Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

186 This Difficulty, as regards its first part, must be settled briefly, because its determination follows from what has been said in the preceding Difficulties.

§ I. The Force of St. Thomas’s Ultimate Reason Is Explained.

It must therefore be said that the ultimate reason of St. Thomas is likewise the best, and that from it the impossibility of the aforesaid species is rightly inferred. Thus the authors cited above in support of our opinion in the preceding Difficulty. This assertion will be proved no better than by setting forth the aforesaid reason and demonstrating its efficacy. St. Thomas proposed it in these words: The divine essence is something incircumscribed, containing supereminently within itself whatever can be signified or understood by created intellect: and this can in no way be represented by any created species, because every created form is determined according to some reason, whether of wisdom, of power, of being itself, or of something of this kind; therefore.

But that the force and efficacy of this third reason may become clear, it must be noted that it rests on the same foundation as the preceding reason, namely the second: the impossibility of equating a created species with God in the degree of immateriality and actuality. The only difference between them lies in the different ways in which divine actuality and immateriality are explained through an ordering to the different potentialities that they exclude. For in the preceding reason [divine actuality] is explained by excluding potentiality toward being, because God is his own being and has it intrinsically: and because this exclusion of potentiality cannot apply to a created species, it is inferred that the latter cannot be commensurate with God in the degree of immateriality, nor can it quidditatively and clearly represent Him, and consequently that such a species is impossible. In this latter reason, however, divine actuality and immateriality are explained by excluding potentiality toward having perfection through composition from genus and difference, or aggregation from several forms, degrees, or quasi-parts: because all these things circumscribe, terminate, and limit the essence of a thing. Therefore, by excluding them, the divine essence is something incircumscribed containing supereminently within itself whatever can be signified and understood. Hence, because exclusion of this potentiality cannot belong to a created species precisely insofar as it is created, it is also inferred that the species cannot equal God in the degree of immateriality, or of purification from potentiality, and therefore is impossible.

§ II. The Arguments Brought in Difficulty 4, from n. 118 to 123, Are Met.

187 To the first [argument], the major is denied. For the first proof, it must be said that that induction is true in natural intellectual powers when they are compared with objects proportionate to them; but otherwise when the aforesaid powers are elevated to understanding in the supernatural and divine order. For then it is not necessary that, whenever vision and created intellectual light are possible, a created species of the same order also be able to be given, as happens at present.

And the reason for the difference is taken from what has been said. For intellectual powers, when natural and compared with their proportionate objects of the same rank, concur altogether connaturally, namely by the mode of simple and total powers. Therefore, as something first perfectible, another altogether connatural principle is due to them: namely, the created intelligible species, which represents quidditatively those same objects by the mode of a simple and total form. For in general, to a principle altogether connatural, and further perfectible by another principle that is also altogether connatural, the aforesaid principle is due as something first perfectible.

On the other hand, when powers are elevated to understanding God in the supernatural order, as He is in Himself, then, elevated by the light of glory, they do not concur altogether connaturally, nor is vision itself altogether connaturally elicited from that light. Therefore, a species of God as He is in Himself—and consequently no created species representing Him in the aforesaid way—should not correspond to them as something first perfectible. For if such a species were possible, it would correspond to created intellect as something first perfectible, as is clear from itself.

Therefore, the species that is due to correspond to it—and not to any intellect whatever, but necessarily as something secondarily perfectible and in the aforesaid manner—must be a species altogether connatural to divine intellect, and consequently must be the divine essence itself. For just as such a species must necessarily represent God by the mode of a simple and total form, and consequently by the mode of a form altogether connatural, as we said above, so it ought to correspond only as something first perfectible to the intellect that influences vision in an altogether connatural manner, namely to divine intellect.

188 Hence, although from the possibility of another created principle altogether connatural with the species itself—namely, a supernatural intellect which, by the mode of a simple and total power, could tend toward God as He is in Himself—the possibility of an intelligible species might be inferred, because the aforesaid species would primarily and per se regard such an intellect as its first perfectible, and such an intellect would regard the species as its first principle; nevertheless, from the possibility of vision not elicited altogether connaturally, as happens at present, in accordance with what we said in n. 170, or from the possibility of light possessing only the ratio of the quantity of an elevating power, and therefore not influencing altogether connaturally, the possibility of a created intelligible species representing God as He is in Himself does not follow, as has been explained. And since the aforesaid intellect, which tends toward God as He is in Himself by the mode of a simple and total power while also preserving the character of created intellect, is impossible, as we shall show in art. 4, it follows that an intelligible species which quidditatively represents God as He is in Himself and is at the same time a created species is likewise impossible.

189 Add, first, that distinction which we touched on in this and the preceding Difficulty, namely that created light of glory holds itself on the part of the power; and thus it would suffice that it be of a higher order, even though it be something created. For since it holds itself by the mode of an elevation of the power, holding itself on that part, it must be commensurable with it, and consequently it must be terminated and limited by it. The intelligible species, however, holds itself on the part of the object, and consequently it must be commensurable with the object, with the degree of immateriality, and with the fact that it has intelligibly the same nature as the object. These two things plainly conflict with a created intelligible species, as has been shown. Through these considerations, the second proof is also sufficiently clear.

