Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

After D. Thomas had explained in the preceding questions how God is in himself, he now begins to treat of the manner in which he is present to our knowledge, or how he is known by creatures. He divides this question, however, into thirteen articles, so that he may explain this whole matter more fully and clearly.

The Angelic Doctor rightly proposes this question under the heading of the manner in which God is known by us: although God's knowability rests, so to speak, on the highest actuality of his being, nevertheless his knowability, as it is in itself—indeed, as infinite—can best be inferred a posteriori from the manner of the knowledge by which he is known; and it follows that his knowability, insofar as it is in itself, is transcendent, and that it can be attained by no created intellect, precisely because such an intellect is finite, nor can it be equated with it; much less can it be represented insofar as it is in itself by a created species.

D. Thomas treated, then, in this first part, of the knowability of God, but not of his lovability: both because what is said here about the manner of knowing God can be applied proportionally to the manner of loving, and also because in 2a 2ae, a quaest. 23 usque 44, he treats of the love by which created will tends toward divine goodness. He has deferred this treatise, however, to the place already mentioned, because the intention of that part is to treat of the motion of the rational creature toward God; and it is proper to love that through it the will be moved toward the thing loved, just as it is proper to knowledge that through it the thing known be drawn toward the knower, as the same S. Doctor teaches, quaest. 82, art. 3, of this first part.

Conclusion. It is possible for a created intellect to see God by essence.

Notes concerning this article.

1 To explain the meaning of the title, and of the other matters to be treated below, it is necessary to indicate the three terms that D. Thomas placed in the title of the article. The first is created intellect: by this he indicates that the title is to be understood as concerning created intellect in general, whether human or angelic. The second is whether it is possible, taken absolutely, without determining whether such an intellect can see God by its natural powers or whether it can do so by grace: for this will be treated below in this same question. The third is to see God by essence, by which is signified the special manner of seeing God, namely by essence—that is, by seeing him immediately, or through his own species representing his entire quiddity, and not by seeing him mediately in some other created object previously seen, or through the species of some other thing, or, as Cajetan explains best here, by understanding him quidditatively, in such a way that, thus seeing God, one completely settles the question of what he is, extending oneself to all the quidditative predicates of God.

2 The reason is evident. For if that species represented only some peculiar predicate or attribute of God, the question what he is, concerning God himself, could not be completely settled through it, as is clear from itself; and consequently God could not be seen by essence absolutely and simply. Just as, if the aforesaid species belonged to some creature, or God were known mediately through it in some created object previously seen, then that species would represent the divine essence only secondarily, deficiently, and in a diminished way, and according to the analogy it would have with such a creature: likewise, God could not thereby be known completely quidditatively; indeed, he could not be known quidditatively in any way.

Although it is possible to infer from discursive reasoning, whether formal or virtual, that God is omnipotent, infinite, pure act, and so forth, nevertheless, since that species, being deficient, cannot represent the manner in which these perfections are present in God, it could represent them only insofar as they concern whether he is. Just as, although through the species of material quiddities we can know several predicates of spiritual substances, nevertheless, because we do not know how these things exist in them, we apprehend them only insofar as they concern whether they are, and not insofar as they concern what they are. Thus we know the conjunction of those predicates with their subjects, but not what kind of conjunction this is: nor can we explain those things, indeed, nor apprehend them as they are in themselves; and we would conceive them very differently if they were seen by us immediately and as they are in themselves.

3 Next, it must be noted that, although more is required for intuitive knowledge than for quidditative knowledge, and consequently quidditative knowledge of some thing can be abstractive, nevertheless at present the quidditative knowledge of God of which we are speaking coincides with intuitive knowledge, or with the vision of God himself. For since actual existence is, in the very reality of God's essence, and the divine essence is otherwise sufficiently present, according to its own existence, to every created intellect, to move and to change it with respect to the aforesaid knowledge, it follows that the quidditative knowledge of God coincides with intuitive knowledge. For precisely insofar as a thing is known quidditatively, that is, insofar as it is understood in its actual existence, in such a way that the thing according to its existence is sufficiently present to move and change the power, that knowledge must not remain within the limits of quidditative knowledge, but must also be intuitive, as seems to follow from its own nature. Whether these two, not only being sufficient, but also being required, for intuitive knowledge, is another question, to be treated elsewhere, God permitting it.

Everything that is to be said in this tractate depends upon the possibility of a vision of the divine essence by the created intellect; and so the Most Holy Doctor rightly raises this very question in the first article, and we accordingly institute the first disputation on that same possibility. But since the Sacred Doctor touches somewhat on the natural inclination of the rational creature toward the vision of God, we shall therefore also touch on it in this first disputation.

The title of this difficulty is sufficiently clear from what we have said in the notes on this article, and therefore requires no further explanation.

§ I. Opinion of the Heretics.

1 Some heretics upheld the negative part, whom D. Gregory reports without naming them in lib. 12 Moral., cap. 38, and D. Thomas refutes in the present article; they therefore asserted that a created intellect could see a certain clarity diffused in it by God, and the splendor of its divinity, but not the divinity itself immediately and in itself.

This can be proved from 1. ad Timoth. 1: “King of the ages, immortal and invisible”; and in the same place, cap. 6: “He dwells in light inaccessible, whom no man has seen, nor can see.” Thus, just as from what is said in Jerem. 32 we assert that God is incomprehensible and therefore cannot be comprehended by any created intellect, so from what is said of him as invisible we must confess that he cannot be seen by any creature.

Next, it is proved first by reason. Since the divine essence, as it is in itself, is not confined within the range of the specificative object of a created intellect, the said intellect therefore cannot be elevated, even supernaturally, to see that essence as it is in itself. The inference is evident, because no power can be borne beyond the range of its specificative object. Thus neither sight can be elevated to perceive sound, nor hearing to perceive taste, nor, finally, material cognitive powers to know purely spiritual things, because all these lie beyond the range of the specificative object of the said powers.

The antecedent, however, is proved. Since the divine essence, as it is in itself, is infinite both in the genus of being and in the genus of object, a created intellect, being finite in both orders, cannot have proportion or commensurability with it, because there is no proportion between the finite and the infinite. The divine essence therefore will not be contained within the range of its specificative object, since every power has proportion and commensurability with its specificative object, and consequently with whatever is contained within that range, as is manifest by induction in all cognitive powers.

This is confirmed first. God, as he is in himself, is farther from a created intellect than an angel is from the power of sight; yet because of this distance the angel is not thereby contained within the range of the object of sight, as D. Thomas teaches in this question, article 3, and article 4 on the third, and as the theologians hold in common. God therefore, as he is in himself, will not be contained within the range of the object of a created intellect. The minor, with its inference, is sufficiently clear. The major is evident as well, for the power of sight and the angel are contained within the notion of created being and belong to the same natural order, whereas God, as he is in himself, is beyond every created being and transcends every natural order.

2 It is confirmed second, because a created intellect is essentially a natural power; its specificative object is therefore only a natural being. Consequently God, as he is in himself, will not be contained within the range of that object. This last inference seems evident, because God, insofar as he is knowable in himself, is a supernatural object, as will be clear from what is said here and below in article 4. The first inference, however, is also evident, because a power is such as its object is. Thus, if the power is essentially natural, its object must likewise be natural, not something abstracted from the natural and supernatural, or including both. Otherwise the specification of that power either would not be natural, or would not be contained wholly and perfectly within the order of nature, but would be partly within and partly outside it. The antecedent, too, is clear, because a created intellect, for example the human intellect, is connatural to the soul, which belongs to the natural order, and consequently is an intellectual power of the natural order, just as the soul itself belongs to that order. For supernatural accidents are distinguished from natural accidents in that the former, being connatural to their subjects, belong to the same natural order as those subjects; but the latter do not.

3 Second, because the object of an intellect, for example the highest angel’s intellect, must be one in itself and univocal. Yet if God, as he is knowable in himself, were contained within the range of that object, he would not be the said intellect’s object as one in itself and univocal. He therefore cannot be contained under it, and consequently cannot be seen by that intellect as he is in himself. Neither inference requires proof. The major, however, seems certain from what our Complutensian College teaches in Log., disp. 19, num. 45. The minor is clear as well: partly because that object would be something natural insofar as it contains things of the natural order, and at the same time something supernatural insofar as it includes the divine essence as it is in itself, which is said to be something supernatural, so that such an object would be something analogous; and partly because no univocal something common to God and creatures can be assigned to them, whether in the respect of being or in the respect of knowability. Otherwise God would be contained under that common notion under some genus and species, which is repugnant to his infinity and his purity from every potentiality, as our Complutensian College shows in Log., disp. 12, num. 34, and in 3 Physic., disp. 18, num. 20 and 21.

This is confirmed, because otherwise the divine, angelic, and human intellects would not differ essentially, which, as is clear, is absurd. The consequence is evident, because if God, as he is in himself—and consequently, as he is a supernatural object—were contained within the range of a created intellect, the object of the created and divine intellects would already be being in its entire commonality, insofar as it abstracts from God and creatures, from natural and supernatural being. There would thus be no basis on which to distinguish them. Likewise, because every human intellect naturally looks toward materiality, there is no basis on which they differ in species.

4 Third, a created intellect cannot be elevated to know simultaneously, in its own proper kind, the entire collection of possible creatures; it therefore cannot be elevated to see God as he is in himself. The antecedent is evident, because such knowledge requires an infinite power and light, as D. Thomas shows in this question, art. 8 et 3 part., quaest. 10 et 11, while a created and infinite light is altogether impossible, as our Complutensians teach in 3 Physic., disp. 18, quaest. penultima. The inference seems clear, because it is more difficult to know the divine essence immediately and as it is in itself than to know the whole collection of possible creatures taken separately. The divine essence, as it is in itself, has an infinitely more perfect being, both in the respect of being and in the respect of object, than all possible creatures, whereas the entity of those creatures, and consequently their knowability, is not infinite through essence, as are the entity and knowability of the divine essence as it is in itself.

§ II. The true opinion is established.

5 Nevertheless, it must be said that a created intellect can be elevated to see God by essence. This is a matter of faith. For it is said in Matt. 5: “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God”; and in cap. 18: “Their angels always behold the face of my Father who is in heaven”; in 1 ad Corinth. 13: “Now we see through a glass darkly, but then face to face”; in 1 Joan. 3: “We know that when he shall appear, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is.” The Church has declared that these testimonies are to be taken properly, and not twisted into a metaphor, in the chapter Damnamus on the most Holy Trinity, and in Concil. Florent., sess. ultima, in the letters of sacred union. It has been defined there that blessed souls clearly behold the triune and one God as he is in himself. Thus, since the act of seeing God as he is in itself necessarily includes the possibility of that same vision, our assertion, defined and certain as a matter of faith, remains such in the cited testimonies.

6 Next, the assertion is proved by three reasons, of which the first is drawn from quaest. 8 de Veritate, art. 1. Because God is the principle of the being of an intellectual creature, its perfection, and consequently its beatitude, consists in its conjunction with him according to its own mode, or in its intellectual conjunction with him as he is in himself. Such a conjunction, therefore, or vision of him intellectually as he is in himself, will be possible for the said creature. This last inference is evident from the previous one, because an intellectual creature can attain its beatitude; otherwise it would be in a worse condition than the other creatures. The first inference follows from the antecedent and can thus be explained. Everything is perfect insofar as it is united to its primordial principle according to its own mode. Indeed, if a thing belongs to a lower order because it does not reach the highest grade of beings, namely the intellectual grade, it is united to that principle according to its own mode, namely deficiently and imperfectly insofar as it is united to its own peculiar ultimate end, which is the participation of God and an ordering toward him. This is evident in a stone, which is perfect and blessed in its own way insofar as it is united to the center in the manner described. If, however, the thing belongs to the highest and most perfect order of beings, namely the intellectual order, it is united to its primordial principle according to its own mode, namely most perfectly and intellectually, and consequently by seeing him as he is in himself. For among the created modes of intellectual conjunction with God, this mode of seeing him as he is in himself—though in a finite and limited manner, or equivalently, this mode of being united to him intellectually—is the most perfect and supreme mode of conjunction with him. Merely because it is finite, it is not repugnant that it be communicated to a created intellect.

7 The second reason for the assertion is drawn from D. Thomas in the present article and can be reduced to the following form. For when effects are seen, a natural desire, for example in a human being, to see and know their cause according to its essence is present; and from this there arises wonder in human beings. Therefore, when God’s effects are seen, there will also arise a natural desire to see him according to his essence. Such a vision will therefore be possible. This last inference is evident, because otherwise the desire of nature would be vain and frustrate.

This is confirmed and explained from the reason of the same holy Doctor in 1a 2ae, quaest. 3, art. 8. For, as Arist. testifies, 3 de Anima, the object of the intellect is that which it is, that is, the essence of the thing. Therefore, as long as the intellect knows God only from his effects, and not immediately in himself according to his complete essence, some perfection will always be lacking in the knowledge of such an object. Consequently, in a human being, for example, there will be a natural desire to know the divine essence in this way. The antecedent is sufficiently clear. The first inference is proved, because God cannot be known from his effects except either insofar as he is that he is, or at most, as elsewhere discussed, insofar as that precise relation is observed by reason of which he is desired to be the cause of such an effect—which is to know him imperfectly as to his essence. The second inference is clear, because every thing naturally desires its own proper perfection.

8 Finally, D. Thomas suggests a third reason in this question, article 4 on the third, which can be put in the following form. The divine essence, as it is in itself, is contained under the adequate object of a created intellect; a created intellect therefore can be elevated to attain it as it is in itself. The inference is obvious, because every power can be elevated to attain any object, however excellent, provided that it is contained under its adequate object. Thus the owl’s sight can be elevated to see some most beautiful visible object surpassing its power, namely the sun as it is in itself, because that object is contained under its adequate object. The antecedent, however, is proved and explained as follows. Although the human intellect is in some way in matter, so that its proportionate object is materiality, nevertheless, since it is not in matter as its subject, it is spiritual according to its substance, and by virtue of this immateriality it is able to conceive and prescind a form from matter. Likewise, although the angelic intellect is mingled with potentiality, so that its proportionate object is a quiddity involved with potentiality and consequently has created being and is determined by it, it can nevertheless by its natural power separate being from essence and conceive it by forming no conception of that essence distinct from that being. Since God is nothing other than a pure form and act without matter, and an extremely abstract and purest being, because he is being itself by essence, it follows that he is contained within the range of the adequate object of the said intellects.

9 This is confirmed from the same holy Doctor. For a created intellect can in some way conceive God by virtue of its immateriality, that is, imperfectly and confusedly by analogy to its proper proportionate object, as experience shows. It can therefore be elevated supernaturally to know him clearly and as he is in himself. The inference is evident, because whenever a power can in any way and in an imperfect manner be directed toward an object, it is not repugnant that it be elevated to attain that object in a more perfect and elevated manner. Thus the owl’s sight, which perceives light in some way, can be elevated to see it clearly and in a more perfect way in its fullness. These are the proofs of our assertion. Whether all these reasons are efficacious, or are instead only congruences and probable conjectures concerning the possibility of a vision of God by essence, which faith nevertheless persuades is possible, will be clear from what is to be said in difficulties 3 and 4.

