Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

The title of this difficulty is sufficiently clear from what we have said in the notes on this article, and therefore requires no further explanation.

§ I. Opinion of the Heretics.

1 Some heretics upheld the negative part, whom D. Gregory reports without naming them in lib. 12 Moral., cap. 38, and D. Thomas refutes in the present article; they therefore asserted that a created intellect could see a certain clarity diffused in it by God, and the splendor of its divinity, but not the divinity itself immediately and in itself.

This can be proved from 1. ad Timoth. 1: “King of the ages, immortal and invisible”; and in the same place, cap. 6: “He dwells in light inaccessible, whom no man has seen, nor can see.” Thus, just as from what is said in Jerem. 32 we assert that God is incomprehensible and therefore cannot be comprehended by any created intellect, so from what is said of him as invisible we must confess that he cannot be seen by any creature.

Next, it is proved first by reason. Since the divine essence, as it is in itself, is not confined within the range of the specificative object of a created intellect, the said intellect therefore cannot be elevated, even supernaturally, to see that essence as it is in itself. The inference is evident, because no power can be borne beyond the range of its specificative object. Thus neither sight can be elevated to perceive sound, nor hearing to perceive taste, nor, finally, material cognitive powers to know purely spiritual things, because all these lie beyond the range of the specificative object of the said powers.

The antecedent, however, is proved. Since the divine essence, as it is in itself, is infinite both in the genus of being and in the genus of object, a created intellect, being finite in both orders, cannot have proportion or commensurability with it, because there is no proportion between the finite and the infinite. The divine essence therefore will not be contained within the range of its specificative object, since every power has proportion and commensurability with its specificative object, and consequently with whatever is contained within that range, as is manifest by induction in all cognitive powers.

This is confirmed first. God, as he is in himself, is farther from a created intellect than an angel is from the power of sight; yet because of this distance the angel is not thereby contained within the range of the object of sight, as D. Thomas teaches in this question, article 3, and article 4 on the third, and as the theologians hold in common. God therefore, as he is in himself, will not be contained within the range of the object of a created intellect. The minor, with its inference, is sufficiently clear. The major is evident as well, for the power of sight and the angel are contained within the notion of created being and belong to the same natural order, whereas God, as he is in himself, is beyond every created being and transcends every natural order.

2 It is confirmed second, because a created intellect is essentially a natural power; its specificative object is therefore only a natural being. Consequently God, as he is in himself, will not be contained within the range of that object. This last inference seems evident, because God, insofar as he is knowable in himself, is a supernatural object, as will be clear from what is said here and below in article 4. The first inference, however, is also evident, because a power is such as its object is. Thus, if the power is essentially natural, its object must likewise be natural, not something abstracted from the natural and supernatural, or including both. Otherwise the specification of that power either would not be natural, or would not be contained wholly and perfectly within the order of nature, but would be partly within and partly outside it. The antecedent, too, is clear, because a created intellect, for example the human intellect, is connatural to the soul, which belongs to the natural order, and consequently is an intellectual power of the natural order, just as the soul itself belongs to that order. For supernatural accidents are distinguished from natural accidents in that the former, being connatural to their subjects, belong to the same natural order as those subjects; but the latter do not.

3 Second, because the object of an intellect, for example the highest angel’s intellect, must be one in itself and univocal. Yet if God, as he is knowable in himself, were contained within the range of that object, he would not be the said intellect’s object as one in itself and univocal. He therefore cannot be contained under it, and consequently cannot be seen by that intellect as he is in himself. Neither inference requires proof. The major, however, seems certain from what our Complutensian College teaches in Log., disp. 19, num. 45. The minor is clear as well: partly because that object would be something natural insofar as it contains things of the natural order, and at the same time something supernatural insofar as it includes the divine essence as it is in itself, which is said to be something supernatural, so that such an object would be something analogous; and partly because no univocal something common to God and creatures can be assigned to them, whether in the respect of being or in the respect of knowability. Otherwise God would be contained under that common notion under some genus and species, which is repugnant to his infinity and his purity from every potentiality, as our Complutensian College shows in Log., disp. 12, num. 34, and in 3 Physic., disp. 18, num. 20 and 21.

