Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

118 Having explained by which intelligible species God is seen in fact, it remains for us to explain whether it is possible, at least by divine power, that He be seen quidditatively and clearly through another species, namely a created one, infused by God Himself.

§ I. Opinion affirming it.

The affirming position is held by Aureolus in 4. dist. 49, quaest. 2; Scotus in the same, quaest. 11, § respondeo; Suarez in his Metaph., disput. 30, section 11, from num. 27 to 33, and 1. part. of the Summa Theologiae, lib. 2, cap. 13; Valentia, tom. 1, disp. 1, quaest. 12, puncto 2; Vazquez, 1. part., disp. 38, cap. 2; and others.

It is proved, first. For whenever in some given order there is no repugnance between a created act of intellection and a created intellectual power eliciting that act, neither again will there be repugnance with a created impressed species having its due proportion and commensurability with them: but there is no repugnance, in the supernatural order, with there being given an act of the vision of God as He is in Himself, and the light of glory, which is the intellectual power eliciting such an act, so that both are something created: therefore, neither again will there be repugnance with a created impressed species being given which represents God as He is in Himself. The consequence with the minor needs no proof. The major, however, is clear: partly from an induction made in all the other created acts and created intellectual powers: partly also because, when an intelligible species holds itself in the intellectual order after the manner of a masculine seed fecundating a female, namely the intellectual power with respect to its offspring, namely intellection, it follows that if, in the supernatural order, the aforesaid female and offspring, which are something created, present no repugnance, neither will the created intellectual seed, namely the intelligible species, present any either, since all these things correspond to one another mutually, as may be seen in generations and in natural offspring.

119 Secondly. The intellect endowed with the light of glory naturally demands the concurrence of some impressed species: but not the concurrence of the divine essence, which has the character of an intelligible species: therefore the concurrence of another created species: therefore, even if such a species is not in fact given, because God supplies the place of that one, nothing stands in the way of its being able to be given. The major is clear. Because any intellectual power, and one complete, such as is the intellect together with the light of glory, naturally demands the concurrence of some species, because without it it cannot elicit intellection. The minor, however, is proved. Because when the divine essence, as it has the character of an intelligible species, is the purest act and most immaterial, it cannot naturally be demanded except by an intellect which is the purest act and most immaterial, namely by the divine intellect: for since the intelligible species of Angels have greater actuality and immateriality than the human intellect, their concurrence cannot naturally be demanded by that same intellect, but only by the Angelic intellect.

120 Thirdly. For a created impressed species representing God as He is in Himself to be given, it is not necessary that it have infinite perfection: therefore there will be no repugnance with its being given. The consequence is clear. Because it can be repugnant only on the ground that it demands infinite perfection, as will appear more clearly from itself and from what is said in support of the assertion. The antecedent, however, is proved. Because such a species is desired only with respect to eliciting a clear vision of God, which is of finite perfection: therefore it is not necessary that it contain infinite perfection, but only that which the aforesaid vision has.

It is confirmed, first. Less is required for a species representing God quidditatively only, as He is in Himself, than for a species which represents Him comprehensively: but for the latter infinite perfection is required: therefore finite and limited perfection will suffice for the former. The major is clear. For as comprehensive knowledge of God exceeds purely quidditative knowledge, so the species serving toward the latter is exceeded by that which serves toward the former. The major, however, will appear from itself and from what is said below. The consequence, moreover, clearly follows from both of the premises. For the excess of comprehensive knowledge of God over knowledge of Himself precisely quidditatively is not of any ordinary sort, but infinite: and so likewise the intelligible species corresponding to it will have the same infinite excess over the species representing God quidditatively only, and consequently the latter will be finite.

It is confirmed, secondly. For such a species would not be produced naturally and necessarily by God: but only freely: therefore it could, according to His will, be limited to this, that although it could represent clearly and intuitively an infinite object, namely God, it would nevertheless not represent Him infinitely, but only so far as would be sufficient with respect to eliciting a finite vision. The antecedent is clear: partly because God cannot act beyond Himself except freely: partly also because it is not of the character of an intelligible species that it be produced necessarily by its object, as is clear in the case of the Angelic species, which are produced freely by God, but not naturally, or necessarily, by their objects. The consequence, however, also stands: because a free agent can limit its concurrence, and produce its effect according to so much, or so great, perfection.

