Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

130 Because it is not enough for the true disciples of St. Thomas merely to follow the opinion of the same holy Doctor, but also to defend the arguments that he deliberately advanced against anyone’s calumnies, by showing that they are legitimate and establishing his intention: accordingly, after we have confirmed the opinion of the Angelic Doctor in the preceding doubt 1 of this disputation, and also in the doubt just cited, and have endeavored to fortify it by a reason that he frequently indicated in passing, it remains for us to examine deliberately the proper and distinctive arguments by which, in the present article, he shows this same opinion, and to unfold their force in this and the following doubt, so that the procedure may be clearer and more precise and the efficacy of the arguments mentioned above be better understood.

§ I. The doubt is decided, and the argument of St. Thomas is proposed.

131 It must therefore be said that the first argument adduced by the holy Doctor in this article is legitimate, and sufficiently shows the impossibility of a created intelligible species that represents God quidditatively and clearly. Thus do all his disciples whom we have mentioned in the preceding doubt.

This assertion will be proved no less well by setting forth and explaining the aforementioned argument. The Angelic Doctor himself states it as follows: Since, as Dionysius says in chapter 1 of The Divine Names, the higher things cannot be known in any way through likenesses of things of a lower order: just as the essence of an incorporeal thing cannot be known through the species of a body, so much less can the essence of God be seen through any created species.

132 It is confirmed and explained by an argument drawn from the same author, Summa contra Gentiles 3, chapter 49, argument 2, and Summa theologiae I, q. 8, De veritate, a. 1. For an intelligible species serving to know an object clearly and as it is in itself is of the same essence and species as that object in its representative being; or, in St. Thomas’s words, it is the very species and quiddity of the thing represented, just as the form of a house that is in the mind of the craftsman is in the representative being of the same species as the form that is in matter—or, rather, as that form’s species. Consequently, such a species and likeness cannot be of a lower order with respect to its object. But no creature can be of the same species and nature as God Himself, even in its representative being, that is, be the very nature and essence of God under the said representative being, as all Metaphysicians and Theologians commonly teach. Therefore no creature can have the character of an intelligible species representing God clearly and as He is in Himself, or serving to know Him in that way.

The minor follows clearly from the consequent. The major, however, is shown by St. Thomas in the cited question, De veritate. For if an intelligible species agrees with its object in representative being according to the generic reason, but not according to the specific reason—and therefore falls short of representing the object’s specific nature, though not the representation of its proper genus—then the thing will be known according to the reason of its genus, not according to the reason of its species. If, however, it also falls short of representing the genus, yet represents it only according to an analogy, then it will not even be known quidditatively according to the reason of the genus, just as if a substance were understood through a likeness of an accident. It is therefore a sign that an intelligible species serving to know some object clearly according to its atom, and its proper reason—that is, according to the object as it is in itself—must have (at least under another mode of being, namely, representative being) a specific agreement with the said object in its own proper and peculiar nature. Consequently, it cannot be of a lower order with respect to that object.

§ II. Vazquez’s and Arrubal’s evasions, and refutations of them.

133 Opponents raise various objections to this argument. First, Vazquez answers that it is false for an intelligible species to be of the same nature or order as its object in representative being, since the object is sometimes a substance, whereas an intelligible species in representative being is an accident; it therefore cannot be of the same specific essence or order as the object, as St. Thomas holds.

But against this: precisely because the created species represents God as He is in Himself, it must express a relation of likeness to God, and therefore this relation must be grounded in some unity with Him—but not merely an analogous or univocal unity that is only generic. It must therefore be univocal and specific unity. Consequently, since every univocal unity or agreement between God and a creature is impossible, a species representing God as He is in Himself cannot but be opposed to Him.

The major is clear with respect to the first part, for an intelligible species is a likeness of its object and therefore must be grounded in and express a relation of likeness to it. The second part follows from the common opinion of the Metaphysicians, who assert that a relation of likeness is grounded in unity and agreement.

