otherwise such a word would not signify the said infinity or exclude every limitation, as will be clear to the reader.

242 A second answer is given, or rather, the preceding solution is more fully explained, by denying the antecedent. With respect to the proof, it must be said that if a created word representing God quidditatively were once granted, it would both not grant and grant God that he is quidditatively and comprehensively known by divine intellect. It would not grant this, first, because, as supposed, it would be something created; and also because the divine essence is itself intellectuality by way of the purest act. It would grant this, because, as is clear from the first reason in this article, by the very fact that it represents God quidditatively, it is of the same nature with him in intelligible being, and thus it would grant God that he is at once quidditatively and comprehensively understood. For a word representing God and being a pure act in the intelligible order cannot fail to grant him being understood in the most perfect way from every standpoint, and therefore being understood quidditatively and comprehensively. And since this cannot hold with respect to created intellect, it would grant God that he is thus known by divine intellect.

243 It makes no difference if one insists that, according to this second solution, the proposition that the said word grants God being at once quidditatively and comprehensively known by his own divine intellect is not saved, if one insists precisely on the force of this last argument, which we have clarified, and does not recur to the earlier argument concerning the unity of nature in intelligible being between a word representing quidditatively and its object.

The answer is that this last argument rests on the earlier one, because the word is efficacious in actually terminating its object's quidditative intellection only insofar as it represents it quidditatively, and it does not have being of the same nature with the object in intelligible being from any other source than from its representing him quidditatively. Yet when one argument rests on another, it supposes that argument and derives its force from it, even while, once it is supposed, it adds something beyond it, as happens here. For once it is supposed from the first reason that the said word is of the same nature with God in intelligible being, another inconsistency is inferred, namely, that it would both grant and not grant God being understood, both quidditatively and comprehensively, by his own intellect, as has been explained.

244 With respect to the second, the antecedent having been granted, the consequence must be denied. The reason for the difference is this. The divine Word produced through the Father's intellection is not essentially distinct from the divine essence, whether it is considered in intelligible being or in entitative being; rather, it has being representative of the essence as of a form or nature that it includes, and thus it does not grant the essence that it is understood by God himself. Rather, the Word is understood by virtue of the divine essence as by its own proper nature. The word of which we now speak, however, insofar as it is created, would be essentially distinct from the divine essence, at least in entitative being, and, thus considered, it would not receive representative being intrinsically from it as a form. It would therefore grant it being understood through itself and would grant it what the said essence essentially has. A word essentially distinct from its object, considered under the entitative mode of being as belonging to the order of essence, cannot be produced precisely by the fecundity of the producer; rather, it must necessarily be produced in order to grant its object being actually understood. Consequently, in divine things, where the word is produced solely by the fecundity of nature, it is not essentially distinct from the primary object of which we here speak, considered under the entitative and natural mode of being as belonging to the order, or line, of essence.

We said that it would be created, because if it had being as an uncreated word from another source, as is clear from what has been said, then in that respect it would be of the same nature with the divine essence, even in entitative being, and would have being representative formally from it, not merely efficiently. Thus it would not grant the essence that it was understood; rather, conversely, the said word would be understood by virtue of the divine essence. Yet hence follows the impossibility and contradiction of the said created word: for if it were granted, it would both be created and not created, and would both render the divine essence understood and not render it understood, and would grant it what terminates and what does not terminate the vision terminative of it according as it is in itself.

Hence, when elsewhere we also said that the said word, insofar as it is created, would be essentially distinct from the divine essence, at least as considered under entitative being, we did not add this qualification because we thought that the said word, insofar as it is created, could be of the same nature with God in intelligible being. But because it now seems more certain that it cannot be of the same nature with God as considered under the entitative mode of being, even though the very fact that such a word is created would follow that it both would and would not be of the same nature with the divine essence, still considered in intelligible being, as was shown above in questions 5 and 9.

§ VIII. The arguments adduced from the second position of the preceding question, n. 201, onward are answered.

245 Because what had to be said in answer to the arguments of the second position of the preceding question could not be fully understood unless what we have said in this difficulty remained explained, we have rightly referred those matters to this point.

