Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

1 All the things that must be said below concerning the similarity required for the clear vision of God depend on the understanding of the mind of St. Thomas about it. Therefore, in the first place, we shall examine the mind of the Holy Doctor, so that this entire difficulty may thus be dispatched from its roots and more completely.

But so that the title of the difficulty may be grasped more fully, it should be noted that we are not speaking here of similarity that is called such in a wholly general sense, namely, insofar as the general represents its cause to any effect whatever. For it is certain among theologians that both the intellectual light of our intellect (in the manner, however, indicated above) and the light of glory are required for the vision of God, and that both are produced by God and are a similarity to him insofar as any effect represents its cause according to the formal reason of cause. This is what St. Thomas teaches here, also in conclusion 1. We are speaking, therefore, only of similarity representing the object insofar as it is the object.

Since, however, this similarity could be threefold—namely, imprinted, or the intelligible species; expressed, or the word of the intellect; and finally objective, insofar as it is an object, which is distinguished from the word as some other known object through which the intellect is led toward knowledge of God through his essence—the title of the difficulty accordingly asks whether any one of these similarities, provided it is created, is to be admitted according to the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor.

§ I. Two opinions are proposed.

2 The first opinion holds that the Angelic Doctor admits an imprinted species, created for the clear vision of God, and that this is the light of glory; but that he denies expressed similarity, and even objective similarity. Thus Vazquez, in the present disp. 39, ch. 1.

It is proved first with regard to its first part. For in the present article St. Doctor expressly says that to see God's essence, some similarity on the part of the power of sight is required, namely, the light of divine glory, which strengthens the intellect to see God. Therefore, such light will be an intelligible species. The consequence is evident. For by the very fact that it is a similarity to God and renders the intellect efficacious toward the clear vision, it must fecundate and determine the intellect toward that vision. These things, however, are required and suffice for the reason of an intelligible species. Therefore, etc.

3 It can be confirmed from 1, in the same Holy Doctor, Quodl. 7, art. 1, where he says as follows: The divine essence itself is entirely intelligible light. Hence the light of glory descending from it into the intellect makes, with respect to the divine essence, in the intellect what it makes with respect to other intelligible things that are not light, but only the species of a thing understood together with light. Just as if sensible light existed by itself, its own light would suffice for its vision, perfecting the eye without any similarity.

It is confirmed from the same article in the answer to the second objection. For when the Holy Doctor had objected to himself that a created intellect cannot see God immediately, but only through some similarity, on the ground that the divine essence cannot by itself inform the intellect and make it actual, he replies: It must be said that the created intellect becomes actual for the vision of the divine essence through the light of glory, and this suffices.

4 Next, with regard to the last part, namely, to both expressed and objective similarity, it is shown as follows. For St. Thomas expressly denies in this article a similarity that holds on the part of the thing seen, as is clear from the context. Yet each of these similarities is a similarity holding on the part of the thing seen. Therefore, both are denied by him. The minor is evident. For just as a similarity on the part of the power seems to be only a quomodo, not an ipsum quod, like the power itself, so a similarity on the part of the thing seen ought to seem to be the ipsum quod, like the thing seen itself, and at the same time the reason of seeing the object. This belongs both to objective similarity, as is evident from itself, and to expressed similarity, which St. Thomas, in the fourth book of Contra Gentiles, ch. 11, calls the understood intention and at the same time the reason of seeing. Therefore, etc.

It is confirmed. Because the arguments made by St. Thomas in the present article clearly prove this. For it is certain that a thing cannot first be seen in another thing already seen, as in a medium, according to its quiddity and as it is in itself, unless the whole entity and reason of the former be in the latter. Therefore, God cannot be seen as he is in himself through a created expressed species, or through any other previously seen object. For both are of an inferior order and reason than God himself.

5 Finally, because in his argument, but against it, St. Thomas rejects a similarity to the vision of God that makes knowledge enigmatic. Yet to see God through a similarity previously known makes knowledge enigmatic, but not to see him through a similarity that merely concurs as the quomodo and as the mode of an intelligible species. Therefore, etc. The minor, with respect to the last part, is clear from itself. With respect to 1, however, it is also evident. For he removes from it its being the immediate vision of God. It will therefore be a vision through something created, as through a mirror and an enigma, since this imperfectly and consequently obscurely represents divine perfection.