This is confirmed, because otherwise the divine, angelic, and human intellects would not differ essentially, which, as is clear, is absurd. The consequence is evident, because if God, as he is in himself—and consequently, as he is a supernatural object—were contained within the range of a created intellect, the object of the created and divine intellects would already be being in its entire commonality, insofar as it abstracts from God and creatures, from natural and supernatural being. There would thus be no basis on which to distinguish them. Likewise, because every human intellect naturally looks toward materiality, there is no basis on which they differ in species.

4 Third, a created intellect cannot be elevated to know simultaneously, in its own proper kind, the entire collection of possible creatures; it therefore cannot be elevated to see God as he is in himself. The antecedent is evident, because such knowledge requires an infinite power and light, as D. Thomas shows in this question, art. 8 et 3 part., quaest. 10 et 11, while a created and infinite light is altogether impossible, as our Complutensians teach in 3 Physic., disp. 18, quaest. penultima. The inference seems clear, because it is more difficult to know the divine essence immediately and as it is in itself than to know the whole collection of possible creatures taken separately. The divine essence, as it is in itself, has an infinitely more perfect being, both in the respect of being and in the respect of object, than all possible creatures, whereas the entity of those creatures, and consequently their knowability, is not infinite through essence, as are the entity and knowability of the divine essence as it is in itself.

§ II. The true opinion is established.

5 Nevertheless, it must be said that a created intellect can be elevated to see God by essence. This is a matter of faith. For it is said in Matt. 5: “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God”; and in cap. 18: “Their angels always behold the face of my Father who is in heaven”; in 1 ad Corinth. 13: “Now we see through a glass darkly, but then face to face”; in 1 Joan. 3: “We know that when he shall appear, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is.” The Church has declared that these testimonies are to be taken properly, and not twisted into a metaphor, in the chapter Damnamus on the most Holy Trinity, and in Concil. Florent., sess. ultima, in the letters of sacred union. It has been defined there that blessed souls clearly behold the triune and one God as he is in himself. Thus, since the act of seeing God as he is in itself necessarily includes the possibility of that same vision, our assertion, defined and certain as a matter of faith, remains such in the cited testimonies.

6 Next, the assertion is proved by three reasons, of which the first is drawn from quaest. 8 de Veritate, art. 1. Because God is the principle of the being of an intellectual creature, its perfection, and consequently its beatitude, consists in its conjunction with him according to its own mode, or in its intellectual conjunction with him as he is in himself. Such a conjunction, therefore, or vision of him intellectually as he is in himself, will be possible for the said creature. This last inference is evident from the previous one, because an intellectual creature can attain its beatitude; otherwise it would be in a worse condition than the other creatures. The first inference follows from the antecedent and can thus be explained. Everything is perfect insofar as it is united to its primordial principle according to its own mode. Indeed, if a thing belongs to a lower order because it does not reach the highest grade of beings, namely the intellectual grade, it is united to that principle according to its own mode, namely deficiently and imperfectly insofar as it is united to its own peculiar ultimate end, which is the participation of God and an ordering toward him. This is evident in a stone, which is perfect and blessed in its own way insofar as it is united to the center in the manner described. If, however, the thing belongs to the highest and most perfect order of beings, namely the intellectual order, it is united to its primordial principle according to its own mode, namely most perfectly and intellectually, and consequently by seeing him as he is in himself. For among the created modes of intellectual conjunction with God, this mode of seeing him as he is in himself—though in a finite and limited manner, or equivalently, this mode of being united to him intellectually—is the most perfect and supreme mode of conjunction with him. Merely because it is finite, it is not repugnant that it be communicated to a created intellect.

