Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

Because a vision is had through an assimilation (though indeed in a manner to be explained below), the Angelic Doctor, having in the preceding article shown that the created intellect can see God, immediately proceeds to treat of the likeness through which it will see him. And although for the aforesaid vision there is required both a likeness on the part of the power, namely the light of glory, and a likeness on the part of the object, nevertheless, since the Angelic Doctor treats of the first of these likenesses more expressly in the following article, article 4, we shall accordingly in this disputation treat principally of the second; although we shall also touch somewhat upon the first, so that we may lay open the mind of the Most Holy Doctor as regards those things which he teaches in this article.

1 All the things that must be said below concerning the similarity required for the clear vision of God depend on the understanding of the mind of St. Thomas about it. Therefore, in the first place, we shall examine the mind of the Holy Doctor, so that this entire difficulty may thus be dispatched from its roots and more completely.

But so that the title of the difficulty may be grasped more fully, it should be noted that we are not speaking here of similarity that is called such in a wholly general sense, namely, insofar as the general represents its cause to any effect whatever. For it is certain among theologians that both the intellectual light of our intellect (in the manner, however, indicated above) and the light of glory are required for the vision of God, and that both are produced by God and are a similarity to him insofar as any effect represents its cause according to the formal reason of cause. This is what St. Thomas teaches here, also in conclusion 1. We are speaking, therefore, only of similarity representing the object insofar as it is the object.

Since, however, this similarity could be threefold—namely, imprinted, or the intelligible species; expressed, or the word of the intellect; and finally objective, insofar as it is an object, which is distinguished from the word as some other known object through which the intellect is led toward knowledge of God through his essence—the title of the difficulty accordingly asks whether any one of these similarities, provided it is created, is to be admitted according to the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor.

§ I. Two opinions are proposed.

2 The first opinion holds that the Angelic Doctor admits an imprinted species, created for the clear vision of God, and that this is the light of glory; but that he denies expressed similarity, and even objective similarity. Thus Vazquez, in the present disp. 39, ch. 1.

It is proved first with regard to its first part. For in the present article St. Doctor expressly says that to see God's essence, some similarity on the part of the power of sight is required, namely, the light of divine glory, which strengthens the intellect to see God. Therefore, such light will be an intelligible species. The consequence is evident. For by the very fact that it is a similarity to God and renders the intellect efficacious toward the clear vision, it must fecundate and determine the intellect toward that vision. These things, however, are required and suffice for the reason of an intelligible species. Therefore, etc.

3 It can be confirmed from 1, in the same Holy Doctor, Quodl. 7, art. 1, where he says as follows: The divine essence itself is entirely intelligible light. Hence the light of glory descending from it into the intellect makes, with respect to the divine essence, in the intellect what it makes with respect to other intelligible things that are not light, but only the species of a thing understood together with light. Just as if sensible light existed by itself, its own light would suffice for its vision, perfecting the eye without any similarity.

It is confirmed from the same article in the answer to the second objection. For when the Holy Doctor had objected to himself that a created intellect cannot see God immediately, but only through some similarity, on the ground that the divine essence cannot by itself inform the intellect and make it actual, he replies: It must be said that the created intellect becomes actual for the vision of the divine essence through the light of glory, and this suffices.

4 Next, with regard to the last part, namely, to both expressed and objective similarity, it is shown as follows. For St. Thomas expressly denies in this article a similarity that holds on the part of the thing seen, as is clear from the context. Yet each of these similarities is a similarity holding on the part of the thing seen. Therefore, both are denied by him. The minor is evident. For just as a similarity on the part of the power seems to be only a quomodo, not an ipsum quod, like the power itself, so a similarity on the part of the thing seen ought to seem to be the ipsum quod, like the thing seen itself, and at the same time the reason of seeing the object. This belongs both to objective similarity, as is evident from itself, and to expressed similarity, which St. Thomas, in the fourth book of Contra Gentiles, ch. 11, calls the understood intention and at the same time the reason of seeing. Therefore, etc.

It is confirmed. Because the arguments made by St. Thomas in the present article clearly prove this. For it is certain that a thing cannot first be seen in another thing already seen, as in a medium, according to its quiddity and as it is in itself, unless the whole entity and reason of the former be in the latter. Therefore, God cannot be seen as he is in himself through a created expressed species, or through any other previously seen object. For both are of an inferior order and reason than God himself.

5 Finally, because in his argument, but against it, St. Thomas rejects a similarity to the vision of God that makes knowledge enigmatic. Yet to see God through a similarity previously known makes knowledge enigmatic, but not to see him through a similarity that merely concurs as the quomodo and as the mode of an intelligible species. Therefore, etc. The minor, with respect to the last part, is clear from itself. With respect to 1, however, it is also evident. For he removes from it its being the immediate vision of God. It will therefore be a vision through something created, as through a mirror and an enigma, since this imperfectly and consequently obscurely represents divine perfection.

6 The second opinion holds that the Angelic Doctor denies imprinted and objective similarity, but on the contrary admits expressed similarity, or the word. Thus Ferrarius, 1 Contra Gentiles, ch. 53; and he holds that it is probable in the way of St. Thomas, as Sylvester teaches in the established question 12, art. 2; Canariensis, 1 part., q. 27, art. 1, disp. 5; Ledesma, De perfectione Dei, q. 8, art. 6, conclusion 1; and Capreolus in 1, d. 27, q. 2, arts. 2 and 3, and in 4, d. 49, q. 5, where he says that the Holy Doctor inclines more toward this position; which Hericeus also affirms, 1 part., tract. 4, disp. 42, ch. 5, no. 33.

This opinion will be clear with respect to the first part from what will be said shortly. With respect to the second part, however, it is proved as follows. For the Angelic Doctor says as follows below, q. 27, art. 1: Whenever anyone understands from the very fact of his understanding that something proceeds within himself—that is, the conception of an understood thing, arising from the power of the intellect and proceeding from its knowledge—this conception is indeed signified by the voice and is called the word of the heart. The same is taught in q. 9 De potentia, art. 5; 4 Contra Gentiles, ch. 11; and q. 4 De veritate, art. 2, where he teaches generally that a word is produced in every intellection.

7 Hericeus proves this same point finally. For with respect to every other knowledge, including that by which an angel beholds his own substance, St. Thomas admits a vital production of expressed similarity and of the word, as is clear from 4 Contra Gentiles, ch. 11. And he gives the reason, because in angels being and understanding are not the same. Therefore, since in the blessed there is no identity between their being and seeing God, the word will be produced in them through the beatific vision.

Nor is the distinction satisfactory which recent Thomists establish between an angel and God, on the ground that God is pure act in the highest degree of immateriality and intellectuality, whereas an angel is not. For the opposite follows from this. First, the substance of an angel is in the same degree of immateriality and intellectuality by comparison with the intuition of itself, in which even proportionally God is by comparison with created vision. Therefore, just as an angel requires an expressed species produced for the vision of itself, so God requires it in order to terminate created vision. Second, they do not explain what the highest degree of immateriality possessed by the divine essence contributes to the effect that a word not be produced through a vision of it.

§ II. The mind of the Angelic Doctor is opened.

8 Nevertheless, it must be said first that St. Thomas denies this threefold created similarity, namely, imprinted, expressed, and objective. Thus Caietanus, Báñez, Nazarius, González, and Zumel in the present work, the last of whom says that very many of St. Thomas's disciples hold this; Navarrete, Controvers. 34; Ripa in this article and q. 27, art. 1, ch. 2; Alvarez, 3 part., disp. 43, nota 3, and disp. 61, no. 10; Javellus in the present work; Soncinus in his Optio on Capreolus in 1, d. 27, q. 2 ¹; and many other recent disciples of the Holy Doctor; and finally Ledesma, De perfectione Dei q. 8, arts. 5 and 6, who, speaking of the expressed species, says that the opinion denying it is more common among Thomists, although, as we have already indicated, in the same place he adds that the opinion admitting the aforesaid expressed species is highly probable according to the way of St. Thomas.

9 It is proved first. For St. Thomas teaches generally in the second conclusion of the article that there is no similarity on the part of the thing seen with respect to the clear vision of God. Yet all these similarities hold on the part of the thing seen. Therefore, all are rejected by him. The minor is evident. Because they are all ordered to supply the concurrence that had to be furnished on the part of the object. Therefore, all hold on its part, as supplying the place of that object.

10 It makes no difference that Vazquez says that the imprinted species holds on the part of the power insofar as it is in it and determines it. This, therefore, makes no difference. For it is wrongly inferred from the inherence of the imprinted species in the power that it does not hold on the part of the thing seen. The expressed species, however, inheres in the power and is its offspring, and nevertheless holds on the part of the thing seen, because it is ordered to supply the concurrence that had to be furnished on the part of the object. Likewise, the fact that the imprinted species determines the intellect toward vision does not indicate that it does not hold on the part of the object. For it is proper to the object to determine the power toward its own cognition. Accordingly, the power will not be complete on every side and determined toward the vision of God until it is determined by God himself, who has the reason of an object. Because it does not concur except as determined both on its own part and on the part of the object; indeed, unless in some way it passes into the object itself and is identical with it, as we shall state below. Hence, because the object, as such, determines through the intelligible species, the species likewise, insofar as it determines, holds on the part of that same object.

It is confirmed first. Because all the arguments by which St. Doctor proves that no created similarity can exist on the part of the thing seen with respect to the clear vision of God prove not only that such similarity cannot be objective, as is evident from itself, but also that it can be neither imprinted nor expressed, as will be clear from what follows when we examine these arguments. Hence, immediately after them he concludes generally that to say that God is seen through created similarity is to say that the divine essence is not seen.

It is confirmed second. For in De veritate, q. 8, art. 1, he excludes every similarity on the part of the object, saying: No similarity of the divine essence can have any agreement with the divine essence except analogically, and therefore a cognition that would be through such a similarity would not be a cognition of God himself through his essence, but would be much more imperfect than if the substance were known through a similarity of an accident.

11 The assertion is proved second. For the same Holy Doctor says as follows in 4, d. 49, q. 2, arts. 1–15: A threefold medium is found in corporeal and intellectual vision. The first is the medium under which, as light. The second is the medium by which, and this is the visible form, by which the power is determined toward a special object, as by the form of a stone for knowing a stone. The third is the medium in which the thing is seen, and this is that through whose inspection sight is led to another thing, as by looking into a mirror sight is led to an image. In the vision of the fatherland, therefore, there will be no third medium, nor a second medium, but only the first. Thus, as one sees, St. Doctor denies with respect to the clear vision of God both the medium in which, namely, objective and already known similarity, as the ipsum quod, and the medium by which, namely, the visible form by which the power is determined toward a special object. Consequently, he denies both imprinted and expressed similarity. For through either of them the intellect is determined toward a special object: through the imprinted species, indeed, as through that by which the object moves the power; but through the expressed species, as through that by which the same object is constituted as the object actually terminating the intellection, as will be clear from what follows.

12 The twofold solution offered by Vazquez does not weaken the force of this testimony. The first is that St. Thomas retracted this opinion in the first part and elsewhere. The second, however, is that when the Holy Doctor denies the second and third medium, he is speaking only of the expressed species and objective similarity.

For the first is contradicted by the fact that the Angelic Teacher never taught elsewhere in express words that an imprinted species exists with respect to the clear vision of God. Indeed, his position was perpetual, both in denying every created similarity holding on the part of the thing seen and in admitting that God has the mode of a species with respect to his own vision. Therefore, there is no reason to think that he retracted elsewhere an opinion that he had taught in the aforesaid testimony. The consequence is evident. For this would have been necessary in order that he should have taught elsewhere in express words the directly opposite, which could admit no probable interpretation. Since, therefore, not only did he not do so, but he even taught the same point generally elsewhere, there is no reason to think that he retracted the opinion.

13 Moreover, if what he teaches here from the fourth book of the Sentences is understood soundly and as it should be, it is rather an explanation of what he asserted in the Summa Theologiae and in the questions disputed afterward. For he enumerates all similarities that hold on the part of the object and seemed able to concur toward the vision of God, and denies that they furnish the concurrence for the aforesaid vision. Yet in almost all other places he taught generally, without always enumerating the aforesaid similarities.

The second solution is likewise contradicted. First, because when St. Thomas denies concurrence toward the vision of God through the second medium, namely, the visible form, he is speaking of that form which determines the power toward vision. Therefore, since the imprinted and expressed species determine it in this way, it follows that both are denied by the Holy Doctor. Second, because the second medium would now be confused with the third among those rejected by St. Thomas, since the second would also concur as the quomodo, and consequently would coincide with the third. For in the opinion that Vazquez attributes to St. Thomas, the expressed species has an influence through the mode of the medium quod, leading to the knowledge of the object.

14 Nor is the evasion of any weight which this author employs of any importance, namely, that the expressed species concurs as an internal medium quod, whereas the third medium does not. It is therefore of no importance. For, as is clear from the context, St. Thomas intends merely to distinguish these three media according to whether they are the medium under which, the medium by which, and finally the medium quod. Therefore, whether the two later media remain or do not remain within the intellect is immaterial to the distinction intended. Hence, when an angel knows God abstractively through its angelic essence, as through a known thing, this threefold medium is then found there, and nevertheless all those media remain within the angel. Therefore, etc.

15 Thirdly, the assertion is proved principally. For in this article St. Thomas denies every created similarity with respect to the vision of God apart from the light of glory. Yet light is not one of the similarities mentioned. Therefore, he denies all of them. The major seems to follow from the text. The minor, however, is common among theologians with respect to expressed and objective similarity to such an extent that no one denies them. With respect to imprinted similarity, it is shown as follows. Imprinted similarity is formal similarity of the object, as is clear from what St. Thomas teaches in the first part, q. 85, art. 2. The light of glory, however, represents God only virtually and according to a wholly general reason, namely, as an effect. Therefore, St. Thomas equates its representation and similarity to God with the similarity of the light of nature to God. That light, as is clear, is a similarity of God in this sense alone.

16 It is confirmed. For, as St. Thomas teaches in the present article and art. 5, the light of glory has the reason of an operative power on the part of the potency. Therefore, he says that it is necessary in order that the intellect become able to understand, in the manner in which a power becomes more able to operate through a habit. Just as corporeal light is likewise necessary in external sight insofar as it makes a medium transparent in act, so that it can be moved by a color. Therefore, such light cannot have the reason of an intelligible species with respect to the clear vision of God. Therefore, neither can it have the reason of expressed or objective similarity. This final consequence is sufficiently established for the present. The first, however, is also evident. For an intelligible species presupposes the power of understanding required on the part of the power and the disposition necessary for it to be changed by an object. For the union of the intelligible species with the intellect, taken formally, occurs not in esse entitativum but in esse intelligibile. An object, however, cannot intelligibly be united except to a power disposed for such union and possessing the power of understanding. Hence, the intelligible species in formal species-being is not united to a mirror, but in entitative being, because on its own part it has no power of understanding.

Moreover, as St. Thomas teaches in the same place, the light of glory does not give power to the potency in just any way, but elevates it to the clear vision of God. Therefore, it cannot have the reason of an intelligible species, because this does not elevate the power to understanding. Since, as we were just saying, it presupposes on the part of the power all the power required on its own part with respect to receiving such a species and understanding together with it.

17 It must be said second that, although St. Thomas denied those three similarities, he rejected imprinted similarity, or the imprinted species, above all. Thus very many disciples of St. Thomas, as González reports in the present work. The assertion is proved. For the Angelic Doctor rejected above all that similarity, or union of the power with the thing seen, which is necessarily required even in every vision, including that of the bodily eye. Therefore, of those three similarities, he rejected above all the similarity, or imprinted species.

The consequence is evident. For the other similarities are not necessarily required for every vision. Therefore, without objective similarity in a reflecting mirror, the object can be seen by the bodily eye, as also without expressed similarity. For the external senses do not form for themselves a word, or expressed species, as St. Thomas teaches in Quodl. 5, art. 9, ad 2, in these words: The external sense itself does not form for itself any sensible form; the imaginative power does this, and its form is in some way like the word of the intellect. Hence for this reason too, in the place cited from the fourth book of Sententiarum St. Doctor did not say that that threefold medium is found in every corporeal and intellectual vision, but only that it is found in corporeal and intellectual vision. Nor did he assert that all those media are required for every vision; he intended only that they can be found in corporeal vision, that is, in a sensation of any sense, and also in several intellections.

18 The antecedent, and therefore also the first argument of the principal enthymeme, is confirmed. For, in order to show what he principally intended, St. Doctor assumes this universal principle: that every vision, including that of the bodily eye, requires both the power of sight and the union of sight with the thing seen. Applying this general doctrine to the present case, he says that of these two, what is required for the clear vision of God is the first, namely, the power of sight, and consequently the light of glory, which strengthens the intellect; but that no created similarity is required through which the union of the thing seen with sight is effected. Therefore, he was speaking above all of that similarity, or union, which is generally required for every vision, including that of the bodily eye. Hence it is also clear how rightly, after St. Thomas had concluded and shown that an imprinted species created to represent God as he is in himself could not be admitted, he immediately concluded generally that no similarity apart from the light of glory is to be admitted. For the arguments he made concerning all the similarities already mentioned establish the intention, as we shall show below.

§ III. The arguments of both opinions are answered.

19 To the first argument, therefore, in favor of the first opinion, it should be answered that the light of glory is only a determination holding on the part of the power, and therefore a determination is required on the part of the object which, for the present, is effected through the divine essence, since it has the reason of an intelligible species, because both determinations are required for such a vision. Therefore, although an angelic intellect, for example that of Gabriel, is naturally determined to the essence of Gabriel himself, whom it must always know, and although prophetic light can be naturally determined to one object alone, as St. Thomas teaches in 2a 2ae, q. 173, art. 2, it nevertheless requires, for the aforesaid reason, a determination coming from the object, or from an intelligible species in its place. But this will be explained more fully in art. 5, dub. 1.

20 It should be answered to the first confirmation that it is sufficiently clear from the testimonies we have adduced from St. Doctor how, according to his own mind, a created intelligible species cannot exist with respect to the vision of God. Therefore, with respect to the testimony cited in this confirmation, it must be said that the divine essence, insofar as it has the reason of an intelligible species, can be considered without being placed in the number with the light of glory, because of the necessary connection explained below in art. 5, which it has with the light, no less than the angelic intellect (proportion being preserved) can also be conceived as not being placed in the number with the essence of the angel, which it necessarily involves. For by the very fact that it is such, it involves having united to itself the aforesaid essence as an intelligible species. Therefore, just as, considering the divine essence and the light not according to the manner in which they are thus connected, but according to the manner in which they are distinct, it could be said of the light of glory that it affords what light affords in us, and an intelligible species in us, so, attending to those things insofar as they are connected in the aforesaid manner, and insofar as by reason of this connection they can be considered as not being placed in the number, it can also be said absolutely that the light of glory affords what the species and the light together afford in us. For this is understood to be said of the light together with what necessarily accompanies it, and not as placing it in the number with those things by reason of the aforesaid connection. And so the light, together with the essence insofar as it has the reason of an intelligible species, affords in a proportionate manner, with respect to that same essence as the known object, what in us is afforded by the species of a material thing and the light of the intellect. For the essence has with respect to itself the reason of a species, because, as St. Thomas says, it is entirely intelligible light itself; and the light of glory gives the intellect efficacy required on the part of that same intellect.

21 Therefore, just as if light existing by itself were given, a species distinct from it would not be required, as many (concerning which elsewhere) probably think, but it would suffice for another light to be derived from it into sight, inhering in sight, and for that light existing by itself to be united in the reason of a species to vision; so in the present case, proportion being preserved, this same thing is required, and only the created imprinted species is excluded, not the uncreated one. For the latter is necessarily connected with the light of glory, as will be explained below in art. 5.

22 To the second confirmation it should be said that St. Thomas intends only that, among what is necessarily required through the mode of things inhering in the intellect and informing it with an admixture of imperfections, nothing else ought to be admitted with respect to vision apart from the light. For the inherence of this light suffices. Thus the argument proposed there by St. Thomas is answered. For the essence, insofar as it has the reason of a species, is not among those required through the mode of something inhering. Therefore, the same divine essence can be a species and can determine the power through the mode of a species, even though it does not inhere in it.

It is not necessary to answer the other arguments of this opinion, because they support us rather than oppose us, although Vazquez admits something there which does not cohere with the doctrine of St. Thomas, as will be clear from what follows.

23 To the foundations of the second opinion it should be answered that St. Doctor is speaking of all intellections of the natural order, however perfect they may be, such as when angels understand themselves through their own essence. For in these a word is always present, as will be explained below. This interpretation accords with the context. For there St. Doctor does not intend to adduce an argument efficacious in itself to prove that a word exists in divine things, since this cannot be demonstrated from natural reason. Rather, he merely brings forward an agreement with what occurs in all natural cognitions, by which the intellect is led, faith being presupposed, toward assent to the aforesaid truth, namely, the generation of the divine Word. For this purpose, it suffices that a word is always found in every natural cognition, because the argument for agreement is drawn more fittingly from that (being better known), than from other intellections known only by the light of faith, such as supernatural intellections. Hence, since St. Thomas brings forward several other agreements by which other mysteries of faith are declared and, the same faith being presupposed, are somehow urged, he uses examples of natural, but not supernatural things. For these also require faith for their certain knowledge, and thus his meaning cannot be effectively gathered from those places in 1 Contra Gentiles and q. 4 De veritate, that a word must be formed in every created intellection. His meaning, as given by St. Thomas, is only that it is universally true that a word must be formed in every intellection of the natural order.

24 It can also be added (so that a tacit objection is thereby met) that from the fact that the blessed do not form a word, it cannot be argued that a word is not generated in divine things. For the beatific vision is not a participation in the notional intellection of the Father, as it is notional (as will be clear from what follows), but in the essential divine intellection, insofar as it is such. But the essential intellection, precisely insofar as it is such, produces no Word; otherwise the Son and the Holy Spirit would produce it, but rather the intellection insofar as it is notional. Therefore, the Word is produced by the Father alone, in whom alone notional intellection, or dictio, is found.

What was drawn from Hericeus in the last place will be clear from what we shall say in the last difficulty of this disputation.

After we have examined the view of D. Thom. and have seen in accordance with it that no created intelligible species is given in the order of the clear vision of God, and consequently that the divine essence is not united under the form of an intelligible species with the intellect of the blessed, we must say what is to be thought concerning this point, setting aside the authorities and the testimonies of D. Thom. and attending to the thing itself alone.

§ I. The first opinion is proposed.

25 The first opinion denies that God is united under the form of an intelligible species with the intellect of the blessed, and consequently affirms that in fact an intelligible species, impressed and created, is given in order for God to be seen through his essence. This is the opinion of Aureolus, as cited by Capreolus in 4. dist. 49. quaest. 5. artic. 2. and of Vazquez in the present disputation, disp. 43. cap. 6. Though led by a different principle, he cites in its favour Richard of St Victor, in 3. dist. 14. art. 1. quaest. 3.

It is proved, first. For the chief causality of an intelligible species lies in the genus of formal cause; but God cannot supply this genus of cause. Therefore neither can he be united with the intellect of the blessed under the form of an intelligible species, and consequently a created intelligible species must be given, through which the union is made. The minor, together with both consequences, is clear from itself. The major is also evident. For the principal function of an intelligible species is to determine the intellect and to impart a species to the intellection, to which it serves; but these two things belong to the genus of formal cause.

26 Secondly. The reason of an intelligible species is that it constitutes the intellect in its first act and gives it the power to act; but this cannot be supplied by the divine essence except through an intrinsic information. Therefore, since this is repugnant to it, it cannot be united under the form of an intelligible species. The major, as regards 1. part., is sufficiently clear. For the intellect, considered in itself and precisely taken, is pure potentiality in the intelligible genus, and is reduced to act through an intelligible species. As regards 2. vero part., however, it is clear from the first point. For since everything operates according to that which it is in act, it follows that if the species constitutes the intellect in act, it gives it the power to act and to understand. The minor is also clear. For if the divine essence is not intrinsically united, and therefore not through information, the intellect remains intrinsically as it was before, and consequently, just as it was not before intrinsically constituted in act, nor endowed with the power to act, so neither is it afterward.

27 It is confirmed, first, that the divine essence cannot be present under the form of potentiality with respect to the beatific vision. Therefore it cannot constitute the intellect in its first act either. The antecedent is evident, for such a potentiality conflicts with the infinite actuality of the essence of God. The consequence is also clear, because the first act is in potentiality to the second act and is perfected through it.

It is confirmed, secondly, because the divine essence cannot of itself produce any formal effect upon the intellect of the blessed. Therefore it can neither constitute it in its first act, and consequently neither can it be united with it under the form of an intelligible species. This last consequence is clear from what has been said. The first point, however, is also clear, because nothing can constitute another in act without giving it some formal effect. The antecedent, however, is proved. For that effect cannot be purely uncreated, since it begins in time; nor purely created, because it involves the divine essence as the form from which it proceeds; nor mixed of created and uncreated, because that created being, in order to be mixed with it, would have to be something substantial, since substantial being cannot be given to the intellect, it being an accident; nor yet something accidental, otherwise there would be given some accident mediating between the divine essence and the intellect, on account of which God would be seen clearly, and so would be seen and not seen immediately, as will be clear from what has been said above and will be said below. Therefore, and so on.

28 Thirdly. From the union of an intelligible species with the intellect there must result something one per se; but from the divine essence and the intellect of the blessed there cannot result this one thing. Therefore the divine essence will not be able to be united with it under the form of an intelligible species. The consequence is sufficiently obvious. The minor, however, seems open to view. For from the divine essence and the intellect there cannot coalesce one substance or one accident, as is clear from itself. Therefore, and so on. The major is also clear. For from pure potentiality in one order, and from the actuality of that same order, there cannot fail to result something one per se, as may be seen in matter and substantial form. Therefore, since the intellect is pure potentiality in the intelligible order, and the impressed species is the proper actuality of that order, it will follow that the two must coalesce into something one per se.

29 It is confirmed. For if the divine essence were united under the form of a species with a created intellect, and something resulted from the two, it could not fail to come about through some new action; but this is repugnant. Therefore, and so on. The major is clear, because a new effect resulting from the union of several things must be produced through a new action, even if one of the extremes be uncreated, as is established in the mystery of the Incarnation.

The minor is also evident, because this action cannot be a productive action of the intellect, since that is of an inferior order, nor a productive action of the light of glory. For just as the production of the light of faith cannot be the production or the union of the intelligible species which are required for believing, so neither can the production of the light of glory be the productive action of the union of the divine essence, or of any third thing resulting from this union. Nor, finally, can it be any other action terminating in that whole conjunction. For in this conjunction there is found only the divine essence itself and its union with the intellect, and then the intellect with the light of glory. Yet no action can be found producing the divine essence, since that is of itself improducible, nor its union, because this union is not distinct from that same essence, in as far as the essence is an extreme capable of union through the form of a most pure act, and therefore is itself the thing unifiable and the union with itself; nor, finally, can it produce the intellect or the light, in such a way that this action have a necessary connection with the other component of this conjunction, namely with the divine essence and its union, for the reasons we have just given. Therefore neither can any action terminating in the aforesaid conjunction be given, since no action produces any whole, or conjunction, unless it produce whatever is in it, or something with which all the other things are necessarily connected.

30 Fourthly. An intelligible species must be received in the intellect; but God cannot be received in it. Therefore neither can he be united with it under the form of the aforesaid species. The consequence is evident. The major is clear, because an intelligible species has the form of form with respect to a created intellect; but a form must be received in that of which it is the form. The minor is also clear, both because the divine essence is the total form and subsists in itself, and therefore is repugnant to being received in another; and also because otherwise the same essence would be limited by the created intellect, since a form received in a subject is terminated and limited by that subject, as our Complutensians show from D. Thom. in 3. Phys. disp. de infinito.

31 Nor will it suffice to say that, although a natural form must be received, inhere, or intrinsically inform that of which it is the form, the intelligible form is different, as appears in the essence of an Angel, which is an intelligible form with respect to its proper intellect, yet does not inhere in it or intrinsically inform it. Whence it accrues to a species, or intelligible form, that it is either substance or accident, and it is enough for it to declare its union in intelligible being with the intellect, apart from imperfections, and therefore without inherence and intrinsic information. And so, although God cannot be united under the form of a natural form with the intellect of the blessed, he can indeed be united under the form of an intelligible form.

Against this, however, is the fact that it is repugnant for anything to be united under the form of an intelligible form without there also being admitted at the same time its union in entitative and natural being. Therefore, if God cannot be united with the intellect of the blessed under the form of a natural form and in entitative being, he will likewise not be able to be united with it intelligibly. The consequence is evident. The antecedent, however, is proved inductively. For in the union of the divine essence under the form of an intelligible species with its intellect, a greater union in natural being is superadded, namely through complete identity; and in the intelligible union of the essence of an Angel with its proper intellect another natural union is mixed in, namely through the form of essence and property. Likewise, with the union in intelligible being of the other species of any created intellect there is mixed a union of the same by inherence and information, which accompanies the union in intelligible being.

It is confirmed, first, because the divine essence, insofar as it pertains to the entitative order, and the same insofar as it is considered with respect to the intelligible order, and has the reason of an intelligible species, is not yet virtually distinguished, but is altogether the same formality. Therefore it cannot be united with the created intellect of the blessed, according to that whereby it has the reason of an intelligible species, unless it be also united with the same according to that whereby it pertains to the entitative order, or under the form of a natural form and in entitative being. The antecedent will be established both from what is to be said in this same dubium, and also from those things which we shall assert in the tractate de scientia Dei, disp. 3. num. 17. and thereafter, and in the tractate de volunt. Dei disp. 2. num. 34. The consequence is also evident. For in order that the divine essence should be united with the intellect of the blessed according to one of those two reasons, and not according to the other, it was necessary that there should be another reason, at least virtually distinct. Therefore, precisely because entitative and natural being on the one part, and intelligible being, or the reason of an intelligible species, on the other, are not virtually distinguished, that is, not distinguished with foundation in the thing in the divine essence, it is necessary that it likewise be unable to be united with the intellect of the blessed in the reason of an intelligible species, and insofar as it pertains to the intelligible order, unless it be also united with the same according to that whereby it pertains to the entitative and natural order.

32 It is confirmed, secondly, because the union of the species in intelligible being is more intimate and greater than the union of matter with substantial form. Therefore it must be by identity, or at least by information and inherence, and consequently in entitative and natural being. The antecedent is established from that common axiom taken from Averroes, 3. de Anima text. 37., namely, that from the intellect and the thing understood there comes a greater unity than from matter and form. For where there is a greater unity coalescing from two things, there a greater and more intimate union must intervene, as is clear from itself. Therefore, and so on. The first consequence, however, is proved. For otherwise that union would be far less and in no way intimate, since it would be only by an extrinsic assistentia and by the non-distinction of one from the other, and consequently by an extrinsic union.

The second consequence, however, is sufficiently evident. For union by inherence and by information, excluding identity between the form and the informed thing, pertains to the entitative and natural order; whereas union by identity with a form in which intelligible being is really the same as entitative and natural being, as occurs here, is a union and an identification both in intelligible being and in entitative and natural being.

33 It is confirmed, thirdly, because if the union in intelligible being, precisely taken, did not demand at least inherence or information, there would follow from this that for the union of the divine essence with the intellect of the blessed under the form of an intelligible form, only a certain most intimate presence by an influx would be required. But this is plainly false. Therefore, and so on. The consequence is clear from the major itself. The minor is also evident, both because the union of the divine essence through mere influx is only in the being of nature and for the effect of preservation, so that it is not sufficient for a union in the supernatural order under the form of an intelligible species; and also because the divine essence cannot be united under the form of an intelligible species with the intellect of the blessed before the light of glory, as will be clear from what is to be said in art. 4 and 5. For if union by influx were sufficient, it would be united before the aforesaid light, because before its coming the influx of God is present in the intellect. And finally, because otherwise the divine essence would remain united to every intellect, even one not blessed, since it makes an intimate influx into every intellect whatever.

§ II. The second opinion is reported.

34 The second opinion in part agrees with the preceding one, and in part indeed differs from it. It agrees, to the extent that it denies that God is united under the form of an intelligible species with the intellect of the blessed, on the ground that to the reason of the aforesaid species inherence is indispensably required. It differs, however, because it denies that in fact another impressed and created species is given. For it believes that it is enough that the divine essence have a peculiar concurrence in the reason of the object together with the created intellect, co-effecting with it the clear vision of God, even though on account of the aforesaid defect it is not an intelligible species with respect to it. Thus Suarez, vol. 1 of the Summa Theologiae, lib. 2. cap. 12.

This opinion, as regards that in which it agrees with the preceding one, seems sufficiently established from the arguments adduced in its favour. As regards that which it adds in the second place, namely, that another created species is not given, this will be clear from what is to be said in support of our own opinion.

The last point, however, can be urged in the following way. For a sufficient reason cannot be given, why an influx other than this should be necessarily required for the intellection, unless it be that the object itself is non-distinct from the intellect and effects the intellection together with it. Therefore in that case an intelligible species will not be necessary, whether as standing in the place of the object, or as meaning that the object is united under the form of a species. The consequence is clear. For both of these require inherence, and that the intellect be constituted in its first act by a species or by the object. And so there will not be only an influx in the genus of a cause co-operating with the intellect in the intellection. The antecedent is also clear. For intellection is a certain intellectual birth, and the word has the reason of offspring in intelligible being, and therefore the object is compared to the intellection after the manner of the male, while the intellect bears itself like the female in parturition, according to that common dictum, namely: from the object and the power knowledge is brought forth. Therefore, just as in a natural birth so much alone is required, namely that the male co-effect together with the female, and not that it constitute her in her first act; and if the male could of itself achieve what it achieves by means of the seed, the seed would not be required, so likewise in an intentional birth. For since this one is of that kind by analogy with the former one, it will be enough to find in it those things which are required of themselves, and indispensably, for a natural birth.

§ III. The true opinion of the Angelic Doctor.

35 Nevertheless it must be said that the divine essence is in fact united under the form of an intelligible species with the intellect of the blessed, in the order of the clear vision of God. Thus the disciples of D. Thom. and almost all the theologians have followed the same Saintly Doctor, both in the places cited in the preceding dubium, and also in 3. cont. Gen. cap. 51., where he says: It is therefore clear that the divine essence can be compared to a created intellect as an intelligible species, because it understands. And in 3. part. quaest. 9. art. 3. ad 3., where he says: The divine essence is united to the blessed mind, as the intelligible to the understanding. And in this same quaestio, art. 5., in these words: But when any created intellect sees God through his essence, the divine essence itself becomes the intelligible form of the intellect. And although this assertion could be sufficiently established from the impossibility of an impressed and created species in the order of seeing God, which we shall show below in this same disputation from D. Thom. and from reasons drawn from him from dub. 4 up to 9.; nevertheless, from the fundamental reason, drawn from its own principles and from the same Saintly Doctor in this art. and in quaest. 56., as well as from other places already cited, it is shown as follows.

36 For whenever an object is intelligible in itself and proportioned to the intellect, and finally united with it, it does not need an intelligible species distinct from itself, but is united in the reason of a species by itself. But the divine essence is intelligible in itself, and proportioned to the intellect bathed in the light of glory, and finally intimately united with it. Therefore it does not need a species distinct from itself, but is united in the reason of an intelligible species by itself. The major is proved. For an intelligible species is given only on account of the defect of one of the three conditions enumerated in the object. Whence, since none of those is lacking to the essence of an Angel with respect to its proper intellect, it does not need a species distinct from itself, but the essence itself is united in the reason of a species in the order of the knowledge of itself.