§ III. The arguments of the heretics are refuted.

10 The foundation therefore, which was drawn from the passages of Scripture, is answered by saying that when Paul states that God is invisible, he is speaking of invisibility with respect to the bodily eye, either in this mortal life and according to the common course of things, or else he means only that God cannot be seen by a comprehensive vision. In this latter sense, several other testimonies commonly adduced to the contrary can also be explained, by adapting to each one or more of these explanations as may be more consonant with the context. Thus, Aug. epist. 111 et 112, et communiter Sancti Patres. But what is added at the close of the argument must be answered by saying that the reasoning is unequal, because God is often said in Jerem. 32 and elsewhere to be incomprehensible, so that he is nowhere said to be comprehensible by a creature, or adequately knowable by it. The foundation drawn from sacred Scripture is therefore insufficient to establish this point. God, although said to be invisible in the testimonies cited, is nevertheless asserted in many other passages already mentioned to be visible and in fact to be seen by the blessed. Hence, in order that all these things be mutually coherent, they must be understood in the manner just stated.

11 The antecedent, however, which was drawn from reason, must be denied. In answer to its proof we appeal to D. Thomas in this article, in the answer to the fourth: although from the infinity of the divine essence one concludes that there is no proper or mathematical proportion between it and a created intellect, it does not follow that there is no improper proportion, whether in the genus of power and object, between the two. Mathematical proportion must be between definite and determinate quantities, whether of bulk or of perfection, and thus must be bounded by fixed terms. It consequently cannot obtain between a finite and an infinite thing; proportion in the genus of power and object, however, can. The reason for this is that for such proportion it is sufficient that the power be accommodated and fitted according to its essence to such an object. Just as a created intellect, by virtue of its immateriality, is accommodated in itself to perceive being in common, and abstracts in its own way from created and uncreated being as has already been stated, so according to its essence—though this will be explained more broadly below—it will be fitted to perceive any being, however infinite, that is in this sense contained under being. For a power that attains an object under some common relation also has an essential adaptation and commensurability for attaining whatever is contained under that object, at least insofar as it is elevated by divine power.

12 From this it is sufficiently clear with respect to the first confirmation. For that argument’s major is true only concerning distance in the genus of being, not concerning distance in the genus of power and object. This is not taken into account in the case of purely spiritual powers with respect to the infinity of the object, because spiritual powers, precisely insofar as they are such, can become all things in intelligible being, as D. Thomas shows below, quaest. 14, art. 1. It is based rather on another point, namely that the thing in question is not contained under the adequate object of the power. For when this is the case, the power stands so far from the thing that it cannot attain it. Thus, since an angel is not contained under the object of the power of sight, whereas God is, as has been said, contained under the object of a created intellectual power, it follows that a created intellect and God, as he is in himself, are less distant in the relation of power and object than an angel and the power of sight.

13 The second confirmation is answered first by saying, as the younger Thomists commonly teach in 3 part., quaest. 13, that a twofold formal distinction must be made in one and the same intellect: one power is essentially natural, which, speaking formally, terminates only in a natural being; the other is obediential power, which, although entitatively and identically it has natural being, is nevertheless formally and radically supernatural, and terminates at least in a supernatural object as such. Thus, although God is not contained under the object of the first power, he is nevertheless contained under the object of the second, and thus can be attained by it. We have said radically, because although this power is formally and according to its substance supernatural, yet, considered as distinct from the other power of the natural order, it does not directly elicit vital and supernatural acts; it does so only remotely and radically. Thus, once it is actuated by another proximate and supernatural power, it can, considered as thus actuated, actively and proximately concur in those acts.

14 Second, it is answered that it is one thing whether a created intellect is a natural power, and another thing whether this belongs to its essential notion. Just as it is one thing whether an intellect is an obediential power for perceiving supernatural objects as such, and another whether this obediential power belongs to its quiddative notion, so, although the intellect is a natural power and possesses the said obediential power, that power nevertheless does not belong to its essence. Considered precisely according to its essential characteristics, the intellect signifies only an ordering toward being as such, insofar as it abstracts from the natural and supernatural. In other words, it consists only in an essential and radical adaptation and commensurability for perceiving being according to the common relation of its analogy and any particular being insofar as it possesses the relation of being. Thus, just as according to this relation it does not look toward being as natural or as supernatural, but as something abstracted from both, so in its quiddative notion it also abstracts from the relation of being natural, supernatural, or obediential, as such.

Nor does the proof offered at that point tell against this. For we do not deny that a created intellect, for example the human intellect, belongs to the natural order, or is a natural power in relation to its proper subject, namely the soul, since the soul too is a natural being insofar as it is its proper passion; nor do we deny that it is a natural power in relation to its proportionate and connatural object, which is in some way distinguished from its specificative object. We deny, however, that it be a natural power of its essence, and consequently that it possess the relation of the said power in relation to its specificative object taken precisely as such. Therefore, precisely because the intellect is not a natural power in this latter sense, and hence precisely because according to its essence it looks toward natural being as its proper specificative object, not as such but insofar as it abstracts from the natural and supernatural, it can be elevated to see God by essence. God, so understood, is contained under its adequate and specificative object, as will be explained more fully immediately.

15 If, however, one asks what the intellect signifies insofar as it is a natural power, and what it signifies insofar as it is an obediential power, the answer is that the intellect, insofar as it is understood as a natural power, is conceived as signifying in a special way its proportionate and connatural object, which is a natural being to be known by natural light and by its proper powers. Consequently, precisely considered according to its essential characteristics, it superadds to itself a proximate efficacy for perceiving the said object from itself. On the other hand, insofar as it is conceived under the notion of obediential power, it is considered as signifying in a special way supernatural objects as such, or as signifying in some way an ordering of pure aptitude toward them. Not in just any manner, but in such a way that it has no proximate efficacy of its own for attaining them, and is not owed what would attain them. Rather, it requires divine elevation, through which the said efficacy is conferred upon it, and through which attainment of the said objects becomes due to it. Thus, just as the intellect according to its essence prescinds from the relation of being a natural or supernatural power, so it looks toward its proper specificative object precisely as an intelligible object. Consequently, prescinding under this relation, and with the twofold qualification stated above, from whether it has from itself or from divine elevation a proximate efficacy for perceiving that object and whatever is contained under it. Accordingly, it sometimes looks toward the object itself through a mediate elevation and under a supernatural relation, as when it perceives supernatural objects as such; at other times, however, it does so through its own native natural power, as when it terminates in natural objects and in the intelligible object as such, yet still under a natural relation. For the said object, insofar as thus taken, is formally and in the relation of object something natural. On these matters, and on what we have said above and will also say below, let those be consulted which our Complutensians teach in the books de Anima, disput. 17, quaest. 1 et 2.

16 With respect to the second argument, the major must be granted, but the minor denied. To the first proof it must be said that, although the formal reason quae, considered as it appears to the intellect of the highest angel, is analogous, it is not the formal reason sub qua. This is sufficient for its specificative object to be one in itself and univocal, as is evident in Metaphysica, whose specificative object, as such, is one in itself and univocal, because although the formal reason quae may be something analogous, the reason sub qua is not. On these matters, let those be consulted which our Complutensians state in Logica, disputation 19, already cited.

Nor is it true what is indicated there, namely that to say that the divine essence, as included in the specificative object of the said intellect, belongs to it, is to say something supernatural. Because, considered precisely in relation to the specificative object of a created intellect, it says nothing natural or supernatural as such, but in its own way prescinds from both and says only that it itself is an intelligible object. For, as we have indicated, an object is said to be natural in relation to the intellect insofar as it is attainable by a natural power and by proximate natural efficacy. It is said to be supernatural insofar as it can be attained by a supernatural power, although that does not apply to the said essence when precisely considered in relation to the order of a specificative object as such. Rather, it applies insofar as the essence belongs to the range of an unproportionate object—for example, in relation to natural light as such, and consequently in relation to its proximate efficacy. In this sense, the said essence adds something to the specificative object as such, as we have already indicated and will explain more fully below.

17 To the second proof it must be said that, although God and creatures cannot agree univocally in some one formal reason quae intrinsic to them, they can nevertheless agree univocally in some one formal reason sub qua, or in the fact that they are attainable under it. There is no need for such a reason to be intrinsic or inhersing in God. It will be enough that it be extrinsic and consist in the special manner in which the intellect attains the said reason quae, provided that this same manner be reflected in the reason itself. Accordingly, the divine relation belongs to the reason sub qua of the object of faith, because the special manner in which this power tends is to tend toward God and toward all other things insofar as they fall under divine revelation. Nevertheless, such revelation is something extrinsic to the things believed. Thus, in this respect, nothing prevents both God and the other created objects from agreeing univocally in the reason already stated.

18 To the confirmation, the consequence must be denied. To the proof it must be said that the divine intellect has the divine essence as its adequate and specificative object, as is usually shown below in question 14. Thus, in this respect, it can be distinguished essentially from a created intellect. Then, although the angelic and human intellects look toward being in its entire range as the formal reason quae, they can nevertheless be distinguished essentially because they look toward the said object under a distinct reason sub qua. This diverse reason sub qua can be explained by the fact that being neither specifies nor distinguishes the said intellects except insofar as they can be perfected by it in one manner or another. This manner can be explained only by the fact that the mode of transforming and perfecting the human intellect is such that, if that transformation and actualization occur connaturally, there must be—at least for this state—a mean immaterial species, abstracted from sensible quiddity, shining forth in the phantasm. In the other state, the intellect is transformed connaturally through the intelligible species of the rational soul, whether through the essence of the soul, insofar as it has the relation of intelligible species with respect to its own intellect, or otherwise. Likewise, the mode of perfecting and fecundating the angelic intellect must be of such a condition that, as its most connatural perfecting object, it requires its proper angelic substance, so that the other objects, or species, which affect it connaturally and are infused into it have a greater or lesser immateriality, according to the greater or lesser immateriality of the said substance, which has the relation of a motivating object to such an intellect.

19 Second, and with sufficient probability, the answer is given with Albert, 1 de Anima, cap. penult.; Caiet., 1 part., quaest. 77, art. 3; Ferrara, 2 contra Gentes, cap. 94; Thienens, 2 de Anima, text. 9; and finally with our Complutensian College in the book de Anima, disp. 17, num. 11, and many other Thomists: the human intellect, for example, can be considered in two ways, namely either under the relation of a formally considered power or under the relation of a property. If it is considered according to the former relation, it is of the same species as the angelic intellect considered formally as a power; but if it is taken according to the latter relation, it is of a different species. For since powers are specified, as powers, by their objects, it follows that both the human and the angelic intellect must have one and the same adequate object of extension. Yet because properties, as such, have their being through an ordering to nature, from which they flow, the said intellects, insofar as they are considered under the relation of properties, must flow from different natures and look toward those natures.

However, this solution displeases Francisco Suarez, 2. tom. Summae Theologiae, tractat. 3, lib. 4, cap. 1, num. 7, and some of the later Scholastics; they therefore raise several objections against it. But because their objections are brought forward from num. 11 of the Complutensian College, recently cited, through num. 21, and they add certain others, and solve them all very well, we shall not linger in presenting and answering them, because they can be seen there with pleasure and profit.

20 With respect to the third argument, the antecedent must be granted and the consequence denied. To the proof it must be answered that the entire collection of possible creatures is more difficult for a created intellect to know than God as he is in himself. For the former knowledge, and the power of the light eliciting it, could be extended to comprehending God as he is in himself. Since the power that comprehends the whole object of a given power can also, insofar as it is from itself, extend to comprehending that power, the entire collection of possible creatures is the adequate object of divine omnipotence; it would follow that that created knowledge, and the power of that light knowing the whole object, could extend to comprehending the same omnipotence, and consequently God himself. It would therefore both be created and not created. Thus, since comprehension of God is more difficult than vision of him as he is in himself, knowledge of the said creatures will also be more difficult than vision of God.

Add that the perfection and infinity of an object do not remove it from the range of the object of a finite power if that power actualizes it in a finite manner. Therefore, although God, as he is in himself, is infinite, nevertheless, notwithstanding this infinity, he can be united in a finite manner with respect to this vision, as we shall explain below. Hence, notwithstanding his infinity, he remains within the range of the intellect’s object. Yet the whole infinity of creatures cannot be united to a created intellect within its own kind except infinitely, that is, through infinite means, and consequently demanding infinite attention. The said infinity therefore removes those creatures, to be known simultaneously, from the range of a created intellect that is incapable of giving infinite attention.

Since unanimous agreement of the Fathers about it is one of the principal proofs of the mysteries of our faith, while for the other mysteries there is no lack of a reason for doubting whether those same Fathers knew the possibility of the vision of God by essence on the part of a created intellect—which is, as it were, the basis of several other mysteries—after we have shown that the aforementioned intellect can see God by essence, we judged it fitting to examine in detail what the Fathers thought on this matter.

§ I. Recent opinion.

21 Vazq., 1 part., disp. 37, cap. 4, holds that almost all the Fathers denied with such explicit language the possibility of the vision of God by essence on the part of a created intellect that, if we wish to speak candidly, they can scarcely be interpreted in a favorable sense.

This is proved first. For Ambrose, lib. 1 in Lucam, cap. 1, asserts that God is invisible by his very nature. Jerome, in his Commentaries on Isaiah, lib. 3, on the words “I saw the Lord”, shortly afterward, holds that man cannot see God. Basil, lib. 1 contra Eunomium, shortly afterward: “The substance of God, apart from the Only-Begotten, is invisible.” Augustine, tom. 4, in the booklet On the Essence of Divinity: “The latter things” (he says), “that is, you will see my Incarnation, but you will not be able to see my divinity.” Theodoret, in the dialogue On the Immutability: “For they do not see” (namely, the angels) “the divine substance, which can neither be circumscribed, nor comprehended, nor perceived by the intellect.”

22 Secondly, it is proved from Chrysostom, whom Vázquez cites most insistently in favor of the error of the Anomoeans. For in homil. 14 on John, shortly after the beginning, he says: “That which is God was not only never seen by the prophets, but neither by angels nor archangels; and if you should question them, you will hear nothing from them about God's substance, but only this report: glory to God in the highest, since, if all created nature is dependent, with what rationale could it see the uncreated?” Likewise, tom. 5, homil. 3, On the Incomprehensibility of God's Nature, he states in explicit words that no creature, whether human or angelic, can behold God.

23 Nor will it suffice, if, with St. Thomas, you say that Chrysostom wishes only to deny comprehensive vision, not however quidditative and intuitive vision; since there he argues against the Anomoeans, who asserted that they comprehensibly attained to God.