7 The second reason for the assertion is drawn from D. Thomas in the present article and can be reduced to the following form. For when effects are seen, a natural desire, for example in a human being, to see and know their cause according to its essence is present; and from this there arises wonder in human beings. Therefore, when God’s effects are seen, there will also arise a natural desire to see him according to his essence. Such a vision will therefore be possible. This last inference is evident, because otherwise the desire of nature would be vain and frustrate.

This is confirmed and explained from the reason of the same holy Doctor in 1a 2ae, quaest. 3, art. 8. For, as Arist. testifies, 3 de Anima, the object of the intellect is that which it is, that is, the essence of the thing. Therefore, as long as the intellect knows God only from his effects, and not immediately in himself according to his complete essence, some perfection will always be lacking in the knowledge of such an object. Consequently, in a human being, for example, there will be a natural desire to know the divine essence in this way. The antecedent is sufficiently clear. The first inference is proved, because God cannot be known from his effects except either insofar as he is that he is, or at most, as elsewhere discussed, insofar as that precise relation is observed by reason of which he is desired to be the cause of such an effect—which is to know him imperfectly as to his essence. The second inference is clear, because every thing naturally desires its own proper perfection.

8 Finally, D. Thomas suggests a third reason in this question, article 4 on the third, which can be put in the following form. The divine essence, as it is in itself, is contained under the adequate object of a created intellect; a created intellect therefore can be elevated to attain it as it is in itself. The inference is obvious, because every power can be elevated to attain any object, however excellent, provided that it is contained under its adequate object. Thus the owl’s sight can be elevated to see some most beautiful visible object surpassing its power, namely the sun as it is in itself, because that object is contained under its adequate object. The antecedent, however, is proved and explained as follows. Although the human intellect is in some way in matter, so that its proportionate object is materiality, nevertheless, since it is not in matter as its subject, it is spiritual according to its substance, and by virtue of this immateriality it is able to conceive and prescind a form from matter. Likewise, although the angelic intellect is mingled with potentiality, so that its proportionate object is a quiddity involved with potentiality and consequently has created being and is determined by it, it can nevertheless by its natural power separate being from essence and conceive it by forming no conception of that essence distinct from that being. Since God is nothing other than a pure form and act without matter, and an extremely abstract and purest being, because he is being itself by essence, it follows that he is contained within the range of the adequate object of the said intellects.

9 This is confirmed from the same holy Doctor. For a created intellect can in some way conceive God by virtue of its immateriality, that is, imperfectly and confusedly by analogy to its proper proportionate object, as experience shows. It can therefore be elevated supernaturally to know him clearly and as he is in himself. The inference is evident, because whenever a power can in any way and in an imperfect manner be directed toward an object, it is not repugnant that it be elevated to attain that object in a more perfect and elevated manner. Thus the owl’s sight, which perceives light in some way, can be elevated to see it clearly and in a more perfect way in its fullness. These are the proofs of our assertion. Whether all these reasons are efficacious, or are instead only congruences and probable conjectures concerning the possibility of a vision of God by essence, which faith nevertheless persuades is possible, will be clear from what is to be said in difficulties 3 and 4.

§ III. The arguments of the heretics are refuted.

10 The foundation therefore, which was drawn from the passages of Scripture, is answered by saying that when Paul states that God is invisible, he is speaking of invisibility with respect to the bodily eye, either in this mortal life and according to the common course of things, or else he means only that God cannot be seen by a comprehensive vision. In this latter sense, several other testimonies commonly adduced to the contrary can also be explained, by adapting to each one or more of these explanations as may be more consonant with the context. Thus, Aug. epist. 111 et 112, et communiter Sancti Patres. But what is added at the close of the argument must be answered by saying that the reasoning is unequal, because God is often said in Jerem. 32 and elsewhere to be incomprehensible, so that he is nowhere said to be comprehensible by a creature, or adequately knowable by it. The foundation drawn from sacred Scripture is therefore insufficient to establish this point. God, although said to be invisible in the testimonies cited, is nevertheless asserted in many other passages already mentioned to be visible and in fact to be seen by the blessed. Hence, in order that all these things be mutually coherent, they must be understood in the manner just stated.

