Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

Everything that is to be said in this tractate depends upon the possibility of a vision of the divine essence by the created intellect; and so the Most Holy Doctor rightly raises this very question in the first article, and we accordingly institute the first disputation on that same possibility. But since the Sacred Doctor touches somewhat on the natural inclination of the rational creature toward the vision of God, we shall therefore also touch on it in this first disputation.

The title of this difficulty is sufficiently clear from what we have said in the notes on this article, and therefore requires no further explanation.

§ I. Opinion of the Heretics.

1 Some heretics upheld the negative part, whom D. Gregory reports without naming them in lib. 12 Moral., cap. 38, and D. Thomas refutes in the present article; they therefore asserted that a created intellect could see a certain clarity diffused in it by God, and the splendor of its divinity, but not the divinity itself immediately and in itself.

This can be proved from 1. ad Timoth. 1: “King of the ages, immortal and invisible”; and in the same place, cap. 6: “He dwells in light inaccessible, whom no man has seen, nor can see.” Thus, just as from what is said in Jerem. 32 we assert that God is incomprehensible and therefore cannot be comprehended by any created intellect, so from what is said of him as invisible we must confess that he cannot be seen by any creature.

Next, it is proved first by reason. Since the divine essence, as it is in itself, is not confined within the range of the specificative object of a created intellect, the said intellect therefore cannot be elevated, even supernaturally, to see that essence as it is in itself. The inference is evident, because no power can be borne beyond the range of its specificative object. Thus neither sight can be elevated to perceive sound, nor hearing to perceive taste, nor, finally, material cognitive powers to know purely spiritual things, because all these lie beyond the range of the specificative object of the said powers.

The antecedent, however, is proved. Since the divine essence, as it is in itself, is infinite both in the genus of being and in the genus of object, a created intellect, being finite in both orders, cannot have proportion or commensurability with it, because there is no proportion between the finite and the infinite. The divine essence therefore will not be contained within the range of its specificative object, since every power has proportion and commensurability with its specificative object, and consequently with whatever is contained within that range, as is manifest by induction in all cognitive powers.

This is confirmed first. God, as he is in himself, is farther from a created intellect than an angel is from the power of sight; yet because of this distance the angel is not thereby contained within the range of the object of sight, as D. Thomas teaches in this question, article 3, and article 4 on the third, and as the theologians hold in common. God therefore, as he is in himself, will not be contained within the range of the object of a created intellect. The minor, with its inference, is sufficiently clear. The major is evident as well, for the power of sight and the angel are contained within the notion of created being and belong to the same natural order, whereas God, as he is in himself, is beyond every created being and transcends every natural order.

2 It is confirmed second, because a created intellect is essentially a natural power; its specificative object is therefore only a natural being. Consequently God, as he is in himself, will not be contained within the range of that object. This last inference seems evident, because God, insofar as he is knowable in himself, is a supernatural object, as will be clear from what is said here and below in article 4. The first inference, however, is also evident, because a power is such as its object is. Thus, if the power is essentially natural, its object must likewise be natural, not something abstracted from the natural and supernatural, or including both. Otherwise the specification of that power either would not be natural, or would not be contained wholly and perfectly within the order of nature, but would be partly within and partly outside it. The antecedent, too, is clear, because a created intellect, for example the human intellect, is connatural to the soul, which belongs to the natural order, and consequently is an intellectual power of the natural order, just as the soul itself belongs to that order. For supernatural accidents are distinguished from natural accidents in that the former, being connatural to their subjects, belong to the same natural order as those subjects; but the latter do not.

3 Second, because the object of an intellect, for example the highest angel’s intellect, must be one in itself and univocal. Yet if God, as he is knowable in himself, were contained within the range of that object, he would not be the said intellect’s object as one in itself and univocal. He therefore cannot be contained under it, and consequently cannot be seen by that intellect as he is in himself. Neither inference requires proof. The major, however, seems certain from what our Complutensian College teaches in Log., disp. 19, num. 45. The minor is clear as well: partly because that object would be something natural insofar as it contains things of the natural order, and at the same time something supernatural insofar as it includes the divine essence as it is in itself, which is said to be something supernatural, so that such an object would be something analogous; and partly because no univocal something common to God and creatures can be assigned to them, whether in the respect of being or in the respect of knowability. Otherwise God would be contained under that common notion under some genus and species, which is repugnant to his infinity and his purity from every potentiality, as our Complutensian College shows in Log., disp. 12, num. 34, and in 3 Physic., disp. 18, num. 20 and 21.

This is confirmed, because otherwise the divine, angelic, and human intellects would not differ essentially, which, as is clear, is absurd. The consequence is evident, because if God, as he is in himself—and consequently, as he is a supernatural object—were contained within the range of a created intellect, the object of the created and divine intellects would already be being in its entire commonality, insofar as it abstracts from God and creatures, from natural and supernatural being. There would thus be no basis on which to distinguish them. Likewise, because every human intellect naturally looks toward materiality, there is no basis on which they differ in species.

4 Third, a created intellect cannot be elevated to know simultaneously, in its own proper kind, the entire collection of possible creatures; it therefore cannot be elevated to see God as he is in himself. The antecedent is evident, because such knowledge requires an infinite power and light, as D. Thomas shows in this question, art. 8 et 3 part., quaest. 10 et 11, while a created and infinite light is altogether impossible, as our Complutensians teach in 3 Physic., disp. 18, quaest. penultima. The inference seems clear, because it is more difficult to know the divine essence immediately and as it is in itself than to know the whole collection of possible creatures taken separately. The divine essence, as it is in itself, has an infinitely more perfect being, both in the respect of being and in the respect of object, than all possible creatures, whereas the entity of those creatures, and consequently their knowability, is not infinite through essence, as are the entity and knowability of the divine essence as it is in itself.

§ II. The true opinion is established.

5 Nevertheless, it must be said that a created intellect can be elevated to see God by essence. This is a matter of faith. For it is said in Matt. 5: “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God”; and in cap. 18: “Their angels always behold the face of my Father who is in heaven”; in 1 ad Corinth. 13: “Now we see through a glass darkly, but then face to face”; in 1 Joan. 3: “We know that when he shall appear, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is.” The Church has declared that these testimonies are to be taken properly, and not twisted into a metaphor, in the chapter Damnamus on the most Holy Trinity, and in Concil. Florent., sess. ultima, in the letters of sacred union. It has been defined there that blessed souls clearly behold the triune and one God as he is in himself. Thus, since the act of seeing God as he is in itself necessarily includes the possibility of that same vision, our assertion, defined and certain as a matter of faith, remains such in the cited testimonies.

6 Next, the assertion is proved by three reasons, of which the first is drawn from quaest. 8 de Veritate, art. 1. Because God is the principle of the being of an intellectual creature, its perfection, and consequently its beatitude, consists in its conjunction with him according to its own mode, or in its intellectual conjunction with him as he is in himself. Such a conjunction, therefore, or vision of him intellectually as he is in himself, will be possible for the said creature. This last inference is evident from the previous one, because an intellectual creature can attain its beatitude; otherwise it would be in a worse condition than the other creatures. The first inference follows from the antecedent and can thus be explained. Everything is perfect insofar as it is united to its primordial principle according to its own mode. Indeed, if a thing belongs to a lower order because it does not reach the highest grade of beings, namely the intellectual grade, it is united to that principle according to its own mode, namely deficiently and imperfectly insofar as it is united to its own peculiar ultimate end, which is the participation of God and an ordering toward him. This is evident in a stone, which is perfect and blessed in its own way insofar as it is united to the center in the manner described. If, however, the thing belongs to the highest and most perfect order of beings, namely the intellectual order, it is united to its primordial principle according to its own mode, namely most perfectly and intellectually, and consequently by seeing him as he is in himself. For among the created modes of intellectual conjunction with God, this mode of seeing him as he is in himself—though in a finite and limited manner, or equivalently, this mode of being united to him intellectually—is the most perfect and supreme mode of conjunction with him. Merely because it is finite, it is not repugnant that it be communicated to a created intellect.

7 The second reason for the assertion is drawn from D. Thomas in the present article and can be reduced to the following form. For when effects are seen, a natural desire, for example in a human being, to see and know their cause according to its essence is present; and from this there arises wonder in human beings. Therefore, when God’s effects are seen, there will also arise a natural desire to see him according to his essence. Such a vision will therefore be possible. This last inference is evident, because otherwise the desire of nature would be vain and frustrate.

This is confirmed and explained from the reason of the same holy Doctor in 1a 2ae, quaest. 3, art. 8. For, as Arist. testifies, 3 de Anima, the object of the intellect is that which it is, that is, the essence of the thing. Therefore, as long as the intellect knows God only from his effects, and not immediately in himself according to his complete essence, some perfection will always be lacking in the knowledge of such an object. Consequently, in a human being, for example, there will be a natural desire to know the divine essence in this way. The antecedent is sufficiently clear. The first inference is proved, because God cannot be known from his effects except either insofar as he is that he is, or at most, as elsewhere discussed, insofar as that precise relation is observed by reason of which he is desired to be the cause of such an effect—which is to know him imperfectly as to his essence. The second inference is clear, because every thing naturally desires its own proper perfection.

8 Finally, D. Thomas suggests a third reason in this question, article 4 on the third, which can be put in the following form. The divine essence, as it is in itself, is contained under the adequate object of a created intellect; a created intellect therefore can be elevated to attain it as it is in itself. The inference is obvious, because every power can be elevated to attain any object, however excellent, provided that it is contained under its adequate object. Thus the owl’s sight can be elevated to see some most beautiful visible object surpassing its power, namely the sun as it is in itself, because that object is contained under its adequate object. The antecedent, however, is proved and explained as follows. Although the human intellect is in some way in matter, so that its proportionate object is materiality, nevertheless, since it is not in matter as its subject, it is spiritual according to its substance, and by virtue of this immateriality it is able to conceive and prescind a form from matter. Likewise, although the angelic intellect is mingled with potentiality, so that its proportionate object is a quiddity involved with potentiality and consequently has created being and is determined by it, it can nevertheless by its natural power separate being from essence and conceive it by forming no conception of that essence distinct from that being. Since God is nothing other than a pure form and act without matter, and an extremely abstract and purest being, because he is being itself by essence, it follows that he is contained within the range of the adequate object of the said intellects.

9 This is confirmed from the same holy Doctor. For a created intellect can in some way conceive God by virtue of its immateriality, that is, imperfectly and confusedly by analogy to its proper proportionate object, as experience shows. It can therefore be elevated supernaturally to know him clearly and as he is in himself. The inference is evident, because whenever a power can in any way and in an imperfect manner be directed toward an object, it is not repugnant that it be elevated to attain that object in a more perfect and elevated manner. Thus the owl’s sight, which perceives light in some way, can be elevated to see it clearly and in a more perfect way in its fullness. These are the proofs of our assertion. Whether all these reasons are efficacious, or are instead only congruences and probable conjectures concerning the possibility of a vision of God by essence, which faith nevertheless persuades is possible, will be clear from what is to be said in difficulties 3 and 4.

§ III. The arguments of the heretics are refuted.

10 The foundation therefore, which was drawn from the passages of Scripture, is answered by saying that when Paul states that God is invisible, he is speaking of invisibility with respect to the bodily eye, either in this mortal life and according to the common course of things, or else he means only that God cannot be seen by a comprehensive vision. In this latter sense, several other testimonies commonly adduced to the contrary can also be explained, by adapting to each one or more of these explanations as may be more consonant with the context. Thus, Aug. epist. 111 et 112, et communiter Sancti Patres. But what is added at the close of the argument must be answered by saying that the reasoning is unequal, because God is often said in Jerem. 32 and elsewhere to be incomprehensible, so that he is nowhere said to be comprehensible by a creature, or adequately knowable by it. The foundation drawn from sacred Scripture is therefore insufficient to establish this point. God, although said to be invisible in the testimonies cited, is nevertheless asserted in many other passages already mentioned to be visible and in fact to be seen by the blessed. Hence, in order that all these things be mutually coherent, they must be understood in the manner just stated.