The minor, as regards 1. part., is sufficiently clear. For since intelligibility arises from immateriality and from the actuality of the object, it follows that the divine essence, which is the most pure act and is most immaterial, inasmuch as it is its own being, without any potentiality at all, is also intelligible through its own essence, indeed most intelligible.

As regards 2. vero part., however, that is, as regards proportion, this is also evident. For the intellect illuminated with the light of glory becomes of the divine order. Whence, just as by this reason the intellect is made divine, so also between it and the divine essence, as the intelligible object, there is a sufficient proportion.

37 As regards the last part, however, it is proved. For precisely because the divine essence is intelligible in itself, and in the reason of an intelligible object proportioned to the intellect as bathed in the light of glory, it must be conferred with it under the form of a species and of an intelligible form, proportioned to it and unifiable with it. Therefore, precisely because it is non-distinct from it by its own and peculiar non-distinction of the divine essence, that is, by the most intimate influx into it, as it is bathed in the light of glory, it will be necessary that it be itself united with the intellect so taken by another union in intelligible being. This consequence is clear. For whatever extreme capable of union, which in the reason of such a thing is a pure act, has in that order, in which it is unifiable and a pure act, its own most actual union with the other extreme, precisely because it is non-distinct from it by its own non-distinction, and on the part of it all the requisites for such a union are present. But this will be treated again expressly in the tractate on the Incarnation, quaest. 1. art. 1., where we shall also show how well these things cohere with those which our Complutensian College teaches in 1. Phys. disp. 6. quaest. 2.

§ IV. Gabriel Vazquez's evasion, and how it is to be precluded.

38 In many ways do adversaries occur to this argument. For in the first place Vazquez answers that in it it is supposed that a special concurrence of the object in the being of the object is necessarily required for the vision, and thus that, whenever the object possesses the assigned conditions, it has in itself the reason of an intelligible species. Yet such a concurrence is not necessarily required for the vision. And therefore the divine essence only concurs under the form of a universal cause. And likewise the intellection by which an Angel knows himself is brought about only by the Angelic intellect, without any special concurrence of the essence itself in the reason of the object or of an intelligible species.

But against this. For (as is established by that common axiom of the theologians and philosophers) from the object and the power knowledge is brought forth. Therefore the object specifically influences the intellection. The consequence is clear. Both because for this reason D. Aug., lib. 9. de Trin., cap. 10. and lib. 14. cap. 17., says that the intellect is passive potentiality, whose active principle is the object. And D. Thom., below, quaest. 77. art. 3., says: The object is compared to the act of passive potentiality as the principle and the moving cause. And also because, since in intellection there intervenes a certain birth, or as it were a birth, it is necessary that the female be present there, namely the intellective power, and at the same time something which bears itself like the fecundating male, namely the object. Therefore, just as the intellect has a special concurrence, because it concurs under the form of the female, so also the object will have an influence through a special influx, and under the form of the active principle that fecundates and moves the power, in as far as it bears itself like the male.

39 Furthermore. Because a word produced of itself necessarily has to be assimilated to the object whenever it is produced through intellection. Therefore the object has a special concurrence with it under the form of the principle by which, and consequently with the intellection. The antecedent is obvious. For a word of itself necessarily has to be representative of the object. Therefore it will necessarily be like IT. Whence in divine things the Word, according to its formal reason, is an image and a likeness of the Father, and is assimilated to IT in that essence which is the object of the Father's knowledge, by which it is produced. The first consequence is also clear. Because a word is necessarily assimilated only to its formal principle by which, which produces it. Therefore, if from its formal reason it is necessarily assimilated to the object, it follows that it therefore has a special influx into it, namely under the form of the productive principle by which, or at least under the form of the formal principle determining it to its production.

40 It is confirmed. Because the object has a special concurrence with respect to volition, whether this be in the genus of an efficient cause, as several Thomists hold, or in the genus of a final cause. Therefore it will also have that concurrence with respect to intellection. The antecedent is clear from itself. The consequence is also evident. Because it is proper to the intellect to draw things intelligible to itself, as theologians and philosophers commonly admit, just as the will is borne towards things willed. Therefore, just as for this reason the willed object has a special influx with respect to volition, so also for that reason the known object, or the intelligible, will specifically concur in the intellection. Otherwise, to what end would the intellect draw things intelligible to itself, if it did not specifically need them, at least as a principle acting inwardly in the order of intellection?

It is confirmed, and is at last explained. For just as the willed object specifies the volition, so, on the testimony of Aristotle, 11. Metaphys., whom Cajetan cites below, quaest. 14. artic. 1., the known object is the specifying principle of cognition. Therefore it is specifically united with the intellect in the order of such a specification, and consequently in the reason of the object it will have a special influx with respect to it. This last consequence is clear. Both from what has been said thus far, because if it did not have a peculiar influx, its union would not be peculiarly required in the order of intellection. And also because the intellection, as an action, is specified by its proximate principle eliciting it, as our Complutensians noted in their Logic, in the chapter on action. And thus, if the object specifies it, as it is an action, it will already have a special influx of a proximate and active principle with respect to it. The first consequence is also clear. Because the known object cannot be the specifying principle of cognition unless, as united, it is one with the knower. Otherwise the knower would not have in itself a sufficient principle of its own operation, which is against the nature of a perfect agent, and one belonging to the highest order of agents, such as the knower itself is.

§ V. Francis Suarez's solution, and how it is to be overturned.

41 Secondly, Suarez occurs, maintaining that in fact no created species is given in the order of the intellection of any object whenever this possesses the conditions enumerated by us. Yet it is falsely supposed that such an object must be united under the form of an intelligible species. Because inherence, or information in entitative being, is indispensably required for this. Wherefore then the special concurrence of the object in the being of the object will suffice, and will be required, insofar as it co-effects the intellection together with the intellect, without there intervening there the reason of an intelligible species, whether created or uncreated.

42 Yet this solution fails in two points among others. The first is that inherence, or information in entitative being, or any other imperfection whatsoever is formally predicated of the essence of an intelligible species taken formally. Its falsity is shown as follows. For in God the most formal reason of an intelligible species is found. But nothing involving intrinsically inherence, or information in entitative being, or any other imperfection whatsoever, can be formally found in him. Therefore the reason of an intelligible species, taken of itself and formally, does not necessarily involve inherence or any other imperfection. The consequence, with the minor, is sufficiently established. For otherwise God would not be a most perfect being, and consequently he would not be God.

The major, however, seems open to view. Both because it is commonly taught by theologians when they say that the divine essence truly and formally has the reason of an intelligible species with respect to the production of the Word. And also because it is stated by D. Thom., 3. cont. Gent. cap. 51. de verit. quaest. 2. art. 2. 1. part. quaest. 14. art. 2., where he says that: In God, because there is nothing of potentiality, therefore in him the intellect and the intellection are the same, so that he does not lack an intelligible species: as our intellect when it understands is in potentiality: nor is the intelligible species other than the substance of the divine intellect, but the intelligible species itself is the intellect itself, and so he understands through himself.

43 It is confirmed, first, that the expressed species, namely the word, is a perfection absolutely simple, and does not necessarily involve the imperfection of inherence or any other whatsoever. Therefore neither does the impressed species. The antecedent is clear. For otherwise the reason of the word would not be formally found in divine things. The consequence is also evident, both from the parity of the reason, and because the impressed species is a principle by which, whether formal only or active with respect to the word. Therefore, if this does not necessarily include an imperfection, neither will the impressed species involve it. The consequence is clear. For otherwise the imperfection of the impressed species would shine forth in the word, since every imperfection of a productive or formal principle, necessarily involved by it, must shine forth in the thing produced.

It is confirmed, second, and at the same time it is explained how the divine essence can be united in the reason of a species without inherence. For an intelligible species does not impart the first and essential power of understanding, which is required on the part of the intellective power. But it only completes, on the part of the object, the aforesaid power, and that in a manner which will be explained more fully immediately below. Therefore, since the divine essence is its own intelligibility under the form of a pure act, and is a true intelligible form, it will be able to be united not only with the divine intellect, but also with a created intellect. The antecedent is commonly admitted by theologians. The consequence is proved. For from it we infer that the divine subsistence can be united under the form of a terminus, without any imperfection of inherence or of information, not only with the essence of God, but also with a created essence, because it has the true reason of a terminus, and is itself subsisting under the form of a pure act, and the reason of subsisting completes nature, but does not impart the first essential reason as holding to it on its own part. Therefore, since the reason of an intelligible species has precisely this, proportion being preserved, and the divine essence is its own intelligibility under the form of a pure act, it will be able, without any admixture of inherence or any other imperfection whatsoever, to be united under the form of a species both with the divine and with the created intellect.

44 It is confirmed, finally, and this very thing is explained at the root by the reasoning of D. Thom. in this art., in the solution to objection 3, and often elsewhere. For the divine essence of itself is a species, or an intelligible form, and over and above it is all its own being, both in the genus of being and in the genus of intelligible, because it is its own intelligibility. Therefore, just as it can itself be an intelligible form with respect to the divine intellect, so also it can, without inherence or the imperfections of information, constitute the created intellect under the form of an intelligible form in its first act for understanding. The antecedent is established from what has been said. The consequence is proved. Because the cause, for which a form which has the true reason of a form in the natural and entitative order cannot constitute in act a subject proportioned to itself except through a middle inherence or information connoting imperfection, is that it necessarily demands that it, insofar as it constitutes the subject in act, not be that being which it gives, and therefore, in order to give such a being, needs some formal causality which is inherence, or information connoting and supposing imperfection. Therefore, where the form can be that being which it constitutes in act and which it gives to the subject, as in the intelligible form that is most perfect, namely in the divine essence, it happens that it will not need the causality of inherence or of the information already mentioned in order to constitute it in act, but will be able to achieve this through the immediate union of itself without any connoting or supposing imperfection of inherence or information.

45 From this also it is clear that the second head contained in this solution is false, namely, that the object, or the divine essence, displays a special and active concurrence in the reason of the object in the order of the clear vision of God, and at the same time does not have the reason of an intelligible species. For these two things do not seem to cohere with each other, as the following argument sufficiently shows.

Because precisely because the object concurs effectively in the reason of the object towards the vision of God, it is necessary that it be in some way united with the intellect under the form of a single principle, not indeed according to natural being, but according to intelligible being. Yet the object thus united with the intellect itself determines, actuates, completes and perfects it in the order of the aforesaid vision. Therefore precisely by this it will have the reason of an intelligible species with respect to it. The consequence seems certain. For by the name of an intelligible species we understand nothing else than the object, or something else standing in its place, which concurs effectively together with the intellect towards the intellection, and which perfects, actuates, completes and determines it in the order of that intellection. The major, however, needs no proof, since it is clear from itself that, whenever the concurrence of two things in the second act is required for some operation, it is necessary that, just as they are united in the second act, so in the first act they should in some way be presupposed as united. Otherwise there would be given a whole second act without a whole and complete first act, which is plainly repugnant.

46 The minor, in which the difficulty seemed to lie, is shown as follows. Because the intellect, as long as it is united with the object, is in essential potentiality with respect to its intellection. And thus the natural light of our intellect in its first production is in pure potentiality in the intelligible order, because it is not united with any object. And likewise, if the natural light of the Angelic intellect were not united with one of its objects, or with the species of them, it would be in essential potentiality with respect to them. Therefore, precisely because the object is united under the form of an active principle, it will be compared to such a light under the form of an act, of complement, and of determination of that same light. The consequence is clear. Because precisely, without any other act, it draws that light out of essential potentiality. And thus there is involved there that it must necessarily be compared under the form of an act, of complement, and of determination with respect to it.

47 It is confirmed, and is explained by the reasoning of D. Thom., 3. con. Gent. cap. 51. and in 4. dist. 49. quaest. 2. art. 1., from the difference which intervenes between a created essence, for example that of an Angel, and the divine essence. For that which concurs actively and is a form in natural and entitative being can be united with any subject capable of constituting it in its first act. On the other hand, that which is composed of matter and form, as is clear from itself, cannot. Therefore that which is pure form in intelligible being, and consequently is intelligibility itself, and influences actively, will be able to be united with another under the form of a form constituting it in this order in its first act, and consequently under the form of an intelligible species. Therefore, since God, as the intelligible object, influences actively, and is intelligibility itself, and consequently pure form in the intelligible genus, he will be able in this way to be united with any intellect that is elevated and proportioned to him. On the other hand, the essence of an Angel, which is not intelligibility itself, but that which is intelligible, cannot. And thus, since it includes intelligibility, it can be to itself the reason of being understood, just as that which includes a natural form can be to itself the reason of existing and operating. Yet because it involves potentiality, and is not intelligibility itself under the form of a pure act and of pure form, but that which has it, it cannot be united under the form of an intelligible form with a foreign intellect. But these matters will be treated more fully in the solution to the last objection for the first opinion.

§ VI. A certain objection is dissolved, from whose solution many things said so far are elucidated.

48 But you will object. From the fact that the divine essence and its attributes are a form in natural and entitative being with respect to God, and at the same time are their own being in this order, and are absolutely simple perfections, it is correctly inferred that they can be united without inherence or information under the form of a natural form with God himself, but not with any created thing. Because by this very fact inherence, or the imperfection of information, is involved there. Otherwise a creature could be, for example, created wisdom uncreated. Therefore, although from the fact that the divine essence is an intelligible form and its own being in the intelligible order, and consequently that the reason of a species is an absolutely simple perfection, it is inferred that it can be united without the aforesaid imperfection under the form of such a form with the uncreated intellect, yet not with a created one, as seems sufficiently clear from the parity of the reason.

49 And you will confirm. Because from the fact that quantity is its being quantitative, and so that it is also extended in itself, it is not correctly inferred that it can constitute a substance without inherence in the reason of an extended thing. Rather, it is inferred only that it can be to itself the reason of having parts. Therefore, from the fact that the divine essence is its own intelligibility, it will be inferred only that it can constitute the divine intellect, with which it is identified, in its first act. On the other hand, this is not true of the created intellect, from which it is really distinguished.

50 It will be answered, first, that what has been gratuitously admitted in God under the form of a natural form, and in entitative being with respect to himself, is nevertheless not granted, because it involves the greatest imperfection, as we shall say immediately. Nevertheless, neither the divine essence nor any other attribute can be united under the form of a natural form with any created thing. It can, however, be united under the form of an intelligible form. Because the latter is limited according to its entity by that in which it is received, whereas this one is not. And therefore this does not inhere; that one, however, does, as we shall weigh more fully immediately below.

51 It will be answered, second, that although the divine essence is the most pure act, and subsists in itself in natural and entitative being, and at the same time has the reason of an intelligible form, yet, if we speak properly and in a strict sense, it is not, nor can be, of itself a natural form in entitative being. And so it cannot constitute a creature, for example a wise one, in being, because by this very fact it would have the reason of a natural form. Whence an Angel, because he is neither a natural form nor can be, cannot by displaying his own entity communicate to another that natural and radical power which he himself has in entitative and natural being within himself. On the contrary, the rational soul can do so precisely because it is a true natural form.

52 Why, then, the reason of a natural form is repugnant to the divine essence, but not the reason of an intelligible form, is sufficiently clear from D. Thom., 1. part. quaest. 8., and from the three reasons, which are sufficiently efficacious, that can be seen there in the same place. Moreover, it can be declared according to the doctrine of the same Saintly Doctor, from the difference which intervenes between a natural form and an intelligible form. For a natural form is limited and terminated by the subject in which it is received, as the Angelic Doctor showed above, quaest. 7., and as our Complutensians do in the same place, 3. Phys. disp. 18. quaest. 2. On the other hand, an intelligible form is not.

The reason of which is taken from those things which we shall say in the aforesaid tractate on the knowledge of God, disp. 2., almost throughout its whole length. For as knowing things are distinguished from non-knowing things, as D. Thom. teaches in quaest. 14., cited above, in this, that just as the nature of a non-knowing thing is more compressed and limited, because it has much of potentiality and of matter, which is the root of compression, and therefore non-knowing things cannot become other things. On the contrary, the nature of a knowing thing is unlimited and broader, insofar as it can become all things in some way, as Aristotle says, 3. de Anima text. 37. So likewise a form which is received not in intelligible being, but in entitative and natural being, is terminated and limited according to its entity by its subject, because it is received in a less perfect way, and consequently the aforesaid form is united by a middle inherence or information, which alone demands limitation. On the contrary, a form which is received intelligibly, and under the form of an intelligible form, need not be limited, at least according to its entity, by that in which it is received in a more elevated and more perfect way, that is, in a very immaterial way, and consequently without any imperfection of limitation. Because materiality is the root of limitation, or of inherence, which from its own force demands limitation. And so, if it be precisely received in intelligible being, without any admixture of reception in entitative and natural being, it is not limited according to its entity by that in which it is received, nor is it in it by a natural information or inherence.

Whence, although it is repugnant to the divine essence to be united under the form of a natural form in entitative being, so that its entity should be terminated and limited by that in which it would be received, and consequently so that it should not inhere in it or itself inform it in entitative being, it is nevertheless not repugnant to be united under the form of an intelligible form, and purely intelligibly. Because this form is not limited, by that to which it is united, according to its entity and the reason of an intelligible form, and consequently it neither inheres in it nor informs it in entitative and natural being, because such an information demands limitation.

53 This can also be explained from those things which we shall say in the aforesaid tractate on the knowledge of God, in the place cited above, from the doctrine of D. Thom., 1. part. quaest. 50. art. 2. ad 2. For there the Saintly Doctor says that an intelligible form is received in the intellect according to the reason of form, that is, as Bannez well explains in the same place, according to the whole amplitude and universality which is proper to it in intelligible being. And therefore, when the species representing human nature, for example, informs the human intellect, then although it is limited in entitative and natural being, and becomes this in number and not that, nevertheless in intelligible and representative being it remains as universal and ample as the reason of such a form demands in its whole amplitude. And consequently it does not demand that, as regards its intrinsic perfection in intelligible being, it be terminated and limited by the intellect which it actually informs in intelligible being. A natural form, however, in entitative being, as such, precisely because it informs actually on the part of the thing, cannot remain with the whole amplitude and perfection which its species demands. Rather it is limited, and becomes this and not that, and it has this mode of participating its species, and not that one which is proper to another form of the same species, as is established in all natural forms which are properly and strictly such. And therefore D. Thom. in the cited quaestio, and often elsewhere, says that the nature, for example, of Michael the Archangel, cannot be multiplied in number. Rather, his one single individual, namely Michael, contains the whole species, and perfection, and amplitude of it, because it does not have the true reason of a natural form, but is an act subsisting in itself, and not receivable in matter, and consequently has nothing by which the amplitude of its species is limited. But these things will be treated again, and more at length, in the tractate cited.

54 Add, first, that an intelligible species, or intelligible form, holds itself on the part of the object rather than on the part of the other thing, and therefore, if the object is infinite, it represents infinitely and is not limited by the other, as we shall treat more fully below in this same disputation. On the other hand, a form in natural and entitative being holds itself on the part of the subject rather than on the part of the other thing, and so it must have its entity limited by a finite subject.

Add, second, that if we speak particularly of a form considered in natural and entitative being, holding itself on the part of the agent, and giving it that it be the principle of operating in a vital way, then such a form has a peculiar reason of being subordinated, for example in a man, to the first principle of his life and of all his operations, namely the soul. Because nothing holding itself on the part of that very thing can live unless it be that very thing or be subordinated to it. And therefore the light of glory, found in fact in the blessed and holding itself on the part of their intellect, and finally influencing the vital act of the beatific vision, is subordinated to the intellect and to the soul. Therefore from this head also it will be repugnant to the divine essence to be united under the form of a natural form with respect to the aforesaid actions. Because such a form holds itself on the part of that to which it is united, and demands a subordination repugnant to God.

Add, third, that a form properly and strictly taken, which as such is in entitative and natural being, is always something incomplete, or something accidental, as is clear inductively. And therefore it demands inherence, or information in natural and entitative being. A form in intelligible being, on the contrary, is the more a form the more complete it is in the reason of being. Indeed, if it be infinite in the genus of being, the more will it be able to be a form in the intelligible order. Because everything is the more intelligible the more it is a being. Whence, that which has more of entity will have also more of intelligibility. And so an intelligible form does not necessarily demand inherence, or the imperfection of information, in natural and entitative being.

55 From this also it will follow that a natural form in entitative being cannot eminently, or radically, possess the whole entity of its effect taken absolutely. As is established by those who teach, our Complutensians, 2. Phys. disput. de causis formali, et materiali. On the other hand, an intelligible form can, as is established in God and in the essence of an Angel, which has the reason of an intelligible species, and contains in fact, at least radically, the intellect and the intellection themselves, and consequently the whole of that which is required for the first act. Whence also on this account it will be repugnant to find in God the reason of a natural form in entitative being. It will not, however, be repugnant to find in him the reason of an intelligible form.

56 All of which D. Thom. explained elegantly, 3. cont. Gent. cap. 51., where, speaking of the divine essence, he says as follows: Nevertheless it cannot be the form of another thing according to natural being. For it would follow that, being united at the same time with some one thing, it would constitute one nature, which cannot be. Since the divine essence is perfect in itself in its own nature, whereas an intelligible species united to the intellect does not constitute any nature, but perfects the intellect itself for understanding, which does not conflict with the perfection of the divine essence. See, therefore, how, according to the mind of the Saintly Doctor, the concept of a natural form is the concept of an imperfect form, and one having a being diminished, inasmuch as it is ordered to the constituting of some nature. The concept of an intelligible species, on the other hand, can be the concept of a total form, and one altogether perfect, inasmuch as it has only to perfect, and not to be perfected. And so it is not strange that the intelligible form is found in God, and not the reason of a natural form.

From this also that which was adduced concerning quantity falls. For although we grant that quantity is, in its own way and with respect to itself, how much, as well as by which, and as that which, about which our Complutensians can be seen in their Logic, disputat. 4. num. 40., nevertheless the disparity is still manifest. Because precisely because it is not an infinite form, it cannot be its being quantitative, that is, that which it gives to a substance. On the other hand, since the divine essence is an intelligible form, and the reason of this form can, as we were saying a moment ago, be altogether complete, indeed infinite, it can therefore contain through the form of a pure act all intelligibility, and consequently be also that intelligible being which it gives to the created intellect.

§ VII. An answer is made to the three previous grounds of the first opinion.

57 To the first point, then, in favour of the first opinion, it must be said that the chief causality of an intelligible species does not lie in the reason of a natural form, which intrinsically demands inherence, or information connoting imperfection. Rather, it lies in the reason of an intelligible form, which only demands to complete and determine, that is, to impart to the intellective power, that in intelligible being the object itself is. And which, if it be united precisely in intelligible being, does not demand inherence, or the imperfection of an intrinsic information in entitative and natural being, but rather actuality, and being form in the intelligible order, pure of all imperfection. And therefore it is not strange that the divine essence, which is united only in intelligible being, can perform this office. Let our Complutensians be consulted, in the book on the soul, disp. 18. quaest. 4. and 5.

58 To the second point, the minor must be denied. And to the argument it will be answered that, although the divine essence is not united by an intrinsic and natural information in entitative being with the created intellect, it is nevertheless intrinsically united under the form of an intelligible form, completing and determining it, and informing it intelligibly, that is, giving it that it have the divine essence united to it, insofar as it has the reason of an intelligible form. And so it is united to it, and precisely corresponds to a created intelligible species representing it as it is in itself, if this were possible, and consequently gives the created intellect that God should be truly in the intelligible order.

This union, however, taken most formally, and still according to that which it imports directly, is sufficient really to change the intellect in intelligible being. Because this mode of changing does not argue any imperfection in the divine essence, and that intelligible being truly is something real. Yet, granted that this holds, namely, that the aforesaid union is not sufficient under the aforesaid precision, taken strictly, to change the created intellect in natural and entitative being, since this mode of changing connotes imperfection, and in this order it is not united with IT. We have said, under the aforesaid precision, because, if it be considered according to those things which it connots, it is able to change that same intellect in entitative being, because it requires the light of glory, as the disposition of itself in intelligible being taken in that sense. Which, indeed, as we shall say immediately, is produced in the intellect from the force of the unitive action of the divine essence, and through it the intellect is really and intrinsically changed in physical and natural being.

59 To the first confirmation, the antecedent must be granted, and the consequence denied. And to the argument it must be said that it does not follow from this, that the divine essence constitutes the created intellect in its first act by completing it and determining the activity of it, elevated as it is by the light of glory, that the same essence is in potentiality to the second act, that is, to the beatific vision. Because it acts and completes, setting aside imperfections. Wherefore the intellect alone, bathed in the light of glory, which is otherwise completed, and is intelligibly actuated by the divine essence, as by an intelligible form, is in potentiality to the vision. Just as the divine subsistence and existence complete the humanity of our Lord Christ, both in the being of being, and in operative being, in as far as the actions are those of supposita. Nevertheless, the divine personality is not in potentiality to receive actions, or to be thereby perfected. Because it completes and determines through the form of a most pure act, and therefore without any imperfection.

To the second confirmation, the antecedent must be denied. And to the argument it must be said that the formal effect which the divine essence gives to the intellect involves something infinite and uncreated, because it imports the divine essence as it is its own intelligible being, and gives to the intellect, already elevated, that it be God intelligibly. Although it at the same time connotates the light of glory, as the disposition necessarily required for such a union. And therefore it is not strange that this effect begins in time. Because, although that intelligible form is eternal, it is nevertheless united temporally. Since it connotes things which are given in time, and not from eternity, as will be more fully explained immediately below.

60 To the third point, it will be answered, first, with Ferr., 3. cont. Gent. cap. 51. §. ad 3. dubium, by distinguishing the major. And if it be understood of something that is one per se in entitative and natural being, it must be denied. On the other hand, if it be understood of something that is one per se in the intelligible order, and resulting from the intellect and the divine essence, as being intimately united, it is so. And in the same way the minor must be distinguished. For, although nothing one per se results from the divine essence and the intellect elevated by the light of glory in entitative and natural being, it does indeed result in intelligible being. Because it follows from this that the created intellect has the reason of one whole principle in itself with respect to the eliciting of the clear vision of God. Nor does the argument for the minor there adduced have force against this. For that from the intellect and the divine essence one accident does not become, or one substance, proves that one does not become from them in entitative being. It does not prove this in intelligible being. Because, as we were saying a moment ago, for this it is only necessary that a principle one per se of intellection should coalesce from them.

61 Secondly, and better, it will be answered with Cajetan, and with our Complutensians, in the book on the soul, disp. 18. quaest. 4. and 5., and with very many others of the disciples of D. Thom., that from the intellect and the intelligible species there does not result anything third, but that one extreme becomes the other, and so the intellect through the species becomes in a certain way, that is, in the intelligible order, the species itself, and moreover the object understood itself, considered in the same order. And in the way in which our Complutensians explain it in the place cited, and as we shall pursue more fully in the tractate on the knowledge of God, disp. 3. There also we shall dissolve all the objections that fight against this mode of speaking. From this there arose that common dictum taken from the Commentary on 3. de Anima text. 37., namely, that from the intellect and the thing understood there comes a greater unity than from matter and form. For matter does not become form, whereas the intellect in a certain way, that is, in intelligible being, becomes the object itself, as that which, and the intelligible species itself becomes, in the aforesaid order, the object itself, as that by which.

62 Whence, in answer to the argument for the minor, insofar as it can serve against this mode of speaking, it must be said that by this union and information in intelligible being the intellect bathed in the light of glory becomes the same, not indeed most formally, but identically through a certain identity, that is, in intelligible being, with the substance and essence of God, as it is the intelligible form, although not in entitative and natural being, because this union is not made with the divine essence according as it pertains to the entitative and natural order, but according as it is considered with respect to the intelligible order, or as it corresponds to a created intelligible species representing God as he is in himself, if this were possible, and were considered precisely in the intelligible order.

We have said, that by this union and information in intelligible being the intellect bathed in the light of glory becomes the same, not indeed most formally, but identically, etc., with the essence of God, as it is the intelligible form, in order to signify, first, that this identity is not so great as to be incompatible with a formal or virtual distinction in itself, and moreover with a real distinction, not indeed actual, but potential, as our Complutensians explain in the place cited. And secondly, that one extreme is not converted into the other, that is, does not lose its own and most formal reason, even though it is identified with the other. Just as, although an action and a passion, according to the probable opinion of many, are really and actually identified with each other, and are only virtually distinguished, nevertheless neither of them on that account has lost its own most formal reason.

Now, although it be granted that this identity in intelligible being is possible between the intellect and the species, nevertheless, after all things have been weighed, and speaking absolutely and simply, will the union of matter and substantial form be greater and more intimate than that of the species with the intellect? And likewise, will the personal union of the Word with the humanity of our Lord Christ be greater and more intimate than the union of the divine essence with the created intellect? This will be clear from what is to be said in the tractate on the knowledge of God, disp. 2. num. 102.

63 To the confirmation, the minor must be denied. And to the argument it must be said that the action by which the light of glory is infused is also a union of the divine essence under the form of an intelligible species. For an action which reaches the last disposition towards some form is extended so as to reach that form itself, with respect to which such a disposition is, when that action proceeds from an agent containing the whole perfection of both. And so such an action is subordinated not to that form in any way whatever, but as containing the whole of that perfection. And therefore an action reaching the last disposition towards the form of fire also reaches that form, as subordinated to the fire generating it.

Wherefore, since the light of glory holds itself under the form of the last disposition towards the reception, or as it were the reception, of the divine essence under the form of an intelligible form, as we shall show in art. 5., it follows that the infusion of it is also a union of that same essence. And consequently, that the divine essence remaining united with the created intellect will come about as it were through a natural emanation, in that proportional manner in which, the last disposition towards fire being posited, the form of fire results, as our Complutensians show, 2. Phys. disp. 10. num. 67., and thereafter.

Nor does the argument adduced there concerning the light of faith have force against this. Because this light does not hold itself under the form of the last disposition towards the acquiring of natural species, which serve for the act of faith. On the other hand, the light of glory does so with respect to the reception of the divine essence under the form of an intelligible form. Whence, in the will to infuse the light of glory, the will to unite the aforesaid essence is contained. Because such a will is freely required necessarily, on account of the eminence of this form for this union and communication, since, being an infinitely perfect form, it is not necessarily communicated even under the form of a form ad extra, but dependently on the free will of God. Just as for the same reason it cannot be communicated freely, but necessarily, ad intra. Otherwise it is just as it occurs in the divine subsistence, which also, by the form of a terminus, cannot fail to be necessarily communicated ad intra on account of its most eminent perfection, nor can it terminate created nature ad extra except freely, or by connoting the aforesaid free act of God.

§ VIII. An objection is made to the last ground of the first opinion, and to its first confirmation.

64 To the last point of the same opinion, because it expounds a longer discourse, it must be met point by point, granting the solution assigned there insofar as it denies that the union and information of the species in entitative being is indispensably required. And to the first objection, it will be answered that, although other essences, or intelligible species, cannot be united with a created intellect purely in intelligible being without there also being mixed in a union in entitative being, and although the divine essence also cannot be united with its divine intellect without there also being present a union in entitative and natural being, nevertheless the same essence of God, according as it has the reason of an intelligible species, will be able to be united purely in intelligible being with the created intellect.

65 The reason for the disparity, however, will be established by traversing in its own order the intelligible species which are set forth in this objection. For in the first place, if we speak of the divine essence as compared under the form of an intelligible species with its own intellect, it is compared with it as with an intellect which is the most pure act. Yet precisely because it is such, it cannot be distinguished from the intelligible species through which it understands, namely from the divine essence, whether this be considered in entitative and natural being, or in intelligible being. And therefore they must be united, according to both reasons, by an intimate and strictest union, namely by identity. Otherwise such an intellect would not be a pure act. Indeed, such an identity must be not just any identity, but complete, excluding any still virtual distinction between the aforesaid intellect and the essence of God.

Also, because, since the divine intellect is a pure act within its own line, it demands to identify without any virtual distinction all those things which pertain to its own line. And therefore, just as in this way it identifies its own intellection with itself, because these pertain to its own line, so also it identifies the divine essence, both according as it has the reason of essence and of nature, according to which reason it pertains to the entitative order, and according as it has the reason of an intelligible species. Because all these things pertain to the same line, as will be established more fully from those things which we shall say in the tractate on the knowledge of God, disp. 3. num. 17., and in the tractate on the will of God, disp. 2. num. 34. Also, because in the divine essence entitative and intelligible being is not yet virtually distinguished. And so, since it has the highest adequation and commensuration with its own intellect, as with its own first, so to speak, perfectible intellect, it cannot be united by complete identity according to that former reason unless it be also united according to this latter reason, which is distinct only on the part of our mode of conceiving.

Wherefore, since these things do not hold in the created intellect of the blessed, as is clear from itself, it follows that, from the divine essence and the intellect of God being compared with each other, neither can it be inferred that, just as between them there intervenes a union both in entitative being and in intelligible being, so also there is one between the divine essence and the created intellect of the blessed.

66 Furthermore, if we speak of the essence of an Angel, according as it has the reason of an intelligible species with respect to its proper intellect, then they are therefore united in natural and entitative being, or, which amounts to the same for the present, under the form of subject and property. Because the essence of an Angel is an intelligible form that is finite and limited. And by reason of this it is so compressed that it cannot be united under the form of an intelligible form except with its own proper intellect. And likewise its subsistence, because it is finite, is so commensurated and compressed to its nature that it cannot terminate another. And therefore it is necessary that the intellect with which the aforesaid Angelic essence is united be its own intellect, and therefore be united with it under the form of subject and property, or under the form of nature and root for understanding, and of proximate power for the same intellection. Because the intellect of an Angel, just like any other vital power, cannot have such a reason unless it be united with its own proper nature, from which it emanates, as our Complutensian College noted in the books of the Physics, disp. 10. num. 66.

Wherefore, since this reason has no place in the divine essence compared with the created intellect of the blessed, because, as is clear from itself, it is itself a certain infinite intelligible form, and the aforesaid intellect does not hold itself under the form of property with respect to the divine essence, and consequently is not rooted in it as a property and proximate vital power is in its nature and radical principle of life, it follows that, from the union in natural and entitative being, which must necessarily be mixed into the union of the Angelic essence under the form of an intelligible species with its own intellect, it cannot be inferred that the same is to be said of the divine essence compared under the form of an intelligible species with the intellect of the blessed. Rather, on the contrary, because the aforesaid essence has the reason of an infinite intelligible form, it will be able to be extended to act intelligibly upon any created intellect. Just as, because the divine subsistence in the reason of a terminus of nature is infinite, it is able to be extended to terminate created nature. And then, because the aforesaid created intellect is not compared with the divine essence under the form of a property emanating from it, and the essence itself cannot have the reason of a natural form in entitative being by reason of its own infinitude, therefore it will not be able to be united in this way, but only purely intelligibly, with the aforesaid intellect.

67 By these things also it is established with respect to another argument adduced in this objection, concerning the other intelligible species, which are accidents. For these, precisely because they are such, their intelligible being must be identified with their natural and entitative being, which is an accident. And consequently they must inhere in the intellect and be united with it in natural and entitative being, as with their subject. This reason, as is established, cannot have place in an infinite intelligible species, such as the divine essence is. Since this must be free from all imperfections, and consequently from inherence, which essentially connotes imperfection.

Add, that from this example of intelligible species which are accidents a not unimportant argument can be derived to urge the possibility of the union of the divine essence under the form of an intelligible form, even though no other union in entitative and natural being be mixed in there. For since those species are united in entitative and natural being, because they must inhere under the form of the entitative being of an accident which they possess, it follows that, if God were to supply supernaturally this inherence, as occurs in the accidents of the Eucharist, then it would be very probable that the aforesaid species could be united under the form of a pure intelligible form, without being united actually and formally in entitative being. Even if according to this being they should have to be non-distinct from the intellect to which they would be united intelligibly, and could not be freed from that which it is to be unifiable according to the aforesaid entitative being. Much more, therefore, will the divine essence be able to be united precisely in intelligible being.

