Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

77 In the title, the qualifier insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species has rightly been added. For we do not doubt that, according to the general reason of a first cause, [the divine essence] concurs actively in vision, and this not somehow or otherwise, but insofar as it is the first cause of the supernatural order; since it is certain that every action of a secondary cause depends proportionately upon its nature on the first cause: namely, that if it belongs to the natural order, it depends on God as its natural author; but if it belongs to the supernatural order, it requires the general influx of God himself as supernatural author. The title of the difficulty therefore concerns another peculiar concurrence, namely, concurrence that is active in the character of an intelligible species. By this kind of concurrence, the divine essence does not influx into all other things: because this mode of concurrence belongs specifically to the object of a cognitive power insofar as it is the object that moves it; and thus only the object just mentioned possesses this peculiar mode of influx.

§ I. The dissenting opinion is proposed.

78 Some younger Thomists distinguish two functions in an intelligible species. The first is to unite the object to the power and, by this union, to determine that power formally with respect to intellection. The second, however, is to concur actively with it. Of these, they judge the former to be altogether indispensable and, according to its own kind, free from imperfections; but not the latter. Accordingly, they deny this concurrence to the divine essence insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species with respect to created intellect. Thus Bannez in the present question, and other younger Thomists. Zumel also regards this opinion as probable in this article, and it seems to be suggested by St. Thomas there, insofar as on the part of the power he posits the light of glory, by which the intellect is made efficacious to see God, while on the part of the object he posits the divine essence under the form of a species. For if the divine essence, as united in the character of a species, possessed any activity by which it might complete and strengthen the active power of the intellect, it would already belong to that power on its own side; for the light does not belong on the part of the intellect for any other reason except that it strengthens the intellect to see.

79 It is proved first by reasoning. An impressed species that concurs actively with intellection inflows insofar as it is subordinated to the intellect; therefore the divine essence cannot concur actively in the character of a species together with created intellect. The consequence is evident. Because to inflow by the mode of a principle subordinated to another implies imperfection and dependence. The antecedent is also evident. Because a species, which is the efficient cause of intellection, inflows by the mode of a principle by which it determines the intellect to understand; but an active principle by which is subordinated to the active principle which, as is clear from itself.

It is confirmed. Because otherwise the concurrence of the species would not be vital, and consequently neither would the specification of intellection proceeding from it be vital; but this is false; therefore, etc. The consequence is evident. For an impressed species, considered in itself, is not a vital principle, since it can arise from a principal cause absolutely without life, as is clear from sensible species. Hence, unless it is subordinated to a vital principle, namely, to a vital power, it cannot provide a vital influx. The falsity of the consequent follows from this. For since intellection is vital of itself and intrinsically, it cannot fail, according to its own species and essence, to have intellectual vitality.

80 Second, because otherwise the divine essence would concur immediately in vision through its own substance, and consequently naturally and insofar as it is such, but not insofar as it wills; yet this is absurd; therefore, etc. The consequence is proved. For it belongs to an object that is actually intelligible in itself, such as the divine essence, to inflow naturally and insofar as it is such into vision, but not freely. For just as through its own substance it is the complete object and determines immediately, so through that same substance it ought to act immediately. The absurdity of the consequent follows from this. First, because the proper and perfect mode of God's operation ad extra is through the intellect and the will, as is sufficiently established from what the theologians teach commonly in q. 25 of this first part. Secondly, because otherwise the influx of the divine essence in the character of a species would be necessary, and therefore infinite: since an infinite power, such as that in the divine essence, which inflows necessarily inflows as far as it can, and therefore infinitely.

81 Third, because on the contrary it would follow that the divine relations, according to their proper characters, concur actively together with created intellect in the vision of God; yet this cannot be said; therefore, etc. The consequence is evident. For, according to the opposite opinion, the divine essence inflows in this way for no other reason than that it is united in the character of an intelligible species, insofar as it is its own being, and has entered intimately into the intellect elevated by the light of glory, and is therefore proportionate to it. Thus, when these conditions are found in the divine relations when considered according to their proper formal reasons, as is evident in itself, it would follow that these relations also would inflow actively into vision according to their proper characters.

The falsity of the consequent is also evident. For although the divine relations can inflow ad extra according to their proper characters as a cause, or quasi-cause, of a formal kind, and thus filiation terminates Christ's human nature according to its proper character, but paternity does not, because this mode of termination is reduced to the genus of a formal cause, or quasi-formal cause; nevertheless they cannot, according to this reason, display any active influx with respect to created vision. For, as the theologians teach commonly, the works, or efficient activity, of the Trinity ad extra are undivided; and thus they always act ad extra through what is common, not through what is proper.

§ II. The difficulty is resolved according to the mind of St. Thomas.

82 Nevertheless, it must be said that the divine essence, insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species, inflows actively together with the intellect of the blessed into the clear vision of God. Thus St. Thomas, below, q. 56, a. 1, where he teaches this generally concerning every species, in these words: In an action that remains in the agent, the object must be united to the agent insofar as the action proceeds; just as the sensible must be united to sense insofar as it actually feels, and thus the object united to a power stands to an action of this kind as the form that is the principle of action in other agents. And speaking particularly of the divine essence, he sufficiently suggests this very point in the present question, particularly in his answer to the third, as well as in 4, d. 49, q. 2, a. 1, in the text near the end; in De veritate, q. 8, a. 1, ad quintum; and in 3 contra Gentes, c. 51, as we shall examine more closely below. And so very many of his disciples follow the Holy Doctor in the present question: Caieta, Nazarenus, Zumel, and others. Ferrarius, 1 contra Gentes, c. 53, and 3 contra Gentes, c. 51; and our Complutensian College, in the De Anima, disp. 18, q. 4.