Against this, first, the Anomoeans did not assert that they knew God comprehensibly, but only quidditatively. Therefore, if Chrysostom speaks against them, he denies to the angels not only comprehensive knowledge, but also quidditative knowledge, which is the vision of God by essence. The consequence is evident. Vázquez proves the antecedent in this way: the Anomoeans were not so mad as to persuade themselves of this; whence, when they said that they knew God so well and so exactly as God knows himself, they meant only that they knew God quidditatively, because quidditative knowledge is equal on the part of the object with respect to everyone, insofar as all who see God see him according to everything that is formally in him.

Next. Because in that homil. 14 on John, Chrysostom denies to the angels all that knowledge which would suffice for them to say anything about God's substance as it is in itself, as is clear from the words already adduced; therefore, since the vision of God as he is in himself suffices the angels (as is clear from the same passage), it follows that he denies them this, comprehensible vision, and not merely comprehensive vision.

24 Likewise, in that homily 3 On the Incomprehensibility of God's Nature, he denies not only comprehensive vision of God, but also quidditative and intuitive vision; for he holds that the substance of God is seen by no angelic intellect, but only something derived from it, which plainly conflicts with the vision of God by essence, since that vision tends immediately to God as he is in himself, as is clear from what has been said. Hence, when he there explains the vision of Isaiah, cap. 5, he says that the Seraphim veil their faces with two wings because they could not bear the surpassing splendor of God. He adds: “Although they did not see the pure light itself, nor the pure substance itself, but what they saw was a condescension and an indulgence.” Here it is plainly apparent that he denies intuitive vision of God as he is in himself, because this is the vision of God's pure and true substance, and grants only the vision of something that God condescends.

This is confirmed and explained. For, in order to show what this condescension is, he added: “When God does not manifest himself as he is, but only insofar as he can be seen by the person who has merited such a regard, we say that he measures and tempers his own representation according to the strength of the beholder's sight; and we call a thing of this kind a condescension and an indulgence.” He adds that the prophets saw that condescension, but more obscurely than the angels. Therefore, since God's accommodation and condescension toward the minds of the prophets is such that he does not manifest himself to them as he is in himself, but through another means much lower and proportioned to their minds, the same must be said concerning the angels, who see God only under this condescension and accommodation.

§ II. The contrary opinion, established as altogether certain.

25 Nevertheless, it must be said that the Fathers truly knew that the created intellect can be supernaturally elevated to see God by essence. Thus the scholastics hold in common, with Gabriel Vázquez alone excepted. It would therefore be superfluous to examine anyone in particular.

This assertion could be proved by bringing forward the testimonies of all the Fathers in a precise way. But since it would be long to recount all of them verbatim, we shall mention here only some of the places in which other Fathers confess this very thing.

First, then, this is taught by Gregory of Nazianzus, orat. 2 On Theology, who says: “What, after all, God is in his nature and essence, no mortal has ever discovered, nor will discover in this life with ease, at least in my judgment; he will discover it for the first time when God shall have united to a thing known and familiar that which is Godlike and divine—that is, our mind and reason—and shall have kindled our image after his own exemplar, for which it now burns with desire.”

Next, Augustine teaches this in tom. 2, epist. 6, and also in epist. 112, cap. 15: “If you ask” (he says) “whether God can also be seen someday as he is, I answer that this is promised to sons, concerning whom we have been told, ‘we know that when he appears we shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is.’ If you ask whence we shall see him, I answer: whence the angels see him, with whom we shall then be equal.” Origen also says, lib. 7 contra Celsum, col. 15: “Now we see God through a glass darkly; afterward, face to face.”

26 Likewise, Chrysostom (whom Vázquez cites as the leader of several other Fathers on behalf of the contrary opinion) confesses this very point in epist. 5 to Theodorus the Fallen, in these words: “If Peter, who saw a certain obscure image of future things, immediately rejected everything from his mind because of the pleasure that such a vision had planted in his soul, what shall we say when truth itself will be present, when, with the royal chambers opened, it will be permitted to behold the King himself—not through an enigma, nor through a glass, but face to face; no longer, I say, through faith, but through sight.” Nothing could be said more clearly in support of a true confession of our beatitude, which consists in the clear vision of God.

Finally, this is confessed by Dionysius, cap. 4 On the Celestial Hierarchy; Ignatius, in his epistle to the Romans; Augustine, On the City of God, cap. 30; Epiphanius, lib. 3 Against Heresies, heresy 70; Gregory of Nyssa, lib. On the Beatitudes, in his explanation of “Blessed are the pure in heart”; Isidore, lib. 1 Sent., cap. 26; On Divine Offices, cap. On the Rule of Faith; Bernard, sermon 31 on the Canticles, and lib. 5 De Consider.; Theophylact, on John 1; Euthymius there, and many others.

All these points can also be confirmed from the preceding Difficulty. For there we said that this truth, namely that the blessed see God by essence, and consequently that this vision is possible for them, was defined by the Church; it is therefore a sign that this was the mind of the Fathers, and consequently that their unanimous agreement decidedly does not stand with the contrary opinion; otherwise the Church would contradict itself, because it would overturn the surest supports by which it is fortified and defended, namely the statements of the Fathers, whom it duly and carefully consults in definitions of this kind, so that it may thereby be better disposed to define even the truth itself.

§ III. The arguments proposed at the outset are answered.

27 To the first argument, therefore, an answer is given along with St. Thomas, in 4, dist. 49, quaest. 2, art. 1, ad 1, and Augustine, epistles 111 and 112: the aforementioned Fathers, and indeed any others, are to be explained by one of the three ways set forth in the preceding Difficulty, namely, whether the reference is to vision in this mortal life, or vision through the bodily eye, or finally comprehensive vision; in such a way, however, that the one which is more consonant with the context be adapted to each Father. Hence Ambrose, Jerome, Basil, and Augustine, in the places cited, call God invisible either because, according to the ordinary course of things, he cannot be seen in this mortal life, or because he is invisible to bodily eyes. In this way they meant to signify that God is not bodily and therefore cannot be seen as a body even by the angels. Augustine thus explains the aforementioned Fathers in the place cited. By this, incidentally, the other objections that Vázquez brings against this explanation can also be clearly seen to fail.

28 To the second argument, the best answer is the solution given by St. Thomas there. First, because in homil. 14 on John, Chrysostom is dealing with the explanation of that testimony: “No one has ever seen God; the Only-Begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has made him known.” This is indeed to be understood not of any kind of vision, but of comprehensive vision. Next, because this is taught by Ambrose, lib. 5 in Lucam, the chapter on the apparition of the angel to the priest Zechariah; Epiphanius, heresy 70; and Augustine, epist. 112 On Seeing God, cap. 5 and 6, who says that the statement is to be understood with regard to the fullness of divinity, because no one except the Son, who is true God, comprehends the divinity.

Next, because John wished there, as is clear from the context, to explain the distinction between Moses and Christ: Moses was the minister of the Law, as a servant; Christ, however, was the Author of grace, as the Only-Begotten Son. Hence, to show that he is God, and consequently equal to the Father, he says that God is seen comprehensibly by no creature; yet he is indeed fully known by the Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, because he is of one nature with him, and thus the Son himself has made known everything belonging to the Father, however hidden it may be. Therefore, Chrysostom, having penetrated the force of this testimony and speaking accordingly about comprehensive vision, rightly said that no creature can see the uncreated nature of God; and, to explain altogether that this was his intention, he added shortly after the quoted words that here vision is called the most certain contemplation of the Father, and such comprehension as the Father has of the Son.

Finally, because, as we indicated above, in that homily and in his other writings On the Incomprehensibility of God's Nature, Chrysostom argues against the Anomoeans, who—as is clear from Theodoret, lib. 4 of Heretical Fables, and from Chrysostom himself in the immediately cited passage—asserted that they were ignorant of nothing about God, but knew God's very substance so exactly that they had the same knowledge of God as God himself has of himself, and consequently attained not somehow or other, but comprehensibly, to the divine essence. Thus he wished to refute this error alone, as is clear from what the same holy Doctor teaches in the same book, hom. 4, immediately following, in these words: “It would now be enough, dearest brothers, if, after we have recently shown that God is incomprehensible to human beings, and even to the Cherubim and Seraphim, relieved of the importunity of human heretics, we should admonish nothing further.”

29 Therefore, against the first proof offered there by St. Thomas in opposition to the solution, the antecedent must be denied. Against his proof, the antecedent must also be denied. For the Anomoeans are called not only mad but also furious by Epiphanius, heresy 76. Indeed, Chrysostom, hom. 5 On the Incomprehensibility of God's Nature, recounting their madness, says: “This kind of men must be despised and rejected no less than fools and madmen.”

Add, that the words of the Anomoeans quoted in this solution are so explicit in affirming comprehension that the scholastics and several of the Fathers use them to explain it; consequently, when all are considered, they do not permit a benign interpretation in this respect: indeed, the truth of the Catholic faith is contained in the testimonies of the Fathers, as will be still more evident from what has been said and what will be said immediately.

30 To the second proof, the answer is that Chrysostom intends there only that the Only-Begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father and of one nature with him, can say anything when asked about God's substance, or can tell it forth if he pleases—not somehow or other, but as the Author and Teacher of this doctrine. The angelic office, however, is not to be teachers and authors of the aforesaid doctrine, but its ministers and God's praisers; hence they always proclaim: “Glory to God in the highest.”

That this was Chrysostom's intention is clear, because, as we said, he was there explaining that testimony of John: “No one has ever seen God; the Only-Begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has made him known.” There, just as he ascribes comprehensive vision of God to the Only-Begotten alone, and consequently distinguishes him from Moses in this, that Moses had been the minister of the Law, as a servant, whereas Christ was the Author of grace, as the Only-Begotten, as we have already shown, so likewise he intends there that only Christ can answer, or tell forth anything about God's substance, as the Teacher and Author of this doctrine, and not the others.

31 Nevertheless, it must be added that things that are God's are known to no one according to their dignity except God himself, and thus cannot be told forth according to their dignity by anyone except him. Hence it is no wonder that, from the defect of this worthy telling-forth, which cannot be found in the angels, Chrysostom said that the angels cannot answer when asked about God's substance; no more than Paul, after the vision of the divine essence, asserted: “I heard secret words which it is not lawful for a man to utter,” because he could not tell them forth according to their dignity.

To the third proof, the answer is that Chrysostom did not say, as Vázquez maintains, that the angels see only something derived from the divine essence, as the text will show to one considering it closely. Even if he had said this, nothing would follow against St. Thomas. For the sense would be that they can comprehensibly attain only to something derived from God's essence, but not to the essence itself as it is in itself.

We admit, moreover, that those words taken from the vision of Isaiah, cap. 6, are Chrysostom's; yet in them he means only that the Seraphim do not comprehensibly see that wondrous light and pure substance of God, but in proportion to the light of glory, by which the intellect is not only strengthened but also accommodated to the object, insofar as, according to the measure and strength of the light, the divine essence is united as intelligible form with the intellects of the blessed, as will be evident from what is said below.

32 Chrysostom explained this very well, both in the words brought forward above in confirmation, namely: “He measures and tempers his own representation according to the strength of the beholder's sight,” and also by the term condescension. For the divine essence, considered under the aspect of form, is united in the highest degree of union and identification with the divine intellect, and consequently wholly, totally, and with reference to comprehension; but with the created intellect of the blessed it is united only in a lower degree, by condescension from that highest degree: for although it is wholly united to it, it is not nevertheless totally united. Likewise, although it is identified with it in intelligible being, as we shall say below, this identification is far less and infinitely deficient in comparison with the former; therefore, this mode of condescension removes comprehension, but not vision: for the divine essence, as it is in itself, is united to either intellect.

Hence the same Chrysostom, in that same book On the Incomprehensibility of God's Nature, hom. 4, expressly explains how this condescension removes only comprehensive knowledge of God, saying: “Since, therefore, he says that God, though condescending, was unable to sustain those powers, he teaches nothing except that his explicit, ample, and complete knowledge could not be received.” And he immediately adds: “Hence also the Evangelist knows more certainly that such a great thing is not concerned with human nature, and that God is not comprehensible even by the highest powers.” Here it is clear, as has been shown, that he teaches only that this condescension removes from the angels the knowledge that would be at once explicit, ample, and complete—that is, adequate to God, and thus extended in the order of knowledge as God is in the order of knowability; and therefore he added those final words: “That God is not comprehensible even by the highest powers.” By this, the confirmation is sufficiently clear.

33 Nor does the statement added at the close of the same confirmation stand in the way, namely, that the Prophets were deprived of the vision of the divine essence and nevertheless saw the aforesaid condescension, though more obscurely than the angels. For Chrysostom called that condescension and indulgence which is the degree of divine knowledge that God grants to each person, whether in this life, as to the Prophets and other human beings, or in the future life, as to the blessed: not because there is no vision of the divine essence in the blessed, as we have seen above from the same Chrysostom, or because it is equal in all, both blessed and unblessed; but because it is inferior to the knowledge adequate to the divine essence, which is comprehensive, and in both is limited according to God's good pleasure and indulgence, as from the first principle, and according to the nature of the light—whether dim or clear—which is conferred by God. Thus, although the same knowledge is obscure in the Prophets because the prophetic light is not indicative of God as he is in himself, it is not so in the blessed; even though in them too it falls short of that clarity which comprehensive knowledge of God seeks. Hence it is said to be obscure in some sense only by comparison with that clarity. Chrysostom indicates this obscurity, so to speak, when he said that the Prophets also saw the aforesaid condescension, but more obscurely than the angels.

Once the possibility of the beatific vision has been explained, and it has been shown that the Holy Fathers, filled with the light of faith, knew it, the mind is immediately prompted to inquire whether it can also be known clearly through the light of nature. Therefore, after the two preceding doubts, we rightly raise this one at once.

§ I. The first opinion is proposed.

34 The first opinion affirms that, by natural reason and wholly devoid of the light of faith, it can be clearly known that the possibility of seeing God clearly, as He is in Himself, is possible. In support of this, Gonzalez, in the present disputation, 24, section 2, cites certain theologians; Vazquez, 1, 2, disp. 20, cap. 2, defends it, although the author here limits this opinion for a time by saying that, although once the reasons demonstrating the possibility of the beatific vision have been investigated, the intellect, by the light of nature alone, can attain to their efficacy, it nevertheless needs the assistance of a greater light in order to investigate or discover them.

35 First, it is proved by the reason that we adduced above in the first doubt in support of our assertion, which, in order to recommend this opinion more effectively, can be put in the following form: It is clear by the natural light that the created intellect can, either by its own power or through God's elevation, know whatever is contained under its adequate object; therefore it will be clear that it can know God as He is in Himself. The antecedent is evident in all powers. For it is certain that sight can perceive, at least through divine elevation, everything visible, and hearing everything audible, and so of the other powers; therefore the same must be granted to the intellect, which is a higher power. The consequence is also evident, because it is clear that God, as He is in Himself, is formally being, and therefore is contained under the adequate object of the intellect, which, as is evident, is being as such.

