Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

Once the possibility of the beatific vision has been explained, and it has been shown that the Holy Fathers, filled with the light of faith, knew it, the mind is immediately prompted to inquire whether it can also be known clearly through the light of nature. Therefore, after the two preceding doubts, we rightly raise this one at once.

§ I. The first opinion is proposed.

34 The first opinion affirms that, by natural reason and wholly devoid of the light of faith, it can be clearly known that the possibility of seeing God clearly, as He is in Himself, is possible. In support of this, Gonzalez, in the present disputation, 24, section 2, cites certain theologians; Vazquez, 1, 2, disp. 20, cap. 2, defends it, although the author here limits this opinion for a time by saying that, although once the reasons demonstrating the possibility of the beatific vision have been investigated, the intellect, by the light of nature alone, can attain to their efficacy, it nevertheless needs the assistance of a greater light in order to investigate or discover them.

35 First, it is proved by the reason that we adduced above in the first doubt in support of our assertion, which, in order to recommend this opinion more effectively, can be put in the following form: It is clear by the natural light that the created intellect can, either by its own power or through God's elevation, know whatever is contained under its adequate object; therefore it will be clear that it can know God as He is in Himself. The antecedent is evident in all powers. For it is certain that sight can perceive, at least through divine elevation, everything visible, and hearing everything audible, and so of the other powers; therefore the same must be granted to the intellect, which is a higher power. The consequence is also evident, because it is clear that God, as He is in Himself, is formally being, and therefore is contained under the adequate object of the intellect, which, as is evident, is being as such.

This is confirmed. By the natural light it is evident that a perfection appropriate to a lower power can belong to a higher one, if both belong to the same genus; but it is evident by the natural light that sight and intellect belong to the genus of cognitive power, with the intellect being far nobler than sight. Therefore, since it is certain that the visual power can intuitively know, as they are in themselves, all things contained under its adequate object, it follows that the same must be granted to the intellectual power. The minor, with the consequence, seems to follow from itself. The major is also clear, because it is certain that the perfections of lower things are found in higher things in a more eminent manner; and thus to be vegetative and sensitive, which is found in the souls of lower brute animals, namely vegetative and sensitive, is found in a more excellent way in the rational [soul], because it is a higher and more eminent form.

36 Second, the created intellect, according to its nature, is capable, at least radically, of the vision of God by essence; but an angel comprehends the aforesaid intellect by the light of nature; therefore it will be evident to him that God, as He is in Himself, is visible to that same intellect. The consequence seems clear. For it is contradictory that a power should be comprehended by an intellect and that the objects to which it can extend should not be known by that intellect; therefore all the individual objects of divine power are known to God alone, because only His intellect can comprehend that all-powerfulness. The minor follows from itself, and is taught by theologians in common. The major also seems certain: first, because it is certain that the essence of the created intellect consists in a coaptation and essential commensuration with being as such, and with whatever being is contained under it, as we said in doubt 1; and again, because otherwise the intellect, by the light of glory, could not be elevated to see God as He is in Himself. Just as corporeal sight is not, even remotely and fundamentally, capable of the vision of God by essence, because it has no coaptation or essential commensuration with that vision, so it cannot be elevated to attain to it.

37 Third, the natural light clearly knows that it is credible by divine faith that the created intellect can see God as He is in Himself; therefore it will also be clearly true to it that such a vision is possible. The antecedent is S. Thomas, 2a 2ae, q. 1, a. 4, ad 2 and 3, whom theologians commonly follow, asserting that all the mysteries of our faith are clearly credible by divine faith. The consequence is proved because it is evident by the natural light that divine faith cannot incline to anything except truth; otherwise such an error would be refuted in God who revealed it. Therefore, if by the light of nature it is clearly certain that the possibility of a clear vision of God by the created intellect is contained under the object of divine faith, then it will also be clearly true with respect to that same light that such a possibility exists. Just as, if it is clearly true that something is contained in itself and directly under the object of sight, it will also be clear that it is colored and bright, or at least bright, because it is evident that sight cannot incline to anything in itself and directly except what is bright and colored, or at least bright.

38 This is confirmed. For this reasoning is the best: This is clearly impossible: therefore it is clearly incredible; therefore this too is legitimate: This is clearly credible: therefore it is clearly possible. The consequence is evident, because we argue from the opposite of the consequent to the opposite of the antecedent, which is a legitimate mode of argument. Therefore, if the natural light clearly knows it to be credible by divine faith that the created intellect can see God as He is in Himself, it will also be clearly certain to it that this is true.