83 It is proved first by the reason suggested by the same Holy Doctor in the cited places. Because the divine essence is united in the character of the object with the blessed intellect in order to determine it with respect to the specification of cognition, namely, so that it would be of such an object and not another; therefore, it concurs efficiently in the specification of that same cognition. The consequence is evident. Because the determination of an active power with respect to the specification of an act cannot occur except through the active power by which the power is constituted in the first act with respect to the specification of that same act. For just as the active power concurs in the specified determination insofar as it has the character of an active power, as our Complutensian College noted in its Logic, in the chapter on action, and as will be clearer from what must be said below, so whatever determines, completes, and, as it were, ultimately gives its formal character to that power with respect to the determination in question must belong to the same line of active power; and consequently it must also be an active principle, or an active determination with respect to the specified determination.

The antecedent is also evident. First, because an intellectual power is intrinsically indeterminate with respect to the specified determination of cognition, which is that of God clearly seen and not of another object, and it is determined through the union with the specified object; therefore, such a union is required for this determination of the power. Secondly, because the divine essence, insofar as it is its own being, can of itself, without any adherence or imperfection of information when taken in entitative being, constitute the created intellect in act and permanently complete it, and therefore through union with it will determine it with respect to the specification of the act. Because a form that permanently constitutes and completes the active power, and is necessarily required for acting, is united with it in order to determine it with respect to the specification of the act, as may be seen in the deduction made concerning other forms.

84 Nor is it necessary to attack again the solution that some of the younger Thomists use against this reasoning, saying that the created intellect together with the light of glory is sufficiently determined with respect to the specification of the act in relation to the clear vision of God; since by the force of such light the intellect cannot produce another species of intellection. Hence, although the force of the reasoning just made establishes the necessity of active concurrence on the part of the object in many other acts of intellection because of the indifference of the intellect, it does not establish it in this one.

Therefore, it will not be necessary to overturn the proposed solution again by several arguments. First, because, as is clear from what has been said, by the force of the light of glory the power is determined only by a determination on the part of the power, not on the part of the object. But in order to elicit intellection, it must be determined on the part of each; and thus an intellect infused with prophetic light can be sufficiently determined by that light on the part of the power with respect to some particular object, and nevertheless, because it is not determined on every side, it requires species that inflow actively, as the opponents themselves admit. Secondly, because, as we have already asserted, intellection is of the kind of an intellectual birth. Hence some seed must proceed in some way from the masculine side to determine the feminine, namely, the intellectual power, toward this birth of intellection rather than another.

85 First, there is a further reason for more thoroughly refuting this solution: it does not agree with what St. Thomas teaches in this article. Since the divine essence, precisely insofar as it is its own being, constitutes the created intellect in act through the form of an intelligible form, it must inflow efficiently into intellection as the clear vision of God itself rather than of another object, and therefore determine it in the specified manner with respect to that vision. Because each thing acts insofar as it is in act, that which has the character of an act with respect to intelligibility must also, in the way now stated, be the reason of operation and an active power in that order.

Second, intellection, insofar as it is an action, is specified by the object insofar as it is an object; and therefore it is of this species and not another, because it is concerned with this object and not another. Therefore, the object, insofar as it is the moving object, inflows actively into intellection. The consequence is evident. Because, as St. Thomas teaches below, q. 14, a. 5, at the end, and 1–2, q. 1, a. 3, intellection, insofar as it is an action, and generally every other action insofar as it is such, is specified by the active principle from which it proceeds; because it is essentially an egress or emanation from the agent. Therefore, if the object, insofar as it is an object, is not an active power with respect to intellection, it cannot specify it as such, and consequently cannot determine the power with respect to its specification.

86 Second, the assertion is proved principally by a reason drawn from various places in St. Thomas. Because every perfection simpliciter found in creatures must be found in God, as St. Thomas teaches above, q. 4, a. 2; otherwise God would not be a most perfect being, and consequently would not be God. But in us an intelligible species concurs actively in intellection, and this belongs to a perfection simpliciter; therefore, this perfection of active power is found in the divine essence insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species, both with respect to divine intellect and to created intellect. The consequence with the major is sufficiently evident. The minor is St. Thomas, q. 56, cited above, and 3 contra Gentes, c. 53, and elsewhere frequently; the philosophers likewise acknowledge, explain, and prove it, as do Aristotle and St. Thomas; as well as by the reasons adduced by our Complutensian College in the cited questions and discussions in the De Anima. The second part is also evident: because the genus of an efficient cause necessarily involves no imperfection, and therefore is found formally in God, as the same Holy Doctor teaches throughout.

87 It makes no difference if one agrees with the opponents that the active concurrence of the intelligible species together with created intellect involves the perfection necessarily accompanied by the imperfections of subordination and dependence upon the aforementioned intellect; and therefore it is no wonder that it is not found in the divine essence insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species with respect to that intellect.

This therefore makes no difference. For although the intelligible species, which is an accident, possesses the said dependence and subordination, the form that is a subsistent form and a complete act nevertheless does not. Therefore, when the divine essence, insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species with respect to the blessed intellect, is a form subsisting in itself and a most perfect act, it will be free from the said imperfections, however actively it may inflow into intellection. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is also evident. Because a principle by which is subordinated to, and depends upon, a principle which insofar as it is sustained by it and receives some being from it in its own way; since, according to the common axiom of the philosophers, the mode of operation follows the mode of being. Therefore, an intelligible species, which is an accident and is sustained as to its being by the operating principle, as that which it depends upon, will depend upon and be subordinated to it with respect to its operation (using the phrase as explained presently), but not insofar as it is a subsistent form and a complete act, since as to its being it does not depend upon it.