11 The antecedent, however, which was drawn from reason, must be denied. In answer to its proof we appeal to D. Thomas in this article, in the answer to the fourth: although from the infinity of the divine essence one concludes that there is no proper or mathematical proportion between it and a created intellect, it does not follow that there is no improper proportion, whether in the genus of power and object, between the two. Mathematical proportion must be between definite and determinate quantities, whether of bulk or of perfection, and thus must be bounded by fixed terms. It consequently cannot obtain between a finite and an infinite thing; proportion in the genus of power and object, however, can. The reason for this is that for such proportion it is sufficient that the power be accommodated and fitted according to its essence to such an object. Just as a created intellect, by virtue of its immateriality, is accommodated in itself to perceive being in common, and abstracts in its own way from created and uncreated being as has already been stated, so according to its essence—though this will be explained more broadly below—it will be fitted to perceive any being, however infinite, that is in this sense contained under being. For a power that attains an object under some common relation also has an essential adaptation and commensurability for attaining whatever is contained under that object, at least insofar as it is elevated by divine power.

12 From this it is sufficiently clear with respect to the first confirmation. For that argument’s major is true only concerning distance in the genus of being, not concerning distance in the genus of power and object. This is not taken into account in the case of purely spiritual powers with respect to the infinity of the object, because spiritual powers, precisely insofar as they are such, can become all things in intelligible being, as D. Thomas shows below, quaest. 14, art. 1. It is based rather on another point, namely that the thing in question is not contained under the adequate object of the power. For when this is the case, the power stands so far from the thing that it cannot attain it. Thus, since an angel is not contained under the object of the power of sight, whereas God is, as has been said, contained under the object of a created intellectual power, it follows that a created intellect and God, as he is in himself, are less distant in the relation of power and object than an angel and the power of sight.

13 The second confirmation is answered first by saying, as the younger Thomists commonly teach in 3 part., quaest. 13, that a twofold formal distinction must be made in one and the same intellect: one power is essentially natural, which, speaking formally, terminates only in a natural being; the other is obediential power, which, although entitatively and identically it has natural being, is nevertheless formally and radically supernatural, and terminates at least in a supernatural object as such. Thus, although God is not contained under the object of the first power, he is nevertheless contained under the object of the second, and thus can be attained by it. We have said radically, because although this power is formally and according to its substance supernatural, yet, considered as distinct from the other power of the natural order, it does not directly elicit vital and supernatural acts; it does so only remotely and radically. Thus, once it is actuated by another proximate and supernatural power, it can, considered as thus actuated, actively and proximately concur in those acts.

14 Second, it is answered that it is one thing whether a created intellect is a natural power, and another thing whether this belongs to its essential notion. Just as it is one thing whether an intellect is an obediential power for perceiving supernatural objects as such, and another whether this obediential power belongs to its quiddative notion, so, although the intellect is a natural power and possesses the said obediential power, that power nevertheless does not belong to its essence. Considered precisely according to its essential characteristics, the intellect signifies only an ordering toward being as such, insofar as it abstracts from the natural and supernatural. In other words, it consists only in an essential and radical adaptation and commensurability for perceiving being according to the common relation of its analogy and any particular being insofar as it possesses the relation of being. Thus, just as according to this relation it does not look toward being as natural or as supernatural, but as something abstracted from both, so in its quiddative notion it also abstracts from the relation of being natural, supernatural, or obediential, as such.

Nor does the proof offered at that point tell against this. For we do not deny that a created intellect, for example the human intellect, belongs to the natural order, or is a natural power in relation to its proper subject, namely the soul, since the soul too is a natural being insofar as it is its proper passion; nor do we deny that it is a natural power in relation to its proportionate and connatural object, which is in some way distinguished from its specificative object. We deny, however, that it be a natural power of its essence, and consequently that it possess the relation of the said power in relation to its specificative object taken precisely as such. Therefore, precisely because the intellect is not a natural power in this latter sense, and hence precisely because according to its essence it looks toward natural being as its proper specificative object, not as such but insofar as it abstracts from the natural and supernatural, it can be elevated to see God by essence. God, so understood, is contained under its adequate and specificative object, as will be explained more fully immediately.