6 The second opinion holds that the Angelic Doctor denies imprinted and objective similarity, but on the contrary admits expressed similarity, or the word. Thus Ferrarius, 1 Contra Gentiles, ch. 53; and he holds that it is probable in the way of St. Thomas, as Sylvester teaches in the established question 12, art. 2; Canariensis, 1 part., q. 27, art. 1, disp. 5; Ledesma, De perfectione Dei, q. 8, art. 6, conclusion 1; and Capreolus in 1, d. 27, q. 2, arts. 2 and 3, and in 4, d. 49, q. 5, where he says that the Holy Doctor inclines more toward this position; which Hericeus also affirms, 1 part., tract. 4, disp. 42, ch. 5, no. 33.

This opinion will be clear with respect to the first part from what will be said shortly. With respect to the second part, however, it is proved as follows. For the Angelic Doctor says as follows below, q. 27, art. 1: Whenever anyone understands from the very fact of his understanding that something proceeds within himself—that is, the conception of an understood thing, arising from the power of the intellect and proceeding from its knowledge—this conception is indeed signified by the voice and is called the word of the heart. The same is taught in q. 9 De potentia, art. 5; 4 Contra Gentiles, ch. 11; and q. 4 De veritate, art. 2, where he teaches generally that a word is produced in every intellection.

7 Hericeus proves this same point finally. For with respect to every other knowledge, including that by which an angel beholds his own substance, St. Thomas admits a vital production of expressed similarity and of the word, as is clear from 4 Contra Gentiles, ch. 11. And he gives the reason, because in angels being and understanding are not the same. Therefore, since in the blessed there is no identity between their being and seeing God, the word will be produced in them through the beatific vision.

Nor is the distinction satisfactory which recent Thomists establish between an angel and God, on the ground that God is pure act in the highest degree of immateriality and intellectuality, whereas an angel is not. For the opposite follows from this. First, the substance of an angel is in the same degree of immateriality and intellectuality by comparison with the intuition of itself, in which even proportionally God is by comparison with created vision. Therefore, just as an angel requires an expressed species produced for the vision of itself, so God requires it in order to terminate created vision. Second, they do not explain what the highest degree of immateriality possessed by the divine essence contributes to the effect that a word not be produced through a vision of it.

§ II. The mind of the Angelic Doctor is opened.

8 Nevertheless, it must be said first that St. Thomas denies this threefold created similarity, namely, imprinted, expressed, and objective. Thus Caietanus, Báñez, Nazarius, González, and Zumel in the present work, the last of whom says that very many of St. Thomas's disciples hold this; Navarrete, Controvers. 34; Ripa in this article and q. 27, art. 1, ch. 2; Alvarez, 3 part., disp. 43, nota 3, and disp. 61, no. 10; Javellus in the present work; Soncinus in his Optio on Capreolus in 1, d. 27, q. 2 ¹; and many other recent disciples of the Holy Doctor; and finally Ledesma, De perfectione Dei q. 8, arts. 5 and 6, who, speaking of the expressed species, says that the opinion denying it is more common among Thomists, although, as we have already indicated, in the same place he adds that the opinion admitting the aforesaid expressed species is highly probable according to the way of St. Thomas.

9 It is proved first. For St. Thomas teaches generally in the second conclusion of the article that there is no similarity on the part of the thing seen with respect to the clear vision of God. Yet all these similarities hold on the part of the thing seen. Therefore, all are rejected by him. The minor is evident. Because they are all ordered to supply the concurrence that had to be furnished on the part of the object. Therefore, all hold on its part, as supplying the place of that object.

10 It makes no difference that Vazquez says that the imprinted species holds on the part of the power insofar as it is in it and determines it. This, therefore, makes no difference. For it is wrongly inferred from the inherence of the imprinted species in the power that it does not hold on the part of the thing seen. The expressed species, however, inheres in the power and is its offspring, and nevertheless holds on the part of the thing seen, because it is ordered to supply the concurrence that had to be furnished on the part of the object. Likewise, the fact that the imprinted species determines the intellect toward vision does not indicate that it does not hold on the part of the object. For it is proper to the object to determine the power toward its own cognition. Accordingly, the power will not be complete on every side and determined toward the vision of God until it is determined by God himself, who has the reason of an object. Because it does not concur except as determined both on its own part and on the part of the object; indeed, unless in some way it passes into the object itself and is identical with it, as we shall state below. Hence, because the object, as such, determines through the intelligible species, the species likewise, insofar as it determines, holds on the part of that same object.