88 This doctrine must be understood even though the principle which is not absolutely and simpliciter of that kind, but only in a certain respect, as happens in our intellect, which in a certain respect has the character of a principle by which with respect to intellection; the cause of which is called in a certain sense intelligible, but does not absolutely and simpliciter have the character of a principle which: because it completes the whole suppositum, namely, a human being or an angel; for the suppositum is precisely that which absolutely and simpliciter is called intelligible.

89 Nor does it tell against this that the principle quo cannot proceed into operation without the principle quod, just as it does not tell against the first cause, which concurs with the second cause by general concurrence, that it cannot (as many think, as discussed elsewhere) produce an effect without the concurrence of that same second cause, so that the latter may depend on the former. Because in both cases the same reason applies, namely, that the second cause does not confer power upon the first to act; quite the contrary is true. Similarly, the principle which does not confer force and the reason of acting, as such, upon the principle by which; least of all when the principle of acting quo subsists in itself, as does the divine essence, even when considered in the character of an intelligible species, as happens. Quite the contrary, the principle of acting quod has such being from the principle that constitutes it.

90 Finally, even if it is admitted that in other things the formal principle by which is subordinated to the principle which, this should nevertheless not be admitted in the intellect and the intelligible species; and the difference between the two cases is drawn from the proper nature of the intellect and the intelligible object, as was explained in the preceding doubt, n. 61. For in other things the formal principle which does not pass into the nature of the principle by which, or (which amounts to the same here) is not identified with it, but remains altogether distinct from it, so that a third thing arises from both. In the intelligible order, however, the intellect in some way passes into the intelligible object: because the intellect becomes identically the very thing understood, and this is in a certain way poured into the very nature of the intellect insofar as it is identified with the object. Therefore, although the intellect may in its own way inflow as a principle which, the object nevertheless will not be subordinated to it: because the intellect is intelligibly the object itself, and nothing is subordinated to itself.

91 Nor does it tell against this that the identity of the created intellect with the understood thing is an identity in a certain sense only, not an identity of every kind that excludes a real actual distinction in esse entitativo, et naturale between the two, and consequently does not appear incompatible with a real subordination of one to the other.

This therefore does not tell against it. Because although the same identity is present there, involving a real distinction in esse entitativo, what must chiefly be considered in the intellect and the intelligible object, if they are considered in the intelligible order and intelligible being, is that identity in the intelligible order of one with the other and the real distinction in entitative being involved there, which is imported materially (although almost always indispensably), whether through the imperfection of the power, or of the species, or of both, as happens in us—not by reason of the fact that an intelligible species of itself and indispensably demands it from the force of its own line. Therefore, attention must chiefly be given to this identity, and the intellect and object must be philosophically considered in the intelligible order as if they were not distinguished in entitative being. And thus, if there is any material subordination there in entitative and material being, it need not be found in this most perfect species; indeed, not even in other species when they are considered precisely with respect to the formal character of their proper line.

92 Hence, when it is said that the intellect becomes in a certain sense the thing understood, the term quodammodo excludes the claim that one necessarily becomes another in esse entitativo, but not in esse intelligibili. Because becoming one with another in esse intelligibili alone demands, at least necessarily and indispensably, the identity explained in the cited place and to be explained more fully in the treatise De scientia Dei, disp. 2, nn. 83–92; and the diversity that intervenes there (which can arise only from information, or from accidental being, or from the substantial mode of being of the species itself) does not arise formally from the intelligible order, but is materially imported from esse entitativo, however indispensably it may be joined there. The reason for the present, at least, is this. For just as a human being and a lion are the same in the character of an animal, because although they are distinguished by their proper differences, they are not distinguished by the reason of animality; and therefore, if those differences did not lie within the proper line, a human being and a lion would be positively the same in the character of an animal, so too, because the diversity intervening between object and intellect, once the union of one with the other is posited, does not arise from the intelligible order but from information, or from adherence in esse entitativo, or from the fact that an intelligible species has its esse entitatively under the mode of a subject with respect to the intellect, or from the imperfection of the power. For all of these stand in a material relation to the intelligible order; whereas the intellect, by reason of the species, has numerically the same nature as the object, albeit under another mode of being, namely, intelligible, as we shall say in the aforementioned treatise De scientia Dei, disp. 2, n. 14. Therefore, with this qualification, namely, in the intelligible order, the intellect must itself become the thing understood. See our Complutensians in the De Anima, disp. 18, q. 4, and what we shall assert in the recently cited disp. 2, nn. 83–92.

§ III. A difficult objection and its first answer.

93 But you will object: The essence of an angel, insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species with respect to its own intellect, does not concur actively with respect to its own knowledge; and this for no other reason than that the said intellect is determined on its own side with respect to the knowledge of the angel itself. Therefore, the fact that a power is determined on its own side with respect to the knowledge of some object removes its need for active concurrence on the part of the object insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species. Consequently, since the intellect infused with the light of glory is determined on its own side with respect to the clear vision of God, it will not need an active influx from the divine essence insofar as it has the character of a species. The major is evident. Because the essence of an angel, which is a created substance, cannot be immediately operative, and consequently cannot inflow actively through the mode of a species: because this concurrence is provided immediately by the species. The minor is also evident. Because the fact that an angel's intellect does not need the active concurrence of another with respect to the said knowledge must arise from its being sufficiently determined within the order of an efficient cause. Hence, if it is not determined actively in this order on the part of the object, it must arise solely from a determination on every side by itself.