68 To the first confirmation, it will be answered by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. And to the argument it must be said that, in order that the divine essence may be able to be united under the form of an intelligible species, and according as it pertains to the intelligible order, but not according as it pertains to the entitative and natural order, it is not necessary that these two reasons be virtually distinguished in the essence itself. Rather, it is enough that the divine essence, with this complete identity which excludes the aforesaid distinction, be the most eminent form, performing by reason of this eminence the office of entitative and natural being, and the office of intelligible being, which in creatures are distinguished either really or virtually.

For just as this eminence is sufficient for this, that it be able to be united with the created intellect of the blessed under the form of an intelligible species, and not under the form of an intellection, although these two are not yet virtually distinguished in the divine essence, as will be clear from what is to be said in the tractate on the knowledge of God, disputat. 3. num. 17., and in the treatise on the will of God, disput. 2, num. 34. And likewise, this same eminence is enough for this, that the same essence be united with the humanity of our Lord Christ under the form of an existence, but not under the form of nature and essence, as we shall say in the treatise on the Incarnation, although the reason of nature and of existence are not distinguished in God by a virtual distinction, as will be clear from those things which will be said in the aforesaid tractate on the knowledge of God, disput. 4. dubio 2. So likewise in the present case, proportion being preserved, one must philosophize. And the reason is the same in all of these. Because neither the humanity of our Lord Christ nor the created intellect is capable of union with the divine essence according as it has the reason of nature, or of intellection. Nor can the divine essence have the reason of a natural form in entitative being.

69 Although you inquire how this eminence and the faculty of exercising several things, no less than if they were several, can cohere in the divine essence with a complete identity, and with the exclusion even of a virtual distinction. Since, indeed, the divine essence and the relation are not virtually distinguished for any other reason than because that same formality exercises its own proper things, several no less than if they were several in act.

To this it must be said that, for a formal and even virtual distinction of one formality from another, it is not enough to exercise the proper things of several things in any way whatever. For from this alone it is inferred that there is an eminence of one and the same, so to speak, most formal reason. But over and above this, it is necessary to exercise the proper things of several things which pertain to distinct lines, and not of those which look to one and the same line. And the reason is that then the proper things of several are exercised as of several. And so from such an exercise a plurality, at least a virtual one, is inferred in the agent. On the other hand, when the proper things of several are exercised which pertain to one and the same line, they are not exercised as of several, but as of those which are one, that is, insofar as they pertain to one and the same line. And therefore in God the essence and the relation are virtually distinguished, because the absolute and the relative look of their own nature to distinct lines. On the other hand, the intellection and the intellect are not, because the line of the intellect in its purity reaches as far as the second act inclusively.

70 Whence, because the line of entitative and natural being, if it be considered in its purity, reaches as far as intelligible being also, because entitative and natural being in its purity is the most immaterial being, and under the form of a most pure act, and this very thing imports intelligible being, therefore, from the fact that the divine essence exercises with respect to God the offices of entitative and intelligible being, which in material things are distinct, a virtual distinction of several formalities does not follow. Rather, it follows that the same formality altogether is the most eminent, and that without that distinction it possesses those things which in others are distinct, and that, since it is one, it exercises distinct offices pertaining to the same line.

§ IX. An answer is made to the two later confirmations of that same last argument.

71 To the second confirmation of that same last argument, it is clear from what was said in num. 61. how the union of the intellect with the intelligible species is in a certain way greater and more intimate than the union of matter and substantial form. For although a third thing results from these by composition, yet matter does not itself become form, as has already been hinted. On the other hand, the intellect, namely, and the intelligible species are in a certain way, that is, in intelligible being, identified. And therefore the intellect becomes identically, though not most formally, the object itself, precisely because it is united with it. But let those things be seen which will be said in the treatise on the knowledge of God, disput. 2. num. 66 and 95, and thereafter.

72 To the third confirmation, some answer by granting the consequence and denying the minor. And to the first argument they deny the antecedent, because the divine essence can be united both under the form of an agent intimately influxing, for the effect of preservation, and also under the form of an intelligible form which is intimately influxed into the intellect as it is bathed in the light of glory. And consequently this latter union, taken formally, will be supernatural. On the other hand, the former will not. From this, to the second argument, they say that the divine essence before the light of glory is united with the intellect under the form of an agent operating intimately in it and preserving its natural entity. Yet not under the form of an intelligible form. And so it is not formally influxed into the intellect, according as it has the reason of the aforesaid form, but materially, and in the being of the agent conserving it.

From this also, to the last objection, they answer that just as visible species are received in a mirror in entitative and qualitative being, and not formally in visible being, because the mirror does not have visual power, and the aforesaid species are only receivable in visible being in visual potency, so the divine essence under the form of an intelligible form is only quasi-receivable in the divine intellect, or in what pertains to the divine order, and consequently in the intellect as elevated by the light of glory. Because the intellect, so elevated, alone has that it be the intellective of God as he is in himself. Whence in an intellect that is not elevated it is only materially, and not as an intelligible form, but under the form of an intimate agent, with which otherwise the reason of an intelligible form is conjoined.

73 Yet this solution does not please. For although the Divine Thomas teaches, quaest. 28. de veritate art. 2. ad octavum, that the union of the divine essence through an intimate influx is more intimate than the union of other created things through information or inherence, on the ground that, as the Saintly Doctor teaches there, that which is united through an intimate influx is within the substance of the thing, whereas that which is united through information, so to speak, surrounds that with which the union is made. Nevertheless, such a union, taken most formally, is not a union of a form with an informed thing, but a union of an intimate agent with its effect, from whom whatever is in it, however intimate, is caused in such a way that the aforesaid agent is present to it only in as far as it causes its whole intimate essence. And therefore, although the divine essence is intimately influxed into any creature, and into its most intimate natural entity, it is not on that account in it in the way in which a form is in an informable thing, but in the way in which an agent is present to its effect, or in the way in which that which is immense demands to be in all things.

74 Wherefore a better and clearer solution of this argument is established from what has been often said, namely, that although for the union of the divine essence under the form of an intelligible form with a created intellect it is required that the same essence, on the part of the thing conceived, be non-distinct from the intellect as elevated by the light of glory, by its own proper non-distinction, which consists in an intimate influx, yet this union does not formally consist in the aforesaid non-distinction. Rather, the divine essence, according as it has the reason of an intelligible form, is united with that same intellect by another union, and therefore it itself informs the aforesaid intellect by an intelligible information. Yet in such a way that at the same time it is form and information in this order. Also because it is an extreme capable of union, and an intelligible form under the form of a pure act. And therefore it is the union of itself. Also because this union and information is most formal in the intelligible order, and consequently it is of such a condition that through it the informed thing and the informing form are in a certain way, that is, in intelligible being, and in the way explained in the treatise on the knowledge of God, identified. And for this reason too, no intermediate mode of union, distinct from the nature of the thing, is required between the essence and the intellect bathed in the light of glory, by which they may remain united. Because such a union is exercised precisely within the intelligible order, and not within the entitative and natural order.

75 We have said that for the union of the divine essence under the form of an intelligible form it is required that the same essence, on the part of the thing conceived, be non-distinct from the intellect as elevated by the light of glory, by a non-distinction consisting in an intimate influx. Because, although this is proper to that same essence, so that it cannot itself be formally united with the created intellect unless it first produce the light of glory in it, and therefore unless it be non-distinct from that same intellect, in as far as it is so elevated by the proper non-distinction of the aforesaid essence, that is, by an entitum¹ influx. Nevertheless, it is not necessary that the same essence, insofar as it expresses the reason of an intelligible species, should cause the light of glory effectively. Yet, because the divine essence, insofar as by the form of the first root it causes it, and insofar as it expresses the reason of an intelligible form, is distinguished only on the part of our mode of conceiving, and not virtually, that is, on the part of the thing conceived, therefore the same essence on the part of the thing conceived must first be non-distinct through an intimate influx, and then be united under the form of an intelligible form. Whence, according to these things, those things which we said above in num. 37. must be understood.

§ X. The ground of the second opinion is dissolved.

76 Finally, to the ground of the second opinion, to its last part, it will be answered by denying the antecedent, as is clear from what has been said. The consequence, however, must be denied. The reason for the disparity is clear from those things which we have already said. Because the divine essence, which concurs under the form of the male, also has in the intelligible order the reason of form, as has been shown, and therefore it must concur in both ways, which is what we say also of the other intelligible species. On the other hand, that which concurs under the form of the male in natural generation, and is distinct from intentional generation, does not hold itself under the form of a natural form with respect to the female. And therefore it does not concur under the form of a form, and in the genus of a formal cause. Wherefore, if there is any analogy between generation or the intentional birth, understood by attribution, and that which is purely natural, of which we have spoken elsewhere, it will be only as regards the reason of effecting, and not as regards the mode of causing in the genus of a formal cause. Because this influx is not found in purely natural generation on the part of the male with respect to the female.

77 In the title, the qualifier insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species has rightly been added. For we do not doubt that, according to the general reason of a first cause, [the divine essence] concurs actively in vision, and this not somehow or otherwise, but insofar as it is the first cause of the supernatural order; since it is certain that every action of a secondary cause depends proportionately upon its nature on the first cause: namely, that if it belongs to the natural order, it depends on God as its natural author; but if it belongs to the supernatural order, it requires the general influx of God himself as supernatural author. The title of the difficulty therefore concerns another peculiar concurrence, namely, concurrence that is active in the character of an intelligible species. By this kind of concurrence, the divine essence does not influx into all other things: because this mode of concurrence belongs specifically to the object of a cognitive power insofar as it is the object that moves it; and thus only the object just mentioned possesses this peculiar mode of influx.

§ I. The dissenting opinion is proposed.

78 Some younger Thomists distinguish two functions in an intelligible species. The first is to unite the object to the power and, by this union, to determine that power formally with respect to intellection. The second, however, is to concur actively with it. Of these, they judge the former to be altogether indispensable and, according to its own kind, free from imperfections; but not the latter. Accordingly, they deny this concurrence to the divine essence insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species with respect to created intellect. Thus Bannez in the present question, and other younger Thomists. Zumel also regards this opinion as probable in this article, and it seems to be suggested by St. Thomas there, insofar as on the part of the power he posits the light of glory, by which the intellect is made efficacious to see God, while on the part of the object he posits the divine essence under the form of a species. For if the divine essence, as united in the character of a species, possessed any activity by which it might complete and strengthen the active power of the intellect, it would already belong to that power on its own side; for the light does not belong on the part of the intellect for any other reason except that it strengthens the intellect to see.

79 It is proved first by reasoning. An impressed species that concurs actively with intellection inflows insofar as it is subordinated to the intellect; therefore the divine essence cannot concur actively in the character of a species together with created intellect. The consequence is evident. Because to inflow by the mode of a principle subordinated to another implies imperfection and dependence. The antecedent is also evident. Because a species, which is the efficient cause of intellection, inflows by the mode of a principle by which it determines the intellect to understand; but an active principle by which is subordinated to the active principle which, as is clear from itself.

It is confirmed. Because otherwise the concurrence of the species would not be vital, and consequently neither would the specification of intellection proceeding from it be vital; but this is false; therefore, etc. The consequence is evident. For an impressed species, considered in itself, is not a vital principle, since it can arise from a principal cause absolutely without life, as is clear from sensible species. Hence, unless it is subordinated to a vital principle, namely, to a vital power, it cannot provide a vital influx. The falsity of the consequent follows from this. For since intellection is vital of itself and intrinsically, it cannot fail, according to its own species and essence, to have intellectual vitality.

80 Second, because otherwise the divine essence would concur immediately in vision through its own substance, and consequently naturally and insofar as it is such, but not insofar as it wills; yet this is absurd; therefore, etc. The consequence is proved. For it belongs to an object that is actually intelligible in itself, such as the divine essence, to inflow naturally and insofar as it is such into vision, but not freely. For just as through its own substance it is the complete object and determines immediately, so through that same substance it ought to act immediately. The absurdity of the consequent follows from this. First, because the proper and perfect mode of God's operation ad extra is through the intellect and the will, as is sufficiently established from what the theologians teach commonly in q. 25 of this first part. Secondly, because otherwise the influx of the divine essence in the character of a species would be necessary, and therefore infinite: since an infinite power, such as that in the divine essence, which inflows necessarily inflows as far as it can, and therefore infinitely.

81 Third, because on the contrary it would follow that the divine relations, according to their proper characters, concur actively together with created intellect in the vision of God; yet this cannot be said; therefore, etc. The consequence is evident. For, according to the opposite opinion, the divine essence inflows in this way for no other reason than that it is united in the character of an intelligible species, insofar as it is its own being, and has entered intimately into the intellect elevated by the light of glory, and is therefore proportionate to it. Thus, when these conditions are found in the divine relations when considered according to their proper formal reasons, as is evident in itself, it would follow that these relations also would inflow actively into vision according to their proper characters.

The falsity of the consequent is also evident. For although the divine relations can inflow ad extra according to their proper characters as a cause, or quasi-cause, of a formal kind, and thus filiation terminates Christ's human nature according to its proper character, but paternity does not, because this mode of termination is reduced to the genus of a formal cause, or quasi-formal cause; nevertheless they cannot, according to this reason, display any active influx with respect to created vision. For, as the theologians teach commonly, the works, or efficient activity, of the Trinity ad extra are undivided; and thus they always act ad extra through what is common, not through what is proper.

§ II. The difficulty is resolved according to the mind of St. Thomas.

82 Nevertheless, it must be said that the divine essence, insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species, inflows actively together with the intellect of the blessed into the clear vision of God. Thus St. Thomas, below, q. 56, a. 1, where he teaches this generally concerning every species, in these words: In an action that remains in the agent, the object must be united to the agent insofar as the action proceeds; just as the sensible must be united to sense insofar as it actually feels, and thus the object united to a power stands to an action of this kind as the form that is the principle of action in other agents. And speaking particularly of the divine essence, he sufficiently suggests this very point in the present question, particularly in his answer to the third, as well as in 4, d. 49, q. 2, a. 1, in the text near the end; in De veritate, q. 8, a. 1, ad quintum; and in 3 contra Gentes, c. 51, as we shall examine more closely below. And so very many of his disciples follow the Holy Doctor in the present question: Caieta, Nazarenus, Zumel, and others. Ferrarius, 1 contra Gentes, c. 53, and 3 contra Gentes, c. 51; and our Complutensian College, in the De Anima, disp. 18, q. 4.

83 It is proved first by the reason suggested by the same Holy Doctor in the cited places. Because the divine essence is united in the character of the object with the blessed intellect in order to determine it with respect to the specification of cognition, namely, so that it would be of such an object and not another; therefore, it concurs efficiently in the specification of that same cognition. The consequence is evident. Because the determination of an active power with respect to the specification of an act cannot occur except through the active power by which the power is constituted in the first act with respect to the specification of that same act. For just as the active power concurs in the specified determination insofar as it has the character of an active power, as our Complutensian College noted in its Logic, in the chapter on action, and as will be clearer from what must be said below, so whatever determines, completes, and, as it were, ultimately gives its formal character to that power with respect to the determination in question must belong to the same line of active power; and consequently it must also be an active principle, or an active determination with respect to the specified determination.

The antecedent is also evident. First, because an intellectual power is intrinsically indeterminate with respect to the specified determination of cognition, which is that of God clearly seen and not of another object, and it is determined through the union with the specified object; therefore, such a union is required for this determination of the power. Secondly, because the divine essence, insofar as it is its own being, can of itself, without any adherence or imperfection of information when taken in entitative being, constitute the created intellect in act and permanently complete it, and therefore through union with it will determine it with respect to the specification of the act. Because a form that permanently constitutes and completes the active power, and is necessarily required for acting, is united with it in order to determine it with respect to the specification of the act, as may be seen in the deduction made concerning other forms.

84 Nor is it necessary to attack again the solution that some of the younger Thomists use against this reasoning, saying that the created intellect together with the light of glory is sufficiently determined with respect to the specification of the act in relation to the clear vision of God; since by the force of such light the intellect cannot produce another species of intellection. Hence, although the force of the reasoning just made establishes the necessity of active concurrence on the part of the object in many other acts of intellection because of the indifference of the intellect, it does not establish it in this one.

Therefore, it will not be necessary to overturn the proposed solution again by several arguments. First, because, as is clear from what has been said, by the force of the light of glory the power is determined only by a determination on the part of the power, not on the part of the object. But in order to elicit intellection, it must be determined on the part of each; and thus an intellect infused with prophetic light can be sufficiently determined by that light on the part of the power with respect to some particular object, and nevertheless, because it is not determined on every side, it requires species that inflow actively, as the opponents themselves admit. Secondly, because, as we have already asserted, intellection is of the kind of an intellectual birth. Hence some seed must proceed in some way from the masculine side to determine the feminine, namely, the intellectual power, toward this birth of intellection rather than another.

85 First, there is a further reason for more thoroughly refuting this solution: it does not agree with what St. Thomas teaches in this article. Since the divine essence, precisely insofar as it is its own being, constitutes the created intellect in act through the form of an intelligible form, it must inflow efficiently into intellection as the clear vision of God itself rather than of another object, and therefore determine it in the specified manner with respect to that vision. Because each thing acts insofar as it is in act, that which has the character of an act with respect to intelligibility must also, in the way now stated, be the reason of operation and an active power in that order.

Second, intellection, insofar as it is an action, is specified by the object insofar as it is an object; and therefore it is of this species and not another, because it is concerned with this object and not another. Therefore, the object, insofar as it is the moving object, inflows actively into intellection. The consequence is evident. Because, as St. Thomas teaches below, q. 14, a. 5, at the end, and 1–2, q. 1, a. 3, intellection, insofar as it is an action, and generally every other action insofar as it is such, is specified by the active principle from which it proceeds; because it is essentially an egress or emanation from the agent. Therefore, if the object, insofar as it is an object, is not an active power with respect to intellection, it cannot specify it as such, and consequently cannot determine the power with respect to its specification.

86 Second, the assertion is proved principally by a reason drawn from various places in St. Thomas. Because every perfection simpliciter found in creatures must be found in God, as St. Thomas teaches above, q. 4, a. 2; otherwise God would not be a most perfect being, and consequently would not be God. But in us an intelligible species concurs actively in intellection, and this belongs to a perfection simpliciter; therefore, this perfection of active power is found in the divine essence insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species, both with respect to divine intellect and to created intellect. The consequence with the major is sufficiently evident. The minor is St. Thomas, q. 56, cited above, and 3 contra Gentes, c. 53, and elsewhere frequently; the philosophers likewise acknowledge, explain, and prove it, as do Aristotle and St. Thomas; as well as by the reasons adduced by our Complutensian College in the cited questions and discussions in the De Anima. The second part is also evident: because the genus of an efficient cause necessarily involves no imperfection, and therefore is found formally in God, as the same Holy Doctor teaches throughout.

87 It makes no difference if one agrees with the opponents that the active concurrence of the intelligible species together with created intellect involves the perfection necessarily accompanied by the imperfections of subordination and dependence upon the aforementioned intellect; and therefore it is no wonder that it is not found in the divine essence insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species with respect to that intellect.

This therefore makes no difference. For although the intelligible species, which is an accident, possesses the said dependence and subordination, the form that is a subsistent form and a complete act nevertheless does not. Therefore, when the divine essence, insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species with respect to the blessed intellect, is a form subsisting in itself and a most perfect act, it will be free from the said imperfections, however actively it may inflow into intellection. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is also evident. Because a principle by which is subordinated to, and depends upon, a principle which insofar as it is sustained by it and receives some being from it in its own way; since, according to the common axiom of the philosophers, the mode of operation follows the mode of being. Therefore, an intelligible species, which is an accident and is sustained as to its being by the operating principle, as that which it depends upon, will depend upon and be subordinated to it with respect to its operation (using the phrase as explained presently), but not insofar as it is a subsistent form and a complete act, since as to its being it does not depend upon it.

88 This doctrine must be understood even though the principle which is not absolutely and simpliciter of that kind, but only in a certain respect, as happens in our intellect, which in a certain respect has the character of a principle by which with respect to intellection; the cause of which is called in a certain sense intelligible, but does not absolutely and simpliciter have the character of a principle which: because it completes the whole suppositum, namely, a human being or an angel; for the suppositum is precisely that which absolutely and simpliciter is called intelligible.

89 Nor does it tell against this that the principle quo cannot proceed into operation without the principle quod, just as it does not tell against the first cause, which concurs with the second cause by general concurrence, that it cannot (as many think, as discussed elsewhere) produce an effect without the concurrence of that same second cause, so that the latter may depend on the former. Because in both cases the same reason applies, namely, that the second cause does not confer power upon the first to act; quite the contrary is true. Similarly, the principle which does not confer force and the reason of acting, as such, upon the principle by which; least of all when the principle of acting quo subsists in itself, as does the divine essence, even when considered in the character of an intelligible species, as happens. Quite the contrary, the principle of acting quod has such being from the principle that constitutes it.

90 Finally, even if it is admitted that in other things the formal principle by which is subordinated to the principle which, this should nevertheless not be admitted in the intellect and the intelligible species; and the difference between the two cases is drawn from the proper nature of the intellect and the intelligible object, as was explained in the preceding doubt, n. 61. For in other things the formal principle which does not pass into the nature of the principle by which, or (which amounts to the same here) is not identified with it, but remains altogether distinct from it, so that a third thing arises from both. In the intelligible order, however, the intellect in some way passes into the intelligible object: because the intellect becomes identically the very thing understood, and this is in a certain way poured into the very nature of the intellect insofar as it is identified with the object. Therefore, although the intellect may in its own way inflow as a principle which, the object nevertheless will not be subordinated to it: because the intellect is intelligibly the object itself, and nothing is subordinated to itself.

91 Nor does it tell against this that the identity of the created intellect with the understood thing is an identity in a certain sense only, not an identity of every kind that excludes a real actual distinction in esse entitativo, et naturale between the two, and consequently does not appear incompatible with a real subordination of one to the other.

This therefore does not tell against it. Because although the same identity is present there, involving a real distinction in esse entitativo, what must chiefly be considered in the intellect and the intelligible object, if they are considered in the intelligible order and intelligible being, is that identity in the intelligible order of one with the other and the real distinction in entitative being involved there, which is imported materially (although almost always indispensably), whether through the imperfection of the power, or of the species, or of both, as happens in us—not by reason of the fact that an intelligible species of itself and indispensably demands it from the force of its own line. Therefore, attention must chiefly be given to this identity, and the intellect and object must be philosophically considered in the intelligible order as if they were not distinguished in entitative being. And thus, if there is any material subordination there in entitative and material being, it need not be found in this most perfect species; indeed, not even in other species when they are considered precisely with respect to the formal character of their proper line.

92 Hence, when it is said that the intellect becomes in a certain sense the thing understood, the term quodammodo excludes the claim that one necessarily becomes another in esse entitativo, but not in esse intelligibili. Because becoming one with another in esse intelligibili alone demands, at least necessarily and indispensably, the identity explained in the cited place and to be explained more fully in the treatise De scientia Dei, disp. 2, nn. 83–92; and the diversity that intervenes there (which can arise only from information, or from accidental being, or from the substantial mode of being of the species itself) does not arise formally from the intelligible order, but is materially imported from esse entitativo, however indispensably it may be joined there. The reason for the present, at least, is this. For just as a human being and a lion are the same in the character of an animal, because although they are distinguished by their proper differences, they are not distinguished by the reason of animality; and therefore, if those differences did not lie within the proper line, a human being and a lion would be positively the same in the character of an animal, so too, because the diversity intervening between object and intellect, once the union of one with the other is posited, does not arise from the intelligible order but from information, or from adherence in esse entitativo, or from the fact that an intelligible species has its esse entitatively under the mode of a subject with respect to the intellect, or from the imperfection of the power. For all of these stand in a material relation to the intelligible order; whereas the intellect, by reason of the species, has numerically the same nature as the object, albeit under another mode of being, namely, intelligible, as we shall say in the aforementioned treatise De scientia Dei, disp. 2, n. 14. Therefore, with this qualification, namely, in the intelligible order, the intellect must itself become the thing understood. See our Complutensians in the De Anima, disp. 18, q. 4, and what we shall assert in the recently cited disp. 2, nn. 83–92.

§ III. A difficult objection and its first answer.

93 But you will object: The essence of an angel, insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species with respect to its own intellect, does not concur actively with respect to its own knowledge; and this for no other reason than that the said intellect is determined on its own side with respect to the knowledge of the angel itself. Therefore, the fact that a power is determined on its own side with respect to the knowledge of some object removes its need for active concurrence on the part of the object insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species. Consequently, since the intellect infused with the light of glory is determined on its own side with respect to the clear vision of God, it will not need an active influx from the divine essence insofar as it has the character of a species. The major is evident. Because the essence of an angel, which is a created substance, cannot be immediately operative, and consequently cannot inflow actively through the mode of a species: because this concurrence is provided immediately by the species. The minor is also evident. Because the fact that an angel's intellect does not need the active concurrence of another with respect to the said knowledge must arise from its being sufficiently determined within the order of an efficient cause. Hence, if it is not determined actively in this order on the part of the object, it must arise solely from a determination on every side by itself.

94 It is confirmed. For either the reason of a species necessarily requires the reason of an active principle, and not one in just any manner, but one free from the imperfections of subordination and dependence; or else it requires that reason involved together with those imperfections. If the first, there will be no reason why this reason, free from the said imperfections, would not be found in the essence of an angel insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species, since it is a subsistent form and a most perfect act, and therefore, even if it is a substance, it will nevertheless be immediately operative; otherwise it will not have the character of a species. If the second, therefore the reason of an intelligible species will not be found in the divine essence with respect to created intellect.

95 This objection can be answered by denying the major. Against this, nothing follows from the proof. Because for the reason of an intelligible species and its active concurrence, it is enough that it concur actively at the radical level through itself, and proximately through its power, as occurs here.

This is explained. For the angelic intellect arises from the essence of the angel, both insofar as it is an intellectual act and insofar as it is actually intelligible, and therefore has the character of an object, because its essence by the reason of its immateriality has both. And the said intellect proceeds from it at the same level of immateriality; and when it thus proceeds from it according to these reasons, so as to be rooted in it according to both, or so as to be intimately united with it, it can by the peculiar right arising from this rooting or union flow from it through the mode of that power insofar as it is intellectual and insofar as it is an actually intelligible object. Consequently, it does not need a new proximate concurrence of that same essence insofar as it is intellectual, distinct in some way from the proximate influx of the intellect as subordinated to the radical active principle. The radical concurrence of the essence of the angel and the proximate concurrence already mentioned of its intellect are enough, as our Complutensians show in 2 Physic., disp. 10, q. 4, and q. 6. Likewise, it does not require a new proximate concurrence insofar as it is an intelligible object: because the said intellect is its proximate power of acting, considered under both reasons.

96 It makes no difference if one objects to this answer. First, because if this is sufficient for the essence of an angel to have the character of a species with respect to its own knowledge, then it will follow that the same is also sufficient for the divine essence, insofar as it is an intelligible species with respect to the blessed intellect, to perform the function of a species. Thus, it itself will inflow only by radical active concurrence, and not proximately; but the light of glory, flowing from it insofar as it is intellectual and insofar as it is actually intelligible, will supply this proximate concurrence. Because what is granted to the angelic intellect cannot be denied to the light of glory, which is of a superior kind.

Secondly (as follows from the proposed answer), the angelic intellect has of itself, primarily and directly, the character of an intelligible species with respect to the knowledge of that same angel, and therefore the essence itself cannot be an intelligible species with respect to that knowledge. The consequence of this latter incongruity seems certain as to the first part. Because just as that which flows immediately and by natural emanation from the essence of the angel insofar as it has the character of an intellectual nature, and therefore of the primary and radical power of understanding, cannot fail to be a power that is proximately intellectual and makes the angel proximately intellectual on the part of power, so that which proceeds from it insofar as it has the radical character of an intelligible object cannot fail to be proximately intelligible and confer on that same essence the property of being proximately intelligible. Therefore, it will of itself have, primarily and directly, the character of an intelligible species with respect to the said essence, since this, and nothing else, is the proper function of an impressed species, as may be seen in sensible species. The second part is also evident. Because it is repugnant that, with respect to one and the same indivisible knowledge of one object, nature should confer a twofold intelligible species, as is evident in itself and is clearly inferred from what our Complutensians teach in Physic., disp. 15, q. 3, n. 97.

97 This therefore makes no difference. For in answer to the first objection, it must be said that the reasons differ. Because the light of glory arises from the divine essence insofar as it is clearly intelligible to itself, but not insofar as it is an object actually intelligible in itself to itself: because although the divine essence by the reason of its infinite immateriality has both, nevertheless, so that the light of glory may arise from it precisely¹, insofar as it is intellectual and through the mode of the elevation of the created intellect, it need not agree with it at the same level of immateriality; otherwise, when it proceeds from that same divine essence insofar as it also has the character of an object, it agrees with it at the same level of immateriality. Because what proceeds from it according to this second character holds itself according to the same character on the object side, and is therefore commensurate with it at the same level of immateriality, as we shall examine in the following doubts; just as what arises from it according to the former character, namely, insofar as it is clearly intelligible to itself, holds itself on the power side through the mode of that elevation, and therefore need not be commensurate in immateriality with the object. Since, therefore, it is repugnant for the light of glory, or for any other creature, to have the same level of immateriality as the divine essence, it follows that it is likewise repugnant for it to arise from that essence insofar as it has the said character of an intelligible object, and therefore through the mode of that power considered according to this character. Thus, either the divine essence does not inflow actively through the mode of an intelligible species, which we have disproved, or it inflows proximately: because nothing inflows radically in any order unless the proximate power of influx arises from it in that same order.

Moreover, the intellect of an angel arises from its essence, both insofar as its power is intellectual and insofar as it is actually intelligible. First, because it agrees with it at the same level of immateriality; and thus on this point nothing prevents it from flowing from it insofar as it is actually intelligible through the mode of its own power. Secondly, because the essence of an angel, insofar as it is an object actually intelligible in itself, must inflow actively into its own intellection, as is clear from the reasons given above for the assertion, applied proportionately. And since it cannot be immediately operative insofar as it is a created substance, it must inflow radically active, and consequently a proximate power must arise from it according to this character, namely, the intellect, by which it acts immediately. Thus the said essence can of itself have a radical influx, and can act proximately through its intellect, and consequently can concur of itself by the proper concurrence of a species: because for this purpose any active influx is sufficient, whether proximate or radical.

98 For the second objection, however, the consequence must be denied as to both parts. In answer to the proof of the first part, on which the proof of the second depends, once the antecedent is granted as to the first part, the consequent must be distinguished in the final part. It must be denied that conferring on the same essence the property of being proximately intelligible means having the power, through the mode of an object, or of an intelligible form, and within the genus of a formal cause or quasi-formal cause in the intelligible order, of determining the intellect proximately. It can be granted that there is a proximate power of actively concurring through the mode of an intelligible object. The consequence must then also be denied. And in answer to the proof that the proper and indispensable function of an intelligible species is nothing else, this is the root of the latter claim. Nor does the instance from sensible species demonstrate anything. For those species formally have the character of such species because they perform that function prior to the species, although on the later account they must also perform it for the reason that will now be assigned.

99 This is explained. Just as the intellect flowing from the essence of the angel insofar as it is intellectual flows only to confer on it what it lacks itself, and therefore confers on it only that by which it may inflow immediately and proximately, because this alone was lacking to the said essence on its own side, so also the same intellect, insofar as it flows from the said essence as an intelligible object, arises from it only by natural emanation in order to confer on it what, according to this character, the said essence does not have. Since the essence itself formally and proximately determines the intellect, within the already-mentioned genus of a formal cause, with respect to the specification of the act, because it is itself formally and proximately united with the intellect through the reason of its immateriality in the character of a proximately intelligible object; and because by the reason of that same immateriality it has the same nature under the immaterial and intelligible mode of being that it itself retains as intellectual under the natural mode of being; and because the same essence has the radical active power to inflow through the mode of an object into its own intellection, the intellect therefore does not arise from it so considered in order to confer on it the function of determining and uniting itself in the specified manner with that intellect, or of concurring radically in intellection. Rather, because the essence itself, by the general reason of created substance, is only radical in any order and is the root of operating powers both in the natural and intelligible orders, as we have already said, the intellect alone arises from it through the mode of that power considered as proximate, making it the object proximately intelligible. Since that function consists only in proximately active influx, while the prior function of determining and at least influencing radically must first be required and suffices for the character of a species, the essence of the angel, and not its intellect, therefore possesses the character of the said intelligible species.

From this also it is clear why a power proceeding from a sensible object, insofar as it is such, has the character of a sensible species. For such objects are not of themselves actually sensible because of the maximum materiality they contain; and because they cannot be united immediately to sense for the reasons advanced in the preceding doubt (applied proportionately here), and therefore a power arising from them in order to confer what they lack must confer on them the property of being proximately sensible, both the power of uniting itself to sense and determining it and the proximate power of concurrence. Thus it will possess the true character of an impressed species.

From all these considerations the confirmation of the principal objection is sufficiently established.

§ IV. A second answer to the same objection.

100 Second, and better still, the principal and difficult objection proposed above, as well as its confirmation, are answered by holding that the essence of an angel, insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species, inflows of itself actively and proximately into intellection, and not merely formally, or with radical active influx, as the graver disciples of St. Thomas commonly infer from the cited place. In answer to the proof, it must be said that although the substance of an angel cannot be the immediate principle of operation through the mode of an active power, and consequently cannot be so in esse entitativo, et naturale, it can nevertheless be so through the mode of a species and in intelligible being: because an intelligible species is not an active power, but a determination in intelligible being of the proximate active power, namely, the intellect, with respect to the specification of the act, as we have already shown. And although it is repugnant for a substance to be immediately operative through the mode of an active power, it is not repugnant through the mode of such a determination, not in just any manner, but in the intelligible order. The essence of an angel must therefore be distinguished in itself insofar as it has the character of nature, namely, an intellectual nature, and insofar as it is an actually intelligible object, or insofar as it has the character of a species. According to this latter character, some immediate activity must be granted to it, but not according to the former.

101 But you will say that, because St. Thomas below, q. 54, a. 2, shows that the substance of an angel is not immediately operative through the mode of an active power—since in creatures being (or substantial existence) and operating are really distinguished, and consequently the power toward being (namely, substance) and the power toward operating are really distinguished—yet this reason also proves that the essence of an angel cannot be the immediate principle of operation through the mode of a species and of the determination of an intellectual power. Therefore, the said activity must be granted in both cases or denied in both. The major is certain. The minor is also evident. Because the being of the essence of an angel insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species and its operation (namely, intellection) are also really distinguished, and thus even supernaturally the substance of the angel insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species could remain with its being without its intellection. Therefore, its substance and the power of acting through the mode of the active operation determination of the intellect will be really distinguished: because they regard the said acts as their proper specific difference, and consequently the angel cannot in any way be an immediate active power with respect to intellection.

102 It is confirmed. Because created intellection must necessarily be an accident, as St. Thomas shows in the cited q. 54; therefore, the essence of an angel, which is a substance, cannot primarily regard it of itself, and therefore cannot in any way be the immediate reason of acting with respect to it. This final consequence follows sufficiently from the first. Because every reason of acting that inflows proximately and actively into an operation regards that operation primarily, since it is considered primarily by nature as such an operating reason. The first consequence is also evident. Because, as our Complutensians show in 2 Physic., disp. 10, q. 4, substance cannot primarily regard anything outside its own category, because it is ordered to itself, and therefore St. Thomas proves that to be immediately operative is implied in substance; otherwise it would not primarily regard the operation for the reason just stated, while regarding it simultaneously, because the whole reason of proximate acting is for the sake of operation. Therefore, it primarily posits a transcendental relation to operation.