It is confirmed first. Because all the arguments by which St. Doctor proves that no created similarity can exist on the part of the thing seen with respect to the clear vision of God prove not only that such similarity cannot be objective, as is evident from itself, but also that it can be neither imprinted nor expressed, as will be clear from what follows when we examine these arguments. Hence, immediately after them he concludes generally that to say that God is seen through created similarity is to say that the divine essence is not seen.

It is confirmed second. For in De veritate, q. 8, art. 1, he excludes every similarity on the part of the object, saying: No similarity of the divine essence can have any agreement with the divine essence except analogically, and therefore a cognition that would be through such a similarity would not be a cognition of God himself through his essence, but would be much more imperfect than if the substance were known through a similarity of an accident.

11 The assertion is proved second. For the same Holy Doctor says as follows in 4, d. 49, q. 2, arts. 1–15: A threefold medium is found in corporeal and intellectual vision. The first is the medium under which, as light. The second is the medium by which, and this is the visible form, by which the power is determined toward a special object, as by the form of a stone for knowing a stone. The third is the medium in which the thing is seen, and this is that through whose inspection sight is led to another thing, as by looking into a mirror sight is led to an image. In the vision of the fatherland, therefore, there will be no third medium, nor a second medium, but only the first. Thus, as one sees, St. Doctor denies with respect to the clear vision of God both the medium in which, namely, objective and already known similarity, as the ipsum quod, and the medium by which, namely, the visible form by which the power is determined toward a special object. Consequently, he denies both imprinted and expressed similarity. For through either of them the intellect is determined toward a special object: through the imprinted species, indeed, as through that by which the object moves the power; but through the expressed species, as through that by which the same object is constituted as the object actually terminating the intellection, as will be clear from what follows.

12 The twofold solution offered by Vazquez does not weaken the force of this testimony. The first is that St. Thomas retracted this opinion in the first part and elsewhere. The second, however, is that when the Holy Doctor denies the second and third medium, he is speaking only of the expressed species and objective similarity.

For the first is contradicted by the fact that the Angelic Teacher never taught elsewhere in express words that an imprinted species exists with respect to the clear vision of God. Indeed, his position was perpetual, both in denying every created similarity holding on the part of the thing seen and in admitting that God has the mode of a species with respect to his own vision. Therefore, there is no reason to think that he retracted elsewhere an opinion that he had taught in the aforesaid testimony. The consequence is evident. For this would have been necessary in order that he should have taught elsewhere in express words the directly opposite, which could admit no probable interpretation. Since, therefore, not only did he not do so, but he even taught the same point generally elsewhere, there is no reason to think that he retracted the opinion.

13 Moreover, if what he teaches here from the fourth book of the Sentences is understood soundly and as it should be, it is rather an explanation of what he asserted in the Summa Theologiae and in the questions disputed afterward. For he enumerates all similarities that hold on the part of the object and seemed able to concur toward the vision of God, and denies that they furnish the concurrence for the aforesaid vision. Yet in almost all other places he taught generally, without always enumerating the aforesaid similarities.

The second solution is likewise contradicted. First, because when St. Thomas denies concurrence toward the vision of God through the second medium, namely, the visible form, he is speaking of that form which determines the power toward vision. Therefore, since the imprinted and expressed species determine it in this way, it follows that both are denied by the Holy Doctor. Second, because the second medium would now be confused with the third among those rejected by St. Thomas, since the second would also concur as the quomodo, and consequently would coincide with the third. For in the opinion that Vazquez attributes to St. Thomas, the expressed species has an influence through the mode of the medium quod, leading to the knowledge of the object.

14 Nor is the evasion of any weight which this author employs of any importance, namely, that the expressed species concurs as an internal medium quod, whereas the third medium does not. It is therefore of no importance. For, as is clear from the context, St. Thomas intends merely to distinguish these three media according to whether they are the medium under which, the medium by which, and finally the medium quod. Therefore, whether the two later media remain or do not remain within the intellect is immaterial to the distinction intended. Hence, when an angel knows God abstractively through its angelic essence, as through a known thing, this threefold medium is then found there, and nevertheless all those media remain within the angel. Therefore, etc.

15 Thirdly, the assertion is proved principally. For in this article St. Thomas denies every created similarity with respect to the vision of God apart from the light of glory. Yet light is not one of the similarities mentioned. Therefore, he denies all of them. The major seems to follow from the text. The minor, however, is common among theologians with respect to expressed and objective similarity to such an extent that no one denies them. With respect to imprinted similarity, it is shown as follows. Imprinted similarity is formal similarity of the object, as is clear from what St. Thomas teaches in the first part, q. 85, art. 2. The light of glory, however, represents God only virtually and according to a wholly general reason, namely, as an effect. Therefore, St. Thomas equates its representation and similarity to God with the similarity of the light of nature to God. That light, as is clear, is a similarity of God in this sense alone.

