Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

§ I. Objections are proposed.

159 So that this argument of St Thomas may remain more fully explained, and we may proceed more distinctly and clearly, it has seemed proper to set down separately in this difficulty certain objections against the principle concerning agreement in the degree of immateriality, on which the angelic intellect rests, and to give their solutions.

The first objection, urged against what was said in the preceding difficulty, is that a lower angel knows connaturally and quidditatively a higher angel; yet the cognitive power and intelligible species that he has of it are surpassed in immateriality by the higher angel. Thus it is false that quidditative and connatural knowledge requires an object that does not surpass in immateriality the cognitive power and the intelligible species representing it. The major premise is generally admitted by theologians; the minor is proved. As the essence of a lower angel is surpassed in immateriality by the essence of a higher angel, since they are specifically distinguished by this excess, so the intellectual power and intelligible species in the lower angel are surpassed in immateriality by the higher angel, because they have the same immateriality as its essence.

It makes no difference if one says that it suffices that higher and lower angels agree in the third common and generic degree of immateriality already described, although within it they differ specifically by their own degrees of immateriality.

For the following is urged against this: if a common and generic agreement in immateriality suffices for a lower angel to understand quidditatively a higher angel whom it surpasses, then the common and analogous agreement in immateriality between created species and God would suffice for a created species to represent its object quidditatively as it is in itself. This is especially so because the light of glory agrees with God only analogically in immateriality, yet that agreement suffices for it to tend toward God quidditatively, as God is in himself.

160 Secondly, one objects chiefly (and thereby the preceding solution is also challenged) that it is asserted without foundation that the degree of immateriality sufficient and required for an angel to be carried connaturally toward an object as it is in itself is only that generic agreement which all angels retain among themselves, namely that all are separated from physical matter, though not from potential matter; for no sufficient reason appears why only this degree of immateriality, and not a greater or lesser one, is required.

161 Thirdly, one objects that if the agreement required in the degree of immateriality between angelic intellect and its object is sought, it ought rather to be an altogether complete and atomically identical agreement, rather than merely that generic agreement assigned above; especially considering what was brought forward to explain St Thomas's argument, no. 149: the species of a higher angel, taken in intelligible being and most formally, is of the same nature, and therefore of exactly the same immateriality, as the angel whom it represents, as was established in the preceding difficulty. Therefore, for it to be connaturally in an intellect and consequently serve that intellect for quidditative knowledge of the same angel as it is in itself, the immateriality required in the intellect in order to receive it connaturally must be as great as that found in the intelligible being of the species; otherwise, as we have said, it would be beyond the nature of that intellect to receive it with the immateriality it has in intelligible being. For when a form necessarily demands, in a given order, a certain immateriality formally, whatever is naturally actuated by it must be just as immaterial in that order.

162 This is confirmed first. Although the species representing a higher angel is not in entitative being and natural being of as great immateriality as the higher angel himself, it is of the same immateriality as the lower angel in whom it exists; consequently it cannot be received connaturally in the former on this account, but can in the latter. Likewise, a species representing a lower angel and existing in a higher intellect has in entitative being greater immateriality than the lower angel; therefore it cannot be received connaturally in the intellect of that lower angel insofar as it exceeds it. With still greater reason, if it is more immaterial according to its intelligible being and atomic nature than the lower angel, it cannot be received connaturally in that intellect in the intelligible order. Consequently the lower angel cannot connaturally know the higher in that respect in which it surpasses it in immateriality.

This is confirmed second. In the cognitive senses, that univocal and generic agreement in the degree of immateriality assigned by St Thomas is not sufficient; an atomically identical and complete agreement between sensitive power and sensible object is required. For the same reason, that generic agreement in immateriality will not suffice in angels. The consequence is evident from parity of reasoning. The antecedent is proved: otherwise any sense could perceive the same object perceived by another, even if it were more immaterial; and audible species naturally present in hearing could naturally be in taste or sight, and so on. Thus we assert that any angel can quidditatively know the same object that another quidditatively apprehends, and that species residing in one intellect in intelligible being can naturally be in another's intellect in the same order.