Fourth, it is evident by the natural light that man has an innate appetite for the vision of God by essence; therefore it will also be evident that this vision is possible. The consequence is evident, because it is evident that an innate appetite can be satisfied; otherwise it would have been implanted by nature in vain. The antecedent is also evident, because it is evident that there is in man a natural appetite for his ultimate end and beatitude, since this inclination is found in all other things; therefore, since man's ultimate end and happiness consist in the clear vision of God, it is absolutely certain that he has a natural appetite for it.

This is confirmed. It is evident that the natural appetite of an intellectual creature rests in nothing outside God until it reaches the clear vision of God, as experience itself seems to attest; therefore God, when clearly seen, is not merely the ultimate end, but the natural ultimate end of that creature, and consequently it naturally desires him. This final consequence follows from itself. The first is also evident, because every natural thing rests when it has attained its natural end; therefore, if the rational creature rests in the clear vision of God and not in anything else, this will be a sign that such a vision is its natural end.

§ II. Resolution of the doubt according to the mind of St. Thomas.

39 In order to proceed more clearly, it must be presupposed that we can speak of the natural light in itself, taken precisely, or as assisted or excited by the light of faith or by divine revelation.

With this presupposed, it must be said first that the natural light in itself, taken precisely, cannot clearly know or demonstrate that the vision of God by essence is possible to the created intellect.

This assertion is openly derived from S. Thomas, 1a 2ae, q. 109, a. 1, whom Caiet., Zumel, Machin, and other Thomists follow in the present Sylvester, part 1, Conflatus, q. 12, a. 1; Medina, 1, 2, q. 5, a. 1; Martinez, ibid.; Alvarez, disp. 28; Suarez, disp. 30, Metaphys., sect. 11, and 1. tom. Summae Theolog., lib. 2, de attributis, cap. 7, and many others.

40 First, it is proved by the reason derived from the cited places of S. Thomas, which can be reduced to this form. The vision of God, as it is in itself, is supernatural according to its substance, as will be shown more fully below in art. 4; therefore its possibility cannot be demonstrated from the natural light alone, taken in itself and precisely. The consequence is evident, because, precisely insofar as it is a created supernatural action, it cannot be demonstrated from any source other than supernatural principles; but the natural light, taken in itself and precisely, proceeds only from natural principles.

This is first confirmed from the same Doctor. A demonstration of the possibility of some created thing made by the natural light, taken in itself, is either a priori, and thus proceeds from causes of the natural order, or a posteriori, and therefore from natural effects; but a supernatural created thing, according to its substance, has neither causes nor effects of the natural order; therefore its possibility cannot be demonstrated by the natural light alone. The consequence and major follow from themselves. The minor is also evident, because when the cause and effect of a thing must be proportionate, a supernatural thing must not, formally speaking, depend on natural causes, nor must its effects as such belong to the natural order.

Secondly, it is confirmed by the reason indicated by the same Doctor, 1a 2ae, q. 114, and 1 Cor. 2. For the possibility of the means by which the vision of God, as He is in Himself, is attained cannot be clearly demonstrated by the natural light alone; therefore neither can the possibility of that vision. The consequence is evident, because the possibility of an end cannot be demonstrated if the possibility of the means cannot be clearly known, since an end cannot be attained except through means. The antecedent is also evident, because the means for attaining the aforesaid vision, namely grace, faith, hope, charity, etc., are supernatural and thus exceed the reach of the natural light.

41 Nor does Vazquez's reply at the cited place weaken the force of this confirmation, namely, that it is enough for demonstrating the possibility of some end that it be demonstrated that some means, taken generally, are possible with regard to such an attainment; and for demonstrating these, the natural light would suffice.

This therefore does not weaken the force of the aforesaid confirmation; rather, a greater corroboration of it arises from it. For the entire reason why the possibility of the means specifically and determinately required for attaining the aforesaid vision cannot be demonstrated by the natural light, yet the possibility of those same means taken generally, without determining whether they are supernatural, cannot be other than this: that in the means taken in this last sense nothing of the supernatural appears, although it does appear in them when taken in the first sense; therefore, since the vision of God as He is in Himself expresses something supernatural, its possibility cannot be demonstrated by the natural light alone; just as, for the same supernatural character, the possibility of the means taken specifically and determinately cannot be demonstrated.

Add to this that, in order to demonstrate the possibility of a supernatural end, such as the beatific vision, one must demonstrate the possibility of means proportionate to that end, and therefore supernatural. Hence, although it is not necessary to descend to a determination of the aforesaid means, nevertheless, however generally they are taken, they must include the supernatural; otherwise they could not, even in this sense, be attained by the natural light alone, since, as we have often said, the natural light in itself, taken precisely, cannot clearly attain a created thing that is supernatural according to its substance as such.