The minor is clear as to the first part, namely, analogous unity, for God cannot be represented or seen quidditatively and as He is in Himself through an analogous likeness or representation; otherwise God could be known as He is in Himself through created effects, which is plainly false. As to the second part, namely, univocal unity that is only generic, the same minor is urged as follows: apart from the fact that it is impossible for God and a creature to agree univocally in some generic predicate—otherwise God would be under a genus, which is absurd, as is shown in the Logic, chapter De quantitate, by the Complutensian—there is nevertheless no possibility of knowing God quidditatively and as He is in Himself through that species, but only according to that generic reason. For it would not represent God quidditatively except under the aforementioned generic reason. If it represented the quiddity and atomic reason of God, it would surely be like God in that respect and would have an agreement and quasi-specific unity with God in God’s proper quiddity and nature, since a species, in that which it represents, is like its object and in that in which it is like it has agreement with that object.

134 Nor does it matter if one says, with certain authors, that just as the relation of likeness by which Caesar’s image refers to Caesar himself is grounded not in unity but in measure and the measured, so too the relation of likeness by which a created intelligible species would refer to God would not be grounded in unity but in measure and the measured.

The point is therefore irrelevant. First, because it is impossible for a likeness of one thing to another not to be grounded in some agreement by which the one agrees with the other; otherwise things could not be like one another. It is therefore impossible for that likeness not to be grounded in unity. The consequent is clear, for agreement is the same as unity: whatever agrees in something, insofar as the things agree there, is not distinguished there and therefore is the same there. Moreover, the example of Caesar’s image itself proves this. For Caesar’s proper essence and quiddity cannot be known through that image, but only his external accidents, because it has agreement with him only in those accidents and not in his proper essence and quiddity. This clearly shows that, for an image to represent some object quidditatively and as it is in itself, it must have specific agreement and unity with that object, at least in representative being.

Moreover, even granting that the relation of likeness of the created intelligible species to God, as to its proper object, is grounded in measure and the measured, the objection made against Gabriel Vazquez nevertheless remains in its full force. For if that proportion of the measured to the measure which would obtain between God and the species could not be univocal—whether specific or generic, since, as we have said, nothing univocal can be common to God and creatures—it must be analogous. Consequently, God could not be represented quidditatively and as He is in Himself through such a species, just as for this reason He cannot be represented in the said manner through the species of creatures.

135 Nor is the argument that Vazquez adduces in his own support—that an intelligible species has the character of an accident in representative being, whereas its object is frequently a substance, so that the two cannot be of the same nature—presses against us. For that same representative being of the species, taken realistically, can be considered in two ways: materially, in the being of the thing, or formally, in the being of likeness and representation insofar as it concerns the intelligible order. If taken in the first way, it sometimes has the character of an accident, as appears in sensible species and in very many intelligible species; sometimes it has the character of a substance, as appears in the angel, who knows himself through his own essence as though through an intelligible species, as the Theologians commonly teach. Thus an intelligible species and its representative being, considered in the being of the thing, is sometimes of a lower order and sometimes of the same order as the thing known. But if the intelligible species is taken formally in the being of the species—that is, according to its representative being formally and as accepted in the intelligible being—according to which reason the form itself that is represented, as it has intelligible being in the intelligible species, is said to be present, then it is of the same order and nature as its object. Therefore, if the object is something substantial, the species itself will also be a substance in its representative and intelligible being, because those substantial predicates that are in the being of the thing in the object are contained in the species itself under representative and intelligible being. Hence, although human nature has one mode of being in itself and another in the intelligible species, it is nevertheless formally the same as regards nature. Just as the house in the mind of the craftsman and the house outside, although they have different modes of being, are nevertheless the same form of house in both. These matters will be explained more fully in the treatise On the Knowledge of God, disputation 2, nn. 14–52.

136 Secondly, Arrubal objects that it makes no difference whether the intelligible species is of the same nature as its object, not indeed in entitative being, but in representing or representative being; consequently, it makes no difference either that the created species is in this way of the same nature as God. Some add that this is true because nothing else is required than that it represent God Himself, as He is in Himself, clearly and quidditatively.

