Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

After we have examined the view of D. Thom. and have seen in accordance with it that no created intelligible species is given in the order of the clear vision of God, and consequently that the divine essence is not united under the form of an intelligible species with the intellect of the blessed, we must say what is to be thought concerning this point, setting aside the authorities and the testimonies of D. Thom. and attending to the thing itself alone.

§ I. The first opinion is proposed.

25 The first opinion denies that God is united under the form of an intelligible species with the intellect of the blessed, and consequently affirms that in fact an intelligible species, impressed and created, is given in order for God to be seen through his essence. This is the opinion of Aureolus, as cited by Capreolus in 4. dist. 49. quaest. 5. artic. 2. and of Vazquez in the present disputation, disp. 43. cap. 6. Though led by a different principle, he cites in its favour Richard of St Victor, in 3. dist. 14. art. 1. quaest. 3.

It is proved, first. For the chief causality of an intelligible species lies in the genus of formal cause; but God cannot supply this genus of cause. Therefore neither can he be united with the intellect of the blessed under the form of an intelligible species, and consequently a created intelligible species must be given, through which the union is made. The minor, together with both consequences, is clear from itself. The major is also evident. For the principal function of an intelligible species is to determine the intellect and to impart a species to the intellection, to which it serves; but these two things belong to the genus of formal cause.

26 Secondly. The reason of an intelligible species is that it constitutes the intellect in its first act and gives it the power to act; but this cannot be supplied by the divine essence except through an intrinsic information. Therefore, since this is repugnant to it, it cannot be united under the form of an intelligible species. The major, as regards 1. part., is sufficiently clear. For the intellect, considered in itself and precisely taken, is pure potentiality in the intelligible genus, and is reduced to act through an intelligible species. As regards 2. vero part., however, it is clear from the first point. For since everything operates according to that which it is in act, it follows that if the species constitutes the intellect in act, it gives it the power to act and to understand. The minor is also clear. For if the divine essence is not intrinsically united, and therefore not through information, the intellect remains intrinsically as it was before, and consequently, just as it was not before intrinsically constituted in act, nor endowed with the power to act, so neither is it afterward.

27 It is confirmed, first, that the divine essence cannot be present under the form of potentiality with respect to the beatific vision. Therefore it cannot constitute the intellect in its first act either. The antecedent is evident, for such a potentiality conflicts with the infinite actuality of the essence of God. The consequence is also clear, because the first act is in potentiality to the second act and is perfected through it.

It is confirmed, secondly, because the divine essence cannot of itself produce any formal effect upon the intellect of the blessed. Therefore it can neither constitute it in its first act, and consequently neither can it be united with it under the form of an intelligible species. This last consequence is clear from what has been said. The first point, however, is also clear, because nothing can constitute another in act without giving it some formal effect. The antecedent, however, is proved. For that effect cannot be purely uncreated, since it begins in time; nor purely created, because it involves the divine essence as the form from which it proceeds; nor mixed of created and uncreated, because that created being, in order to be mixed with it, would have to be something substantial, since substantial being cannot be given to the intellect, it being an accident; nor yet something accidental, otherwise there would be given some accident mediating between the divine essence and the intellect, on account of which God would be seen clearly, and so would be seen and not seen immediately, as will be clear from what has been said above and will be said below. Therefore, and so on.

28 Thirdly. From the union of an intelligible species with the intellect there must result something one per se; but from the divine essence and the intellect of the blessed there cannot result this one thing. Therefore the divine essence will not be able to be united with it under the form of an intelligible species. The consequence is sufficiently obvious. The minor, however, seems open to view. For from the divine essence and the intellect there cannot coalesce one substance or one accident, as is clear from itself. Therefore, and so on. The major is also clear. For from pure potentiality in one order, and from the actuality of that same order, there cannot fail to result something one per se, as may be seen in matter and substantial form. Therefore, since the intellect is pure potentiality in the intelligible order, and the impressed species is the proper actuality of that order, it will follow that the two must coalesce into something one per se.

29 It is confirmed. For if the divine essence were united under the form of a species with a created intellect, and something resulted from the two, it could not fail to come about through some new action; but this is repugnant. Therefore, and so on. The major is clear, because a new effect resulting from the union of several things must be produced through a new action, even if one of the extremes be uncreated, as is established in the mystery of the Incarnation.

The minor is also evident, because this action cannot be a productive action of the intellect, since that is of an inferior order, nor a productive action of the light of glory. For just as the production of the light of faith cannot be the production or the union of the intelligible species which are required for believing, so neither can the production of the light of glory be the productive action of the union of the divine essence, or of any third thing resulting from this union. Nor, finally, can it be any other action terminating in that whole conjunction. For in this conjunction there is found only the divine essence itself and its union with the intellect, and then the intellect with the light of glory. Yet no action can be found producing the divine essence, since that is of itself improducible, nor its union, because this union is not distinct from that same essence, in as far as the essence is an extreme capable of union through the form of a most pure act, and therefore is itself the thing unifiable and the union with itself; nor, finally, can it produce the intellect or the light, in such a way that this action have a necessary connection with the other component of this conjunction, namely with the divine essence and its union, for the reasons we have just given. Therefore neither can any action terminating in the aforesaid conjunction be given, since no action produces any whole, or conjunction, unless it produce whatever is in it, or something with which all the other things are necessarily connected.

30 Fourthly. An intelligible species must be received in the intellect; but God cannot be received in it. Therefore neither can he be united with it under the form of the aforesaid species. The consequence is evident. The major is clear, because an intelligible species has the form of form with respect to a created intellect; but a form must be received in that of which it is the form. The minor is also clear, both because the divine essence is the total form and subsists in itself, and therefore is repugnant to being received in another; and also because otherwise the same essence would be limited by the created intellect, since a form received in a subject is terminated and limited by that subject, as our Complutensians show from D. Thom. in 3. Phys. disp. de infinito.

31 Nor will it suffice to say that, although a natural form must be received, inhere, or intrinsically inform that of which it is the form, the intelligible form is different, as appears in the essence of an Angel, which is an intelligible form with respect to its proper intellect, yet does not inhere in it or intrinsically inform it. Whence it accrues to a species, or intelligible form, that it is either substance or accident, and it is enough for it to declare its union in intelligible being with the intellect, apart from imperfections, and therefore without inherence and intrinsic information. And so, although God cannot be united under the form of a natural form with the intellect of the blessed, he can indeed be united under the form of an intelligible form.

Against this, however, is the fact that it is repugnant for anything to be united under the form of an intelligible form without there also being admitted at the same time its union in entitative and natural being. Therefore, if God cannot be united with the intellect of the blessed under the form of a natural form and in entitative being, he will likewise not be able to be united with it intelligibly. The consequence is evident. The antecedent, however, is proved inductively. For in the union of the divine essence under the form of an intelligible species with its intellect, a greater union in natural being is superadded, namely through complete identity; and in the intelligible union of the essence of an Angel with its proper intellect another natural union is mixed in, namely through the form of essence and property. Likewise, with the union in intelligible being of the other species of any created intellect there is mixed a union of the same by inherence and information, which accompanies the union in intelligible being.