15 If, however, one asks what the intellect signifies insofar as it is a natural power, and what it signifies insofar as it is an obediential power, the answer is that the intellect, insofar as it is understood as a natural power, is conceived as signifying in a special way its proportionate and connatural object, which is a natural being to be known by natural light and by its proper powers. Consequently, precisely considered according to its essential characteristics, it superadds to itself a proximate efficacy for perceiving the said object from itself. On the other hand, insofar as it is conceived under the notion of obediential power, it is considered as signifying in a special way supernatural objects as such, or as signifying in some way an ordering of pure aptitude toward them. Not in just any manner, but in such a way that it has no proximate efficacy of its own for attaining them, and is not owed what would attain them. Rather, it requires divine elevation, through which the said efficacy is conferred upon it, and through which attainment of the said objects becomes due to it. Thus, just as the intellect according to its essence prescinds from the relation of being a natural or supernatural power, so it looks toward its proper specificative object precisely as an intelligible object. Consequently, prescinding under this relation, and with the twofold qualification stated above, from whether it has from itself or from divine elevation a proximate efficacy for perceiving that object and whatever is contained under it. Accordingly, it sometimes looks toward the object itself through a mediate elevation and under a supernatural relation, as when it perceives supernatural objects as such; at other times, however, it does so through its own native natural power, as when it terminates in natural objects and in the intelligible object as such, yet still under a natural relation. For the said object, insofar as thus taken, is formally and in the relation of object something natural. On these matters, and on what we have said above and will also say below, let those be consulted which our Complutensians teach in the books de Anima, disput. 17, quaest. 1 et 2.

16 With respect to the second argument, the major must be granted, but the minor denied. To the first proof it must be said that, although the formal reason quae, considered as it appears to the intellect of the highest angel, is analogous, it is not the formal reason sub qua. This is sufficient for its specificative object to be one in itself and univocal, as is evident in Metaphysica, whose specificative object, as such, is one in itself and univocal, because although the formal reason quae may be something analogous, the reason sub qua is not. On these matters, let those be consulted which our Complutensians state in Logica, disputation 19, already cited.

Nor is it true what is indicated there, namely that to say that the divine essence, as included in the specificative object of the said intellect, belongs to it, is to say something supernatural. Because, considered precisely in relation to the specificative object of a created intellect, it says nothing natural or supernatural as such, but in its own way prescinds from both and says only that it itself is an intelligible object. For, as we have indicated, an object is said to be natural in relation to the intellect insofar as it is attainable by a natural power and by proximate natural efficacy. It is said to be supernatural insofar as it can be attained by a supernatural power, although that does not apply to the said essence when precisely considered in relation to the order of a specificative object as such. Rather, it applies insofar as the essence belongs to the range of an unproportionate object—for example, in relation to natural light as such, and consequently in relation to its proximate efficacy. In this sense, the said essence adds something to the specificative object as such, as we have already indicated and will explain more fully below.

17 To the second proof it must be said that, although God and creatures cannot agree univocally in some one formal reason quae intrinsic to them, they can nevertheless agree univocally in some one formal reason sub qua, or in the fact that they are attainable under it. There is no need for such a reason to be intrinsic or inhersing in God. It will be enough that it be extrinsic and consist in the special manner in which the intellect attains the said reason quae, provided that this same manner be reflected in the reason itself. Accordingly, the divine relation belongs to the reason sub qua of the object of faith, because the special manner in which this power tends is to tend toward God and toward all other things insofar as they fall under divine revelation. Nevertheless, such revelation is something extrinsic to the things believed. Thus, in this respect, nothing prevents both God and the other created objects from agreeing univocally in the reason already stated.

