Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

70 So that every difficulty that could arise concerning the appetite for the vision of God may remain completely resolved, we therefore raise the present question. For, as we said above, the adequate appetite is divided into an innate appetite and an elicited appetite.

§ I. Some things are preliminarily explained for understanding the title.

So that the title of this question may become clearer, it should be noted that, with respect to the elicited appetite, as at present considered, there are two kinds: one is efficacious and absolute, while the other is inefficacious and conditional. Through the former we desire perfectly, absolutely, and efficaciously what is good; and therefore that act, insofar as it is such by itself, brings about, or effects, the execution and attainment of the desired thing. Through the latter, however, the thing is desired only imperfectly, conditionally, and inefficaciously; and thus it does not execute the good appetite. Hence the former is explained by ly volo, or appeto; the latter, however (provided that it is understood in another way), by ly vellem, or appeterem; and accordingly, although the latter can be directed toward an impossible thing, because impossibilities can be desired conditionally and inefficaciously, as when one says, I would have infinite riches if they were possible; the former, however, cannot be so directed. For as an impossible thing cannot be commanded into execution, so neither can it be desired by an efficacious and executive appetite.

Each appetite, however, can be called natural in two ways: either insofar as “natural” is distinguished from “supernatural” and denotes the act of desiring habituated by the powers of nature; or insofar as “natural” is distinguished from “free” and signifies an appetite that is necessary in some sense. For what is necessary has the mode of being of nature, namely, a determination toward one thing; and therefore it is rightly called natural.

71 Moreover, because the act of desiring is called free in two ways: first, with respect to both its exercise and its specification, insofar as it can be exercised or not exercised with regard to a proposed good (in which freedom consists with respect to the exercise of the act), but also, even when it is assumed to be exercised, it need not be of this species, for example of love, but can be of hatred (which is what it means to be free with respect to both specification and exercise); secondly, however, with respect to exercise alone, insofar as we can exercise or not exercise the act, provided that when we do exercise it, it must be, for example, of love. Hence an elicited natural appetite, insofar as it is distinguished from a free one, and thus is something necessary, may itself also be twofold. One is natural, or necessary, with respect to both specification and exercise, as are all the appetites of brute animals with respect to the object apprehended under the aspect of something harmful or suitable. For the sheep mentioned above necessarily loves the lamb it has begotten and the pasture offered to it, and so forth. The other, however, is necessary with respect to specification alone, as is the act of desiring beatitude in the common sense: for although we can abstain from the act or not abstain from it, if we do break forth into it, it must be of this species, namely of love, and not of another.

72 Finally, it should be noted that, just as these appetites have the multiplicity of distinctions already described, so God himself, considered quidditatively and through his essence, can be considered in many ways: namely, either according to those essential predicates by which he is known otherwise from creatures of the natural order, or according to those predicates that belong to him insofar as he is Trinity in himself and the author of grace.

The title of the question concerning the aforesaid appetites, and concerning God considered according to the reasons enumerated, must therefore be understood as follows: whether, with respect to God himself as existing through his essence and clearly visible, or according to what he is as Trinity in himself and author of grace, or at least according to what he is as one and with respect to the predicates that are required for the reason of the first cause of natural things, there exists in the intellectual creature considered by itself an efficacious or inefficacious elicited appetite which, in one of the ways described, is natural.

§ II. Two opinions are referred to.

73 The first opinion denies the elicited and efficacious appetite; nevertheless it admits at least a conditional and inefficacious appetite which is natural, or necessary with respect to specification, with respect to God as clearly visible, both as one and as Trinity, and thus both as author of nature and as author of grace. Thus Vazquez, 1a 2ae, q. 5, art. 8, disp. 22; Pesantius in the present article; Suarez, lib. 2 de attributis Dei, ch. 7, no. 10 and 11, and in part Valentia in the place cited from 1a 2ae; Montesin., 1a 2ae, q. 5, art. 8, disp. 7, q. 3, as well as others among the later theologians. They prove this, first, from Augustine, lib. 4, contra Julian., ch. 3 and 13; De Trin., ch. 8, asserting that all by natural instinct wish to be blessed, where he seems to be speaking of our beatitude in particular, as is clear from the context. Then also from St. Thomas in the present passage, where the desire to see God through his essence, and therefore according to all that is formally and intrinsically in him, is called natural, because it is necessary with respect to the specification of the act, as seems clear from the context.