It is confirmed, first, because the divine essence, insofar as it pertains to the entitative order, and the same insofar as it is considered with respect to the intelligible order, and has the reason of an intelligible species, is not yet virtually distinguished, but is altogether the same formality. Therefore it cannot be united with the created intellect of the blessed, according to that whereby it has the reason of an intelligible species, unless it be also united with the same according to that whereby it pertains to the entitative order, or under the form of a natural form and in entitative being. The antecedent will be established both from what is to be said in this same dubium, and also from those things which we shall assert in the tractate de scientia Dei, disp. 3. num. 17. and thereafter, and in the tractate de volunt. Dei disp. 2. num. 34. The consequence is also evident. For in order that the divine essence should be united with the intellect of the blessed according to one of those two reasons, and not according to the other, it was necessary that there should be another reason, at least virtually distinct. Therefore, precisely because entitative and natural being on the one part, and intelligible being, or the reason of an intelligible species, on the other, are not virtually distinguished, that is, not distinguished with foundation in the thing in the divine essence, it is necessary that it likewise be unable to be united with the intellect of the blessed in the reason of an intelligible species, and insofar as it pertains to the intelligible order, unless it be also united with the same according to that whereby it pertains to the entitative and natural order.

32 It is confirmed, secondly, because the union of the species in intelligible being is more intimate and greater than the union of matter with substantial form. Therefore it must be by identity, or at least by information and inherence, and consequently in entitative and natural being. The antecedent is established from that common axiom taken from Averroes, 3. de Anima text. 37., namely, that from the intellect and the thing understood there comes a greater unity than from matter and form. For where there is a greater unity coalescing from two things, there a greater and more intimate union must intervene, as is clear from itself. Therefore, and so on. The first consequence, however, is proved. For otherwise that union would be far less and in no way intimate, since it would be only by an extrinsic assistentia and by the non-distinction of one from the other, and consequently by an extrinsic union.

The second consequence, however, is sufficiently evident. For union by inherence and by information, excluding identity between the form and the informed thing, pertains to the entitative and natural order; whereas union by identity with a form in which intelligible being is really the same as entitative and natural being, as occurs here, is a union and an identification both in intelligible being and in entitative and natural being.

33 It is confirmed, thirdly, because if the union in intelligible being, precisely taken, did not demand at least inherence or information, there would follow from this that for the union of the divine essence with the intellect of the blessed under the form of an intelligible form, only a certain most intimate presence by an influx would be required. But this is plainly false. Therefore, and so on. The consequence is clear from the major itself. The minor is also evident, both because the union of the divine essence through mere influx is only in the being of nature and for the effect of preservation, so that it is not sufficient for a union in the supernatural order under the form of an intelligible species; and also because the divine essence cannot be united under the form of an intelligible species with the intellect of the blessed before the light of glory, as will be clear from what is to be said in art. 4 and 5. For if union by influx were sufficient, it would be united before the aforesaid light, because before its coming the influx of God is present in the intellect. And finally, because otherwise the divine essence would remain united to every intellect, even one not blessed, since it makes an intimate influx into every intellect whatever.

§ II. The second opinion is reported.

34 The second opinion in part agrees with the preceding one, and in part indeed differs from it. It agrees, to the extent that it denies that God is united under the form of an intelligible species with the intellect of the blessed, on the ground that to the reason of the aforesaid species inherence is indispensably required. It differs, however, because it denies that in fact another impressed and created species is given. For it believes that it is enough that the divine essence have a peculiar concurrence in the reason of the object together with the created intellect, co-effecting with it the clear vision of God, even though on account of the aforesaid defect it is not an intelligible species with respect to it. Thus Suarez, vol. 1 of the Summa Theologiae, lib. 2. cap. 12.

This opinion, as regards that in which it agrees with the preceding one, seems sufficiently established from the arguments adduced in its favour. As regards that which it adds in the second place, namely, that another created species is not given, this will be clear from what is to be said in support of our own opinion.

The last point, however, can be urged in the following way. For a sufficient reason cannot be given, why an influx other than this should be necessarily required for the intellection, unless it be that the object itself is non-distinct from the intellect and effects the intellection together with it. Therefore in that case an intelligible species will not be necessary, whether as standing in the place of the object, or as meaning that the object is united under the form of a species. The consequence is clear. For both of these require inherence, and that the intellect be constituted in its first act by a species or by the object. And so there will not be only an influx in the genus of a cause co-operating with the intellect in the intellection. The antecedent is also clear. For intellection is a certain intellectual birth, and the word has the reason of offspring in intelligible being, and therefore the object is compared to the intellection after the manner of the male, while the intellect bears itself like the female in parturition, according to that common dictum, namely: from the object and the power knowledge is brought forth. Therefore, just as in a natural birth so much alone is required, namely that the male co-effect together with the female, and not that it constitute her in her first act; and if the male could of itself achieve what it achieves by means of the seed, the seed would not be required, so likewise in an intentional birth. For since this one is of that kind by analogy with the former one, it will be enough to find in it those things which are required of themselves, and indispensably, for a natural birth.

§ III. The true opinion of the Angelic Doctor.

35 Nevertheless it must be said that the divine essence is in fact united under the form of an intelligible species with the intellect of the blessed, in the order of the clear vision of God. Thus the disciples of D. Thom. and almost all the theologians have followed the same Saintly Doctor, both in the places cited in the preceding dubium, and also in 3. cont. Gen. cap. 51., where he says: It is therefore clear that the divine essence can be compared to a created intellect as an intelligible species, because it understands. And in 3. part. quaest. 9. art. 3. ad 3., where he says: The divine essence is united to the blessed mind, as the intelligible to the understanding. And in this same quaestio, art. 5., in these words: But when any created intellect sees God through his essence, the divine essence itself becomes the intelligible form of the intellect. And although this assertion could be sufficiently established from the impossibility of an impressed and created species in the order of seeing God, which we shall show below in this same disputation from D. Thom. and from reasons drawn from him from dub. 4 up to 9.; nevertheless, from the fundamental reason, drawn from its own principles and from the same Saintly Doctor in this art. and in quaest. 56., as well as from other places already cited, it is shown as follows.

36 For whenever an object is intelligible in itself and proportioned to the intellect, and finally united with it, it does not need an intelligible species distinct from itself, but is united in the reason of a species by itself. But the divine essence is intelligible in itself, and proportioned to the intellect bathed in the light of glory, and finally intimately united with it. Therefore it does not need a species distinct from itself, but is united in the reason of an intelligible species by itself. The major is proved. For an intelligible species is given only on account of the defect of one of the three conditions enumerated in the object. Whence, since none of those is lacking to the essence of an Angel with respect to its proper intellect, it does not need a species distinct from itself, but the essence itself is united in the reason of a species in the order of the knowledge of itself.

The minor, as regards 1. part., is sufficiently clear. For since intelligibility arises from immateriality and from the actuality of the object, it follows that the divine essence, which is the most pure act and is most immaterial, inasmuch as it is its own being, without any potentiality at all, is also intelligible through its own essence, indeed most intelligible.

As regards 2. vero part., however, that is, as regards proportion, this is also evident. For the intellect illuminated with the light of glory becomes of the divine order. Whence, just as by this reason the intellect is made divine, so also between it and the divine essence, as the intelligible object, there is a sufficient proportion.

37 As regards the last part, however, it is proved. For precisely because the divine essence is intelligible in itself, and in the reason of an intelligible object proportioned to the intellect as bathed in the light of glory, it must be conferred with it under the form of a species and of an intelligible form, proportioned to it and unifiable with it. Therefore, precisely because it is non-distinct from it by its own and peculiar non-distinction of the divine essence, that is, by the most intimate influx into it, as it is bathed in the light of glory, it will be necessary that it be itself united with the intellect so taken by another union in intelligible being. This consequence is clear. For whatever extreme capable of union, which in the reason of such a thing is a pure act, has in that order, in which it is unifiable and a pure act, its own most actual union with the other extreme, precisely because it is non-distinct from it by its own non-distinction, and on the part of it all the requisites for such a union are present. But this will be treated again expressly in the tractate on the Incarnation, quaest. 1. art. 1., where we shall also show how well these things cohere with those which our Complutensian College teaches in 1. Phys. disp. 6. quaest. 2.