94 It is confirmed. For either the reason of a species necessarily requires the reason of an active principle, and not one in just any manner, but one free from the imperfections of subordination and dependence; or else it requires that reason involved together with those imperfections. If the first, there will be no reason why this reason, free from the said imperfections, would not be found in the essence of an angel insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species, since it is a subsistent form and a most perfect act, and therefore, even if it is a substance, it will nevertheless be immediately operative; otherwise it will not have the character of a species. If the second, therefore the reason of an intelligible species will not be found in the divine essence with respect to created intellect.

95 This objection can be answered by denying the major. Against this, nothing follows from the proof. Because for the reason of an intelligible species and its active concurrence, it is enough that it concur actively at the radical level through itself, and proximately through its power, as occurs here.

This is explained. For the angelic intellect arises from the essence of the angel, both insofar as it is an intellectual act and insofar as it is actually intelligible, and therefore has the character of an object, because its essence by the reason of its immateriality has both. And the said intellect proceeds from it at the same level of immateriality; and when it thus proceeds from it according to these reasons, so as to be rooted in it according to both, or so as to be intimately united with it, it can by the peculiar right arising from this rooting or union flow from it through the mode of that power insofar as it is intellectual and insofar as it is an actually intelligible object. Consequently, it does not need a new proximate concurrence of that same essence insofar as it is intellectual, distinct in some way from the proximate influx of the intellect as subordinated to the radical active principle. The radical concurrence of the essence of the angel and the proximate concurrence already mentioned of its intellect are enough, as our Complutensians show in 2 Physic., disp. 10, q. 4, and q. 6. Likewise, it does not require a new proximate concurrence insofar as it is an intelligible object: because the said intellect is its proximate power of acting, considered under both reasons.

96 It makes no difference if one objects to this answer. First, because if this is sufficient for the essence of an angel to have the character of a species with respect to its own knowledge, then it will follow that the same is also sufficient for the divine essence, insofar as it is an intelligible species with respect to the blessed intellect, to perform the function of a species. Thus, it itself will inflow only by radical active concurrence, and not proximately; but the light of glory, flowing from it insofar as it is intellectual and insofar as it is actually intelligible, will supply this proximate concurrence. Because what is granted to the angelic intellect cannot be denied to the light of glory, which is of a superior kind.

Secondly (as follows from the proposed answer), the angelic intellect has of itself, primarily and directly, the character of an intelligible species with respect to the knowledge of that same angel, and therefore the essence itself cannot be an intelligible species with respect to that knowledge. The consequence of this latter incongruity seems certain as to the first part. Because just as that which flows immediately and by natural emanation from the essence of the angel insofar as it has the character of an intellectual nature, and therefore of the primary and radical power of understanding, cannot fail to be a power that is proximately intellectual and makes the angel proximately intellectual on the part of power, so that which proceeds from it insofar as it has the radical character of an intelligible object cannot fail to be proximately intelligible and confer on that same essence the property of being proximately intelligible. Therefore, it will of itself have, primarily and directly, the character of an intelligible species with respect to the said essence, since this, and nothing else, is the proper function of an impressed species, as may be seen in sensible species. The second part is also evident. Because it is repugnant that, with respect to one and the same indivisible knowledge of one object, nature should confer a twofold intelligible species, as is evident in itself and is clearly inferred from what our Complutensians teach in Physic., disp. 15, q. 3, n. 97.

97 This therefore makes no difference. For in answer to the first objection, it must be said that the reasons differ. Because the light of glory arises from the divine essence insofar as it is clearly intelligible to itself, but not insofar as it is an object actually intelligible in itself to itself: because although the divine essence by the reason of its infinite immateriality has both, nevertheless, so that the light of glory may arise from it precisely¹, insofar as it is intellectual and through the mode of the elevation of the created intellect, it need not agree with it at the same level of immateriality; otherwise, when it proceeds from that same divine essence insofar as it also has the character of an object, it agrees with it at the same level of immateriality. Because what proceeds from it according to this second character holds itself according to the same character on the object side, and is therefore commensurate with it at the same level of immateriality, as we shall examine in the following doubts; just as what arises from it according to the former character, namely, insofar as it is clearly intelligible to itself, holds itself on the power side through the mode of that elevation, and therefore need not be commensurate in immateriality with the object. Since, therefore, it is repugnant for the light of glory, or for any other creature, to have the same level of immateriality as the divine essence, it follows that it is likewise repugnant for it to arise from that essence insofar as it has the said character of an intelligible object, and therefore through the mode of that power considered according to this character. Thus, either the divine essence does not inflow actively through the mode of an intelligible species, which we have disproved, or it inflows proximately: because nothing inflows radically in any order unless the proximate power of influx arises from it in that same order.

Moreover, the intellect of an angel arises from its essence, both insofar as its power is intellectual and insofar as it is actually intelligible. First, because it agrees with it at the same level of immateriality; and thus on this point nothing prevents it from flowing from it insofar as it is actually intelligible through the mode of its own power. Secondly, because the essence of an angel, insofar as it is an object actually intelligible in itself, must inflow actively into its own intellection, as is clear from the reasons given above for the assertion, applied proportionately. And since it cannot be immediately operative insofar as it is a created substance, it must inflow radically active, and consequently a proximate power must arise from it according to this character, namely, the intellect, by which it acts immediately. Thus the said essence can of itself have a radical influx, and can act proximately through its intellect, and consequently can concur of itself by the proper concurrence of a species: because for this purpose any active influx is sufficient, whether proximate or radical.