74 Second. For in God seen through his essence, as he is Trinity in himself and one, no reason for evil appears, but rather the highest and altogether complete reason for good. Therefore, insofar as he is thus considered by himself, and insofar as the labor of the means through which he must be reached is set aside, there will appear no reason on account of which he could be rejected; and consequently the desire to see him in this way will be necessary with respect to specification. The antecedent and this final consequence are clear in themselves. The first, however, is also evident: because what is good as such cannot be hated. Therefore, for something to be rejected, some reason of evil must shine in it,

It is confirmed and explained. For beatitude in the common sense is necessarily loved with necessity with respect to specification; therefore our beatitude in particular, which is the vision of God as Trinity and as one, is also necessarily loved. The antecedent is generally accepted by theologians. The consequence, moreover, is also clear. For beatitude in the common sense is necessarily loved because it is, and is truly conceived as, our highest perfection; therefore, since the vision of God through his essence, which we now suppose, is also this beatitude and the eminent beatitude of the intellectual creature, it follows that it too is necessarily loved.

75 The second opinion agrees with the preceding opinion in this: that there is not in the intellectual creature an elicited and efficacious appetite for seeing God clearly; but only an inefficacious and conditional appetite. It adds, however, that this appetite is natural, or necessary with respect to specification, with respect to the clear vision of God, not according to what God is in himself as Trinity and author of grace, but precisely with respect to the reason of the first cause of natural things and with respect to the predicates that are known from creatures. Thus Ferrara, 3 cont. Gent., ch. 50.

The principal foundation of this opinion, however, is taken from what we said above from the same holy Doctor concerning doubt 1, namely, that it is natural, or necessary, for man or an angel, having seen an effect, to desire to see the cause quidditatively, insofar as the predicates that belong to the reason of a cause as such and are gathered from the aforesaid effects; but not insofar as other predicates are concerned. Therefore, having seen God's effects, there will be in us a natural, or necessary, desire to see God himself quidditatively, precisely and formally insofar as he is the first cause. The consequence does not seem to require proof. The antecedent, however, is also established insofar as the first part is concerned. Then, because the knowledge of a cause as to what it is is the complement and perfect consummation of the intellect, insofar as the cause is known by someone from its effects, and only insofar as it knows whether it exists, it follows that an intellect knowing the cause in this way cannot reject it or hate it. For the imperfect necessarily desires its full consummation. Then also: because nothing appears more connatural to close upon in the natural and necessary desire to know in the common sense, which every intellectual creature possesses, than the desire to see the cause after seeing the effect, and thus each of the two desires will be necessary. As for the latter point, the same antecedent is clear. For when this desire is excited from knowledge of the effect as such, it will be directed toward the cause only insofar as the cause is formally taken as such, and therefore not insofar as the predicates that are otherwise materially found in it are concerned.

76 Nor will it be enough to say that the vision of God, insofar as he is in himself the first cause, is not separable from the vision of God as Trinity and as author of grace. Hence, if it cannot be naturally desired once according to this latter reason, neither will it be possible according to the former reason: just as if it cannot be attained once according to one reason, neither will it be possible according to another.

For against this it is said that the intellect on its way can naturally apprehend God as author of nature without apprehending him as author of grace. Therefore the will will be able to desire, by an elicited appetite, to see God through his essence according to the former reason, without desiring to see him intuitively according to the latter reason; therefore such a desire will be natural, or necessary with respect to specification, in relation to the intellect insofar as it knows God from his effects. This final consequence is clear from what has been said, while the first and the antecedent seem to be clear in themselves.

It is confirmed. For the fact that an intellectual creature naturally desires beatitude in the common sense by an elicited appetite, and not beatitude in the particular sense insofar as this consists in the clear vision of God as he is in himself, is sufficiently established when these two are separable by our concepts. Therefore, in order that the same natural appetite, or appetite necessary with respect to specification, should desire the vision of God through his essence as author of nature, and not the vision of God as author of grace, it is enough that these aforesaid visions are separable in the same way.

§ III. The question is decided according to the mind of St. Thomas.

77 Nevertheless, it must first be said that no elicited and efficacious appetite for the clear vision of God, insofar as he is in himself—whether he is Trinity and one and author of grace, or is one only and author of nature, and insofar as the predicates that are otherwise known from natural effects are concerned—can be given by the powers of nature. The inefficient appetite, however, is indeed well able to exist. Thus St. Thomas in the places cited.

And indeed, with respect to the first part, namely, the efficacious appetite, this is clear from what has been said. For this appetite is executive and applicative of the means, but the powers of nature cannot execute the means necessary for this vision, as faith teaches and reason demonstrates, since they are supernatural as to their substance.