§ IV. Gabriel Vazquez's evasion, and how it is to be precluded.

38 In many ways do adversaries occur to this argument. For in the first place Vazquez answers that in it it is supposed that a special concurrence of the object in the being of the object is necessarily required for the vision, and thus that, whenever the object possesses the assigned conditions, it has in itself the reason of an intelligible species. Yet such a concurrence is not necessarily required for the vision. And therefore the divine essence only concurs under the form of a universal cause. And likewise the intellection by which an Angel knows himself is brought about only by the Angelic intellect, without any special concurrence of the essence itself in the reason of the object or of an intelligible species.

But against this. For (as is established by that common axiom of the theologians and philosophers) from the object and the power knowledge is brought forth. Therefore the object specifically influences the intellection. The consequence is clear. Both because for this reason D. Aug., lib. 9. de Trin., cap. 10. and lib. 14. cap. 17., says that the intellect is passive potentiality, whose active principle is the object. And D. Thom., below, quaest. 77. art. 3., says: The object is compared to the act of passive potentiality as the principle and the moving cause. And also because, since in intellection there intervenes a certain birth, or as it were a birth, it is necessary that the female be present there, namely the intellective power, and at the same time something which bears itself like the fecundating male, namely the object. Therefore, just as the intellect has a special concurrence, because it concurs under the form of the female, so also the object will have an influence through a special influx, and under the form of the active principle that fecundates and moves the power, in as far as it bears itself like the male.

39 Furthermore. Because a word produced of itself necessarily has to be assimilated to the object whenever it is produced through intellection. Therefore the object has a special concurrence with it under the form of the principle by which, and consequently with the intellection. The antecedent is obvious. For a word of itself necessarily has to be representative of the object. Therefore it will necessarily be like IT. Whence in divine things the Word, according to its formal reason, is an image and a likeness of the Father, and is assimilated to IT in that essence which is the object of the Father's knowledge, by which it is produced. The first consequence is also clear. Because a word is necessarily assimilated only to its formal principle by which, which produces it. Therefore, if from its formal reason it is necessarily assimilated to the object, it follows that it therefore has a special influx into it, namely under the form of the productive principle by which, or at least under the form of the formal principle determining it to its production.

40 It is confirmed. Because the object has a special concurrence with respect to volition, whether this be in the genus of an efficient cause, as several Thomists hold, or in the genus of a final cause. Therefore it will also have that concurrence with respect to intellection. The antecedent is clear from itself. The consequence is also evident. Because it is proper to the intellect to draw things intelligible to itself, as theologians and philosophers commonly admit, just as the will is borne towards things willed. Therefore, just as for this reason the willed object has a special influx with respect to volition, so also for that reason the known object, or the intelligible, will specifically concur in the intellection. Otherwise, to what end would the intellect draw things intelligible to itself, if it did not specifically need them, at least as a principle acting inwardly in the order of intellection?

It is confirmed, and is at last explained. For just as the willed object specifies the volition, so, on the testimony of Aristotle, 11. Metaphys., whom Cajetan cites below, quaest. 14. artic. 1., the known object is the specifying principle of cognition. Therefore it is specifically united with the intellect in the order of such a specification, and consequently in the reason of the object it will have a special influx with respect to it. This last consequence is clear. Both from what has been said thus far, because if it did not have a peculiar influx, its union would not be peculiarly required in the order of intellection. And also because the intellection, as an action, is specified by its proximate principle eliciting it, as our Complutensians noted in their Logic, in the chapter on action. And thus, if the object specifies it, as it is an action, it will already have a special influx of a proximate and active principle with respect to it. The first consequence is also clear. Because the known object cannot be the specifying principle of cognition unless, as united, it is one with the knower. Otherwise the knower would not have in itself a sufficient principle of its own operation, which is against the nature of a perfect agent, and one belonging to the highest order of agents, such as the knower itself is.

§ V. Francis Suarez's solution, and how it is to be overturned.

41 Secondly, Suarez occurs, maintaining that in fact no created species is given in the order of the intellection of any object whenever this possesses the conditions enumerated by us. Yet it is falsely supposed that such an object must be united under the form of an intelligible species. Because inherence, or information in entitative being, is indispensably required for this. Wherefore then the special concurrence of the object in the being of the object will suffice, and will be required, insofar as it co-effects the intellection together with the intellect, without there intervening there the reason of an intelligible species, whether created or uncreated.

42 Yet this solution fails in two points among others. The first is that inherence, or information in entitative being, or any other imperfection whatsoever is formally predicated of the essence of an intelligible species taken formally. Its falsity is shown as follows. For in God the most formal reason of an intelligible species is found. But nothing involving intrinsically inherence, or information in entitative being, or any other imperfection whatsoever, can be formally found in him. Therefore the reason of an intelligible species, taken of itself and formally, does not necessarily involve inherence or any other imperfection. The consequence, with the minor, is sufficiently established. For otherwise God would not be a most perfect being, and consequently he would not be God.

The major, however, seems open to view. Both because it is commonly taught by theologians when they say that the divine essence truly and formally has the reason of an intelligible species with respect to the production of the Word. And also because it is stated by D. Thom., 3. cont. Gent. cap. 51. de verit. quaest. 2. art. 2. 1. part. quaest. 14. art. 2., where he says that: In God, because there is nothing of potentiality, therefore in him the intellect and the intellection are the same, so that he does not lack an intelligible species: as our intellect when it understands is in potentiality: nor is the intelligible species other than the substance of the divine intellect, but the intelligible species itself is the intellect itself, and so he understands through himself.

43 It is confirmed, first, that the expressed species, namely the word, is a perfection absolutely simple, and does not necessarily involve the imperfection of inherence or any other whatsoever. Therefore neither does the impressed species. The antecedent is clear. For otherwise the reason of the word would not be formally found in divine things. The consequence is also evident, both from the parity of the reason, and because the impressed species is a principle by which, whether formal only or active with respect to the word. Therefore, if this does not necessarily include an imperfection, neither will the impressed species involve it. The consequence is clear. For otherwise the imperfection of the impressed species would shine forth in the word, since every imperfection of a productive or formal principle, necessarily involved by it, must shine forth in the thing produced.

It is confirmed, second, and at the same time it is explained how the divine essence can be united in the reason of a species without inherence. For an intelligible species does not impart the first and essential power of understanding, which is required on the part of the intellective power. But it only completes, on the part of the object, the aforesaid power, and that in a manner which will be explained more fully immediately below. Therefore, since the divine essence is its own intelligibility under the form of a pure act, and is a true intelligible form, it will be able to be united not only with the divine intellect, but also with a created intellect. The antecedent is commonly admitted by theologians. The consequence is proved. For from it we infer that the divine subsistence can be united under the form of a terminus, without any imperfection of inherence or of information, not only with the essence of God, but also with a created essence, because it has the true reason of a terminus, and is itself subsisting under the form of a pure act, and the reason of subsisting completes nature, but does not impart the first essential reason as holding to it on its own part. Therefore, since the reason of an intelligible species has precisely this, proportion being preserved, and the divine essence is its own intelligibility under the form of a pure act, it will be able, without any admixture of inherence or any other imperfection whatsoever, to be united under the form of a species both with the divine and with the created intellect.

