Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

57 So that the title may remain more familiar, it should be noted, following St. Thomas, I part., q. 19, a. 1 and 9, q. 59, a. 1, and q. 80, a. 1, that the appetite is twofold: one innate, or natural, and the other elicited. The first is the inclination, or propensity, implanted by the author of nature, by which each thing, without any knowledge, is inclined toward its own good, as heavy things are inclined toward the center and light things toward the place above. This appetite, however, does not constitute a special kind of power, distinct from substantial or accidental nature, to which it belongs; rather, it is the weight of that thing toward its own perfection. The elicited appetite, on the other hand, which properly has the character of an appetite, is the act of appeting, by which a thing is borne toward a known good under the aspect of good. Thus, it proceeds from a certain special power, namely, a sensitive or rational appetite. The former is borne toward a sensible good, and the latter toward a good as such. At present, however, we are speaking only of the first appetite, not of the latter; for we shall treat of the latter more clearly and distinctly in the following difficulty.

§ I. The Position of Scotus and Others.

58 The first opinion affirms that there is in intellectual nature an innate appetite, in the manner of nature’s weight, for the vision of God as He is in Himself, Triune and One. Thus Scotus, in 1, q. 1, prol., and in 4, d. 49, q. 10; Durandus, at the same place, q. 8; Paludanus, q. 47; Soto, q. 2, a. 1, and lib. 1 On Nature and Grace, ch. 4; Valentia, 1a 2ae, q. 5, a. 8, d. 1, point 1.

The principal foundations of this opinion can be reduced to two. The first is that which occasioned the present difficulty. The second is as follows. Because God, as He is in Himself Triune and One, belongs to the specific object of the intellect; therefore, the intellect is naturally inclined to see Him when considered under this aspect. The conclusion is evident. For every power is naturally inclined toward its specific object, and toward whatever pertains to it, just as it is inclined toward that from which it has its entire being and its specification.

59 Nor does it matter if one says that God, as He is in Himself, is contained within the specific object of the intellect as something exceeding and disproportionate to it; and thus that the intellect has no innate appetite toward Him when thus considered. For against this it may be said that the same objective reason according to species that is found in other beings is also found in God as He is in Himself when described in the present way; therefore, just as the intellect is naturally inclined to know other objects, so is it naturally inclined to attain to God under the reason described above. The antecedent is proved. Because the same objective reason according to species must be found in all objects not proportionate to any one power; otherwise, it would not be one according to species. The conclusion, too, is evident. For the entire reason for its natural inclination toward other objects is that the same reason is formally and specifically found in them, just as sight is naturally inclined toward its objects because its own proper objective reason, namely visibility, is found in them.

It is confirmed. For the material reason is related materially and accidentally to the formal and objective reason; therefore, if the same formal objective reason is found once in God as He is in Himself Triune and One and in other objects, it follows either that the intellect is not naturally inclined toward the others, or that it is naturally inclined toward God under both reasons.

§ II. The Knot of the Difficulty Is Untied from the Doctrine of St. Thomas.

60 Nevertheless, it must be said that the innate appetite just described, taken in the created intellectual being as a weight or inclination of nature, does not exist without some prior knowledge ordered to God that is clear and quidditative—whether of God as Triune and One, or merely as One—and with respect to those predicates that pertain to the notion of the first cause. This assertion is plainly drawn from St. Thomas in this article, and q. 23, a. 1, q. 62, a. 1 and 2, 1a 2ae, q. 114, a. 2, On Truth, q. 22, a. 7, and finally in 4, d. 49, q. 1, a. 3, q. unc. 3, in these words: Although, however, the will may have from its natural inclination a tendency toward blessedness according to the common notion, nevertheless, the fact that it tends to this or that blessedness does not come from natural inclination, but through the discernment of reason, which discovers that man’s highest good consists in this or that blessedness. And so in the present case they follow the Holy Doctor, as do Cajetan, Báñez, Zumel, Nazarius, and Molina; Álvarez, 1a 2ae, d. 26; Martínez, q. 3, a. 8, dub. 1; and very many others.