To the first, then, on behalf of the said second position, the antecedent must be granted with respect to priority virtually, or—which is more probable—with respect to priority on the part of the mode of conception alone, not on the part of the thing conceived. Then the consequence must be denied. The proof should proceed by granting the first part of the antecedent and denying the second, namely that intellection, considered as it is being actually enacted, possesses being as the word. Nor does the contrary establish the proof adduced there. For the word is not the being actually enacted of intellection, since intellection itself proceeds from the intellect as the principle and as that which is understood, by way of a perfect form, although the said word is indeed required on the part of the object whenever the object lacks sufficient actuality so that, by itself and inwardly, without another supplying its defect, it possesses the role of an actually intelligible and understood object. These matters will be explained further in the following solution.

246 To the second, it must be said that the eternal Father does not produce the Word from need, but from fecundity. Thus it makes no difference that he has the most present and perfectly proportioned divine essence in the role of a motivating object and terminus of his own intellection. For we assert only that when the object is present in the said manner, a word cannot be formed from need of it; but that it is then formed solely from fecundity, as occurs only in the divine intellection of the Father, presents no obstacle. For by the very fact that it is produced solely from fecundity, the divine essence itself is not rendered understood through it, nor does it receive from it being actually terminating the intellection of God; rather, the reverse obtains. For just as the divine essence has in itself and essentially by its own reason that it is itself intellection and itself intelligibility, or being actually terminating its own intellection, so too, by the very fact that the eternal Father communicates the same essence to the Word, he communicates to it intelligibility itself—that is, that by virtue of the divine essence communicated to it in the procession, it essentially has being understood, or actually terminating divine intellection.

247 But why a blessed person, insofar as he sees God, cannot produce that word from fecundity even though he does not form it from need, is clear from what has been said. First, because only an intellect having the same immateriality as God clearly seen can have sufficient fecundity to produce a word representing him quidditatively. For the said word must be of the same nature with God in intelligible being, and consequently a pure act in this order and therefore also in entitative being. For supreme purity in the intelligible order consists in being a pure act in that order and cannot fail to be united with supreme purity in entitative being, as has been explained.

Moreover, because only that intellect can produce a word precisely from fecundity which can communicate to it the same numerical nature, both in intelligible being and in entitative being, as the understood object, although otherwise they are really distinct. For if it did not have the same nature, in the way described, with its object, it could fail to grant its object being actually understood. For this is proper to a word not having the same nature with its object, both in intelligible being and in natural and entitative being, to grant its object being actually understood, or to terminate intellection actually, as is clear inductively. Thus, if a word does not have the same nature in intelligible and entitative being with its object, it is a sign that such a word is produced not solely from fecundity, but also from need of the object. Therefore, since the Father's intellect alone can grant his Word the same nature, both in intelligible being and in natural and entitative being, with an object understood in every way primarily through his intellection, it follows that only the Father's intellect can produce a word solely from fecundity, and only it can grant the word that it essentially is understood, or that it actually terminates intellection, by virtue of an object primarily and distinct from the word in every way, or, equivalently (since this can be found only in divine things), by virtue of the divine essence, which is altogether the primary object of that intellection. For, as we said above, the word and the object—which is at least primary in every way through the representation of the word—are compared with each other in such a way that either the word, by virtue of the said object, or conversely the object, by virtue of the word, essentially has what it is to be understood, or to be the object actually terminating intellection.

248 As for the angelic intellect, in which its own essence and angelic nature is immediately present, yet a word is still formed, it must be said that it is not surprising that an angel forms a word when knowing himself. For although he has sufficient actuality and immateriality to be united according to his proper substance with his own intellect in the role of a motivating object, he does not have this in the role of an understood object, or one actually terminating intellection through the manner of an internal object actually existing in the same intellect. For being understood does not belong to his essence; otherwise he would be a pure act and infinitely perfect in the intelligible order, and consequently also in entitative being.