Add, second, that induction is entirely true when the object is not immediately intelligible per se and simpliciter by any intellect, and consequently is not intelligibility itself; but otherwise when it is immediately intelligible by any intellect because of its own intelligibility, by reason of its most pure actuality. For then it is impossible for it to become intelligible by another, and consequently impossible for a species really distinct from it to be given, through which it might be rendered intelligible, as was explained above in n. 123 and afterward. Therefore, since God is intelligibility itself by the mode of a most pure act, it follows that although a created light and vision that attain God quidditatively, as He is in Himself, may be possible, a created intelligible species through which God might be represented quidditatively is nevertheless impossible. For the light of glory and created vision make created intellect seeing and able to see in such a way that they do not thereby grant God that He is seeing or that He is seen, insofar as this belongs to God from His own side. But an intelligible species representing God quidditatively, precisely by granting created intellect the ability to see God itself, would also grant God that He was intelligible through it by that intelligibility which is required on the part of the object. For, as we said in the recently cited number, it belongs to the intelligible species to render its object intelligible by the intelligibility required from its own side. We said by the intelligibility required from its own side, on account of those things which we shall mention in Difficulty 8, nn. 226 and 227: these things must be considered for an exact understanding of them.

190 To the second, the major is granted, in accordance with what we said in n. 170, but the minor must be denied. For just as the intellect, as filled with the light of glory, is a kind of participation in divine intellect as it is in itself, so in the aforesaid manner it is inclined toward the same object toward which divine intellect, as it is in itself, is inclined, namely God Himself, clearly and quidditatively knowable. Consequently, it is in some way naturally ordered toward union with Him in intelligible being; and thus, in some way, the union of the divine essence with the intelligible species will be due to the intellect filled with that same light, insofar as it comes from the light of glory, although not insofar as it concerns essential commensurability, according to what belongs to it from itself.

And to the proof taken in the contrary sense, it must be said that from the highest immateriality and most pure actuality of the divine essence, insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species, it follows only that this species is demanded altogether connaturally by divine intellect, as by a cognitive power that per se first demands it, and therefore adequately corresponds to it and identifies it with itself by the mode of a most pure act; but not that it is not demanded by the intellect filled with the light of glory as by a secondarily perfectible intellect, and in the aforesaid way by that light, which in no way corresponds adequately to the species or identifies it with itself, but only as something now intimately present and united to it in an intelligible way, as has been explained. For this kind of demand, which is not altogether connatural, it is enough that created intellect, when filled with the light of glory and elevated to this, be of the same order as God clearly and quidditatively visible, and have a participation in divine intellect as it is in Himself. For the intelligible species must be commensurable in such a way that with its first perfectible it neither exceeds nor is exceeded in immateriality; but with the secondary perfectible, which in some way participates in the character of the first perfectible, this is otherwise.

191 Accordingly, the objection raised in the same proof is also clear. For just as the human intellect, as it is in this state, cannot in any way connaturally seek species so immaterial as the Angelic species, because it is on a lower degree of immateriality; but otherwise, if elevated by the light of a higher order, it in some way connaturally demands them, namely insofar as they come from the elevating light, not insofar as they come from the power or essential commensurability of the intellect as it is in this state. For it was necessary for this that the light of that higher order be connatural and due to the aforesaid intellect in that state. Thus, although created intellect cannot per se connaturally seek the concurrence of a species that is supremely immaterial, such as the divine essence, it can nevertheless do so, in the aforesaid manner, when elevated to the supernatural and divine order and when it has a participation in divine intellect as it is in itself, or insofar as it is filled with the light of glory. For then, although it demands the union of the divine essence through the mode of an intelligible species insofar as it comes from the light, it does not demand it insofar as it comes from the power or essential commensurability of that essence. For this required that the light of glory be connatural and due to that created intellect. Therefore, although it is demanded in some way connaturally, it is not demanded altogether connaturally by the aforesaid intellect.

For altogether connaturality, of which we are speaking, requires that the aforesaid species be demanded on the part of each of the two extremes. Accordingly, whatever gives the intellect its quantity of power, or its efficacy for seeing God, must also give it essential commensurability with God, and conversely with respect to the same vision. Consequently, what is demanded on the part of the power tends toward seeing God not just in any way, but through the mode of a simple and total power that does not require elevation.

192 From this it also follows that the aforesaid species is not only not demanded altogether connaturally by that same created and elevated intellect, because it is not demanded on the part of either extreme according to what each of them demands from itself; but even insofar as it concerns the light of glory, or the quantity of power, there is not yet altogether complete connaturality. For this requires, according to what has been said, that by that very thing by which the intellect has its quantity of power it should also have that essential commensurability primordially suited to it, and therefore that the quantity of power be due to the essential commensurability and connatural to it, and conversely. Yet let it be granted that the aforesaid light of glory, insofar as it belongs to it and to the quantity of its power, simply and connaturally demands the union of the divine essence in the character of an intelligible species, even though this connaturality is not perfect in every respect.