103 It is answered that, even granting that the being or existence of the angel insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species and most formally belongs to the intelligible order is distinguished from intellection (the contrary of which we shall show from St. Thomas in the treatise De scientia Dei, disp. 3, n. 7, and in the treatise De voluntate Dei, disp. 2, n. 34), the objection nevertheless proves nothing. Because the substance of an angel, insofar as it has the character of nature, and its immediately operative power, are not really distinguished simply because the substance in some way regards substantial being and the operative power operation, but because the former primarily of itself regards its own being through the mode of a receptive power, whereas the latter of itself tends toward its operation through the mode of an active power, as the cited discussion and question show in the Complutensian College. Yet the same angelic substance, insofar as it is an intelligible object, although it regards both its substantial being, using the qualification just stated, and intellection, nevertheless, when considered according to this character, is not distinguished from itself as regards these two things: because it primarily regards intellection and secondarily its own being. Therefore, insofar as it has the character of an object and of an intelligible species, it can of itself be the immediate reason actively eliciting intellection. The same is true, with proportion preserved, of heat, which although it regards being and operating nevertheless, because it primarily regards operation and secondarily being, as the cited question of the Complutensian College explains in q. 5, can of itself be an immediately operative power.

Why the essence of an angel, insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species, primarily regards operation alone is sufficiently inferred from the nature of that same species. For since a species is of itself primarily instituted to actualize, complete, and perfect the intellectual power, and since the intellectual power of the angel already has, according to this mode of speaking, its own being, and only objective activity and determination are lacking to it, it follows that the object, insofar as it has the character of a species, is primarily instituted for intellection. For just as the same essence, insofar as it has the character of essence and nature, already possesses the being that it primarily regarded and merely needs a power that is immediately operative, the intellect therefore is primarily instituted through the mode of its active power for operation, and secondarily regards being. But on these matters, see the Complutensian College in the cited place.

104 Nor does it tell against this a tacit reply hidden in this same objection, which can be put as follows. Although, from this premise, that the essence of an angel insofar as it has precisely the character of an object and species is not really distinguished from itself when considered according to this character, insofar as it regards being and operating—because it primarily regards operation and secondarily being—this is otherwise when it is considered according to both characters, namely, insofar as it is nature and insofar as it is an intelligible object, because insofar as it is an intelligible object it primarily regards operation, whereas as nature it primarily tends toward being, or toward its existence; and it is not for any other reason that the same essence and its immediately operative power are really distinguished, except that the said essence primarily regards being, whereas the immediately operative power primarily tends toward operation.

This therefore does not tell against it. Because the reason for which the substance of the angel, insofar as it has the character of essence and nature, is really distinguished from its immediately operative power is not that, according to its essence, it in some way primarily regards being or substantial existence and that its operative power primarily tends into operation; but that this is proper to each in the same entitative order. Therefore, when the essence of the angel, insofar as it has the character of nature, primarily regards in the entitative order its being and existence, and insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species it primarily tends in another order, namely, in intelligible being and, in the manner now explained, toward operation, no real distinction between itself considered as nature and itself considered as an intelligible species can be inferred: just as, although it is repugnant for the same intellect to be simultaneously an act, a form, and a mere potency in entitative being, it is not repugnant that it be an act in entitative being and a mere potency in the intelligible order.

105 This is explained. For the essence of an angel, insofar as it is an intelligible object, is a determination of the intellect, not in just any manner, but in the intelligible order; and therefore, insofar as it has the character of an object, or of an intelligible species, it does not regard operation except as founded in, and identified with, the esse entitativo, et naturale of the same essence. Because it belongs to intelligible being, at least created intelligible being, to be founded in, and identified with, in the manner suggested above, some esse entitativo, et naturale, as is evident in itself and as St. Thomas teaches in 2 De Anima. Hence, in this intelligible determination, an entitative, or real, distinction is not taken from that same root, nor is its proper formal reason: because an entitative, or real, distinction is taken from entitative and natural being, and therefore the essence of one angel, insofar as it is an intelligible object, cannot be really distinguished from itself insofar as it has entitative and natural being, but can certainly be distinguished from any other essence of another angel. Its most formal reason, however, is drawn from intelligible operation, which it primarily regards through the mode of active determination, placed in the intelligible order. On the other hand, immediately active power, for example the intellect, as well as the receptive power of substantial being, namely, the same angelic substance, claim for themselves their proper formal reason and their proper entity from the same source: because each has its own through a relation to its proper entitative, or natural, act, primarily regarded as such. And therefore, when this is multiplied, those things are multiplied as well.

106 In answer to the confirmation, it is said that the essence of an angel, insofar as it is formally a substance, never primarily regards an accident as such. For if we speak of it insofar as it is a substance in the intelligible order, that is, insofar as, in an intelligible manner and through the mode of a first act in this order, it unites the object, namely, the essence of the angel as belonging to the intelligible order, with an intellectual power, then intellection itself, insofar as it terminates the relation of the said species, is not formally an accident, but only materially, although otherwise it necessarily has the character of an accident from other principles, and so it terminates most formally, under the character of a union through the mode of a second act of the same object with the intellect. Thus, in God the most formal character of intellection and of actual union with the object is found, but not the character of an accident.

But if we speak of it insofar as it is a substance in the entitative and natural order, then, just as insofar as it most formally has the character of an intelligible species, it is something material and accidental that it is a substance in esse entitativo, so too, from the fact that insofar as it is taken in the character of an intelligible species it primarily regards operation, it does not follow that, insofar as it has the character of a substance in esse entitativo, it primarily regards that operation; because according to that precise and most formal character of an intelligible species, it is not a substance in esse entitativo, et naturale.

107 The reason why a species, insofar as it is taken in the most formal sense of a species, is something material and accidental that it is either a substance or an accident in esse entitativo, et naturale is sufficiently clear from what has been said, and can moreover be explained as follows: because, as the Thomists note very well, a created species abstracts both from a created species that is an accident in esse entitativo and from a created species that is a substance in that same entitative being, insofar as the essence of an angel can be said univocally of both. Thus, the essence of Gabriel, insofar as it serves as an intelligible species with respect to its own intellect, and an intelligible species that is an accident in esse entitativo and that naturally represents that same essence of Gabriel, are of the same atomic essence in the character of an intelligible species. Because although, in the being of a thing, or in esse entitativo, substance and accident agree only by analogical essential agreement, they can nevertheless agree univocally in intelligible being, with respect to which these two characters in esse entitativo are material and accidental.

108 This can be declared and established even more clearly from the fact that, for two intelligible species to be of the same atomic character, two things are considered: first, that they have the same immateriality in entitative being; and second, that intelligibly, or in intelligible being, they unite the same object with a power—whether both are required formally of themselves, or one is required materially of itself and the other formally of itself alone, as will be explained later. Now, an intelligible species representing the nature of Gabriel that is in the intellect of Michael, and which in entitative being is an accident, and the essence of that same Gabriel, which in entitative being is a substance, can on the one hand agree in entitative being at the same level of immateriality (as will be clear from what we shall say in this same disp., dub. 6, because accidents can be of the same immateriality as substance, as is clear in the angelic intellect, which has the same immateriality as the substance of an angel), and on the other hand each species intelligibly unites one and the same intelligible object with a power. For just as the essence of Gabriel is itself intelligible by the reason of its immateriality, and therefore intelligibly unites itself with its own intellect, so the intelligible species of that essence remaining in the intellect of Michael, which is an accident in entitative being, is of the same nature in intelligible and representative being with that same angelic essence of Gabriel, as we shall say in this disputation and shall pursue more fully in the treatise De scientia Dei, disp. 2; and therefore [the intelligible species] intelligibly is one and the same essence of Gabriel with the intellect of Michael. Consequently, they can agree in the character of an intelligible species by univocal and atomic, or (better said) numerical, agreement, as will be clear from what is said in num. 31 of the cited treatise De scientia Dei, where this same point will be elucidated further.

109 From this it also follows that a certain objection which greatly troubles some is of no importance, namely, that the created intelligible order is formally something real, and consequently is formally either a substance or an accident, because created real being is formally and within its own line divided into being of itself or being in another.

This objection therefore easily collapses from what has been said. For at most it follows from it that being a substance or an accident in intelligible being is of itself and formally with respect to the character of an intelligible species; that is, that, among differences contracting the character of an intelligible species within its own line, it is either being a substance in this order or being an accident in this same order, so that a species representing, or uniting, a substance with the intellect is a substance in the intelligible or representative order, whereas one uniting an accident is an accident; but if it unites only the reason of being as such, then it is only being in the intelligible order, not being a substance or accident.

Hence, the division of created being into being of itself or being in another according to entitative being is at most formal and within the proper line with respect to being as entitative and natural, as is said; but otherwise, with respect to the line and order of intelligibility, it says this character only materially and accidentally, while of the formal it says what has been stated about the union of object and power, and, at least materially (though formally in itself), of the real immateriality in esse entitativo. And that immateriality is of such a condition that a species representing something quidditatively agrees with it in esse entitativo at the same level of immateriality, according to what we shall say in disp. 7 of this same treatise. Consequently, of itself and within its proper line, it is divided at least in the manner now suggested, by a distinct immateriality insofar as it belongs to the entitative order.

110 We said ut pertinentem ad ordinem entitativum. For whether an intelligible species, insofar as it belongs to the intelligible order, is divided not only materially of itself, but also formally of itself, by immateriality as it pertains to the intelligible order (of which something will be touched in this treatise) will be clear from what will be adduced below in this treatise and in De scientia Dei. For now, however, we assert only that, if such immateriality as pertains to the intelligible order formally divides an intelligible species within its line of itself, then precisely because a species unites some object in esse intelligibili and agrees with it in immateriality in esse entitativo, it must also have the same immateriality as that object insofar as it pertains to the intelligible order.

From all these considerations, the distinction clearly appears between other things, for example created wisdom and even a created intelligible species. For although created wisdom, insofar as it is created wisdom as such, may in its own way be either a substance, or a quality resting in such a thing, or such a species of quality, yet as created wisdom it formally and within its own line bears the character of the said quality in esse entitativo. A created intelligible species, however, for example the species of the highest angel, says that it is an accident, or a quality, in esse entitativo only materially and accidentally, not formally and within its own line. But this will be treated at length in the treatise De scientia Dei, disp. 2, dub. 1, § 5, and dub. 2, § item 5, and frequently elsewhere in these same doubts.

§ V. The argument of the first opinion is satisfied.

The first is clear from what was said from n. 84 through n. 92.

111 In answer to its confirmation, however, the consequence must be denied. In answer to the proof, it must be said that the species, considered in the formal character of species, is identified in esse cognoscibili with the intellect, as is clear from what was said in the preceding doubt and from what will be said in the recently cited disputation; and thus, although considered in itself it does not equal the perfection of cognition, yet, insofar as it is identified with the intellect, it equals it in the same way as the intellect itself. Hence, just as if in² entitative and natural order they were identified, that entity, as though composed from both characters, could actively elicit vital intellection in the same order without real subordination, so likewise, precisely because they are identified in the intelligible order, that same entity, as though coalescing from the power of knowing and the species, can inflow actively into that very intellection without the said subordination.

However, although the said species and intellect are really identified in the specified order, they are nevertheless distinguished in that same order virtually, or formally, and also really potentially, as we shall say in the treatise De scientia Dei, disp. 3, nn. 84 and 94. Therefore, it is necessary to explain how, insofar as thus distinguished, they can inflow actively into vital cognition.

112 We say, therefore, that the species, still considered as virtually and really potentially distinguished from the power of knowing with which it is identified in knowable being, has a kind of vitality insofar as it intrinsically has the being of a determination of the vital power as such, and cannot concur otherwise except through the mode of that determination. This is sufficient so that, in its own order and through the mode of the said determination, it can inflow actively together with the power into cognition, even insofar as that cognition is vital. First, because a determination of the vital power, formally considered, intrinsically has a concurrence toward the operations of that power insofar as they are such, and consequently also toward their vitality. Secondly, because, in order that a cause coalescing from diverse reasons of acting, one of which is the determination of another, should inflow, it is not necessary that each contain the effect in a completely adequate way according to the reason toward which it concurs; but it is enough that, if the effect in question is, for example, vital, each reason of acting, namely, the vital power and its determination on the part of the object, have something of vitality, and that in both the whole perfection of the effect be equally encompassed. Because although then neither by itself alone is sufficient, nevertheless each is sufficient (using the expression) in its own order, since a vital determination through the species is required together with the vital power; yet this determination does not itself concur through the mode of a power, nor does the power as such through the mode of an object determination.

This answer can be applied in proportion to the present confirmation, even if it is said that the species and intellect are not really identified even in intelligible being: because for a species really distinct from the intellect in any order to concur actively in vital intellection, it is enough that it intrinsically be a determination of the vital power and that it concur as such.

113 Nor does it tell against this that in the same confirmation it is argued that sensible species cannot have any kind of vitality because they do not proceed from a principle of life. Because in order to possess vitality in the manner explained, it is enough that they be determinations of formally considered vital powers, and that, just as they proceed from material things insofar as they have some participation in immaterial and separated substances, as our Complutensians assert in the books On Generation, so too they proceed from them insofar as, under the character of a knowable object, they are also vital determinations of their powers.

This entire answer can be clarified from the fact that the radical and proximate powers of understanding, as well as the intelligible species and intellection, belong to one and the same line of intellectual life; and therefore, wherever this line is found in all its purity and through the mode of a most pure act, as happens in God, there all these things are one and the same, even in formal identity without even a virtual distinction, as will be clear from what we shall say in the treatise De scientia Dei, disp. 3, nn. 17, 46, and 47, and in the treatise De voluntate Dei, disp. 2, n. 34.

114 Therefore, just as for this reason both the radical power and the proximate power of understanding, as well as intellection itself, express in God their own, so to speak, peculiar mode of life, so also an intelligible species must express its own peculiar vitality in him; otherwise, it would not belong to one and the same line of intellectual life. And since this peculiar vitality cannot subsist in anything other than this, namely, that the intelligible species is a vital determination that holds itself on the object side with respect to the intellect, through which it is fecundated with respect to intellection, so that, although all these things are not even virtually distinguished in God, they are nevertheless truly found in him, and that very same formal identity performs all these functions, it follows that the divine essence, insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species and according to this character is united with created intellect, has its own peculiar vitality, and according to this character can inflow into the beatific vision as vital. We say the same thing, in proportion, of other intelligible or sensible species. Because all of these have their own proportionate vitality, already indicated and distinct from the vitality that is in the vital power.

115 The second is clear from what has been said: that the divine essence, insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species, formally concurs of itself, not however in just any manner, but as applied through the intellect and the free divine will, just as, with proportion preserved, the subsistent Word terminates the humanity of Our Lord Christ by the reason of its proper reality. Nevertheless, because of its eminence, it is fitting that it be applied through the intellect and the divine will, as we explained in the preceding doubt. Moreover, the very same essence, insofar as it formally concurs by general concurrence, inflows through an executive power, namely, through its practical knowledge, as through the power of acting that is proximate in its own way. How this is to be understood will be touched upon in the treatise De voluntate Dei, and will be explained more fully below, q. 14, disp. 5, n. 43.

116 In answer to the third, the consequence must be denied. In answer to the proof, it must be said that the divine essence, of itself and by its own reason, is united in the character of an intelligible species, and consequently of itself and by its own reason inflows actively into vision, because without a virtual distinction it is its own being of existence in the intelligible order, and consequently in the natural and entitative order: since in the divine essence these two orders are so identified that they are not even virtually distinct, as we noted in n. 70, and as we shall say in the treatise De scientia Dei, disp. 3, n. 23, and disp. 4, nn. 15–19. The divine relations, however, are not their own being in intelligible being without a virtual distinction, and consequently neither are they in entitative being: because divine intellection, which is the existence of the intelligible order, as we shall say in the treatises De scientia Dei, disp. 4, n. 7, and De voluntate Dei, disp. 1, n. 21, and thereafter, and the very existence of God in entitative being is likewise without a virtual distinction by the reason of its own eminence, as are all the other things found in God, must be wholly identified with the divine essence without a virtual distinction, but not with the divine relations.

117 The reason why, in order for something to be united of itself and by its own reason in the character of an intelligible species with respect to seeing God, it is required that it be its own being of existence in the intelligible order, and consequently in the entitative order, is sufficiently inferred from what we shall say in the treatise De scientia Dei, disp. 3, n. 36 and following, where we shall show that the divine relations are not united of themselves and by their own reason with divine intellect in the character of an intelligible species with respect to the vision of themselves, because they are not their own being of existence in the entitative and intelligible order. Hence, since the vision of the blessed is a participation in the uncreated vision of God, and is produced through the same species as that vision, as the theologians teach commonly and as will be clearer from what is to be said in the cited place, it follows that the divine relations are not united by their own reason with the intellects of the blessed with respect to the vision of themselves, but only by the reason of the essence; and consequently that, by their own reason, they do not have active influx into the said vision.

118 Having explained by which intelligible species God is seen in fact, it remains for us to explain whether it is possible, at least by divine power, that He be seen quidditatively and clearly through another species, namely a created one, infused by God Himself.

§ I. Opinion affirming it.

The affirming position is held by Aureolus in 4. dist. 49, quaest. 2; Scotus in the same, quaest. 11, § respondeo; Suarez in his Metaph., disput. 30, section 11, from num. 27 to 33, and 1. part. of the Summa Theologiae, lib. 2, cap. 13; Valentia, tom. 1, disp. 1, quaest. 12, puncto 2; Vazquez, 1. part., disp. 38, cap. 2; and others.

It is proved, first. For whenever in some given order there is no repugnance between a created act of intellection and a created intellectual power eliciting that act, neither again will there be repugnance with a created impressed species having its due proportion and commensurability with them: but there is no repugnance, in the supernatural order, with there being given an act of the vision of God as He is in Himself, and the light of glory, which is the intellectual power eliciting such an act, so that both are something created: therefore, neither again will there be repugnance with a created impressed species being given which represents God as He is in Himself. The consequence with the minor needs no proof. The major, however, is clear: partly from an induction made in all the other created acts and created intellectual powers: partly also because, when an intelligible species holds itself in the intellectual order after the manner of a masculine seed fecundating a female, namely the intellectual power with respect to its offspring, namely intellection, it follows that if, in the supernatural order, the aforesaid female and offspring, which are something created, present no repugnance, neither will the created intellectual seed, namely the intelligible species, present any either, since all these things correspond to one another mutually, as may be seen in generations and in natural offspring.

119 Secondly. The intellect endowed with the light of glory naturally demands the concurrence of some impressed species: but not the concurrence of the divine essence, which has the character of an intelligible species: therefore the concurrence of another created species: therefore, even if such a species is not in fact given, because God supplies the place of that one, nothing stands in the way of its being able to be given. The major is clear. Because any intellectual power, and one complete, such as is the intellect together with the light of glory, naturally demands the concurrence of some species, because without it it cannot elicit intellection. The minor, however, is proved. Because when the divine essence, as it has the character of an intelligible species, is the purest act and most immaterial, it cannot naturally be demanded except by an intellect which is the purest act and most immaterial, namely by the divine intellect: for since the intelligible species of Angels have greater actuality and immateriality than the human intellect, their concurrence cannot naturally be demanded by that same intellect, but only by the Angelic intellect.

120 Thirdly. For a created impressed species representing God as He is in Himself to be given, it is not necessary that it have infinite perfection: therefore there will be no repugnance with its being given. The consequence is clear. Because it can be repugnant only on the ground that it demands infinite perfection, as will appear more clearly from itself and from what is said in support of the assertion. The antecedent, however, is proved. Because such a species is desired only with respect to eliciting a clear vision of God, which is of finite perfection: therefore it is not necessary that it contain infinite perfection, but only that which the aforesaid vision has.

It is confirmed, first. Less is required for a species representing God quidditatively only, as He is in Himself, than for a species which represents Him comprehensively: but for the latter infinite perfection is required: therefore finite and limited perfection will suffice for the former. The major is clear. For as comprehensive knowledge of God exceeds purely quidditative knowledge, so the species serving toward the latter is exceeded by that which serves toward the former. The major, however, will appear from itself and from what is said below. The consequence, moreover, clearly follows from both of the premises. For the excess of comprehensive knowledge of God over knowledge of Himself precisely quidditatively is not of any ordinary sort, but infinite: and so likewise the intelligible species corresponding to it will have the same infinite excess over the species representing God quidditatively only, and consequently the latter will be finite.

It is confirmed, secondly. For such a species would not be produced naturally and necessarily by God: but only freely: therefore it could, according to His will, be limited to this, that although it could represent clearly and intuitively an infinite object, namely God, it would nevertheless not represent Him infinitely, but only so far as would be sufficient with respect to eliciting a finite vision. The antecedent is clear: partly because God cannot act beyond Himself except freely: partly also because it is not of the character of an intelligible species that it be produced necessarily by its object, as is clear in the case of the Angelic species, which are produced freely by God, but not naturally, or necessarily, by their objects. The consequence, however, also stands: because a free agent can limit its concurrence, and produce its effect according to so much, or so great, perfection.

121 Fourthly. The clear vision of God itself is the formal likeness of God as He is in Himself: therefore a created impressed species can also be given which is the formal likeness of God as He is in Himself. The consequence is clear from the parity of the reason. The antecedent is D. Augustine, lib. 9 de Trin., cap. 10, at the end: where he affirms in general that every knowledge is similar to the thing known through it; and cap. 11, at the beginning, he teaches this in particular concerning the knowledge of God on the way; and lib. 14, cap. 17, near the end, speaking of the beatific vision, he says: Then a perfect and full likeness of God will be in us, when His vision will have been perfect and full; and in confirmation of this he adduces that of John 3: When He shall appear, we shall be like unto Him, because we shall see Him as He is. Which Anselmus also asserts in the Monologium, cap. 31.

122 Lastly. There is given an expressed species, or created Word, representing God clearly and intuitively: therefore a created impressed species representing Him in the same way can also be given. The consequence is clear. Because an expressed species represents God more formally and more expressly than an impressed one, and has therefore acquired the name of an expressed species: therefore, if a created expressed species representing God clearly and intuitively is given, much more can a created impressed species representing Him in the same way be given; indeed it would be given in fact if God were not united in the manner of an intelligible species with the intellect of the blessed. The antecedent, however, is proved. For the vision, or beatific intellection, is a true vital action and a true becoming, and therefore some terminus must be posited for it in place of light ¹: therefore, since the proper terminus produced through intellection is the Word, or an expressed species proportionate to it, it follows that through the beatific vision, which attains God clearly and intuitively, as He is in Himself, there is produced a Word, or an expressed species, representing God in the same way, namely as He is in Himself.

§ II. The opinion of D. Thomas is preferred.

123 Nevertheless it must be said that by no power can there be given a created impressed species representing God clearly and intuitively, as He is in Himself. Thus D. Thomas, in the places cited, dub. 1 of this disputation, which all his disciples follow, Capreolus in 4. dist. 49, quaest. 5, art. 1; Ferrariolus, 3. cont. Gent., cap. 49; Caietanus in the present place, and below, quaest. 56, art. 3; Soto in 4. dist. 49, quaest. 2, art. 3; Paludanus, quaest. 1, art. 2, concl. 3; Bannez, Zumel, Navarrete, Ripa, Nazarenus, in this article. Which opinion is also held by Alexander, 1. part., quaest. 2, membrum 3, art. 1, ad 2, and quaest. 7, membrum 1; Henricus, quodl. 3, quaest. 1, and quodl. 4, quaest. 7; Durandus in 4. dist. 49, quaest. 2, num. 13, and following, and quaest. 3, in the prolog, num. 12; Marsilius in 3., quaest. 10, art. 2, on the first part, at the doubt arising in 2. concl.; Aegidius in the Castigatory, art. 1; Canariensis below, around quaest. 27, art. 1; Arrubal, disp. 16, quaest. 4; Machin in the present place; and many others.

The assertion is proved from a reason drawn from D. Thomas, quodl. 7, art. 1, and 1. cont. Gent., cap. 56, as also from what was said in dub. 2 of this disputation. For the divine essence is the pure act in the character of the intelligible, and so it is itself intelligibility: therefore it is repugnant that it be, or become, intelligible through something distinct from itself: therefore it will also be repugnant that it be able to be understood through a created species representing it quidditatively and as it is itself. This last consequence follows sufficiently from the previous. For whatever object is rendered intelligible is rendered so through a species representing it quidditatively and as it is itself. The first, however, is clear from the antecedent. For whatever is the formal reason of something cannot be made such through another: as, since union is itself the formal reason of the uniting, it cannot be united through another union distinct from itself: therefore, if the divine essence is itself intelligibility, intelligible through itself, it will not be able to be intelligible through anything distinct from itself, namely through a created species: as, since God is through Himself the very omnipotency that is almighty, and the very wisdom that is wise in all things, He cannot be wise or almighty through a created wisdom or omnipotency.

124 Nor does it matter if you say, first, that this is to be taken only from hence, namely that God cannot be made intelligible to His own intellect through a created species, because from His own force it lies in His power to be intelligible to Himself; but otherwise with respect to other intellects: because with respect to them He is not proportionate in the character of His supreme eminence: and so through such a species the object may be rendered proportionate and intelligible to them.

The contrary is urged against this. Because that God quidditatively, and as He is in Himself, is not understood by a created intellect does not arise from any defect of intelligibility on His part: therefore He cannot be made intelligible through a created species. The antecedent is clear. For God, insofar as He is from Himself, has supreme and infinite intelligibility, by reason of which He can be understood quidditatively both by Himself and by any other intellect whatever: because He is not intelligible in just any way, but He is intelligibility itself by essence, and so He has every characteristic of intelligibility. The consequence, however, is proved. Because a species holds itself on the part of the object: and so it is given only to supply the place and the defect of that object, and for this end, that it be made intelligible on its own part: as, since the light of glory holds itself on the part of the power, it does not render the object intelligible, but confers upon the intellect that it may have the power to see God by essence: therefore, if God, insofar as He is on His own part, is most intelligible to any intellect whatever, He cannot be made, or be, intelligible through a created species.

125 It is confirmed and explained. For the fact that an object intelligible from itself should, by reason of its own eminence, be an object out of proportion with, or surpassing, another, does not argue that something is to be added on the part of that same object itself, namely a species, but something on the part of the power, by which it may be strengthened and made efficacious for reaching it: as, from the fact that the Sun, for example, by reason of its very great clarity, is in being an object out of proportion to, and surpassing, the sight of the Owl, it does not argue that something must be given on the part of the Sun which would render it proportionate, but only that a greater power and efficacy must be added to the visual power of the Owl.

126 Nor does it likewise stand in the way if you say, secondly, that although it belongs to God to be the immediate productive cause of all creatures, it is not thereby excluded that secondary causes may supply concurrence for such a production: therefore, although God is immediately intelligible, it will not be inferred from this that the concurrence of another intermediate cause must necessarily be excluded, namely of the impressed species, through which He may be seen as He is in Himself.

This therefore does not stand in the way, because of the manifest disparity of reason which intervenes between the two. For the concurrence of secondary causes does not confer upon God that He produce, or be able to produce, created effects: and so, if such a concurrence were to confer that upon Him, then God would be the first cause and the first efficient, as is supposed, and at the same time would not have the character of such a cause, since it belongs to the character of a first cause that He have from another nothing which He works, or could work. Nevertheless an intelligible species renders the object intelligible: and so, if God were to be understood through a created species, He would be, and would not be, the first intelligible: He would indeed be so, as is supposed; but He would not be so, because the first intelligible cannot be made intelligible through another being distinct from it, just as neither can the first efficient have from another that which it works.

127 Nor, finally, does it stand in the way if you say, further on, that although God is intelligibility itself, nevertheless He can be made, and become, intelligible quoad an est through other created species, since through them we come, quoad an est, to a knowledge of many things predicable of God, as we said in the annotations on the first article of this question: therefore, even notwithstanding that He is intelligibility itself, He can be made, and be, intelligible quoad quid est, through another created species which is of the highest perfection among all the other created species: since intelligibility itself is no less the reason of its knowing itself quoad an est than quoad quid est. Hence, if the former does not remove from it the fact that it becomes intelligible through a created species quoad an est, neither will the latter either impede its being rendered intelligible quoad quid est through another most excellent, yet created, species.

This last point therefore does not stand in the way. For the divine essence is intelligibility itself, and the reason on account of which it is itself intelligible is not an abstractive and imperfect intelligibility, which cannot be stripped of imperfections and which unavoidably involves the exclusion of quidditative knowledge, such as is that of which the objection treats. Because such an intelligibility cannot belong to the divine essence through itself, since it brings with it its own proper divine quiddity, and is intimately present to any created intellect, so that insofar as it is from itself it can sufficiently move and change that intellect. And so it is no wonder that the same divine essence, by reason of a created species representing the creature first and by itself, and God secondarily and virtually, becomes intelligible by the aforesaid intelligibility, which denotes only an imperfection in the intellect itself and in the created species, but not in God, to whom nothing intrinsic accrues from this, nor is any imperfection thereby insinuated in Him. Nevertheless, to be itself the intelligibility which is the reason of seeing Him by essence and as He is in Himself is a proper intelligibility, answering to the divine essence from its own proper merits, and declaring a perfection that can be stripped of imperfections: and so it cannot belong to the divine essence through anything created, but it must itself thus be intelligible of itself, and its own intelligibility, otherwise it would not be the pure act in the intelligible order, as appears from what has been said above.

128 Nor, finally, does it matter if you press that, if once those things which are said in this solution are true, there will be no repugnance, from the force of this reasoning of D. Thomas which we have just examined, with there being given a species representing God as He is quidditatively knowable, while excluding that He be representable comprehensively through the same; and consequently, that He be able to be seen by the blessed through a created species.

The consequence is proved. First, because God does not, by reason of His being, have the character of being knowable precisely quidditatively, excluding that He be knowable also comprehensively: therefore, although a created species were given which rendered Him knowable precisely quidditatively, it would not follow that it conferred upon Him that which He possesses from Himself and essentially; and consequently neither would the involvement of the aforesaid species follow from this.

Also, because as a species serving toward knowledge quoad an est precisely, excluding quidditative knowledge, essentially declares an imperfection, and therefore God can in some way be made intelligible through this species, since He cannot be knowable from Himself in this way: so likewise, because a species representing God precisely quidditatively, excluding that it represent Him comprehensively, declares an imperfection, it will not be repugnant that God be made intelligible through such a species.

For it is answered by denying the consequence. And to the first proof it must be said that, although to be representable and knowable precisely quidditatively with respect to the divine intellect, excluding that He be representable and knowable also comprehensively with respect to it, declares an imperfection and an involvement, yet to be knowable precisely quidditatively and representable in the same way with respect to a created intellect, excluding that He be comprehensible by that same intellect, or representable comprehensively to itself, argues the greatest perfection. And so, by reason of His supreme and infinite eminence, God has both that He cannot be at the same time quidditatively and comprehensively knowable by His own intellect and representable in that way to it, and that He is at the same time only quidditatively knowable by a created intellect: and therefore a created species of God cannot be given which represents Him still more quidditatively, while excluding that it represent Him comprehensively to a created intellect, lest that which is intelligible from itself essentially should be rendered intelligible in the same way by some other, in a peculiar manner.

129 From this, with respect to the second proof of the same consequence, it is clear in what way a species that in some way renders God intelligible quoad an est, precisely, declares an imperfection: on the ground that it does not pertain to the supreme perfection of God that He be known by creatures quoad an est, excluding quidditative knowledge; and further, on the ground that a species rendering an object knowable quoad an est only is not its own proper species, but that of another thing, with which the thing known in that way has a connection; and consequently the aforesaid species, representing God in this way, will not be His own proper species, but that of some creature, and will itself involve an imperfection. But a species which represents God to a created intellect as knowable precisely quidditatively, but not comprehensively, by that same intellect, does not declare an imperfection on its own part, although it presupposes one on the part of the created intellect: because God, by reason of His supreme perfection, is knowable in this way through Himself and by reason of His own knowability; and so, in Himself and by reason of the character of His essence, He must precisely have the character of a species with respect to that same intellect; and consequently such a species demands infinitude and excludes every imperfection.

Hence, although the reason of comprehensive knowledge can be separated from the quidditative knowledge of God, as may be seen in the intellection elicited in the intellect of the blessed, it nevertheless cannot be separated from the species serving toward such a knowledge; lest (as we said) God should be made intelligible through that species, which is distinct from Him, by that intelligibility which He has through Himself and essentially with respect to a created intellect.

We shall answer the arguments adduced at the beginning of this doubt below, in dubium 8 of this disputation, from num. 187 to 197.

130 Because it is not enough for the true disciples of St. Thomas merely to follow the opinion of the same holy Doctor, but also to defend the arguments that he deliberately advanced against anyone’s calumnies, by showing that they are legitimate and establishing his intention: accordingly, after we have confirmed the opinion of the Angelic Doctor in the preceding doubt 1 of this disputation, and also in the doubt just cited, and have endeavored to fortify it by a reason that he frequently indicated in passing, it remains for us to examine deliberately the proper and distinctive arguments by which, in the present article, he shows this same opinion, and to unfold their force in this and the following doubt, so that the procedure may be clearer and more precise and the efficacy of the arguments mentioned above be better understood.

§ I. The doubt is decided, and the argument of St. Thomas is proposed.

131 It must therefore be said that the first argument adduced by the holy Doctor in this article is legitimate, and sufficiently shows the impossibility of a created intelligible species that represents God quidditatively and clearly. Thus do all his disciples whom we have mentioned in the preceding doubt.

This assertion will be proved no less well by setting forth and explaining the aforementioned argument. The Angelic Doctor himself states it as follows: Since, as Dionysius says in chapter 1 of The Divine Names, the higher things cannot be known in any way through likenesses of things of a lower order: just as the essence of an incorporeal thing cannot be known through the species of a body, so much less can the essence of God be seen through any created species.

132 It is confirmed and explained by an argument drawn from the same author, Summa contra Gentiles 3, chapter 49, argument 2, and Summa theologiae I, q. 8, De veritate, a. 1. For an intelligible species serving to know an object clearly and as it is in itself is of the same essence and species as that object in its representative being; or, in St. Thomas’s words, it is the very species and quiddity of the thing represented, just as the form of a house that is in the mind of the craftsman is in the representative being of the same species as the form that is in matter—or, rather, as that form’s species. Consequently, such a species and likeness cannot be of a lower order with respect to its object. But no creature can be of the same species and nature as God Himself, even in its representative being, that is, be the very nature and essence of God under the said representative being, as all Metaphysicians and Theologians commonly teach. Therefore no creature can have the character of an intelligible species representing God clearly and as He is in Himself, or serving to know Him in that way.

The minor follows clearly from the consequent. The major, however, is shown by St. Thomas in the cited question, De veritate. For if an intelligible species agrees with its object in representative being according to the generic reason, but not according to the specific reason—and therefore falls short of representing the object’s specific nature, though not the representation of its proper genus—then the thing will be known according to the reason of its genus, not according to the reason of its species. If, however, it also falls short of representing the genus, yet represents it only according to an analogy, then it will not even be known quidditatively according to the reason of the genus, just as if a substance were understood through a likeness of an accident. It is therefore a sign that an intelligible species serving to know some object clearly according to its atom, and its proper reason—that is, according to the object as it is in itself—must have (at least under another mode of being, namely, representative being) a specific agreement with the said object in its own proper and peculiar nature. Consequently, it cannot be of a lower order with respect to that object.