But against this: representative being in an intelligible species is not some fictitious being or extrinsic denomination, but a true and real intrinsic being. Therefore, if the intelligible species representing God, as He is in Himself, is univocally of the same nature as God in representative being, it would certainly be the same as God in some true and real being and would therefore have univocal atomic agreement with Him in that real being. As the Metaphysicians and Theologians commonly teach, this is altogether false. Otherwise there would be a real composition in God from genus and difference under some true and real being, which is surely absurd, as the Complutensian well teaches in On the Physics, disputation 18, nn. 20–23.

137 It must further be added that this solution remains refuted by the preceding objection, since it has been sufficiently attacked. For although a species that represents an object clearly and quidditatively is of the same nature as it in representative or intelligible being, and there is in fact nothing beyond its really possessing, from its own nature, the capacity to represent that object quidditatively and clearly as it is in itself and to be like it, nevertheless, in order actually to possess this, it cannot fail to have the same nature univocally and atomically as the said object—not under the natural and entitative mode of being, but in representative or intelligible being. For, as we have just said, it is impossible for anything to represent another thing per se and intrinsically, as it is in itself, and to be like it, without having univocal agreement with it under some real being, whether entitative or representative, in the respect in which it represents that thing and is like it.

138 This is confirmed and explained by the distinction between representing something else and being like it through an extrinsic human imposition, on the one hand, and representing that very thing quidditatively and as it is in itself and being intrinsically and per se like it, on the other. For although something that represents in the former way is not of the same nature as its object but has at most some agreement with it, and is imposed upon it in order to represent it—or, more properly speaking, to signify it—and therefore the external image of Christ can denote and signify Him in this way without having the same nature as He does, nevertheless, whatever represents another thing per se and intrinsically, quidditatively and as it is in itself, and is like it, must have univocal agreement with it under some real mode of being in the very respect in which it represents it. Moreover, to be like another in its own proper and quidditative being necessarily involves the quidditative being that is in one thing existing under some real being in the thing that is like it in the said being. Just as a twofold whiteness is like whiteness in being whiteness involves possessing the nature of whiteness in both. Moreover, otherwise there would be no reason why a thing should represent another per se and intrinsically, quidditatively and as it is in itself and be like it, rather than possess this property with respect to something else, as appears from the terms themselves.

§ III. Another evasion of the Juniors, and its exclusion.

139 Next, others of the Juniors answer that this whole argument of St. Thomas, and what we have said about it, presupposes that the intelligible species is the formal likeness of its object and therefore represents it formally, whereas the species does not represent its object except virtually and by the mode of a seed, and therefore is like it in this respect alone.

The Complutensian, however, best refutes this evasion in On the Soul, disputation 18, q. 2, and Aristotle and St. Thomas show the opposite in n. 26 of the same disputation. The same author then proves it from an argument drawn from St. Thomas in nn. 26–30, and finally in nn. 30–38 by another argument elicited from the Angelic Doctor below, q. 27, a. 2, in these words: The created production of the Word is a certain vital generation, and the Word proceeds in a certain way as a son, that is, not according to natural being, but according to intentional and representative being. Therefore, an intelligible species must be the formal likeness of its object no less than the Word congruent with it is its formal likeness.

The consequence is clear. For what proceeds as something vitally begotten and as a son must be like its principle: indeed, if it proceeds as a son in natural being, it has a being like that principle and is of the same nature with it under such being; but if it proceeds as a son in intentional and representative being, it is like the principle and of the same nature with it in representative being. Therefore, since the intelligible species is the principle that fecundates the intellect in the generation of the Word, the Word and the said species must be of the same nature. Consequently, if the Word formally represents its object, the said species will formally represent it too.

140 The antecedent is proved as follows. First, it is commonly said for this reason that knowledge and the word are produced from the object and the power, because the production of the word is a kind of vital birth or generation, and the word is in a certain sense a son. Moreover, vital generation is the origin of a living being from a living being that is united at the origin in likeness of nature, as the Theologians and Philosophers commonly teach. The production of the word is the origin of a living being from a living being, because the word produced through it is an intrinsically vital terminus proceeding from a vital principle. It is likewise from a united principle, namely, through the intelligible species, which is united to the intellect and exists in the same subject as the word. Finally, the said word proceeds in likeness of nature to its principle, that is, to its object, because in representative being it is altogether like it. Consequently, its procession will be a vital generation, and the word itself will proceed in a certain sense and according to quiddity as a son—or, equivalently, it will proceed as a son in intentional and representative being.