61 It is proved by an argument taken from the same Saintly Doctor at the places cited. Because, as is evident from those same places, God seen clearly, whether as Triune and One or as One, and as the first cause, is a supernatural object, one that exceeds and is disproportionate to the created intellectual being; therefore, there is not in that being an innate appetite, in the manner of a weight and inclination of nature, ordered toward Him thus considered. The antecedent will be evident from what we shall say in articles 4 and 5. For, as will there be evident, God as He is in Himself cannot be seen clearly and intuitively even with respect to the notion of the first cause, apart from the light of glory and the union of the divine essence in the aspect of the intelligible species with the intellect. Since these things are therefore above its nature—because neither the light of glory nor the union of the divine essence in the aspect of the intelligible species can be connatural to any created or creatable intellect—it follows that the vision of the divine essence as it is in Himself, whether under both reasons or as the first cause, is an object exceeding, disproportionate, and supernatural with respect to created intellectual nature. The conclusion, too, is evident. For a natural appetite in the manner of a weight of nature exists only toward a connatural and proportionate good, as is evident by induction from the other appetites and natural inclinations; and therefore a heavy body is inclined in this manner toward the center, and a light body toward the place above, because these are goods proportionate and connatural to it.

62 It is confirmed, first. Because the natural inclination in the manner of a weight of nature of which we are speaking was implanted by God precisely as the author of nature; therefore, it cannot extend to God Himself, insofar as He is in Himself and transcends the entire order of that nature, and consequently neither to Him as He is clearly visible in Himself, whether as Triune and One or as One. The antecedent is evident of itself. Both conclusions, too, are evident. Because an inclination cannot extend beyond that toward which its own principle extends; therefore, if it is from God as the author of nature, it will not have the power to transcend this entire order and belong to the supernatural order, within which God is contained as He is clearly and visibly in Himself, whether as Triune and One or as One and the first cause.

It is confirmed, second, by the argument indicated by St. Thomas, 1a 2ae, q. 114, a. 2. For whenever the aforesaid innate appetite in the manner of a weight and inclination of nature toward some end is given, instruments and powers within the order of nature are also given for attaining that end. But in the created intellectual being there are not given instruments and powers within the aforesaid order by which it could attain to a clear vision of God; rather, these are bestowed upon it gratuitously by God, the supernatural author. Therefore, there will not be in it an innate appetite for the vision of God. The consequence seems evident. The minor premise is certain. The major premise, too, is evident. Because otherwise that appetite and natural weight would be frustrate, since it could not be fulfilled by the powers of nature, which alone it regards. Hence Aristotle proves from this, in 2 On the Heavens, text 50, that the stars are not naturally inclined to progressive motion; because otherwise the author of nature would have given them instruments for that motion, which ought to proceed from them, so that their inclination would not be frustrate.

63 Scotus objects that it is enough for the clear vision of God to be the ultimate end of the created intellectual being, because every nature naturally tends toward its ultimate end. Then, by way of a fuller solution confirming the second argument, he adds that an innate appetite is often given for a form that nevertheless cannot be attained by the powers of nature. This is evident in the separated soul, which, although it naturally desires union with the body—as St. Thomas seems to teach in 1 part., q. 76, a. 1, ad 6—is not nevertheless given in nature instruments and powers for reuniting with it. Likewise, in a person who has an innate appetite to live according to right reason, and also to the effect that he may never sin, and thus may never deviate from right reason, there is need of special assistance from grace.

But against this: the fact that something is the ultimate end with respect to some nature does not prevent it from being disproportionate and exceeding, as is evident in itself and in the vision of God by essence with respect to the created intellectual being; therefore, in that case, nature will not have an innate appetite ordered toward the aforesaid end, even though it is ultimate. The conclusion is evident. Because the weight of nature is directed only toward the ultimate natural end, not toward an ultimate end that is disproportionate, exceeding, and supernatural. For just as such an end is above nature, so nature itself is not connaturally inclined toward it except through something that exceeds that same nature—and especially because an inclination in the manner of a weight of nature is founded on a natural sympathy and affinity between appetite and the thing sought, as can be established by induction. Therefore, since there is no natural sympathy, affinity, or proximity between a thing of the order of nature as such and a supernatural form, there will likewise be no natural inclination or weight of one toward the other.