§ II. Vazquez’s and Arrubal’s evasions, and refutations of them.

133 Opponents raise various objections to this argument. First, Vazquez answers that it is false for an intelligible species to be of the same nature or order as its object in representative being, since the object is sometimes a substance, whereas an intelligible species in representative being is an accident; it therefore cannot be of the same specific essence or order as the object, as St. Thomas holds.

But against this: precisely because the created species represents God as He is in Himself, it must express a relation of likeness to God, and therefore this relation must be grounded in some unity with Him—but not merely an analogous or univocal unity that is only generic. It must therefore be univocal and specific unity. Consequently, since every univocal unity or agreement between God and a creature is impossible, a species representing God as He is in Himself cannot but be opposed to Him.

The major is clear with respect to the first part, for an intelligible species is a likeness of its object and therefore must be grounded in and express a relation of likeness to it. The second part follows from the common opinion of the Metaphysicians, who assert that a relation of likeness is grounded in unity and agreement.

The minor is clear as to the first part, namely, analogous unity, for God cannot be represented or seen quidditatively and as He is in Himself through an analogous likeness or representation; otherwise God could be known as He is in Himself through created effects, which is plainly false. As to the second part, namely, univocal unity that is only generic, the same minor is urged as follows: apart from the fact that it is impossible for God and a creature to agree univocally in some generic predicate—otherwise God would be under a genus, which is absurd, as is shown in the Logic, chapter De quantitate, by the Complutensian—there is nevertheless no possibility of knowing God quidditatively and as He is in Himself through that species, but only according to that generic reason. For it would not represent God quidditatively except under the aforementioned generic reason. If it represented the quiddity and atomic reason of God, it would surely be like God in that respect and would have an agreement and quasi-specific unity with God in God’s proper quiddity and nature, since a species, in that which it represents, is like its object and in that in which it is like it has agreement with that object.

134 Nor does it matter if one says, with certain authors, that just as the relation of likeness by which Caesar’s image refers to Caesar himself is grounded not in unity but in measure and the measured, so too the relation of likeness by which a created intelligible species would refer to God would not be grounded in unity but in measure and the measured.

The point is therefore irrelevant. First, because it is impossible for a likeness of one thing to another not to be grounded in some agreement by which the one agrees with the other; otherwise things could not be like one another. It is therefore impossible for that likeness not to be grounded in unity. The consequent is clear, for agreement is the same as unity: whatever agrees in something, insofar as the things agree there, is not distinguished there and therefore is the same there. Moreover, the example of Caesar’s image itself proves this. For Caesar’s proper essence and quiddity cannot be known through that image, but only his external accidents, because it has agreement with him only in those accidents and not in his proper essence and quiddity. This clearly shows that, for an image to represent some object quidditatively and as it is in itself, it must have specific agreement and unity with that object, at least in representative being.

Moreover, even granting that the relation of likeness of the created intelligible species to God, as to its proper object, is grounded in measure and the measured, the objection made against Gabriel Vazquez nevertheless remains in its full force. For if that proportion of the measured to the measure which would obtain between God and the species could not be univocal—whether specific or generic, since, as we have said, nothing univocal can be common to God and creatures—it must be analogous. Consequently, God could not be represented quidditatively and as He is in Himself through such a species, just as for this reason He cannot be represented in the said manner through the species of creatures.

135 Nor is the argument that Vazquez adduces in his own support—that an intelligible species has the character of an accident in representative being, whereas its object is frequently a substance, so that the two cannot be of the same nature—presses against us. For that same representative being of the species, taken realistically, can be considered in two ways: materially, in the being of the thing, or formally, in the being of likeness and representation insofar as it concerns the intelligible order. If taken in the first way, it sometimes has the character of an accident, as appears in sensible species and in very many intelligible species; sometimes it has the character of a substance, as appears in the angel, who knows himself through his own essence as though through an intelligible species, as the Theologians commonly teach. Thus an intelligible species and its representative being, considered in the being of the thing, is sometimes of a lower order and sometimes of the same order as the thing known. But if the intelligible species is taken formally in the being of the species—that is, according to its representative being formally and as accepted in the intelligible being—according to which reason the form itself that is represented, as it has intelligible being in the intelligible species, is said to be present, then it is of the same order and nature as its object. Therefore, if the object is something substantial, the species itself will also be a substance in its representative and intelligible being, because those substantial predicates that are in the being of the thing in the object are contained in the species itself under representative and intelligible being. Hence, although human nature has one mode of being in itself and another in the intelligible species, it is nevertheless formally the same as regards nature. Just as the house in the mind of the craftsman and the house outside, although they have different modes of being, are nevertheless the same form of house in both. These matters will be explained more fully in the treatise On the Knowledge of God, disputation 2, nn. 14–52.

136 Secondly, Arrubal objects that it makes no difference whether the intelligible species is of the same nature as its object, not indeed in entitative being, but in representing or representative being; consequently, it makes no difference either that the created species is in this way of the same nature as God. Some add that this is true because nothing else is required than that it represent God Himself, as He is in Himself, clearly and quidditatively.

But against this: representative being in an intelligible species is not some fictitious being or extrinsic denomination, but a true and real intrinsic being. Therefore, if the intelligible species representing God, as He is in Himself, is univocally of the same nature as God in representative being, it would certainly be the same as God in some true and real being and would therefore have univocal atomic agreement with Him in that real being. As the Metaphysicians and Theologians commonly teach, this is altogether false. Otherwise there would be a real composition in God from genus and difference under some true and real being, which is surely absurd, as the Complutensian well teaches in On the Physics, disputation 18, nn. 20–23.

137 It must further be added that this solution remains refuted by the preceding objection, since it has been sufficiently attacked. For although a species that represents an object clearly and quidditatively is of the same nature as it in representative or intelligible being, and there is in fact nothing beyond its really possessing, from its own nature, the capacity to represent that object quidditatively and clearly as it is in itself and to be like it, nevertheless, in order actually to possess this, it cannot fail to have the same nature univocally and atomically as the said object—not under the natural and entitative mode of being, but in representative or intelligible being. For, as we have just said, it is impossible for anything to represent another thing per se and intrinsically, as it is in itself, and to be like it, without having univocal agreement with it under some real being, whether entitative or representative, in the respect in which it represents that thing and is like it.

138 This is confirmed and explained by the distinction between representing something else and being like it through an extrinsic human imposition, on the one hand, and representing that very thing quidditatively and as it is in itself and being intrinsically and per se like it, on the other. For although something that represents in the former way is not of the same nature as its object but has at most some agreement with it, and is imposed upon it in order to represent it—or, more properly speaking, to signify it—and therefore the external image of Christ can denote and signify Him in this way without having the same nature as He does, nevertheless, whatever represents another thing per se and intrinsically, quidditatively and as it is in itself, and is like it, must have univocal agreement with it under some real mode of being in the very respect in which it represents it. Moreover, to be like another in its own proper and quidditative being necessarily involves the quidditative being that is in one thing existing under some real being in the thing that is like it in the said being. Just as a twofold whiteness is like whiteness in being whiteness involves possessing the nature of whiteness in both. Moreover, otherwise there would be no reason why a thing should represent another per se and intrinsically, quidditatively and as it is in itself and be like it, rather than possess this property with respect to something else, as appears from the terms themselves.

§ III. Another evasion of the Juniors, and its exclusion.

139 Next, others of the Juniors answer that this whole argument of St. Thomas, and what we have said about it, presupposes that the intelligible species is the formal likeness of its object and therefore represents it formally, whereas the species does not represent its object except virtually and by the mode of a seed, and therefore is like it in this respect alone.

The Complutensian, however, best refutes this evasion in On the Soul, disputation 18, q. 2, and Aristotle and St. Thomas show the opposite in n. 26 of the same disputation. The same author then proves it from an argument drawn from St. Thomas in nn. 26–30, and finally in nn. 30–38 by another argument elicited from the Angelic Doctor below, q. 27, a. 2, in these words: The created production of the Word is a certain vital generation, and the Word proceeds in a certain way as a son, that is, not according to natural being, but according to intentional and representative being. Therefore, an intelligible species must be the formal likeness of its object no less than the Word congruent with it is its formal likeness.

The consequence is clear. For what proceeds as something vitally begotten and as a son must be like its principle: indeed, if it proceeds as a son in natural being, it has a being like that principle and is of the same nature with it under such being; but if it proceeds as a son in intentional and representative being, it is like the principle and of the same nature with it in representative being. Therefore, since the intelligible species is the principle that fecundates the intellect in the generation of the Word, the Word and the said species must be of the same nature. Consequently, if the Word formally represents its object, the said species will formally represent it too.

140 The antecedent is proved as follows. First, it is commonly said for this reason that knowledge and the word are produced from the object and the power, because the production of the word is a kind of vital birth or generation, and the word is in a certain sense a son. Moreover, vital generation is the origin of a living being from a living being that is united at the origin in likeness of nature, as the Theologians and Philosophers commonly teach. The production of the word is the origin of a living being from a living being, because the word produced through it is an intrinsically vital terminus proceeding from a vital principle. It is likewise from a united principle, namely, through the intelligible species, which is united to the intellect and exists in the same subject as the word. Finally, the said word proceeds in likeness of nature to its principle, that is, to its object, because in representative being it is altogether like it. Consequently, its procession will be a vital generation, and the word itself will proceed in a certain sense and according to quiddity as a son—or, equivalently, it will proceed as a son in intentional and representative being.

Finally, because according to the common opinion of the Theologians the production of the divine Word by the power of its own line is generation, not generation of some merely restricted kind—that is, generation according to quiddity and only in representative being—but generation simply and in natural and entitative being. For the production of the word in this sense has, by the power of its own line, generation and the production of something naturally like its principle in some sense. Otherwise, if this production did not have, by the power of its own being, generation in some sense, at least according to quiddity and in the manner explained, it would follow that neither the production of the divine Word, which is the most perfect intellectual production, would have by the power of its own line to generate perfectly and simply by producing something naturally like it in natural and entitative being.

141 Nor does it matter if one objects first that, although the Word may be granted to proceed from the intellect as begotten and as a son, it need not therefore be like the intelligible species in representative being, since the principle and principal cause of the generation of the Word is not the intelligible species but the object represented through it. The Word therefore ought not to be like the said species in representative being, but like the object. The consequence is clear, because for something to proceed as begotten and as a son, it suffices that it proceed like its principle and principal cause. Thus Peter, proceeding as a son from his father, proceeds as one like the father, who is the principal cause, not the seed, which has the character of an instrument.

For we answer that the intelligible species, for example, and its object are not included in the account of the production of the Word, or in the order of causing intellection. The object does not concur except insofar as it is made intelligible through the said species, nor does the species exert an influx except insofar as it makes such an object intelligible. Thus they stand in the intelligible genus as form and that of which it is the form. Consequently, in this intellectual generation, what is like the object as its principal principle must also in the same manner be like the intelligible species. In natural and entitative generation, however, the seed and the generator from which the offspring is determined are included in the account of its generation. For the seed is not the form that makes the generator generative and constitutes it in the being of a principle proportioned to generation. The generator, by reason of its natural form, is absolutely the principal principle proportioned to such a principle with respect to natural generation.

142 This can further be explained from the fact that intellectual generation is inward and immanent, and therefore its principal principle must also be inward and united with the intellect. Consequently, such a principle cannot be the object according to the being it has outside the intellect, but according to the being it has in the intelligible species, by virtue of which it is united with the intellect as an inward productive principle. Therefore, the said species and object are not included in the account of the principal principle with respect to such production. Natural generation, by contrast, which is distinguished from intellectual generation and occurs in entitative being, is a procession into external matter. Therefore, its principal principle need not be united with the thing begotten that proceeds as a son, but must rather be separate from it. Accordingly, the seed, which must be united with the thing begotten, is included in the account with such a principle. It is therefore not necessary that, merely because the thing begotten is like its principal principle, it should also be assimilated to the seed.

143 Nor does it stand in the way if, second, one objects that the nature of the intelligible species and the Word cannot be coherent when they are similar and of the same nature in representative being, and consequently that the procession of the Word cannot be a vital generation in representative being. The consequence requires no proof. The antecedent, however, is proved as follows. First, because the Word per se and intrinsically has a being that easily passes away and depends on intellection in its being made (fieri) and preserved (conservari); whereas the intelligible species is self-subsistent and does not easily pass away, and finally does not depend on intellection in being made (fieri) or preserved (conservari). Moreover, otherwise two accidents differing only numerically would exist at the same time in the intellect, namely, the intelligible species and the Word; these are certainly found together whenever an object is understood. Finally, because the Word and the intelligible species cannot fail to be specifically distinguished in entitative and natural being, as the Philosophers commonly teach; they must therefore also be distinguished in the same manner in representative being. The consequence is clear, because both what the intelligible species and the Word have in entitative being and what they have in representative being belong to their specific and atomic difference. Whatever is specifically distinguished from something according to one unequal and atomic reason is also distinguished from it according to other unequal and atomic reasons, as appears inductively. Therefore, and so on.

144 We answer that just as the object and the produced Word are of the same nature and species, although under different modes of being, because the nature and species of the object is in the Word under the natural mode of being but under the intentional and representative mode of being in the word, so also the intelligible species and the Word congruent with it, or representing its primary object, are of the same species of the intelligible species, although under different modes of being within the range of modes contained under representative being. For the intelligible species represents by the mode of a habit; the Word, however, need not represent in this manner, but rather always, or almost always, has an easily transient mode of representing, and thus represents by the mode of a disposition.

Accordingly, just as the object, considered as regards its nature with precision, does not determinately demand the natural mode of being, but indifferently demands either this or the intentional and representative mode of being, so the same nature, considered with the same precision, does not determinately demand the intentional and representative mode of being that the Word has, nor the mode belonging to the intelligible species. Rather, of itself and apart from these three modes of being, it abstracts from them and can have any one of them. Although, when considered not in itself but as it is in the Word, it necessarily involves that mode, yet, considered simply as it is in the object, it indispensably imports its own proper natural mode of being.

145 Therefore, to return to the form of the argument, the antecedent must be denied. The antecedent in the first proof must also be denied if it is understood to concern the Word or intelligible species precisely with respect to their nature or species. For, just as according to this argument, taken with precision, they are of the same nature, so from the side of nature and form they do not determinately demand, as the argument suggests, either a permanent or a transient mode of being.

For the second proof, it must be said that just as the Word and the object not only are of the same nature according to species, but have numerically the same nature under different natural and representative modes of being, as has been said and will be treated more fully in the treatise On the Knowledge of God, disputation 2, n. 14 and following, so also the Word and the species can sometimes be numerically the same nature, although under different modes of being within the range of modes contained under representative being. It follows that from the fact that the species and the Word, corresponding to it per se in the first place, are of the same nature, it does not follow that two accidents distinguished only numerically are simultaneously in the same subject. Rather, one and the same thing, numerically one according to nature and possessing different specific modes of being, is present together with them in the intellect. Let those things be consulted that are discussed in the place cited above.

For the final proof, if the antecedent is granted, the consequent must be denied. To prove the consequent, the major must be denied if it is understood of the species in the being of the species. For according to this reasoning, it imports the natural and entitative mode of being accidentally and materially, that is, the being by which it is a substance or an accident in entitative being, as was touched upon above.

146 Nor, finally, does it stand in the way if one argues that, if the Word and the species are specifically distinguished in intentional and representative being, then the generation of the Word will not be a proper generation of a living being, nor will the Word be in any sense a son, because it does not proceed in specific likeness of nature to its principle under any mode of being, whether entitative and natural or representative.

This therefore is no obstacle. For the notion of vital generation, and for what proceeds through it to be a son in some sense, likeness in nature suffices, even if there is not likeness in the mode of having that nature, but the said modes are distinguished either specifically and within the same order, as occurs in the Word and intelligible species, or within different orders and generically or quasi-generically, as occurs between the intelligible species expressed on the one hand and the object on the other. Although it remains true that, for the said generation to be generation simply and perfectly, and consequently for the thing begotten to be a son simply and perfectly, there must be likeness between the thing produced and the reason of producing it, both in nature and in the natural mode of having that nature, as will be explained in its proper place.

§ IV. Two other solutions, and their refutation.

147 From all these considerations it is clear that none of the solutions is valid. A Junior has argued that St. Thomas, in this argument, did not intend, nor is it proved by it, that God cannot be seen quidditatively and as He is in Himself through an inferior or created species that nevertheless represents Him directly. He intended only that God cannot be represented or seen as He is in Himself through likenesses or species of lower things, that is, through species that directly represent lower or created natures. Accordingly, the holy Doctor expressed himself as follows in the antecedent of that argument: Through likenesses of things of a lower order, the higher things cannot in any way be known, just as the essence of an incorporeal thing cannot be known through the species of a body.

148 Thus, from what has been said, this solution remains refuted. For in St. Thomas and in the truth itself, to be a species lower than some object because of this inferiority and to be unable, on that account, to attain to representing it as it is in itself, are the same as to be a species that represents another thing of a lower order per se in the first place and directly, because the species and its object, as represented per se in the first place and directly, are of the same nature, although they may differ in mode of being. Thus, to be a species of a lower order unable, because of its inferiority, to represent directly and per se in the first place some higher object is the same as not having the same nature as it in intelligible being. Consequently, this is the same as representing another thing of a lower order and having the same nature as it in intelligible being. A species must always be of the same nature as the object represented through it per se in the first place, as has been shown.

Accordingly, so that St. Thomas might indicate that no created species could have the same nature as God, and consequently could not represent Him quidditatively, he supposes every created species to be a species of things of a lower order. It is therefore of the same nature in intelligible being as created essences and objects, and consequently cannot be of the same nature in the same order as God. It therefore cannot serve for a quidditative vision of God, because a species serving for this vision must be of the same nature as God in intelligible being, and consequently must not be a species of a lower thing. Let those things be consulted that will be discussed repeatedly in the treatise On the Knowledge of God, disputation 2, doubt 1.

149 Finally, Suárez and others object that although a species of the same order and nature as God is required to know Him infinitely and adequately, it is not required to know Him finitely and inadequately, just as although a light and an infinite vision of the same reason as the uncreated light and vision of God are required for an infinite and adequate vision of God, they are not required for an inadequate and finite vision of Him.

But against this: there is a very great distinction between the light and vision on the one hand and the intelligible species of God on the other. For light and vision belong to the side of potency, not to the side of the object as representing it quidditatively and as it is in itself. It is therefore not necessary that they be of the same nature and essence in representative being, or under some mode of being with the same object. It suffices that they tend and incline toward it per se, as will appear more clearly below. The intelligible species, however, belongs to the side of the object, as a likeness representing it quidditatively. It must therefore, in representing, be of the same quiddity as the object. And since such representative being, by virtue of which it would represent God and be like Him as He is in Himself, would be a true and real being in the species itself, the species would necessarily have to agree univocally with God in the divine nature, by virtue of which it would be assimilated to Him, as has been said. Consequently, it would have to be infinite simply, indeed infinite in essence, since nothing univocal can be common to God and creatures.

150 Moreover, that intelligible species would arise from God as from an infinite object, and naturally and necessarily, not freely. It would therefore equal the entire knowability of God, and consequently would not only represent the infinite object, namely God, but would represent Him infinitely. This last consequence is clear, because a species that equals the infinite knowability of God cannot fail to represent infinitely. The first consequence is also clear, because by the very fact that it would proceed naturally and necessarily, not freely, it would proceed from God, not insofar as God wills, but insofar as God exists. It would therefore emanate from God according to all His infinite perfection, and consequently would be infinitely perfect. For there would be nothing from which the influx and causality of its infinite object, namely God, would be limited. The antecedent also follows clearly, for whenever an object can imprint its species, it does so naturally, not freely, as can be seen in sensible objects.

151 Nor does it matter if it is said that this is true whenever nothing on the side of the subject limits and constrains the influx of the object, but otherwise when something on the side of the subject limits it, as would occur here because the said species must be received in a created intellect, whose power and capacity are finite, and it would therefore be limited from this source.

This therefore makes no difference. For the notion of an intelligible species, understood as such, does not require that it be an inhering accident. Rather, its essence abstracts from accident and from self-subsisting substance. Therefore, the said intelligible species, representing God quidditatively and as He is in Himself, would be a self-subsisting substance, and consequently could neither be nor ought to be limited by a subject. The antecedent is clear. For in the angels their proper substance and essence have the character of an intelligible species with respect to their own intellect; similarly, the divine essence has this character with respect to the divine intellect and the intellects of the blessed. Finally, other species that are in us and in the angels have the character of an accident. It is therefore a sign that an intelligible species does not, as regards its notion, demand either that it be substance or that it be accident, but abstracts from both. The first consequence also follows from this. For once it does not work against the notion of a species that it be a substance, the said species representing God could have the character of a self-subsisting substance, since it would be the most perfect of all intelligible species. The second consequence also follows from the first prior conclusion. A self-subsisting and total substance, such as the said intelligible species would be in that event, as follows from what has been said, cannot be limited by a subject, because it neither needs one nor is received in one. Let those things be consulted that we shall discuss in the treatise On the Knowledge of God, disputation 2.

152 After we have examined the first argument of St. Thomas, the force of the second must be disclosed, and for this purpose we raise the present difficulty.

§ UNICUS. Decision of the Difficulty.

It must therefore be said that the second argument of the Angelic Doctor—and consequently the impossibility of the aforementioned impressed species—is sufficient proof. Thus do the disciples whom he cites, dub. 4. The assertion is proved by adducing the aforementioned argument, which the Saint Doctor proposes in these words: The essence of God is His very being, as was shown above, which cannot belong to any created form. Therefore no created form can be a likeness representing to the one who sees the essence of God.

153 Opponents meet this argument by saying that just as in us, a species, which is an accident, can represent a substance quidditatively, so also an impressed and created species, although it is not its own being, can represent quidditatively and clearly God, who is His own being.

Nevertheless, this solution remains sufficiently refuted by what we said in the preceding difficulty. For precisely because that species could not represent God quidditatively, as God is His own being, it could not have its own being in the representational being; and precisely because it has this in the representational being, it is most aptly inferred that it must also have its own being in entitative being, and conversely, as is established from the first objection brought against the solution of Suárez in the preceding difficulty. Hence, from the fact that a created form having that actuality according to its entitative being is repugnant, St. Thomas most aptly inferred that such a form cannot represent God, who is His own being.

154 Next, the same solution is refuted, and at the same time St. Thomas’s argument is elucidated, on the supposition, according to the common opinion of the Doctors, that just as an intellectual power which reaches an object quidditatively and clearly by the mode of a simple and perfect power has it by its own merits, and consequently reaches it connaturally, so also an intelligible species, which represents an object quidditatively and clearly by its own merits, naturally represents it, since what belongs to the species by its own merits must also belong to it connaturally.

From this, therefore, the following objection follows, and St. Thomas’s argument is further elucidated. For it is repugnant that an intellectual power should reach some object quidditatively and clearly by the mode of a simple and perfect power, and consequently connaturally, if it be surpassed by that object in the degree of immateriality and actuality: therefore it will likewise be repugnant that an impressed species should represent some object in the same way if it be surpassed by that object in immateriality and actuality. Therefore, since it is repugnant that there should be a created form not surpassed by God in the degree of immateriality and actuality, it will likewise be repugnant that by its own force, and consequently naturally, it should represent Him quidditatively and clearly as He is in Himself.

155 The antecedent is proved. For when, as Aristotle testifies in the second and third books of de Anima (whom all philosophers follow), knowledge requires that the known be in the knower, we must conclude that for connatural knowledge the known cannot have a mode of being more excellent than that of the cognitive power: for if the mode of being of the known object were above the mode of being of the knower, the knower would not receive it connaturally, but above its nature; and consequently its knowledge would not be connatural to the knower either. Since the mode of being required in itself for the knowability of an object and for the cognitive power’s faculty is immateriality, and elevation above matter and its condition, namely potentiality (because, as St. Thomas and the theologians commonly teach below q. 14, from immateriality and an immaterial mode of being the cognitive power has its character as a cognitive power, the species its character as representative, and finally the object its character as knowable), it follows that if the known and the knower are to be connatural with one another, they must agree in their mode of being in such a way that the known does not have a mode of being more excellent than the knower; then the known cannot surpass the knower in the degree of immateriality and actuality.

From this, the first consequence, on which the force of the second argument depends, is sufficiently established: both from the parity of reason and because the intelligible species is posited so that, through it, the known may be in the knower. Thus, unless they have a mode of being as immaterial as the object’s—as we shall explain more fully immediately—[the species] will in this way perform the office of a more immaterial object. Above all, because, as we said in nn. 123 and 141, the intelligible species does not perform the office of an object as an instrument of it, but by the mode of an intelligible form making the object actually intelligible to the intellect in which the aforementioned species is received.

156 This is confirmed and explained by St. Thomas’s reason in arts. 4 and 11 of this question. For according to the multiplicity and diversity of the degrees of immateriality of knowable things, there are multiplied and distinguished just as many degrees of faculties and intentional species corresponding to them: therefore there must be a correspondence in the degree of immateriality and actuality between the power, the impressed species, and the object: therefore, since it is repugnant for there to be a created form corresponding to God in the degree of immateriality and actuality, and consequently possessing such actuality that it is its own being, it will likewise be repugnant for there to be a created form that represents Him quidditatively and clearly. Both consequences are evident.

The antecedent, however, can be proved more excellently only by adducing and explaining the four degrees of immateriality corresponding to knowable things, which St. Thomas assigns in art. 4 of the following question with sufficient elegance. The first and lowest is that of things which have being in individual matter and cannot be separated from it by the intellect, such as singular and material things. The immateriality of this degree consists only in a certain actuality sufficient to change the sensitive power, which is a power elevated in some way above matter, as is commonly said in the De Anima. To this object correspond the sensitive power and sensible and material species possessing the same degree of immateriality, and consequently capable of changing the sensitive power, and no more excellent one.

157 The second is that of things which are in some way in individual, sensible matter, and in some way separated from it, such as the quiddities of material things, because in reality they have being in individual, sensible matter, yet can be separated from it by the intellect. Hence, to this knowable object possessing the aforementioned immateriality corresponds our cognitive power, namely our intellect insofar as it is partly in matter, because it is the act of a soul which is the act of the body, and partly separated from matter, insofar as the soul does not depend in its being on the body, and the intellect is not the act of the body as an organ, but is entitatively spiritual and immediately inheres in the substance of the soul. Hence, to this object and to the cognitive power considered in this state correspond intelligible species, which are partly separated from matter and partly joined to it. Then because they inhere in the intellect and the soul in the same way in which the intellect itself is received in the same soul in this state. Thus, just as the intellect is partly in matter and partly not in it, as we have already explained, so also the species. Moreover, because although species are spiritual according to their entity, they nevertheless depend on matter, namely on phantasms, and so are something material in the process of becoming and operating, and thus in this respect have a certain materiality.

The third is that of things which have being wholly separated from matter, though not from potentiality, because they are not pure acts, but in them potentiality with respect to being and operating is found. To this object corresponds a cognitive power wholly separated from physical matter, though not from potentiality, such as the angelic intellect; and likewise intelligible species separated in the same way from matter, but not from potentiality.

158 The fourth and last, finally, is that of the being which is a pure act, separated not only from every physical matter but also from every potentiality, and consequently is not in potentiality with respect to being, but by the mode of the purest act is its own being: such is God alone. To this object corresponds an intellectual faculty separated as well from every matter and from every potentiality, so that it is its own being; and likewise species separated from both, and consequently a pure act and its own being, such as the divine intellect alone and the divine essence insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species, because no creature can possess such purity that it is its own being, and therefore it must necessarily have a potency with respect to being.

From this it also follows that no obstacle is posed by the instance which the solution of the opponents adduces on its own behalf, namely that intellectual species in us are accidents and yet can represent a substance: hence also an impressed species of God can represent God, who is His own being, although it is not its own being. For, as is evident from what has been said, the case is different, because species that represent a substance in us can have the same immateriality as the represented substance, although often they cannot have the same perfection in the being of the thing as it does. Nevertheless, no form can correspond to God in the degree of immateriality and actuality, but it must necessarily be surpassed by Him in that degree, and therefore cannot represent God quidditatively and connaturally. Hence, although in other intelligible species it is not necessary that these two things coincide in one, namely being of the same immateriality as its object and being of the same perfection in the being of the thing as the object, it is otherwise in the species representing the divine essence as it is in itself: because such great immateriality, namely by the mode of the purest act, already explained, cannot be found except in an uncreated being, and essentially, so that it is supremely and infinitely perfect.

§ I. Objections are proposed.

159 So that this argument of St Thomas may remain more fully explained, and we may proceed more distinctly and clearly, it has seemed proper to set down separately in this difficulty certain objections against the principle concerning agreement in the degree of immateriality, on which the angelic intellect rests, and to give their solutions.

The first objection, urged against what was said in the preceding difficulty, is that a lower angel knows connaturally and quidditatively a higher angel; yet the cognitive power and intelligible species that he has of it are surpassed in immateriality by the higher angel. Thus it is false that quidditative and connatural knowledge requires an object that does not surpass in immateriality the cognitive power and the intelligible species representing it. The major premise is generally admitted by theologians; the minor is proved. As the essence of a lower angel is surpassed in immateriality by the essence of a higher angel, since they are specifically distinguished by this excess, so the intellectual power and intelligible species in the lower angel are surpassed in immateriality by the higher angel, because they have the same immateriality as its essence.

It makes no difference if one says that it suffices that higher and lower angels agree in the third common and generic degree of immateriality already described, although within it they differ specifically by their own degrees of immateriality.

For the following is urged against this: if a common and generic agreement in immateriality suffices for a lower angel to understand quidditatively a higher angel whom it surpasses, then the common and analogous agreement in immateriality between created species and God would suffice for a created species to represent its object quidditatively as it is in itself. This is especially so because the light of glory agrees with God only analogically in immateriality, yet that agreement suffices for it to tend toward God quidditatively, as God is in himself.

160 Secondly, one objects chiefly (and thereby the preceding solution is also challenged) that it is asserted without foundation that the degree of immateriality sufficient and required for an angel to be carried connaturally toward an object as it is in itself is only that generic agreement which all angels retain among themselves, namely that all are separated from physical matter, though not from potential matter; for no sufficient reason appears why only this degree of immateriality, and not a greater or lesser one, is required.

161 Thirdly, one objects that if the agreement required in the degree of immateriality between angelic intellect and its object is sought, it ought rather to be an altogether complete and atomically identical agreement, rather than merely that generic agreement assigned above; especially considering what was brought forward to explain St Thomas's argument, no. 149: the species of a higher angel, taken in intelligible being and most formally, is of the same nature, and therefore of exactly the same immateriality, as the angel whom it represents, as was established in the preceding difficulty. Therefore, for it to be connaturally in an intellect and consequently serve that intellect for quidditative knowledge of the same angel as it is in itself, the immateriality required in the intellect in order to receive it connaturally must be as great as that found in the intelligible being of the species; otherwise, as we have said, it would be beyond the nature of that intellect to receive it with the immateriality it has in intelligible being. For when a form necessarily demands, in a given order, a certain immateriality formally, whatever is naturally actuated by it must be just as immaterial in that order.

162 This is confirmed first. Although the species representing a higher angel is not in entitative being and natural being of as great immateriality as the higher angel himself, it is of the same immateriality as the lower angel in whom it exists; consequently it cannot be received connaturally in the former on this account, but can in the latter. Likewise, a species representing a lower angel and existing in a higher intellect has in entitative being greater immateriality than the lower angel; therefore it cannot be received connaturally in the intellect of that lower angel insofar as it exceeds it. With still greater reason, if it is more immaterial according to its intelligible being and atomic nature than the lower angel, it cannot be received connaturally in that intellect in the intelligible order. Consequently the lower angel cannot connaturally know the higher in that respect in which it surpasses it in immateriality.

This is confirmed second. In the cognitive senses, that univocal and generic agreement in the degree of immateriality assigned by St Thomas is not sufficient; an atomically identical and complete agreement between sensitive power and sensible object is required. For the same reason, that generic agreement in immateriality will not suffice in angels. The consequence is evident from parity of reasoning. The antecedent is proved: otherwise any sense could perceive the same object perceived by another, even if it were more immaterial; and audible species naturally present in hearing could naturally be in taste or sight, and so on. Thus we assert that any angel can quidditatively know the same object that another quidditatively apprehends, and that species residing in one intellect in intelligible being can naturally be in another's intellect in the same order.

163 Fourthly, one objects that the separated soul can quidditatively know angels although it does not agree with them in the degree of immateriality. The major is proved: as while in the body it can quidditatively know corporeal things and things involving matter, so when separated from body and matter it can quidditatively apprehend things separated from body and matter, such as angelic substances. The minor is clear: the degree of immateriality suited to angels is complete separation from physical matter, both from what intrinsically includes matter, as material and complete substances do, and from relation to matter. But the degree suited to the separated soul is not complete separation from all physical matter: although it does not contain matter as a part or depend on it actually for its entity or mode, it is not separated from relation to matter, since it always remains the form of a body capable of informing matter.

164 Lastly, one objects that entitative being, of the material and accidentally, is imported by the intelligible species taken most formally as a species; therefore, from its having the character of a species with respect to an object, it does not necessarily follow that it must agree with the object in the degree of immateriality in entitative being. The consequence is certain: what agrees accidentally need not agree necessarily. The antecedent is proved: just as it is imported, materially and accidentally, to be a substance or accident in entitative being, so that it is sometimes an accident and sometimes a substance in that being, so also the said being is imported materially and accidentally.

§ II. The first objection is solved.

165 To the first of these objections we answer that the solution proposed is excellent, if properly explained. The species residing in a lower angel's intellect agrees with the higher angel in the degree of immateriality already explained, namely being separated from all physical matter, though not from potential matter. Although it is surpassed by the higher angel, this excess is not an immateriality required per se and formally for the character of species in formal species being, but immateriality imported materially and agreeing with it in formal being. For the immateriality required per se for an angelic species to represent the object quidditatively formally demands only that it reach the degree already explained, even if in relation to the lower angel's intellectual power it does not reach it proportionately, whether considered formally in the being of the power or in the being of the thing, unless materially it has an immateriality commensurate with the immateriality in the being of the thing of the lower angel's intellectual power, which is less than the immateriality materially imported from the essence and intellectual power of the higher angel.

166 This is further explained. The lowest angel does not have a cognitive power so limited that it cannot naturally and quidditatively know another angel, as is established from itself and the common opinion of theologians; and since it cannot but be surpassed in some immateriality by all other angels, because angels differ among themselves by greater or lesser immateriality according to their specific character, it follows that the agreement in the degree of immateriality with another angel, which we showed must be imported from it in order to know it quidditatively and naturally, formally means only agreement in the degree of immateriality already explained. Consequently this excess in the higher angel and defect in the lower are materially imported from the angels themselves.

It also follows that, although this degree is in the being of a thing only generic and further contractible through diverse differential modes constituting different species of angels, formally considered it constitutes a specific degree distinct from the three others already enumerated and is not further divisible by formal differences, but only materially. Thus, formally taken, it constitutes an atomic species of a peculiar degree distinct from the others. Also, the fact that angels can know one another quidditatively, precisely according to the formal quidditative knowledge they require of one another, does not depend on their special and atomic reasons by which they surpass one another in immateriality, but on that general reason of immateriality already described, which is generic in the being of the thing and atomic in the being of the degree.