163 Fourthly, one objects that the separated soul can quidditatively know angels although it does not agree with them in the degree of immateriality. The major is proved: as while in the body it can quidditatively know corporeal things and things involving matter, so when separated from body and matter it can quidditatively apprehend things separated from body and matter, such as angelic substances. The minor is clear: the degree of immateriality suited to angels is complete separation from physical matter, both from what intrinsically includes matter, as material and complete substances do, and from relation to matter. But the degree suited to the separated soul is not complete separation from all physical matter: although it does not contain matter as a part or depend on it actually for its entity or mode, it is not separated from relation to matter, since it always remains the form of a body capable of informing matter.

164 Lastly, one objects that entitative being, of the material and accidentally, is imported by the intelligible species taken most formally as a species; therefore, from its having the character of a species with respect to an object, it does not necessarily follow that it must agree with the object in the degree of immateriality in entitative being. The consequence is certain: what agrees accidentally need not agree necessarily. The antecedent is proved: just as it is imported, materially and accidentally, to be a substance or accident in entitative being, so that it is sometimes an accident and sometimes a substance in that being, so also the said being is imported materially and accidentally.

§ II. The first objection is solved.

165 To the first of these objections we answer that the solution proposed is excellent, if properly explained. The species residing in a lower angel's intellect agrees with the higher angel in the degree of immateriality already explained, namely being separated from all physical matter, though not from potential matter. Although it is surpassed by the higher angel, this excess is not an immateriality required per se and formally for the character of species in formal species being, but immateriality imported materially and agreeing with it in formal being. For the immateriality required per se for an angelic species to represent the object quidditatively formally demands only that it reach the degree already explained, even if in relation to the lower angel's intellectual power it does not reach it proportionately, whether considered formally in the being of the power or in the being of the thing, unless materially it has an immateriality commensurate with the immateriality in the being of the thing of the lower angel's intellectual power, which is less than the immateriality materially imported from the essence and intellectual power of the higher angel.

166 This is further explained. The lowest angel does not have a cognitive power so limited that it cannot naturally and quidditatively know another angel, as is established from itself and the common opinion of theologians; and since it cannot but be surpassed in some immateriality by all other angels, because angels differ among themselves by greater or lesser immateriality according to their specific character, it follows that the agreement in the degree of immateriality with another angel, which we showed must be imported from it in order to know it quidditatively and naturally, formally means only agreement in the degree of immateriality already explained. Consequently this excess in the higher angel and defect in the lower are materially imported from the angels themselves.

It also follows that, although this degree is in the being of a thing only generic and further contractible through diverse differential modes constituting different species of angels, formally considered it constitutes a specific degree distinct from the three others already enumerated and is not further divisible by formal differences, but only materially. Thus, formally taken, it constitutes an atomic species of a peculiar degree distinct from the others. Also, the fact that angels can know one another quidditatively, precisely according to the formal quidditative knowledge they require of one another, does not depend on their special and atomic reasons by which they surpass one another in immateriality, but on that general reason of immateriality already described, which is generic in the being of the thing and atomic in the being of the degree.

167 The objection has no force against this explanation. An analogous agreement in immateriality intrinsically and actually includes agreement with difference and excess; it therefore does not suffice for an object to be known connaturally in the knower with an excess over it. As we said, for an object to be known connaturally in the knower, what is required per se and formally for its presence there is that it not actually have a more excellent mode of being, as has been explained.