11 The antecedent, however, which was drawn from reason, must be denied. In answer to its proof we appeal to D. Thomas in this article, in the answer to the fourth: although from the infinity of the divine essence one concludes that there is no proper or mathematical proportion between it and a created intellect, it does not follow that there is no improper proportion, whether in the genus of power and object, between the two. Mathematical proportion must be between definite and determinate quantities, whether of bulk or of perfection, and thus must be bounded by fixed terms. It consequently cannot obtain between a finite and an infinite thing; proportion in the genus of power and object, however, can. The reason for this is that for such proportion it is sufficient that the power be accommodated and fitted according to its essence to such an object. Just as a created intellect, by virtue of its immateriality, is accommodated in itself to perceive being in common, and abstracts in its own way from created and uncreated being as has already been stated, so according to its essence—though this will be explained more broadly below—it will be fitted to perceive any being, however infinite, that is in this sense contained under being. For a power that attains an object under some common relation also has an essential adaptation and commensurability for attaining whatever is contained under that object, at least insofar as it is elevated by divine power.

12 From this it is sufficiently clear with respect to the first confirmation. For that argument’s major is true only concerning distance in the genus of being, not concerning distance in the genus of power and object. This is not taken into account in the case of purely spiritual powers with respect to the infinity of the object, because spiritual powers, precisely insofar as they are such, can become all things in intelligible being, as D. Thomas shows below, quaest. 14, art. 1. It is based rather on another point, namely that the thing in question is not contained under the adequate object of the power. For when this is the case, the power stands so far from the thing that it cannot attain it. Thus, since an angel is not contained under the object of the power of sight, whereas God is, as has been said, contained under the object of a created intellectual power, it follows that a created intellect and God, as he is in himself, are less distant in the relation of power and object than an angel and the power of sight.

13 The second confirmation is answered first by saying, as the younger Thomists commonly teach in 3 part., quaest. 13, that a twofold formal distinction must be made in one and the same intellect: one power is essentially natural, which, speaking formally, terminates only in a natural being; the other is obediential power, which, although entitatively and identically it has natural being, is nevertheless formally and radically supernatural, and terminates at least in a supernatural object as such. Thus, although God is not contained under the object of the first power, he is nevertheless contained under the object of the second, and thus can be attained by it. We have said radically, because although this power is formally and according to its substance supernatural, yet, considered as distinct from the other power of the natural order, it does not directly elicit vital and supernatural acts; it does so only remotely and radically. Thus, once it is actuated by another proximate and supernatural power, it can, considered as thus actuated, actively and proximately concur in those acts.

14 Second, it is answered that it is one thing whether a created intellect is a natural power, and another thing whether this belongs to its essential notion. Just as it is one thing whether an intellect is an obediential power for perceiving supernatural objects as such, and another whether this obediential power belongs to its quiddative notion, so, although the intellect is a natural power and possesses the said obediential power, that power nevertheless does not belong to its essence. Considered precisely according to its essential characteristics, the intellect signifies only an ordering toward being as such, insofar as it abstracts from the natural and supernatural. In other words, it consists only in an essential and radical adaptation and commensurability for perceiving being according to the common relation of its analogy and any particular being insofar as it possesses the relation of being. Thus, just as according to this relation it does not look toward being as natural or as supernatural, but as something abstracted from both, so in its quiddative notion it also abstracts from the relation of being natural, supernatural, or obediential, as such.

Nor does the proof offered at that point tell against this. For we do not deny that a created intellect, for example the human intellect, belongs to the natural order, or is a natural power in relation to its proper subject, namely the soul, since the soul too is a natural being insofar as it is its proper passion; nor do we deny that it is a natural power in relation to its proportionate and connatural object, which is in some way distinguished from its specificative object. We deny, however, that it be a natural power of its essence, and consequently that it possess the relation of the said power in relation to its specificative object taken precisely as such. Therefore, precisely because the intellect is not a natural power in this latter sense, and hence precisely because according to its essence it looks toward natural being as its proper specificative object, not as such but insofar as it abstracts from the natural and supernatural, it can be elevated to see God by essence. God, so understood, is contained under its adequate and specificative object, as will be explained more fully immediately.

15 If, however, one asks what the intellect signifies insofar as it is a natural power, and what it signifies insofar as it is an obediential power, the answer is that the intellect, insofar as it is understood as a natural power, is conceived as signifying in a special way its proportionate and connatural object, which is a natural being to be known by natural light and by its proper powers. Consequently, precisely considered according to its essential characteristics, it superadds to itself a proximate efficacy for perceiving the said object from itself. On the other hand, insofar as it is conceived under the notion of obediential power, it is considered as signifying in a special way supernatural objects as such, or as signifying in some way an ordering of pure aptitude toward them. Not in just any manner, but in such a way that it has no proximate efficacy of its own for attaining them, and is not owed what would attain them. Rather, it requires divine elevation, through which the said efficacy is conferred upon it, and through which attainment of the said objects becomes due to it. Thus, just as the intellect according to its essence prescinds from the relation of being a natural or supernatural power, so it looks toward its proper specificative object precisely as an intelligible object. Consequently, prescinding under this relation, and with the twofold qualification stated above, from whether it has from itself or from divine elevation a proximate efficacy for perceiving that object and whatever is contained under it. Accordingly, it sometimes looks toward the object itself through a mediate elevation and under a supernatural relation, as when it perceives supernatural objects as such; at other times, however, it does so through its own native natural power, as when it terminates in natural objects and in the intelligible object as such, yet still under a natural relation. For the said object, insofar as thus taken, is formally and in the relation of object something natural. On these matters, and on what we have said above and will also say below, let those be consulted which our Complutensians teach in the books de Anima, disput. 17, quaest. 1 et 2.

16 With respect to the second argument, the major must be granted, but the minor denied. To the first proof it must be said that, although the formal reason quae, considered as it appears to the intellect of the highest angel, is analogous, it is not the formal reason sub qua. This is sufficient for its specificative object to be one in itself and univocal, as is evident in Metaphysica, whose specificative object, as such, is one in itself and univocal, because although the formal reason quae may be something analogous, the reason sub qua is not. On these matters, let those be consulted which our Complutensians state in Logica, disputation 19, already cited.

Nor is it true what is indicated there, namely that to say that the divine essence, as included in the specificative object of the said intellect, belongs to it, is to say something supernatural. Because, considered precisely in relation to the specificative object of a created intellect, it says nothing natural or supernatural as such, but in its own way prescinds from both and says only that it itself is an intelligible object. For, as we have indicated, an object is said to be natural in relation to the intellect insofar as it is attainable by a natural power and by proximate natural efficacy. It is said to be supernatural insofar as it can be attained by a supernatural power, although that does not apply to the said essence when precisely considered in relation to the order of a specificative object as such. Rather, it applies insofar as the essence belongs to the range of an unproportionate object—for example, in relation to natural light as such, and consequently in relation to its proximate efficacy. In this sense, the said essence adds something to the specificative object as such, as we have already indicated and will explain more fully below.

17 To the second proof it must be said that, although God and creatures cannot agree univocally in some one formal reason quae intrinsic to them, they can nevertheless agree univocally in some one formal reason sub qua, or in the fact that they are attainable under it. There is no need for such a reason to be intrinsic or inhersing in God. It will be enough that it be extrinsic and consist in the special manner in which the intellect attains the said reason quae, provided that this same manner be reflected in the reason itself. Accordingly, the divine relation belongs to the reason sub qua of the object of faith, because the special manner in which this power tends is to tend toward God and toward all other things insofar as they fall under divine revelation. Nevertheless, such revelation is something extrinsic to the things believed. Thus, in this respect, nothing prevents both God and the other created objects from agreeing univocally in the reason already stated.

18 To the confirmation, the consequence must be denied. To the proof it must be said that the divine intellect has the divine essence as its adequate and specificative object, as is usually shown below in question 14. Thus, in this respect, it can be distinguished essentially from a created intellect. Then, although the angelic and human intellects look toward being in its entire range as the formal reason quae, they can nevertheless be distinguished essentially because they look toward the said object under a distinct reason sub qua. This diverse reason sub qua can be explained by the fact that being neither specifies nor distinguishes the said intellects except insofar as they can be perfected by it in one manner or another. This manner can be explained only by the fact that the mode of transforming and perfecting the human intellect is such that, if that transformation and actualization occur connaturally, there must be—at least for this state—a mean immaterial species, abstracted from sensible quiddity, shining forth in the phantasm. In the other state, the intellect is transformed connaturally through the intelligible species of the rational soul, whether through the essence of the soul, insofar as it has the relation of intelligible species with respect to its own intellect, or otherwise. Likewise, the mode of perfecting and fecundating the angelic intellect must be of such a condition that, as its most connatural perfecting object, it requires its proper angelic substance, so that the other objects, or species, which affect it connaturally and are infused into it have a greater or lesser immateriality, according to the greater or lesser immateriality of the said substance, which has the relation of a motivating object to such an intellect.

19 Second, and with sufficient probability, the answer is given with Albert, 1 de Anima, cap. penult.; Caiet., 1 part., quaest. 77, art. 3; Ferrara, 2 contra Gentes, cap. 94; Thienens, 2 de Anima, text. 9; and finally with our Complutensian College in the book de Anima, disp. 17, num. 11, and many other Thomists: the human intellect, for example, can be considered in two ways, namely either under the relation of a formally considered power or under the relation of a property. If it is considered according to the former relation, it is of the same species as the angelic intellect considered formally as a power; but if it is taken according to the latter relation, it is of a different species. For since powers are specified, as powers, by their objects, it follows that both the human and the angelic intellect must have one and the same adequate object of extension. Yet because properties, as such, have their being through an ordering to nature, from which they flow, the said intellects, insofar as they are considered under the relation of properties, must flow from different natures and look toward those natures.

However, this solution displeases Francisco Suarez, 2. tom. Summae Theologiae, tractat. 3, lib. 4, cap. 1, num. 7, and some of the later Scholastics; they therefore raise several objections against it. But because their objections are brought forward from num. 11 of the Complutensian College, recently cited, through num. 21, and they add certain others, and solve them all very well, we shall not linger in presenting and answering them, because they can be seen there with pleasure and profit.

20 With respect to the third argument, the antecedent must be granted and the consequence denied. To the proof it must be answered that the entire collection of possible creatures is more difficult for a created intellect to know than God as he is in himself. For the former knowledge, and the power of the light eliciting it, could be extended to comprehending God as he is in himself. Since the power that comprehends the whole object of a given power can also, insofar as it is from itself, extend to comprehending that power, the entire collection of possible creatures is the adequate object of divine omnipotence; it would follow that that created knowledge, and the power of that light knowing the whole object, could extend to comprehending the same omnipotence, and consequently God himself. It would therefore both be created and not created. Thus, since comprehension of God is more difficult than vision of him as he is in himself, knowledge of the said creatures will also be more difficult than vision of God.

Add that the perfection and infinity of an object do not remove it from the range of the object of a finite power if that power actualizes it in a finite manner. Therefore, although God, as he is in himself, is infinite, nevertheless, notwithstanding this infinity, he can be united in a finite manner with respect to this vision, as we shall explain below. Hence, notwithstanding his infinity, he remains within the range of the intellect’s object. Yet the whole infinity of creatures cannot be united to a created intellect within its own kind except infinitely, that is, through infinite means, and consequently demanding infinite attention. The said infinity therefore removes those creatures, to be known simultaneously, from the range of a created intellect that is incapable of giving infinite attention.

Since unanimous agreement of the Fathers about it is one of the principal proofs of the mysteries of our faith, while for the other mysteries there is no lack of a reason for doubting whether those same Fathers knew the possibility of the vision of God by essence on the part of a created intellect—which is, as it were, the basis of several other mysteries—after we have shown that the aforementioned intellect can see God by essence, we judged it fitting to examine in detail what the Fathers thought on this matter.