44 It is confirmed, finally, and this very thing is explained at the root by the reasoning of D. Thom. in this art., in the solution to objection 3, and often elsewhere. For the divine essence of itself is a species, or an intelligible form, and over and above it is all its own being, both in the genus of being and in the genus of intelligible, because it is its own intelligibility. Therefore, just as it can itself be an intelligible form with respect to the divine intellect, so also it can, without inherence or the imperfections of information, constitute the created intellect under the form of an intelligible form in its first act for understanding. The antecedent is established from what has been said. The consequence is proved. Because the cause, for which a form which has the true reason of a form in the natural and entitative order cannot constitute in act a subject proportioned to itself except through a middle inherence or information connoting imperfection, is that it necessarily demands that it, insofar as it constitutes the subject in act, not be that being which it gives, and therefore, in order to give such a being, needs some formal causality which is inherence, or information connoting and supposing imperfection. Therefore, where the form can be that being which it constitutes in act and which it gives to the subject, as in the intelligible form that is most perfect, namely in the divine essence, it happens that it will not need the causality of inherence or of the information already mentioned in order to constitute it in act, but will be able to achieve this through the immediate union of itself without any connoting or supposing imperfection of inherence or information.

45 From this also it is clear that the second head contained in this solution is false, namely, that the object, or the divine essence, displays a special and active concurrence in the reason of the object in the order of the clear vision of God, and at the same time does not have the reason of an intelligible species. For these two things do not seem to cohere with each other, as the following argument sufficiently shows.

Because precisely because the object concurs effectively in the reason of the object towards the vision of God, it is necessary that it be in some way united with the intellect under the form of a single principle, not indeed according to natural being, but according to intelligible being. Yet the object thus united with the intellect itself determines, actuates, completes and perfects it in the order of the aforesaid vision. Therefore precisely by this it will have the reason of an intelligible species with respect to it. The consequence seems certain. For by the name of an intelligible species we understand nothing else than the object, or something else standing in its place, which concurs effectively together with the intellect towards the intellection, and which perfects, actuates, completes and determines it in the order of that intellection. The major, however, needs no proof, since it is clear from itself that, whenever the concurrence of two things in the second act is required for some operation, it is necessary that, just as they are united in the second act, so in the first act they should in some way be presupposed as united. Otherwise there would be given a whole second act without a whole and complete first act, which is plainly repugnant.

46 The minor, in which the difficulty seemed to lie, is shown as follows. Because the intellect, as long as it is united with the object, is in essential potentiality with respect to its intellection. And thus the natural light of our intellect in its first production is in pure potentiality in the intelligible order, because it is not united with any object. And likewise, if the natural light of the Angelic intellect were not united with one of its objects, or with the species of them, it would be in essential potentiality with respect to them. Therefore, precisely because the object is united under the form of an active principle, it will be compared to such a light under the form of an act, of complement, and of determination of that same light. The consequence is clear. Because precisely, without any other act, it draws that light out of essential potentiality. And thus there is involved there that it must necessarily be compared under the form of an act, of complement, and of determination with respect to it.

47 It is confirmed, and is explained by the reasoning of D. Thom., 3. con. Gent. cap. 51. and in 4. dist. 49. quaest. 2. art. 1., from the difference which intervenes between a created essence, for example that of an Angel, and the divine essence. For that which concurs actively and is a form in natural and entitative being can be united with any subject capable of constituting it in its first act. On the other hand, that which is composed of matter and form, as is clear from itself, cannot. Therefore that which is pure form in intelligible being, and consequently is intelligibility itself, and influences actively, will be able to be united with another under the form of a form constituting it in this order in its first act, and consequently under the form of an intelligible species. Therefore, since God, as the intelligible object, influences actively, and is intelligibility itself, and consequently pure form in the intelligible genus, he will be able in this way to be united with any intellect that is elevated and proportioned to him. On the other hand, the essence of an Angel, which is not intelligibility itself, but that which is intelligible, cannot. And thus, since it includes intelligibility, it can be to itself the reason of being understood, just as that which includes a natural form can be to itself the reason of existing and operating. Yet because it involves potentiality, and is not intelligibility itself under the form of a pure act and of pure form, but that which has it, it cannot be united under the form of an intelligible form with a foreign intellect. But these matters will be treated more fully in the solution to the last objection for the first opinion.

§ VI. A certain objection is dissolved, from whose solution many things said so far are elucidated.

48 But you will object. From the fact that the divine essence and its attributes are a form in natural and entitative being with respect to God, and at the same time are their own being in this order, and are absolutely simple perfections, it is correctly inferred that they can be united without inherence or information under the form of a natural form with God himself, but not with any created thing. Because by this very fact inherence, or the imperfection of information, is involved there. Otherwise a creature could be, for example, created wisdom uncreated. Therefore, although from the fact that the divine essence is an intelligible form and its own being in the intelligible order, and consequently that the reason of a species is an absolutely simple perfection, it is inferred that it can be united without the aforesaid imperfection under the form of such a form with the uncreated intellect, yet not with a created one, as seems sufficiently clear from the parity of the reason.

49 And you will confirm. Because from the fact that quantity is its being quantitative, and so that it is also extended in itself, it is not correctly inferred that it can constitute a substance without inherence in the reason of an extended thing. Rather, it is inferred only that it can be to itself the reason of having parts. Therefore, from the fact that the divine essence is its own intelligibility, it will be inferred only that it can constitute the divine intellect, with which it is identified, in its first act. On the other hand, this is not true of the created intellect, from which it is really distinguished.

50 It will be answered, first, that what has been gratuitously admitted in God under the form of a natural form, and in entitative being with respect to himself, is nevertheless not granted, because it involves the greatest imperfection, as we shall say immediately. Nevertheless, neither the divine essence nor any other attribute can be united under the form of a natural form with any created thing. It can, however, be united under the form of an intelligible form. Because the latter is limited according to its entity by that in which it is received, whereas this one is not. And therefore this does not inhere; that one, however, does, as we shall weigh more fully immediately below.

51 It will be answered, second, that although the divine essence is the most pure act, and subsists in itself in natural and entitative being, and at the same time has the reason of an intelligible form, yet, if we speak properly and in a strict sense, it is not, nor can be, of itself a natural form in entitative being. And so it cannot constitute a creature, for example a wise one, in being, because by this very fact it would have the reason of a natural form. Whence an Angel, because he is neither a natural form nor can be, cannot by displaying his own entity communicate to another that natural and radical power which he himself has in entitative and natural being within himself. On the contrary, the rational soul can do so precisely because it is a true natural form.

52 Why, then, the reason of a natural form is repugnant to the divine essence, but not the reason of an intelligible form, is sufficiently clear from D. Thom., 1. part. quaest. 8., and from the three reasons, which are sufficiently efficacious, that can be seen there in the same place. Moreover, it can be declared according to the doctrine of the same Saintly Doctor, from the difference which intervenes between a natural form and an intelligible form. For a natural form is limited and terminated by the subject in which it is received, as the Angelic Doctor showed above, quaest. 7., and as our Complutensians do in the same place, 3. Phys. disp. 18. quaest. 2. On the other hand, an intelligible form is not.