98 For the second objection, however, the consequence must be denied as to both parts. In answer to the proof of the first part, on which the proof of the second depends, once the antecedent is granted as to the first part, the consequent must be distinguished in the final part. It must be denied that conferring on the same essence the property of being proximately intelligible means having the power, through the mode of an object, or of an intelligible form, and within the genus of a formal cause or quasi-formal cause in the intelligible order, of determining the intellect proximately. It can be granted that there is a proximate power of actively concurring through the mode of an intelligible object. The consequence must then also be denied. And in answer to the proof that the proper and indispensable function of an intelligible species is nothing else, this is the root of the latter claim. Nor does the instance from sensible species demonstrate anything. For those species formally have the character of such species because they perform that function prior to the species, although on the later account they must also perform it for the reason that will now be assigned.

99 This is explained. Just as the intellect flowing from the essence of the angel insofar as it is intellectual flows only to confer on it what it lacks itself, and therefore confers on it only that by which it may inflow immediately and proximately, because this alone was lacking to the said essence on its own side, so also the same intellect, insofar as it flows from the said essence as an intelligible object, arises from it only by natural emanation in order to confer on it what, according to this character, the said essence does not have. Since the essence itself formally and proximately determines the intellect, within the already-mentioned genus of a formal cause, with respect to the specification of the act, because it is itself formally and proximately united with the intellect through the reason of its immateriality in the character of a proximately intelligible object; and because by the reason of that same immateriality it has the same nature under the immaterial and intelligible mode of being that it itself retains as intellectual under the natural mode of being; and because the same essence has the radical active power to inflow through the mode of an object into its own intellection, the intellect therefore does not arise from it so considered in order to confer on it the function of determining and uniting itself in the specified manner with that intellect, or of concurring radically in intellection. Rather, because the essence itself, by the general reason of created substance, is only radical in any order and is the root of operating powers both in the natural and intelligible orders, as we have already said, the intellect alone arises from it through the mode of that power considered as proximate, making it the object proximately intelligible. Since that function consists only in proximately active influx, while the prior function of determining and at least influencing radically must first be required and suffices for the character of a species, the essence of the angel, and not its intellect, therefore possesses the character of the said intelligible species.

From this also it is clear why a power proceeding from a sensible object, insofar as it is such, has the character of a sensible species. For such objects are not of themselves actually sensible because of the maximum materiality they contain; and because they cannot be united immediately to sense for the reasons advanced in the preceding doubt (applied proportionately here), and therefore a power arising from them in order to confer what they lack must confer on them the property of being proximately sensible, both the power of uniting itself to sense and determining it and the proximate power of concurrence. Thus it will possess the true character of an impressed species.

From all these considerations the confirmation of the principal objection is sufficiently established.

§ IV. A second answer to the same objection.

100 Second, and better still, the principal and difficult objection proposed above, as well as its confirmation, are answered by holding that the essence of an angel, insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species, inflows of itself actively and proximately into intellection, and not merely formally, or with radical active influx, as the graver disciples of St. Thomas commonly infer from the cited place. In answer to the proof, it must be said that although the substance of an angel cannot be the immediate principle of operation through the mode of an active power, and consequently cannot be so in esse entitativo, et naturale, it can nevertheless be so through the mode of a species and in intelligible being: because an intelligible species is not an active power, but a determination in intelligible being of the proximate active power, namely, the intellect, with respect to the specification of the act, as we have already shown. And although it is repugnant for a substance to be immediately operative through the mode of an active power, it is not repugnant through the mode of such a determination, not in just any manner, but in the intelligible order. The essence of an angel must therefore be distinguished in itself insofar as it has the character of nature, namely, an intellectual nature, and insofar as it is an actually intelligible object, or insofar as it has the character of a species. According to this latter character, some immediate activity must be granted to it, but not according to the former.

101 But you will say that, because St. Thomas below, q. 54, a. 2, shows that the substance of an angel is not immediately operative through the mode of an active power—since in creatures being (or substantial existence) and operating are really distinguished, and consequently the power toward being (namely, substance) and the power toward operating are really distinguished—yet this reason also proves that the essence of an angel cannot be the immediate principle of operation through the mode of a species and of the determination of an intellectual power. Therefore, the said activity must be granted in both cases or denied in both. The major is certain. The minor is also evident. Because the being of the essence of an angel insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species and its operation (namely, intellection) are also really distinguished, and thus even supernaturally the substance of the angel insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species could remain with its being without its intellection. Therefore, its substance and the power of acting through the mode of the active operation determination of the intellect will be really distinguished: because they regard the said acts as their proper specific difference, and consequently the angel cannot in any way be an immediate active power with respect to intellection.

102 It is confirmed. Because created intellection must necessarily be an accident, as St. Thomas shows in the cited q. 54; therefore, the essence of an angel, which is a substance, cannot primarily regard it of itself, and therefore cannot in any way be the immediate reason of acting with respect to it. This final consequence follows sufficiently from the first. Because every reason of acting that inflows proximately and actively into an operation regards that operation primarily, since it is considered primarily by nature as such an operating reason. The first consequence is also evident. Because, as our Complutensians show in 2 Physic., disp. 10, q. 4, substance cannot primarily regard anything outside its own category, because it is ordered to itself, and therefore St. Thomas proves that to be immediately operative is implied in substance; otherwise it would not primarily regard the operation for the reason just stated, while regarding it simultaneously, because the whole reason of proximate acting is for the sake of operation. Therefore, it primarily posits a transcendental relation to operation.