§ I. Recent opinion.

21 Vazq., 1 part., disp. 37, cap. 4, holds that almost all the Fathers denied with such explicit language the possibility of the vision of God by essence on the part of a created intellect that, if we wish to speak candidly, they can scarcely be interpreted in a favorable sense.

This is proved first. For Ambrose, lib. 1 in Lucam, cap. 1, asserts that God is invisible by his very nature. Jerome, in his Commentaries on Isaiah, lib. 3, on the words “I saw the Lord”, shortly afterward, holds that man cannot see God. Basil, lib. 1 contra Eunomium, shortly afterward: “The substance of God, apart from the Only-Begotten, is invisible.” Augustine, tom. 4, in the booklet On the Essence of Divinity: “The latter things” (he says), “that is, you will see my Incarnation, but you will not be able to see my divinity.” Theodoret, in the dialogue On the Immutability: “For they do not see” (namely, the angels) “the divine substance, which can neither be circumscribed, nor comprehended, nor perceived by the intellect.”

22 Secondly, it is proved from Chrysostom, whom Vázquez cites most insistently in favor of the error of the Anomoeans. For in homil. 14 on John, shortly after the beginning, he says: “That which is God was not only never seen by the prophets, but neither by angels nor archangels; and if you should question them, you will hear nothing from them about God's substance, but only this report: glory to God in the highest, since, if all created nature is dependent, with what rationale could it see the uncreated?” Likewise, tom. 5, homil. 3, On the Incomprehensibility of God's Nature, he states in explicit words that no creature, whether human or angelic, can behold God.

23 Nor will it suffice, if, with St. Thomas, you say that Chrysostom wishes only to deny comprehensive vision, not however quidditative and intuitive vision; since there he argues against the Anomoeans, who asserted that they comprehensibly attained to God.

Against this, first, the Anomoeans did not assert that they knew God comprehensibly, but only quidditatively. Therefore, if Chrysostom speaks against them, he denies to the angels not only comprehensive knowledge, but also quidditative knowledge, which is the vision of God by essence. The consequence is evident. Vázquez proves the antecedent in this way: the Anomoeans were not so mad as to persuade themselves of this; whence, when they said that they knew God so well and so exactly as God knows himself, they meant only that they knew God quidditatively, because quidditative knowledge is equal on the part of the object with respect to everyone, insofar as all who see God see him according to everything that is formally in him.

Next. Because in that homil. 14 on John, Chrysostom denies to the angels all that knowledge which would suffice for them to say anything about God's substance as it is in itself, as is clear from the words already adduced; therefore, since the vision of God as he is in himself suffices the angels (as is clear from the same passage), it follows that he denies them this, comprehensible vision, and not merely comprehensive vision.

24 Likewise, in that homily 3 On the Incomprehensibility of God's Nature, he denies not only comprehensive vision of God, but also quidditative and intuitive vision; for he holds that the substance of God is seen by no angelic intellect, but only something derived from it, which plainly conflicts with the vision of God by essence, since that vision tends immediately to God as he is in himself, as is clear from what has been said. Hence, when he there explains the vision of Isaiah, cap. 5, he says that the Seraphim veil their faces with two wings because they could not bear the surpassing splendor of God. He adds: “Although they did not see the pure light itself, nor the pure substance itself, but what they saw was a condescension and an indulgence.” Here it is plainly apparent that he denies intuitive vision of God as he is in himself, because this is the vision of God's pure and true substance, and grants only the vision of something that God condescends.

This is confirmed and explained. For, in order to show what this condescension is, he added: “When God does not manifest himself as he is, but only insofar as he can be seen by the person who has merited such a regard, we say that he measures and tempers his own representation according to the strength of the beholder's sight; and we call a thing of this kind a condescension and an indulgence.” He adds that the prophets saw that condescension, but more obscurely than the angels. Therefore, since God's accommodation and condescension toward the minds of the prophets is such that he does not manifest himself to them as he is in himself, but through another means much lower and proportioned to their minds, the same must be said concerning the angels, who see God only under this condescension and accommodation.

§ II. The contrary opinion, established as altogether certain.

25 Nevertheless, it must be said that the Fathers truly knew that the created intellect can be supernaturally elevated to see God by essence. Thus the scholastics hold in common, with Gabriel Vázquez alone excepted. It would therefore be superfluous to examine anyone in particular.

This assertion could be proved by bringing forward the testimonies of all the Fathers in a precise way. But since it would be long to recount all of them verbatim, we shall mention here only some of the places in which other Fathers confess this very thing.

First, then, this is taught by Gregory of Nazianzus, orat. 2 On Theology, who says: “What, after all, God is in his nature and essence, no mortal has ever discovered, nor will discover in this life with ease, at least in my judgment; he will discover it for the first time when God shall have united to a thing known and familiar that which is Godlike and divine—that is, our mind and reason—and shall have kindled our image after his own exemplar, for which it now burns with desire.”

Next, Augustine teaches this in tom. 2, epist. 6, and also in epist. 112, cap. 15: “If you ask” (he says) “whether God can also be seen someday as he is, I answer that this is promised to sons, concerning whom we have been told, ‘we know that when he appears we shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is.’ If you ask whence we shall see him, I answer: whence the angels see him, with whom we shall then be equal.” Origen also says, lib. 7 contra Celsum, col. 15: “Now we see God through a glass darkly; afterward, face to face.”

26 Likewise, Chrysostom (whom Vázquez cites as the leader of several other Fathers on behalf of the contrary opinion) confesses this very point in epist. 5 to Theodorus the Fallen, in these words: “If Peter, who saw a certain obscure image of future things, immediately rejected everything from his mind because of the pleasure that such a vision had planted in his soul, what shall we say when truth itself will be present, when, with the royal chambers opened, it will be permitted to behold the King himself—not through an enigma, nor through a glass, but face to face; no longer, I say, through faith, but through sight.” Nothing could be said more clearly in support of a true confession of our beatitude, which consists in the clear vision of God.

Finally, this is confessed by Dionysius, cap. 4 On the Celestial Hierarchy; Ignatius, in his epistle to the Romans; Augustine, On the City of God, cap. 30; Epiphanius, lib. 3 Against Heresies, heresy 70; Gregory of Nyssa, lib. On the Beatitudes, in his explanation of “Blessed are the pure in heart”; Isidore, lib. 1 Sent., cap. 26; On Divine Offices, cap. On the Rule of Faith; Bernard, sermon 31 on the Canticles, and lib. 5 De Consider.; Theophylact, on John 1; Euthymius there, and many others.

All these points can also be confirmed from the preceding Difficulty. For there we said that this truth, namely that the blessed see God by essence, and consequently that this vision is possible for them, was defined by the Church; it is therefore a sign that this was the mind of the Fathers, and consequently that their unanimous agreement decidedly does not stand with the contrary opinion; otherwise the Church would contradict itself, because it would overturn the surest supports by which it is fortified and defended, namely the statements of the Fathers, whom it duly and carefully consults in definitions of this kind, so that it may thereby be better disposed to define even the truth itself.

§ III. The arguments proposed at the outset are answered.

27 To the first argument, therefore, an answer is given along with St. Thomas, in 4, dist. 49, quaest. 2, art. 1, ad 1, and Augustine, epistles 111 and 112: the aforementioned Fathers, and indeed any others, are to be explained by one of the three ways set forth in the preceding Difficulty, namely, whether the reference is to vision in this mortal life, or vision through the bodily eye, or finally comprehensive vision; in such a way, however, that the one which is more consonant with the context be adapted to each Father. Hence Ambrose, Jerome, Basil, and Augustine, in the places cited, call God invisible either because, according to the ordinary course of things, he cannot be seen in this mortal life, or because he is invisible to bodily eyes. In this way they meant to signify that God is not bodily and therefore cannot be seen as a body even by the angels. Augustine thus explains the aforementioned Fathers in the place cited. By this, incidentally, the other objections that Vázquez brings against this explanation can also be clearly seen to fail.

28 To the second argument, the best answer is the solution given by St. Thomas there. First, because in homil. 14 on John, Chrysostom is dealing with the explanation of that testimony: “No one has ever seen God; the Only-Begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has made him known.” This is indeed to be understood not of any kind of vision, but of comprehensive vision. Next, because this is taught by Ambrose, lib. 5 in Lucam, the chapter on the apparition of the angel to the priest Zechariah; Epiphanius, heresy 70; and Augustine, epist. 112 On Seeing God, cap. 5 and 6, who says that the statement is to be understood with regard to the fullness of divinity, because no one except the Son, who is true God, comprehends the divinity.

Next, because John wished there, as is clear from the context, to explain the distinction between Moses and Christ: Moses was the minister of the Law, as a servant; Christ, however, was the Author of grace, as the Only-Begotten Son. Hence, to show that he is God, and consequently equal to the Father, he says that God is seen comprehensibly by no creature; yet he is indeed fully known by the Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, because he is of one nature with him, and thus the Son himself has made known everything belonging to the Father, however hidden it may be. Therefore, Chrysostom, having penetrated the force of this testimony and speaking accordingly about comprehensive vision, rightly said that no creature can see the uncreated nature of God; and, to explain altogether that this was his intention, he added shortly after the quoted words that here vision is called the most certain contemplation of the Father, and such comprehension as the Father has of the Son.

Finally, because, as we indicated above, in that homily and in his other writings On the Incomprehensibility of God's Nature, Chrysostom argues against the Anomoeans, who—as is clear from Theodoret, lib. 4 of Heretical Fables, and from Chrysostom himself in the immediately cited passage—asserted that they were ignorant of nothing about God, but knew God's very substance so exactly that they had the same knowledge of God as God himself has of himself, and consequently attained not somehow or other, but comprehensibly, to the divine essence. Thus he wished to refute this error alone, as is clear from what the same holy Doctor teaches in the same book, hom. 4, immediately following, in these words: “It would now be enough, dearest brothers, if, after we have recently shown that God is incomprehensible to human beings, and even to the Cherubim and Seraphim, relieved of the importunity of human heretics, we should admonish nothing further.”

29 Therefore, against the first proof offered there by St. Thomas in opposition to the solution, the antecedent must be denied. Against his proof, the antecedent must also be denied. For the Anomoeans are called not only mad but also furious by Epiphanius, heresy 76. Indeed, Chrysostom, hom. 5 On the Incomprehensibility of God's Nature, recounting their madness, says: “This kind of men must be despised and rejected no less than fools and madmen.”

Add, that the words of the Anomoeans quoted in this solution are so explicit in affirming comprehension that the scholastics and several of the Fathers use them to explain it; consequently, when all are considered, they do not permit a benign interpretation in this respect: indeed, the truth of the Catholic faith is contained in the testimonies of the Fathers, as will be still more evident from what has been said and what will be said immediately.

30 To the second proof, the answer is that Chrysostom intends there only that the Only-Begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father and of one nature with him, can say anything when asked about God's substance, or can tell it forth if he pleases—not somehow or other, but as the Author and Teacher of this doctrine. The angelic office, however, is not to be teachers and authors of the aforesaid doctrine, but its ministers and God's praisers; hence they always proclaim: “Glory to God in the highest.”

That this was Chrysostom's intention is clear, because, as we said, he was there explaining that testimony of John: “No one has ever seen God; the Only-Begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has made him known.” There, just as he ascribes comprehensive vision of God to the Only-Begotten alone, and consequently distinguishes him from Moses in this, that Moses had been the minister of the Law, as a servant, whereas Christ was the Author of grace, as the Only-Begotten, as we have already shown, so likewise he intends there that only Christ can answer, or tell forth anything about God's substance, as the Teacher and Author of this doctrine, and not the others.

31 Nevertheless, it must be added that things that are God's are known to no one according to their dignity except God himself, and thus cannot be told forth according to their dignity by anyone except him. Hence it is no wonder that, from the defect of this worthy telling-forth, which cannot be found in the angels, Chrysostom said that the angels cannot answer when asked about God's substance; no more than Paul, after the vision of the divine essence, asserted: “I heard secret words which it is not lawful for a man to utter,” because he could not tell them forth according to their dignity.