The reason is evident. For just as created existence is itself and essentially the ultimate act of an essence, and in a certain sense exists itself, and nevertheless it does not follow that it is a pure act or infinitely perfect; so too, just as something essential cannot fail to be a pure act, both an essence and its existence, and thus this belongs to God alone—so too, the fact that something possesses precisely that it is essentially the object itself actually terminating intellection, or that it consists in intelligibility, or that it is intellection itself, does not argue infinite purity and perfection in intelligible or entitative being. Nevertheless, if it at the same time possesses the role of an intelligible species and intellectual nature, and finally the role of an object consisting in this, that it essentially has being understood, or actually terminates intellection, as would occur in the angel if it were essentially the object actually understood, this argues infinite purity and perfection in the intelligible order, and consequently also in the entitative order. For by the very fact that it would essentially identify with itself, together with the other properties already stated, the role of an object essentially understood, it would also identify with itself intellection itself, which necessarily mediates between radical nature and intelligible species on the one hand, and the object actually understood on the other. For just as intellectual nature, which essentially identifies intellection with itself, must identify with itself the understood, which mediates between nature and intellection, so too the said angel, identifying with itself as something essential both its nature, being actually understood, and intellection itself, would be a pure act.

249 To the third, the antecedent must be denied. With respect to the proof, it must be said that a word representing an object quidditatively and connaturally must be commensurate both with the object itself and with potency. For it resides partly on the object's side and partly on the potency's side. On the potency's side, indeed, insofar as it must be its effect. On the object's side, however, both insofar as it is of the same nature with it in intelligible being as that which it represents quidditatively, and also because, just as an imprinted species renders an object intelligible and therefore resides on its side as something acting and supplying its place, so too a word renders an object actually understood and actually places it in the role of an object terminating intellection, and therefore must also reside on its side.

Hence, when a word ought to be of such a condition that it cannot reside on either side—that of potency and that of the object—and consequently cannot have both roles, namely that of the effect of intellectual potency and simultaneously that of a form having the same nature in intelligible being with the object, and that of constituting it in being an object actually understood, such a word will involve an evident contradiction. And since a word representing God quidditatively cannot have both roles—this is true both because it involves the divine essence being placed in the role of an object actually understood by something distinct from itself, as we said above, and also because, insofar as it would be the effect of created potency, it would signify finitude and limitation, whereas, insofar as it is of the same nature in intelligible being with the divine essence, it would have to import infinite perfection and infinite immateriality in intelligible being—such a word therefore plainly involves a contradiction.

250 By this, the first confirmation is also sufficiently clear. For with the antecedent granted, the consequence must be denied. For although a word representing quidditatively can represent only through an intelligible species, and not just any intelligible species but one according as the intellect uses it, and thus an angel may have a word inadequate to the intelligible species and to the object adequately represented through it, the word must nevertheless always be of the same nature and immateriality as the object, or those properties that are predicated quidditatively of the object, and must place it in the role of an object actually terminating knowledge. All these things, however, are repugnant in a word representing the divine essence according as it is in itself, unless it has infinite perfection and immateriality, and consequently unless it is the divine essence itself, as has been shown.

251 It is also clear with respect to the second confirmation that that word will both be and not be limited by the beatific vision. It will indeed be, because, as supposed, it is an effect produced through such a vision. It will not be, however, because insofar as it resides on the object's side and represents it quidditatively, rendering the object itself actually understood, it must be of the same nature and immateriality as God, and consequently would be God. Thus the same argument does not apply to intellection and to the word. For intellection is neither a likeness of the object nor does it constitute the object in being actually understood, residing on the object's side as the formal reason terminating intellection; it is only an intellectual tendency toward the object. Thus it is not required that it be of the same nature in intelligible being with the object, or be a univocal likeness of it; it is enough that it touch the said object, either in itself or through its univocal likeness, when a likeness, or word, is formed through this intellection, as occurs in other acts of intellection. The word, however, as we have already explained, must be a univocal likeness of the object, of the same nature with it in intelligible being, and must place it in the role of an object actually understood, or terminating intellection. Thus it is no wonder that a created word representing the divine essence quidditatively involves a contradiction.

The conclusion is negative. Nothing occurs here that needs to be noted or discussed, since the point is sufficiently clear from itself and from what was said in article 1 of this question.

The conclusion is negative.