168 First, since God, as he is in himself, is the first and supreme intelligible, by which every other intelligible is exemplified, yet he is exemplified by none, he must constitute a special degree of intelligibility peculiar to himself. Just as a purely spiritual substance, such as an angelic substance, cannot agree in immateriality with a created cognitive power or intelligible species, insofar as this suffices for the power itself to be known quidditatively as it is, unless that power and species have the immateriality proper to the angelic degree of intelligibility, distinct from others and consisting in complete separation from physical matter, though not from its conditions, namely potential matter; so no power or species can have sufficient immateriality to enable a power, for example, by a simple and total power, clearly and quidditatively to know God unless it has the proper immateriality of the supreme degree, namely the degree of God's intelligibility. Since such a degree, as distinct from others, signifies only the immateriality necessary for its own being to be known, no cognitive power acting as a simple and total power (of which alone we now speak), nor intelligible species, can apprehend that degree quidditatively and clearly unless it has the said immateriality and therefore agrees wholly, not merely analogically, with God in the immateriality of the degree.

169 Second, it belongs to a creature and an essence that is from another, precisely because this does not exclude but rather admits potentiality, that it can undergo a multiplicity of diverse modes of being, one of which is more perfect and more immaterial than another. Thus the created quiddity of the highest angel can exist under a mode of being natural to it in the being of the thing, and under an intentional mode of lesser immateriality (in the manner explained) in the intellect and intentional species of the lower angel. Therefore only the per se and formal agreement in the already explained degree of immateriality is required for knowing and representing it.

However, an essence that is from itself, which alone is divine, demands an indivisible degree of infinite nature and immateriality and cannot in any way exist under an inferior mode of being. Wherever this, namely being from itself, is really found, infinity will necessarily be found there. Thus, since the imprinted and quidditative species of God must contain all the essential realities of God in a real and immaterial being, namely in representative or intelligible being, it must consequently have infinity with respect to immateriality and therefore be pure act.

170 What is added in the same objection concerning the light of glory is clear from the preceding difficulty 5, no. 149. We may also add a doctrine taken from St Thomas worthy of notice: the said light does not have complete naturalness with the clear and quidditative vision of God. As the Divine Doctor teaches, III part., q. 9, a. 4, the blessed vision is wholly natural only to God: for complete naturalness with a principle does not require only that an operation be due to it or that something flow into it, but that it proceed from it according to the exigency of the nature whose operation it is. Intellectual nature demands that intellection occur according to its complete exigency, proceeding from a twofold principle, each simple in its own order: one from the side of nature, namely intellect, and the other from the side of the object, namely the imprinted species. Indeed complete naturalness requires that intellect be a proper passion of intellectual nature through its act of understanding, or belong to it intrinsically and essentially.

Therefore, since the light of glory is not present as a wholly simple and total principle, but as the elevation of a power and increase of its virtue, it follows that it is not a principle wholly and perfectly natural to vision, nor is vision naturally produced from it or does it attain God in that manner. Consequently such light does not demand the same immateriality and purity as its object, since it is wholly and perfectly natural only as a principle; otherwise, the intelligible species, which concurs as a simple and total principle in its own order.

171 If one asks why, just as elevation of a power is granted, namely the said light which together with the power, though not wholly naturally, attains God as he is, elevation of a species is not likewise granted, representing God with complete naturalness and not demanding as much immateriality as God himself, the answer is that the reasons are unequal.

For the reason of quidditative vision and of tending toward a thing as it is in itself is that it occur through a species representing it quidditatively, as we said above in the notes on the first article of this question. But an intelligible species cannot represent quidditatively or possess this through elevation, but only as a simple and total principle. Precisely because it represents its object quidditatively, it is of the same nature with it, as we proved; and precisely because it is of the same nature with it, it requires no elevation, but by its own powers represents it quidditatively. Add that a species representing an object quidditatively, and whatever is essentially required for it, holds itself from the side of the object and therefore must be commensurate with it. Thus just as it implies that a species representing God, as he is in himself, by a simple and total species is given, because it cannot be commensurate with him in immateriality, for the same reason it implies that a species elevated insofar as he is in himself is given; but the elevating light holds itself from the side of the power.

§ III. The second and third objections are refuted.