To the third proof, the answer is that Chrysostom did not say, as Vázquez maintains, that the angels see only something derived from the divine essence, as the text will show to one considering it closely. Even if he had said this, nothing would follow against St. Thomas. For the sense would be that they can comprehensibly attain only to something derived from God's essence, but not to the essence itself as it is in itself.

We admit, moreover, that those words taken from the vision of Isaiah, cap. 6, are Chrysostom's; yet in them he means only that the Seraphim do not comprehensibly see that wondrous light and pure substance of God, but in proportion to the light of glory, by which the intellect is not only strengthened but also accommodated to the object, insofar as, according to the measure and strength of the light, the divine essence is united as intelligible form with the intellects of the blessed, as will be evident from what is said below.

32 Chrysostom explained this very well, both in the words brought forward above in confirmation, namely: “He measures and tempers his own representation according to the strength of the beholder's sight,” and also by the term condescension. For the divine essence, considered under the aspect of form, is united in the highest degree of union and identification with the divine intellect, and consequently wholly, totally, and with reference to comprehension; but with the created intellect of the blessed it is united only in a lower degree, by condescension from that highest degree: for although it is wholly united to it, it is not nevertheless totally united. Likewise, although it is identified with it in intelligible being, as we shall say below, this identification is far less and infinitely deficient in comparison with the former; therefore, this mode of condescension removes comprehension, but not vision: for the divine essence, as it is in itself, is united to either intellect.

Hence the same Chrysostom, in that same book On the Incomprehensibility of God's Nature, hom. 4, expressly explains how this condescension removes only comprehensive knowledge of God, saying: “Since, therefore, he says that God, though condescending, was unable to sustain those powers, he teaches nothing except that his explicit, ample, and complete knowledge could not be received.” And he immediately adds: “Hence also the Evangelist knows more certainly that such a great thing is not concerned with human nature, and that God is not comprehensible even by the highest powers.” Here it is clear, as has been shown, that he teaches only that this condescension removes from the angels the knowledge that would be at once explicit, ample, and complete—that is, adequate to God, and thus extended in the order of knowledge as God is in the order of knowability; and therefore he added those final words: “That God is not comprehensible even by the highest powers.” By this, the confirmation is sufficiently clear.

33 Nor does the statement added at the close of the same confirmation stand in the way, namely, that the Prophets were deprived of the vision of the divine essence and nevertheless saw the aforesaid condescension, though more obscurely than the angels. For Chrysostom called that condescension and indulgence which is the degree of divine knowledge that God grants to each person, whether in this life, as to the Prophets and other human beings, or in the future life, as to the blessed: not because there is no vision of the divine essence in the blessed, as we have seen above from the same Chrysostom, or because it is equal in all, both blessed and unblessed; but because it is inferior to the knowledge adequate to the divine essence, which is comprehensive, and in both is limited according to God's good pleasure and indulgence, as from the first principle, and according to the nature of the light—whether dim or clear—which is conferred by God. Thus, although the same knowledge is obscure in the Prophets because the prophetic light is not indicative of God as he is in himself, it is not so in the blessed; even though in them too it falls short of that clarity which comprehensive knowledge of God seeks. Hence it is said to be obscure in some sense only by comparison with that clarity. Chrysostom indicates this obscurity, so to speak, when he said that the Prophets also saw the aforesaid condescension, but more obscurely than the angels.

Once the possibility of the beatific vision has been explained, and it has been shown that the Holy Fathers, filled with the light of faith, knew it, the mind is immediately prompted to inquire whether it can also be known clearly through the light of nature. Therefore, after the two preceding doubts, we rightly raise this one at once.

§ I. The first opinion is proposed.

34 The first opinion affirms that, by natural reason and wholly devoid of the light of faith, it can be clearly known that the possibility of seeing God clearly, as He is in Himself, is possible. In support of this, Gonzalez, in the present disputation, 24, section 2, cites certain theologians; Vazquez, 1, 2, disp. 20, cap. 2, defends it, although the author here limits this opinion for a time by saying that, although once the reasons demonstrating the possibility of the beatific vision have been investigated, the intellect, by the light of nature alone, can attain to their efficacy, it nevertheless needs the assistance of a greater light in order to investigate or discover them.

35 First, it is proved by the reason that we adduced above in the first doubt in support of our assertion, which, in order to recommend this opinion more effectively, can be put in the following form: It is clear by the natural light that the created intellect can, either by its own power or through God's elevation, know whatever is contained under its adequate object; therefore it will be clear that it can know God as He is in Himself. The antecedent is evident in all powers. For it is certain that sight can perceive, at least through divine elevation, everything visible, and hearing everything audible, and so of the other powers; therefore the same must be granted to the intellect, which is a higher power. The consequence is also evident, because it is clear that God, as He is in Himself, is formally being, and therefore is contained under the adequate object of the intellect, which, as is evident, is being as such.

This is confirmed. By the natural light it is evident that a perfection appropriate to a lower power can belong to a higher one, if both belong to the same genus; but it is evident by the natural light that sight and intellect belong to the genus of cognitive power, with the intellect being far nobler than sight. Therefore, since it is certain that the visual power can intuitively know, as they are in themselves, all things contained under its adequate object, it follows that the same must be granted to the intellectual power. The minor, with the consequence, seems to follow from itself. The major is also clear, because it is certain that the perfections of lower things are found in higher things in a more eminent manner; and thus to be vegetative and sensitive, which is found in the souls of lower brute animals, namely vegetative and sensitive, is found in a more excellent way in the rational [soul], because it is a higher and more eminent form.

36 Second, the created intellect, according to its nature, is capable, at least radically, of the vision of God by essence; but an angel comprehends the aforesaid intellect by the light of nature; therefore it will be evident to him that God, as He is in Himself, is visible to that same intellect. The consequence seems clear. For it is contradictory that a power should be comprehended by an intellect and that the objects to which it can extend should not be known by that intellect; therefore all the individual objects of divine power are known to God alone, because only His intellect can comprehend that all-powerfulness. The minor follows from itself, and is taught by theologians in common. The major also seems certain: first, because it is certain that the essence of the created intellect consists in a coaptation and essential commensuration with being as such, and with whatever being is contained under it, as we said in doubt 1; and again, because otherwise the intellect, by the light of glory, could not be elevated to see God as He is in Himself. Just as corporeal sight is not, even remotely and fundamentally, capable of the vision of God by essence, because it has no coaptation or essential commensuration with that vision, so it cannot be elevated to attain to it.

37 Third, the natural light clearly knows that it is credible by divine faith that the created intellect can see God as He is in Himself; therefore it will also be clearly true to it that such a vision is possible. The antecedent is S. Thomas, 2a 2ae, q. 1, a. 4, ad 2 and 3, whom theologians commonly follow, asserting that all the mysteries of our faith are clearly credible by divine faith. The consequence is proved because it is evident by the natural light that divine faith cannot incline to anything except truth; otherwise such an error would be refuted in God who revealed it. Therefore, if by the light of nature it is clearly certain that the possibility of a clear vision of God by the created intellect is contained under the object of divine faith, then it will also be clearly true with respect to that same light that such a possibility exists. Just as, if it is clearly true that something is contained in itself and directly under the object of sight, it will also be clear that it is colored and bright, or at least bright, because it is evident that sight cannot incline to anything in itself and directly except what is bright and colored, or at least bright.

38 This is confirmed. For this reasoning is the best: This is clearly impossible: therefore it is clearly incredible; therefore this too is legitimate: This is clearly credible: therefore it is clearly possible. The consequence is evident, because we argue from the opposite of the consequent to the opposite of the antecedent, which is a legitimate mode of argument. Therefore, if the natural light clearly knows it to be credible by divine faith that the created intellect can see God as He is in Himself, it will also be clearly certain to it that this is true.

Fourth, it is evident by the natural light that man has an innate appetite for the vision of God by essence; therefore it will also be evident that this vision is possible. The consequence is evident, because it is evident that an innate appetite can be satisfied; otherwise it would have been implanted by nature in vain. The antecedent is also evident, because it is evident that there is in man a natural appetite for his ultimate end and beatitude, since this inclination is found in all other things; therefore, since man's ultimate end and happiness consist in the clear vision of God, it is absolutely certain that he has a natural appetite for it.

This is confirmed. It is evident that the natural appetite of an intellectual creature rests in nothing outside God until it reaches the clear vision of God, as experience itself seems to attest; therefore God, when clearly seen, is not merely the ultimate end, but the natural ultimate end of that creature, and consequently it naturally desires him. This final consequence follows from itself. The first is also evident, because every natural thing rests when it has attained its natural end; therefore, if the rational creature rests in the clear vision of God and not in anything else, this will be a sign that such a vision is its natural end.

§ II. Resolution of the doubt according to the mind of St. Thomas.

39 In order to proceed more clearly, it must be presupposed that we can speak of the natural light in itself, taken precisely, or as assisted or excited by the light of faith or by divine revelation.

With this presupposed, it must be said first that the natural light in itself, taken precisely, cannot clearly know or demonstrate that the vision of God by essence is possible to the created intellect.

This assertion is openly derived from S. Thomas, 1a 2ae, q. 109, a. 1, whom Caiet., Zumel, Machin, and other Thomists follow in the present Sylvester, part 1, Conflatus, q. 12, a. 1; Medina, 1, 2, q. 5, a. 1; Martinez, ibid.; Alvarez, disp. 28; Suarez, disp. 30, Metaphys., sect. 11, and 1. tom. Summae Theolog., lib. 2, de attributis, cap. 7, and many others.

40 First, it is proved by the reason derived from the cited places of S. Thomas, which can be reduced to this form. The vision of God, as it is in itself, is supernatural according to its substance, as will be shown more fully below in art. 4; therefore its possibility cannot be demonstrated from the natural light alone, taken in itself and precisely. The consequence is evident, because, precisely insofar as it is a created supernatural action, it cannot be demonstrated from any source other than supernatural principles; but the natural light, taken in itself and precisely, proceeds only from natural principles.

This is first confirmed from the same Doctor. A demonstration of the possibility of some created thing made by the natural light, taken in itself, is either a priori, and thus proceeds from causes of the natural order, or a posteriori, and therefore from natural effects; but a supernatural created thing, according to its substance, has neither causes nor effects of the natural order; therefore its possibility cannot be demonstrated by the natural light alone. The consequence and major follow from themselves. The minor is also evident, because when the cause and effect of a thing must be proportionate, a supernatural thing must not, formally speaking, depend on natural causes, nor must its effects as such belong to the natural order.

Secondly, it is confirmed by the reason indicated by the same Doctor, 1a 2ae, q. 114, and 1 Cor. 2. For the possibility of the means by which the vision of God, as He is in Himself, is attained cannot be clearly demonstrated by the natural light alone; therefore neither can the possibility of that vision. The consequence is evident, because the possibility of an end cannot be demonstrated if the possibility of the means cannot be clearly known, since an end cannot be attained except through means. The antecedent is also evident, because the means for attaining the aforesaid vision, namely grace, faith, hope, charity, etc., are supernatural and thus exceed the reach of the natural light.

41 Nor does Vazquez's reply at the cited place weaken the force of this confirmation, namely, that it is enough for demonstrating the possibility of some end that it be demonstrated that some means, taken generally, are possible with regard to such an attainment; and for demonstrating these, the natural light would suffice.

This therefore does not weaken the force of the aforesaid confirmation; rather, a greater corroboration of it arises from it. For the entire reason why the possibility of the means specifically and determinately required for attaining the aforesaid vision cannot be demonstrated by the natural light, yet the possibility of those same means taken generally, without determining whether they are supernatural, cannot be other than this: that in the means taken in this last sense nothing of the supernatural appears, although it does appear in them when taken in the first sense; therefore, since the vision of God as He is in Himself expresses something supernatural, its possibility cannot be demonstrated by the natural light alone; just as, for the same supernatural character, the possibility of the means taken specifically and determinately cannot be demonstrated.