The reason of which is taken from those things which we shall say in the aforesaid tractate on the knowledge of God, disp. 2., almost throughout its whole length. For as knowing things are distinguished from non-knowing things, as D. Thom. teaches in quaest. 14., cited above, in this, that just as the nature of a non-knowing thing is more compressed and limited, because it has much of potentiality and of matter, which is the root of compression, and therefore non-knowing things cannot become other things. On the contrary, the nature of a knowing thing is unlimited and broader, insofar as it can become all things in some way, as Aristotle says, 3. de Anima text. 37. So likewise a form which is received not in intelligible being, but in entitative and natural being, is terminated and limited according to its entity by its subject, because it is received in a less perfect way, and consequently the aforesaid form is united by a middle inherence or information, which alone demands limitation. On the contrary, a form which is received intelligibly, and under the form of an intelligible form, need not be limited, at least according to its entity, by that in which it is received in a more elevated and more perfect way, that is, in a very immaterial way, and consequently without any imperfection of limitation. Because materiality is the root of limitation, or of inherence, which from its own force demands limitation. And so, if it be precisely received in intelligible being, without any admixture of reception in entitative and natural being, it is not limited according to its entity by that in which it is received, nor is it in it by a natural information or inherence.

Whence, although it is repugnant to the divine essence to be united under the form of a natural form in entitative being, so that its entity should be terminated and limited by that in which it would be received, and consequently so that it should not inhere in it or itself inform it in entitative being, it is nevertheless not repugnant to be united under the form of an intelligible form, and purely intelligibly. Because this form is not limited, by that to which it is united, according to its entity and the reason of an intelligible form, and consequently it neither inheres in it nor informs it in entitative and natural being, because such an information demands limitation.

53 This can also be explained from those things which we shall say in the aforesaid tractate on the knowledge of God, in the place cited above, from the doctrine of D. Thom., 1. part. quaest. 50. art. 2. ad 2. For there the Saintly Doctor says that an intelligible form is received in the intellect according to the reason of form, that is, as Bannez well explains in the same place, according to the whole amplitude and universality which is proper to it in intelligible being. And therefore, when the species representing human nature, for example, informs the human intellect, then although it is limited in entitative and natural being, and becomes this in number and not that, nevertheless in intelligible and representative being it remains as universal and ample as the reason of such a form demands in its whole amplitude. And consequently it does not demand that, as regards its intrinsic perfection in intelligible being, it be terminated and limited by the intellect which it actually informs in intelligible being. A natural form, however, in entitative being, as such, precisely because it informs actually on the part of the thing, cannot remain with the whole amplitude and perfection which its species demands. Rather it is limited, and becomes this and not that, and it has this mode of participating its species, and not that one which is proper to another form of the same species, as is established in all natural forms which are properly and strictly such. And therefore D. Thom. in the cited quaestio, and often elsewhere, says that the nature, for example, of Michael the Archangel, cannot be multiplied in number. Rather, his one single individual, namely Michael, contains the whole species, and perfection, and amplitude of it, because it does not have the true reason of a natural form, but is an act subsisting in itself, and not receivable in matter, and consequently has nothing by which the amplitude of its species is limited. But these things will be treated again, and more at length, in the tractate cited.

54 Add, first, that an intelligible species, or intelligible form, holds itself on the part of the object rather than on the part of the other thing, and therefore, if the object is infinite, it represents infinitely and is not limited by the other, as we shall treat more fully below in this same disputation. On the other hand, a form in natural and entitative being holds itself on the part of the subject rather than on the part of the other thing, and so it must have its entity limited by a finite subject.

Add, second, that if we speak particularly of a form considered in natural and entitative being, holding itself on the part of the agent, and giving it that it be the principle of operating in a vital way, then such a form has a peculiar reason of being subordinated, for example in a man, to the first principle of his life and of all his operations, namely the soul. Because nothing holding itself on the part of that very thing can live unless it be that very thing or be subordinated to it. And therefore the light of glory, found in fact in the blessed and holding itself on the part of their intellect, and finally influencing the vital act of the beatific vision, is subordinated to the intellect and to the soul. Therefore from this head also it will be repugnant to the divine essence to be united under the form of a natural form with respect to the aforesaid actions. Because such a form holds itself on the part of that to which it is united, and demands a subordination repugnant to God.

Add, third, that a form properly and strictly taken, which as such is in entitative and natural being, is always something incomplete, or something accidental, as is clear inductively. And therefore it demands inherence, or information in natural and entitative being. A form in intelligible being, on the contrary, is the more a form the more complete it is in the reason of being. Indeed, if it be infinite in the genus of being, the more will it be able to be a form in the intelligible order. Because everything is the more intelligible the more it is a being. Whence, that which has more of entity will have also more of intelligibility. And so an intelligible form does not necessarily demand inherence, or the imperfection of information, in natural and entitative being.

55 From this also it will follow that a natural form in entitative being cannot eminently, or radically, possess the whole entity of its effect taken absolutely. As is established by those who teach, our Complutensians, 2. Phys. disput. de causis formali, et materiali. On the other hand, an intelligible form can, as is established in God and in the essence of an Angel, which has the reason of an intelligible species, and contains in fact, at least radically, the intellect and the intellection themselves, and consequently the whole of that which is required for the first act. Whence also on this account it will be repugnant to find in God the reason of a natural form in entitative being. It will not, however, be repugnant to find in him the reason of an intelligible form.

56 All of which D. Thom. explained elegantly, 3. cont. Gent. cap. 51., where, speaking of the divine essence, he says as follows: Nevertheless it cannot be the form of another thing according to natural being. For it would follow that, being united at the same time with some one thing, it would constitute one nature, which cannot be. Since the divine essence is perfect in itself in its own nature, whereas an intelligible species united to the intellect does not constitute any nature, but perfects the intellect itself for understanding, which does not conflict with the perfection of the divine essence. See, therefore, how, according to the mind of the Saintly Doctor, the concept of a natural form is the concept of an imperfect form, and one having a being diminished, inasmuch as it is ordered to the constituting of some nature. The concept of an intelligible species, on the other hand, can be the concept of a total form, and one altogether perfect, inasmuch as it has only to perfect, and not to be perfected. And so it is not strange that the intelligible form is found in God, and not the reason of a natural form.

From this also that which was adduced concerning quantity falls. For although we grant that quantity is, in its own way and with respect to itself, how much, as well as by which, and as that which, about which our Complutensians can be seen in their Logic, disputat. 4. num. 40., nevertheless the disparity is still manifest. Because precisely because it is not an infinite form, it cannot be its being quantitative, that is, that which it gives to a substance. On the other hand, since the divine essence is an intelligible form, and the reason of this form can, as we were saying a moment ago, be altogether complete, indeed infinite, it can therefore contain through the form of a pure act all intelligibility, and consequently be also that intelligible being which it gives to the created intellect.

§ VII. An answer is made to the three previous grounds of the first opinion.

57 To the first point, then, in favour of the first opinion, it must be said that the chief causality of an intelligible species does not lie in the reason of a natural form, which intrinsically demands inherence, or information connoting imperfection. Rather, it lies in the reason of an intelligible form, which only demands to complete and determine, that is, to impart to the intellective power, that in intelligible being the object itself is. And which, if it be united precisely in intelligible being, does not demand inherence, or the imperfection of an intrinsic information in entitative and natural being, but rather actuality, and being form in the intelligible order, pure of all imperfection. And therefore it is not strange that the divine essence, which is united only in intelligible being, can perform this office. Let our Complutensians be consulted, in the book on the soul, disp. 18. quaest. 4. and 5.