121 Fourthly. The clear vision of God itself is the formal likeness of God as He is in Himself: therefore a created impressed species can also be given which is the formal likeness of God as He is in Himself. The consequence is clear from the parity of the reason. The antecedent is D. Augustine, lib. 9 de Trin., cap. 10, at the end: where he affirms in general that every knowledge is similar to the thing known through it; and cap. 11, at the beginning, he teaches this in particular concerning the knowledge of God on the way; and lib. 14, cap. 17, near the end, speaking of the beatific vision, he says: Then a perfect and full likeness of God will be in us, when His vision will have been perfect and full; and in confirmation of this he adduces that of John 3: When He shall appear, we shall be like unto Him, because we shall see Him as He is. Which Anselmus also asserts in the Monologium, cap. 31.

122 Lastly. There is given an expressed species, or created Word, representing God clearly and intuitively: therefore a created impressed species representing Him in the same way can also be given. The consequence is clear. Because an expressed species represents God more formally and more expressly than an impressed one, and has therefore acquired the name of an expressed species: therefore, if a created expressed species representing God clearly and intuitively is given, much more can a created impressed species representing Him in the same way be given; indeed it would be given in fact if God were not united in the manner of an intelligible species with the intellect of the blessed. The antecedent, however, is proved. For the vision, or beatific intellection, is a true vital action and a true becoming, and therefore some terminus must be posited for it in place of light ¹: therefore, since the proper terminus produced through intellection is the Word, or an expressed species proportionate to it, it follows that through the beatific vision, which attains God clearly and intuitively, as He is in Himself, there is produced a Word, or an expressed species, representing God in the same way, namely as He is in Himself.

§ II. The opinion of D. Thomas is preferred.

123 Nevertheless it must be said that by no power can there be given a created impressed species representing God clearly and intuitively, as He is in Himself. Thus D. Thomas, in the places cited, dub. 1 of this disputation, which all his disciples follow, Capreolus in 4. dist. 49, quaest. 5, art. 1; Ferrariolus, 3. cont. Gent., cap. 49; Caietanus in the present place, and below, quaest. 56, art. 3; Soto in 4. dist. 49, quaest. 2, art. 3; Paludanus, quaest. 1, art. 2, concl. 3; Bannez, Zumel, Navarrete, Ripa, Nazarenus, in this article. Which opinion is also held by Alexander, 1. part., quaest. 2, membrum 3, art. 1, ad 2, and quaest. 7, membrum 1; Henricus, quodl. 3, quaest. 1, and quodl. 4, quaest. 7; Durandus in 4. dist. 49, quaest. 2, num. 13, and following, and quaest. 3, in the prolog, num. 12; Marsilius in 3., quaest. 10, art. 2, on the first part, at the doubt arising in 2. concl.; Aegidius in the Castigatory, art. 1; Canariensis below, around quaest. 27, art. 1; Arrubal, disp. 16, quaest. 4; Machin in the present place; and many others.

The assertion is proved from a reason drawn from D. Thomas, quodl. 7, art. 1, and 1. cont. Gent., cap. 56, as also from what was said in dub. 2 of this disputation. For the divine essence is the pure act in the character of the intelligible, and so it is itself intelligibility: therefore it is repugnant that it be, or become, intelligible through something distinct from itself: therefore it will also be repugnant that it be able to be understood through a created species representing it quidditatively and as it is itself. This last consequence follows sufficiently from the previous. For whatever object is rendered intelligible is rendered so through a species representing it quidditatively and as it is itself. The first, however, is clear from the antecedent. For whatever is the formal reason of something cannot be made such through another: as, since union is itself the formal reason of the uniting, it cannot be united through another union distinct from itself: therefore, if the divine essence is itself intelligibility, intelligible through itself, it will not be able to be intelligible through anything distinct from itself, namely through a created species: as, since God is through Himself the very omnipotency that is almighty, and the very wisdom that is wise in all things, He cannot be wise or almighty through a created wisdom or omnipotency.