Add to this that, in order to demonstrate the possibility of a supernatural end, such as the beatific vision, one must demonstrate the possibility of means proportionate to that end, and therefore supernatural. Hence, although it is not necessary to descend to a determination of the aforesaid means, nevertheless, however generally they are taken, they must include the supernatural; otherwise they could not, even in this sense, be attained by the natural light alone, since, as we have often said, the natural light in itself, taken precisely, cannot clearly attain a created thing that is supernatural according to its substance as such.

42 Second, and principally, the assertion is proved by the reason indicated by St. Thomas in 1 Cor. 2. Because none of the ancient and most renowned philosophers, guided by the natural light alone and disputing about God, attained the knowledge that the created intellect can see God immediately and as He is in Himself; therefore there is a sign that this cannot be demonstrated by the natural light alone. The consequence is evident, because if it were demonstrable by the aforesaid light, there is no doubt that some one of them would have attained it, as they demonstrated many other things, and very difficult things, because they are knowable by the natural light.

43 Nor does Vazquez's solution avail, namely, that although the possibility of the vision of God by essence is demonstrable by the natural light alone, the demonstrations serving this purpose cannot be investigated by natural philosophers through the aforesaid light; because, so that the created intellect may not err about many natural things, it needs to be assisted by the light of faith, and therefore it cannot discover them without that light, although once discovered, their efficacy will exercise force upon the intellect assisted by the natural light alone and move it to assent.

Thus, this does not avail. Because contradictions seem to be involved in this solution. For if the aforesaid demonstrations cannot be investigated by the natural light alone, they cannot be achieved by it when taken precisely; and then, if their efficacy does not exceed that light, there is no reason why they could not be investigated by it. Above all, the reason which seems to this author unjustly to be a demonstration, namely, that the created intellect has a natural appetite for its beatitude, and consequently for the vision of God, and that this appetite can be satisfied so that it is not frustrated, is not so difficult that no created intellect could investigate it, when many other demonstrations, far more difficult, were discovered by Aristotle and Plato to show other natural truths.

44 It must be said second that the created intellect, not in itself and taken precisely, but as assisted or excited by the light of faith, can show by theological demonstration, probable reasons, or other conjectures, the possibility of the vision of God by essence. This assertion is openly derived from what is taught by St. Thomas below, q. 27, a. 2, and q. 32, a. 1, and in 3 part., q. 1, a. 1, and is commonly received by the authors cited for the preceding assertion.

It nevertheless requires explanation. For the created intellect can use the light of faith in two ways: either so that, from revealed principles and from others known by the natural light, it deduces some conclusion; or so that it is excited by the light of faith to use natural, but not revealed, principles in order to reach some conclusion. We therefore say that the created intellect, assisted in the first way by the light of faith, can show by theological demonstration the possibility of the vision of God by essence; but when excited in the second way, it can do so only probabilistically, and by certain fitting considerations persuade us of it.

45 The assertion, thus explained, is proved as regards its first part. For from this revealed principle: Men or angels are elevated to the supernatural order by grace and charity, which are participations and effects of God as He is in Himself; and from another principle known by the natural light, namely, that once the effect is known, there is a natural desire to know its cause as far as it is the cause, it is effectively inferred that there is in elevated men or angels a natural desire to see their cause, namely God, as He is in Himself. For in this respect God is the cause of the aforesaid effects, grace and charity; and therefore from this it is also inferred that it is possible that such a vision exist, because a natural appetite, so that it not be frustrated, cannot tend toward the impossible.

46 As regards the second part, the same assertion is urged as follows: just as natural reason excited by the light of faith can discover reasons and conjectures by which it may prove in some way that the mystery of the Incarnation, or of the procession of the Word, is not discordant with natural reason, but agrees with it in its own way, as is usually shown in its proper materials; so, excited by the same light, it can also use probable reasons to prove that the possibility of the vision of God by essence is not discordant with the natures of things, as is established by the reasons adduced in doubt 1 in support of our assertion. Although these do not effectively convince, as will be clear from what has been said and from what remains to be said in this doubt, that the created intellect can see God as He is in Himself, nevertheless, with this possibility presupposed from faith, these considerations show in some way that the aforesaid vision of God, as He is in Himself, is not repugnant to the nature of the created intellect, but agrees with it in its own way, especially if the solutions of the arguments opposing the possibility of this mystery are added, which we shall immediately append.

§ III. The foundations of the first opinion are met.

47 To the first, therefore, it must be answered that both it and the other arguments prove our second assertion as regards its final part, if they are applied in the due manner. But insofar as they oppose the first assertion, it must be said in answer to the first that it is not evident by the natural light that the adequate object of the intellect is being as such, abstracted from natural and supernatural being. Hence, anyone who asserted that its object is only natural being could not be clearly convinced of falsity from the force of the natural light.

Add that, although we freely granted that it is evident that the object of the intellect is being according to the common meaning of its analogy, nevertheless it could not be clearly concluded from that by the natural light that God can be seen in the most perfect way, and therefore quidditatively and as He is in Himself; because it would suffice that He be knowable in a more imperfect way, as will be more fully shown in the answer to the second.

48 To the confirmation it is answered that it is not universally true that a perfection appropriate to a lower thing must be found in a higher and more eminent thing, even if both belong to the same genus. Hence, although man and heaven belong to the genus of body, incorruptibility appropriate to heaven must not thereby be found in man, who is a higher thing. Likewise, although corporeal vision includes evidentness, which is a great perfection of cognition, it does not follow that the act of faith, contained under the genus of cognition, must have the same evidentness; indeed, it is rather opposed to it. And surely, if the argument proved what was intended, it would also conclude that the created intellect can see God as He is by its own powers; because there can be a sight, namely corporeal sight, able by its own powers to attain its whole object. Therefore, since this concerns its perfection, the intellect too could attain its whole object by its own powers, and as it is in itself, if it were once true that a perfection appropriate to a lower power with respect to its own object must be found in a higher one with respect to its own object.

49 The reason why we philosophize differently about sight and intellect here is that, since sight is a lower, material, and sufficiently imperfect power, it need not have an object belonging to a higher and exceeding order. The intellect, however, is not only more eminent than sight, but is also intrinsically most noble, tending toward being according to the common meaning of its analogy; and thus an object of a higher reason can be contained under its adequate object, and consequently exceeds its natural efficacy. It therefore does not belong to the proportionate and connatural object, but to the extensive object of the intellect. Yet it does not follow that the aforesaid object can be clearly known, in a particular way, as contained under the extensive object of the intellect by the natural light alone; because just as the natural light of that intellect cannot reach it by its own powers, since it transcends the entire natural order, so it is not evident that, when taken in that sense, it is contained under its adequate object, although in reality it is contained under it.

50 To the second it is answered first that, if it is true that in the created intellect there is a distinction between a twofold power, one natural, so that the intellect itself is essentially a natural power, and another obediential, belonging to the supernatural order, as we said above in no. 12 of this disputation, then the aforesaid intellect will not be capable of attaining the vision of God by essence through the former power, but through this latter power. Therefore, from the fact that an angel comprehends that same intellect, it does not follow that he will know the possibility of the beatific vision, because he comprehends only the natural power, which does not extend to that vision, and not the obediential power formally considered, by virtue of which it is capable of attaining the aforesaid vision.

51 Secondly, it is answered (indeed consequently with regard to what we said in no. 13) by granting the major and minor and denying the consequence. In answer to the proof, it must be said that it is true of objects connatural to a power, but not of those with respect to which it has precisely capacity and essential commensuration. For although an intellect comprehending a power must know, both the specific object of that power according to the reason expressed by it, according to which it specifies, and thus in a more explanatory way, and also what the connatural objects are in particular to which it can extend, it still need not know what are the disproportionate and exceeding objects in particular to which it can be elevated supernaturally.

Thus, although the intellect is comprehended by an angel according to its essence, it does not follow that by the force of that comprehension its capacity for the clear vision of God, which is something exceeding, is clearly known; but only that it is known both what the connatural objects are in particular to which the aforesaid intellect can extend, or with respect to which intelligible species are connaturally due to it, and by which they are known, and also that the aforesaid intellect is of such a nature that it looks to its specific object, namely being as such, without determining expressly whether it is natural or supernatural, or whether inferior things belong to the natural or supernatural order, and consequently whether there is something common with respect to natural or supernatural beings as such. Although in reality all these things are contained under it, therefore, by the force of the cognition of this object, it cannot be known whether supernatural beings are possible when taken in particular, or whether they are comprehended under its object.

52 This can also be explained by the example of the same angelic intellect when compared with other possible creatures of the natural order and tending toward another universal. For although the aforesaid creatures are comprehended under its object, the aforesaid intellect, comprehending itself, does not attain such creatures in particular; because they do not belong to its connatural object, or to the object with respect to which intelligible species are due to them, as is usually said in the treatise on angels, and as we shall explain there, God granting it.

This is sufficient against what is urged from omnipotence in this argument. Because all possible creatures, taken individually, are not disproportionate and exceeding objects with respect to it; and therefore they cannot be comprehensively attained unless all of them are also attained in particular.

53 Nor does it matter if one argues that, in order for knowledge to be comprehensive, it must extend just as the known object extends, as will be evident from what we shall say in art. 7, but that the intellect according to its essence extends even to supernatural objects in particular, namely to the vision of God by essence; therefore comprehensive knowledge, precisely as such, must extend to the vision of the divine essence, attaining what the aforesaid intellect, when comprehended, is capable of seeing, namely the divine essence.

It is answered, indeed, by granting the major in the formal sense, that is, concerning the known object according to that precise reason under which it falls under comprehension, and denying the minor concerning the intellect, insofar as it falls under comprehension by an angel, but otherwise insofar as it does not fall under it. Then the consequence must be denied.

This is explained. The intellect according to its essence can be considered either by being compared with its specific object according to the reason that it expressly and most formally states in the idea of the specific object, or with it according to everything that it implicitly and materially includes, or with the connatural object proportionate to the quantity of its power, or finally by being compared with its exceeding object. Therefore, although the intellect according to its essence is comprehended by angelic cognition insofar as it is compared with its specific object, taken in the first manner, or with its proportionate object, it is not comprehended insofar as it is compared with its exceeding object, or with the specific object according to everything that it implicitly and materially includes. Thus it is not necessary that by the force of that comprehension it be known that the aforesaid intellect can extend to the clear vision of God, which is a disproportionate and exceeding object with respect to it.

54 Nor does it follow that, absolutely and simply speaking, the aforesaid intellect is not comprehended by natural comprehension through that angelic cognition; for in order absolutely and simply to comprehend the essence of a power, it is not necessary except to comprehend it as compared with its proportionate and specific object, taken in the manner already stated. For the aforementioned comprehension does not in any way require comprehensiveness of an obediential power, as theologians commonly teach; whether it is supernatural according to substance, as we said in the first solution of this argument, or is not supernatural according to substance but is purely obediential, as happens according to this mode of speaking. Consequently, it will not be necessary to comprehend the aforesaid essence insofar as it reduplicatively and formally connotes or covertly brings in its obediential power with respect to the supernatural object, and therefore it will not be necessary to comprehend it insofar as it is compared in particular with its exceeding object (since according to its obediential power it must be compared in that way), or insofar as it is compared with its specific object according to everything that it materially and implicitly connotes. For in this sense it is said that the aforesaid essence, insofar as it reduplicatively and formally connotes, covertly includes its obediential power with respect to the supernatural object.