42 Second, and principally, the assertion is proved by the reason indicated by St. Thomas in 1 Cor. 2. Because none of the ancient and most renowned philosophers, guided by the natural light alone and disputing about God, attained the knowledge that the created intellect can see God immediately and as He is in Himself; therefore there is a sign that this cannot be demonstrated by the natural light alone. The consequence is evident, because if it were demonstrable by the aforesaid light, there is no doubt that some one of them would have attained it, as they demonstrated many other things, and very difficult things, because they are knowable by the natural light.

43 Nor does Vazquez's solution avail, namely, that although the possibility of the vision of God by essence is demonstrable by the natural light alone, the demonstrations serving this purpose cannot be investigated by natural philosophers through the aforesaid light; because, so that the created intellect may not err about many natural things, it needs to be assisted by the light of faith, and therefore it cannot discover them without that light, although once discovered, their efficacy will exercise force upon the intellect assisted by the natural light alone and move it to assent.

Thus, this does not avail. Because contradictions seem to be involved in this solution. For if the aforesaid demonstrations cannot be investigated by the natural light alone, they cannot be achieved by it when taken precisely; and then, if their efficacy does not exceed that light, there is no reason why they could not be investigated by it. Above all, the reason which seems to this author unjustly to be a demonstration, namely, that the created intellect has a natural appetite for its beatitude, and consequently for the vision of God, and that this appetite can be satisfied so that it is not frustrated, is not so difficult that no created intellect could investigate it, when many other demonstrations, far more difficult, were discovered by Aristotle and Plato to show other natural truths.

44 It must be said second that the created intellect, not in itself and taken precisely, but as assisted or excited by the light of faith, can show by theological demonstration, probable reasons, or other conjectures, the possibility of the vision of God by essence. This assertion is openly derived from what is taught by St. Thomas below, q. 27, a. 2, and q. 32, a. 1, and in 3 part., q. 1, a. 1, and is commonly received by the authors cited for the preceding assertion.

It nevertheless requires explanation. For the created intellect can use the light of faith in two ways: either so that, from revealed principles and from others known by the natural light, it deduces some conclusion; or so that it is excited by the light of faith to use natural, but not revealed, principles in order to reach some conclusion. We therefore say that the created intellect, assisted in the first way by the light of faith, can show by theological demonstration the possibility of the vision of God by essence; but when excited in the second way, it can do so only probabilistically, and by certain fitting considerations persuade us of it.

45 The assertion, thus explained, is proved as regards its first part. For from this revealed principle: Men or angels are elevated to the supernatural order by grace and charity, which are participations and effects of God as He is in Himself; and from another principle known by the natural light, namely, that once the effect is known, there is a natural desire to know its cause as far as it is the cause, it is effectively inferred that there is in elevated men or angels a natural desire to see their cause, namely God, as He is in Himself. For in this respect God is the cause of the aforesaid effects, grace and charity; and therefore from this it is also inferred that it is possible that such a vision exist, because a natural appetite, so that it not be frustrated, cannot tend toward the impossible.

46 As regards the second part, the same assertion is urged as follows: just as natural reason excited by the light of faith can discover reasons and conjectures by which it may prove in some way that the mystery of the Incarnation, or of the procession of the Word, is not discordant with natural reason, but agrees with it in its own way, as is usually shown in its proper materials; so, excited by the same light, it can also use probable reasons to prove that the possibility of the vision of God by essence is not discordant with the natures of things, as is established by the reasons adduced in doubt 1 in support of our assertion. Although these do not effectively convince, as will be clear from what has been said and from what remains to be said in this doubt, that the created intellect can see God as He is in Himself, nevertheless, with this possibility presupposed from faith, these considerations show in some way that the aforesaid vision of God, as He is in Himself, is not repugnant to the nature of the created intellect, but agrees with it in its own way, especially if the solutions of the arguments opposing the possibility of this mystery are added, which we shall immediately append.

§ III. The foundations of the first opinion are met.

47 To the first, therefore, it must be answered that both it and the other arguments prove our second assertion as regards its final part, if they are applied in the due manner. But insofar as they oppose the first assertion, it must be said in answer to the first that it is not evident by the natural light that the adequate object of the intellect is being as such, abstracted from natural and supernatural being. Hence, anyone who asserted that its object is only natural being could not be clearly convinced of falsity from the force of the natural light.