172 To the second objection we answer by denying the antecedent. Its proof also requires denial of the antecedent. For precisely because every angel quidditatively knows another, a sufficient reason is given why the agreement in the degree of immateriality assigned to the third degree must be exactly as great as that assigned by St Thomas, neither greater nor lesser, as follows from what was said in no. 166. We shall return to these matters in the treatise on angels; for now it suffices to touch lightly on the reason given by Aristotle in III De Anima: just as it is proper to intellect to become whatever things are naturally knowable, so it is proper to a perfect intellect, rooted in the entire and perfect nature such as the angelic intellect, to become perfectly in intelligible being all things naturally knowable. Likewise it is proper to an imperfect and lowest intellect, rooted in a partial and incomplete substance, to become all things in whatever way, namely imperfectly. Since for an intellect to become perfectly all things naturally intelligible it is required that it have species, perfectly representing them, or equivalently representing them quidditatively, and that quidditative knowledge follow the quidditative species, every angel having a perfect intellect can quidditatively know every naturally intelligible being, and thus every angel can apprehend another quidditatively.

173 To the third objection the antecedent must be denied. Having granted the antecedent for its proof, the consequent must be distinguished: Let it be as great as is found in intelligible being in the said species, insofar as it concerns the formal reason which holds itself from its side and is intrinsic to it, or the reason under which it is inspected by the intellect and according to which it actuates it, the consequent is granted; insofar as it concerns materially considered and involved reasons which do not constitute a special degree of immateriality, it is denied. The proof of the consequence is denied: it proves only that an immaterial form and its receptive or actuable power must have the same immateriality with respect to the immateriality according to which they are first inspected per se and by reason of which the form actuates it.

174 This is explained. Although a lower angel's knowledge of a higher angel quidditatively requires a species reaching to represent him as to his atomic nature, and therefore as to that in which he surpasses the lower angel, nevertheless the angelic intellect, whatever it may be, does not regard quae the higher angel per se and formally, because he is higher. Nor does it regard the species representing him as such with respect to that excess, nor does it receive it in that way, esse. It does, however, regard quae and understand the same higher angel by the general reason of a substance wholly purified from physical matter, though not from potential matter, and is actuated sub qua through that species by the general reason of a species first representing that same substance per se. For the adequate intensive object, per se first and formally, of the angelic intellect is angelic substance, or substance purified from all physical matter, though not from potentiality; its formal inadequate object is this or that angelic substance insofar as it participates in the reason common to all; its material and proximate object is this or that angelic substance insofar as they are distinguished by a peculiar immateriality which they unequally possess in entitative being. Thus intelligible species representing substances with respect to the excess they possess in entitative immateriality represent only the material object of that intellect, and for that reason are only materially inspected under this reason and actuate the intellect only in this way.

Therefore, since an immaterial form acts naturally when it has the same immateriality as its receptive power, and conversely, with respect to what they formally regard in one another for this actuation, materially considered reasons not constituting a special degree of immateriality cannot be naturally or unnaturally related except insofar as they stand under the formally considered reason. Hence a species representing a higher angel, insofar as its atomic and exceeding reason, is received connaturally in a lower angel's intellect: with respect to that excess alone it is received as something materially considered, and insofar as it is formally inspected and received, it has the same immateriality as the lower angel.

175 This can be further clarified: as it is beyond the nature of a subject to receive a form exceeding it in immateriality when immateriality is the reason for receiving it, so it is beyond the nature of an immaterial form to be received in a more immaterial subject when immateriality is the reason for its actuation and consequently for receiving it in the subject. Thus, notwithstanding that a species representing a lower angel and residing in a higher intellect has less immateriality in intelligible being than the higher angel and its intellect have in entitative being, it is received connaturally. The formal reasons agree in the same degree of immateriality, and that formal element, merely something generic in the being of the thing, contains under itself the many things materially distinguished in species; for it is not further divisible by formally diverse atomic differences.