18 To the confirmation, the consequence must be denied. To the proof it must be said that the divine intellect has the divine essence as its adequate and specificative object, as is usually shown below in question 14. Thus, in this respect, it can be distinguished essentially from a created intellect. Then, although the angelic and human intellects look toward being in its entire range as the formal reason quae, they can nevertheless be distinguished essentially because they look toward the said object under a distinct reason sub qua. This diverse reason sub qua can be explained by the fact that being neither specifies nor distinguishes the said intellects except insofar as they can be perfected by it in one manner or another. This manner can be explained only by the fact that the mode of transforming and perfecting the human intellect is such that, if that transformation and actualization occur connaturally, there must be—at least for this state—a mean immaterial species, abstracted from sensible quiddity, shining forth in the phantasm. In the other state, the intellect is transformed connaturally through the intelligible species of the rational soul, whether through the essence of the soul, insofar as it has the relation of intelligible species with respect to its own intellect, or otherwise. Likewise, the mode of perfecting and fecundating the angelic intellect must be of such a condition that, as its most connatural perfecting object, it requires its proper angelic substance, so that the other objects, or species, which affect it connaturally and are infused into it have a greater or lesser immateriality, according to the greater or lesser immateriality of the said substance, which has the relation of a motivating object to such an intellect.

19 Second, and with sufficient probability, the answer is given with Albert, 1 de Anima, cap. penult.; Caiet., 1 part., quaest. 77, art. 3; Ferrara, 2 contra Gentes, cap. 94; Thienens, 2 de Anima, text. 9; and finally with our Complutensian College in the book de Anima, disp. 17, num. 11, and many other Thomists: the human intellect, for example, can be considered in two ways, namely either under the relation of a formally considered power or under the relation of a property. If it is considered according to the former relation, it is of the same species as the angelic intellect considered formally as a power; but if it is taken according to the latter relation, it is of a different species. For since powers are specified, as powers, by their objects, it follows that both the human and the angelic intellect must have one and the same adequate object of extension. Yet because properties, as such, have their being through an ordering to nature, from which they flow, the said intellects, insofar as they are considered under the relation of properties, must flow from different natures and look toward those natures.

However, this solution displeases Francisco Suarez, 2. tom. Summae Theologiae, tractat. 3, lib. 4, cap. 1, num. 7, and some of the later Scholastics; they therefore raise several objections against it. But because their objections are brought forward from num. 11 of the Complutensian College, recently cited, through num. 21, and they add certain others, and solve them all very well, we shall not linger in presenting and answering them, because they can be seen there with pleasure and profit.

20 With respect to the third argument, the antecedent must be granted and the consequence denied. To the proof it must be answered that the entire collection of possible creatures is more difficult for a created intellect to know than God as he is in himself. For the former knowledge, and the power of the light eliciting it, could be extended to comprehending God as he is in himself. Since the power that comprehends the whole object of a given power can also, insofar as it is from itself, extend to comprehending that power, the entire collection of possible creatures is the adequate object of divine omnipotence; it would follow that that created knowledge, and the power of that light knowing the whole object, could extend to comprehending the same omnipotence, and consequently God himself. It would therefore both be created and not created. Thus, since comprehension of God is more difficult than vision of him as he is in himself, knowledge of the said creatures will also be more difficult than vision of God.

Add that the perfection and infinity of an object do not remove it from the range of the object of a finite power if that power actualizes it in a finite manner. Therefore, although God, as he is in himself, is infinite, nevertheless, notwithstanding this infinity, he can be united in a finite manner with respect to this vision, as we shall explain below. Hence, notwithstanding his infinity, he remains within the range of the intellect’s object. Yet the whole infinity of creatures cannot be united to a created intellect within its own kind except infinitely, that is, through infinite means, and consequently demanding infinite attention. The said infinity therefore removes those creatures, to be known simultaneously, from the range of a created intellect that is incapable of giving infinite attention.