Add that, although we freely granted that it is evident that the object of the intellect is being according to the common meaning of its analogy, nevertheless it could not be clearly concluded from that by the natural light that God can be seen in the most perfect way, and therefore quidditatively and as He is in Himself; because it would suffice that He be knowable in a more imperfect way, as will be more fully shown in the answer to the second.

48 To the confirmation it is answered that it is not universally true that a perfection appropriate to a lower thing must be found in a higher and more eminent thing, even if both belong to the same genus. Hence, although man and heaven belong to the genus of body, incorruptibility appropriate to heaven must not thereby be found in man, who is a higher thing. Likewise, although corporeal vision includes evidentness, which is a great perfection of cognition, it does not follow that the act of faith, contained under the genus of cognition, must have the same evidentness; indeed, it is rather opposed to it. And surely, if the argument proved what was intended, it would also conclude that the created intellect can see God as He is by its own powers; because there can be a sight, namely corporeal sight, able by its own powers to attain its whole object. Therefore, since this concerns its perfection, the intellect too could attain its whole object by its own powers, and as it is in itself, if it were once true that a perfection appropriate to a lower power with respect to its own object must be found in a higher one with respect to its own object.

49 The reason why we philosophize differently about sight and intellect here is that, since sight is a lower, material, and sufficiently imperfect power, it need not have an object belonging to a higher and exceeding order. The intellect, however, is not only more eminent than sight, but is also intrinsically most noble, tending toward being according to the common meaning of its analogy; and thus an object of a higher reason can be contained under its adequate object, and consequently exceeds its natural efficacy. It therefore does not belong to the proportionate and connatural object, but to the extensive object of the intellect. Yet it does not follow that the aforesaid object can be clearly known, in a particular way, as contained under the extensive object of the intellect by the natural light alone; because just as the natural light of that intellect cannot reach it by its own powers, since it transcends the entire natural order, so it is not evident that, when taken in that sense, it is contained under its adequate object, although in reality it is contained under it.

50 To the second it is answered first that, if it is true that in the created intellect there is a distinction between a twofold power, one natural, so that the intellect itself is essentially a natural power, and another obediential, belonging to the supernatural order, as we said above in no. 12 of this disputation, then the aforesaid intellect will not be capable of attaining the vision of God by essence through the former power, but through this latter power. Therefore, from the fact that an angel comprehends that same intellect, it does not follow that he will know the possibility of the beatific vision, because he comprehends only the natural power, which does not extend to that vision, and not the obediential power formally considered, by virtue of which it is capable of attaining the aforesaid vision.

51 Secondly, it is answered (indeed consequently with regard to what we said in no. 13) by granting the major and minor and denying the consequence. In answer to the proof, it must be said that it is true of objects connatural to a power, but not of those with respect to which it has precisely capacity and essential commensuration. For although an intellect comprehending a power must know, both the specific object of that power according to the reason expressed by it, according to which it specifies, and thus in a more explanatory way, and also what the connatural objects are in particular to which it can extend, it still need not know what are the disproportionate and exceeding objects in particular to which it can be elevated supernaturally.

Thus, although the intellect is comprehended by an angel according to its essence, it does not follow that by the force of that comprehension its capacity for the clear vision of God, which is something exceeding, is clearly known; but only that it is known both what the connatural objects are in particular to which the aforesaid intellect can extend, or with respect to which intelligible species are connaturally due to it, and by which they are known, and also that the aforesaid intellect is of such a nature that it looks to its specific object, namely being as such, without determining expressly whether it is natural or supernatural, or whether inferior things belong to the natural or supernatural order, and consequently whether there is something common with respect to natural or supernatural beings as such. Although in reality all these things are contained under it, therefore, by the force of the cognition of this object, it cannot be known whether supernatural beings are possible when taken in particular, or whether they are comprehended under its object.

52 This can also be explained by the example of the same angelic intellect when compared with other possible creatures of the natural order and tending toward another universal. For although the aforesaid creatures are comprehended under its object, the aforesaid intellect, comprehending itself, does not attain such creatures in particular; because they do not belong to its connatural object, or to the object with respect to which intelligible species are due to them, as is usually said in the treatise on angels, and as we shall explain there, God granting it.

This is sufficient against what is urged from omnipotence in this argument. Because all possible creatures, taken individually, are not disproportionate and exceeding objects with respect to it; and therefore they cannot be comprehensively attained unless all of them are also attained in particular.

53 Nor does it matter if one argues that, in order for knowledge to be comprehensive, it must extend just as the known object extends, as will be evident from what we shall say in art. 7, but that the intellect according to its essence extends even to supernatural objects in particular, namely to the vision of God by essence; therefore comprehensive knowledge, precisely as such, must extend to the vision of the divine essence, attaining what the aforesaid intellect, when comprehended, is capable of seeing, namely the divine essence.