64 Furthermore, because the fact that some end is ultimate does not prevent it from being, if it is disproportionate and supernatural, only an obediential power in nature ordered toward it. But the appetite and weight of nature do not signify merely obediential power, but natural, or connatural, power—or at least a passive power distinct from obediential power, whether the latter is formally supernatural or not; therefore, such an end, however ultimate, would not be sought by an innate appetite. The major premise is evident both from what has been said and from the following: otherwise, beyond the aforesaid obediential power there would be in nature a power—at least passive, natural, or connatural with respect to that supernatural end—and consequently that supernatural end, for example, a clear vision of God, would be naturally attainable, since every passive power that is natural in the way just described has corresponding to it an active power that is either natural or ought to act according to the debt of nature in such a way that the passive power can be naturally reduced to act.

The minor premise, too, is evident. First, because the appetite, so to speak, in the manner of desire and the weight of nature of which we are speaking here is with respect to a due form, and therefore signifies its privation, not merely its negation; whereas obediential power alone is not with respect to a due form, and so, although it lacks that form, it is not properly and strictly said to be deprived of the aforesaid form. Second, because otherwise there would be in every created substance a natural appetite for hypostatic union, to which it has obediential power; and thus it would remain in a violent state until it was hypostatically united with God.

65 From this, too, it is sufficiently clear how much falsity is contained in what Scotus adds by way of fuller solution confirming the second argument, namely, that a form is not naturally attainable merely because an innate appetite and weight toward it exist in nature. For besides the fact that this has already been refuted by what has been said, its falsity can further be inferred from the fact that philosophers inferred from it that the rational soul, for example Socrates along with his matter, was connaturally capable of being united in the first production of that soul, because the same matter contained a natural weight and inclination toward such union. And from this Aristotle proves, in 3 On the Soul, ch. 5, that an agent intellect is given because a possible intellect is given; for since the latter is a passive power, there must also be given an agent of the same order, which naturally reduces it to act.

And this doctrine is very consonant with the mind of St. Thomas, 1a 2ae, q. 114, in the article cited, where he teaches that eternal life exceeds the proportion of created nature, as does its knowledge and desire, and therefore that no creature is a sufficient principle for meriting and attaining it unless the gift of grace is given to it. There, from the defect of natural inclination, or weight and desire of nature, he proves the defect of attaining it through merit achieved by one’s own natural powers, judging these two things to be inseparable, namely, naturally to desire an end and naturally to be able to attain it.

66 Nor do the examples brought forward by Scotus support his view. For the natural inclination that is in the soul toward union with matter, since matter is the true part of a human being, is sufficiently grounded in the fact that in due time that union was naturally reducible to act; yet it is not necessary that this be possible at every time and in every state. Hence, although the soul absolutely and in itself, considered from the principles of nature and setting aside the state and time of separation after the first union, is naturally inclined toward its union, it is not so in the composite sense and under the supposition of the aforesaid state of separation. For it has no cause of its own that could naturally reduce that inclination to act, and therefore that inclination is called natural only on the part of the terminus taken materially and secundum quid, not absolutely and simpliciter for the reason stated, as the Complutensian College noted in 1 Physics, d. 3, d. 3, no. 92 and 93. Nor does St. Thomas intend anything else at the cited place, in 1 part., q. 76, a. 1, ad 6.

Likewise, from the fact that there is in a human being a natural inclination to live according to reason, it does not follow that the powers of nature can fulfill all the precepts; because such an inclination is not toward living conformably to reason in all things collectively, but only distributively, as is usually explained in 1a 2ae, q. 109.