This is confirmed. By the natural light it is evident that a perfection appropriate to a lower power can belong to a higher one, if both belong to the same genus; but it is evident by the natural light that sight and intellect belong to the genus of cognitive power, with the intellect being far nobler than sight. Therefore, since it is certain that the visual power can intuitively know, as they are in themselves, all things contained under its adequate object, it follows that the same must be granted to the intellectual power. The minor, with the consequence, seems to follow from itself. The major is also clear, because it is certain that the perfections of lower things are found in higher things in a more eminent manner; and thus to be vegetative and sensitive, which is found in the souls of lower brute animals, namely vegetative and sensitive, is found in a more excellent way in the rational [soul], because it is a higher and more eminent form.

36 Second, the created intellect, according to its nature, is capable, at least radically, of the vision of God by essence; but an angel comprehends the aforesaid intellect by the light of nature; therefore it will be evident to him that God, as He is in Himself, is visible to that same intellect. The consequence seems clear. For it is contradictory that a power should be comprehended by an intellect and that the objects to which it can extend should not be known by that intellect; therefore all the individual objects of divine power are known to God alone, because only His intellect can comprehend that all-powerfulness. The minor follows from itself, and is taught by theologians in common. The major also seems certain: first, because it is certain that the essence of the created intellect consists in a coaptation and essential commensuration with being as such, and with whatever being is contained under it, as we said in doubt 1; and again, because otherwise the intellect, by the light of glory, could not be elevated to see God as He is in Himself. Just as corporeal sight is not, even remotely and fundamentally, capable of the vision of God by essence, because it has no coaptation or essential commensuration with that vision, so it cannot be elevated to attain to it.

37 Third, the natural light clearly knows that it is credible by divine faith that the created intellect can see God as He is in Himself; therefore it will also be clearly true to it that such a vision is possible. The antecedent is S. Thomas, 2a 2ae, q. 1, a. 4, ad 2 and 3, whom theologians commonly follow, asserting that all the mysteries of our faith are clearly credible by divine faith. The consequence is proved because it is evident by the natural light that divine faith cannot incline to anything except truth; otherwise such an error would be refuted in God who revealed it. Therefore, if by the light of nature it is clearly certain that the possibility of a clear vision of God by the created intellect is contained under the object of divine faith, then it will also be clearly true with respect to that same light that such a possibility exists. Just as, if it is clearly true that something is contained in itself and directly under the object of sight, it will also be clear that it is colored and bright, or at least bright, because it is evident that sight cannot incline to anything in itself and directly except what is bright and colored, or at least bright.

38 This is confirmed. For this reasoning is the best: This is clearly impossible: therefore it is clearly incredible; therefore this too is legitimate: This is clearly credible: therefore it is clearly possible. The consequence is evident, because we argue from the opposite of the consequent to the opposite of the antecedent, which is a legitimate mode of argument. Therefore, if the natural light clearly knows it to be credible by divine faith that the created intellect can see God as He is in Himself, it will also be clearly certain to it that this is true.

Fourth, it is evident by the natural light that man has an innate appetite for the vision of God by essence; therefore it will also be evident that this vision is possible. The consequence is evident, because it is evident that an innate appetite can be satisfied; otherwise it would have been implanted by nature in vain. The antecedent is also evident, because it is evident that there is in man a natural appetite for his ultimate end and beatitude, since this inclination is found in all other things; therefore, since man's ultimate end and happiness consist in the clear vision of God, it is absolutely certain that he has a natural appetite for it.

This is confirmed. It is evident that the natural appetite of an intellectual creature rests in nothing outside God until it reaches the clear vision of God, as experience itself seems to attest; therefore God, when clearly seen, is not merely the ultimate end, but the natural ultimate end of that creature, and consequently it naturally desires him. This final consequence follows from itself. The first is also evident, because every natural thing rests when it has attained its natural end; therefore, if the rational creature rests in the clear vision of God and not in anything else, this will be a sign that such a vision is its natural end.

§ II. Resolution of the doubt according to the mind of St. Thomas.

39 In order to proceed more clearly, it must be presupposed that we can speak of the natural light in itself, taken precisely, or as assisted or excited by the light of faith or by divine revelation.

With this presupposed, it must be said first that the natural light in itself, taken precisely, cannot clearly know or demonstrate that the vision of God by essence is possible to the created intellect.

This assertion is openly derived from S. Thomas, 1a 2ae, q. 109, a. 1, whom Caiet., Zumel, Machin, and other Thomists follow in the present Sylvester, part 1, Conflatus, q. 12, a. 1; Medina, 1, 2, q. 5, a. 1; Martinez, ibid.; Alvarez, disp. 28; Suarez, disp. 30, Metaphys., sect. 11, and 1. tom. Summae Theolog., lib. 2, de attributis, cap. 7, and many others.

40 First, it is proved by the reason derived from the cited places of S. Thomas, which can be reduced to this form. The vision of God, as it is in itself, is supernatural according to its substance, as will be shown more fully below in art. 4; therefore its possibility cannot be demonstrated from the natural light alone, taken in itself and precisely. The consequence is evident, because, precisely insofar as it is a created supernatural action, it cannot be demonstrated from any source other than supernatural principles; but the natural light, taken in itself and precisely, proceeds only from natural principles.

This is first confirmed from the same Doctor. A demonstration of the possibility of some created thing made by the natural light, taken in itself, is either a priori, and thus proceeds from causes of the natural order, or a posteriori, and therefore from natural effects; but a supernatural created thing, according to its substance, has neither causes nor effects of the natural order; therefore its possibility cannot be demonstrated by the natural light alone. The consequence and major follow from themselves. The minor is also evident, because when the cause and effect of a thing must be proportionate, a supernatural thing must not, formally speaking, depend on natural causes, nor must its effects as such belong to the natural order.

Secondly, it is confirmed by the reason indicated by the same Doctor, 1a 2ae, q. 114, and 1 Cor. 2. For the possibility of the means by which the vision of God, as He is in Himself, is attained cannot be clearly demonstrated by the natural light alone; therefore neither can the possibility of that vision. The consequence is evident, because the possibility of an end cannot be demonstrated if the possibility of the means cannot be clearly known, since an end cannot be attained except through means. The antecedent is also evident, because the means for attaining the aforesaid vision, namely grace, faith, hope, charity, etc., are supernatural and thus exceed the reach of the natural light.

41 Nor does Vazquez's reply at the cited place weaken the force of this confirmation, namely, that it is enough for demonstrating the possibility of some end that it be demonstrated that some means, taken generally, are possible with regard to such an attainment; and for demonstrating these, the natural light would suffice.

This therefore does not weaken the force of the aforesaid confirmation; rather, a greater corroboration of it arises from it. For the entire reason why the possibility of the means specifically and determinately required for attaining the aforesaid vision cannot be demonstrated by the natural light, yet the possibility of those same means taken generally, without determining whether they are supernatural, cannot be other than this: that in the means taken in this last sense nothing of the supernatural appears, although it does appear in them when taken in the first sense; therefore, since the vision of God as He is in Himself expresses something supernatural, its possibility cannot be demonstrated by the natural light alone; just as, for the same supernatural character, the possibility of the means taken specifically and determinately cannot be demonstrated.

Add to this that, in order to demonstrate the possibility of a supernatural end, such as the beatific vision, one must demonstrate the possibility of means proportionate to that end, and therefore supernatural. Hence, although it is not necessary to descend to a determination of the aforesaid means, nevertheless, however generally they are taken, they must include the supernatural; otherwise they could not, even in this sense, be attained by the natural light alone, since, as we have often said, the natural light in itself, taken precisely, cannot clearly attain a created thing that is supernatural according to its substance as such.

42 Second, and principally, the assertion is proved by the reason indicated by St. Thomas in 1 Cor. 2. Because none of the ancient and most renowned philosophers, guided by the natural light alone and disputing about God, attained the knowledge that the created intellect can see God immediately and as He is in Himself; therefore there is a sign that this cannot be demonstrated by the natural light alone. The consequence is evident, because if it were demonstrable by the aforesaid light, there is no doubt that some one of them would have attained it, as they demonstrated many other things, and very difficult things, because they are knowable by the natural light.

43 Nor does Vazquez's solution avail, namely, that although the possibility of the vision of God by essence is demonstrable by the natural light alone, the demonstrations serving this purpose cannot be investigated by natural philosophers through the aforesaid light; because, so that the created intellect may not err about many natural things, it needs to be assisted by the light of faith, and therefore it cannot discover them without that light, although once discovered, their efficacy will exercise force upon the intellect assisted by the natural light alone and move it to assent.

Thus, this does not avail. Because contradictions seem to be involved in this solution. For if the aforesaid demonstrations cannot be investigated by the natural light alone, they cannot be achieved by it when taken precisely; and then, if their efficacy does not exceed that light, there is no reason why they could not be investigated by it. Above all, the reason which seems to this author unjustly to be a demonstration, namely, that the created intellect has a natural appetite for its beatitude, and consequently for the vision of God, and that this appetite can be satisfied so that it is not frustrated, is not so difficult that no created intellect could investigate it, when many other demonstrations, far more difficult, were discovered by Aristotle and Plato to show other natural truths.

44 It must be said second that the created intellect, not in itself and taken precisely, but as assisted or excited by the light of faith, can show by theological demonstration, probable reasons, or other conjectures, the possibility of the vision of God by essence. This assertion is openly derived from what is taught by St. Thomas below, q. 27, a. 2, and q. 32, a. 1, and in 3 part., q. 1, a. 1, and is commonly received by the authors cited for the preceding assertion.

It nevertheless requires explanation. For the created intellect can use the light of faith in two ways: either so that, from revealed principles and from others known by the natural light, it deduces some conclusion; or so that it is excited by the light of faith to use natural, but not revealed, principles in order to reach some conclusion. We therefore say that the created intellect, assisted in the first way by the light of faith, can show by theological demonstration the possibility of the vision of God by essence; but when excited in the second way, it can do so only probabilistically, and by certain fitting considerations persuade us of it.

45 The assertion, thus explained, is proved as regards its first part. For from this revealed principle: Men or angels are elevated to the supernatural order by grace and charity, which are participations and effects of God as He is in Himself; and from another principle known by the natural light, namely, that once the effect is known, there is a natural desire to know its cause as far as it is the cause, it is effectively inferred that there is in elevated men or angels a natural desire to see their cause, namely God, as He is in Himself. For in this respect God is the cause of the aforesaid effects, grace and charity; and therefore from this it is also inferred that it is possible that such a vision exist, because a natural appetite, so that it not be frustrated, cannot tend toward the impossible.

46 As regards the second part, the same assertion is urged as follows: just as natural reason excited by the light of faith can discover reasons and conjectures by which it may prove in some way that the mystery of the Incarnation, or of the procession of the Word, is not discordant with natural reason, but agrees with it in its own way, as is usually shown in its proper materials; so, excited by the same light, it can also use probable reasons to prove that the possibility of the vision of God by essence is not discordant with the natures of things, as is established by the reasons adduced in doubt 1 in support of our assertion. Although these do not effectively convince, as will be clear from what has been said and from what remains to be said in this doubt, that the created intellect can see God as He is in Himself, nevertheless, with this possibility presupposed from faith, these considerations show in some way that the aforesaid vision of God, as He is in Himself, is not repugnant to the nature of the created intellect, but agrees with it in its own way, especially if the solutions of the arguments opposing the possibility of this mystery are added, which we shall immediately append.

§ III. The foundations of the first opinion are met.

47 To the first, therefore, it must be answered that both it and the other arguments prove our second assertion as regards its final part, if they are applied in the due manner. But insofar as they oppose the first assertion, it must be said in answer to the first that it is not evident by the natural light that the adequate object of the intellect is being as such, abstracted from natural and supernatural being. Hence, anyone who asserted that its object is only natural being could not be clearly convinced of falsity from the force of the natural light.

Add that, although we freely granted that it is evident that the object of the intellect is being according to the common meaning of its analogy, nevertheless it could not be clearly concluded from that by the natural light that God can be seen in the most perfect way, and therefore quidditatively and as He is in Himself; because it would suffice that He be knowable in a more imperfect way, as will be more fully shown in the answer to the second.

48 To the confirmation it is answered that it is not universally true that a perfection appropriate to a lower thing must be found in a higher and more eminent thing, even if both belong to the same genus. Hence, although man and heaven belong to the genus of body, incorruptibility appropriate to heaven must not thereby be found in man, who is a higher thing. Likewise, although corporeal vision includes evidentness, which is a great perfection of cognition, it does not follow that the act of faith, contained under the genus of cognition, must have the same evidentness; indeed, it is rather opposed to it. And surely, if the argument proved what was intended, it would also conclude that the created intellect can see God as He is by its own powers; because there can be a sight, namely corporeal sight, able by its own powers to attain its whole object. Therefore, since this concerns its perfection, the intellect too could attain its whole object by its own powers, and as it is in itself, if it were once true that a perfection appropriate to a lower power with respect to its own object must be found in a higher one with respect to its own object.

49 The reason why we philosophize differently about sight and intellect here is that, since sight is a lower, material, and sufficiently imperfect power, it need not have an object belonging to a higher and exceeding order. The intellect, however, is not only more eminent than sight, but is also intrinsically most noble, tending toward being according to the common meaning of its analogy; and thus an object of a higher reason can be contained under its adequate object, and consequently exceeds its natural efficacy. It therefore does not belong to the proportionate and connatural object, but to the extensive object of the intellect. Yet it does not follow that the aforesaid object can be clearly known, in a particular way, as contained under the extensive object of the intellect by the natural light alone; because just as the natural light of that intellect cannot reach it by its own powers, since it transcends the entire natural order, so it is not evident that, when taken in that sense, it is contained under its adequate object, although in reality it is contained under it.

50 To the second it is answered first that, if it is true that in the created intellect there is a distinction between a twofold power, one natural, so that the intellect itself is essentially a natural power, and another obediential, belonging to the supernatural order, as we said above in no. 12 of this disputation, then the aforesaid intellect will not be capable of attaining the vision of God by essence through the former power, but through this latter power. Therefore, from the fact that an angel comprehends that same intellect, it does not follow that he will know the possibility of the beatific vision, because he comprehends only the natural power, which does not extend to that vision, and not the obediential power formally considered, by virtue of which it is capable of attaining the aforesaid vision.

51 Secondly, it is answered (indeed consequently with regard to what we said in no. 13) by granting the major and minor and denying the consequence. In answer to the proof, it must be said that it is true of objects connatural to a power, but not of those with respect to which it has precisely capacity and essential commensuration. For although an intellect comprehending a power must know, both the specific object of that power according to the reason expressed by it, according to which it specifies, and thus in a more explanatory way, and also what the connatural objects are in particular to which it can extend, it still need not know what are the disproportionate and exceeding objects in particular to which it can be elevated supernaturally.