124 Nor does it matter if you say, first, that this is to be taken only from hence, namely that God cannot be made intelligible to His own intellect through a created species, because from His own force it lies in His power to be intelligible to Himself; but otherwise with respect to other intellects: because with respect to them He is not proportionate in the character of His supreme eminence: and so through such a species the object may be rendered proportionate and intelligible to them.

The contrary is urged against this. Because that God quidditatively, and as He is in Himself, is not understood by a created intellect does not arise from any defect of intelligibility on His part: therefore He cannot be made intelligible through a created species. The antecedent is clear. For God, insofar as He is from Himself, has supreme and infinite intelligibility, by reason of which He can be understood quidditatively both by Himself and by any other intellect whatever: because He is not intelligible in just any way, but He is intelligibility itself by essence, and so He has every characteristic of intelligibility. The consequence, however, is proved. Because a species holds itself on the part of the object: and so it is given only to supply the place and the defect of that object, and for this end, that it be made intelligible on its own part: as, since the light of glory holds itself on the part of the power, it does not render the object intelligible, but confers upon the intellect that it may have the power to see God by essence: therefore, if God, insofar as He is on His own part, is most intelligible to any intellect whatever, He cannot be made, or be, intelligible through a created species.

125 It is confirmed and explained. For the fact that an object intelligible from itself should, by reason of its own eminence, be an object out of proportion with, or surpassing, another, does not argue that something is to be added on the part of that same object itself, namely a species, but something on the part of the power, by which it may be strengthened and made efficacious for reaching it: as, from the fact that the Sun, for example, by reason of its very great clarity, is in being an object out of proportion to, and surpassing, the sight of the Owl, it does not argue that something must be given on the part of the Sun which would render it proportionate, but only that a greater power and efficacy must be added to the visual power of the Owl.

126 Nor does it likewise stand in the way if you say, secondly, that although it belongs to God to be the immediate productive cause of all creatures, it is not thereby excluded that secondary causes may supply concurrence for such a production: therefore, although God is immediately intelligible, it will not be inferred from this that the concurrence of another intermediate cause must necessarily be excluded, namely of the impressed species, through which He may be seen as He is in Himself.

This therefore does not stand in the way, because of the manifest disparity of reason which intervenes between the two. For the concurrence of secondary causes does not confer upon God that He produce, or be able to produce, created effects: and so, if such a concurrence were to confer that upon Him, then God would be the first cause and the first efficient, as is supposed, and at the same time would not have the character of such a cause, since it belongs to the character of a first cause that He have from another nothing which He works, or could work. Nevertheless an intelligible species renders the object intelligible: and so, if God were to be understood through a created species, He would be, and would not be, the first intelligible: He would indeed be so, as is supposed; but He would not be so, because the first intelligible cannot be made intelligible through another being distinct from it, just as neither can the first efficient have from another that which it works.

127 Nor, finally, does it stand in the way if you say, further on, that although God is intelligibility itself, nevertheless He can be made, and become, intelligible quoad an est through other created species, since through them we come, quoad an est, to a knowledge of many things predicable of God, as we said in the annotations on the first article of this question: therefore, even notwithstanding that He is intelligibility itself, He can be made, and be, intelligible quoad quid est, through another created species which is of the highest perfection among all the other created species: since intelligibility itself is no less the reason of its knowing itself quoad an est than quoad quid est. Hence, if the former does not remove from it the fact that it becomes intelligible through a created species quoad an est, neither will the latter either impede its being rendered intelligible quoad quid est through another most excellent, yet created, species.