Granting, however, that there is in a human being a natural appetite to live in all things according to right reason, it would then have to be said that for the natural appetite at least what is required is that it can be fulfilled by powers belonging to the order of nature, in the manner in which the aforesaid appetite could be fulfilled; since for living in all things according to what the natural reason directly prescribes, special aids belonging to the order of nature would be enough. But to satisfy the innate appetite for the vision of God as He is in Himself, aids of nature’s order, however special and gratuitous, are not sufficient; rather, gratuitous powers belonging to the supernatural order are required, as has been proved.

§ III. Scotus’s Argument Is Satisfied.

67 To the first point, therefore, which we left unresolved in difficulty 3 and which we also adduced in no. 36 of that same difficulty, the answer is given that the innate appetite is not with respect to any ultimate end whatever, or any perfection whatever, but with respect to the ultimate natural end, which is not the vision of God as He is in Himself with respect to the created intellectual being considered in itself. We said considered in itself, because, when elevated by grace and charity—with respect to which ratio we are not speaking here—it is connaturally inclined toward the aforesaid vision.

In answer to the confirmation recently adduced under the same number, it must be said that the innate appetite of the created intellectual being considered in itself rests in abstractive and perfect knowledge of God, which is known from creatures of the natural order, because in this knowledge its connatural blessedness consists, as is usually explained in 1a 2ae. The appetite of that same being, however, when elevated, rests only in God clearly seen. Nor is it incongruous that a creature which, considered according to its diverse aspects, can have a twofold ultimate end and a twofold blessedness, cannot in every respect and in every order rest in either of them, namely, in the lower one, which does not eminently possess those things that belong to the higher order, as it seems to be evident of itself.

We said that it cannot rest in either of them, namely, in the lower one, because it can and must have rest in the higher ultimate end; for that end contains, in the most eminent manner, every perfection of the natural end itself. Nor does it follow from this that the aforesaid supernatural end is naturally sought by the created intellectual being considered in itself. For what now, when thus described, satisfies the natural appetite need not be naturally sought, as is evident in the humanity of Our Lord Christ, whose natural appetite for His own subsistence is satisfied by the subsistence of the Word, and yet it is not sought by an innate appetite from that humanity.

68 To the second point a satisfactory answer is given in the same place. For the proof, however, it must be said that the innate appetite of a created intellect ordered toward some object is not taken from the reason under which it is taken precisely, because this is formally and univocally the same in all objects of the intellect insofar as they concur in its specification, and it abstracts from what is natural and supernatural; rather, it is taken from the formal reason which, not any such reason whatever, but a proportionate and non-exceeding one. God, however, insofar as He is clearly visible, has a formal reason which that is disproportionate and supernatural, as has been shown.

69 Nor is it an obstacle that the same proof adds that every power has an innate inclination toward its specific object and toward whatever pertains to it. For whenever specification, and consequently the objective reason, abstracts from what is natural and supernatural—as happens in the intellect (provided that the first difficulty of this article has first been explained)—then the power is not naturally inclined toward its specific object precisely as such, but insofar as the reason of a proportionate object is supervening. Thus, the intellect will be naturally inclined toward the intelligible, without thereby explaining or determining whether the intelligible is comprehended under it as something supernatural, taken in itself and in particular. For the intelligible, taken in this way, supervenes the reason of a proportionate object, just as the aforesaid intellect is also naturally inclined toward other proportionate intelligibles, but not toward intelligibles exceeding it when considered in particular, whether by determining what the intelligible, as such, that is the object of a created intellect, contains in itself under those things taken in particular.

Add, that if what we said in no. 12 is true, namely, that the intellect consists essentially of a twofold formally distinct power, one natural and the other obediential, the latter being formally supernatural, then only natural things will belong to the object of the intellect insofar as it is a natural power. Therefore, there will in no way be formally one and the same objective reason found in God, insofar as He is clearly visible, and in other natural beings, and consequently the argument will establish nothing.

The confirmation is evident from what has been said, namely, how the formal reason which, when proportionate, is not accidentally related to the reason of a natural appetite, but is indispensably required for it.