103 It is answered that, even granting that the being or existence of the angel insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species and most formally belongs to the intelligible order is distinguished from intellection (the contrary of which we shall show from St. Thomas in the treatise De scientia Dei, disp. 3, n. 7, and in the treatise De voluntate Dei, disp. 2, n. 34), the objection nevertheless proves nothing. Because the substance of an angel, insofar as it has the character of nature, and its immediately operative power, are not really distinguished simply because the substance in some way regards substantial being and the operative power operation, but because the former primarily of itself regards its own being through the mode of a receptive power, whereas the latter of itself tends toward its operation through the mode of an active power, as the cited discussion and question show in the Complutensian College. Yet the same angelic substance, insofar as it is an intelligible object, although it regards both its substantial being, using the qualification just stated, and intellection, nevertheless, when considered according to this character, is not distinguished from itself as regards these two things: because it primarily regards intellection and secondarily its own being. Therefore, insofar as it has the character of an object and of an intelligible species, it can of itself be the immediate reason actively eliciting intellection. The same is true, with proportion preserved, of heat, which although it regards being and operating nevertheless, because it primarily regards operation and secondarily being, as the cited question of the Complutensian College explains in q. 5, can of itself be an immediately operative power.

Why the essence of an angel, insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species, primarily regards operation alone is sufficiently inferred from the nature of that same species. For since a species is of itself primarily instituted to actualize, complete, and perfect the intellectual power, and since the intellectual power of the angel already has, according to this mode of speaking, its own being, and only objective activity and determination are lacking to it, it follows that the object, insofar as it has the character of a species, is primarily instituted for intellection. For just as the same essence, insofar as it has the character of essence and nature, already possesses the being that it primarily regarded and merely needs a power that is immediately operative, the intellect therefore is primarily instituted through the mode of its active power for operation, and secondarily regards being. But on these matters, see the Complutensian College in the cited place.

104 Nor does it tell against this a tacit reply hidden in this same objection, which can be put as follows. Although, from this premise, that the essence of an angel insofar as it has precisely the character of an object and species is not really distinguished from itself when considered according to this character, insofar as it regards being and operating—because it primarily regards operation and secondarily being—this is otherwise when it is considered according to both characters, namely, insofar as it is nature and insofar as it is an intelligible object, because insofar as it is an intelligible object it primarily regards operation, whereas as nature it primarily tends toward being, or toward its existence; and it is not for any other reason that the same essence and its immediately operative power are really distinguished, except that the said essence primarily regards being, whereas the immediately operative power primarily tends toward operation.

This therefore does not tell against it. Because the reason for which the substance of the angel, insofar as it has the character of essence and nature, is really distinguished from its immediately operative power is not that, according to its essence, it in some way primarily regards being or substantial existence and that its operative power primarily tends into operation; but that this is proper to each in the same entitative order. Therefore, when the essence of the angel, insofar as it has the character of nature, primarily regards in the entitative order its being and existence, and insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species it primarily tends in another order, namely, in intelligible being and, in the manner now explained, toward operation, no real distinction between itself considered as nature and itself considered as an intelligible species can be inferred: just as, although it is repugnant for the same intellect to be simultaneously an act, a form, and a mere potency in entitative being, it is not repugnant that it be an act in entitative being and a mere potency in the intelligible order.

105 This is explained. For the essence of an angel, insofar as it is an intelligible object, is a determination of the intellect, not in just any manner, but in the intelligible order; and therefore, insofar as it has the character of an object, or of an intelligible species, it does not regard operation except as founded in, and identified with, the esse entitativo, et naturale of the same essence. Because it belongs to intelligible being, at least created intelligible being, to be founded in, and identified with, in the manner suggested above, some esse entitativo, et naturale, as is evident in itself and as St. Thomas teaches in 2 De Anima. Hence, in this intelligible determination, an entitative, or real, distinction is not taken from that same root, nor is its proper formal reason: because an entitative, or real, distinction is taken from entitative and natural being, and therefore the essence of one angel, insofar as it is an intelligible object, cannot be really distinguished from itself insofar as it has entitative and natural being, but can certainly be distinguished from any other essence of another angel. Its most formal reason, however, is drawn from intelligible operation, which it primarily regards through the mode of active determination, placed in the intelligible order. On the other hand, immediately active power, for example the intellect, as well as the receptive power of substantial being, namely, the same angelic substance, claim for themselves their proper formal reason and their proper entity from the same source: because each has its own through a relation to its proper entitative, or natural, act, primarily regarded as such. And therefore, when this is multiplied, those things are multiplied as well.

106 In answer to the confirmation, it is said that the essence of an angel, insofar as it is formally a substance, never primarily regards an accident as such. For if we speak of it insofar as it is a substance in the intelligible order, that is, insofar as, in an intelligible manner and through the mode of a first act in this order, it unites the object, namely, the essence of the angel as belonging to the intelligible order, with an intellectual power, then intellection itself, insofar as it terminates the relation of the said species, is not formally an accident, but only materially, although otherwise it necessarily has the character of an accident from other principles, and so it terminates most formally, under the character of a union through the mode of a second act of the same object with the intellect. Thus, in God the most formal character of intellection and of actual union with the object is found, but not the character of an accident.

But if we speak of it insofar as it is a substance in the entitative and natural order, then, just as insofar as it most formally has the character of an intelligible species, it is something material and accidental that it is a substance in esse entitativo, so too, from the fact that insofar as it is taken in the character of an intelligible species it primarily regards operation, it does not follow that, insofar as it has the character of a substance in esse entitativo, it primarily regards that operation; because according to that precise and most formal character of an intelligible species, it is not a substance in esse entitativo, et naturale.