This last point therefore does not stand in the way. For the divine essence is intelligibility itself, and the reason on account of which it is itself intelligible is not an abstractive and imperfect intelligibility, which cannot be stripped of imperfections and which unavoidably involves the exclusion of quidditative knowledge, such as is that of which the objection treats. Because such an intelligibility cannot belong to the divine essence through itself, since it brings with it its own proper divine quiddity, and is intimately present to any created intellect, so that insofar as it is from itself it can sufficiently move and change that intellect. And so it is no wonder that the same divine essence, by reason of a created species representing the creature first and by itself, and God secondarily and virtually, becomes intelligible by the aforesaid intelligibility, which denotes only an imperfection in the intellect itself and in the created species, but not in God, to whom nothing intrinsic accrues from this, nor is any imperfection thereby insinuated in Him. Nevertheless, to be itself the intelligibility which is the reason of seeing Him by essence and as He is in Himself is a proper intelligibility, answering to the divine essence from its own proper merits, and declaring a perfection that can be stripped of imperfections: and so it cannot belong to the divine essence through anything created, but it must itself thus be intelligible of itself, and its own intelligibility, otherwise it would not be the pure act in the intelligible order, as appears from what has been said above.

128 Nor, finally, does it matter if you press that, if once those things which are said in this solution are true, there will be no repugnance, from the force of this reasoning of D. Thomas which we have just examined, with there being given a species representing God as He is quidditatively knowable, while excluding that He be representable comprehensively through the same; and consequently, that He be able to be seen by the blessed through a created species.

The consequence is proved. First, because God does not, by reason of His being, have the character of being knowable precisely quidditatively, excluding that He be knowable also comprehensively: therefore, although a created species were given which rendered Him knowable precisely quidditatively, it would not follow that it conferred upon Him that which He possesses from Himself and essentially; and consequently neither would the involvement of the aforesaid species follow from this.

Also, because as a species serving toward knowledge quoad an est precisely, excluding quidditative knowledge, essentially declares an imperfection, and therefore God can in some way be made intelligible through this species, since He cannot be knowable from Himself in this way: so likewise, because a species representing God precisely quidditatively, excluding that it represent Him comprehensively, declares an imperfection, it will not be repugnant that God be made intelligible through such a species.

For it is answered by denying the consequence. And to the first proof it must be said that, although to be representable and knowable precisely quidditatively with respect to the divine intellect, excluding that He be representable and knowable also comprehensively with respect to it, declares an imperfection and an involvement, yet to be knowable precisely quidditatively and representable in the same way with respect to a created intellect, excluding that He be comprehensible by that same intellect, or representable comprehensively to itself, argues the greatest perfection. And so, by reason of His supreme and infinite eminence, God has both that He cannot be at the same time quidditatively and comprehensively knowable by His own intellect and representable in that way to it, and that He is at the same time only quidditatively knowable by a created intellect: and therefore a created species of God cannot be given which represents Him still more quidditatively, while excluding that it represent Him comprehensively to a created intellect, lest that which is intelligible from itself essentially should be rendered intelligible in the same way by some other, in a peculiar manner.

129 From this, with respect to the second proof of the same consequence, it is clear in what way a species that in some way renders God intelligible quoad an est, precisely, declares an imperfection: on the ground that it does not pertain to the supreme perfection of God that He be known by creatures quoad an est, excluding quidditative knowledge; and further, on the ground that a species rendering an object knowable quoad an est only is not its own proper species, but that of another thing, with which the thing known in that way has a connection; and consequently the aforesaid species, representing God in this way, will not be His own proper species, but that of some creature, and will itself involve an imperfection. But a species which represents God to a created intellect as knowable precisely quidditatively, but not comprehensively, by that same intellect, does not declare an imperfection on its own part, although it presupposes one on the part of the created intellect: because God, by reason of His supreme perfection, is knowable in this way through Himself and by reason of His own knowability; and so, in Himself and by reason of the character of His essence, He must precisely have the character of a species with respect to that same intellect; and consequently such a species demands infinitude and excludes every imperfection.

Hence, although the reason of comprehensive knowledge can be separated from the quidditative knowledge of God, as may be seen in the intellection elicited in the intellect of the blessed, it nevertheless cannot be separated from the species serving toward such a knowledge; lest (as we said) God should be made intelligible through that species, which is distinct from Him, by that intelligibility which He has through Himself and essentially with respect to a created intellect.

We shall answer the arguments adduced at the beginning of this doubt below, in dubium 8 of this disputation, from num. 187 to 197.