With respect to the second part, namely, the possibility of the conditional and inefficacious appetite, this too is clear. For since this appetite is so imperfect, there is no obstacle to its being present through the powers of nature. Thus, just as the will, when another great good is proposed, could break forth into this act, namely, I would wish to obtain that, so, when the clear vision of God is proposed under the aspect of some greatest good, the will will be able in the same way to desire it. For although the thing desired would then be materially supernatural, the reason for desiring it would not be. For this, as we have already indicated, would be natural, since it is in the same proportion as the elicited appetite of that same vision of God, absolute in its own way and inefficacious, which is in some way reduced to the conditional appetite, as we shall explain elsewhere when God grants it. For, at least once divine revelation concerning its possibility is supposed, someone could desire it under the aspect of some great good by the aforesaid appetite.

78 It must be said, second, that in an intellectual creature that does not see God through his essence and considered by himself, for example in man, there is no elicited appetite, even a conditional one, for the aforesaid vision which is necessary with respect to specification. Thus Caiet., 1 part., q. 82, art. 1; Conrad., 1a 2ae, q. 10, art. 2; Nazar. in the present passage; Martinez, 1, 2, q. 3, art. 8, dub. 2; Alvarez, 1a 2ae, disp. 27, saying that this is the common opinion of the Thomists, and that Durand holds it in 4, dist. 49, q. 8, and others.

And certainly it seems to follow openly from what has been said in the preceding doubt. For the elicited and natural appetite, or appetite necessary with respect to specification, indicates that in that nature there is an innate appetite through the mode of inclination and weight; because, if the elicited appetite is not natural and necessary with respect to specification from some extrinsic principle—since in this respect it would rather be violent—the consequence is that it would be natural and necessary from the natural inclination of the will itself, which naturally inclines toward that object with a determination toward one thing.

79 Next, it is proved, first, from St. Thomas, de verit., q. 22, art. 7, where, speaking of man, he says: When, therefore, aided by divine grace, a man apprehends by his proper reason some special good, such as his beatitude, in which his beatitude truly consists, then he deserves this, not because he desires beatitude, which he naturally desires, but because he desires that special thing which he does not naturally desire, namely, the vision of God, in which nevertheless, according to the truth of the matter, his beatitude consists. And in 4, dist. 49, q. 1, art. 3, where, in order to give the reason why it is permissible for one to desire the divine vision even though it is itself beatitude, he added: Because beatitude, insofar as it is of this kind, of itself imports the object of the will, but the divine vision does not.

From these words, the following and efficacious reason is formed, assuming, however, that the object of the will in itself is the same as the adequate object. For an inadequate object is compared with it in its own way as an object accidentally, not in itself. Whence it is sufficiently probable that even if such an object were destroyed or were involved in something, nevertheless the nature of the will would not perish for that reason; the opposite, however, would hold if the adequate object of the will were involved. Or, at least, it is altogether certain that, if the aforesaid inadequate object were destroyed, the nature of the will would not perish in itself, but would be changed in itself in a second respect, insofar as the adequate object would thereby be altered, since it would no longer include all that it previously included. Thus the inadequate object is compared with the will in its own way accidentally, insofar as it is not conferred with the will as an object in itself of the first order; and consequently neither is it conferred as an object at all in itself.

80 Hence the argument is as follows. The will is necessitated with respect to specification by its object considered in itself, or its adequate object, and not by something else. But the clear vision of God, or God as clearly visible, is not the object in itself, or the adequate object of the will on its way; therefore it cannot necessitate the will. The consequence is clear. The minor premise also seems clear in itself, since on its way the will desires many other things besides beatitude in the particular sense, and things that are not ordered to it, but are even opposed to it.

The major premise, as regards the first part, is sufficiently clear. For every power is determined by its nature to tend toward its adequate object, because it receives its entire essence and specification from it. As regards the second part, it is shown as follows. Then, because an inadequate object, precisely insofar as it is such, does not equal the entire force and capacity of the power, it is not necessary that, precisely because the will wills to break forth into the act, it should be occupied with pursuing that object. It can rather elicit an act of another and opposite species, namely hatred. Then also: because what is not the good that equals the will, but an inadequate good that does not satisfy it—and this is essentially included in the reason of an object inadequate to the will—has some reason of evil with respect to the will; and therefore such an object, precisely because it is not adequate, cannot necessitate the will with respect to specification.

81 It is confirmed and explained. For although whiteness is a great perfection of sight and no reason for evil seems at first sight to appear in it, because whiteness is nevertheless not the object in itself adequate to the power of sight, it is therefore—rightly considered—a reason for evil to appear in it; namely, that it is not the good equal to the whole of its power. Thus, at least insofar as sight is subject to the command of the will, it is not necessitated with respect to specification to tend toward whiteness. Therefore, since God as clearly visible is not the adequate object of the will of the wayfarer, there will likewise appear in him—though through the defect of the creature—some reason of evil on account of which he may be rejected.