Thus, although the intellect is comprehended by an angel according to its essence, it does not follow that by the force of that comprehension its capacity for the clear vision of God, which is something exceeding, is clearly known; but only that it is known both what the connatural objects are in particular to which the aforesaid intellect can extend, or with respect to which intelligible species are connaturally due to it, and by which they are known, and also that the aforesaid intellect is of such a nature that it looks to its specific object, namely being as such, without determining expressly whether it is natural or supernatural, or whether inferior things belong to the natural or supernatural order, and consequently whether there is something common with respect to natural or supernatural beings as such. Although in reality all these things are contained under it, therefore, by the force of the cognition of this object, it cannot be known whether supernatural beings are possible when taken in particular, or whether they are comprehended under its object.

52 This can also be explained by the example of the same angelic intellect when compared with other possible creatures of the natural order and tending toward another universal. For although the aforesaid creatures are comprehended under its object, the aforesaid intellect, comprehending itself, does not attain such creatures in particular; because they do not belong to its connatural object, or to the object with respect to which intelligible species are due to them, as is usually said in the treatise on angels, and as we shall explain there, God granting it.

This is sufficient against what is urged from omnipotence in this argument. Because all possible creatures, taken individually, are not disproportionate and exceeding objects with respect to it; and therefore they cannot be comprehensively attained unless all of them are also attained in particular.

53 Nor does it matter if one argues that, in order for knowledge to be comprehensive, it must extend just as the known object extends, as will be evident from what we shall say in art. 7, but that the intellect according to its essence extends even to supernatural objects in particular, namely to the vision of God by essence; therefore comprehensive knowledge, precisely as such, must extend to the vision of the divine essence, attaining what the aforesaid intellect, when comprehended, is capable of seeing, namely the divine essence.

It is answered, indeed, by granting the major in the formal sense, that is, concerning the known object according to that precise reason under which it falls under comprehension, and denying the minor concerning the intellect, insofar as it falls under comprehension by an angel, but otherwise insofar as it does not fall under it. Then the consequence must be denied.

This is explained. The intellect according to its essence can be considered either by being compared with its specific object according to the reason that it expressly and most formally states in the idea of the specific object, or with it according to everything that it implicitly and materially includes, or with the connatural object proportionate to the quantity of its power, or finally by being compared with its exceeding object. Therefore, although the intellect according to its essence is comprehended by angelic cognition insofar as it is compared with its specific object, taken in the first manner, or with its proportionate object, it is not comprehended insofar as it is compared with its exceeding object, or with the specific object according to everything that it implicitly and materially includes. Thus it is not necessary that by the force of that comprehension it be known that the aforesaid intellect can extend to the clear vision of God, which is a disproportionate and exceeding object with respect to it.

54 Nor does it follow that, absolutely and simply speaking, the aforesaid intellect is not comprehended by natural comprehension through that angelic cognition; for in order absolutely and simply to comprehend the essence of a power, it is not necessary except to comprehend it as compared with its proportionate and specific object, taken in the manner already stated. For the aforementioned comprehension does not in any way require comprehensiveness of an obediential power, as theologians commonly teach; whether it is supernatural according to substance, as we said in the first solution of this argument, or is not supernatural according to substance but is purely obediential, as happens according to this mode of speaking. Consequently, it will not be necessary to comprehend the aforesaid essence insofar as it reduplicatively and formally connotes or covertly brings in its obediential power with respect to the supernatural object, and therefore it will not be necessary to comprehend it insofar as it is compared in particular with its exceeding object (since according to its obediential power it must be compared in that way), or insofar as it is compared with its specific object according to everything that it materially and implicitly connotes. For in this sense it is said that the aforesaid essence, insofar as it reduplicatively and formally connotes, covertly includes its obediential power with respect to the supernatural object.

55 To the third it is answered that, although it is not metaphysically evident that the mysteries of our faith, with respect to the thing itself, have all the conditions required in order that they be believed by divine, that is, supernatural, faith, because, on the side of the thing believed, what falls under that faith must be true in itself, and so, since the argument concludes well, it would clearly be known that they are true if it were evident in the said manner that they fall under divine faith, nevertheless it is metaphysically evident with respect to prudent and right reason that, namely, although it is not evident that the thing itself has the aforesaid conditions, it is nevertheless evident that it is prudently judged to have them. From this, however, it does not follow that it is evident that they are such as faith teaches, but only that it is prudently judged that they are so. Hence, notwithstanding that judgment, they could, so far as this head is concerned, be false and impossible, as will be more fully explained in the answer to the confirmation; and thus their possibility cannot be clearly inferred from it.

56 To the confirmation it is answered by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. In answer to the proof, it should be noted that there the argument is not from the opposite of the consequent to the opposite of the antecedent, since both propositions are affirmative; but it should be inferred as follows: This is not clearly incredible: therefore it is not clearly impossible. From this, however, nothing follows against us, because the conclusion is at most that the possibility of the mystery is clearly negative, not positive; that is, it is not proved that such a mystery is impossible, nor is it positively proved that it is possible.

This confirmation can also plainly be pressed by an analogy. Just as, from the fact that something is clearly impossible, and therefore clearly unthinkable, it is not well inferred that if it is clearly thinkable, it will be clearly possible, because from the fact that it is evident that something can be held opinatively and probably, it does not follow that it is evident that it is true; so the reasoning used in this confirmation will likewise have no force, as will be evident to the one considering it.

And surely the reason in both cases is the same: namely, that the evidentness of the probability and credibility of a thing in the sense meant is not taken from the fact that the thing is or is not, since many false things are more probable than true things; but from other extrinsic causes, namely, the testimonies of the Doctors, or signs, or other reasons and conjectures. These can coexist with the falsity of the same thing, and nevertheless clearly persuade us that it has all the conditions required in order that it be prudently judged worthy of belief. This is evident in the case of a rustic, to whom the common consensus of the Doctors proposed as certain by faith that Christ is present under the form of this host. Then it would be evident that the rustic would prudently judge, if he thought, that it was worthy of belief by divine faith, even though in reality it were not so.

The last point will become clear in the following doubt.

57 So that the title may remain more familiar, it should be noted, following St. Thomas, I part., q. 19, a. 1 and 9, q. 59, a. 1, and q. 80, a. 1, that the appetite is twofold: one innate, or natural, and the other elicited. The first is the inclination, or propensity, implanted by the author of nature, by which each thing, without any knowledge, is inclined toward its own good, as heavy things are inclined toward the center and light things toward the place above. This appetite, however, does not constitute a special kind of power, distinct from substantial or accidental nature, to which it belongs; rather, it is the weight of that thing toward its own perfection. The elicited appetite, on the other hand, which properly has the character of an appetite, is the act of appeting, by which a thing is borne toward a known good under the aspect of good. Thus, it proceeds from a certain special power, namely, a sensitive or rational appetite. The former is borne toward a sensible good, and the latter toward a good as such. At present, however, we are speaking only of the first appetite, not of the latter; for we shall treat of the latter more clearly and distinctly in the following difficulty.

§ I. The Position of Scotus and Others.

58 The first opinion affirms that there is in intellectual nature an innate appetite, in the manner of nature’s weight, for the vision of God as He is in Himself, Triune and One. Thus Scotus, in 1, q. 1, prol., and in 4, d. 49, q. 10; Durandus, at the same place, q. 8; Paludanus, q. 47; Soto, q. 2, a. 1, and lib. 1 On Nature and Grace, ch. 4; Valentia, 1a 2ae, q. 5, a. 8, d. 1, point 1.

The principal foundations of this opinion can be reduced to two. The first is that which occasioned the present difficulty. The second is as follows. Because God, as He is in Himself Triune and One, belongs to the specific object of the intellect; therefore, the intellect is naturally inclined to see Him when considered under this aspect. The conclusion is evident. For every power is naturally inclined toward its specific object, and toward whatever pertains to it, just as it is inclined toward that from which it has its entire being and its specification.

59 Nor does it matter if one says that God, as He is in Himself, is contained within the specific object of the intellect as something exceeding and disproportionate to it; and thus that the intellect has no innate appetite toward Him when thus considered. For against this it may be said that the same objective reason according to species that is found in other beings is also found in God as He is in Himself when described in the present way; therefore, just as the intellect is naturally inclined to know other objects, so is it naturally inclined to attain to God under the reason described above. The antecedent is proved. Because the same objective reason according to species must be found in all objects not proportionate to any one power; otherwise, it would not be one according to species. The conclusion, too, is evident. For the entire reason for its natural inclination toward other objects is that the same reason is formally and specifically found in them, just as sight is naturally inclined toward its objects because its own proper objective reason, namely visibility, is found in them.

It is confirmed. For the material reason is related materially and accidentally to the formal and objective reason; therefore, if the same formal objective reason is found once in God as He is in Himself Triune and One and in other objects, it follows either that the intellect is not naturally inclined toward the others, or that it is naturally inclined toward God under both reasons.

§ II. The Knot of the Difficulty Is Untied from the Doctrine of St. Thomas.

60 Nevertheless, it must be said that the innate appetite just described, taken in the created intellectual being as a weight or inclination of nature, does not exist without some prior knowledge ordered to God that is clear and quidditative—whether of God as Triune and One, or merely as One—and with respect to those predicates that pertain to the notion of the first cause. This assertion is plainly drawn from St. Thomas in this article, and q. 23, a. 1, q. 62, a. 1 and 2, 1a 2ae, q. 114, a. 2, On Truth, q. 22, a. 7, and finally in 4, d. 49, q. 1, a. 3, q. unc. 3, in these words: Although, however, the will may have from its natural inclination a tendency toward blessedness according to the common notion, nevertheless, the fact that it tends to this or that blessedness does not come from natural inclination, but through the discernment of reason, which discovers that man’s highest good consists in this or that blessedness. And so in the present case they follow the Holy Doctor, as do Cajetan, Báñez, Zumel, Nazarius, and Molina; Álvarez, 1a 2ae, d. 26; Martínez, q. 3, a. 8, dub. 1; and very many others.

61 It is proved by an argument taken from the same Saintly Doctor at the places cited. Because, as is evident from those same places, God seen clearly, whether as Triune and One or as One, and as the first cause, is a supernatural object, one that exceeds and is disproportionate to the created intellectual being; therefore, there is not in that being an innate appetite, in the manner of a weight and inclination of nature, ordered toward Him thus considered. The antecedent will be evident from what we shall say in articles 4 and 5. For, as will there be evident, God as He is in Himself cannot be seen clearly and intuitively even with respect to the notion of the first cause, apart from the light of glory and the union of the divine essence in the aspect of the intelligible species with the intellect. Since these things are therefore above its nature—because neither the light of glory nor the union of the divine essence in the aspect of the intelligible species can be connatural to any created or creatable intellect—it follows that the vision of the divine essence as it is in Himself, whether under both reasons or as the first cause, is an object exceeding, disproportionate, and supernatural with respect to created intellectual nature. The conclusion, too, is evident. For a natural appetite in the manner of a weight of nature exists only toward a connatural and proportionate good, as is evident by induction from the other appetites and natural inclinations; and therefore a heavy body is inclined in this manner toward the center, and a light body toward the place above, because these are goods proportionate and connatural to it.

62 It is confirmed, first. Because the natural inclination in the manner of a weight of nature of which we are speaking was implanted by God precisely as the author of nature; therefore, it cannot extend to God Himself, insofar as He is in Himself and transcends the entire order of that nature, and consequently neither to Him as He is clearly visible in Himself, whether as Triune and One or as One. The antecedent is evident of itself. Both conclusions, too, are evident. Because an inclination cannot extend beyond that toward which its own principle extends; therefore, if it is from God as the author of nature, it will not have the power to transcend this entire order and belong to the supernatural order, within which God is contained as He is clearly and visibly in Himself, whether as Triune and One or as One and the first cause.

It is confirmed, second, by the argument indicated by St. Thomas, 1a 2ae, q. 114, a. 2. For whenever the aforesaid innate appetite in the manner of a weight and inclination of nature toward some end is given, instruments and powers within the order of nature are also given for attaining that end. But in the created intellectual being there are not given instruments and powers within the aforesaid order by which it could attain to a clear vision of God; rather, these are bestowed upon it gratuitously by God, the supernatural author. Therefore, there will not be in it an innate appetite for the vision of God. The consequence seems evident. The minor premise is certain. The major premise, too, is evident. Because otherwise that appetite and natural weight would be frustrate, since it could not be fulfilled by the powers of nature, which alone it regards. Hence Aristotle proves from this, in 2 On the Heavens, text 50, that the stars are not naturally inclined to progressive motion; because otherwise the author of nature would have given them instruments for that motion, which ought to proceed from them, so that their inclination would not be frustrate.

63 Scotus objects that it is enough for the clear vision of God to be the ultimate end of the created intellectual being, because every nature naturally tends toward its ultimate end. Then, by way of a fuller solution confirming the second argument, he adds that an innate appetite is often given for a form that nevertheless cannot be attained by the powers of nature. This is evident in the separated soul, which, although it naturally desires union with the body—as St. Thomas seems to teach in 1 part., q. 76, a. 1, ad 6—is not nevertheless given in nature instruments and powers for reuniting with it. Likewise, in a person who has an innate appetite to live according to right reason, and also to the effect that he may never sin, and thus may never deviate from right reason, there is need of special assistance from grace.

But against this: the fact that something is the ultimate end with respect to some nature does not prevent it from being disproportionate and exceeding, as is evident in itself and in the vision of God by essence with respect to the created intellectual being; therefore, in that case, nature will not have an innate appetite ordered toward the aforesaid end, even though it is ultimate. The conclusion is evident. Because the weight of nature is directed only toward the ultimate natural end, not toward an ultimate end that is disproportionate, exceeding, and supernatural. For just as such an end is above nature, so nature itself is not connaturally inclined toward it except through something that exceeds that same nature—and especially because an inclination in the manner of a weight of nature is founded on a natural sympathy and affinity between appetite and the thing sought, as can be established by induction. Therefore, since there is no natural sympathy, affinity, or proximity between a thing of the order of nature as such and a supernatural form, there will likewise be no natural inclination or weight of one toward the other.

64 Furthermore, because the fact that some end is ultimate does not prevent it from being, if it is disproportionate and supernatural, only an obediential power in nature ordered toward it. But the appetite and weight of nature do not signify merely obediential power, but natural, or connatural, power—or at least a passive power distinct from obediential power, whether the latter is formally supernatural or not; therefore, such an end, however ultimate, would not be sought by an innate appetite. The major premise is evident both from what has been said and from the following: otherwise, beyond the aforesaid obediential power there would be in nature a power—at least passive, natural, or connatural with respect to that supernatural end—and consequently that supernatural end, for example, a clear vision of God, would be naturally attainable, since every passive power that is natural in the way just described has corresponding to it an active power that is either natural or ought to act according to the debt of nature in such a way that the passive power can be naturally reduced to act.

The minor premise, too, is evident. First, because the appetite, so to speak, in the manner of desire and the weight of nature of which we are speaking here is with respect to a due form, and therefore signifies its privation, not merely its negation; whereas obediential power alone is not with respect to a due form, and so, although it lacks that form, it is not properly and strictly said to be deprived of the aforesaid form. Second, because otherwise there would be in every created substance a natural appetite for hypostatic union, to which it has obediential power; and thus it would remain in a violent state until it was hypostatically united with God.