16 It is confirmed. For, as St. Thomas teaches in the present article and art. 5, the light of glory has the reason of an operative power on the part of the potency. Therefore, he says that it is necessary in order that the intellect become able to understand, in the manner in which a power becomes more able to operate through a habit. Just as corporeal light is likewise necessary in external sight insofar as it makes a medium transparent in act, so that it can be moved by a color. Therefore, such light cannot have the reason of an intelligible species with respect to the clear vision of God. Therefore, neither can it have the reason of expressed or objective similarity. This final consequence is sufficiently established for the present. The first, however, is also evident. For an intelligible species presupposes the power of understanding required on the part of the power and the disposition necessary for it to be changed by an object. For the union of the intelligible species with the intellect, taken formally, occurs not in esse entitativum but in esse intelligibile. An object, however, cannot intelligibly be united except to a power disposed for such union and possessing the power of understanding. Hence, the intelligible species in formal species-being is not united to a mirror, but in entitative being, because on its own part it has no power of understanding.

Moreover, as St. Thomas teaches in the same place, the light of glory does not give power to the potency in just any way, but elevates it to the clear vision of God. Therefore, it cannot have the reason of an intelligible species, because this does not elevate the power to understanding. Since, as we were just saying, it presupposes on the part of the power all the power required on its own part with respect to receiving such a species and understanding together with it.

17 It must be said second that, although St. Thomas denied those three similarities, he rejected imprinted similarity, or the imprinted species, above all. Thus very many disciples of St. Thomas, as González reports in the present work. The assertion is proved. For the Angelic Doctor rejected above all that similarity, or union of the power with the thing seen, which is necessarily required even in every vision, including that of the bodily eye. Therefore, of those three similarities, he rejected above all the similarity, or imprinted species.

The consequence is evident. For the other similarities are not necessarily required for every vision. Therefore, without objective similarity in a reflecting mirror, the object can be seen by the bodily eye, as also without expressed similarity. For the external senses do not form for themselves a word, or expressed species, as St. Thomas teaches in Quodl. 5, art. 9, ad 2, in these words: The external sense itself does not form for itself any sensible form; the imaginative power does this, and its form is in some way like the word of the intellect. Hence for this reason too, in the place cited from the fourth book of Sententiarum St. Doctor did not say that that threefold medium is found in every corporeal and intellectual vision, but only that it is found in corporeal and intellectual vision. Nor did he assert that all those media are required for every vision; he intended only that they can be found in corporeal vision, that is, in a sensation of any sense, and also in several intellections.

18 The antecedent, and therefore also the first argument of the principal enthymeme, is confirmed. For, in order to show what he principally intended, St. Doctor assumes this universal principle: that every vision, including that of the bodily eye, requires both the power of sight and the union of sight with the thing seen. Applying this general doctrine to the present case, he says that of these two, what is required for the clear vision of God is the first, namely, the power of sight, and consequently the light of glory, which strengthens the intellect; but that no created similarity is required through which the union of the thing seen with sight is effected. Therefore, he was speaking above all of that similarity, or union, which is generally required for every vision, including that of the bodily eye. Hence it is also clear how rightly, after St. Thomas had concluded and shown that an imprinted species created to represent God as he is in himself could not be admitted, he immediately concluded generally that no similarity apart from the light of glory is to be admitted. For the arguments he made concerning all the similarities already mentioned establish the intention, as we shall show below.

§ III. The arguments of both opinions are answered.

19 To the first argument, therefore, in favor of the first opinion, it should be answered that the light of glory is only a determination holding on the part of the power, and therefore a determination is required on the part of the object which, for the present, is effected through the divine essence, since it has the reason of an intelligible species, because both determinations are required for such a vision. Therefore, although an angelic intellect, for example that of Gabriel, is naturally determined to the essence of Gabriel himself, whom it must always know, and although prophetic light can be naturally determined to one object alone, as St. Thomas teaches in 2a 2ae, q. 173, art. 2, it nevertheless requires, for the aforesaid reason, a determination coming from the object, or from an intelligible species in its place. But this will be explained more fully in art. 5, dub. 1.