55 To the third it is answered that, although it is not metaphysically evident that the mysteries of our faith, with respect to the thing itself, have all the conditions required in order that they be believed by divine, that is, supernatural, faith, because, on the side of the thing believed, what falls under that faith must be true in itself, and so, since the argument concludes well, it would clearly be known that they are true if it were evident in the said manner that they fall under divine faith, nevertheless it is metaphysically evident with respect to prudent and right reason that, namely, although it is not evident that the thing itself has the aforesaid conditions, it is nevertheless evident that it is prudently judged to have them. From this, however, it does not follow that it is evident that they are such as faith teaches, but only that it is prudently judged that they are so. Hence, notwithstanding that judgment, they could, so far as this head is concerned, be false and impossible, as will be more fully explained in the answer to the confirmation; and thus their possibility cannot be clearly inferred from it.

56 To the confirmation it is answered by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. In answer to the proof, it should be noted that there the argument is not from the opposite of the consequent to the opposite of the antecedent, since both propositions are affirmative; but it should be inferred as follows: This is not clearly incredible: therefore it is not clearly impossible. From this, however, nothing follows against us, because the conclusion is at most that the possibility of the mystery is clearly negative, not positive; that is, it is not proved that such a mystery is impossible, nor is it positively proved that it is possible.

This confirmation can also plainly be pressed by an analogy. Just as, from the fact that something is clearly impossible, and therefore clearly unthinkable, it is not well inferred that if it is clearly thinkable, it will be clearly possible, because from the fact that it is evident that something can be held opinatively and probably, it does not follow that it is evident that it is true; so the reasoning used in this confirmation will likewise have no force, as will be evident to the one considering it.

And surely the reason in both cases is the same: namely, that the evidentness of the probability and credibility of a thing in the sense meant is not taken from the fact that the thing is or is not, since many false things are more probable than true things; but from other extrinsic causes, namely, the testimonies of the Doctors, or signs, or other reasons and conjectures. These can coexist with the falsity of the same thing, and nevertheless clearly persuade us that it has all the conditions required in order that it be prudently judged worthy of belief. This is evident in the case of a rustic, to whom the common consensus of the Doctors proposed as certain by faith that Christ is present under the form of this host. Then it would be evident that the rustic would prudently judge, if he thought, that it was worthy of belief by divine faith, even though in reality it were not so.

The last point will become clear in the following doubt.

57 So that the title may remain more familiar, it should be noted, following St. Thomas, I part., q. 19, a. 1 and 9, q. 59, a. 1, and q. 80, a. 1, that the appetite is twofold: one innate, or natural, and the other elicited. The first is the inclination, or propensity, implanted by the author of nature, by which each thing, without any knowledge, is inclined toward its own good, as heavy things are inclined toward the center and light things toward the place above. This appetite, however, does not constitute a special kind of power, distinct from substantial or accidental nature, to which it belongs; rather, it is the weight of that thing toward its own perfection. The elicited appetite, on the other hand, which properly has the character of an appetite, is the act of appeting, by which a thing is borne toward a known good under the aspect of good. Thus, it proceeds from a certain special power, namely, a sensitive or rational appetite. The former is borne toward a sensible good, and the latter toward a good as such. At present, however, we are speaking only of the first appetite, not of the latter; for we shall treat of the latter more clearly and distinctly in the following difficulty.

§ I. The Position of Scotus and Others.

58 The first opinion affirms that there is in intellectual nature an innate appetite, in the manner of nature’s weight, for the vision of God as He is in Himself, Triune and One. Thus Scotus, in 1, q. 1, prol., and in 4, d. 49, q. 10; Durandus, at the same place, q. 8; Paludanus, q. 47; Soto, q. 2, a. 1, and lib. 1 On Nature and Grace, ch. 4; Valentia, 1a 2ae, q. 5, a. 8, d. 1, point 1.

The principal foundations of this opinion can be reduced to two. The first is that which occasioned the present difficulty. The second is as follows. Because God, as He is in Himself Triune and One, belongs to the specific object of the intellect; therefore, the intellect is naturally inclined to see Him when considered under this aspect. The conclusion is evident. For every power is naturally inclined toward its specific object, and toward whatever pertains to it, just as it is inclined toward that from which it has its entire being and its specification.

59 Nor does it matter if one says that God, as He is in Himself, is contained within the specific object of the intellect as something exceeding and disproportionate to it; and thus that the intellect has no innate appetite toward Him when thus considered. For against this it may be said that the same objective reason according to species that is found in other beings is also found in God as He is in Himself when described in the present way; therefore, just as the intellect is naturally inclined to know other objects, so is it naturally inclined to attain to God under the reason described above. The antecedent is proved. Because the same objective reason according to species must be found in all objects not proportionate to any one power; otherwise, it would not be one according to species. The conclusion, too, is evident. For the entire reason for its natural inclination toward other objects is that the same reason is formally and specifically found in them, just as sight is naturally inclined toward its objects because its own proper objective reason, namely visibility, is found in them.

It is confirmed. For the material reason is related materially and accidentally to the formal and objective reason; therefore, if the same formal objective reason is found once in God as He is in Himself Triune and One and in other objects, it follows either that the intellect is not naturally inclined toward the others, or that it is naturally inclined toward God under both reasons.

§ II. The Knot of the Difficulty Is Untied from the Doctrine of St. Thomas.

60 Nevertheless, it must be said that the innate appetite just described, taken in the created intellectual being as a weight or inclination of nature, does not exist without some prior knowledge ordered to God that is clear and quidditative—whether of God as Triune and One, or merely as One—and with respect to those predicates that pertain to the notion of the first cause. This assertion is plainly drawn from St. Thomas in this article, and q. 23, a. 1, q. 62, a. 1 and 2, 1a 2ae, q. 114, a. 2, On Truth, q. 22, a. 7, and finally in 4, d. 49, q. 1, a. 3, q. unc. 3, in these words: Although, however, the will may have from its natural inclination a tendency toward blessedness according to the common notion, nevertheless, the fact that it tends to this or that blessedness does not come from natural inclination, but through the discernment of reason, which discovers that man’s highest good consists in this or that blessedness. And so in the present case they follow the Holy Doctor, as do Cajetan, Báñez, Zumel, Nazarius, and Molina; Álvarez, 1a 2ae, d. 26; Martínez, q. 3, a. 8, dub. 1; and very many others.

61 It is proved by an argument taken from the same Saintly Doctor at the places cited. Because, as is evident from those same places, God seen clearly, whether as Triune and One or as One, and as the first cause, is a supernatural object, one that exceeds and is disproportionate to the created intellectual being; therefore, there is not in that being an innate appetite, in the manner of a weight and inclination of nature, ordered toward Him thus considered. The antecedent will be evident from what we shall say in articles 4 and 5. For, as will there be evident, God as He is in Himself cannot be seen clearly and intuitively even with respect to the notion of the first cause, apart from the light of glory and the union of the divine essence in the aspect of the intelligible species with the intellect. Since these things are therefore above its nature—because neither the light of glory nor the union of the divine essence in the aspect of the intelligible species can be connatural to any created or creatable intellect—it follows that the vision of the divine essence as it is in Himself, whether under both reasons or as the first cause, is an object exceeding, disproportionate, and supernatural with respect to created intellectual nature. The conclusion, too, is evident. For a natural appetite in the manner of a weight of nature exists only toward a connatural and proportionate good, as is evident by induction from the other appetites and natural inclinations; and therefore a heavy body is inclined in this manner toward the center, and a light body toward the place above, because these are goods proportionate and connatural to it.

62 It is confirmed, first. Because the natural inclination in the manner of a weight of nature of which we are speaking was implanted by God precisely as the author of nature; therefore, it cannot extend to God Himself, insofar as He is in Himself and transcends the entire order of that nature, and consequently neither to Him as He is clearly visible in Himself, whether as Triune and One or as One. The antecedent is evident of itself. Both conclusions, too, are evident. Because an inclination cannot extend beyond that toward which its own principle extends; therefore, if it is from God as the author of nature, it will not have the power to transcend this entire order and belong to the supernatural order, within which God is contained as He is clearly and visibly in Himself, whether as Triune and One or as One and the first cause.

It is confirmed, second, by the argument indicated by St. Thomas, 1a 2ae, q. 114, a. 2. For whenever the aforesaid innate appetite in the manner of a weight and inclination of nature toward some end is given, instruments and powers within the order of nature are also given for attaining that end. But in the created intellectual being there are not given instruments and powers within the aforesaid order by which it could attain to a clear vision of God; rather, these are bestowed upon it gratuitously by God, the supernatural author. Therefore, there will not be in it an innate appetite for the vision of God. The consequence seems evident. The minor premise is certain. The major premise, too, is evident. Because otherwise that appetite and natural weight would be frustrate, since it could not be fulfilled by the powers of nature, which alone it regards. Hence Aristotle proves from this, in 2 On the Heavens, text 50, that the stars are not naturally inclined to progressive motion; because otherwise the author of nature would have given them instruments for that motion, which ought to proceed from them, so that their inclination would not be frustrate.

63 Scotus objects that it is enough for the clear vision of God to be the ultimate end of the created intellectual being, because every nature naturally tends toward its ultimate end. Then, by way of a fuller solution confirming the second argument, he adds that an innate appetite is often given for a form that nevertheless cannot be attained by the powers of nature. This is evident in the separated soul, which, although it naturally desires union with the body—as St. Thomas seems to teach in 1 part., q. 76, a. 1, ad 6—is not nevertheless given in nature instruments and powers for reuniting with it. Likewise, in a person who has an innate appetite to live according to right reason, and also to the effect that he may never sin, and thus may never deviate from right reason, there is need of special assistance from grace.

But against this: the fact that something is the ultimate end with respect to some nature does not prevent it from being disproportionate and exceeding, as is evident in itself and in the vision of God by essence with respect to the created intellectual being; therefore, in that case, nature will not have an innate appetite ordered toward the aforesaid end, even though it is ultimate. The conclusion is evident. Because the weight of nature is directed only toward the ultimate natural end, not toward an ultimate end that is disproportionate, exceeding, and supernatural. For just as such an end is above nature, so nature itself is not connaturally inclined toward it except through something that exceeds that same nature—and especially because an inclination in the manner of a weight of nature is founded on a natural sympathy and affinity between appetite and the thing sought, as can be established by induction. Therefore, since there is no natural sympathy, affinity, or proximity between a thing of the order of nature as such and a supernatural form, there will likewise be no natural inclination or weight of one toward the other.

64 Furthermore, because the fact that some end is ultimate does not prevent it from being, if it is disproportionate and supernatural, only an obediential power in nature ordered toward it. But the appetite and weight of nature do not signify merely obediential power, but natural, or connatural, power—or at least a passive power distinct from obediential power, whether the latter is formally supernatural or not; therefore, such an end, however ultimate, would not be sought by an innate appetite. The major premise is evident both from what has been said and from the following: otherwise, beyond the aforesaid obediential power there would be in nature a power—at least passive, natural, or connatural with respect to that supernatural end—and consequently that supernatural end, for example, a clear vision of God, would be naturally attainable, since every passive power that is natural in the way just described has corresponding to it an active power that is either natural or ought to act according to the debt of nature in such a way that the passive power can be naturally reduced to act.

The minor premise, too, is evident. First, because the appetite, so to speak, in the manner of desire and the weight of nature of which we are speaking here is with respect to a due form, and therefore signifies its privation, not merely its negation; whereas obediential power alone is not with respect to a due form, and so, although it lacks that form, it is not properly and strictly said to be deprived of the aforesaid form. Second, because otherwise there would be in every created substance a natural appetite for hypostatic union, to which it has obediential power; and thus it would remain in a violent state until it was hypostatically united with God.

65 From this, too, it is sufficiently clear how much falsity is contained in what Scotus adds by way of fuller solution confirming the second argument, namely, that a form is not naturally attainable merely because an innate appetite and weight toward it exist in nature. For besides the fact that this has already been refuted by what has been said, its falsity can further be inferred from the fact that philosophers inferred from it that the rational soul, for example Socrates along with his matter, was connaturally capable of being united in the first production of that soul, because the same matter contained a natural weight and inclination toward such union. And from this Aristotle proves, in 3 On the Soul, ch. 5, that an agent intellect is given because a possible intellect is given; for since the latter is a passive power, there must also be given an agent of the same order, which naturally reduces it to act.