58 To the second point, the minor must be denied. And to the argument it will be answered that, although the divine essence is not united by an intrinsic and natural information in entitative being with the created intellect, it is nevertheless intrinsically united under the form of an intelligible form, completing and determining it, and informing it intelligibly, that is, giving it that it have the divine essence united to it, insofar as it has the reason of an intelligible form. And so it is united to it, and precisely corresponds to a created intelligible species representing it as it is in itself, if this were possible, and consequently gives the created intellect that God should be truly in the intelligible order.

This union, however, taken most formally, and still according to that which it imports directly, is sufficient really to change the intellect in intelligible being. Because this mode of changing does not argue any imperfection in the divine essence, and that intelligible being truly is something real. Yet, granted that this holds, namely, that the aforesaid union is not sufficient under the aforesaid precision, taken strictly, to change the created intellect in natural and entitative being, since this mode of changing connotes imperfection, and in this order it is not united with IT. We have said, under the aforesaid precision, because, if it be considered according to those things which it connots, it is able to change that same intellect in entitative being, because it requires the light of glory, as the disposition of itself in intelligible being taken in that sense. Which, indeed, as we shall say immediately, is produced in the intellect from the force of the unitive action of the divine essence, and through it the intellect is really and intrinsically changed in physical and natural being.

59 To the first confirmation, the antecedent must be granted, and the consequence denied. And to the argument it must be said that it does not follow from this, that the divine essence constitutes the created intellect in its first act by completing it and determining the activity of it, elevated as it is by the light of glory, that the same essence is in potentiality to the second act, that is, to the beatific vision. Because it acts and completes, setting aside imperfections. Wherefore the intellect alone, bathed in the light of glory, which is otherwise completed, and is intelligibly actuated by the divine essence, as by an intelligible form, is in potentiality to the vision. Just as the divine subsistence and existence complete the humanity of our Lord Christ, both in the being of being, and in operative being, in as far as the actions are those of supposita. Nevertheless, the divine personality is not in potentiality to receive actions, or to be thereby perfected. Because it completes and determines through the form of a most pure act, and therefore without any imperfection.

To the second confirmation, the antecedent must be denied. And to the argument it must be said that the formal effect which the divine essence gives to the intellect involves something infinite and uncreated, because it imports the divine essence as it is its own intelligible being, and gives to the intellect, already elevated, that it be God intelligibly. Although it at the same time connotates the light of glory, as the disposition necessarily required for such a union. And therefore it is not strange that this effect begins in time. Because, although that intelligible form is eternal, it is nevertheless united temporally. Since it connotes things which are given in time, and not from eternity, as will be more fully explained immediately below.

60 To the third point, it will be answered, first, with Ferr., 3. cont. Gent. cap. 51. §. ad 3. dubium, by distinguishing the major. And if it be understood of something that is one per se in entitative and natural being, it must be denied. On the other hand, if it be understood of something that is one per se in the intelligible order, and resulting from the intellect and the divine essence, as being intimately united, it is so. And in the same way the minor must be distinguished. For, although nothing one per se results from the divine essence and the intellect elevated by the light of glory in entitative and natural being, it does indeed result in intelligible being. Because it follows from this that the created intellect has the reason of one whole principle in itself with respect to the eliciting of the clear vision of God. Nor does the argument for the minor there adduced have force against this. For that from the intellect and the divine essence one accident does not become, or one substance, proves that one does not become from them in entitative being. It does not prove this in intelligible being. Because, as we were saying a moment ago, for this it is only necessary that a principle one per se of intellection should coalesce from them.

61 Secondly, and better, it will be answered with Cajetan, and with our Complutensians, in the book on the soul, disp. 18. quaest. 4. and 5., and with very many others of the disciples of D. Thom., that from the intellect and the intelligible species there does not result anything third, but that one extreme becomes the other, and so the intellect through the species becomes in a certain way, that is, in the intelligible order, the species itself, and moreover the object understood itself, considered in the same order. And in the way in which our Complutensians explain it in the place cited, and as we shall pursue more fully in the tractate on the knowledge of God, disp. 3. There also we shall dissolve all the objections that fight against this mode of speaking. From this there arose that common dictum taken from the Commentary on 3. de Anima text. 37., namely, that from the intellect and the thing understood there comes a greater unity than from matter and form. For matter does not become form, whereas the intellect in a certain way, that is, in intelligible being, becomes the object itself, as that which, and the intelligible species itself becomes, in the aforesaid order, the object itself, as that by which.

62 Whence, in answer to the argument for the minor, insofar as it can serve against this mode of speaking, it must be said that by this union and information in intelligible being the intellect bathed in the light of glory becomes the same, not indeed most formally, but identically through a certain identity, that is, in intelligible being, with the substance and essence of God, as it is the intelligible form, although not in entitative and natural being, because this union is not made with the divine essence according as it pertains to the entitative and natural order, but according as it is considered with respect to the intelligible order, or as it corresponds to a created intelligible species representing God as he is in himself, if this were possible, and were considered precisely in the intelligible order.

We have said, that by this union and information in intelligible being the intellect bathed in the light of glory becomes the same, not indeed most formally, but identically, etc., with the essence of God, as it is the intelligible form, in order to signify, first, that this identity is not so great as to be incompatible with a formal or virtual distinction in itself, and moreover with a real distinction, not indeed actual, but potential, as our Complutensians explain in the place cited. And secondly, that one extreme is not converted into the other, that is, does not lose its own and most formal reason, even though it is identified with the other. Just as, although an action and a passion, according to the probable opinion of many, are really and actually identified with each other, and are only virtually distinguished, nevertheless neither of them on that account has lost its own most formal reason.

Now, although it be granted that this identity in intelligible being is possible between the intellect and the species, nevertheless, after all things have been weighed, and speaking absolutely and simply, will the union of matter and substantial form be greater and more intimate than that of the species with the intellect? And likewise, will the personal union of the Word with the humanity of our Lord Christ be greater and more intimate than the union of the divine essence with the created intellect? This will be clear from what is to be said in the tractate on the knowledge of God, disp. 2. num. 102.

63 To the confirmation, the minor must be denied. And to the argument it must be said that the action by which the light of glory is infused is also a union of the divine essence under the form of an intelligible species. For an action which reaches the last disposition towards some form is extended so as to reach that form itself, with respect to which such a disposition is, when that action proceeds from an agent containing the whole perfection of both. And so such an action is subordinated not to that form in any way whatever, but as containing the whole of that perfection. And therefore an action reaching the last disposition towards the form of fire also reaches that form, as subordinated to the fire generating it.

Wherefore, since the light of glory holds itself under the form of the last disposition towards the reception, or as it were the reception, of the divine essence under the form of an intelligible form, as we shall show in art. 5., it follows that the infusion of it is also a union of that same essence. And consequently, that the divine essence remaining united with the created intellect will come about as it were through a natural emanation, in that proportional manner in which, the last disposition towards fire being posited, the form of fire results, as our Complutensians show, 2. Phys. disp. 10. num. 67., and thereafter.