167 The objection has no force against this explanation. An analogous agreement in immateriality intrinsically and actually includes agreement with difference and excess; it therefore does not suffice for an object to be known connaturally in the knower with an excess over it. As we said, for an object to be known connaturally in the knower, what is required per se and formally for its presence there is that it not actually have a more excellent mode of being, as has been explained.

168 First, since God, as he is in himself, is the first and supreme intelligible, by which every other intelligible is exemplified, yet he is exemplified by none, he must constitute a special degree of intelligibility peculiar to himself. Just as a purely spiritual substance, such as an angelic substance, cannot agree in immateriality with a created cognitive power or intelligible species, insofar as this suffices for the power itself to be known quidditatively as it is, unless that power and species have the immateriality proper to the angelic degree of intelligibility, distinct from others and consisting in complete separation from physical matter, though not from its conditions, namely potential matter; so no power or species can have sufficient immateriality to enable a power, for example, by a simple and total power, clearly and quidditatively to know God unless it has the proper immateriality of the supreme degree, namely the degree of God's intelligibility. Since such a degree, as distinct from others, signifies only the immateriality necessary for its own being to be known, no cognitive power acting as a simple and total power (of which alone we now speak), nor intelligible species, can apprehend that degree quidditatively and clearly unless it has the said immateriality and therefore agrees wholly, not merely analogically, with God in the immateriality of the degree.

169 Second, it belongs to a creature and an essence that is from another, precisely because this does not exclude but rather admits potentiality, that it can undergo a multiplicity of diverse modes of being, one of which is more perfect and more immaterial than another. Thus the created quiddity of the highest angel can exist under a mode of being natural to it in the being of the thing, and under an intentional mode of lesser immateriality (in the manner explained) in the intellect and intentional species of the lower angel. Therefore only the per se and formal agreement in the already explained degree of immateriality is required for knowing and representing it.

However, an essence that is from itself, which alone is divine, demands an indivisible degree of infinite nature and immateriality and cannot in any way exist under an inferior mode of being. Wherever this, namely being from itself, is really found, infinity will necessarily be found there. Thus, since the imprinted and quidditative species of God must contain all the essential realities of God in a real and immaterial being, namely in representative or intelligible being, it must consequently have infinity with respect to immateriality and therefore be pure act.

170 What is added in the same objection concerning the light of glory is clear from the preceding difficulty 5, no. 149. We may also add a doctrine taken from St Thomas worthy of notice: the said light does not have complete naturalness with the clear and quidditative vision of God. As the Divine Doctor teaches, III part., q. 9, a. 4, the blessed vision is wholly natural only to God: for complete naturalness with a principle does not require only that an operation be due to it or that something flow into it, but that it proceed from it according to the exigency of the nature whose operation it is. Intellectual nature demands that intellection occur according to its complete exigency, proceeding from a twofold principle, each simple in its own order: one from the side of nature, namely intellect, and the other from the side of the object, namely the imprinted species. Indeed complete naturalness requires that intellect be a proper passion of intellectual nature through its act of understanding, or belong to it intrinsically and essentially.

Therefore, since the light of glory is not present as a wholly simple and total principle, but as the elevation of a power and increase of its virtue, it follows that it is not a principle wholly and perfectly natural to vision, nor is vision naturally produced from it or does it attain God in that manner. Consequently such light does not demand the same immateriality and purity as its object, since it is wholly and perfectly natural only as a principle; otherwise, the intelligible species, which concurs as a simple and total principle in its own order.

171 If one asks why, just as elevation of a power is granted, namely the said light which together with the power, though not wholly naturally, attains God as he is, elevation of a species is not likewise granted, representing God with complete naturalness and not demanding as much immateriality as God himself, the answer is that the reasons are unequal.

For the reason of quidditative vision and of tending toward a thing as it is in itself is that it occur through a species representing it quidditatively, as we said above in the notes on the first article of this question. But an intelligible species cannot represent quidditatively or possess this through elevation, but only as a simple and total principle. Precisely because it represents its object quidditatively, it is of the same nature with it, as we proved; and precisely because it is of the same nature with it, it requires no elevation, but by its own powers represents it quidditatively. Add that a species representing an object quidditatively, and whatever is essentially required for it, holds itself from the side of the object and therefore must be commensurate with it. Thus just as it implies that a species representing God, as he is in himself, by a simple and total species is given, because it cannot be commensurate with him in immateriality, for the same reason it implies that a species elevated insofar as he is in himself is given; but the elevating light holds itself from the side of the power.

§ III. The second and third objections are refuted.

172 To the second objection we answer by denying the antecedent. Its proof also requires denial of the antecedent. For precisely because every angel quidditatively knows another, a sufficient reason is given why the agreement in the degree of immateriality assigned to the third degree must be exactly as great as that assigned by St Thomas, neither greater nor lesser, as follows from what was said in no. 166. We shall return to these matters in the treatise on angels; for now it suffices to touch lightly on the reason given by Aristotle in III De Anima: just as it is proper to intellect to become whatever things are naturally knowable, so it is proper to a perfect intellect, rooted in the entire and perfect nature such as the angelic intellect, to become perfectly in intelligible being all things naturally knowable. Likewise it is proper to an imperfect and lowest intellect, rooted in a partial and incomplete substance, to become all things in whatever way, namely imperfectly. Since for an intellect to become perfectly all things naturally intelligible it is required that it have species, perfectly representing them, or equivalently representing them quidditatively, and that quidditative knowledge follow the quidditative species, every angel having a perfect intellect can quidditatively know every naturally intelligible being, and thus every angel can apprehend another quidditatively.

173 To the third objection the antecedent must be denied. Having granted the antecedent for its proof, the consequent must be distinguished: Let it be as great as is found in intelligible being in the said species, insofar as it concerns the formal reason which holds itself from its side and is intrinsic to it, or the reason under which it is inspected by the intellect and according to which it actuates it, the consequent is granted; insofar as it concerns materially considered and involved reasons which do not constitute a special degree of immateriality, it is denied. The proof of the consequence is denied: it proves only that an immaterial form and its receptive or actuable power must have the same immateriality with respect to the immateriality according to which they are first inspected per se and by reason of which the form actuates it.

174 This is explained. Although a lower angel's knowledge of a higher angel quidditatively requires a species reaching to represent him as to his atomic nature, and therefore as to that in which he surpasses the lower angel, nevertheless the angelic intellect, whatever it may be, does not regard quae the higher angel per se and formally, because he is higher. Nor does it regard the species representing him as such with respect to that excess, nor does it receive it in that way, esse. It does, however, regard quae and understand the same higher angel by the general reason of a substance wholly purified from physical matter, though not from potential matter, and is actuated sub qua through that species by the general reason of a species first representing that same substance per se. For the adequate intensive object, per se first and formally, of the angelic intellect is angelic substance, or substance purified from all physical matter, though not from potentiality; its formal inadequate object is this or that angelic substance insofar as it participates in the reason common to all; its material and proximate object is this or that angelic substance insofar as they are distinguished by a peculiar immateriality which they unequally possess in entitative being. Thus intelligible species representing substances with respect to the excess they possess in entitative immateriality represent only the material object of that intellect, and for that reason are only materially inspected under this reason and actuate the intellect only in this way.

Therefore, since an immaterial form acts naturally when it has the same immateriality as its receptive power, and conversely, with respect to what they formally regard in one another for this actuation, materially considered reasons not constituting a special degree of immateriality cannot be naturally or unnaturally related except insofar as they stand under the formally considered reason. Hence a species representing a higher angel, insofar as its atomic and exceeding reason, is received connaturally in a lower angel's intellect: with respect to that excess alone it is received as something materially considered, and insofar as it is formally inspected and received, it has the same immateriality as the lower angel.

175 This can be further clarified: as it is beyond the nature of a subject to receive a form exceeding it in immateriality when immateriality is the reason for receiving it, so it is beyond the nature of an immaterial form to be received in a more immaterial subject when immateriality is the reason for its actuation and consequently for receiving it in the subject. Thus, notwithstanding that a species representing a lower angel and residing in a higher intellect has less immateriality in intelligible being than the higher angel and its intellect have in entitative being, it is received connaturally. The formal reasons agree in the same degree of immateriality, and that formal element, merely something generic in the being of the thing, contains under itself the many things materially distinguished in species; for it is not further divisible by formally diverse atomic differences.

Conversely, although the species, insofar as it is more immaterial than the intellect of the lower angel in intelligible being—this being being said materially of the formally taken actuable—can nevertheless be received connaturally in that intellect. For insofar as the formal elements in the being of the actuable thing and of the agent agree in the same degree of immateriality, and this formal element is such that, precisely because what it is in the being of the thing is something generic, it requires that many things be contained under it which are distinguished in species by what they import materially, and are thus compared by way of one exceeding and exceeded; although insofar as they are described formally, they are considered only as agreeing in that reason, because that reason, taken most formally in the being of a degree, is not further divisible into formally diverse atomic differences, as has been said.

176 From this, the solution of the first confirmation is easy. Entitative and immaterial being considered in the being of the thing, found in angelic substances, is divided per se by formal differences, and within the same line by distinct immaterialities constituting diverse species which agree in the same angels in entitative being and in the being of the thing. Thus a species residing in a higher angel's intellect, considered formally as to entitative being, is not something material within the line of entitative being possessing an entitative immateriality exceeding that of the lower angel's intellect. Therefore the lower angel's intellect, precisely with respect to this line, does not connaturally regard an intelligible species taken in entitative being unless it has the same immateriality, neither greater nor lesser. The reason under which it is received is therefore not purity from all physical matter in general, but that purity contracted to this determinate species of immateriality corresponding to the lower angel's immateriality esse, esse.

However, the same immaterial being found in the angels, considered with respect to the intelligible order, is materially divided by this excess in immateriality, which is diverse in species. Thus in the intelligible species it is something material: the intelligible being by which it represents this excess, although it cannot serve for knowing the angel with respect to that excess unless it carries this material feature. Similarly in the angelic intellect, formally considered in the being of cognitive power and corresponding to the intelligible species, there is also something material carrying a distinct species of immateriality in entitative being; what is formal is that the power is wholly purified from physical matter, though not from potentiality. Therefore the reason sub qua it is received is this purity, and for this reason it naturally receives that species, even though with respect to the intelligible being materially imported it is exceeding. The reason for all this is the often-stated one: complete abstraction from physical matter, though not from potentiality, constitutes an atomic species of degree in the being of the degree and therefore is not further divisible by formal differences.

177 It also follows that the objection which considerably troubles others has no force: namely, that an intelligible species representing a higher angel constitutes, in its specification and most formal reason, something formal because it represents him as to his nature and therefore as to the excess by which he surpasses a lower angel; therefore nothing material in the intelligible order can represent the said angel in this respect. The consequence is clear, because what is most formal and the specification of a thing cannot be materially imported from it.

Thus the objection is clearly of no force. What the species has in entitative being, whether considered with respect to the entitative order or the intelligible order considered in entitative being, is one thing; what it has as the reason of a receptive or quasi-receptive form, with respect to the reason sub qua it is received and, per se first, formally inspected by the intellect considered formally in the being of cognitive power, is another. Although that representation is formal to the species in entitative being, it is not formal in the being of a receptive or unifiable form considered with respect to the reason sub qua it is received or united. Likewise, although the higher angel's essence, whether taken in entitative or intelligible being, is something formal to him, it is not formal in the reason of the object of the angelic intellect or intellection, by which he is understood according to what is said of it formally as first inspected by that intellect; all this is material. Thus, even if the angel remained, impossibly, by that whereby he is a substance purified from all physical matter, though not from potentiality, and consequently lost his atomic reason, with another atomic reason given in its place, he would still remain formally in the object being of the same reason esse.

Therefore, since one must philosophize in the same way about the intelligible species of an object as about the object itself insofar as it is considered in the intelligible order, whether that order is considered in entitative being or in the being of the object formally inspected per se, what has been said above about the angelic substance must be applied proportionately to its intelligible species. The species quo must be distinguished in itself as entitative being and as intelligible being, contracted under different concepts: once under the concept of entitative being and once under intelligible being, and finally as a form unifiable with intellect, with respect to the formal reason by which it is united and regarded, or as a motivating object whose formal reason moves it.

178 To the second confirmation, the antecedent is to be denied if immateriality is understood as immateriality required per se, formally, and in a formal sense; and the consequent is to be denied. The same is to be understood in the same way. In proving the antecedent, however, the consequent, or sequence, is to be denied. For although some agreement in the degree of immateriality is required in order that a power may be borne toward a thing, this is not sufficient; rather, it is required that the thing have the formal character of being the object of that power, and consequently that it belong, in the being of an object, to the line of the object of such a power. Thus, for example, although a man's intellect and will agree in the same degree of immateriality, and hence even the objects connatural to those powers also belong to the same degree of immateriality, the intellect nevertheless cannot be borne toward the object of the will as such, nor the will toward the object of the intellect as possessing that character; for the object of the will as such does not possess the formal objective character proper to the object of the intellect, and conversely.

Hence, although the objects of sight and hearing, and even these two senses, agree in the same degree of immateriality formally imported, the object of sight nevertheless does not possess the formal objective character which of itself and formally pertains to the line of the object of hearing; for what is required here is the formal consideration of the matter under discussion, and the contraction and limitation of these powers, so that they agree in a degree of immateriality materially imported. Consequently, hearing cannot perceive the object of sight, and conversely. Hence the objection adduced there is also resolved. For all angels have the same degree of immateriality formally imported, and all of them have the objective character pertaining to the line of the object of the angelic intellect. For the angelic intellect, by reason of its perfection and purity from matter, and consequently by reason of its greater illumination and amplitude, cannot be restricted to understanding quidditatively its own substance and what is below it; but it must also extend to a quidditative knowledge of the other angels.

179 If, however, one asks why we assign to all the senses this degree of immateriality, in which all agree, and not a greater or lesser degree, as we assigned to the angels the degree of immateriality under investigation, the answer is that it is because all the senses arise from the sensitive soul, because it is sensitive, though in the manner explained by our Complutensians in their commentary on De Anima. Therefore these senses, according to a highly probable opinion, do not differ specifically, formally, in the brute animal and in man, but only materially, by reason of some modification and greater modal perfection which they receive from the same sensitive soul, considered as such in an atomic species.

From this, one can also infer the probable reason—let us mention it in passing—why any angel can know another quidditatively, and why the degree of immateriality formally imported is the one we have derived from St Thomas, and neither greater nor lesser. For it is probable, following St Thomas's line, that the angelic intellect does not arise from the angels, because they are such in an atomic species, but from the general character of angelic substance, or of a substance wholly purified from physical matter, or prime matter, though not from potentiality. Thus all angelic intellects are formally of the same species, and differ only in material and modal species insofar as they receive a greater modal perfection from the atomic nature of each angel, by virtue of which they can understand more perfectly than was said above; as we spoke in the analogous case of the sensitive powers, for example, sight existing in different animals. The reason is this. For specific and formal distinction between an intellect and its object requires diversity in the degree of immateriality formally imported; whereas, for distinction in the being of property and materially, insofar as they are distinguished modally from another intellect by reason of this modification, that greater immateriality materially imported is sufficient. But let our Complutensians' statements in the commentary on De Anima, disputation 17, no. 11 through no. 21, be considered here in their entirety; for those things which concern the present question apply, proportion being preserved.

180 The points made in the two immediately preceding numbers can be further elucidated by explaining a certain distinction which intervenes between the already stated agreement among the angelic vital powers and the agreement among the sensitive powers. For if we speak of the sensitive powers, then, since all the senses arise from the same form, which claims for itself one degree of immateriality, they must be in the same degree of immateriality already explained, because this is the only way in which they all agree. And since they flow from the form of an organic body as such, and depend on the body as on an organ, and consequently arise from the soul, which has little immateriality and amplitude and much contraction and limitation, they proceed from it in such a contracted state that they require diverse and limited sensible objects operari.

If, however, we speak of the vital powers, namely the angelic intellect and will, then, since the angelic intellect and will arise in the manner stated from the same intellectual angelic nature insofar as it is angelic, they flow into the same degree of immateriality; and no angelic intellect is formally distinguished in species from another angelic intellect, nor will the will of one angel be formally distinct in species from the will of another, just as, by proportional reasoning, we said that the sight of all animals is formally of the same species. Furthermore, because they proceed from that which is highly immaterial and ample, they flow with great amplitude and without limitation, so that a single intellect suffices for understanding every intelligible, and a single will suffices for willing every volitable. Finally, although the said intellectual nature is highly immaterial, it is nevertheless still mixed with potentiality and consequently limited; hence one and the same faculty of it is not simultaneously volitive and intellective, but these two faculties are distinguished in species and are directed toward different objects, although they agree in the same degree of immateriality.

It should be noted in passing, however, that according to this mode of speaking one must philosophize differently concerning the present matter than according to the opposite mode which we indicated above. For just as, according to this mode, no specific formal distinction is to be assigned between angelic intellects, so too there is no distinction in esse under any consideration, whether it is considered in the being of a degree or in the being of a thing. According to the other, opposite mode of speaking, although they are formally distinguished in immateriality in the being of a thing, because immateriality according to which they agree in the being of a thing is only a generic reason, they are nevertheless not formally distinguished in species in it, since it constitutes an atomic degree, as we have often said.

181 Therefore, to denote these intellects as thus taken, namely insofar as they agree in the said immateriality constituting a degree, we signify them by the fact that they possess the reason of a cognitive power formally considered in the being of a cognitive power.

For although the said powers are still divided within themselves into the being of a thing, insofar as they do not constitute a degree, and into what constitutes it, and according to the former consideration they import essentially and formally that excess of immateriality by which they are essentially and specifically absolutely distinguished in the being of a thing, and consequently the generic agreement in being wholly separated from physical matter is in this order potential with respect to the excess in immateriality by which one angel's intellect exceeds another in the being of a thing, consisting in its ability to understand through more universal species, nevertheless this entire excess is material, and indeed accidental with respect to these powers insofar as they found and constitute the degree, because in founding it only those intellects are considered per se according to their agreement in that generic immateriality in the being of a thing. Thus this same reason, which in the former order was generic and potential and in the manner of metaphysical matter, has in this order, namely as it constitutes a degree, the character of an atomic species, because it is not divided into other differences constituting diverse degrees of immateriality; and consequently this same constitutive reason of the degree formalizes those intellective powers as unequal in the being of a thing and draws them to intellective being constituting the same degree, as has been said. And so, to denote these intellects thus accepted and formalizing themselves as considered in the being of a thing, we signify them by the name of cognitive powers formally considered and taken in the being of cognitive powers.

§ IV. The remaining objections are met.

182 To the fourth objection, with our Complutensians, In De Anima, disp. 17, no. 34, we answer by denying the major. For its proof we say that, just as from the soul's being separated from the body it does not follow that it is separated from relation to the body, but only that it is not united to it, so it does not follow that the proportionate and connatural object which it can know quidditatively consists of substances wholly separated from matter, both from actual union with matter and from relation to it, such as angelic substances. For precisely because they are wholly separated from matter, no agreement in immateriality is found between them and the soul; rather it follows that it can quidditatively apprehend its own substance and other separated souls with which it agrees in immateriality.

This solution was taken by our Complutensians, and we have taken it with them from St Thomas, III part., q. 21, a. 1, ad 2; I part., q. 89, a. 2. He says of the separated soul and therefore of the intellect in the state of separation: But when it is separated from the body, it will understand not by turning to phantasms, but to things that are intelligible in themselves. Hence it understands itself. It belongs to every separated substance that it understand what is above it, and what is below it according to the mode of its own substance. Thus it has perfect knowledge of other separated souls, but imperfect and deficient knowledge of angels, speaking of the soul's natural knowledge. The knowledge of glory is different. Whether the same separated soul can quidditatively know material things belonging to this universe is clear from what the Complutensians teach in the same disputation and number, and will be clearer from what we shall mention in the following numbers. Nor does it follow (as we say incidentally) that St Thomas in article 4 of this question counted the degrees of immateriality diminutively. For precisely because he assigned a degree of immateriality to the human intellect in this state distinct from that of an angelic intellect wholly separated from matter, he thereby indicated that the same human intellect, when separated from matter, that is, from union with it but not from relation to it, has a greater and better degree of immateriality than when in the body, and less than that of the angels.

183 Secondly, with the Complutensians, Albert the Great, Cajetan, Ferrara, Thiene, and other Thomists cited by the Complutensians, it is probable that the human and angelic intellects are not specifically distinguished with respect to cognitive powers, or, as they say, their tendency toward the intelligible object, although in respect to properties they are specifically distinguished. The Complutensians explain this clearly from no. 11 to no. 21.

184 Accordingly, in this way, the human and angelic intellects agree in the degree of immateriality when the human intellect is in the state of separation, and consequently know angels quidditatively, though not perfectly quidditatively, that is, not with all the quidditative predicates or quid est, and not altogether clearly, but nevertheless quidditatively, imperfectly, and confusedly. Quidditative knowledge of angels follows, according to this mode of speaking, from the degree of immateriality suited both to angels and to the separated soul, considered according to its formal character. But perfect quidditative knowledge follows from that degree insofar as it has such a material perfection consisting in the property of a complete substance wholly separated from matter, and therefore also from relation to matter. Thus the human intellect cannot know angels perfectly quidditatively. Nor does St Thomas's testimony for the preceding solution entirely refute this, since it may be understood probabilistically as denying perfect quidditative knowledge while allowing imperfect knowledge with the defect of clarity already described. St Thomas says in the same question that the soul's knowledge of angelic substances is quasi-common, as may be seen in article 2 of q. 89. Although it terminates quidditatively in something proper to those angels because the soul agrees with them in immateriality, namely in being separated from matter or actual union with it, this knowledge is not wholly proper: it does not terminate in all their quidditative predicates as they are knowable in themselves. Sometimes he says that this knowledge is not proper and certain, but common and confused.

Beyond this immateriality there is in the same intelligible species another formal immateriality, namely the immateriality of the represented nature, constituting a special degree. As it is intelligibly present in the species, it has there an intelligible mode of being necessarily; and, as is explained in the frequently cited treatise On the Science of God, disputation 2, § 5, it is required in order that an object, or the same nature which otherwise is natural in itself, be intelligibly united with the power with respect to the quidditative knowledge of the quid est of that nature. The reason for which we assign this formal immateriality is that, in the intelligible order, attention is paid per se and formally to formal, actual, and immaterial being. Thus, inasmuch as immateriality in entitative being belongs to the species materially, another immateriality formally imported must also be found in it. This can indeed be none other than the one we assigned, as will be clear to the reader, and it will be explained more fully in the treatise On the Science of God, disputation 2, no. 24.

185 To the last objection it must be said that although immateriality in entitative being does not of itself and formally belong to a created intelligible species, if it is considered in the being of a species most formally, it does belong materially of itself, because it requires an entitative being in which to be founded. This being may be accidental insofar as it is a foundation and something material with respect to intelligible being, whether it be substance or accident in entitative being; it does not follow, however, that it has as much immateriality in entitative being as has been shown. Hence, beyond this immateriality there is in the same intelligible species another formal immateriality, namely the immateriality of the represented nature, as has been said, constituting a special degree. As it is intelligibly present in the said species, it has there that intelligible mode of being which it has necessarily, namely that the object, or the same nature which otherwise is natural in itself, be intelligibly united with the power with respect to the quidditative knowledge of that nature. The reason for which we assign this formal immateriality is that in the intelligible order, per se and formally, attention is paid to formal, actual, and immaterial being. Thus, since immateriality in entitative is materially present in the species, another immateriality formally imported must also be found there. This can indeed be none other than the one assigned, as will appear to the reader, and it will be explained more fully in the treatise On the Science of God, disputation 2, no. 24.

186 This Difficulty, as regards its first part, must be settled briefly, because its determination follows from what has been said in the preceding Difficulties.

§ I. The Force of St. Thomas’s Ultimate Reason Is Explained.

It must therefore be said that the ultimate reason of St. Thomas is likewise the best, and that from it the impossibility of the aforesaid species is rightly inferred. Thus the authors cited above in support of our opinion in the preceding Difficulty. This assertion will be proved no better than by setting forth the aforesaid reason and demonstrating its efficacy. St. Thomas proposed it in these words: The divine essence is something incircumscribed, containing supereminently within itself whatever can be signified or understood by created intellect: and this can in no way be represented by any created species, because every created form is determined according to some reason, whether of wisdom, of power, of being itself, or of something of this kind; therefore.

But that the force and efficacy of this third reason may become clear, it must be noted that it rests on the same foundation as the preceding reason, namely the second: the impossibility of equating a created species with God in the degree of immateriality and actuality. The only difference between them lies in the different ways in which divine actuality and immateriality are explained through an ordering to the different potentialities that they exclude. For in the preceding reason [divine actuality] is explained by excluding potentiality toward being, because God is his own being and has it intrinsically: and because this exclusion of potentiality cannot apply to a created species, it is inferred that the latter cannot be commensurate with God in the degree of immateriality, nor can it quidditatively and clearly represent Him, and consequently that such a species is impossible. In this latter reason, however, divine actuality and immateriality are explained by excluding potentiality toward having perfection through composition from genus and difference, or aggregation from several forms, degrees, or quasi-parts: because all these things circumscribe, terminate, and limit the essence of a thing. Therefore, by excluding them, the divine essence is something incircumscribed containing supereminently within itself whatever can be signified and understood. Hence, because exclusion of this potentiality cannot belong to a created species precisely insofar as it is created, it is also inferred that the species cannot equal God in the degree of immateriality, or of purification from potentiality, and therefore is impossible.

§ II. The Arguments Brought in Difficulty 4, from n. 118 to 123, Are Met.

187 To the first [argument], the major is denied. For the first proof, it must be said that that induction is true in natural intellectual powers when they are compared with objects proportionate to them; but otherwise when the aforesaid powers are elevated to understanding in the supernatural and divine order. For then it is not necessary that, whenever vision and created intellectual light are possible, a created species of the same order also be able to be given, as happens at present.

And the reason for the difference is taken from what has been said. For intellectual powers, when natural and compared with their proportionate objects of the same rank, concur altogether connaturally, namely by the mode of simple and total powers. Therefore, as something first perfectible, another altogether connatural principle is due to them: namely, the created intelligible species, which represents quidditatively those same objects by the mode of a simple and total form. For in general, to a principle altogether connatural, and further perfectible by another principle that is also altogether connatural, the aforesaid principle is due as something first perfectible.

On the other hand, when powers are elevated to understanding God in the supernatural order, as He is in Himself, then, elevated by the light of glory, they do not concur altogether connaturally, nor is vision itself altogether connaturally elicited from that light. Therefore, a species of God as He is in Himself—and consequently no created species representing Him in the aforesaid way—should not correspond to them as something first perfectible. For if such a species were possible, it would correspond to created intellect as something first perfectible, as is clear from itself.

Therefore, the species that is due to correspond to it—and not to any intellect whatever, but necessarily as something secondarily perfectible and in the aforesaid manner—must be a species altogether connatural to divine intellect, and consequently must be the divine essence itself. For just as such a species must necessarily represent God by the mode of a simple and total form, and consequently by the mode of a form altogether connatural, as we said above, so it ought to correspond only as something first perfectible to the intellect that influences vision in an altogether connatural manner, namely to divine intellect.

188 Hence, although from the possibility of another created principle altogether connatural with the species itself—namely, a supernatural intellect which, by the mode of a simple and total power, could tend toward God as He is in Himself—the possibility of an intelligible species might be inferred, because the aforesaid species would primarily and per se regard such an intellect as its first perfectible, and such an intellect would regard the species as its first principle; nevertheless, from the possibility of vision not elicited altogether connaturally, as happens at present, in accordance with what we said in n. 170, or from the possibility of light possessing only the ratio of the quantity of an elevating power, and therefore not influencing altogether connaturally, the possibility of a created intelligible species representing God as He is in Himself does not follow, as has been explained. And since the aforesaid intellect, which tends toward God as He is in Himself by the mode of a simple and total power while also preserving the character of created intellect, is impossible, as we shall show in art. 4, it follows that an intelligible species which quidditatively represents God as He is in Himself and is at the same time a created species is likewise impossible.

189 Add, first, that distinction which we touched on in this and the preceding Difficulty, namely that created light of glory holds itself on the part of the power; and thus it would suffice that it be of a higher order, even though it be something created. For since it holds itself by the mode of an elevation of the power, holding itself on that part, it must be commensurable with it, and consequently it must be terminated and limited by it. The intelligible species, however, holds itself on the part of the object, and consequently it must be commensurable with the object, with the degree of immateriality, and with the fact that it has intelligibly the same nature as the object. These two things plainly conflict with a created intelligible species, as has been shown. Through these considerations, the second proof is also sufficiently clear.

Add, second, that induction is entirely true when the object is not immediately intelligible per se and simpliciter by any intellect, and consequently is not intelligibility itself; but otherwise when it is immediately intelligible by any intellect because of its own intelligibility, by reason of its most pure actuality. For then it is impossible for it to become intelligible by another, and consequently impossible for a species really distinct from it to be given, through which it might be rendered intelligible, as was explained above in n. 123 and afterward. Therefore, since God is intelligibility itself by the mode of a most pure act, it follows that although a created light and vision that attain God quidditatively, as He is in Himself, may be possible, a created intelligible species through which God might be represented quidditatively is nevertheless impossible. For the light of glory and created vision make created intellect seeing and able to see in such a way that they do not thereby grant God that He is seeing or that He is seen, insofar as this belongs to God from His own side. But an intelligible species representing God quidditatively, precisely by granting created intellect the ability to see God itself, would also grant God that He was intelligible through it by that intelligibility which is required on the part of the object. For, as we said in the recently cited number, it belongs to the intelligible species to render its object intelligible by the intelligibility required from its own side. We said by the intelligibility required from its own side, on account of those things which we shall mention in Difficulty 8, nn. 226 and 227: these things must be considered for an exact understanding of them.

190 To the second, the major is granted, in accordance with what we said in n. 170, but the minor must be denied. For just as the intellect, as filled with the light of glory, is a kind of participation in divine intellect as it is in itself, so in the aforesaid manner it is inclined toward the same object toward which divine intellect, as it is in itself, is inclined, namely God Himself, clearly and quidditatively knowable. Consequently, it is in some way naturally ordered toward union with Him in intelligible being; and thus, in some way, the union of the divine essence with the intelligible species will be due to the intellect filled with that same light, insofar as it comes from the light of glory, although not insofar as it concerns essential commensurability, according to what belongs to it from itself.

And to the proof taken in the contrary sense, it must be said that from the highest immateriality and most pure actuality of the divine essence, insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species, it follows only that this species is demanded altogether connaturally by divine intellect, as by a cognitive power that per se first demands it, and therefore adequately corresponds to it and identifies it with itself by the mode of a most pure act; but not that it is not demanded by the intellect filled with the light of glory as by a secondarily perfectible intellect, and in the aforesaid way by that light, which in no way corresponds adequately to the species or identifies it with itself, but only as something now intimately present and united to it in an intelligible way, as has been explained. For this kind of demand, which is not altogether connatural, it is enough that created intellect, when filled with the light of glory and elevated to this, be of the same order as God clearly and quidditatively visible, and have a participation in divine intellect as it is in Himself. For the intelligible species must be commensurable in such a way that with its first perfectible it neither exceeds nor is exceeded in immateriality; but with the secondary perfectible, which in some way participates in the character of the first perfectible, this is otherwise.

191 Accordingly, the objection raised in the same proof is also clear. For just as the human intellect, as it is in this state, cannot in any way connaturally seek species so immaterial as the Angelic species, because it is on a lower degree of immateriality; but otherwise, if elevated by the light of a higher order, it in some way connaturally demands them, namely insofar as they come from the elevating light, not insofar as they come from the power or essential commensurability of the intellect as it is in this state. For it was necessary for this that the light of that higher order be connatural and due to the aforesaid intellect in that state. Thus, although created intellect cannot per se connaturally seek the concurrence of a species that is supremely immaterial, such as the divine essence, it can nevertheless do so, in the aforesaid manner, when elevated to the supernatural and divine order and when it has a participation in divine intellect as it is in itself, or insofar as it is filled with the light of glory. For then, although it demands the union of the divine essence through the mode of an intelligible species insofar as it comes from the light, it does not demand it insofar as it comes from the power or essential commensurability of that essence. For this required that the light of glory be connatural and due to that created intellect. Therefore, although it is demanded in some way connaturally, it is not demanded altogether connaturally by the aforesaid intellect.

For altogether connaturality, of which we are speaking, requires that the aforesaid species be demanded on the part of each of the two extremes. Accordingly, whatever gives the intellect its quantity of power, or its efficacy for seeing God, must also give it essential commensurability with God, and conversely with respect to the same vision. Consequently, what is demanded on the part of the power tends toward seeing God not just in any way, but through the mode of a simple and total power that does not require elevation.

192 From this it also follows that the aforesaid species is not only not demanded altogether connaturally by that same created and elevated intellect, because it is not demanded on the part of either extreme according to what each of them demands from itself; but even insofar as it concerns the light of glory, or the quantity of power, there is not yet altogether complete connaturality. For this requires, according to what has been said, that by that very thing by which the intellect has its quantity of power it should also have that essential commensurability primordially suited to it, and therefore that the quantity of power be due to the essential commensurability and connatural to it, and conversely. Yet let it be granted that the aforesaid light of glory, insofar as it belongs to it and to the quantity of its power, simply and connaturally demands the union of the divine essence in the character of an intelligible species, even though this connaturality is not perfect in every respect.

193 To the third [argument], the antecedent must be denied. For the proof is clear from what has been said. For an impressed species is not demanded with respect to clear vision as a power holding itself on the part of the power, but as something holding itself on the part of the object, uniting the intellect with God Himself as He is in Himself through the mode of a quidditative likeness to Him. Hence, although what is demanded for a finite vision of God by essence, by the mode of a principle holding itself on the part of the power, need not have infinite perfection—and it is enough that it virtually contain the perfection present in such a finite and limited vision—the case is otherwise with what influences through the mode of a principle on the part of the object. For precisely because it influences in this way, and therefore quidditatively and connaturally represents God, it must have the same nature in intelligible being and must correspond with Him in entitative being in the degree of immateriality. For, as we said above, every species quidditatively representing an object must have the same nature as that object in representative being and must correspond with it in entitative being in the degree of immateriality; that is, it must not be exceeded by the object in that degree.

Hence, the quidditative species of God, insofar as it is in itself, would influence an infinite and comprehensive vision of God Himself, even though accidentally, and because of a defect in the principle holding itself on the part of the power, it would not influence infinitely. Thus, if the aforesaid impressed species were given, there would follow an evident entanglement: namely, that it would be demanded only for eliciting a vision of finite perfection, since, as is supposed, such a species would be created; and that at the same time it would be demanded for a vision infinite by essence, because it would be of the same univocal nature as God and would have as much immateriality as He does, and consequently, in the character of an intelligible species, would be a pure act and of infinite perfection by essence.

194 Accordingly, the first confirmation is also clear. For although we were to grant that other species quidditatively representing [God] might at some time not represent Him comprehensively, the case is otherwise with the quidditative species of God because of the reason given above.

For the second confirmation, it must be said that a created and impressed species of God as He is in Himself is impossible precisely because, among other things, it would be both caused by God and not caused by God, and both caused freely by Him and not caused freely by Him. It would indeed be caused, and caused freely, because it is supposed to be created; but it would not be caused, nor caused freely, but would have being from itself naturally and necessarily, because it would be of infinite immateriality and a pure act, and consequently would be God Himself, as has been shown. Thus such a species would be, and would not be, created.