And this doctrine is very consonant with the mind of St. Thomas, 1a 2ae, q. 114, in the article cited, where he teaches that eternal life exceeds the proportion of created nature, as does its knowledge and desire, and therefore that no creature is a sufficient principle for meriting and attaining it unless the gift of grace is given to it. There, from the defect of natural inclination, or weight and desire of nature, he proves the defect of attaining it through merit achieved by one’s own natural powers, judging these two things to be inseparable, namely, naturally to desire an end and naturally to be able to attain it.

66 Nor do the examples brought forward by Scotus support his view. For the natural inclination that is in the soul toward union with matter, since matter is the true part of a human being, is sufficiently grounded in the fact that in due time that union was naturally reducible to act; yet it is not necessary that this be possible at every time and in every state. Hence, although the soul absolutely and in itself, considered from the principles of nature and setting aside the state and time of separation after the first union, is naturally inclined toward its union, it is not so in the composite sense and under the supposition of the aforesaid state of separation. For it has no cause of its own that could naturally reduce that inclination to act, and therefore that inclination is called natural only on the part of the terminus taken materially and secundum quid, not absolutely and simpliciter for the reason stated, as the Complutensian College noted in 1 Physics, d. 3, d. 3, no. 92 and 93. Nor does St. Thomas intend anything else at the cited place, in 1 part., q. 76, a. 1, ad 6.

Likewise, from the fact that there is in a human being a natural inclination to live according to reason, it does not follow that the powers of nature can fulfill all the precepts; because such an inclination is not toward living conformably to reason in all things collectively, but only distributively, as is usually explained in 1a 2ae, q. 109.

Granting, however, that there is in a human being a natural appetite to live in all things according to right reason, it would then have to be said that for the natural appetite at least what is required is that it can be fulfilled by powers belonging to the order of nature, in the manner in which the aforesaid appetite could be fulfilled; since for living in all things according to what the natural reason directly prescribes, special aids belonging to the order of nature would be enough. But to satisfy the innate appetite for the vision of God as He is in Himself, aids of nature’s order, however special and gratuitous, are not sufficient; rather, gratuitous powers belonging to the supernatural order are required, as has been proved.

§ III. Scotus’s Argument Is Satisfied.

67 To the first point, therefore, which we left unresolved in difficulty 3 and which we also adduced in no. 36 of that same difficulty, the answer is given that the innate appetite is not with respect to any ultimate end whatever, or any perfection whatever, but with respect to the ultimate natural end, which is not the vision of God as He is in Himself with respect to the created intellectual being considered in itself. We said considered in itself, because, when elevated by grace and charity—with respect to which ratio we are not speaking here—it is connaturally inclined toward the aforesaid vision.

In answer to the confirmation recently adduced under the same number, it must be said that the innate appetite of the created intellectual being considered in itself rests in abstractive and perfect knowledge of God, which is known from creatures of the natural order, because in this knowledge its connatural blessedness consists, as is usually explained in 1a 2ae. The appetite of that same being, however, when elevated, rests only in God clearly seen. Nor is it incongruous that a creature which, considered according to its diverse aspects, can have a twofold ultimate end and a twofold blessedness, cannot in every respect and in every order rest in either of them, namely, in the lower one, which does not eminently possess those things that belong to the higher order, as it seems to be evident of itself.

We said that it cannot rest in either of them, namely, in the lower one, because it can and must have rest in the higher ultimate end; for that end contains, in the most eminent manner, every perfection of the natural end itself. Nor does it follow from this that the aforesaid supernatural end is naturally sought by the created intellectual being considered in itself. For what now, when thus described, satisfies the natural appetite need not be naturally sought, as is evident in the humanity of Our Lord Christ, whose natural appetite for His own subsistence is satisfied by the subsistence of the Word, and yet it is not sought by an innate appetite from that humanity.

68 To the second point a satisfactory answer is given in the same place. For the proof, however, it must be said that the innate appetite of a created intellect ordered toward some object is not taken from the reason under which it is taken precisely, because this is formally and univocally the same in all objects of the intellect insofar as they concur in its specification, and it abstracts from what is natural and supernatural; rather, it is taken from the formal reason which, not any such reason whatever, but a proportionate and non-exceeding one. God, however, insofar as He is clearly visible, has a formal reason which that is disproportionate and supernatural, as has been shown.

69 Nor is it an obstacle that the same proof adds that every power has an innate inclination toward its specific object and toward whatever pertains to it. For whenever specification, and consequently the objective reason, abstracts from what is natural and supernatural—as happens in the intellect (provided that the first difficulty of this article has first been explained)—then the power is not naturally inclined toward its specific object precisely as such, but insofar as the reason of a proportionate object is supervening. Thus, the intellect will be naturally inclined toward the intelligible, without thereby explaining or determining whether the intelligible is comprehended under it as something supernatural, taken in itself and in particular. For the intelligible, taken in this way, supervenes the reason of a proportionate object, just as the aforesaid intellect is also naturally inclined toward other proportionate intelligibles, but not toward intelligibles exceeding it when considered in particular, whether by determining what the intelligible, as such, that is the object of a created intellect, contains in itself under those things taken in particular.

Add, that if what we said in no. 12 is true, namely, that the intellect consists essentially of a twofold formally distinct power, one natural and the other obediential, the latter being formally supernatural, then only natural things will belong to the object of the intellect insofar as it is a natural power. Therefore, there will in no way be formally one and the same objective reason found in God, insofar as He is clearly visible, and in other natural beings, and consequently the argument will establish nothing.

The confirmation is evident from what has been said, namely, how the formal reason which, when proportionate, is not accidentally related to the reason of a natural appetite, but is indispensably required for it.

70 So that every difficulty that could arise concerning the appetite for the vision of God may remain completely resolved, we therefore raise the present question. For, as we said above, the adequate appetite is divided into an innate appetite and an elicited appetite.

§ I. Some things are preliminarily explained for understanding the title.

So that the title of this question may become clearer, it should be noted that, with respect to the elicited appetite, as at present considered, there are two kinds: one is efficacious and absolute, while the other is inefficacious and conditional. Through the former we desire perfectly, absolutely, and efficaciously what is good; and therefore that act, insofar as it is such by itself, brings about, or effects, the execution and attainment of the desired thing. Through the latter, however, the thing is desired only imperfectly, conditionally, and inefficaciously; and thus it does not execute the good appetite. Hence the former is explained by ly volo, or appeto; the latter, however (provided that it is understood in another way), by ly vellem, or appeterem; and accordingly, although the latter can be directed toward an impossible thing, because impossibilities can be desired conditionally and inefficaciously, as when one says, I would have infinite riches if they were possible; the former, however, cannot be so directed. For as an impossible thing cannot be commanded into execution, so neither can it be desired by an efficacious and executive appetite.

Each appetite, however, can be called natural in two ways: either insofar as “natural” is distinguished from “supernatural” and denotes the act of desiring habituated by the powers of nature; or insofar as “natural” is distinguished from “free” and signifies an appetite that is necessary in some sense. For what is necessary has the mode of being of nature, namely, a determination toward one thing; and therefore it is rightly called natural.

71 Moreover, because the act of desiring is called free in two ways: first, with respect to both its exercise and its specification, insofar as it can be exercised or not exercised with regard to a proposed good (in which freedom consists with respect to the exercise of the act), but also, even when it is assumed to be exercised, it need not be of this species, for example of love, but can be of hatred (which is what it means to be free with respect to both specification and exercise); secondly, however, with respect to exercise alone, insofar as we can exercise or not exercise the act, provided that when we do exercise it, it must be, for example, of love. Hence an elicited natural appetite, insofar as it is distinguished from a free one, and thus is something necessary, may itself also be twofold. One is natural, or necessary, with respect to both specification and exercise, as are all the appetites of brute animals with respect to the object apprehended under the aspect of something harmful or suitable. For the sheep mentioned above necessarily loves the lamb it has begotten and the pasture offered to it, and so forth. The other, however, is necessary with respect to specification alone, as is the act of desiring beatitude in the common sense: for although we can abstain from the act or not abstain from it, if we do break forth into it, it must be of this species, namely of love, and not of another.

72 Finally, it should be noted that, just as these appetites have the multiplicity of distinctions already described, so God himself, considered quidditatively and through his essence, can be considered in many ways: namely, either according to those essential predicates by which he is known otherwise from creatures of the natural order, or according to those predicates that belong to him insofar as he is Trinity in himself and the author of grace.

The title of the question concerning the aforesaid appetites, and concerning God considered according to the reasons enumerated, must therefore be understood as follows: whether, with respect to God himself as existing through his essence and clearly visible, or according to what he is as Trinity in himself and author of grace, or at least according to what he is as one and with respect to the predicates that are required for the reason of the first cause of natural things, there exists in the intellectual creature considered by itself an efficacious or inefficacious elicited appetite which, in one of the ways described, is natural.

§ II. Two opinions are referred to.

73 The first opinion denies the elicited and efficacious appetite; nevertheless it admits at least a conditional and inefficacious appetite which is natural, or necessary with respect to specification, with respect to God as clearly visible, both as one and as Trinity, and thus both as author of nature and as author of grace. Thus Vazquez, 1a 2ae, q. 5, art. 8, disp. 22; Pesantius in the present article; Suarez, lib. 2 de attributis Dei, ch. 7, no. 10 and 11, and in part Valentia in the place cited from 1a 2ae; Montesin., 1a 2ae, q. 5, art. 8, disp. 7, q. 3, as well as others among the later theologians. They prove this, first, from Augustine, lib. 4, contra Julian., ch. 3 and 13; De Trin., ch. 8, asserting that all by natural instinct wish to be blessed, where he seems to be speaking of our beatitude in particular, as is clear from the context. Then also from St. Thomas in the present passage, where the desire to see God through his essence, and therefore according to all that is formally and intrinsically in him, is called natural, because it is necessary with respect to the specification of the act, as seems clear from the context.

74 Second. For in God seen through his essence, as he is Trinity in himself and one, no reason for evil appears, but rather the highest and altogether complete reason for good. Therefore, insofar as he is thus considered by himself, and insofar as the labor of the means through which he must be reached is set aside, there will appear no reason on account of which he could be rejected; and consequently the desire to see him in this way will be necessary with respect to specification. The antecedent and this final consequence are clear in themselves. The first, however, is also evident: because what is good as such cannot be hated. Therefore, for something to be rejected, some reason of evil must shine in it,

It is confirmed and explained. For beatitude in the common sense is necessarily loved with necessity with respect to specification; therefore our beatitude in particular, which is the vision of God as Trinity and as one, is also necessarily loved. The antecedent is generally accepted by theologians. The consequence, moreover, is also clear. For beatitude in the common sense is necessarily loved because it is, and is truly conceived as, our highest perfection; therefore, since the vision of God through his essence, which we now suppose, is also this beatitude and the eminent beatitude of the intellectual creature, it follows that it too is necessarily loved.

75 The second opinion agrees with the preceding opinion in this: that there is not in the intellectual creature an elicited and efficacious appetite for seeing God clearly; but only an inefficacious and conditional appetite. It adds, however, that this appetite is natural, or necessary with respect to specification, with respect to the clear vision of God, not according to what God is in himself as Trinity and author of grace, but precisely with respect to the reason of the first cause of natural things and with respect to the predicates that are known from creatures. Thus Ferrara, 3 cont. Gent., ch. 50.