Nor does the argument adduced there concerning the light of faith have force against this. Because this light does not hold itself under the form of the last disposition towards the acquiring of natural species, which serve for the act of faith. On the other hand, the light of glory does so with respect to the reception of the divine essence under the form of an intelligible form. Whence, in the will to infuse the light of glory, the will to unite the aforesaid essence is contained. Because such a will is freely required necessarily, on account of the eminence of this form for this union and communication, since, being an infinitely perfect form, it is not necessarily communicated even under the form of a form ad extra, but dependently on the free will of God. Just as for the same reason it cannot be communicated freely, but necessarily, ad intra. Otherwise it is just as it occurs in the divine subsistence, which also, by the form of a terminus, cannot fail to be necessarily communicated ad intra on account of its most eminent perfection, nor can it terminate created nature ad extra except freely, or by connoting the aforesaid free act of God.

§ VIII. An objection is made to the last ground of the first opinion, and to its first confirmation.

64 To the last point of the same opinion, because it expounds a longer discourse, it must be met point by point, granting the solution assigned there insofar as it denies that the union and information of the species in entitative being is indispensably required. And to the first objection, it will be answered that, although other essences, or intelligible species, cannot be united with a created intellect purely in intelligible being without there also being mixed in a union in entitative being, and although the divine essence also cannot be united with its divine intellect without there also being present a union in entitative and natural being, nevertheless the same essence of God, according as it has the reason of an intelligible species, will be able to be united purely in intelligible being with the created intellect.

65 The reason for the disparity, however, will be established by traversing in its own order the intelligible species which are set forth in this objection. For in the first place, if we speak of the divine essence as compared under the form of an intelligible species with its own intellect, it is compared with it as with an intellect which is the most pure act. Yet precisely because it is such, it cannot be distinguished from the intelligible species through which it understands, namely from the divine essence, whether this be considered in entitative and natural being, or in intelligible being. And therefore they must be united, according to both reasons, by an intimate and strictest union, namely by identity. Otherwise such an intellect would not be a pure act. Indeed, such an identity must be not just any identity, but complete, excluding any still virtual distinction between the aforesaid intellect and the essence of God.

Also, because, since the divine intellect is a pure act within its own line, it demands to identify without any virtual distinction all those things which pertain to its own line. And therefore, just as in this way it identifies its own intellection with itself, because these pertain to its own line, so also it identifies the divine essence, both according as it has the reason of essence and of nature, according to which reason it pertains to the entitative order, and according as it has the reason of an intelligible species. Because all these things pertain to the same line, as will be established more fully from those things which we shall say in the tractate on the knowledge of God, disp. 3. num. 17., and in the tractate on the will of God, disp. 2. num. 34. Also, because in the divine essence entitative and intelligible being is not yet virtually distinguished. And so, since it has the highest adequation and commensuration with its own intellect, as with its own first, so to speak, perfectible intellect, it cannot be united by complete identity according to that former reason unless it be also united according to this latter reason, which is distinct only on the part of our mode of conceiving.

Wherefore, since these things do not hold in the created intellect of the blessed, as is clear from itself, it follows that, from the divine essence and the intellect of God being compared with each other, neither can it be inferred that, just as between them there intervenes a union both in entitative being and in intelligible being, so also there is one between the divine essence and the created intellect of the blessed.

66 Furthermore, if we speak of the essence of an Angel, according as it has the reason of an intelligible species with respect to its proper intellect, then they are therefore united in natural and entitative being, or, which amounts to the same for the present, under the form of subject and property. Because the essence of an Angel is an intelligible form that is finite and limited. And by reason of this it is so compressed that it cannot be united under the form of an intelligible form except with its own proper intellect. And likewise its subsistence, because it is finite, is so commensurated and compressed to its nature that it cannot terminate another. And therefore it is necessary that the intellect with which the aforesaid Angelic essence is united be its own intellect, and therefore be united with it under the form of subject and property, or under the form of nature and root for understanding, and of proximate power for the same intellection. Because the intellect of an Angel, just like any other vital power, cannot have such a reason unless it be united with its own proper nature, from which it emanates, as our Complutensian College noted in the books of the Physics, disp. 10. num. 66.

Wherefore, since this reason has no place in the divine essence compared with the created intellect of the blessed, because, as is clear from itself, it is itself a certain infinite intelligible form, and the aforesaid intellect does not hold itself under the form of property with respect to the divine essence, and consequently is not rooted in it as a property and proximate vital power is in its nature and radical principle of life, it follows that, from the union in natural and entitative being, which must necessarily be mixed into the union of the Angelic essence under the form of an intelligible species with its own intellect, it cannot be inferred that the same is to be said of the divine essence compared under the form of an intelligible species with the intellect of the blessed. Rather, on the contrary, because the aforesaid essence has the reason of an infinite intelligible form, it will be able to be extended to act intelligibly upon any created intellect. Just as, because the divine subsistence in the reason of a terminus of nature is infinite, it is able to be extended to terminate created nature. And then, because the aforesaid created intellect is not compared with the divine essence under the form of a property emanating from it, and the essence itself cannot have the reason of a natural form in entitative being by reason of its own infinitude, therefore it will not be able to be united in this way, but only purely intelligibly, with the aforesaid intellect.

67 By these things also it is established with respect to another argument adduced in this objection, concerning the other intelligible species, which are accidents. For these, precisely because they are such, their intelligible being must be identified with their natural and entitative being, which is an accident. And consequently they must inhere in the intellect and be united with it in natural and entitative being, as with their subject. This reason, as is established, cannot have place in an infinite intelligible species, such as the divine essence is. Since this must be free from all imperfections, and consequently from inherence, which essentially connotes imperfection.

Add, that from this example of intelligible species which are accidents a not unimportant argument can be derived to urge the possibility of the union of the divine essence under the form of an intelligible form, even though no other union in entitative and natural being be mixed in there. For since those species are united in entitative and natural being, because they must inhere under the form of the entitative being of an accident which they possess, it follows that, if God were to supply supernaturally this inherence, as occurs in the accidents of the Eucharist, then it would be very probable that the aforesaid species could be united under the form of a pure intelligible form, without being united actually and formally in entitative being. Even if according to this being they should have to be non-distinct from the intellect to which they would be united intelligibly, and could not be freed from that which it is to be unifiable according to the aforesaid entitative being. Much more, therefore, will the divine essence be able to be united precisely in intelligible being.

68 To the first confirmation, it will be answered by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. And to the argument it must be said that, in order that the divine essence may be able to be united under the form of an intelligible species, and according as it pertains to the intelligible order, but not according as it pertains to the entitative and natural order, it is not necessary that these two reasons be virtually distinguished in the essence itself. Rather, it is enough that the divine essence, with this complete identity which excludes the aforesaid distinction, be the most eminent form, performing by reason of this eminence the office of entitative and natural being, and the office of intelligible being, which in creatures are distinguished either really or virtually.

For just as this eminence is sufficient for this, that it be able to be united with the created intellect of the blessed under the form of an intelligible species, and not under the form of an intellection, although these two are not yet virtually distinguished in the divine essence, as will be clear from what is to be said in the tractate on the knowledge of God, disputat. 3. num. 17., and in the treatise on the will of God, disput. 2, num. 34. And likewise, this same eminence is enough for this, that the same essence be united with the humanity of our Lord Christ under the form of an existence, but not under the form of nature and essence, as we shall say in the treatise on the Incarnation, although the reason of nature and of existence are not distinguished in God by a virtual distinction, as will be clear from those things which will be said in the aforesaid tractate on the knowledge of God, disput. 4. dubio 2. So likewise in the present case, proportion being preserved, one must philosophize. And the reason is the same in all of these. Because neither the humanity of our Lord Christ nor the created intellect is capable of union with the divine essence according as it has the reason of nature, or of intellection. Nor can the divine essence have the reason of a natural form in entitative being.