Finally, because according to the common opinion of the Theologians the production of the divine Word by the power of its own line is generation, not generation of some merely restricted kind—that is, generation according to quiddity and only in representative being—but generation simply and in natural and entitative being. For the production of the word in this sense has, by the power of its own line, generation and the production of something naturally like its principle in some sense. Otherwise, if this production did not have, by the power of its own being, generation in some sense, at least according to quiddity and in the manner explained, it would follow that neither the production of the divine Word, which is the most perfect intellectual production, would have by the power of its own line to generate perfectly and simply by producing something naturally like it in natural and entitative being.

141 Nor does it matter if one objects first that, although the Word may be granted to proceed from the intellect as begotten and as a son, it need not therefore be like the intelligible species in representative being, since the principle and principal cause of the generation of the Word is not the intelligible species but the object represented through it. The Word therefore ought not to be like the said species in representative being, but like the object. The consequence is clear, because for something to proceed as begotten and as a son, it suffices that it proceed like its principle and principal cause. Thus Peter, proceeding as a son from his father, proceeds as one like the father, who is the principal cause, not the seed, which has the character of an instrument.

For we answer that the intelligible species, for example, and its object are not included in the account of the production of the Word, or in the order of causing intellection. The object does not concur except insofar as it is made intelligible through the said species, nor does the species exert an influx except insofar as it makes such an object intelligible. Thus they stand in the intelligible genus as form and that of which it is the form. Consequently, in this intellectual generation, what is like the object as its principal principle must also in the same manner be like the intelligible species. In natural and entitative generation, however, the seed and the generator from which the offspring is determined are included in the account of its generation. For the seed is not the form that makes the generator generative and constitutes it in the being of a principle proportioned to generation. The generator, by reason of its natural form, is absolutely the principal principle proportioned to such a principle with respect to natural generation.

142 This can further be explained from the fact that intellectual generation is inward and immanent, and therefore its principal principle must also be inward and united with the intellect. Consequently, such a principle cannot be the object according to the being it has outside the intellect, but according to the being it has in the intelligible species, by virtue of which it is united with the intellect as an inward productive principle. Therefore, the said species and object are not included in the account of the principal principle with respect to such production. Natural generation, by contrast, which is distinguished from intellectual generation and occurs in entitative being, is a procession into external matter. Therefore, its principal principle need not be united with the thing begotten that proceeds as a son, but must rather be separate from it. Accordingly, the seed, which must be united with the thing begotten, is included in the account with such a principle. It is therefore not necessary that, merely because the thing begotten is like its principal principle, it should also be assimilated to the seed.

143 Nor does it stand in the way if, second, one objects that the nature of the intelligible species and the Word cannot be coherent when they are similar and of the same nature in representative being, and consequently that the procession of the Word cannot be a vital generation in representative being. The consequence requires no proof. The antecedent, however, is proved as follows. First, because the Word per se and intrinsically has a being that easily passes away and depends on intellection in its being made (fieri) and preserved (conservari); whereas the intelligible species is self-subsistent and does not easily pass away, and finally does not depend on intellection in being made (fieri) or preserved (conservari). Moreover, otherwise two accidents differing only numerically would exist at the same time in the intellect, namely, the intelligible species and the Word; these are certainly found together whenever an object is understood. Finally, because the Word and the intelligible species cannot fail to be specifically distinguished in entitative and natural being, as the Philosophers commonly teach; they must therefore also be distinguished in the same manner in representative being. The consequence is clear, because both what the intelligible species and the Word have in entitative being and what they have in representative being belong to their specific and atomic difference. Whatever is specifically distinguished from something according to one unequal and atomic reason is also distinguished from it according to other unequal and atomic reasons, as appears inductively. Therefore, and so on.