195 To what is added there, namely that it is not of the character of an intelligible species that it be necessarily produced by its object, as is evident in the Angelic species, it must be answered that although it is not necessary that every intelligible species proceed from its object as from an efficient cause, the species of which we speak would nevertheless necessarily have to be produced by God. For, as is supposed, it is created, and no other agent could communicate to it the infinite immateriality that it demands, as is clear from itself; even though from another standpoint, and even by God, it could not be produced precisely because it would itself be the creative essence, as has been explained.

Add that, as is clear from what has been said, it belongs to every species that quidditatively represents an object that it either must proceed from that object—not from any object whatever, but necessarily and naturally—or, if it proceeds from another, must proceed from it with such immateriality as the object has, so that they correspond in the degree of immateriality. Hence, a species representing God by essence would have to proceed as possessing infinite immateriality, and consequently, for this reason, it could not proceed freely from God.

196 To the fourth [argument], the antecedent must be denied. For intellection, taken formally, is not a formal likeness of the object, but a certain tendency toward it, uniting the power in the second and completed act with the same object; or, as others explain, it is a tension toward the aforementioned object in the second act. Hence, the intelligible species, the word, and intellection unite the intellect with its object in different ways. For the impressed species unites through the mode of likeness in the first act; the word, through the mode of expressed likeness, such that the object is at least known inwardly as the quod [that which is known]; but intellection, through the mode of actual tendency, reaches the object in act, or through the mode of intelligible tension toward the aforesaid object.

And to the proof drawn from those testimonies and from others that might be brought together, it must be said, with Capreolus in 2. dist. 3. quaest. 2. art. 3. ad 2., from those things brought in the second place against the fourth conclusion, and in 4. dist. 49. quaest. 1. art. 3. ad 1., together with other Junior Thomists, that they must be understood in the active or passive causal sense; that is, [the thing] either produces the likeness, or is produced by the species, which is the natural likeness; or finally, as others say, it is only the complement and final actuality of the aforesaid likeness. Add with Nazarius that this belongs to the beatific vision: that it is a likeness of the object seen, namely God—not indeed in intelligible and representative being, but in entitative and natural being, insofar as through some participation and analogical likeness it participates in what has the character of nature in God, namely that God sees Himself as He is in Himself, although it does not participate in God by the mode of nature. Hence, for this reason as well, Augustine justly said in John: When He shall appear, we shall be like Him: because we shall see Him as He is.

Finally, this will become clear from what is to be said in the following Difficulty.

The final argument of the preceding fourth difficulty calls upon us, after we have explained that an imprinted species clearly and quidditatively representing God cannot exist, to explain whether the same must be said of an expressed species, or, better, of the Word.

§ I. The first opinion is proposed.

197 The first opinion affirms that the Word is so necessary in the blessed for seeing God by essence that its absence implicitly entails their not seeing. Thus Suarez, lib. 2 de attributis, cap. 11, and others among the Commentators.

The principal foundation of this opinion, apart from the final argument of the preceding fourth difficulty, can first be confirmed and explained as follows: the beatific vision is either a quality or a true immanent predicamental action. If the former, then it is itself the word of the mind. The consequence is evident. For the word of the mind is nothing other than a certain quality proceeding immediately from the intellect, so that the intellect itself in its representative being is similar to its object: since the word is a quality produced by the intellect and representing an object, it cannot fail to be a quality proceeding from that same intellect, as it is similar to its object in representative being; therefore, since the beatific vision proceeds from the intellect insofar as it is similar to its object in representative being, the consequence follows that, if it is once a quality, nothing is lacking to it for the ratio of a word. If, however, it is said to be the latter, then since it implies the presence of a true action—and a true becoming without some having been made—it will imply the presence of the beatific vision without its proper having been made, namely, a word.

It is confirmed secondly. For since the beatific vision is something created and proceeding from the intellect, it proceeds from it either precisely as that by which (quo) something proceeds, or as that by which and that which (quo and quod). If the former, therefore, it is that by which something proceeds and is made from the intellect; and since that which is made, the mean in question, cannot be anything except a word, as we have just said, the consequence follows that the word is necessarily produced through it. The second alternative, however, cannot be stated: for nothing can be the becoming of itself. Then also, because otherwise it would exist before it existed, as is evident from itself. Then too, because, just as a real cause is necessarily really distinguished from its effect, so its real causation and becoming cannot fail to be really distinguished from that effect; and thus nothing will be able to proceed from any cause as that by which it is made from it, either as quo or as quod.

198 The same opinion can be proved secondly. For the word formally constitutes the intellect as an intellect actually understanding: therefore it implies the presence of the vision of God by essence without a word. The consequence seems evident. The antecedent, however, is proved. First by the testimony of St Augustine, lib. 9 de Trinit., cap. 10, where he calls the Word knowledge: for knowledge is certainly nothing other than cognition and the apprehension of an object; therefore, etc. Then too from St Thomas, 1, part, q. 34, art. 1, ad 3, who, speaking of intellection formally taken, says: To understand imports only the disposition of the intellect toward the thing understood, in which no relation of origin is imported, but a certain information in our intellect, according as our intellect is put into act by the form of the thing understood. Here, as you can see, to understand is said to be the formal effect of the form of the thing understood, in which no relation of origin is imported: for the word alone is the form of the thing understood in which no relation of origin is imported; indeed, although the intelligible species is the form of the thing understood, nevertheless it involves the fact that a word proceeds from it, whereas no other form of the thing understood, or anything else, originates from the word, because it is the terminus of the intellect's productive power. Finally from the same St Thomas, q. 8, De potentia, art. 1, where he says: The word of our intellect is not extrinsic to the very act of understanding by the intellect, since the act of understanding itself cannot be completed without the word mentioned. Therefore he holds that it pertains intrinsically to the act of understanding, and consequently is the intellection itself: for intellection, which is a quality, as is evident from what has been said, must be one simple quality, just as other qualities pertain of themselves and directly to the predicament of quality; and thus it cannot result from a word and some other quality.

199 Thirdly, the view is proved and the preceding argument confirmed. Because intellection is nothing other than actual manifestation, through which a thing is manifested to the intellect; but through the word of the mind the thing represented through it is actually manifested to the intellect; therefore intellection and the word will be the same, and consequently, precisely because the vision of God by essence is present in the blessed, the Word itself cannot fail to be found there as well. Both consequences clearly follow from what precedes. The major is evident too, because nothing else means that a thing is made manifest to the intellect than that the intellect perceives it; and consequently a thing cannot be manifest to it while unknown to it. The minor is evident too: for since the word is the most actual representation of an object, it will also be the most actual manifestation of that object.

It is confirmed. For the divine essence is from itself an actual intellection of all intelligible things, because it represents all of them most actually and is the most actual manifestation of them all; therefore, since the word represents the thing understood most actually to the intellect, it will be its actual manifestation, and consequently its actual knowledge and intellection.

200 Fourthly, the view is proved, and the two preceding arguments are confirmed together. For precisely by being informed by an intelligible species that habitually represents its object, the intellect is constituted as an intellect; therefore, precisely by being informed by an expressed species that represents its object most actually, it is constituted as understanding in the second act, and consequently word and intellection will be the same; and this being present in the blessed, it cannot be denied to them. This second consequence follows from the preceding one. The former, however, is also clear. For just as intentional likeness completes the intellectual power, so likeness in the first act and according to the mode of a habit will complete it and constitute it in the first act, rendering it, as it were, habitually complete as an intellect; then the most actual likeness, which represents in the second act, will complete it most actually by rendering it understanding in the second act. The antecedent, however, requires no proof.

It is confirmed first. For the intellect understands by actually drawing things to itself, whereas the will wills by being actually borne toward them, as Aristotle seems to teach in 3 de Anima, text. 15, and St Thomas, below q. 27, art. 4, show. Therefore intellection consists in the word of the mind, through which things are represented most actually and in the second act, and are consequently drawn most actually, and in their intelligible or representative being, to that same intellect.

It can be confirmed secondly from what we have said above. For when we wish to understand some thing rightly, we then strive above all to form within us a perfect likeness to it; and when our intellect is first put into act through it, we immediately have a perfect knowledge of that same thing. This sufficiently proves that intellection consists in the likeness just mentioned.

201 Finally. For a person to be understanding in act, it is necessarily required that the person be a thing understood in act; just as for something to be intellectual habitually, it is indispensably required that it be a thing understood in the habit, namely through an intelligible species habitually representing its object. Therefore a word is likewise necessarily required, and consequently will be produced through every intellection. This final consequence follows from the preceding one, since precisely because a word is present, it must occur through intellection. The former also follows from the antecedent: because the word is nothing other than the most actual form of the thing understood, through which the intellect becomes in act the thing understood itself.

§ II. The second opinion is referred to.

202 The second opinion affirms that in the blessed there is in fact a word of the mind representing the divine essence quidditatively and as it is in itself, but that this does not imply that the said essence as it is in itself can be seen without a word produced. They hold this view to be probable: Sylvius, in conflatu q. 12, art. 2; Canarianus, q. 27, art. 1, disp. 15; Capreolus, in 1, dist. 27, q. 2, art. 3, ad 8, and in 4, dist. 49, q. 5, art. 3. The same view is held by St Bonaventure, in 1, dist. 3, q. 1, art. 1, qaest. 1, ad ult.; Scotus, quodlib. 8, and in 4, dist. 49, q. 2, where he cites Soto, art. 3; Gabriel, in 1, dist. 27, and at the same place; Durand; Ferrara, 1 contra Gentes, cap. 53; Vazquez, in the present dissertation, 38; Molina, here, disp. 1; Arrubal, disp. 17, cap. 2.

This opinion will be clear as to its second part from what we shall say in support of our assertion. As to the first part, however, it is proved first. For the beatific vision, speaking naturally, is prior in having the connaturality of being in becoming than of being in having been made; therefore, speaking connaturally, and consequently in fact, action and word will be simultaneous. The antecedent is proved. Because intellection itself depends upon the actually inflowing intellect, and is considered in this respect to be in becoming; and then such intellection, at least speaking connaturally and therefore in fact, is truly complete and terminated; and thus it will not only be in becoming but in having been made, and not just somehow, but in such a way that speaking connaturally it is prior in becoming than in having been made, since whatever is under either of these states must first be in becoming than in having been made, as appears inductively. The consequence, however, is proved. Because in its becoming, and in so far as it itself depends actually upon the intellect, it is an action, since this is proper to an action; but in its having been made it is a word, since the word is nothing other than completed intellection in its having been made.

203 Secondly. For although the eternal Father has his own most present essence in the ratio of an object to be known, he nevertheless produces the Word; and likewise, although the essence of an angel may be actually present and proportionate to the angelic intellect, nevertheless in his intellection he also forms a word, as we shall say below from the doctrine of St Thomas; therefore the blessed will also form a word in act in the beatific vision. The consequence is evident. For one of the chief reasons why this production of a word could be denied to the blessed was that the word was posited to supply the absence of the terminating object of intellection, just as the imprinted species is posited to supply the absence or disproportion of the object motivating the intellect, because the intellect understands by drawing things to itself and consequently by holding the object within itself both as motive and as terminus. Therefore, if this reason is no obstacle in other intellections, neither will it prevent the word from being produced there, nor will it impede it in the beatific vision.

204 Thirdly. A representative word of God by essence need not import infinite perfection, as the intelligible species quidditatively representing God does; therefore it can be present in the beatific vision, and in fact will be present. The consequence—that the latter statement follows from the former part—is clear from the preceding argument. For once a created representative word of God by essence is not contrary, there is no reason why it should not in fact be present, since every intellection connaturally seeks to be terminated by its own terminus, namely by a word. As to the first part, the same consequence plainly follows from the antecedent. For the said word alone could be impossible because it would necessarily import infinite perfection.

The antecedent, however, follows from the distinction between the imprinted species and the word. For although the imprinted species must be commensurate with the object and its immateriality, because it holds itself on the object's side, the word is otherwise situated, because it is not immediately commensurate with the object itself, but with the perfection of the light and action through which it is produced. Since therefore both have a bounded existence both in the being of a thing and in the intelligible genus, the word likewise cannot fail to have the same finitude and limitation in both orders.

205 It is confirmed first. The representative word that an angel forms need not equal in entitative perfection, or in representative being, the whole imprinted species through which it is produced; therefore, neither will the word representing the divine essence have to equal its perfection in any real being, whether entitative or representative, as it has the ratio of an intelligible species. The antecedent is commonly admitted by theologians when treating of angels. The consequence, however, seems sufficiently established: first from the parity of the reason; then also because precisely because the angelic word does not equal the intelligible species through which it is produced, the mean through which it is produced is not part of the reason of a word to equal that species; and consequently a created representative word of God as it is in itself can be produced, even though it does not equal the power of the species through which it is made.

It is confirmed and explained secondly. For a word cannot fail to be limited by the beatific vision, which is of finite perfection, in its representing; therefore it cannot fail to be finite and limited, and consequently it will be possible and will in fact be present together with the same beatific vision. Both consequences are clear from what has been said. The antecedent, however, is urged because a word cannot represent more than what is attained through cognition; therefore the word cannot fail to be limited through the said cognition.

§ III. The more probable opinion.

206 Nevertheless, it must be said that even by God's absolute power a word representing God by essence cannot be produced. Thus St Thomas in the places cited, after considering dub. 1 of this article, whom Caietanus, Bannesius, Zumel, Nazarius, Gonzalez, Navarette, Ripa, Alvarez, Javellus, and Soncinas follow in the places cited for the difficulty; and Capreolus in 4, dist. 49, q. 5; and our Complutenses in lib. de Anima, disp. 21, q. 5; and finally Ledesma, De perfectione Dei, q. 8, art. 5 and 6, where he says that this opinion is more common among Thomists than it is openly defended by very many others.

This assertion follows openly from that twofold reason by which, in the preceding difficulties, we proved the impossibility of a created imprinted species quidditatively representing God. For just as an imprinted species represents God quidditatively and as He is in Himself, so an expressed species, or a word formed through the beatific vision, ought to represent Him quidditatively as well. Hence, just as for this reason an intelligible species cannot fail to be of the same nature as its object, namely as God, so for the same reason a word also could not fail to be of the same nature as God; for that likeness of the word to God could not fail to be grounded in the unity of nature, as is clear from what was said above; and since it implies a created form to be in some true and real being of the same nature as God, as has been shown, it will also imply the presence of a word seeking the said likeness.

Then, just as an imprinted species must be of the same immateriality as the object quidditatively represented, so also must an expressed species, or word. Therefore, whenever an angel—for example—is known through a word representing him quidditatively, that word is as immaterial as the angel; and likewise our word representing some material quidditity, or some quidditative predicate of it, is of the same immateriality as those things. Therefore, just as for this reason a created imprinted species of God by essence is repugnant, so also is a created word, or expressed species, of God as He is in Himself.

§ IV. Solutions of the arguments of the first opinion.

207 To the first argument of the first opinion, which was left as the final one from the fourth difficulty, the answer is given by denying the antecedent. To its proof, the antecedent must be distinguished. Considered under the predicament of action, consisting in flux and vital being, it is a true vital action and a true becoming must be denied; considered under the predicament of quality, possessing by the mode of a perfect form the ratio of an action and terminus in an eminent manner, it must be granted; and then the first consequence must be denied.

This is explained as follows. The said immanent action, namely intellection, and the other actions already mentioned, because of their eminence and ultimate actuality, are equivalent to a transient action and its terminus: to its terminus indeed, because it is a form and a kind of perfect quality, just as it is the terminus of the said action; but to the action, because it is in an eminent manner the ultimate actuality of a power and consists in a most actual exercise. Thus it is a kind of perfect form constituted in actual exercise and ultimate actuality, by which the intellect actually lives and is virtually and intelligibly united to its object. Hence, although a transient action, which is a pure becoming considered under the predicament of action and consists really in vital being and flux, must necessarily have a terminus produced from the nature of the thing and distinct from it, since its being, namely vital, is for the sake of that terminus; the case is different with intellection, because it is not necessarily for the sake of a terminus, namely the word, but the terminus and word exist for the sake of it, so that through the word, as an object understood beforehand in the manner already explained, the object is contemplated.

Accordingly, when the said intellection needs this terminus because the object is not actually present and does not have sufficient actuality under the ratio of a terminating object, since it is not part of its ratio to be actually understood, or to exist in act as terminating intellection, then the same intellection, insofar as it is eminently equivalent to a transient action and is the ultimate actuality of the agent, produces in a more elevated manner a terminus distinct from itself, namely a word. When, however, it does not need it because the object is intimately present and has sufficient actuality to be united immediately with the intellect itself not only under the ratio of a motivating object but also as an actually terminating object, as occurs in the beatific vision, then it does not produce a terminus distinct from itself. For since, unlike a transient action, it does not exist for the sake of the terminus, but rather the terminus exists because of the intellection's need, it does not produce it, since it has no need of it; rather, by itself alone, in the mode of a perfect form, and bearing in itself the ratio of action and terminus eminently, it proceeds from the intellect and is united with it and the object in the second act.

208 The first confirmation is answered with the Complutenses, in lib. Phys., disp. 16, num. 13, and in lib. de Anima, disp. 21, q. 1, as well as 2 and 3, and especially q. 1: namely, that the beatific vision is not an action under the predicament of action, but a true quality. For as St Thomas teaches in 1, dist. 8, q. 4, art. 3, ad 3, action, insofar as it constitutes a special predicament distinct from all others, is said to be something flowing with motion; but intellection does not consist in flux or vital being, nor does it have the ratio of motion or instantaneous mutation, which in 3 Physic. is defined as being the act of a thing in potency, etc.—features imported by action under the predicament of action. On this point the said Complutenses should be consulted in the place cited. Hence, just as intellection is a perfect form, so it does not constitute its subject in flux and in a process; but, as Aristotle says in 3 de Anima, text. 22, and St Thomas explains in the same place, lecture 12, it is the act of the perfect, that is, it constitutes the intellect in perfect being, not in vital being.

We have said that it is not an action under the predicament of action, but not absolutely that it is not an action, for we do not deny that it is a true action, but that it is an action under the predicament of action. For true action is abstracted from what constitutes the predicament of action as distinct from all other things, and from what is a true quality pertaining to the second species of quality, as the said Complutenses explain at length from St Thomas in the place cited.

To the argument proving the contrary, it must be denied that the beatific vision arises from this as the word of the mind; for this word is not any kind of quality, but a quality similar to its object and proceeding from the intellect through another intervening quality, namely intellection, as it has the ratio of a word. What intellection means insofar as it is a word, and how intellection itself, as the contemplation of an object, and the same insofar as it is the production and utterance of a word, together with other matters bearing on this, are to be compared for a more exact understanding of this difficulty, are explained from St Thomas by the said Complutenses in the cited lib. de Anima, disp., q. 4.

The reason, however, why a word does not proceed immediately from the intellect itself is that it does not have the ratio of a quality so eminent as intellection, which is equivalent to a transient action and its terminus. Thus it needs an action distinct from itself, through which it is made and which, as was touched upon above, has the ratio of the ultimate actuality with respect to it, to the intellect, and to the whole order of purely created intelligibles insofar as such.

209 Nor does it matter that it is said there that each thing produces something similar to itself, and consequently that the beatific vision, proceeding from the intellect insofar as it is similar to its object, ought to be a likeness of that same object and therefore cannot fail to be a word. For this means nothing other than an expressed or produced quality, proceeding from the intellect, which is similar to its object.

This therefore makes no difference. For whenever the created intellect is concerned with an object that is in itself an intelligible object and is at the same time essentially understood through some intellection, that is, with the divine essence as it is in itself, then it acts in the ratio of a productive principle by the mode of an equivocal agent. Thus it produces nothing except the intellection which, by its eminence, is equivalent to a transient action and its terminus, as has been said; and, as is also clear from what has been said, it cannot be a formal likeness of the object unless it is of the same nature in its intelligible being as God, and consequently it would mean infinite perfection in this order. Yet when the same intellect is concerned with other objects, it has at least in part the ratio of a univocal agent, and therefore it produces a word which is of the same nature in its intelligible being as the object, or intelligible species, subject nevertheless to what was indicated above in dub. 5 of this dissertation.

210 The second confirmation is answered by saying that, precisely because intellection proceeds from the intellect by the mode of a perfect form eminently equivalent to a transient action and its terminus, it can proceed from it in an eminent manner both as quo and as quod. Consequently, if such intellection does not need a terminus really distinct from itself, because the object is intimately united with the intellect under the ratio of the object understood, owing to its eminence and most pure actuality, then no word will be produced.

To the first argument proving the contrary, the answer is that although a becoming under the predicament of action and joined with motion cannot be the becoming of itself so as to be made both as quo and as quod, but only as quo, the case is different with an eminent becoming consisting in a form and a kind of perfect quality. For insofar as it is the ultimate actuality of the agent and is equivalent to a transient action, it needs no other intervening actuality or action through which it proceeds from the intellect; and insofar as it is a perfect form, not consisting as to its formality or entitative status in flux and vital being, it also proceeds as a thing effected, as quod. Nor does it follow that it exists before it exists, as the argument intends; rather, it simultaneously has the ratio of proceeding by its eminence as quo and as quod, without any distinction on the part of the thing conceived, but only on the part of the mode of conception, and at most (discussed elsewhere) with a merely virtual distinction. Thus, that formality by which it is equivalent to a transient action is virtually prior to the other, by which it is equivalent to the terminus of that action, although, speaking really, both formalities are altogether simultaneous.

Accordingly, the second argument is also sufficiently clear. For although the effect, or the produced terminus, must necessarily be distinguished from its cause or productive principle, it is not nevertheless necessary that the becoming and production of a thing, consisting in actual exercise and in the ultimate actuality of the agent while also bearing the ratio of a perfect form, be distinguished from that same form as produced, as quod. For such a becoming is not the ordinary real becoming of the thing, but a real and eminent becoming.

Hence, just as the passive generation of the divine Word—which, according to the highly probable opinion of many, consists in the relation of filiation signified by the mode of origin—simultaneously has a real existence produced in an eminent manner both as quo and as quod, without this proving a real distinction in it, because this belongs to it only as something real, but in an eminent manner, and thus through the mode of some pre-existing unity and in a more elevated manner bearing both ratios; so, proportion being preserved, this same will be found in intelligible and created emanation by the ratio of its eminence.

211 To the second argument the answer is given with our Complutenses, in lib. de Anima, disp. 21, q. 2, 3, and 4, and especially q. 2, num. 32 and the following, by denying the antecedent. To the first argument, drawn from the testimony of Augustine, the answer is given with the Angelic Doctor, 1, part, q. 34, art. 1, where, after he had set against himself Augustine's words used in this argument, he says as follows in the answer to the second: Now, therefore, when it is said that the Word is knowledge, knowledge is not taken for the act of the understanding intellect, or for any habit of it, but for what the intellect conceives by knowing. Hence Augustine also says that the Word is begotten wisdom, which is nothing other than the very conception of the wise man, which can likewise in the same way be called begotten knowledge.

212 To the second argument, the answer is that the holy Doctor is speaking there of intelligere, insofar as it is distinguished from dicere; but, taken in that sense, it is true that no relation of origin is imported into it—that is, that nothing proceeds from it as a terminus produced through it and distinct from it, as occurs in dicere itself. For this reason St Thomas said that no relation of origin is imported into it, but only a certain information in our intellect, to signify that one ought not to regard anything distinct from it as a terminus produced through it, but rather the subject, which it constitutes in the being of an understanding subject as its object.

Nevertheless, after the words just cited, namely: according as our intellect is in act through the form of the thing understood, he immediately added, he did not intend to signify that the form of the thing understood is that through which the intellect is most formally constituted in the ratio of an understanding subject, such that this be the formal effect of such a form; but rather what it is through which the intellect is rendered altogether capable of eliciting and receiving within itself an intellection distinct from the said form and through which it is constituted in the being of an understanding subject. He said that this itself is the form of the thing understood, namely the intelligible species: he often calls this the form of the thing understood, as is clear from 1 cont. Gent., cap. 53, and the other places cited above. For unless the intellect be actualized through the said intelligible form, it is not at all capable of eliciting and receiving within itself an intellection distinct both from an imprinted species and from an expressed species, or word.

Whence it is not altogether true that what is added in the same argument, namely that to understand is said by St Thomas to be the formal effect of the form of the thing understood in which no relation of origin is imported. For although it is true that no relation of origin is imported into intelligere, insofar as it is distinguished from dicere, it is nevertheless false that intelligere is the formal effect of the form of the thing understood. Whether, however, an intelligible species is required in order to receive intellection, so that it may adhere immediately to the species, or whether it is only received in an intellect nevertheless actualized and informed through the said species in the proportionate manner in which the actions of our Lord, although not received into the substance of the Word, are nevertheless received in his humanity specified by the said hypostasis, and the beatific vision, although not received into the divine essence, is nevertheless received in the blessed intellect actualized by the divine essence under the ratio of an intelligible form, is another question and is to be discussed elsewhere.

213 To the last argument, the answer is that it is not correctly inferred from the fact that intelligere cannot be completed without a word, and hence is not extrinsic to it, that the said word pertains intrinsically to the act of understanding as something directly imported by it. It is inferred only that the word has a necessary connection with it, as with an object that is first per se and (as we shall say below) understood in those intellections of the natural order and in many others in which the object is not intimately present in the intellect with sufficient actuality and immateriality for it to be united of itself, without the aid of a word distinct from it, to the intellect under the ratio of an object understood.

Against this, the proof there adduced has no force, namely that intellection is one simple quality, and therefore cannot result from a word and some other quality, but must necessarily consist in a word if it is once required for it. For that intellection is a simple quality takes from it the direct importation of a word as something intrinsically constituting it, but does not imply that it brings it as an object in the manner just explained and in the sense already stated. For just as it belongs to the ratio of the intellect to be per se united with its intelligible object, so it belongs to the ratio of intellection to be united also with the object whose ratio it is to be actually understood, or to exist in act as terminating intellection, as was touched upon above. It is clear from what has been said in this difficulty that the word is an object actually understood through the intellections already explained; and thus it is no wonder that it has a necessary connection with it.

214 To the third, the answer is that there is a twofold actual manifestation of a thing: one indeed through the mode of a vital operation, and another through the mode of an object and likeness which manifests the object not habitually but actually, and which is always and indispensably united with the actual intellection distinct from it. Intellection, therefore, is the actual manifestation of a thing through the mode of vital operation, not through the mode of an object terminating intellection, which does not have the ratio of vital operation. These considerations make sufficiently clear everything there adduced.

To the confirmation, what has been said shows the point. For the divine essence, by the ratio of its eminence and most pure actuality, has united in itself the ratio both of intellection and of the object whose ratio it is to be actually understood. The former, however, belongs to it because it is a manifestation of the thing understood through the mode of intelligible and vital operation. The latter, by contrast, belongs to it insofar as it corresponds (though we shall explain the manner elsewhere) to the mental word, in that, by belonging to its ratio, it is the manifestation of the thing understood as actually existing and intrinsically terminating intellection, or existing through the mode of the object already explained. Hence, insofar as it expresses this ratio, it does not express itself as intellection, but as the object understood.

215 To the fourth, while granting the antecedent, the consequence must be denied. For intellection is not formally, however actual, a likeness of its object. To its proof, it must be said that it proves only that just as an intelligible species makes an intelligible object by the ratio of its habitual representation, so an expressed species, or word, makes it actually understood, that is, actually terminating intellection; but not that, just as an intelligible species constitutes the intellect in the first act as something intrinsic and intrinsically pertaining to such a first act, so the word constitutes the intellect as understanding as something intrinsic and intrinsically bearing on intellection.

The reason for the difference is taken from what has been said above. For although intellection must arise, as from a single principle perfectly adapted to the first act, from the male and female of intellectual nature, that is, from the intellect and the object, or from the intelligible species that is the same object in its intelligible being and renders it intelligible, and although likewise the object, or word, which in that order and in a more actual manner is the same object and constitutes it in the ratio of the thing understood, must terminate intellection, or that act of giving birth to intellection in the intellections mentioned above, nevertheless intellection itself in creatures (of whom we are speaking) is not the object understood insofar as it is still in its intelligible being, as its principle and terminus do have the said object as their being. For it is not a likeness of that object, but a union with it as with the object understood, or a vital tendency toward it as toward a thing understood. Consequently, the object, or word, will not pertain intrinsically to intellection as something intrinsically constituting it, but only as an object considered in itself and actually united with it. Nevertheless, the intelligible species pertains to the intellect as intrinsically completing it, constituting it in the first act, and rendering the object intelligible; and likewise the word bears intrinsically on the ratio of the terminus and object of actual intellection, because each of these offices is an office of the thing understood, or of what is the same as it in its intelligible being.

216 Accordingly, the answer to both confirmations is also clear. For the intellect is not said to understand by drawing things to itself insofar as intellection itself consists in the intellect's having things intelligibly, or drawing them to itself, or (equivalent for our present purpose) being a likeness of them in its intelligible being. Rather, no intellection can occur unless the object is intimately present to the intellect both under the ratio of a motivating and under that of a terminating object, whether it terminates intellection in itself or through the intervening likeness just mentioned. Hence, when we wish perfectly to understand a thing, we accordingly strive to form a perfect expressed likeness of it. For in the intellections already mentioned, such a likeness is necessarily required in order to produce this influx; and when it is formed through intellection, a perfect knowledge of that thing cannot fail to be possessed.

It makes no difference if one objects that these claims do not fit what the Complutenses say in Summulis, lib. 1 de Terminis, cap. 1, about the acts of the intellect, namely that they are likenesses of things expressed per se. The answer is that they said this much only because they introduced the acts of the intellect as an example in order to explain the formal sign as distinct from the instrumental sign. For it is clear from the common opinion of the Doctors that, to introduce something as an example, the probable opinion of others suffices, as St Thomas often did.

217 To the last, the answer is given with our Complutenses, in lib. de Anima, disp. cited, num. 102, by granting the antecedent. For although intellection, taken most formally, does not consist in the intellect becoming the thing understood itself—since to be understood is not by itself the first formal effect of the thing understood—nevertheless there is no intellection unless the intellect becomes in act the thing understood. This occurs either because the thing understood is united of itself, in the ratio of a thing actually understood, with the intellect itself, or because it is united with it through the word supplying its defect. Then both consequences must be denied. To the proof of the former, upon which the latter rests, what has just been said makes the point clear. For a word is not any form of the thing understood, or the thing understood itself, but the expressed form of that thing, produced through intellection. Nevertheless, for the intellect to understand, it is not necessary that it become in act through this form, but through the form, or through the thing understood itself, not expressed through intellection but united of itself with the intellect by the ratio of its supreme actuality under the mode of the object understood, or the object actually terminating intellection. On account of this ratio, what is commonly called the word is usually so named.

We shall answer the arguments of the second opinion in the following difficulty.

218 This difficulty is rightly raised separately by us. For, just as when treating the impossibility of an imprinted and created species representing God quidditatively, we derived that impossibility both from the arguments expressly adduced in this article by D. Thom. and, separately, from another argument advanced by the same holy Doctor, quoted in the Quodlibetum and likewise in 4. contra Gent. cap. 11., it was fitting that, when treating the impossibility of a created word representing God quidditatively, we should derive it both from the arguments expressly advanced in this article by the holy Doctor, as we did in the preceding difficulty, and also separately from that argument cited in the Quodlibetum and in 4. cont. Gent. cap., advanced by the same holy Doctor but now applied here: namely, from the fact that God is his own intelligible being and understood—or, equivalently, because he not only has in himself and essentially the object motivating the intellect with respect to a quidditative knowledge of himself, but is also the object actually terminating that knowledge; and thus there cannot be a word that represents him quidditatively, as we shall examine more fully in this difficulty.

We have, however, joined the arguments of the present article into a single difficulty, because after assuming what we have said above concerning the impossibility of an imprinted species, nothing peculiar arose concerning them themselves. Thus, the opposite consideration will examine the argument adduced by D. Thom. in the Quodlibetum, whereas in this peculiar difficulty it must be examined because that argument, insofar as it is now applied, appears to involve a somewhat greater difficulty, at least in external appearance.

§ I. The opposing opinion is mentioned.

219 All the Doctors cited in the first and second positions of the preceding difficulty defend the negative position, and it can be proved first from this: for even if a created word representing God quidditatively were granted, it would not thereby be granted to it that it is known by created intellect according to that ratio by which it has from itself and essentially the property of being known by that intellect, or according to that ratio by which it has the property of terminating its intellection. Thus the argument is utterly refuted, and its entire foundation collapses. The consequence therefore seems certain. For the whole force of the argument just discussed consists in this: that if a created word were granted, it would render God actually understood, or place him in the role of the object actually terminating created intellection, even though he has that property essentially. But if the created word did not grant to God that he is quidditatively understood by created intellect according to that ratio according to which it belongs to him from himself and essentially to be understood, it would not grant him what essentially belongs to him; and thus the whole force of this argument would fall.

The antecedent, however, is proved. For being actually understood, or known, belongs essentially to God insofar as he is thus known quidditatively by created intellect alone, while at the same time he is known quidditatively and comprehensively by his own divine intellect. Therefore, his being known quidditatively alone by created intellect, to the exclusion of his being quidditatively and comprehensively understood by divine intellect, is not to be an actually understood being, which is proper to God and essentially belongs to him, as is clear from itself. Yet if a created word representing God quidditatively were granted, it would grant him that he is quidditatively known by created intellect, to the exclusion of his being at the same time quidditatively and comprehensively known by divine intellect according to the said word; for the said word would be in created intellect alone, not in the divine intellect. Thus such a word would not grant God to be understood, or known by created intellect, according to that ratio of being understood which essentially and from itself belongs to God.

220 This objection, however, seems to have even greater force against the argument insofar as it is used to prove the impossibility of a created word representing God quidditatively than against it insofar as it is intended to establish the impossibility of an intelligible species representing him in the same way according as he is in himself. For any intelligible species representing an object quidditatively represents it according as it is in itself, comprehensively; yet not every species expressively representing its object quidditatively must represent it comprehensively. Thus angelic intelligible species comprehensively represent whatever they represent quidditatively; the express species of angels do the opposite, because they can use those intelligible species at will in order to know precisely and quidditatively some object represented through them. The word produced through such knowledge then represents that object only quidditatively, insofar as it is commensurate with the intellection through which it occurs. Hence a created word produced through the vision of the blessed, if that vision touched God only quidditatively, would represent the divine essence only quidditatively, not comprehensively; and thus it could not grant God that he is known quidditatively and comprehensively, or that he terminates knowledge quidditatively and comprehensively with respect to created or divine intellect. Consequently, neither would it grant him that being actually understood which essentially belongs to him.

221 It is proved secondly. For in divine things a word is produced properly and strictly speaking, and yet it is not granted to the divine essence that it is actually understood; for the divine essence has from itself that it is understood, or is the object actually terminating intellection, and therefore it is not granted to it that it is understood. For the same reason, therefore, a created word produced in the beatific vision would not grant the divine essence that which belongs to it essentially, namely, that it terminates the quidditative intellection of itself. The antecedent is universally admitted among theologians. The consequence, however, seems to follow from parity of reason.

§ II. Decision of the difficulty.

222 Nevertheless, it must be said that the impossibility of a created word representing God quidditatively is rightly established by the force of the argument indicated in the heading. This assertion of D. Thom.'s disciples can be proved only better by adducing and explaining the said argument, which can indeed be proposed in the following form. For just as the divine essence is its own intelligible being and its own intellection, so too it is its own actually understood being. Therefore, just as for the former reason—namely, because it is its own intelligible being—it cannot be made intelligible through any other intelligible species, and consequently no created intelligible species can be given that represents it quidditatively, whose proper function is to render intelligible the object represented through it in that way; so too, for this reason, namely, because it is its own actually understood being, it cannot be made the object actually understood through any created form; and consequently there cannot be a created word representatively representing it quidditatively. The antecedent is sufficiently clear. The consequence, namely what is stated in part 1 from what was said in question 4 of this disputation, is clear. For whatever is such from itself and essentially cannot be made such by another: just as, because union is essentially the union of extremes, its union with them cannot be produced through another; so too, if the divine essence is intelligible in itself and essentially quidditatively, there cannot be given an intelligible species representing it quidditatively, since the function of such a species is to render intelligible the object represented through it. From this the same consequence is likewise clear in the second part: since it is proper to the said word to render the object represented through it actually understood.