It is answered, indeed, by granting the major in the formal sense, that is, concerning the known object according to that precise reason under which it falls under comprehension, and denying the minor concerning the intellect, insofar as it falls under comprehension by an angel, but otherwise insofar as it does not fall under it. Then the consequence must be denied.

This is explained. The intellect according to its essence can be considered either by being compared with its specific object according to the reason that it expressly and most formally states in the idea of the specific object, or with it according to everything that it implicitly and materially includes, or with the connatural object proportionate to the quantity of its power, or finally by being compared with its exceeding object. Therefore, although the intellect according to its essence is comprehended by angelic cognition insofar as it is compared with its specific object, taken in the first manner, or with its proportionate object, it is not comprehended insofar as it is compared with its exceeding object, or with the specific object according to everything that it implicitly and materially includes. Thus it is not necessary that by the force of that comprehension it be known that the aforesaid intellect can extend to the clear vision of God, which is a disproportionate and exceeding object with respect to it.

54 Nor does it follow that, absolutely and simply speaking, the aforesaid intellect is not comprehended by natural comprehension through that angelic cognition; for in order absolutely and simply to comprehend the essence of a power, it is not necessary except to comprehend it as compared with its proportionate and specific object, taken in the manner already stated. For the aforementioned comprehension does not in any way require comprehensiveness of an obediential power, as theologians commonly teach; whether it is supernatural according to substance, as we said in the first solution of this argument, or is not supernatural according to substance but is purely obediential, as happens according to this mode of speaking. Consequently, it will not be necessary to comprehend the aforesaid essence insofar as it reduplicatively and formally connotes or covertly brings in its obediential power with respect to the supernatural object, and therefore it will not be necessary to comprehend it insofar as it is compared in particular with its exceeding object (since according to its obediential power it must be compared in that way), or insofar as it is compared with its specific object according to everything that it materially and implicitly connotes. For in this sense it is said that the aforesaid essence, insofar as it reduplicatively and formally connotes, covertly includes its obediential power with respect to the supernatural object.

55 To the third it is answered that, although it is not metaphysically evident that the mysteries of our faith, with respect to the thing itself, have all the conditions required in order that they be believed by divine, that is, supernatural, faith, because, on the side of the thing believed, what falls under that faith must be true in itself, and so, since the argument concludes well, it would clearly be known that they are true if it were evident in the said manner that they fall under divine faith, nevertheless it is metaphysically evident with respect to prudent and right reason that, namely, although it is not evident that the thing itself has the aforesaid conditions, it is nevertheless evident that it is prudently judged to have them. From this, however, it does not follow that it is evident that they are such as faith teaches, but only that it is prudently judged that they are so. Hence, notwithstanding that judgment, they could, so far as this head is concerned, be false and impossible, as will be more fully explained in the answer to the confirmation; and thus their possibility cannot be clearly inferred from it.

56 To the confirmation it is answered by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. In answer to the proof, it should be noted that there the argument is not from the opposite of the consequent to the opposite of the antecedent, since both propositions are affirmative; but it should be inferred as follows: This is not clearly incredible: therefore it is not clearly impossible. From this, however, nothing follows against us, because the conclusion is at most that the possibility of the mystery is clearly negative, not positive; that is, it is not proved that such a mystery is impossible, nor is it positively proved that it is possible.

This confirmation can also plainly be pressed by an analogy. Just as, from the fact that something is clearly impossible, and therefore clearly unthinkable, it is not well inferred that if it is clearly thinkable, it will be clearly possible, because from the fact that it is evident that something can be held opinatively and probably, it does not follow that it is evident that it is true; so the reasoning used in this confirmation will likewise have no force, as will be evident to the one considering it.

And surely the reason in both cases is the same: namely, that the evidentness of the probability and credibility of a thing in the sense meant is not taken from the fact that the thing is or is not, since many false things are more probable than true things; but from other extrinsic causes, namely, the testimonies of the Doctors, or signs, or other reasons and conjectures. These can coexist with the falsity of the same thing, and nevertheless clearly persuade us that it has all the conditions required in order that it be prudently judged worthy of belief. This is evident in the case of a rustic, to whom the common consensus of the Doctors proposed as certain by faith that Christ is present under the form of this host. Then it would be evident that the rustic would prudently judge, if he thought, that it was worthy of belief by divine faith, even though in reality it were not so.

The last point will become clear in the following doubt.