144 We answer that just as the object and the produced Word are of the same nature and species, although under different modes of being, because the nature and species of the object is in the Word under the natural mode of being but under the intentional and representative mode of being in the word, so also the intelligible species and the Word congruent with it, or representing its primary object, are of the same species of the intelligible species, although under different modes of being within the range of modes contained under representative being. For the intelligible species represents by the mode of a habit; the Word, however, need not represent in this manner, but rather always, or almost always, has an easily transient mode of representing, and thus represents by the mode of a disposition.

Accordingly, just as the object, considered as regards its nature with precision, does not determinately demand the natural mode of being, but indifferently demands either this or the intentional and representative mode of being, so the same nature, considered with the same precision, does not determinately demand the intentional and representative mode of being that the Word has, nor the mode belonging to the intelligible species. Rather, of itself and apart from these three modes of being, it abstracts from them and can have any one of them. Although, when considered not in itself but as it is in the Word, it necessarily involves that mode, yet, considered simply as it is in the object, it indispensably imports its own proper natural mode of being.

145 Therefore, to return to the form of the argument, the antecedent must be denied. The antecedent in the first proof must also be denied if it is understood to concern the Word or intelligible species precisely with respect to their nature or species. For, just as according to this argument, taken with precision, they are of the same nature, so from the side of nature and form they do not determinately demand, as the argument suggests, either a permanent or a transient mode of being.

For the second proof, it must be said that just as the Word and the object not only are of the same nature according to species, but have numerically the same nature under different natural and representative modes of being, as has been said and will be treated more fully in the treatise On the Knowledge of God, disputation 2, n. 14 and following, so also the Word and the species can sometimes be numerically the same nature, although under different modes of being within the range of modes contained under representative being. It follows that from the fact that the species and the Word, corresponding to it per se in the first place, are of the same nature, it does not follow that two accidents distinguished only numerically are simultaneously in the same subject. Rather, one and the same thing, numerically one according to nature and possessing different specific modes of being, is present together with them in the intellect. Let those things be consulted that are discussed in the place cited above.

For the final proof, if the antecedent is granted, the consequent must be denied. To prove the consequent, the major must be denied if it is understood of the species in the being of the species. For according to this reasoning, it imports the natural and entitative mode of being accidentally and materially, that is, the being by which it is a substance or an accident in entitative being, as was touched upon above.

146 Nor, finally, does it stand in the way if one argues that, if the Word and the species are specifically distinguished in intentional and representative being, then the generation of the Word will not be a proper generation of a living being, nor will the Word be in any sense a son, because it does not proceed in specific likeness of nature to its principle under any mode of being, whether entitative and natural or representative.

This therefore is no obstacle. For the notion of vital generation, and for what proceeds through it to be a son in some sense, likeness in nature suffices, even if there is not likeness in the mode of having that nature, but the said modes are distinguished either specifically and within the same order, as occurs in the Word and intelligible species, or within different orders and generically or quasi-generically, as occurs between the intelligible species expressed on the one hand and the object on the other. Although it remains true that, for the said generation to be generation simply and perfectly, and consequently for the thing begotten to be a son simply and perfectly, there must be likeness between the thing produced and the reason of producing it, both in nature and in the natural mode of having that nature, as will be explained in its proper place.

§ IV. Two other solutions, and their refutation.

147 From all these considerations it is clear that none of the solutions is valid. A Junior has argued that St. Thomas, in this argument, did not intend, nor is it proved by it, that God cannot be seen quidditatively and as He is in Himself through an inferior or created species that nevertheless represents Him directly. He intended only that God cannot be represented or seen as He is in Himself through likenesses or species of lower things, that is, through species that directly represent lower or created natures. Accordingly, the holy Doctor expressed himself as follows in the antecedent of that argument: Through likenesses of things of a lower order, the higher things cannot in any way be known, just as the essence of an incorporeal thing cannot be known through the species of a body.

148 Thus, from what has been said, this solution remains refuted. For in St. Thomas and in the truth itself, to be a species lower than some object because of this inferiority and to be unable, on that account, to attain to representing it as it is in itself, are the same as to be a species that represents another thing of a lower order per se in the first place and directly, because the species and its object, as represented per se in the first place and directly, are of the same nature, although they may differ in mode of being. Thus, to be a species of a lower order unable, because of its inferiority, to represent directly and per se in the first place some higher object is the same as not having the same nature as it in intelligible being. Consequently, this is the same as representing another thing of a lower order and having the same nature as it in intelligible being. A species must always be of the same nature as the object represented through it per se in the first place, as has been shown.