Conversely, although the species, insofar as it is more immaterial than the intellect of the lower angel in intelligible being—this being being said materially of the formally taken actuable—can nevertheless be received connaturally in that intellect. For insofar as the formal elements in the being of the actuable thing and of the agent agree in the same degree of immateriality, and this formal element is such that, precisely because what it is in the being of the thing is something generic, it requires that many things be contained under it which are distinguished in species by what they import materially, and are thus compared by way of one exceeding and exceeded; although insofar as they are described formally, they are considered only as agreeing in that reason, because that reason, taken most formally in the being of a degree, is not further divisible into formally diverse atomic differences, as has been said.

176 From this, the solution of the first confirmation is easy. Entitative and immaterial being considered in the being of the thing, found in angelic substances, is divided per se by formal differences, and within the same line by distinct immaterialities constituting diverse species which agree in the same angels in entitative being and in the being of the thing. Thus a species residing in a higher angel's intellect, considered formally as to entitative being, is not something material within the line of entitative being possessing an entitative immateriality exceeding that of the lower angel's intellect. Therefore the lower angel's intellect, precisely with respect to this line, does not connaturally regard an intelligible species taken in entitative being unless it has the same immateriality, neither greater nor lesser. The reason under which it is received is therefore not purity from all physical matter in general, but that purity contracted to this determinate species of immateriality corresponding to the lower angel's immateriality esse, esse.

However, the same immaterial being found in the angels, considered with respect to the intelligible order, is materially divided by this excess in immateriality, which is diverse in species. Thus in the intelligible species it is something material: the intelligible being by which it represents this excess, although it cannot serve for knowing the angel with respect to that excess unless it carries this material feature. Similarly in the angelic intellect, formally considered in the being of cognitive power and corresponding to the intelligible species, there is also something material carrying a distinct species of immateriality in entitative being; what is formal is that the power is wholly purified from physical matter, though not from potentiality. Therefore the reason sub qua it is received is this purity, and for this reason it naturally receives that species, even though with respect to the intelligible being materially imported it is exceeding. The reason for all this is the often-stated one: complete abstraction from physical matter, though not from potentiality, constitutes an atomic species of degree in the being of the degree and therefore is not further divisible by formal differences.

177 It also follows that the objection which considerably troubles others has no force: namely, that an intelligible species representing a higher angel constitutes, in its specification and most formal reason, something formal because it represents him as to his nature and therefore as to the excess by which he surpasses a lower angel; therefore nothing material in the intelligible order can represent the said angel in this respect. The consequence is clear, because what is most formal and the specification of a thing cannot be materially imported from it.

Thus the objection is clearly of no force. What the species has in entitative being, whether considered with respect to the entitative order or the intelligible order considered in entitative being, is one thing; what it has as the reason of a receptive or quasi-receptive form, with respect to the reason sub qua it is received and, per se first, formally inspected by the intellect considered formally in the being of cognitive power, is another. Although that representation is formal to the species in entitative being, it is not formal in the being of a receptive or unifiable form considered with respect to the reason sub qua it is received or united. Likewise, although the higher angel's essence, whether taken in entitative or intelligible being, is something formal to him, it is not formal in the reason of the object of the angelic intellect or intellection, by which he is understood according to what is said of it formally as first inspected by that intellect; all this is material. Thus, even if the angel remained, impossibly, by that whereby he is a substance purified from all physical matter, though not from potentiality, and consequently lost his atomic reason, with another atomic reason given in its place, he would still remain formally in the object being of the same reason esse.

Therefore, since one must philosophize in the same way about the intelligible species of an object as about the object itself insofar as it is considered in the intelligible order, whether that order is considered in entitative being or in the being of the object formally inspected per se, what has been said above about the angelic substance must be applied proportionately to its intelligible species. The species quo must be distinguished in itself as entitative being and as intelligible being, contracted under different concepts: once under the concept of entitative being and once under intelligible being, and finally as a form unifiable with intellect, with respect to the formal reason by which it is united and regarded, or as a motivating object whose formal reason moves it.