65 From this, too, it is sufficiently clear how much falsity is contained in what Scotus adds by way of fuller solution confirming the second argument, namely, that a form is not naturally attainable merely because an innate appetite and weight toward it exist in nature. For besides the fact that this has already been refuted by what has been said, its falsity can further be inferred from the fact that philosophers inferred from it that the rational soul, for example Socrates along with his matter, was connaturally capable of being united in the first production of that soul, because the same matter contained a natural weight and inclination toward such union. And from this Aristotle proves, in 3 On the Soul, ch. 5, that an agent intellect is given because a possible intellect is given; for since the latter is a passive power, there must also be given an agent of the same order, which naturally reduces it to act.

And this doctrine is very consonant with the mind of St. Thomas, 1a 2ae, q. 114, in the article cited, where he teaches that eternal life exceeds the proportion of created nature, as does its knowledge and desire, and therefore that no creature is a sufficient principle for meriting and attaining it unless the gift of grace is given to it. There, from the defect of natural inclination, or weight and desire of nature, he proves the defect of attaining it through merit achieved by one’s own natural powers, judging these two things to be inseparable, namely, naturally to desire an end and naturally to be able to attain it.

66 Nor do the examples brought forward by Scotus support his view. For the natural inclination that is in the soul toward union with matter, since matter is the true part of a human being, is sufficiently grounded in the fact that in due time that union was naturally reducible to act; yet it is not necessary that this be possible at every time and in every state. Hence, although the soul absolutely and in itself, considered from the principles of nature and setting aside the state and time of separation after the first union, is naturally inclined toward its union, it is not so in the composite sense and under the supposition of the aforesaid state of separation. For it has no cause of its own that could naturally reduce that inclination to act, and therefore that inclination is called natural only on the part of the terminus taken materially and secundum quid, not absolutely and simpliciter for the reason stated, as the Complutensian College noted in 1 Physics, d. 3, d. 3, no. 92 and 93. Nor does St. Thomas intend anything else at the cited place, in 1 part., q. 76, a. 1, ad 6.

Likewise, from the fact that there is in a human being a natural inclination to live according to reason, it does not follow that the powers of nature can fulfill all the precepts; because such an inclination is not toward living conformably to reason in all things collectively, but only distributively, as is usually explained in 1a 2ae, q. 109.

Granting, however, that there is in a human being a natural appetite to live in all things according to right reason, it would then have to be said that for the natural appetite at least what is required is that it can be fulfilled by powers belonging to the order of nature, in the manner in which the aforesaid appetite could be fulfilled; since for living in all things according to what the natural reason directly prescribes, special aids belonging to the order of nature would be enough. But to satisfy the innate appetite for the vision of God as He is in Himself, aids of nature’s order, however special and gratuitous, are not sufficient; rather, gratuitous powers belonging to the supernatural order are required, as has been proved.

§ III. Scotus’s Argument Is Satisfied.

67 To the first point, therefore, which we left unresolved in difficulty 3 and which we also adduced in no. 36 of that same difficulty, the answer is given that the innate appetite is not with respect to any ultimate end whatever, or any perfection whatever, but with respect to the ultimate natural end, which is not the vision of God as He is in Himself with respect to the created intellectual being considered in itself. We said considered in itself, because, when elevated by grace and charity—with respect to which ratio we are not speaking here—it is connaturally inclined toward the aforesaid vision.

In answer to the confirmation recently adduced under the same number, it must be said that the innate appetite of the created intellectual being considered in itself rests in abstractive and perfect knowledge of God, which is known from creatures of the natural order, because in this knowledge its connatural blessedness consists, as is usually explained in 1a 2ae. The appetite of that same being, however, when elevated, rests only in God clearly seen. Nor is it incongruous that a creature which, considered according to its diverse aspects, can have a twofold ultimate end and a twofold blessedness, cannot in every respect and in every order rest in either of them, namely, in the lower one, which does not eminently possess those things that belong to the higher order, as it seems to be evident of itself.

We said that it cannot rest in either of them, namely, in the lower one, because it can and must have rest in the higher ultimate end; for that end contains, in the most eminent manner, every perfection of the natural end itself. Nor does it follow from this that the aforesaid supernatural end is naturally sought by the created intellectual being considered in itself. For what now, when thus described, satisfies the natural appetite need not be naturally sought, as is evident in the humanity of Our Lord Christ, whose natural appetite for His own subsistence is satisfied by the subsistence of the Word, and yet it is not sought by an innate appetite from that humanity.

68 To the second point a satisfactory answer is given in the same place. For the proof, however, it must be said that the innate appetite of a created intellect ordered toward some object is not taken from the reason under which it is taken precisely, because this is formally and univocally the same in all objects of the intellect insofar as they concur in its specification, and it abstracts from what is natural and supernatural; rather, it is taken from the formal reason which, not any such reason whatever, but a proportionate and non-exceeding one. God, however, insofar as He is clearly visible, has a formal reason which that is disproportionate and supernatural, as has been shown.

69 Nor is it an obstacle that the same proof adds that every power has an innate inclination toward its specific object and toward whatever pertains to it. For whenever specification, and consequently the objective reason, abstracts from what is natural and supernatural—as happens in the intellect (provided that the first difficulty of this article has first been explained)—then the power is not naturally inclined toward its specific object precisely as such, but insofar as the reason of a proportionate object is supervening. Thus, the intellect will be naturally inclined toward the intelligible, without thereby explaining or determining whether the intelligible is comprehended under it as something supernatural, taken in itself and in particular. For the intelligible, taken in this way, supervenes the reason of a proportionate object, just as the aforesaid intellect is also naturally inclined toward other proportionate intelligibles, but not toward intelligibles exceeding it when considered in particular, whether by determining what the intelligible, as such, that is the object of a created intellect, contains in itself under those things taken in particular.

Add, that if what we said in no. 12 is true, namely, that the intellect consists essentially of a twofold formally distinct power, one natural and the other obediential, the latter being formally supernatural, then only natural things will belong to the object of the intellect insofar as it is a natural power. Therefore, there will in no way be formally one and the same objective reason found in God, insofar as He is clearly visible, and in other natural beings, and consequently the argument will establish nothing.

The confirmation is evident from what has been said, namely, how the formal reason which, when proportionate, is not accidentally related to the reason of a natural appetite, but is indispensably required for it.

70 So that every difficulty that could arise concerning the appetite for the vision of God may remain completely resolved, we therefore raise the present question. For, as we said above, the adequate appetite is divided into an innate appetite and an elicited appetite.

§ I. Some things are preliminarily explained for understanding the title.

So that the title of this question may become clearer, it should be noted that, with respect to the elicited appetite, as at present considered, there are two kinds: one is efficacious and absolute, while the other is inefficacious and conditional. Through the former we desire perfectly, absolutely, and efficaciously what is good; and therefore that act, insofar as it is such by itself, brings about, or effects, the execution and attainment of the desired thing. Through the latter, however, the thing is desired only imperfectly, conditionally, and inefficaciously; and thus it does not execute the good appetite. Hence the former is explained by ly volo, or appeto; the latter, however (provided that it is understood in another way), by ly vellem, or appeterem; and accordingly, although the latter can be directed toward an impossible thing, because impossibilities can be desired conditionally and inefficaciously, as when one says, I would have infinite riches if they were possible; the former, however, cannot be so directed. For as an impossible thing cannot be commanded into execution, so neither can it be desired by an efficacious and executive appetite.

Each appetite, however, can be called natural in two ways: either insofar as “natural” is distinguished from “supernatural” and denotes the act of desiring habituated by the powers of nature; or insofar as “natural” is distinguished from “free” and signifies an appetite that is necessary in some sense. For what is necessary has the mode of being of nature, namely, a determination toward one thing; and therefore it is rightly called natural.

71 Moreover, because the act of desiring is called free in two ways: first, with respect to both its exercise and its specification, insofar as it can be exercised or not exercised with regard to a proposed good (in which freedom consists with respect to the exercise of the act), but also, even when it is assumed to be exercised, it need not be of this species, for example of love, but can be of hatred (which is what it means to be free with respect to both specification and exercise); secondly, however, with respect to exercise alone, insofar as we can exercise or not exercise the act, provided that when we do exercise it, it must be, for example, of love. Hence an elicited natural appetite, insofar as it is distinguished from a free one, and thus is something necessary, may itself also be twofold. One is natural, or necessary, with respect to both specification and exercise, as are all the appetites of brute animals with respect to the object apprehended under the aspect of something harmful or suitable. For the sheep mentioned above necessarily loves the lamb it has begotten and the pasture offered to it, and so forth. The other, however, is necessary with respect to specification alone, as is the act of desiring beatitude in the common sense: for although we can abstain from the act or not abstain from it, if we do break forth into it, it must be of this species, namely of love, and not of another.

72 Finally, it should be noted that, just as these appetites have the multiplicity of distinctions already described, so God himself, considered quidditatively and through his essence, can be considered in many ways: namely, either according to those essential predicates by which he is known otherwise from creatures of the natural order, or according to those predicates that belong to him insofar as he is Trinity in himself and the author of grace.

The title of the question concerning the aforesaid appetites, and concerning God considered according to the reasons enumerated, must therefore be understood as follows: whether, with respect to God himself as existing through his essence and clearly visible, or according to what he is as Trinity in himself and author of grace, or at least according to what he is as one and with respect to the predicates that are required for the reason of the first cause of natural things, there exists in the intellectual creature considered by itself an efficacious or inefficacious elicited appetite which, in one of the ways described, is natural.

§ II. Two opinions are referred to.

73 The first opinion denies the elicited and efficacious appetite; nevertheless it admits at least a conditional and inefficacious appetite which is natural, or necessary with respect to specification, with respect to God as clearly visible, both as one and as Trinity, and thus both as author of nature and as author of grace. Thus Vazquez, 1a 2ae, q. 5, art. 8, disp. 22; Pesantius in the present article; Suarez, lib. 2 de attributis Dei, ch. 7, no. 10 and 11, and in part Valentia in the place cited from 1a 2ae; Montesin., 1a 2ae, q. 5, art. 8, disp. 7, q. 3, as well as others among the later theologians. They prove this, first, from Augustine, lib. 4, contra Julian., ch. 3 and 13; De Trin., ch. 8, asserting that all by natural instinct wish to be blessed, where he seems to be speaking of our beatitude in particular, as is clear from the context. Then also from St. Thomas in the present passage, where the desire to see God through his essence, and therefore according to all that is formally and intrinsically in him, is called natural, because it is necessary with respect to the specification of the act, as seems clear from the context.

74 Second. For in God seen through his essence, as he is Trinity in himself and one, no reason for evil appears, but rather the highest and altogether complete reason for good. Therefore, insofar as he is thus considered by himself, and insofar as the labor of the means through which he must be reached is set aside, there will appear no reason on account of which he could be rejected; and consequently the desire to see him in this way will be necessary with respect to specification. The antecedent and this final consequence are clear in themselves. The first, however, is also evident: because what is good as such cannot be hated. Therefore, for something to be rejected, some reason of evil must shine in it,

It is confirmed and explained. For beatitude in the common sense is necessarily loved with necessity with respect to specification; therefore our beatitude in particular, which is the vision of God as Trinity and as one, is also necessarily loved. The antecedent is generally accepted by theologians. The consequence, moreover, is also clear. For beatitude in the common sense is necessarily loved because it is, and is truly conceived as, our highest perfection; therefore, since the vision of God through his essence, which we now suppose, is also this beatitude and the eminent beatitude of the intellectual creature, it follows that it too is necessarily loved.

75 The second opinion agrees with the preceding opinion in this: that there is not in the intellectual creature an elicited and efficacious appetite for seeing God clearly; but only an inefficacious and conditional appetite. It adds, however, that this appetite is natural, or necessary with respect to specification, with respect to the clear vision of God, not according to what God is in himself as Trinity and author of grace, but precisely with respect to the reason of the first cause of natural things and with respect to the predicates that are known from creatures. Thus Ferrara, 3 cont. Gent., ch. 50.

The principal foundation of this opinion, however, is taken from what we said above from the same holy Doctor concerning doubt 1, namely, that it is natural, or necessary, for man or an angel, having seen an effect, to desire to see the cause quidditatively, insofar as the predicates that belong to the reason of a cause as such and are gathered from the aforesaid effects; but not insofar as other predicates are concerned. Therefore, having seen God's effects, there will be in us a natural, or necessary, desire to see God himself quidditatively, precisely and formally insofar as he is the first cause. The consequence does not seem to require proof. The antecedent, however, is also established insofar as the first part is concerned. Then, because the knowledge of a cause as to what it is is the complement and perfect consummation of the intellect, insofar as the cause is known by someone from its effects, and only insofar as it knows whether it exists, it follows that an intellect knowing the cause in this way cannot reject it or hate it. For the imperfect necessarily desires its full consummation. Then also: because nothing appears more connatural to close upon in the natural and necessary desire to know in the common sense, which every intellectual creature possesses, than the desire to see the cause after seeing the effect, and thus each of the two desires will be necessary. As for the latter point, the same antecedent is clear. For when this desire is excited from knowledge of the effect as such, it will be directed toward the cause only insofar as the cause is formally taken as such, and therefore not insofar as the predicates that are otherwise materially found in it are concerned.

76 Nor will it be enough to say that the vision of God, insofar as he is in himself the first cause, is not separable from the vision of God as Trinity and as author of grace. Hence, if it cannot be naturally desired once according to this latter reason, neither will it be possible according to the former reason: just as if it cannot be attained once according to one reason, neither will it be possible according to another.

For against this it is said that the intellect on its way can naturally apprehend God as author of nature without apprehending him as author of grace. Therefore the will will be able to desire, by an elicited appetite, to see God through his essence according to the former reason, without desiring to see him intuitively according to the latter reason; therefore such a desire will be natural, or necessary with respect to specification, in relation to the intellect insofar as it knows God from his effects. This final consequence is clear from what has been said, while the first and the antecedent seem to be clear in themselves.

It is confirmed. For the fact that an intellectual creature naturally desires beatitude in the common sense by an elicited appetite, and not beatitude in the particular sense insofar as this consists in the clear vision of God as he is in himself, is sufficiently established when these two are separable by our concepts. Therefore, in order that the same natural appetite, or appetite necessary with respect to specification, should desire the vision of God through his essence as author of nature, and not the vision of God as author of grace, it is enough that these aforesaid visions are separable in the same way.

§ III. The question is decided according to the mind of St. Thomas.

77 Nevertheless, it must first be said that no elicited and efficacious appetite for the clear vision of God, insofar as he is in himself—whether he is Trinity and one and author of grace, or is one only and author of nature, and insofar as the predicates that are otherwise known from natural effects are concerned—can be given by the powers of nature. The inefficient appetite, however, is indeed well able to exist. Thus St. Thomas in the places cited.

And indeed, with respect to the first part, namely, the efficacious appetite, this is clear from what has been said. For this appetite is executive and applicative of the means, but the powers of nature cannot execute the means necessary for this vision, as faith teaches and reason demonstrates, since they are supernatural as to their substance.