107 The reason why a species, insofar as it is taken in the most formal sense of a species, is something material and accidental that it is either a substance or an accident in esse entitativo, et naturale is sufficiently clear from what has been said, and can moreover be explained as follows: because, as the Thomists note very well, a created species abstracts both from a created species that is an accident in esse entitativo and from a created species that is a substance in that same entitative being, insofar as the essence of an angel can be said univocally of both. Thus, the essence of Gabriel, insofar as it serves as an intelligible species with respect to its own intellect, and an intelligible species that is an accident in esse entitativo and that naturally represents that same essence of Gabriel, are of the same atomic essence in the character of an intelligible species. Because although, in the being of a thing, or in esse entitativo, substance and accident agree only by analogical essential agreement, they can nevertheless agree univocally in intelligible being, with respect to which these two characters in esse entitativo are material and accidental.

108 This can be declared and established even more clearly from the fact that, for two intelligible species to be of the same atomic character, two things are considered: first, that they have the same immateriality in entitative being; and second, that intelligibly, or in intelligible being, they unite the same object with a power—whether both are required formally of themselves, or one is required materially of itself and the other formally of itself alone, as will be explained later. Now, an intelligible species representing the nature of Gabriel that is in the intellect of Michael, and which in entitative being is an accident, and the essence of that same Gabriel, which in entitative being is a substance, can on the one hand agree in entitative being at the same level of immateriality (as will be clear from what we shall say in this same disp., dub. 6, because accidents can be of the same immateriality as substance, as is clear in the angelic intellect, which has the same immateriality as the substance of an angel), and on the other hand each species intelligibly unites one and the same intelligible object with a power. For just as the essence of Gabriel is itself intelligible by the reason of its immateriality, and therefore intelligibly unites itself with its own intellect, so the intelligible species of that essence remaining in the intellect of Michael, which is an accident in entitative being, is of the same nature in intelligible and representative being with that same angelic essence of Gabriel, as we shall say in this disputation and shall pursue more fully in the treatise De scientia Dei, disp. 2; and therefore [the intelligible species] intelligibly is one and the same essence of Gabriel with the intellect of Michael. Consequently, they can agree in the character of an intelligible species by univocal and atomic, or (better said) numerical, agreement, as will be clear from what is said in num. 31 of the cited treatise De scientia Dei, where this same point will be elucidated further.

109 From this it also follows that a certain objection which greatly troubles some is of no importance, namely, that the created intelligible order is formally something real, and consequently is formally either a substance or an accident, because created real being is formally and within its own line divided into being of itself or being in another.

This objection therefore easily collapses from what has been said. For at most it follows from it that being a substance or an accident in intelligible being is of itself and formally with respect to the character of an intelligible species; that is, that, among differences contracting the character of an intelligible species within its own line, it is either being a substance in this order or being an accident in this same order, so that a species representing, or uniting, a substance with the intellect is a substance in the intelligible or representative order, whereas one uniting an accident is an accident; but if it unites only the reason of being as such, then it is only being in the intelligible order, not being a substance or accident.

Hence, the division of created being into being of itself or being in another according to entitative being is at most formal and within the proper line with respect to being as entitative and natural, as is said; but otherwise, with respect to the line and order of intelligibility, it says this character only materially and accidentally, while of the formal it says what has been stated about the union of object and power, and, at least materially (though formally in itself), of the real immateriality in esse entitativo. And that immateriality is of such a condition that a species representing something quidditatively agrees with it in esse entitativo at the same level of immateriality, according to what we shall say in disp. 7 of this same treatise. Consequently, of itself and within its proper line, it is divided at least in the manner now suggested, by a distinct immateriality insofar as it belongs to the entitative order.

110 We said ut pertinentem ad ordinem entitativum. For whether an intelligible species, insofar as it belongs to the intelligible order, is divided not only materially of itself, but also formally of itself, by immateriality as it pertains to the intelligible order (of which something will be touched in this treatise) will be clear from what will be adduced below in this treatise and in De scientia Dei. For now, however, we assert only that, if such immateriality as pertains to the intelligible order formally divides an intelligible species within its line of itself, then precisely because a species unites some object in esse intelligibili and agrees with it in immateriality in esse entitativo, it must also have the same immateriality as that object insofar as it pertains to the intelligible order.

From all these considerations, the distinction clearly appears between other things, for example created wisdom and even a created intelligible species. For although created wisdom, insofar as it is created wisdom as such, may in its own way be either a substance, or a quality resting in such a thing, or such a species of quality, yet as created wisdom it formally and within its own line bears the character of the said quality in esse entitativo. A created intelligible species, however, for example the species of the highest angel, says that it is an accident, or a quality, in esse entitativo only materially and accidentally, not formally and within its own line. But this will be treated at length in the treatise De scientia Dei, disp. 2, dub. 1, § 5, and dub. 2, § item 5, and frequently elsewhere in these same doubts.

§ V. The argument of the first opinion is satisfied.

The first is clear from what was said from n. 84 through n. 92.

111 In answer to its confirmation, however, the consequence must be denied. In answer to the proof, it must be said that the species, considered in the formal character of species, is identified in esse cognoscibili with the intellect, as is clear from what was said in the preceding doubt and from what will be said in the recently cited disputation; and thus, although considered in itself it does not equal the perfection of cognition, yet, insofar as it is identified with the intellect, it equals it in the same way as the intellect itself. Hence, just as if in² entitative and natural order they were identified, that entity, as though composed from both characters, could actively elicit vital intellection in the same order without real subordination, so likewise, precisely because they are identified in the intelligible order, that same entity, as though coalescing from the power of knowing and the species, can inflow actively into that very intellection without the said subordination.

However, although the said species and intellect are really identified in the specified order, they are nevertheless distinguished in that same order virtually, or formally, and also really potentially, as we shall say in the treatise De scientia Dei, disp. 3, nn. 84 and 94. Therefore, it is necessary to explain how, insofar as thus distinguished, they can inflow actively into vital cognition.