178 To the second confirmation, the antecedent is to be denied if immateriality is understood as immateriality required per se, formally, and in a formal sense; and the consequent is to be denied. The same is to be understood in the same way. In proving the antecedent, however, the consequent, or sequence, is to be denied. For although some agreement in the degree of immateriality is required in order that a power may be borne toward a thing, this is not sufficient; rather, it is required that the thing have the formal character of being the object of that power, and consequently that it belong, in the being of an object, to the line of the object of such a power. Thus, for example, although a man's intellect and will agree in the same degree of immateriality, and hence even the objects connatural to those powers also belong to the same degree of immateriality, the intellect nevertheless cannot be borne toward the object of the will as such, nor the will toward the object of the intellect as possessing that character; for the object of the will as such does not possess the formal objective character proper to the object of the intellect, and conversely.

Hence, although the objects of sight and hearing, and even these two senses, agree in the same degree of immateriality formally imported, the object of sight nevertheless does not possess the formal objective character which of itself and formally pertains to the line of the object of hearing; for what is required here is the formal consideration of the matter under discussion, and the contraction and limitation of these powers, so that they agree in a degree of immateriality materially imported. Consequently, hearing cannot perceive the object of sight, and conversely. Hence the objection adduced there is also resolved. For all angels have the same degree of immateriality formally imported, and all of them have the objective character pertaining to the line of the object of the angelic intellect. For the angelic intellect, by reason of its perfection and purity from matter, and consequently by reason of its greater illumination and amplitude, cannot be restricted to understanding quidditatively its own substance and what is below it; but it must also extend to a quidditative knowledge of the other angels.

179 If, however, one asks why we assign to all the senses this degree of immateriality, in which all agree, and not a greater or lesser degree, as we assigned to the angels the degree of immateriality under investigation, the answer is that it is because all the senses arise from the sensitive soul, because it is sensitive, though in the manner explained by our Complutensians in their commentary on De Anima. Therefore these senses, according to a highly probable opinion, do not differ specifically, formally, in the brute animal and in man, but only materially, by reason of some modification and greater modal perfection which they receive from the same sensitive soul, considered as such in an atomic species.

From this, one can also infer the probable reason—let us mention it in passing—why any angel can know another quidditatively, and why the degree of immateriality formally imported is the one we have derived from St Thomas, and neither greater nor lesser. For it is probable, following St Thomas's line, that the angelic intellect does not arise from the angels, because they are such in an atomic species, but from the general character of angelic substance, or of a substance wholly purified from physical matter, or prime matter, though not from potentiality. Thus all angelic intellects are formally of the same species, and differ only in material and modal species insofar as they receive a greater modal perfection from the atomic nature of each angel, by virtue of which they can understand more perfectly than was said above; as we spoke in the analogous case of the sensitive powers, for example, sight existing in different animals. The reason is this. For specific and formal distinction between an intellect and its object requires diversity in the degree of immateriality formally imported; whereas, for distinction in the being of property and materially, insofar as they are distinguished modally from another intellect by reason of this modification, that greater immateriality materially imported is sufficient. But let our Complutensians' statements in the commentary on De Anima, disputation 17, no. 11 through no. 21, be considered here in their entirety; for those things which concern the present question apply, proportion being preserved.

180 The points made in the two immediately preceding numbers can be further elucidated by explaining a certain distinction which intervenes between the already stated agreement among the angelic vital powers and the agreement among the sensitive powers. For if we speak of the sensitive powers, then, since all the senses arise from the same form, which claims for itself one degree of immateriality, they must be in the same degree of immateriality already explained, because this is the only way in which they all agree. And since they flow from the form of an organic body as such, and depend on the body as on an organ, and consequently arise from the soul, which has little immateriality and amplitude and much contraction and limitation, they proceed from it in such a contracted state that they require diverse and limited sensible objects operari.