The principal foundation of this opinion, however, is taken from what we said above from the same holy Doctor concerning doubt 1, namely, that it is natural, or necessary, for man or an angel, having seen an effect, to desire to see the cause quidditatively, insofar as the predicates that belong to the reason of a cause as such and are gathered from the aforesaid effects; but not insofar as other predicates are concerned. Therefore, having seen God's effects, there will be in us a natural, or necessary, desire to see God himself quidditatively, precisely and formally insofar as he is the first cause. The consequence does not seem to require proof. The antecedent, however, is also established insofar as the first part is concerned. Then, because the knowledge of a cause as to what it is is the complement and perfect consummation of the intellect, insofar as the cause is known by someone from its effects, and only insofar as it knows whether it exists, it follows that an intellect knowing the cause in this way cannot reject it or hate it. For the imperfect necessarily desires its full consummation. Then also: because nothing appears more connatural to close upon in the natural and necessary desire to know in the common sense, which every intellectual creature possesses, than the desire to see the cause after seeing the effect, and thus each of the two desires will be necessary. As for the latter point, the same antecedent is clear. For when this desire is excited from knowledge of the effect as such, it will be directed toward the cause only insofar as the cause is formally taken as such, and therefore not insofar as the predicates that are otherwise materially found in it are concerned.

76 Nor will it be enough to say that the vision of God, insofar as he is in himself the first cause, is not separable from the vision of God as Trinity and as author of grace. Hence, if it cannot be naturally desired once according to this latter reason, neither will it be possible according to the former reason: just as if it cannot be attained once according to one reason, neither will it be possible according to another.

For against this it is said that the intellect on its way can naturally apprehend God as author of nature without apprehending him as author of grace. Therefore the will will be able to desire, by an elicited appetite, to see God through his essence according to the former reason, without desiring to see him intuitively according to the latter reason; therefore such a desire will be natural, or necessary with respect to specification, in relation to the intellect insofar as it knows God from his effects. This final consequence is clear from what has been said, while the first and the antecedent seem to be clear in themselves.

It is confirmed. For the fact that an intellectual creature naturally desires beatitude in the common sense by an elicited appetite, and not beatitude in the particular sense insofar as this consists in the clear vision of God as he is in himself, is sufficiently established when these two are separable by our concepts. Therefore, in order that the same natural appetite, or appetite necessary with respect to specification, should desire the vision of God through his essence as author of nature, and not the vision of God as author of grace, it is enough that these aforesaid visions are separable in the same way.

§ III. The question is decided according to the mind of St. Thomas.

77 Nevertheless, it must first be said that no elicited and efficacious appetite for the clear vision of God, insofar as he is in himself—whether he is Trinity and one and author of grace, or is one only and author of nature, and insofar as the predicates that are otherwise known from natural effects are concerned—can be given by the powers of nature. The inefficient appetite, however, is indeed well able to exist. Thus St. Thomas in the places cited.

And indeed, with respect to the first part, namely, the efficacious appetite, this is clear from what has been said. For this appetite is executive and applicative of the means, but the powers of nature cannot execute the means necessary for this vision, as faith teaches and reason demonstrates, since they are supernatural as to their substance.

With respect to the second part, namely, the possibility of the conditional and inefficacious appetite, this too is clear. For since this appetite is so imperfect, there is no obstacle to its being present through the powers of nature. Thus, just as the will, when another great good is proposed, could break forth into this act, namely, I would wish to obtain that, so, when the clear vision of God is proposed under the aspect of some greatest good, the will will be able in the same way to desire it. For although the thing desired would then be materially supernatural, the reason for desiring it would not be. For this, as we have already indicated, would be natural, since it is in the same proportion as the elicited appetite of that same vision of God, absolute in its own way and inefficacious, which is in some way reduced to the conditional appetite, as we shall explain elsewhere when God grants it. For, at least once divine revelation concerning its possibility is supposed, someone could desire it under the aspect of some great good by the aforesaid appetite.

78 It must be said, second, that in an intellectual creature that does not see God through his essence and considered by himself, for example in man, there is no elicited appetite, even a conditional one, for the aforesaid vision which is necessary with respect to specification. Thus Caiet., 1 part., q. 82, art. 1; Conrad., 1a 2ae, q. 10, art. 2; Nazar. in the present passage; Martinez, 1, 2, q. 3, art. 8, dub. 2; Alvarez, 1a 2ae, disp. 27, saying that this is the common opinion of the Thomists, and that Durand holds it in 4, dist. 49, q. 8, and others.

And certainly it seems to follow openly from what has been said in the preceding doubt. For the elicited and natural appetite, or appetite necessary with respect to specification, indicates that in that nature there is an innate appetite through the mode of inclination and weight; because, if the elicited appetite is not natural and necessary with respect to specification from some extrinsic principle—since in this respect it would rather be violent—the consequence is that it would be natural and necessary from the natural inclination of the will itself, which naturally inclines toward that object with a determination toward one thing.

79 Next, it is proved, first, from St. Thomas, de verit., q. 22, art. 7, where, speaking of man, he says: When, therefore, aided by divine grace, a man apprehends by his proper reason some special good, such as his beatitude, in which his beatitude truly consists, then he deserves this, not because he desires beatitude, which he naturally desires, but because he desires that special thing which he does not naturally desire, namely, the vision of God, in which nevertheless, according to the truth of the matter, his beatitude consists. And in 4, dist. 49, q. 1, art. 3, where, in order to give the reason why it is permissible for one to desire the divine vision even though it is itself beatitude, he added: Because beatitude, insofar as it is of this kind, of itself imports the object of the will, but the divine vision does not.

From these words, the following and efficacious reason is formed, assuming, however, that the object of the will in itself is the same as the adequate object. For an inadequate object is compared with it in its own way as an object accidentally, not in itself. Whence it is sufficiently probable that even if such an object were destroyed or were involved in something, nevertheless the nature of the will would not perish for that reason; the opposite, however, would hold if the adequate object of the will were involved. Or, at least, it is altogether certain that, if the aforesaid inadequate object were destroyed, the nature of the will would not perish in itself, but would be changed in itself in a second respect, insofar as the adequate object would thereby be altered, since it would no longer include all that it previously included. Thus the inadequate object is compared with the will in its own way accidentally, insofar as it is not conferred with the will as an object in itself of the first order; and consequently neither is it conferred as an object at all in itself.

80 Hence the argument is as follows. The will is necessitated with respect to specification by its object considered in itself, or its adequate object, and not by something else. But the clear vision of God, or God as clearly visible, is not the object in itself, or the adequate object of the will on its way; therefore it cannot necessitate the will. The consequence is clear. The minor premise also seems clear in itself, since on its way the will desires many other things besides beatitude in the particular sense, and things that are not ordered to it, but are even opposed to it.

The major premise, as regards the first part, is sufficiently clear. For every power is determined by its nature to tend toward its adequate object, because it receives its entire essence and specification from it. As regards the second part, it is shown as follows. Then, because an inadequate object, precisely insofar as it is such, does not equal the entire force and capacity of the power, it is not necessary that, precisely because the will wills to break forth into the act, it should be occupied with pursuing that object. It can rather elicit an act of another and opposite species, namely hatred. Then also: because what is not the good that equals the will, but an inadequate good that does not satisfy it—and this is essentially included in the reason of an object inadequate to the will—has some reason of evil with respect to the will; and therefore such an object, precisely because it is not adequate, cannot necessitate the will with respect to specification.

81 It is confirmed and explained. For although whiteness is a great perfection of sight and no reason for evil seems at first sight to appear in it, because whiteness is nevertheless not the object in itself adequate to the power of sight, it is therefore—rightly considered—a reason for evil to appear in it; namely, that it is not the good equal to the whole of its power. Thus, at least insofar as sight is subject to the command of the will, it is not necessitated with respect to specification to tend toward whiteness. Therefore, since God as clearly visible is not the adequate object of the will of the wayfarer, there will likewise appear in him—though through the defect of the creature—some reason of evil on account of which he may be rejected.

82 Nor does it matter that the opponents suggest, in order to dissolve this reason, that it is enough for God as clearly visible to contain every good in a more eminent way than beatitude in the common sense contains it. Hence it can no less than that necessitate, and therefore in the fatherland it will necessitate by an altogether comprehensive necessity, namely, not only with respect to specification, but also with respect to exercise, because in the aforesaid way it contains every good, is perfectly applied, and is shown to the will.

So this is not the point. For if the argument that has been made is carefully examined, it is sufficiently convicted of falsity from it. For although God, as clearly visible, contains every good and thus, insofar as he is in himself, in a more eminent way equals and satisfies the entire force of the will, nevertheless on the way he is not presented to it as the object and adequate good of the will; otherwise in the fatherland. Therefore, although in the fatherland there is necessity with respect to specification, indeed even with respect to exercise, nevertheless there is not such necessity on the way. The consequence seems certain. The antecedent is also clear. Because an object is then presented as adequate when a power ought to tend toward it and toward other things, not except on account of it; and therefore a mobile being is the natural object of philosophy, because it considers that for itself, whereas other things are considered only on account of it. But the will of the wayfarer can tend toward other created goods, not on account of divine goodness, and as ordered toward it, but rather as opposed to it; otherwise the will of one who comprehends God. Therefore on the way the universal and adequate good of the will is not presented to it; but it is well presented in the fatherland.

83 It is confirmed and explained. For however much some good may equal the will in itself, indeed may be represented most firmly as such on the part of the light by which it is known, such as faith, nevertheless, as long as it is not known clearly and as it is in itself, but only obscurely, it is possible—not on the part of the light or the object, but well on the part of the subject—for a kind of suspicion or doubt to arise concerning the goodness so perfect and so equal to such an object. Thus one can have faith in mysteries revealed by God and suffer very many temptations concerning them. Whence, even when that representation is evident, however certain and completely firm it may be, it can happen that the subject tends toward that good, not indeed in a defined act, but in an act actually exercised, as if the good were not certainly and wholly perfectly equal to the will, but were proposed in some respect as a kind of evil. Consequently, the will is not necessitated with respect to specification to embrace or profess that good as long as the object is not known clearly and in itself, as happens at present.

§ IV. The foundations of both opinions are met.

84 Therefore, it only remains to satisfy the foundations of both opinions. And first, to the testimony of Augustine adduced in support of the former opinion, it will be answered that those words are to be understood as concerning beatitude in the common sense. For he touches upon incidentally the proposition reported there, and known by the light of nature, although in the same chapter he teaches much concerning the vision of God through his essence.

To the testimony adduced from St. Thomas, however, it is answered that the desire to see God, arising from the vision of his natural effects, is only inefficacious and conditional. It is, however, called by the holy Doctor natural, or necessary with respect to specification, not because it is simply such, and therefore always has the aforesaid necessity, as the desire for beatitude in the common sense has it, but because it is natural, or necessary, as in many other things. Not otherwise, however, with the proportion nevertheless preserved, than as the appetites for life, knowledge, bodily integrity, and similar things, which are not a natural appetite, nor necessary always, but, as they often are, as St. Thomas and Caiet., 1a 2ae, q. 10, art. 1, and elsewhere often, teach.

From this, too, one incidentally understands the congruence of the argument adduced there by the Angelic Doctor to prove from this desire to see God the possibility of such a vision. For from the desire, even though inefficacious, the possibility of the desired thing can nevertheless in some way be inferred, given the aforesaid necessity.

As to the reason and confirmation adduced in support of the same opinion, what has been said makes it clear.

85 As to the testimony adduced in support of the second opinion, what we have just said is also clear. To the reason, however, it is answered that the assertion does not prove in any way that there is in the intellectual creature an elicited and efficacious appetite for the clear vision of God insofar as he is the first cause. For however much this reason may be set aside in favor of another, it is always supernatural as to its substance, as has been shown. It can nevertheless be proved that there is in the intellect an elicited and inefficacious appetite which is natural, or necessary according to what it is, as we have just asserted; but not natural, or necessary simply. For although the aforesaid vision is the consummation of another knowledge drawn from effects, it is nevertheless not the adequate object of the will. Consequently it cannot simply necessitate it with respect to specification, as we have already explained. From these things it is clear that all the arguments adduced in that reason insofar as they can oppose us are addressed.

First conclusion. In order to see God, some likeness on the part of the power is required.

Second conclusion. It is impossible for any likeness on the part of the thing seen and created to concur with the clear vision of God through his essence.