112 We say, therefore, that the species, still considered as virtually and really potentially distinguished from the power of knowing with which it is identified in knowable being, has a kind of vitality insofar as it intrinsically has the being of a determination of the vital power as such, and cannot concur otherwise except through the mode of that determination. This is sufficient so that, in its own order and through the mode of the said determination, it can inflow actively together with the power into cognition, even insofar as that cognition is vital. First, because a determination of the vital power, formally considered, intrinsically has a concurrence toward the operations of that power insofar as they are such, and consequently also toward their vitality. Secondly, because, in order that a cause coalescing from diverse reasons of acting, one of which is the determination of another, should inflow, it is not necessary that each contain the effect in a completely adequate way according to the reason toward which it concurs; but it is enough that, if the effect in question is, for example, vital, each reason of acting, namely, the vital power and its determination on the part of the object, have something of vitality, and that in both the whole perfection of the effect be equally encompassed. Because although then neither by itself alone is sufficient, nevertheless each is sufficient (using the expression) in its own order, since a vital determination through the species is required together with the vital power; yet this determination does not itself concur through the mode of a power, nor does the power as such through the mode of an object determination.

This answer can be applied in proportion to the present confirmation, even if it is said that the species and intellect are not really identified even in intelligible being: because for a species really distinct from the intellect in any order to concur actively in vital intellection, it is enough that it intrinsically be a determination of the vital power and that it concur as such.

113 Nor does it tell against this that in the same confirmation it is argued that sensible species cannot have any kind of vitality because they do not proceed from a principle of life. Because in order to possess vitality in the manner explained, it is enough that they be determinations of formally considered vital powers, and that, just as they proceed from material things insofar as they have some participation in immaterial and separated substances, as our Complutensians assert in the books On Generation, so too they proceed from them insofar as, under the character of a knowable object, they are also vital determinations of their powers.

This entire answer can be clarified from the fact that the radical and proximate powers of understanding, as well as the intelligible species and intellection, belong to one and the same line of intellectual life; and therefore, wherever this line is found in all its purity and through the mode of a most pure act, as happens in God, there all these things are one and the same, even in formal identity without even a virtual distinction, as will be clear from what we shall say in the treatise De scientia Dei, disp. 3, nn. 17, 46, and 47, and in the treatise De voluntate Dei, disp. 2, n. 34.

114 Therefore, just as for this reason both the radical power and the proximate power of understanding, as well as intellection itself, express in God their own, so to speak, peculiar mode of life, so also an intelligible species must express its own peculiar vitality in him; otherwise, it would not belong to one and the same line of intellectual life. And since this peculiar vitality cannot subsist in anything other than this, namely, that the intelligible species is a vital determination that holds itself on the object side with respect to the intellect, through which it is fecundated with respect to intellection, so that, although all these things are not even virtually distinguished in God, they are nevertheless truly found in him, and that very same formal identity performs all these functions, it follows that the divine essence, insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species and according to this character is united with created intellect, has its own peculiar vitality, and according to this character can inflow into the beatific vision as vital. We say the same thing, in proportion, of other intelligible or sensible species. Because all of these have their own proportionate vitality, already indicated and distinct from the vitality that is in the vital power.

115 The second is clear from what has been said: that the divine essence, insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species, formally concurs of itself, not however in just any manner, but as applied through the intellect and the free divine will, just as, with proportion preserved, the subsistent Word terminates the humanity of Our Lord Christ by the reason of its proper reality. Nevertheless, because of its eminence, it is fitting that it be applied through the intellect and the divine will, as we explained in the preceding doubt. Moreover, the very same essence, insofar as it formally concurs by general concurrence, inflows through an executive power, namely, through its practical knowledge, as through the power of acting that is proximate in its own way. How this is to be understood will be touched upon in the treatise De voluntate Dei, and will be explained more fully below, q. 14, disp. 5, n. 43.

116 In answer to the third, the consequence must be denied. In answer to the proof, it must be said that the divine essence, of itself and by its own reason, is united in the character of an intelligible species, and consequently of itself and by its own reason inflows actively into vision, because without a virtual distinction it is its own being of existence in the intelligible order, and consequently in the natural and entitative order: since in the divine essence these two orders are so identified that they are not even virtually distinct, as we noted in n. 70, and as we shall say in the treatise De scientia Dei, disp. 3, n. 23, and disp. 4, nn. 15–19. The divine relations, however, are not their own being in intelligible being without a virtual distinction, and consequently neither are they in entitative being: because divine intellection, which is the existence of the intelligible order, as we shall say in the treatises De scientia Dei, disp. 4, n. 7, and De voluntate Dei, disp. 1, n. 21, and thereafter, and the very existence of God in entitative being is likewise without a virtual distinction by the reason of its own eminence, as are all the other things found in God, must be wholly identified with the divine essence without a virtual distinction, but not with the divine relations.

117 The reason why, in order for something to be united of itself and by its own reason in the character of an intelligible species with respect to seeing God, it is required that it be its own being of existence in the intelligible order, and consequently in the entitative order, is sufficiently inferred from what we shall say in the treatise De scientia Dei, disp. 3, n. 36 and following, where we shall show that the divine relations are not united of themselves and by their own reason with divine intellect in the character of an intelligible species with respect to the vision of themselves, because they are not their own being of existence in the entitative and intelligible order. Hence, since the vision of the blessed is a participation in the uncreated vision of God, and is produced through the same species as that vision, as the theologians teach commonly and as will be clearer from what is to be said in the cited place, it follows that the divine relations are not united by their own reason with the intellects of the blessed with respect to the vision of themselves, but only by the reason of the essence; and consequently that, by their own reason, they do not have active influx into the said vision.