If, however, we speak of the vital powers, namely the angelic intellect and will, then, since the angelic intellect and will arise in the manner stated from the same intellectual angelic nature insofar as it is angelic, they flow into the same degree of immateriality; and no angelic intellect is formally distinguished in species from another angelic intellect, nor will the will of one angel be formally distinct in species from the will of another, just as, by proportional reasoning, we said that the sight of all animals is formally of the same species. Furthermore, because they proceed from that which is highly immaterial and ample, they flow with great amplitude and without limitation, so that a single intellect suffices for understanding every intelligible, and a single will suffices for willing every volitable. Finally, although the said intellectual nature is highly immaterial, it is nevertheless still mixed with potentiality and consequently limited; hence one and the same faculty of it is not simultaneously volitive and intellective, but these two faculties are distinguished in species and are directed toward different objects, although they agree in the same degree of immateriality.

It should be noted in passing, however, that according to this mode of speaking one must philosophize differently concerning the present matter than according to the opposite mode which we indicated above. For just as, according to this mode, no specific formal distinction is to be assigned between angelic intellects, so too there is no distinction in esse under any consideration, whether it is considered in the being of a degree or in the being of a thing. According to the other, opposite mode of speaking, although they are formally distinguished in immateriality in the being of a thing, because immateriality according to which they agree in the being of a thing is only a generic reason, they are nevertheless not formally distinguished in species in it, since it constitutes an atomic degree, as we have often said.

181 Therefore, to denote these intellects as thus taken, namely insofar as they agree in the said immateriality constituting a degree, we signify them by the fact that they possess the reason of a cognitive power formally considered in the being of a cognitive power.

For although the said powers are still divided within themselves into the being of a thing, insofar as they do not constitute a degree, and into what constitutes it, and according to the former consideration they import essentially and formally that excess of immateriality by which they are essentially and specifically absolutely distinguished in the being of a thing, and consequently the generic agreement in being wholly separated from physical matter is in this order potential with respect to the excess in immateriality by which one angel's intellect exceeds another in the being of a thing, consisting in its ability to understand through more universal species, nevertheless this entire excess is material, and indeed accidental with respect to these powers insofar as they found and constitute the degree, because in founding it only those intellects are considered per se according to their agreement in that generic immateriality in the being of a thing. Thus this same reason, which in the former order was generic and potential and in the manner of metaphysical matter, has in this order, namely as it constitutes a degree, the character of an atomic species, because it is not divided into other differences constituting diverse degrees of immateriality; and consequently this same constitutive reason of the degree formalizes those intellective powers as unequal in the being of a thing and draws them to intellective being constituting the same degree, as has been said. And so, to denote these intellects thus accepted and formalizing themselves as considered in the being of a thing, we signify them by the name of cognitive powers formally considered and taken in the being of cognitive powers.

§ IV. The remaining objections are met.

182 To the fourth objection, with our Complutensians, In De Anima, disp. 17, no. 34, we answer by denying the major. For its proof we say that, just as from the soul's being separated from the body it does not follow that it is separated from relation to the body, but only that it is not united to it, so it does not follow that the proportionate and connatural object which it can know quidditatively consists of substances wholly separated from matter, both from actual union with matter and from relation to it, such as angelic substances. For precisely because they are wholly separated from matter, no agreement in immateriality is found between them and the soul; rather it follows that it can quidditatively apprehend its own substance and other separated souls with which it agrees in immateriality.

This solution was taken by our Complutensians, and we have taken it with them from St Thomas, III part., q. 21, a. 1, ad 2; I part., q. 89, a. 2. He says of the separated soul and therefore of the intellect in the state of separation: But when it is separated from the body, it will understand not by turning to phantasms, but to things that are intelligible in themselves. Hence it understands itself. It belongs to every separated substance that it understand what is above it, and what is below it according to the mode of its own substance. Thus it has perfect knowledge of other separated souls, but imperfect and deficient knowledge of angels, speaking of the soul's natural knowledge. The knowledge of glory is different. Whether the same separated soul can quidditatively know material things belonging to this universe is clear from what the Complutensians teach in the same disputation and number, and will be clearer from what we shall mention in the following numbers. Nor does it follow (as we say incidentally) that St Thomas in article 4 of this question counted the degrees of immateriality diminutively. For precisely because he assigned a degree of immateriality to the human intellect in this state distinct from that of an angelic intellect wholly separated from matter, he thereby indicated that the same human intellect, when separated from matter, that is, from union with it but not from relation to it, has a greater and better degree of immateriality than when in the body, and less than that of the angels.