With respect to the second part, namely, the possibility of the conditional and inefficacious appetite, this too is clear. For since this appetite is so imperfect, there is no obstacle to its being present through the powers of nature. Thus, just as the will, when another great good is proposed, could break forth into this act, namely, I would wish to obtain that, so, when the clear vision of God is proposed under the aspect of some greatest good, the will will be able in the same way to desire it. For although the thing desired would then be materially supernatural, the reason for desiring it would not be. For this, as we have already indicated, would be natural, since it is in the same proportion as the elicited appetite of that same vision of God, absolute in its own way and inefficacious, which is in some way reduced to the conditional appetite, as we shall explain elsewhere when God grants it. For, at least once divine revelation concerning its possibility is supposed, someone could desire it under the aspect of some great good by the aforesaid appetite.

78 It must be said, second, that in an intellectual creature that does not see God through his essence and considered by himself, for example in man, there is no elicited appetite, even a conditional one, for the aforesaid vision which is necessary with respect to specification. Thus Caiet., 1 part., q. 82, art. 1; Conrad., 1a 2ae, q. 10, art. 2; Nazar. in the present passage; Martinez, 1, 2, q. 3, art. 8, dub. 2; Alvarez, 1a 2ae, disp. 27, saying that this is the common opinion of the Thomists, and that Durand holds it in 4, dist. 49, q. 8, and others.

And certainly it seems to follow openly from what has been said in the preceding doubt. For the elicited and natural appetite, or appetite necessary with respect to specification, indicates that in that nature there is an innate appetite through the mode of inclination and weight; because, if the elicited appetite is not natural and necessary with respect to specification from some extrinsic principle—since in this respect it would rather be violent—the consequence is that it would be natural and necessary from the natural inclination of the will itself, which naturally inclines toward that object with a determination toward one thing.

79 Next, it is proved, first, from St. Thomas, de verit., q. 22, art. 7, where, speaking of man, he says: When, therefore, aided by divine grace, a man apprehends by his proper reason some special good, such as his beatitude, in which his beatitude truly consists, then he deserves this, not because he desires beatitude, which he naturally desires, but because he desires that special thing which he does not naturally desire, namely, the vision of God, in which nevertheless, according to the truth of the matter, his beatitude consists. And in 4, dist. 49, q. 1, art. 3, where, in order to give the reason why it is permissible for one to desire the divine vision even though it is itself beatitude, he added: Because beatitude, insofar as it is of this kind, of itself imports the object of the will, but the divine vision does not.

From these words, the following and efficacious reason is formed, assuming, however, that the object of the will in itself is the same as the adequate object. For an inadequate object is compared with it in its own way as an object accidentally, not in itself. Whence it is sufficiently probable that even if such an object were destroyed or were involved in something, nevertheless the nature of the will would not perish for that reason; the opposite, however, would hold if the adequate object of the will were involved. Or, at least, it is altogether certain that, if the aforesaid inadequate object were destroyed, the nature of the will would not perish in itself, but would be changed in itself in a second respect, insofar as the adequate object would thereby be altered, since it would no longer include all that it previously included. Thus the inadequate object is compared with the will in its own way accidentally, insofar as it is not conferred with the will as an object in itself of the first order; and consequently neither is it conferred as an object at all in itself.

80 Hence the argument is as follows. The will is necessitated with respect to specification by its object considered in itself, or its adequate object, and not by something else. But the clear vision of God, or God as clearly visible, is not the object in itself, or the adequate object of the will on its way; therefore it cannot necessitate the will. The consequence is clear. The minor premise also seems clear in itself, since on its way the will desires many other things besides beatitude in the particular sense, and things that are not ordered to it, but are even opposed to it.

The major premise, as regards the first part, is sufficiently clear. For every power is determined by its nature to tend toward its adequate object, because it receives its entire essence and specification from it. As regards the second part, it is shown as follows. Then, because an inadequate object, precisely insofar as it is such, does not equal the entire force and capacity of the power, it is not necessary that, precisely because the will wills to break forth into the act, it should be occupied with pursuing that object. It can rather elicit an act of another and opposite species, namely hatred. Then also: because what is not the good that equals the will, but an inadequate good that does not satisfy it—and this is essentially included in the reason of an object inadequate to the will—has some reason of evil with respect to the will; and therefore such an object, precisely because it is not adequate, cannot necessitate the will with respect to specification.

81 It is confirmed and explained. For although whiteness is a great perfection of sight and no reason for evil seems at first sight to appear in it, because whiteness is nevertheless not the object in itself adequate to the power of sight, it is therefore—rightly considered—a reason for evil to appear in it; namely, that it is not the good equal to the whole of its power. Thus, at least insofar as sight is subject to the command of the will, it is not necessitated with respect to specification to tend toward whiteness. Therefore, since God as clearly visible is not the adequate object of the will of the wayfarer, there will likewise appear in him—though through the defect of the creature—some reason of evil on account of which he may be rejected.

82 Nor does it matter that the opponents suggest, in order to dissolve this reason, that it is enough for God as clearly visible to contain every good in a more eminent way than beatitude in the common sense contains it. Hence it can no less than that necessitate, and therefore in the fatherland it will necessitate by an altogether comprehensive necessity, namely, not only with respect to specification, but also with respect to exercise, because in the aforesaid way it contains every good, is perfectly applied, and is shown to the will.

So this is not the point. For if the argument that has been made is carefully examined, it is sufficiently convicted of falsity from it. For although God, as clearly visible, contains every good and thus, insofar as he is in himself, in a more eminent way equals and satisfies the entire force of the will, nevertheless on the way he is not presented to it as the object and adequate good of the will; otherwise in the fatherland. Therefore, although in the fatherland there is necessity with respect to specification, indeed even with respect to exercise, nevertheless there is not such necessity on the way. The consequence seems certain. The antecedent is also clear. Because an object is then presented as adequate when a power ought to tend toward it and toward other things, not except on account of it; and therefore a mobile being is the natural object of philosophy, because it considers that for itself, whereas other things are considered only on account of it. But the will of the wayfarer can tend toward other created goods, not on account of divine goodness, and as ordered toward it, but rather as opposed to it; otherwise the will of one who comprehends God. Therefore on the way the universal and adequate good of the will is not presented to it; but it is well presented in the fatherland.

83 It is confirmed and explained. For however much some good may equal the will in itself, indeed may be represented most firmly as such on the part of the light by which it is known, such as faith, nevertheless, as long as it is not known clearly and as it is in itself, but only obscurely, it is possible—not on the part of the light or the object, but well on the part of the subject—for a kind of suspicion or doubt to arise concerning the goodness so perfect and so equal to such an object. Thus one can have faith in mysteries revealed by God and suffer very many temptations concerning them. Whence, even when that representation is evident, however certain and completely firm it may be, it can happen that the subject tends toward that good, not indeed in a defined act, but in an act actually exercised, as if the good were not certainly and wholly perfectly equal to the will, but were proposed in some respect as a kind of evil. Consequently, the will is not necessitated with respect to specification to embrace or profess that good as long as the object is not known clearly and in itself, as happens at present.

§ IV. The foundations of both opinions are met.

84 Therefore, it only remains to satisfy the foundations of both opinions. And first, to the testimony of Augustine adduced in support of the former opinion, it will be answered that those words are to be understood as concerning beatitude in the common sense. For he touches upon incidentally the proposition reported there, and known by the light of nature, although in the same chapter he teaches much concerning the vision of God through his essence.

To the testimony adduced from St. Thomas, however, it is answered that the desire to see God, arising from the vision of his natural effects, is only inefficacious and conditional. It is, however, called by the holy Doctor natural, or necessary with respect to specification, not because it is simply such, and therefore always has the aforesaid necessity, as the desire for beatitude in the common sense has it, but because it is natural, or necessary, as in many other things. Not otherwise, however, with the proportion nevertheless preserved, than as the appetites for life, knowledge, bodily integrity, and similar things, which are not a natural appetite, nor necessary always, but, as they often are, as St. Thomas and Caiet., 1a 2ae, q. 10, art. 1, and elsewhere often, teach.

From this, too, one incidentally understands the congruence of the argument adduced there by the Angelic Doctor to prove from this desire to see God the possibility of such a vision. For from the desire, even though inefficacious, the possibility of the desired thing can nevertheless in some way be inferred, given the aforesaid necessity.

As to the reason and confirmation adduced in support of the same opinion, what has been said makes it clear.

85 As to the testimony adduced in support of the second opinion, what we have just said is also clear. To the reason, however, it is answered that the assertion does not prove in any way that there is in the intellectual creature an elicited and efficacious appetite for the clear vision of God insofar as he is the first cause. For however much this reason may be set aside in favor of another, it is always supernatural as to its substance, as has been shown. It can nevertheless be proved that there is in the intellect an elicited and inefficacious appetite which is natural, or necessary according to what it is, as we have just asserted; but not natural, or necessary simply. For although the aforesaid vision is the consummation of another knowledge drawn from effects, it is nevertheless not the adequate object of the will. Consequently it cannot simply necessitate it with respect to specification, as we have already explained. From these things it is clear that all the arguments adduced in that reason insofar as they can oppose us are addressed.

First conclusion. In order to see God, some likeness on the part of the power is required.

Second conclusion. It is impossible for any likeness on the part of the thing seen and created to concur with the clear vision of God through his essence.

Because a vision is had through an assimilation (though indeed in a manner to be explained below), the Angelic Doctor, having in the preceding article shown that the created intellect can see God, immediately proceeds to treat of the likeness through which it will see him. And although for the aforesaid vision there is required both a likeness on the part of the power, namely the light of glory, and a likeness on the part of the object, nevertheless, since the Angelic Doctor treats of the first of these likenesses more expressly in the following article, article 4, we shall accordingly in this disputation treat principally of the second; although we shall also touch somewhat upon the first, so that we may lay open the mind of the Most Holy Doctor as regards those things which he teaches in this article.

1 All the things that must be said below concerning the similarity required for the clear vision of God depend on the understanding of the mind of St. Thomas about it. Therefore, in the first place, we shall examine the mind of the Holy Doctor, so that this entire difficulty may thus be dispatched from its roots and more completely.

But so that the title of the difficulty may be grasped more fully, it should be noted that we are not speaking here of similarity that is called such in a wholly general sense, namely, insofar as the general represents its cause to any effect whatever. For it is certain among theologians that both the intellectual light of our intellect (in the manner, however, indicated above) and the light of glory are required for the vision of God, and that both are produced by God and are a similarity to him insofar as any effect represents its cause according to the formal reason of cause. This is what St. Thomas teaches here, also in conclusion 1. We are speaking, therefore, only of similarity representing the object insofar as it is the object.

Since, however, this similarity could be threefold—namely, imprinted, or the intelligible species; expressed, or the word of the intellect; and finally objective, insofar as it is an object, which is distinguished from the word as some other known object through which the intellect is led toward knowledge of God through his essence—the title of the difficulty accordingly asks whether any one of these similarities, provided it is created, is to be admitted according to the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor.

§ I. Two opinions are proposed.

2 The first opinion holds that the Angelic Doctor admits an imprinted species, created for the clear vision of God, and that this is the light of glory; but that he denies expressed similarity, and even objective similarity. Thus Vazquez, in the present disp. 39, ch. 1.

It is proved first with regard to its first part. For in the present article St. Doctor expressly says that to see God's essence, some similarity on the part of the power of sight is required, namely, the light of divine glory, which strengthens the intellect to see God. Therefore, such light will be an intelligible species. The consequence is evident. For by the very fact that it is a similarity to God and renders the intellect efficacious toward the clear vision, it must fecundate and determine the intellect toward that vision. These things, however, are required and suffice for the reason of an intelligible species. Therefore, etc.

3 It can be confirmed from 1, in the same Holy Doctor, Quodl. 7, art. 1, where he says as follows: The divine essence itself is entirely intelligible light. Hence the light of glory descending from it into the intellect makes, with respect to the divine essence, in the intellect what it makes with respect to other intelligible things that are not light, but only the species of a thing understood together with light. Just as if sensible light existed by itself, its own light would suffice for its vision, perfecting the eye without any similarity.

It is confirmed from the same article in the answer to the second objection. For when the Holy Doctor had objected to himself that a created intellect cannot see God immediately, but only through some similarity, on the ground that the divine essence cannot by itself inform the intellect and make it actual, he replies: It must be said that the created intellect becomes actual for the vision of the divine essence through the light of glory, and this suffices.

4 Next, with regard to the last part, namely, to both expressed and objective similarity, it is shown as follows. For St. Thomas expressly denies in this article a similarity that holds on the part of the thing seen, as is clear from the context. Yet each of these similarities is a similarity holding on the part of the thing seen. Therefore, both are denied by him. The minor is evident. For just as a similarity on the part of the power seems to be only a quomodo, not an ipsum quod, like the power itself, so a similarity on the part of the thing seen ought to seem to be the ipsum quod, like the thing seen itself, and at the same time the reason of seeing the object. This belongs both to objective similarity, as is evident from itself, and to expressed similarity, which St. Thomas, in the fourth book of Contra Gentiles, ch. 11, calls the understood intention and at the same time the reason of seeing. Therefore, etc.

It is confirmed. Because the arguments made by St. Thomas in the present article clearly prove this. For it is certain that a thing cannot first be seen in another thing already seen, as in a medium, according to its quiddity and as it is in itself, unless the whole entity and reason of the former be in the latter. Therefore, God cannot be seen as he is in himself through a created expressed species, or through any other previously seen object. For both are of an inferior order and reason than God himself.

5 Finally, because in his argument, but against it, St. Thomas rejects a similarity to the vision of God that makes knowledge enigmatic. Yet to see God through a similarity previously known makes knowledge enigmatic, but not to see him through a similarity that merely concurs as the quomodo and as the mode of an intelligible species. Therefore, etc. The minor, with respect to the last part, is clear from itself. With respect to 1, however, it is also evident. For he removes from it its being the immediate vision of God. It will therefore be a vision through something created, as through a mirror and an enigma, since this imperfectly and consequently obscurely represents divine perfection.

6 The second opinion holds that the Angelic Doctor denies imprinted and objective similarity, but on the contrary admits expressed similarity, or the word. Thus Ferrarius, 1 Contra Gentiles, ch. 53; and he holds that it is probable in the way of St. Thomas, as Sylvester teaches in the established question 12, art. 2; Canariensis, 1 part., q. 27, art. 1, disp. 5; Ledesma, De perfectione Dei, q. 8, art. 6, conclusion 1; and Capreolus in 1, d. 27, q. 2, arts. 2 and 3, and in 4, d. 49, q. 5, where he says that the Holy Doctor inclines more toward this position; which Hericeus also affirms, 1 part., tract. 4, disp. 42, ch. 5, no. 33.