193 To the third [argument], the antecedent must be denied. For the proof is clear from what has been said. For an impressed species is not demanded with respect to clear vision as a power holding itself on the part of the power, but as something holding itself on the part of the object, uniting the intellect with God Himself as He is in Himself through the mode of a quidditative likeness to Him. Hence, although what is demanded for a finite vision of God by essence, by the mode of a principle holding itself on the part of the power, need not have infinite perfection—and it is enough that it virtually contain the perfection present in such a finite and limited vision—the case is otherwise with what influences through the mode of a principle on the part of the object. For precisely because it influences in this way, and therefore quidditatively and connaturally represents God, it must have the same nature in intelligible being and must correspond with Him in entitative being in the degree of immateriality. For, as we said above, every species quidditatively representing an object must have the same nature as that object in representative being and must correspond with it in entitative being in the degree of immateriality; that is, it must not be exceeded by the object in that degree.

Hence, the quidditative species of God, insofar as it is in itself, would influence an infinite and comprehensive vision of God Himself, even though accidentally, and because of a defect in the principle holding itself on the part of the power, it would not influence infinitely. Thus, if the aforesaid impressed species were given, there would follow an evident entanglement: namely, that it would be demanded only for eliciting a vision of finite perfection, since, as is supposed, such a species would be created; and that at the same time it would be demanded for a vision infinite by essence, because it would be of the same univocal nature as God and would have as much immateriality as He does, and consequently, in the character of an intelligible species, would be a pure act and of infinite perfection by essence.

194 Accordingly, the first confirmation is also clear. For although we were to grant that other species quidditatively representing [God] might at some time not represent Him comprehensively, the case is otherwise with the quidditative species of God because of the reason given above.

For the second confirmation, it must be said that a created and impressed species of God as He is in Himself is impossible precisely because, among other things, it would be both caused by God and not caused by God, and both caused freely by Him and not caused freely by Him. It would indeed be caused, and caused freely, because it is supposed to be created; but it would not be caused, nor caused freely, but would have being from itself naturally and necessarily, because it would be of infinite immateriality and a pure act, and consequently would be God Himself, as has been shown. Thus such a species would be, and would not be, created.

195 To what is added there, namely that it is not of the character of an intelligible species that it be necessarily produced by its object, as is evident in the Angelic species, it must be answered that although it is not necessary that every intelligible species proceed from its object as from an efficient cause, the species of which we speak would nevertheless necessarily have to be produced by God. For, as is supposed, it is created, and no other agent could communicate to it the infinite immateriality that it demands, as is clear from itself; even though from another standpoint, and even by God, it could not be produced precisely because it would itself be the creative essence, as has been explained.

Add that, as is clear from what has been said, it belongs to every species that quidditatively represents an object that it either must proceed from that object—not from any object whatever, but necessarily and naturally—or, if it proceeds from another, must proceed from it with such immateriality as the object has, so that they correspond in the degree of immateriality. Hence, a species representing God by essence would have to proceed as possessing infinite immateriality, and consequently, for this reason, it could not proceed freely from God.

196 To the fourth [argument], the antecedent must be denied. For intellection, taken formally, is not a formal likeness of the object, but a certain tendency toward it, uniting the power in the second and completed act with the same object; or, as others explain, it is a tension toward the aforementioned object in the second act. Hence, the intelligible species, the word, and intellection unite the intellect with its object in different ways. For the impressed species unites through the mode of likeness in the first act; the word, through the mode of expressed likeness, such that the object is at least known inwardly as the quod [that which is known]; but intellection, through the mode of actual tendency, reaches the object in act, or through the mode of intelligible tension toward the aforesaid object.

And to the proof drawn from those testimonies and from others that might be brought together, it must be said, with Capreolus in 2. dist. 3. quaest. 2. art. 3. ad 2., from those things brought in the second place against the fourth conclusion, and in 4. dist. 49. quaest. 1. art. 3. ad 1., together with other Junior Thomists, that they must be understood in the active or passive causal sense; that is, [the thing] either produces the likeness, or is produced by the species, which is the natural likeness; or finally, as others say, it is only the complement and final actuality of the aforesaid likeness. Add with Nazarius that this belongs to the beatific vision: that it is a likeness of the object seen, namely God—not indeed in intelligible and representative being, but in entitative and natural being, insofar as through some participation and analogical likeness it participates in what has the character of nature in God, namely that God sees Himself as He is in Himself, although it does not participate in God by the mode of nature. Hence, for this reason as well, Augustine justly said in John: When He shall appear, we shall be like Him: because we shall see Him as He is.

Finally, this will become clear from what is to be said in the following Difficulty.