183 Secondly, with the Complutensians, Albert the Great, Cajetan, Ferrara, Thiene, and other Thomists cited by the Complutensians, it is probable that the human and angelic intellects are not specifically distinguished with respect to cognitive powers, or, as they say, their tendency toward the intelligible object, although in respect to properties they are specifically distinguished. The Complutensians explain this clearly from no. 11 to no. 21.

184 Accordingly, in this way, the human and angelic intellects agree in the degree of immateriality when the human intellect is in the state of separation, and consequently know angels quidditatively, though not perfectly quidditatively, that is, not with all the quidditative predicates or quid est, and not altogether clearly, but nevertheless quidditatively, imperfectly, and confusedly. Quidditative knowledge of angels follows, according to this mode of speaking, from the degree of immateriality suited both to angels and to the separated soul, considered according to its formal character. But perfect quidditative knowledge follows from that degree insofar as it has such a material perfection consisting in the property of a complete substance wholly separated from matter, and therefore also from relation to matter. Thus the human intellect cannot know angels perfectly quidditatively. Nor does St Thomas's testimony for the preceding solution entirely refute this, since it may be understood probabilistically as denying perfect quidditative knowledge while allowing imperfect knowledge with the defect of clarity already described. St Thomas says in the same question that the soul's knowledge of angelic substances is quasi-common, as may be seen in article 2 of q. 89. Although it terminates quidditatively in something proper to those angels because the soul agrees with them in immateriality, namely in being separated from matter or actual union with it, this knowledge is not wholly proper: it does not terminate in all their quidditative predicates as they are knowable in themselves. Sometimes he says that this knowledge is not proper and certain, but common and confused.

Beyond this immateriality there is in the same intelligible species another formal immateriality, namely the immateriality of the represented nature, constituting a special degree. As it is intelligibly present in the species, it has there an intelligible mode of being necessarily; and, as is explained in the frequently cited treatise On the Science of God, disputation 2, § 5, it is required in order that an object, or the same nature which otherwise is natural in itself, be intelligibly united with the power with respect to the quidditative knowledge of the quid est of that nature. The reason for which we assign this formal immateriality is that, in the intelligible order, attention is paid per se and formally to formal, actual, and immaterial being. Thus, inasmuch as immateriality in entitative being belongs to the species materially, another immateriality formally imported must also be found in it. This can indeed be none other than the one we assigned, as will be clear to the reader, and it will be explained more fully in the treatise On the Science of God, disputation 2, no. 24.

185 To the last objection it must be said that although immateriality in entitative being does not of itself and formally belong to a created intelligible species, if it is considered in the being of a species most formally, it does belong materially of itself, because it requires an entitative being in which to be founded. This being may be accidental insofar as it is a foundation and something material with respect to intelligible being, whether it be substance or accident in entitative being; it does not follow, however, that it has as much immateriality in entitative being as has been shown. Hence, beyond this immateriality there is in the same intelligible species another formal immateriality, namely the immateriality of the represented nature, as has been said, constituting a special degree. As it is intelligibly present in the said species, it has there that intelligible mode of being which it has necessarily, namely that the object, or the same nature which otherwise is natural in itself, be intelligibly united with the power with respect to the quidditative knowledge of that nature. The reason for which we assign this formal immateriality is that in the intelligible order, per se and formally, attention is paid to formal, actual, and immaterial being. Thus, since immateriality in entitative is materially present in the species, another immateriality formally imported must also be found there. This can indeed be none other than the one assigned, as will appear to the reader, and it will be explained more fully in the treatise On the Science of God, disputation 2, no. 24.