223 This is confirmed and explained. For if the said created word were granted, it would both place God in the role of what is understood, or that of terminating the beatific vision, and not place him there: hence an evident contradiction would follow. The antecedent is clear in part 1. For, as we shall explain more fully immediately below, to constitute a word distinct in entitative being from the object understood as the said created word would be in relation to God is to constitute it in the role of what is understood. Which, 2.

224 This is confirmed, 2. For an angel needs an express species in order to know himself, rather than a species imprinted by and distinct from himself, because although he is knowable in the first act by reason of his immateriality and actuality, nevertheless, since this is not through the manner of a second act but contains an admixture of potentiality, precisely considered in terms of the force of his own essence he does not have a knowable being in the second act, but only in the first; and consequently he needs an express species through which he may be rendered intelligible in the second act, or, so far as the present question is concerned, through which he may be constituted in the role of the object actually terminating his knowledge. Therefore, since God not only has from himself a knowable being proximately and immediately in the first act, but a knowable being in the second act, or a terminus actually terminating every quidditative knowledge of himself—since he is not only his own intelligible being, but also his own actually understood being, insofar as he is a pure act in this order—it follows that he needs no express species or word in order to be seen quidditatively by the blessed; indeed, he cannot be seen through one.

§ III. Solution of the opponents, and its first refutation.

225 The opponents object that although this pertains to the perfection of the divine essence insofar as it is intelligible by created intellect, it is not actually understood by it. Thus it has the former from itself, but not the latter; and thus it cannot be made intelligible through any created form, but it can nevertheless be made actually understood with respect to created intellect by something created, namely a word.

They confirm this solution both from the fact that, if God were not intelligible by created intellect, he would lack infinite perfection in the role of an intelligible object; whereas even if he were not actually understood by it, and therefore had the same perfection, he would still be seen by some created intellect, or would still be the object actually seen with respect to it. And also because being the object actually understood with respect to created intellect does not belong to him before created intellection or vision, as seems evident from the terms themselves. Thus this is a sign that it does not pertain to God's intrinsic perfection, and consequently does not belong to him from himself; for what pertains to God's intrinsic perfection and belongs to him from himself cannot fail to belong to him antecedently to created intellection. Finally (and this confirms and explains the preceding twofold reason), because it seems rather to follow from this reason, adduced in favor of our assertion, that a created word representing God according as he is in himself must be given in order that he himself may be seen quidditatively. For although the divine essence has essentially that it is understood by God, it is not understood by created intellect. Thus, although for God himself to be understood it requires no produced word, by virtue of which he would be rendered understood by God, for him to be understood by created intellect it does indeed require one.

226 This solution, however, is unsatisfactory. For it is false that being the object actually understood with respect to created and blessed intellect, as such, does not pertain to the intrinsic perfection of the divine essence, if this denotes—which in truth it must denote—that the object, according as it is from itself, is actually understood by that intellect, or, according as it possesses in itself sufficient actuality to terminate created intellection, namely the beatific vision, by itself alone and without the aid of another, we speak here of being understood; this does not pertain to the intrinsic perfection of the essence. The reason is evident. For just as it belongs to the function of the understood object to have the role of a motivating object with respect to intellection, so too it belongs to the function of that same object to possess the role of a terminating object, or, according as it is from itself, actually terminating that intellection. Thus, just as having sufficient immateriality and actuality to possess by itself, by its own reason, and without the intervention of another, the role of a motivating object pertains to the intrinsic perfection of the said object, and much more does its having the role of an object that, according as it is from itself, actually moves with respect to intellection; so too, it will pertain to the intrinsic perfection of that same object that it possess sufficient immateriality and actuality so that, according as it is from itself and without the aid of another, it has the force to terminate intellection actually, or according as it is from itself actually terminate it.

227 This is confirmed and explained. For just as in being the intelligible object a twofold intelligibility is involved: one is an extrinsic denomination arising from intellectual potency, and therefore resides on the potency's side and is referred back to the object itself; the other, however, resides on the object's side and arises from its intrinsic immateriality and actuality, or, if these are lacking, arises from the intelligible species insofar as the latter resides on their side and supplies their defect—so too, in being actually understood there is also involved a twofold being understood: one is an extrinsic denomination arising from intellection, and therefore resides on its side and is referred back to the object itself; the other, however, resides on the object's side and signifies in it such immateriality and actuality that, at least according as it is from itself, it actually terminates intellection and is, so to speak, that upon which the extrinsic denomination arising from that intellection immediately falls. Thus, in order actually to terminate, it needs nothing to supply a defect of its own actuality or immateriality; or, if it does need something, that defect is supplied by the word, insofar as the latter resides on its side. Therefore, although the former being understood does not signify an intrinsic perfection in the object residing primordially on its side, the latter being understood indeed does; just as, although the former being intelligible, arising from intellectual potency, does not signify intrinsic perfection in the object, the latter being intelligible, residing on the object's side, does. The due proportion required between the intelligible and understood object demands this, as will be clearer from itself and from what is to be said below. Indeed—as we shall examine in this same difficulty—the fact that an object is actually understood, insofar as this denotes being understood residing on the object's side, signifies a far greater perfection in the object than being intelligible that is found in it.

§ IV. Second refutation of the opponents' solution.

228 First, this very point can be urged and explained from the fact that whenever a created word is given, it is not needed for intellection as something in which the intellection itself essentially consists, but as something residing on the object's side and supplying its defect, or as an internal object that essentially has being as a terminus actually terminating that intellection and by virtue of which the object represented through it has an ultimate termination. Thus, whenever a word is produced through an intellection, it arises from a defect of the object—that is, from the fact that the object does not possess such actuality and immateriality as to have, from itself and essentially, being actually understood, or, according as it is from itself, to terminate its own intellection. Therefore, that an object from itself alone, and without needing a word, has being actually understood or actually terminates intellection, signifies intrinsic perfection and actuality in it. This second consequence follows plainly from the first. For if the need of a word in order actually to terminate intellection arose from a defect, and therefore from an intrinsic imperfection of the object, it would follow that an object which needs no word in order actually to terminate intellection has intrinsic perfection and actuality in it. Likewise, because an intelligible species is needed as something residing on the object's side in order to have the role of a motivating object and supply its defect and intrinsic potentiality, an object's not needing that species, but having in itself essentially the power to move the intellect, signifies intrinsic actuality and perfection in the same object. The first consequence, however, follows from the antecedent. For if the production of a word through intellection did not arise from a defect of the object, the word would not be needed as something residing on the object's side and supplying its defect, as is stated in the antecedent.

The antecedent, namely that whenever a word produced through created intellection is given, it is not needed as something in which intellection essentially consists, is clear from what was said in the preceding question and from the positions of our Complutensian teachers in lib. de Anima disp. 21, q. 23 and 4, which must altogether be consulted for an exact understanding of this point.

229 With respect, however, to the third part of the consequence just given, namely that a word is required in order that the object represented through it may ultimately be actually terminated by intellection, this is sufficiently clear from the second part of the same antecedent, namely that a word is needed as an internal object that essentially has being as a terminus actually terminating that intellection. Also because, since the word is not an object, which, strictly speaking, it cannot be required as an object actually and essentially terminating intellection unless, through its means, the object represented through it should have that ultimate termination. Moreover, because whatever is essentially such must be such in everything else that shares that property: thus, if the word is essentially an object actually terminating intellection, the object represented through it must have from it its actual termination.

230 With respect, however, to the second part of the consequence just given, the same antecedent is urged. First, because D. Thom. teaches this in 4. contra Gent. cap. 11, where he says that to be the word is to be understood: that is, its being is of such a condition that, among other things, it indispensably has being as the object terminating intellection actually. Thus he says there that a human word cannot be called absolutely and simply a human being, but a human being in a qualified sense, namely, an intelligent human being. Hence this would be false: The human being is the word; but this can be true: The intelligent human being is the word. And q. 4, de verit. art. 2, ad 3, says: The conception of the intellect is the mean between the intellect and the understood thing, because through it the operation of the intellect reaches the thing, and therefore the conception of the intellect is not only that which is understood, but also that by which the thing is understood. Thus the same thing that is understood can be called both the thing itself and the conception of the intellect; likewise, what is said can be called both the thing said through the word and the word itself. But if the word did not intrinsically have being as an object actually understood, or terminating intellection actually, it would not be one thing, as we have just said, by which the thing represented through it is understood, or by which the same intellection is actually terminated, so that the word would terminate immediately and by its own reason, while the thing represented would terminate only mediately and through the word. For what is the first and immediate reason of termination has termination from itself and intrinsically, just as what is the first reason of being white has whiteness from itself and intrinsically, at least insofar as it is the principle by which something is made white.

231 Moreover, because the following proof explains and establishes this sufficiently. For since it is proper to the intellect to understand by drawing its object to itself, and since it has such an object with respect to itself, both as a motivating object and as a terminating object, the object must, according to each relation, be drawn to the intellect whenever the said object is not united to it in itself and with sufficient actuality and immateriality to exercise both functions. Therefore, since an object is drawn to the intellect through an intelligible species only in the role of a motivating object and principle of intellection, but not in the role of a terminating object, or, more properly, of one terminating intellection, it follows that in the stated case there must necessarily be given an express species, or word, through which the understood object is drawn to the intellectual power in the role of an object terminating intellection.

Hence, just as an intelligible species is essentially the principle of intellection, because through it the intelligible thing is drawn to the intellect in the role of a motivating object, and therefore the external object is by its reason the efficient principle with respect to intellection, so too the word will essentially be the intellection understood, or the terminus or internal object whose conception makes the object to be understood, or the object actually terminating intellection; and by virtue of it, the external object, lacking sufficient immateriality and actuality, will ultimately terminate intellection. For through the word the thing is drawn to the intellect in the role of an object actually terminating intellection.

232 Next (a tacit evasion that might have been used against the preceding proof will thus remain refuted). Since the word, or created express species, essentially has what is precisely required because of intellection's need, so that it is given only when that intellection needs it, and otherwise when it does not need it, as is clear from the preceding question and from what N. Complut. teaches in lib. de Anima disp. 21, it must likewise essentially belong to it that it lasts as long as the intellection itself is present, because the latter needs it only then, and that it vanish when the intellection vanishes. For then it is not the intellection that needs it; hence it must also essentially have being actually terminating intellection. The consequence is clear. For what essentially has being as a terminus, or object, of intellection and has an indispensable connection in its being produced and preserved by it cannot fail essentially to have being actually understood through it, or to actually terminate it.

233 Finally, from the difference between intelligible species and word, or express species. For since intelligible species resides on the object's side, it must be commensurate with the object. Thus, just as if the object had in itself the role of an intelligible species strictly so taken, it would have only the role of a motivating object, and would not essentially require that it always be an object actually moving toward intellection and actually influencing it, so too intelligible species has none of this. The word, however, resides on the side of the object and intellection so far as it is so called; and thus, insofar as it resides on the object's side, it is of the same nature as the object, just as an intelligible species representing quidditatively is of the same nature as its object for the same reason. But insofar as it resides on the side of intellection, and not in any respect whatever, but as something produced precisely because of its need, it must, in the role of object, have that actuality which the intellection itself has in the role of intellection. Thus, just as the intellection itself is essentially actual and tends toward the word and, through it, toward the ultimate object, so too the word will essentially be the object actually terminating intellection, by virtue of which the ultimate object terminates it.

Hence for this reason it is commonly said that, although intelligible species and express species are formal likenesses of the object, intelligible species nevertheless represents it habitually, whereas express species represents it most actually. For just as an external image is said actually to represent its prototype to sight when the prototype is actually seen, but not when it is not thus seen, and therefore then represents it only in the first act and by way of a habit, though formally, so too, because actual intellection does not belong to the essence of intelligible species, but does belong to the essence of the word, the former represents it only habitually, whereas the latter represents it most actually, although both are formal likenesses of the same object.

§ V. The opponents' solution does not satisfy the three arguments adduced in its favor at n. 225.

234 Nor do the arguments they advance in its favor support it. For to the first proof it is clear from what has been said that God would not have infinite perfection and actuality if, from himself and without needing a created word distinct from himself, he were not actually understood by created intellect, provided being understood is taken here as we take it, namely, as saying that he has such actuality and immateriality that, according as he is from himself and without needing a distinct word, he terminates created intellection, through which he is seen quidditatively. Thus, the fact that he does not always actually terminate does not arise from a defect of the divine essence, but from a defect of created vision. Yet to these it follows that he would retain the same perfection he now has even if he were not understood by created intellect, provided being understood denotes the extrinsic denomination arising from created intellection. For this being understood arises from intellection and thus neither increases nor diminishes divine perfection. The former being understood, however, resides on the object's side and signifies the greatest actuality and immateriality in it; hence, if it were removed from God, some very great perfection and actuality of his own would necessarily be removed from him.

235 From this, in answer to the second proof, it must be said that although being the object actually understood with respect to created intellect, according as it denotes the said extrinsic denomination arising from the intellection of the blessed, does not belong to God before such intellection, being actually understood with respect to the same created intellect, according as this denotes that former being understood, does belong to him—namely, that, according as he is from himself and by the force of his supreme actuality and immateriality, he actually terminates the said intellection, or has the most actual force to terminate it actually—even though the exercise of this termination is not given except when created intellection actually touches him quidditatively. Hence, his not always actually exercising this terminating function does not arise from a defect of God or of his immateriality and actuality, but from a defect of created vision, which is required as a condition and concomitant. Thus, simply by positing this, God exercises by himself, and without the intervention and need of anything distinct from himself, the said function of actually terminating intellection, insofar as it is his own being actually understood, as has been explained and will shortly be explained further.

236 Thus, also, with respect to the last proof, the antecedent must be denied. For although the divine essence does not essentially have being understood by created intellect, provided that being understood by it denotes the extrinsic denomination arising from created intellection, nevertheless, according as being understood by the same denotes being the object of such actuality that, according as it is from itself, it would actually terminate intellection, the fact that it does not terminate in act arises only from a defect of that intellection, not from a defect of the divine essence. Thus it will not need a word distinct from itself by virtue of which it would be rendered understood with respect to created intellect. For the said word is not needed in order to grant the object being understood according as being understood is taken in that former sense, but in order to grant it being understood according as this denotes actual force to terminate intellection actually, and in order to supply the defect of actuality and immateriality in the object by virtue of which it does not have being essentially understood through any intellection, or does not actually terminate it. Thus, simply because the divine essence is essentially understood by itself, it will not need a created word through which, in the sense just described, it would be rendered actually understood with respect to blessed intellect. Rather, by virtue of its own actuality and being understood, it will be able, without needing any created word, to terminate both uncreated intellection and any beatific and created intellection.

237 All these points can be explained by the example of the person of the divine Word. For just as for his personal being to extend secondarily to terminating the human nature of Christ the Lord, so that on its part that nature is actually terminated by him, it is not required that it belong to his notion actually and in act to terminate that nature; it is enough that he have that very filiation in the abstract through essence and by way of the purest act. Thus only the divine Word, or the other persons of the Most Holy Trinity, can—so to speak—personify a foreign nature. Likewise, for the divine essence to unite itself, or secondarily—that is, after union with the divine intellect—to unite with blessed intellect in the being of an understood object, it is not necessary that being actually understood by it belong to its notion; it is enough that it be the very actual being understood in the abstract through essence and by way of the purest act.

The reason is the same in both cases. Because the subsistence of the Word and the divine essence possess the conditions already stated, they essentially actually terminate what is proper to them and is terminable in the first instance by them; and thus, without any addition, they can extend themselves to what is terminable in the second instance. Their not doing so actually does not arise from a defect in themselves, but from the defect, potentiality, of human nature and created intellection. Hence, just as created subsistence signifies an essential commensurability with created nature, which it terminates, so that it cannot terminate another nature secondarily, whereas uncreated subsistence can; and just as uncreated subsistence, because it terminates divine nature primarily and created nature secondarily, has the property that it always and indispensably terminates the former actually and in act, whereas with respect to secondary termination it has only the property of terminating it according as it is from itself—so too, the notion of a created word requires complete commensurability with the one created intellection that it terminates. This does not belong to the notion of the uncreated word of which we now speak and which is commonly so called. Therefore, it belongs to the notion of that word, namely, a created word, that it must always terminate the intellection that it is fit to terminate. It does not belong to the notion of the uncreated word commonly so called and compared with an intellection that it terminates secondarily, but sometimes terminates actually and in act and sometimes does not terminate it, so that this arises from a defect of the intellection itself, not of the word's actuality. In what sense and by what right we bestow the name Word on the divine essence is clear from what we said in the solution of the last argument in favor of the first position of the preceding question.

§ VI. A noteworthy corollary clarifying what we have said and resolving several arguments.

238 From all of this it follows, first, that what we recently said is further clarified: namely, that the role of an object terminating intellection and not needing a word requires greater immateriality and actuality, and greater intrinsic perfection in the object itself, than does the role of a motivating object. Second, it follows how an object's terminating intellection by itself and without needing a word signifies intrinsic perfection in it distinct from an object that is only potentially terminative of intellection. Finally, it follows how an object terminating intellection by itself and without a distinct word cannot fail essentially to have being actually understood through some intellection, and consequently how this can belong only to the divine essence.

239 The reason for this corollary, as regards its first part, is this. First, because there is given an object which by itself and without need of another can have the role of a motivating object, as appears in the essence of an angel with respect to his own intellect; yet he cannot by himself, by his own reason, and without the intervention and need of a word, actually terminate intellection, as is clear from what has been said. Thus it is a sign that an object's being by itself and by its own reason, without need of a word, the object actually terminating intellection signifies greater perfection and actuality than the perfection required in an object that is by itself and by its own reason a motive of the intellect; otherwise there would be no reason why both should not belong to the angel. Moreover, because the word is more actual than the intelligible species; therefore, since each supplies a defect of the object, it is a sign that the defect supplied in the terminating object is greater than that supplied in the motivating object. Consequently, the terminating object, which does not need to be supplied in it by this defect, is more actual than the motivating object, which likewise does not need a species but moves itself to intellection. Finally—and this confirms and explains the preceding proof—because a thing not needing a word must have that same actuality which the word has as something supplying its defect, just as an object not needing an intelligible species must have that same actuality which the species has as something supplying the object's defect when the object needs it. Therefore, since the word signifies such actuality in the intelligible order that it essentially says to be the object actually understood, or actually terminating intellection, it follows that the object terminating intellection by itself and by its own reason, without need of a word, must have that same actuality. And since this signifies greater actuality in the intelligible order, and therefore the word is something more actual in this order than the intelligible species, as we were just saying, greater actuality and greater immateriality are required for the role of the said object terminating intellection.

240 The reason for the same corollary with respect to its second part, namely that terminating intellection by itself and without need of a word signifies intrinsic perfection in it distinct from an object that is only potentially terminative, is deduced from the first and second proofs advanced for the first part of this corollary, as will be clear to the reader, and also from the third. For just as the word, supplying the defect of the terminating object, intrinsically has being in the word actually terminating, not merely being potentially terminative, and therefore cannot fail to be distinct from that which is only potentially terminative, so too an object not needing a word, but terminating itself, will intrinsically have being actually terminating, not merely being potentially terminative. Consequently, it will be distinct from an object that is only potentially terminative.

From this, also, the reason for the same corollary with respect to its last part is gathered. For, as we were just saying, an object not needing a word in order actually to terminate intellection must have that same actuality which it would have in the word, if one were given, as something supplying its defect. Therefore, since the word supplying the defect of the object must essentially have being as an object actually understood, it follows that the same must belong to an object not needing a word, and consequently it cannot fail essentially to have being actually understood through some intellection, namely through the intellection most connatural to it. And since this can belong only to the divine essence, as is clear from itself, it follows that the divine essence alone can lack a word distinct from itself in order actually to terminate intellection.

§ VII. The arguments of the first position are met.

241 To the first [argument] it is answered by denying the antecedent. For if the said created word were granted, then, although according to what it expresses, it would grant God that he is understood only quidditatively, and not comprehensively, by created and blessed intellect, it would not grant God adequately that whole being understood which he has from himself and essentially; yet it would grant him inadequately that being understood which belongs to him essentially and according to that ratio according to which it belongs to God. This is explained. For it can be understood in two ways that God belongs to being understood quidditatively only by created intellect, and is not at the same time known quidditatively and comprehensively by divine intellect. First, indeed, in a purely restrictive sense, such that by force of that concept alone it is conceived only as known quidditatively, or as terminating, according as it is from itself, only a purely quidditative knowledge with respect to created intellect, and nothing is conceived concerning that being understood quidditatively and comprehensively which he has with respect to divine intellect. And thus, only in this restrictive sense is it said that he does not have being understood quidditatively and comprehensively at the same time by divine intellect, insofar as that being understood, or that power of terminating his own intellection actually which belongs to God from himself, is conceived strictly with respect to the inadequate function of terminating only the quidditative knowledge with respect to created intellect, with no concern for that same inadequate function of terminating both quidditative and comprehensive intellection with respect to his own divine intellect. In a second way, however, in a negative sense: namely, that it be granted to God that he is known only quidditatively by created intellect—or equivalently—that, according as he is from himself, he terminates that cognition by his own reason, while it is denied that he thereby has being actually understood quidditatively and comprehensively with respect to divine intellect.

Although, therefore, being understood only quidditatively, or quidditatively and not comprehensively at the same time by created intellect, with only taken in the negative sense, as denying that he is understood quidditatively and comprehensively at the same time with respect to divine intellect, is not yet an inadequate being understood, or a being understood suitable to the divine essence, yet it is so if only is taken in the purely restrictive sense just explained. For this is proper and peculiar to the divine essence, such that it cannot be shared with any created or creatable essence. For although it is in itself a single, so to speak, atomic essence, it is nevertheless quidditatively and comprehensively knowable and known by God alone, and consequently by any others is only quidditatively knowable and known only in this way whenever created intellect is occupied with it according as it is in itself. Therefore, if a created word granted God that he would be understood, or known, only quidditatively and not comprehensively by created intellect, without denying that he is nevertheless understood by his divine intellect, both quidditatively and comprehensively, this would also by that very reason entail that the said word be given; for nothing can deny or take from God that he is known by himself quidditatively and comprehensively, or, equivalently, that by himself, without the intervention of a word distinct from himself and without need of it, he actually terminates his own quidditative and comprehensive cognition. The consequence would be that such a word grants God an inadequate property which he has from himself and essentially, namely, that he is understood only quidditatively and not comprehensively by created intellect.

From this, too, it would follow—so that the tacit objection is resolved—that the said word, considered according to what it implicitly or adequately would grant God, namely, that he both is and is not quidditatively and comprehensively known by himself, cannot be created. For insofar as it were created, it could not grant this, as is clear from itself. And insofar as it would grant God that inadequate property already stated, which he has from himself and essentially, namely, being understood only quidditatively and not comprehensively by created intellect, it would also, according to what it implicitly and adequately posits, have the force to grant God that he is quidditatively and comprehensively understood by himself, or that he is the object actually terminating that quidditative and comprehensive intellection by which he comprehends himself. For what grants God a property that is essential to him cannot intrinsically involve a limitation; consequently, if taken adequately, it must signify infinity within its own line. But because the said word signifies this infinity and excludes limitation, it could, if taken adequately, grant God that he is the object actually terminating both the quidditative vision by which created intellect sees him and the quidditative and comprehensive vision by which he comprehends himself. Otherwise such a word would not signify the said infinity or exclude every limitation, as will be clear to the reader.

242 A second answer is given, or rather, the preceding solution is more fully explained, by denying the antecedent. With respect to the proof, it must be said that if a created word representing God quidditatively were once granted, it would both not grant and grant God that he is quidditatively and comprehensively known by divine intellect. It would not grant this, first, because, as supposed, it would be something created; and also because the divine essence is itself intellectuality by way of the purest act. It would grant this, because, as is clear from the first reason in this article, by the very fact that it represents God quidditatively, it is of the same nature with him in intelligible being, and thus it would grant God that he is at once quidditatively and comprehensively understood. For a word representing God and being a pure act in the intelligible order cannot fail to grant him being understood in the most perfect way from every standpoint, and therefore being understood quidditatively and comprehensively. And since this cannot hold with respect to created intellect, it would grant God that he is thus known by divine intellect.

243 It makes no difference if one insists that, according to this second solution, the proposition that the said word grants God being at once quidditatively and comprehensively known by his own divine intellect is not saved, if one insists precisely on the force of this last argument, which we have clarified, and does not recur to the earlier argument concerning the unity of nature in intelligible being between a word representing quidditatively and its object.

The answer is that this last argument rests on the earlier one, because the word is efficacious in actually terminating its object's quidditative intellection only insofar as it represents it quidditatively, and it does not have being of the same nature with the object in intelligible being from any other source than from its representing him quidditatively. Yet when one argument rests on another, it supposes that argument and derives its force from it, even while, once it is supposed, it adds something beyond it, as happens here. For once it is supposed from the first reason that the said word is of the same nature with God in intelligible being, another inconsistency is inferred, namely, that it would both grant and not grant God being understood, both quidditatively and comprehensively, by his own intellect, as has been explained.

244 With respect to the second, the antecedent having been granted, the consequence must be denied. The reason for the difference is this. The divine Word produced through the Father's intellection is not essentially distinct from the divine essence, whether it is considered in intelligible being or in entitative being; rather, it has being representative of the essence as of a form or nature that it includes, and thus it does not grant the essence that it is understood by God himself. Rather, the Word is understood by virtue of the divine essence as by its own proper nature. The word of which we now speak, however, insofar as it is created, would be essentially distinct from the divine essence, at least in entitative being, and, thus considered, it would not receive representative being intrinsically from it as a form. It would therefore grant it being understood through itself and would grant it what the said essence essentially has. A word essentially distinct from its object, considered under the entitative mode of being as belonging to the order of essence, cannot be produced precisely by the fecundity of the producer; rather, it must necessarily be produced in order to grant its object being actually understood. Consequently, in divine things, where the word is produced solely by the fecundity of nature, it is not essentially distinct from the primary object of which we here speak, considered under the entitative and natural mode of being as belonging to the order, or line, of essence.

We said that it would be created, because if it had being as an uncreated word from another source, as is clear from what has been said, then in that respect it would be of the same nature with the divine essence, even in entitative being, and would have being representative formally from it, not merely efficiently. Thus it would not grant the essence that it was understood; rather, conversely, the said word would be understood by virtue of the divine essence. Yet hence follows the impossibility and contradiction of the said created word: for if it were granted, it would both be created and not created, and would both render the divine essence understood and not render it understood, and would grant it what terminates and what does not terminate the vision terminative of it according as it is in itself.

Hence, when elsewhere we also said that the said word, insofar as it is created, would be essentially distinct from the divine essence, at least as considered under entitative being, we did not add this qualification because we thought that the said word, insofar as it is created, could be of the same nature with God in intelligible being. But because it now seems more certain that it cannot be of the same nature with God as considered under the entitative mode of being, even though the very fact that such a word is created would follow that it both would and would not be of the same nature with the divine essence, still considered in intelligible being, as was shown above in questions 5 and 9.

§ VIII. The arguments adduced from the second position of the preceding question, n. 201, onward are answered.

245 Because what had to be said in answer to the arguments of the second position of the preceding question could not be fully understood unless what we have said in this difficulty remained explained, we have rightly referred those matters to this point.

To the first, then, on behalf of the said second position, the antecedent must be granted with respect to priority virtually, or—which is more probable—with respect to priority on the part of the mode of conception alone, not on the part of the thing conceived. Then the consequence must be denied. The proof should proceed by granting the first part of the antecedent and denying the second, namely that intellection, considered as it is being actually enacted, possesses being as the word. Nor does the contrary establish the proof adduced there. For the word is not the being actually enacted of intellection, since intellection itself proceeds from the intellect as the principle and as that which is understood, by way of a perfect form, although the said word is indeed required on the part of the object whenever the object lacks sufficient actuality so that, by itself and inwardly, without another supplying its defect, it possesses the role of an actually intelligible and understood object. These matters will be explained further in the following solution.

246 To the second, it must be said that the eternal Father does not produce the Word from need, but from fecundity. Thus it makes no difference that he has the most present and perfectly proportioned divine essence in the role of a motivating object and terminus of his own intellection. For we assert only that when the object is present in the said manner, a word cannot be formed from need of it; but that it is then formed solely from fecundity, as occurs only in the divine intellection of the Father, presents no obstacle. For by the very fact that it is produced solely from fecundity, the divine essence itself is not rendered understood through it, nor does it receive from it being actually terminating the intellection of God; rather, the reverse obtains. For just as the divine essence has in itself and essentially by its own reason that it is itself intellection and itself intelligibility, or being actually terminating its own intellection, so too, by the very fact that the eternal Father communicates the same essence to the Word, he communicates to it intelligibility itself—that is, that by virtue of the divine essence communicated to it in the procession, it essentially has being understood, or actually terminating divine intellection.

247 But why a blessed person, insofar as he sees God, cannot produce that word from fecundity even though he does not form it from need, is clear from what has been said. First, because only an intellect having the same immateriality as God clearly seen can have sufficient fecundity to produce a word representing him quidditatively. For the said word must be of the same nature with God in intelligible being, and consequently a pure act in this order and therefore also in entitative being. For supreme purity in the intelligible order consists in being a pure act in that order and cannot fail to be united with supreme purity in entitative being, as has been explained.

Moreover, because only that intellect can produce a word precisely from fecundity which can communicate to it the same numerical nature, both in intelligible being and in entitative being, as the understood object, although otherwise they are really distinct. For if it did not have the same nature, in the way described, with its object, it could fail to grant its object being actually understood. For this is proper to a word not having the same nature with its object, both in intelligible being and in natural and entitative being, to grant its object being actually understood, or to terminate intellection actually, as is clear inductively. Thus, if a word does not have the same nature in intelligible and entitative being with its object, it is a sign that such a word is produced not solely from fecundity, but also from need of the object. Therefore, since the Father's intellect alone can grant his Word the same nature, both in intelligible being and in natural and entitative being, with an object understood in every way primarily through his intellection, it follows that only the Father's intellect can produce a word solely from fecundity, and only it can grant the word that it essentially is understood, or that it actually terminates intellection, by virtue of an object primarily and distinct from the word in every way, or, equivalently (since this can be found only in divine things), by virtue of the divine essence, which is altogether the primary object of that intellection. For, as we said above, the word and the object—which is at least primary in every way through the representation of the word—are compared with each other in such a way that either the word, by virtue of the said object, or conversely the object, by virtue of the word, essentially has what it is to be understood, or to be the object actually terminating intellection.

248 As for the angelic intellect, in which its own essence and angelic nature is immediately present, yet a word is still formed, it must be said that it is not surprising that an angel forms a word when knowing himself. For although he has sufficient actuality and immateriality to be united according to his proper substance with his own intellect in the role of a motivating object, he does not have this in the role of an understood object, or one actually terminating intellection through the manner of an internal object actually existing in the same intellect. For being understood does not belong to his essence; otherwise he would be a pure act and infinitely perfect in the intelligible order, and consequently also in entitative being.

The reason is evident. For just as created existence is itself and essentially the ultimate act of an essence, and in a certain sense exists itself, and nevertheless it does not follow that it is a pure act or infinitely perfect; so too, just as something essential cannot fail to be a pure act, both an essence and its existence, and thus this belongs to God alone—so too, the fact that something possesses precisely that it is essentially the object itself actually terminating intellection, or that it consists in intelligibility, or that it is intellection itself, does not argue infinite purity and perfection in intelligible or entitative being. Nevertheless, if it at the same time possesses the role of an intelligible species and intellectual nature, and finally the role of an object consisting in this, that it essentially has being understood, or actually terminates intellection, as would occur in the angel if it were essentially the object actually understood, this argues infinite purity and perfection in the intelligible order, and consequently also in the entitative order. For by the very fact that it would essentially identify with itself, together with the other properties already stated, the role of an object essentially understood, it would also identify with itself intellection itself, which necessarily mediates between radical nature and intelligible species on the one hand, and the object actually understood on the other. For just as intellectual nature, which essentially identifies intellection with itself, must identify with itself the understood, which mediates between nature and intellection, so too the said angel, identifying with itself as something essential both its nature, being actually understood, and intellection itself, would be a pure act.

249 To the third, the antecedent must be denied. With respect to the proof, it must be said that a word representing an object quidditatively and connaturally must be commensurate both with the object itself and with potency. For it resides partly on the object's side and partly on the potency's side. On the potency's side, indeed, insofar as it must be its effect. On the object's side, however, both insofar as it is of the same nature with it in intelligible being as that which it represents quidditatively, and also because, just as an imprinted species renders an object intelligible and therefore resides on its side as something acting and supplying its place, so too a word renders an object actually understood and actually places it in the role of an object terminating intellection, and therefore must also reside on its side.

Hence, when a word ought to be of such a condition that it cannot reside on either side—that of potency and that of the object—and consequently cannot have both roles, namely that of the effect of intellectual potency and simultaneously that of a form having the same nature in intelligible being with the object, and that of constituting it in being an object actually understood, such a word will involve an evident contradiction. And since a word representing God quidditatively cannot have both roles—this is true both because it involves the divine essence being placed in the role of an object actually understood by something distinct from itself, as we said above, and also because, insofar as it would be the effect of created potency, it would signify finitude and limitation, whereas, insofar as it is of the same nature in intelligible being with the divine essence, it would have to import infinite perfection and infinite immateriality in intelligible being—such a word therefore plainly involves a contradiction.

250 By this, the first confirmation is also sufficiently clear. For with the antecedent granted, the consequence must be denied. For although a word representing quidditatively can represent only through an intelligible species, and not just any intelligible species but one according as the intellect uses it, and thus an angel may have a word inadequate to the intelligible species and to the object adequately represented through it, the word must nevertheless always be of the same nature and immateriality as the object, or those properties that are predicated quidditatively of the object, and must place it in the role of an object actually terminating knowledge. All these things, however, are repugnant in a word representing the divine essence according as it is in itself, unless it has infinite perfection and immateriality, and consequently unless it is the divine essence itself, as has been shown.

251 It is also clear with respect to the second confirmation that that word will both be and not be limited by the beatific vision. It will indeed be, because, as supposed, it is an effect produced through such a vision. It will not be, however, because insofar as it resides on the object's side and represents it quidditatively, rendering the object itself actually understood, it must be of the same nature and immateriality as God, and consequently would be God. Thus the same argument does not apply to intellection and to the word. For intellection is neither a likeness of the object nor does it constitute the object in being actually understood, residing on the object's side as the formal reason terminating intellection; it is only an intellectual tendency toward the object. Thus it is not required that it be of the same nature in intelligible being with the object, or be a univocal likeness of it; it is enough that it touch the said object, either in itself or through its univocal likeness, when a likeness, or word, is formed through this intellection, as occurs in other acts of intellection. The word, however, as we have already explained, must be a univocal likeness of the object, of the same nature with it in intelligible being, and must place it in the role of an object actually understood, or terminating intellection. Thus it is no wonder that a created word representing the divine essence quidditatively involves a contradiction.

The conclusion is negative. Nothing occurs here that needs to be noted or discussed, since the point is sufficiently clear from itself and from what was said in article 1 of this question.

The conclusion is negative.