82 Nor does it matter that the opponents suggest, in order to dissolve this reason, that it is enough for God as clearly visible to contain every good in a more eminent way than beatitude in the common sense contains it. Hence it can no less than that necessitate, and therefore in the fatherland it will necessitate by an altogether comprehensive necessity, namely, not only with respect to specification, but also with respect to exercise, because in the aforesaid way it contains every good, is perfectly applied, and is shown to the will.

So this is not the point. For if the argument that has been made is carefully examined, it is sufficiently convicted of falsity from it. For although God, as clearly visible, contains every good and thus, insofar as he is in himself, in a more eminent way equals and satisfies the entire force of the will, nevertheless on the way he is not presented to it as the object and adequate good of the will; otherwise in the fatherland. Therefore, although in the fatherland there is necessity with respect to specification, indeed even with respect to exercise, nevertheless there is not such necessity on the way. The consequence seems certain. The antecedent is also clear. Because an object is then presented as adequate when a power ought to tend toward it and toward other things, not except on account of it; and therefore a mobile being is the natural object of philosophy, because it considers that for itself, whereas other things are considered only on account of it. But the will of the wayfarer can tend toward other created goods, not on account of divine goodness, and as ordered toward it, but rather as opposed to it; otherwise the will of one who comprehends God. Therefore on the way the universal and adequate good of the will is not presented to it; but it is well presented in the fatherland.

83 It is confirmed and explained. For however much some good may equal the will in itself, indeed may be represented most firmly as such on the part of the light by which it is known, such as faith, nevertheless, as long as it is not known clearly and as it is in itself, but only obscurely, it is possible—not on the part of the light or the object, but well on the part of the subject—for a kind of suspicion or doubt to arise concerning the goodness so perfect and so equal to such an object. Thus one can have faith in mysteries revealed by God and suffer very many temptations concerning them. Whence, even when that representation is evident, however certain and completely firm it may be, it can happen that the subject tends toward that good, not indeed in a defined act, but in an act actually exercised, as if the good were not certainly and wholly perfectly equal to the will, but were proposed in some respect as a kind of evil. Consequently, the will is not necessitated with respect to specification to embrace or profess that good as long as the object is not known clearly and in itself, as happens at present.

§ IV. The foundations of both opinions are met.

84 Therefore, it only remains to satisfy the foundations of both opinions. And first, to the testimony of Augustine adduced in support of the former opinion, it will be answered that those words are to be understood as concerning beatitude in the common sense. For he touches upon incidentally the proposition reported there, and known by the light of nature, although in the same chapter he teaches much concerning the vision of God through his essence.

To the testimony adduced from St. Thomas, however, it is answered that the desire to see God, arising from the vision of his natural effects, is only inefficacious and conditional. It is, however, called by the holy Doctor natural, or necessary with respect to specification, not because it is simply such, and therefore always has the aforesaid necessity, as the desire for beatitude in the common sense has it, but because it is natural, or necessary, as in many other things. Not otherwise, however, with the proportion nevertheless preserved, than as the appetites for life, knowledge, bodily integrity, and similar things, which are not a natural appetite, nor necessary always, but, as they often are, as St. Thomas and Caiet., 1a 2ae, q. 10, art. 1, and elsewhere often, teach.

From this, too, one incidentally understands the congruence of the argument adduced there by the Angelic Doctor to prove from this desire to see God the possibility of such a vision. For from the desire, even though inefficacious, the possibility of the desired thing can nevertheless in some way be inferred, given the aforesaid necessity.

As to the reason and confirmation adduced in support of the same opinion, what has been said makes it clear.

85 As to the testimony adduced in support of the second opinion, what we have just said is also clear. To the reason, however, it is answered that the assertion does not prove in any way that there is in the intellectual creature an elicited and efficacious appetite for the clear vision of God insofar as he is the first cause. For however much this reason may be set aside in favor of another, it is always supernatural as to its substance, as has been shown. It can nevertheless be proved that there is in the intellect an elicited and inefficacious appetite which is natural, or necessary according to what it is, as we have just asserted; but not natural, or necessary simply. For although the aforesaid vision is the consummation of another knowledge drawn from effects, it is nevertheless not the adequate object of the will. Consequently it cannot simply necessitate it with respect to specification, as we have already explained. From these things it is clear that all the arguments adduced in that reason insofar as they can oppose us are addressed.

First conclusion. In order to see God, some likeness on the part of the power is required.

Second conclusion. It is impossible for any likeness on the part of the thing seen and created to concur with the clear vision of God through his essence.