69 Although you inquire how this eminence and the faculty of exercising several things, no less than if they were several, can cohere in the divine essence with a complete identity, and with the exclusion even of a virtual distinction. Since, indeed, the divine essence and the relation are not virtually distinguished for any other reason than because that same formality exercises its own proper things, several no less than if they were several in act.

To this it must be said that, for a formal and even virtual distinction of one formality from another, it is not enough to exercise the proper things of several things in any way whatever. For from this alone it is inferred that there is an eminence of one and the same, so to speak, most formal reason. But over and above this, it is necessary to exercise the proper things of several things which pertain to distinct lines, and not of those which look to one and the same line. And the reason is that then the proper things of several are exercised as of several. And so from such an exercise a plurality, at least a virtual one, is inferred in the agent. On the other hand, when the proper things of several are exercised which pertain to one and the same line, they are not exercised as of several, but as of those which are one, that is, insofar as they pertain to one and the same line. And therefore in God the essence and the relation are virtually distinguished, because the absolute and the relative look of their own nature to distinct lines. On the other hand, the intellection and the intellect are not, because the line of the intellect in its purity reaches as far as the second act inclusively.

70 Whence, because the line of entitative and natural being, if it be considered in its purity, reaches as far as intelligible being also, because entitative and natural being in its purity is the most immaterial being, and under the form of a most pure act, and this very thing imports intelligible being, therefore, from the fact that the divine essence exercises with respect to God the offices of entitative and intelligible being, which in material things are distinct, a virtual distinction of several formalities does not follow. Rather, it follows that the same formality altogether is the most eminent, and that without that distinction it possesses those things which in others are distinct, and that, since it is one, it exercises distinct offices pertaining to the same line.

§ IX. An answer is made to the two later confirmations of that same last argument.

71 To the second confirmation of that same last argument, it is clear from what was said in num. 61. how the union of the intellect with the intelligible species is in a certain way greater and more intimate than the union of matter and substantial form. For although a third thing results from these by composition, yet matter does not itself become form, as has already been hinted. On the other hand, the intellect, namely, and the intelligible species are in a certain way, that is, in intelligible being, identified. And therefore the intellect becomes identically, though not most formally, the object itself, precisely because it is united with it. But let those things be seen which will be said in the treatise on the knowledge of God, disput. 2. num. 66 and 95, and thereafter.

72 To the third confirmation, some answer by granting the consequence and denying the minor. And to the first argument they deny the antecedent, because the divine essence can be united both under the form of an agent intimately influxing, for the effect of preservation, and also under the form of an intelligible form which is intimately influxed into the intellect as it is bathed in the light of glory. And consequently this latter union, taken formally, will be supernatural. On the other hand, the former will not. From this, to the second argument, they say that the divine essence before the light of glory is united with the intellect under the form of an agent operating intimately in it and preserving its natural entity. Yet not under the form of an intelligible form. And so it is not formally influxed into the intellect, according as it has the reason of the aforesaid form, but materially, and in the being of the agent conserving it.

From this also, to the last objection, they answer that just as visible species are received in a mirror in entitative and qualitative being, and not formally in visible being, because the mirror does not have visual power, and the aforesaid species are only receivable in visible being in visual potency, so the divine essence under the form of an intelligible form is only quasi-receivable in the divine intellect, or in what pertains to the divine order, and consequently in the intellect as elevated by the light of glory. Because the intellect, so elevated, alone has that it be the intellective of God as he is in himself. Whence in an intellect that is not elevated it is only materially, and not as an intelligible form, but under the form of an intimate agent, with which otherwise the reason of an intelligible form is conjoined.

73 Yet this solution does not please. For although the Divine Thomas teaches, quaest. 28. de veritate art. 2. ad octavum, that the union of the divine essence through an intimate influx is more intimate than the union of other created things through information or inherence, on the ground that, as the Saintly Doctor teaches there, that which is united through an intimate influx is within the substance of the thing, whereas that which is united through information, so to speak, surrounds that with which the union is made. Nevertheless, such a union, taken most formally, is not a union of a form with an informed thing, but a union of an intimate agent with its effect, from whom whatever is in it, however intimate, is caused in such a way that the aforesaid agent is present to it only in as far as it causes its whole intimate essence. And therefore, although the divine essence is intimately influxed into any creature, and into its most intimate natural entity, it is not on that account in it in the way in which a form is in an informable thing, but in the way in which an agent is present to its effect, or in the way in which that which is immense demands to be in all things.

74 Wherefore a better and clearer solution of this argument is established from what has been often said, namely, that although for the union of the divine essence under the form of an intelligible form with a created intellect it is required that the same essence, on the part of the thing conceived, be non-distinct from the intellect as elevated by the light of glory, by its own proper non-distinction, which consists in an intimate influx, yet this union does not formally consist in the aforesaid non-distinction. Rather, the divine essence, according as it has the reason of an intelligible form, is united with that same intellect by another union, and therefore it itself informs the aforesaid intellect by an intelligible information. Yet in such a way that at the same time it is form and information in this order. Also because it is an extreme capable of union, and an intelligible form under the form of a pure act. And therefore it is the union of itself. Also because this union and information is most formal in the intelligible order, and consequently it is of such a condition that through it the informed thing and the informing form are in a certain way, that is, in intelligible being, and in the way explained in the treatise on the knowledge of God, identified. And for this reason too, no intermediate mode of union, distinct from the nature of the thing, is required between the essence and the intellect bathed in the light of glory, by which they may remain united. Because such a union is exercised precisely within the intelligible order, and not within the entitative and natural order.

75 We have said that for the union of the divine essence under the form of an intelligible form it is required that the same essence, on the part of the thing conceived, be non-distinct from the intellect as elevated by the light of glory, by a non-distinction consisting in an intimate influx. Because, although this is proper to that same essence, so that it cannot itself be formally united with the created intellect unless it first produce the light of glory in it, and therefore unless it be non-distinct from that same intellect, in as far as it is so elevated by the proper non-distinction of the aforesaid essence, that is, by an entitum¹ influx. Nevertheless, it is not necessary that the same essence, insofar as it expresses the reason of an intelligible species, should cause the light of glory effectively. Yet, because the divine essence, insofar as by the form of the first root it causes it, and insofar as it expresses the reason of an intelligible form, is distinguished only on the part of our mode of conceiving, and not virtually, that is, on the part of the thing conceived, therefore the same essence on the part of the thing conceived must first be non-distinct through an intimate influx, and then be united under the form of an intelligible form. Whence, according to these things, those things which we said above in num. 37. must be understood.

§ X. The ground of the second opinion is dissolved.

76 Finally, to the ground of the second opinion, to its last part, it will be answered by denying the antecedent, as is clear from what has been said. The consequence, however, must be denied. The reason for the disparity is clear from those things which we have already said. Because the divine essence, which concurs under the form of the male, also has in the intelligible order the reason of form, as has been shown, and therefore it must concur in both ways, which is what we say also of the other intelligible species. On the other hand, that which concurs under the form of the male in natural generation, and is distinct from intentional generation, does not hold itself under the form of a natural form with respect to the female. And therefore it does not concur under the form of a form, and in the genus of a formal cause. Wherefore, if there is any analogy between generation or the intentional birth, understood by attribution, and that which is purely natural, of which we have spoken elsewhere, it will be only as regards the reason of effecting, and not as regards the mode of causing in the genus of a formal cause. Because this influx is not found in purely natural generation on the part of the male with respect to the female.