20 It should be answered to the first confirmation that it is sufficiently clear from the testimonies we have adduced from St. Doctor how, according to his own mind, a created intelligible species cannot exist with respect to the vision of God. Therefore, with respect to the testimony cited in this confirmation, it must be said that the divine essence, insofar as it has the reason of an intelligible species, can be considered without being placed in the number with the light of glory, because of the necessary connection explained below in art. 5, which it has with the light, no less than the angelic intellect (proportion being preserved) can also be conceived as not being placed in the number with the essence of the angel, which it necessarily involves. For by the very fact that it is such, it involves having united to itself the aforesaid essence as an intelligible species. Therefore, just as, considering the divine essence and the light not according to the manner in which they are thus connected, but according to the manner in which they are distinct, it could be said of the light of glory that it affords what light affords in us, and an intelligible species in us, so, attending to those things insofar as they are connected in the aforesaid manner, and insofar as by reason of this connection they can be considered as not being placed in the number, it can also be said absolutely that the light of glory affords what the species and the light together afford in us. For this is understood to be said of the light together with what necessarily accompanies it, and not as placing it in the number with those things by reason of the aforesaid connection. And so the light, together with the essence insofar as it has the reason of an intelligible species, affords in a proportionate manner, with respect to that same essence as the known object, what in us is afforded by the species of a material thing and the light of the intellect. For the essence has with respect to itself the reason of a species, because, as St. Thomas says, it is entirely intelligible light itself; and the light of glory gives the intellect efficacy required on the part of that same intellect.

21 Therefore, just as if light existing by itself were given, a species distinct from it would not be required, as many (concerning which elsewhere) probably think, but it would suffice for another light to be derived from it into sight, inhering in sight, and for that light existing by itself to be united in the reason of a species to vision; so in the present case, proportion being preserved, this same thing is required, and only the created imprinted species is excluded, not the uncreated one. For the latter is necessarily connected with the light of glory, as will be explained below in art. 5.

22 To the second confirmation it should be said that St. Thomas intends only that, among what is necessarily required through the mode of things inhering in the intellect and informing it with an admixture of imperfections, nothing else ought to be admitted with respect to vision apart from the light. For the inherence of this light suffices. Thus the argument proposed there by St. Thomas is answered. For the essence, insofar as it has the reason of a species, is not among those required through the mode of something inhering. Therefore, the same divine essence can be a species and can determine the power through the mode of a species, even though it does not inhere in it.

It is not necessary to answer the other arguments of this opinion, because they support us rather than oppose us, although Vazquez admits something there which does not cohere with the doctrine of St. Thomas, as will be clear from what follows.

23 To the foundations of the second opinion it should be answered that St. Doctor is speaking of all intellections of the natural order, however perfect they may be, such as when angels understand themselves through their own essence. For in these a word is always present, as will be explained below. This interpretation accords with the context. For there St. Doctor does not intend to adduce an argument efficacious in itself to prove that a word exists in divine things, since this cannot be demonstrated from natural reason. Rather, he merely brings forward an agreement with what occurs in all natural cognitions, by which the intellect is led, faith being presupposed, toward assent to the aforesaid truth, namely, the generation of the divine Word. For this purpose, it suffices that a word is always found in every natural cognition, because the argument for agreement is drawn more fittingly from that (being better known), than from other intellections known only by the light of faith, such as supernatural intellections. Hence, since St. Thomas brings forward several other agreements by which other mysteries of faith are declared and, the same faith being presupposed, are somehow urged, he uses examples of natural, but not supernatural things. For these also require faith for their certain knowledge, and thus his meaning cannot be effectively gathered from those places in 1 Contra Gentiles and q. 4 De veritate, that a word must be formed in every created intellection. His meaning, as given by St. Thomas, is only that it is universally true that a word must be formed in every intellection of the natural order.

24 It can also be added (so that a tacit objection is thereby met) that from the fact that the blessed do not form a word, it cannot be argued that a word is not generated in divine things. For the beatific vision is not a participation in the notional intellection of the Father, as it is notional (as will be clear from what follows), but in the essential divine intellection, insofar as it is such. But the essential intellection, precisely insofar as it is such, produces no Word; otherwise the Son and the Holy Spirit would produce it, but rather the intellection insofar as it is notional. Therefore, the Word is produced by the Father alone, in whom alone notional intellection, or dictio, is found.

What was drawn from Hericeus in the last place will be clear from what we shall say in the last difficulty of this disputation.