Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

After D. Thomas had explained in the preceding questions how God is in himself, he now begins to treat of the manner in which he is present to our knowledge, or how he is known by creatures. He divides this question, however, into thirteen articles, so that he may explain this whole matter more fully and clearly.

The Angelic Doctor rightly proposes this question under the heading of the manner in which God is known by us: although God's knowability rests, so to speak, on the highest actuality of his being, nevertheless his knowability, as it is in itself—indeed, as infinite—can best be inferred a posteriori from the manner of the knowledge by which he is known; and it follows that his knowability, insofar as it is in itself, is transcendent, and that it can be attained by no created intellect, precisely because such an intellect is finite, nor can it be equated with it; much less can it be represented insofar as it is in itself by a created species.

D. Thomas treated, then, in this first part, of the knowability of God, but not of his lovability: both because what is said here about the manner of knowing God can be applied proportionally to the manner of loving, and also because in 2a 2ae, a quaest. 23 usque 44, he treats of the love by which created will tends toward divine goodness. He has deferred this treatise, however, to the place already mentioned, because the intention of that part is to treat of the motion of the rational creature toward God; and it is proper to love that through it the will be moved toward the thing loved, just as it is proper to knowledge that through it the thing known be drawn toward the knower, as the same S. Doctor teaches, quaest. 82, art. 3, of this first part.

Conclusion. It is possible for a created intellect to see God by essence.

Notes concerning this article.

1 To explain the meaning of the title, and of the other matters to be treated below, it is necessary to indicate the three terms that D. Thomas placed in the title of the article. The first is created intellect: by this he indicates that the title is to be understood as concerning created intellect in general, whether human or angelic. The second is whether it is possible, taken absolutely, without determining whether such an intellect can see God by its natural powers or whether it can do so by grace: for this will be treated below in this same question. The third is to see God by essence, by which is signified the special manner of seeing God, namely by essence—that is, by seeing him immediately, or through his own species representing his entire quiddity, and not by seeing him mediately in some other created object previously seen, or through the species of some other thing, or, as Cajetan explains best here, by understanding him quidditatively, in such a way that, thus seeing God, one completely settles the question of what he is, extending oneself to all the quidditative predicates of God.

2 The reason is evident. For if that species represented only some peculiar predicate or attribute of God, the question what he is, concerning God himself, could not be completely settled through it, as is clear from itself; and consequently God could not be seen by essence absolutely and simply. Just as, if the aforesaid species belonged to some creature, or God were known mediately through it in some created object previously seen, then that species would represent the divine essence only secondarily, deficiently, and in a diminished way, and according to the analogy it would have with such a creature: likewise, God could not thereby be known completely quidditatively; indeed, he could not be known quidditatively in any way.

Although it is possible to infer from discursive reasoning, whether formal or virtual, that God is omnipotent, infinite, pure act, and so forth, nevertheless, since that species, being deficient, cannot represent the manner in which these perfections are present in God, it could represent them only insofar as they concern whether he is. Just as, although through the species of material quiddities we can know several predicates of spiritual substances, nevertheless, because we do not know how these things exist in them, we apprehend them only insofar as they concern whether they are, and not insofar as they concern what they are. Thus we know the conjunction of those predicates with their subjects, but not what kind of conjunction this is: nor can we explain those things, indeed, nor apprehend them as they are in themselves; and we would conceive them very differently if they were seen by us immediately and as they are in themselves.

3 Next, it must be noted that, although more is required for intuitive knowledge than for quidditative knowledge, and consequently quidditative knowledge of some thing can be abstractive, nevertheless at present the quidditative knowledge of God of which we are speaking coincides with intuitive knowledge, or with the vision of God himself. For since actual existence is, in the very reality of God's essence, and the divine essence is otherwise sufficiently present, according to its own existence, to every created intellect, to move and to change it with respect to the aforesaid knowledge, it follows that the quidditative knowledge of God coincides with intuitive knowledge. For precisely insofar as a thing is known quidditatively, that is, insofar as it is understood in its actual existence, in such a way that the thing according to its existence is sufficiently present to move and change the power, that knowledge must not remain within the limits of quidditative knowledge, but must also be intuitive, as seems to follow from its own nature. Whether these two, not only being sufficient, but also being required, for intuitive knowledge, is another question, to be treated elsewhere, God permitting it.