Accordingly, so that St. Thomas might indicate that no created species could have the same nature as God, and consequently could not represent Him quidditatively, he supposes every created species to be a species of things of a lower order. It is therefore of the same nature in intelligible being as created essences and objects, and consequently cannot be of the same nature in the same order as God. It therefore cannot serve for a quidditative vision of God, because a species serving for this vision must be of the same nature as God in intelligible being, and consequently must not be a species of a lower thing. Let those things be consulted that will be discussed repeatedly in the treatise On the Knowledge of God, disputation 2, doubt 1.

149 Finally, Suárez and others object that although a species of the same order and nature as God is required to know Him infinitely and adequately, it is not required to know Him finitely and inadequately, just as although a light and an infinite vision of the same reason as the uncreated light and vision of God are required for an infinite and adequate vision of God, they are not required for an inadequate and finite vision of Him.

But against this: there is a very great distinction between the light and vision on the one hand and the intelligible species of God on the other. For light and vision belong to the side of potency, not to the side of the object as representing it quidditatively and as it is in itself. It is therefore not necessary that they be of the same nature and essence in representative being, or under some mode of being with the same object. It suffices that they tend and incline toward it per se, as will appear more clearly below. The intelligible species, however, belongs to the side of the object, as a likeness representing it quidditatively. It must therefore, in representing, be of the same quiddity as the object. And since such representative being, by virtue of which it would represent God and be like Him as He is in Himself, would be a true and real being in the species itself, the species would necessarily have to agree univocally with God in the divine nature, by virtue of which it would be assimilated to Him, as has been said. Consequently, it would have to be infinite simply, indeed infinite in essence, since nothing univocal can be common to God and creatures.

150 Moreover, that intelligible species would arise from God as from an infinite object, and naturally and necessarily, not freely. It would therefore equal the entire knowability of God, and consequently would not only represent the infinite object, namely God, but would represent Him infinitely. This last consequence is clear, because a species that equals the infinite knowability of God cannot fail to represent infinitely. The first consequence is also clear, because by the very fact that it would proceed naturally and necessarily, not freely, it would proceed from God, not insofar as God wills, but insofar as God exists. It would therefore emanate from God according to all His infinite perfection, and consequently would be infinitely perfect. For there would be nothing from which the influx and causality of its infinite object, namely God, would be limited. The antecedent also follows clearly, for whenever an object can imprint its species, it does so naturally, not freely, as can be seen in sensible objects.

151 Nor does it matter if it is said that this is true whenever nothing on the side of the subject limits and constrains the influx of the object, but otherwise when something on the side of the subject limits it, as would occur here because the said species must be received in a created intellect, whose power and capacity are finite, and it would therefore be limited from this source.

This therefore makes no difference. For the notion of an intelligible species, understood as such, does not require that it be an inhering accident. Rather, its essence abstracts from accident and from self-subsisting substance. Therefore, the said intelligible species, representing God quidditatively and as He is in Himself, would be a self-subsisting substance, and consequently could neither be nor ought to be limited by a subject. The antecedent is clear. For in the angels their proper substance and essence have the character of an intelligible species with respect to their own intellect; similarly, the divine essence has this character with respect to the divine intellect and the intellects of the blessed. Finally, other species that are in us and in the angels have the character of an accident. It is therefore a sign that an intelligible species does not, as regards its notion, demand either that it be substance or that it be accident, but abstracts from both. The first consequence also follows from this. For once it does not work against the notion of a species that it be a substance, the said species representing God could have the character of a self-subsisting substance, since it would be the most perfect of all intelligible species. The second consequence also follows from the first prior conclusion. A self-subsisting and total substance, such as the said intelligible species would be in that event, as follows from what has been said, cannot be limited by a subject, because it neither needs one nor is received in one. Let those things be consulted that we shall discuss in the treatise On the Knowledge of God, disputation 2.