This opinion will be clear with respect to the first part from what will be said shortly. With respect to the second part, however, it is proved as follows. For the Angelic Doctor says as follows below, q. 27, art. 1: Whenever anyone understands from the very fact of his understanding that something proceeds within himself—that is, the conception of an understood thing, arising from the power of the intellect and proceeding from its knowledge—this conception is indeed signified by the voice and is called the word of the heart. The same is taught in q. 9 De potentia, art. 5; 4 Contra Gentiles, ch. 11; and q. 4 De veritate, art. 2, where he teaches generally that a word is produced in every intellection.

7 Hericeus proves this same point finally. For with respect to every other knowledge, including that by which an angel beholds his own substance, St. Thomas admits a vital production of expressed similarity and of the word, as is clear from 4 Contra Gentiles, ch. 11. And he gives the reason, because in angels being and understanding are not the same. Therefore, since in the blessed there is no identity between their being and seeing God, the word will be produced in them through the beatific vision.

Nor is the distinction satisfactory which recent Thomists establish between an angel and God, on the ground that God is pure act in the highest degree of immateriality and intellectuality, whereas an angel is not. For the opposite follows from this. First, the substance of an angel is in the same degree of immateriality and intellectuality by comparison with the intuition of itself, in which even proportionally God is by comparison with created vision. Therefore, just as an angel requires an expressed species produced for the vision of itself, so God requires it in order to terminate created vision. Second, they do not explain what the highest degree of immateriality possessed by the divine essence contributes to the effect that a word not be produced through a vision of it.

§ II. The mind of the Angelic Doctor is opened.

8 Nevertheless, it must be said first that St. Thomas denies this threefold created similarity, namely, imprinted, expressed, and objective. Thus Caietanus, Báñez, Nazarius, González, and Zumel in the present work, the last of whom says that very many of St. Thomas's disciples hold this; Navarrete, Controvers. 34; Ripa in this article and q. 27, art. 1, ch. 2; Alvarez, 3 part., disp. 43, nota 3, and disp. 61, no. 10; Javellus in the present work; Soncinus in his Optio on Capreolus in 1, d. 27, q. 2 ¹; and many other recent disciples of the Holy Doctor; and finally Ledesma, De perfectione Dei q. 8, arts. 5 and 6, who, speaking of the expressed species, says that the opinion denying it is more common among Thomists, although, as we have already indicated, in the same place he adds that the opinion admitting the aforesaid expressed species is highly probable according to the way of St. Thomas.

9 It is proved first. For St. Thomas teaches generally in the second conclusion of the article that there is no similarity on the part of the thing seen with respect to the clear vision of God. Yet all these similarities hold on the part of the thing seen. Therefore, all are rejected by him. The minor is evident. Because they are all ordered to supply the concurrence that had to be furnished on the part of the object. Therefore, all hold on its part, as supplying the place of that object.

10 It makes no difference that Vazquez says that the imprinted species holds on the part of the power insofar as it is in it and determines it. This, therefore, makes no difference. For it is wrongly inferred from the inherence of the imprinted species in the power that it does not hold on the part of the thing seen. The expressed species, however, inheres in the power and is its offspring, and nevertheless holds on the part of the thing seen, because it is ordered to supply the concurrence that had to be furnished on the part of the object. Likewise, the fact that the imprinted species determines the intellect toward vision does not indicate that it does not hold on the part of the object. For it is proper to the object to determine the power toward its own cognition. Accordingly, the power will not be complete on every side and determined toward the vision of God until it is determined by God himself, who has the reason of an object. Because it does not concur except as determined both on its own part and on the part of the object; indeed, unless in some way it passes into the object itself and is identical with it, as we shall state below. Hence, because the object, as such, determines through the intelligible species, the species likewise, insofar as it determines, holds on the part of that same object.

It is confirmed first. Because all the arguments by which St. Doctor proves that no created similarity can exist on the part of the thing seen with respect to the clear vision of God prove not only that such similarity cannot be objective, as is evident from itself, but also that it can be neither imprinted nor expressed, as will be clear from what follows when we examine these arguments. Hence, immediately after them he concludes generally that to say that God is seen through created similarity is to say that the divine essence is not seen.

It is confirmed second. For in De veritate, q. 8, art. 1, he excludes every similarity on the part of the object, saying: No similarity of the divine essence can have any agreement with the divine essence except analogically, and therefore a cognition that would be through such a similarity would not be a cognition of God himself through his essence, but would be much more imperfect than if the substance were known through a similarity of an accident.

11 The assertion is proved second. For the same Holy Doctor says as follows in 4, d. 49, q. 2, arts. 1–15: A threefold medium is found in corporeal and intellectual vision. The first is the medium under which, as light. The second is the medium by which, and this is the visible form, by which the power is determined toward a special object, as by the form of a stone for knowing a stone. The third is the medium in which the thing is seen, and this is that through whose inspection sight is led to another thing, as by looking into a mirror sight is led to an image. In the vision of the fatherland, therefore, there will be no third medium, nor a second medium, but only the first. Thus, as one sees, St. Doctor denies with respect to the clear vision of God both the medium in which, namely, objective and already known similarity, as the ipsum quod, and the medium by which, namely, the visible form by which the power is determined toward a special object. Consequently, he denies both imprinted and expressed similarity. For through either of them the intellect is determined toward a special object: through the imprinted species, indeed, as through that by which the object moves the power; but through the expressed species, as through that by which the same object is constituted as the object actually terminating the intellection, as will be clear from what follows.

12 The twofold solution offered by Vazquez does not weaken the force of this testimony. The first is that St. Thomas retracted this opinion in the first part and elsewhere. The second, however, is that when the Holy Doctor denies the second and third medium, he is speaking only of the expressed species and objective similarity.

For the first is contradicted by the fact that the Angelic Teacher never taught elsewhere in express words that an imprinted species exists with respect to the clear vision of God. Indeed, his position was perpetual, both in denying every created similarity holding on the part of the thing seen and in admitting that God has the mode of a species with respect to his own vision. Therefore, there is no reason to think that he retracted elsewhere an opinion that he had taught in the aforesaid testimony. The consequence is evident. For this would have been necessary in order that he should have taught elsewhere in express words the directly opposite, which could admit no probable interpretation. Since, therefore, not only did he not do so, but he even taught the same point generally elsewhere, there is no reason to think that he retracted the opinion.

13 Moreover, if what he teaches here from the fourth book of the Sentences is understood soundly and as it should be, it is rather an explanation of what he asserted in the Summa Theologiae and in the questions disputed afterward. For he enumerates all similarities that hold on the part of the object and seemed able to concur toward the vision of God, and denies that they furnish the concurrence for the aforesaid vision. Yet in almost all other places he taught generally, without always enumerating the aforesaid similarities.

The second solution is likewise contradicted. First, because when St. Thomas denies concurrence toward the vision of God through the second medium, namely, the visible form, he is speaking of that form which determines the power toward vision. Therefore, since the imprinted and expressed species determine it in this way, it follows that both are denied by the Holy Doctor. Second, because the second medium would now be confused with the third among those rejected by St. Thomas, since the second would also concur as the quomodo, and consequently would coincide with the third. For in the opinion that Vazquez attributes to St. Thomas, the expressed species has an influence through the mode of the medium quod, leading to the knowledge of the object.

14 Nor is the evasion of any weight which this author employs of any importance, namely, that the expressed species concurs as an internal medium quod, whereas the third medium does not. It is therefore of no importance. For, as is clear from the context, St. Thomas intends merely to distinguish these three media according to whether they are the medium under which, the medium by which, and finally the medium quod. Therefore, whether the two later media remain or do not remain within the intellect is immaterial to the distinction intended. Hence, when an angel knows God abstractively through its angelic essence, as through a known thing, this threefold medium is then found there, and nevertheless all those media remain within the angel. Therefore, etc.

15 Thirdly, the assertion is proved principally. For in this article St. Thomas denies every created similarity with respect to the vision of God apart from the light of glory. Yet light is not one of the similarities mentioned. Therefore, he denies all of them. The major seems to follow from the text. The minor, however, is common among theologians with respect to expressed and objective similarity to such an extent that no one denies them. With respect to imprinted similarity, it is shown as follows. Imprinted similarity is formal similarity of the object, as is clear from what St. Thomas teaches in the first part, q. 85, art. 2. The light of glory, however, represents God only virtually and according to a wholly general reason, namely, as an effect. Therefore, St. Thomas equates its representation and similarity to God with the similarity of the light of nature to God. That light, as is clear, is a similarity of God in this sense alone.

16 It is confirmed. For, as St. Thomas teaches in the present article and art. 5, the light of glory has the reason of an operative power on the part of the potency. Therefore, he says that it is necessary in order that the intellect become able to understand, in the manner in which a power becomes more able to operate through a habit. Just as corporeal light is likewise necessary in external sight insofar as it makes a medium transparent in act, so that it can be moved by a color. Therefore, such light cannot have the reason of an intelligible species with respect to the clear vision of God. Therefore, neither can it have the reason of expressed or objective similarity. This final consequence is sufficiently established for the present. The first, however, is also evident. For an intelligible species presupposes the power of understanding required on the part of the power and the disposition necessary for it to be changed by an object. For the union of the intelligible species with the intellect, taken formally, occurs not in esse entitativum but in esse intelligibile. An object, however, cannot intelligibly be united except to a power disposed for such union and possessing the power of understanding. Hence, the intelligible species in formal species-being is not united to a mirror, but in entitative being, because on its own part it has no power of understanding.

Moreover, as St. Thomas teaches in the same place, the light of glory does not give power to the potency in just any way, but elevates it to the clear vision of God. Therefore, it cannot have the reason of an intelligible species, because this does not elevate the power to understanding. Since, as we were just saying, it presupposes on the part of the power all the power required on its own part with respect to receiving such a species and understanding together with it.

17 It must be said second that, although St. Thomas denied those three similarities, he rejected imprinted similarity, or the imprinted species, above all. Thus very many disciples of St. Thomas, as González reports in the present work. The assertion is proved. For the Angelic Doctor rejected above all that similarity, or union of the power with the thing seen, which is necessarily required even in every vision, including that of the bodily eye. Therefore, of those three similarities, he rejected above all the similarity, or imprinted species.

The consequence is evident. For the other similarities are not necessarily required for every vision. Therefore, without objective similarity in a reflecting mirror, the object can be seen by the bodily eye, as also without expressed similarity. For the external senses do not form for themselves a word, or expressed species, as St. Thomas teaches in Quodl. 5, art. 9, ad 2, in these words: The external sense itself does not form for itself any sensible form; the imaginative power does this, and its form is in some way like the word of the intellect. Hence for this reason too, in the place cited from the fourth book of Sententiarum St. Doctor did not say that that threefold medium is found in every corporeal and intellectual vision, but only that it is found in corporeal and intellectual vision. Nor did he assert that all those media are required for every vision; he intended only that they can be found in corporeal vision, that is, in a sensation of any sense, and also in several intellections.

18 The antecedent, and therefore also the first argument of the principal enthymeme, is confirmed. For, in order to show what he principally intended, St. Doctor assumes this universal principle: that every vision, including that of the bodily eye, requires both the power of sight and the union of sight with the thing seen. Applying this general doctrine to the present case, he says that of these two, what is required for the clear vision of God is the first, namely, the power of sight, and consequently the light of glory, which strengthens the intellect; but that no created similarity is required through which the union of the thing seen with sight is effected. Therefore, he was speaking above all of that similarity, or union, which is generally required for every vision, including that of the bodily eye. Hence it is also clear how rightly, after St. Thomas had concluded and shown that an imprinted species created to represent God as he is in himself could not be admitted, he immediately concluded generally that no similarity apart from the light of glory is to be admitted. For the arguments he made concerning all the similarities already mentioned establish the intention, as we shall show below.

§ III. The arguments of both opinions are answered.

19 To the first argument, therefore, in favor of the first opinion, it should be answered that the light of glory is only a determination holding on the part of the power, and therefore a determination is required on the part of the object which, for the present, is effected through the divine essence, since it has the reason of an intelligible species, because both determinations are required for such a vision. Therefore, although an angelic intellect, for example that of Gabriel, is naturally determined to the essence of Gabriel himself, whom it must always know, and although prophetic light can be naturally determined to one object alone, as St. Thomas teaches in 2a 2ae, q. 173, art. 2, it nevertheless requires, for the aforesaid reason, a determination coming from the object, or from an intelligible species in its place. But this will be explained more fully in art. 5, dub. 1.

20 It should be answered to the first confirmation that it is sufficiently clear from the testimonies we have adduced from St. Doctor how, according to his own mind, a created intelligible species cannot exist with respect to the vision of God. Therefore, with respect to the testimony cited in this confirmation, it must be said that the divine essence, insofar as it has the reason of an intelligible species, can be considered without being placed in the number with the light of glory, because of the necessary connection explained below in art. 5, which it has with the light, no less than the angelic intellect (proportion being preserved) can also be conceived as not being placed in the number with the essence of the angel, which it necessarily involves. For by the very fact that it is such, it involves having united to itself the aforesaid essence as an intelligible species. Therefore, just as, considering the divine essence and the light not according to the manner in which they are thus connected, but according to the manner in which they are distinct, it could be said of the light of glory that it affords what light affords in us, and an intelligible species in us, so, attending to those things insofar as they are connected in the aforesaid manner, and insofar as by reason of this connection they can be considered as not being placed in the number, it can also be said absolutely that the light of glory affords what the species and the light together afford in us. For this is understood to be said of the light together with what necessarily accompanies it, and not as placing it in the number with those things by reason of the aforesaid connection. And so the light, together with the essence insofar as it has the reason of an intelligible species, affords in a proportionate manner, with respect to that same essence as the known object, what in us is afforded by the species of a material thing and the light of the intellect. For the essence has with respect to itself the reason of a species, because, as St. Thomas says, it is entirely intelligible light itself; and the light of glory gives the intellect efficacy required on the part of that same intellect.

21 Therefore, just as if light existing by itself were given, a species distinct from it would not be required, as many (concerning which elsewhere) probably think, but it would suffice for another light to be derived from it into sight, inhering in sight, and for that light existing by itself to be united in the reason of a species to vision; so in the present case, proportion being preserved, this same thing is required, and only the created imprinted species is excluded, not the uncreated one. For the latter is necessarily connected with the light of glory, as will be explained below in art. 5.

22 To the second confirmation it should be said that St. Thomas intends only that, among what is necessarily required through the mode of things inhering in the intellect and informing it with an admixture of imperfections, nothing else ought to be admitted with respect to vision apart from the light. For the inherence of this light suffices. Thus the argument proposed there by St. Thomas is answered. For the essence, insofar as it has the reason of a species, is not among those required through the mode of something inhering. Therefore, the same divine essence can be a species and can determine the power through the mode of a species, even though it does not inhere in it.

It is not necessary to answer the other arguments of this opinion, because they support us rather than oppose us, although Vazquez admits something there which does not cohere with the doctrine of St. Thomas, as will be clear from what follows.

23 To the foundations of the second opinion it should be answered that St. Doctor is speaking of all intellections of the natural order, however perfect they may be, such as when angels understand themselves through their own essence. For in these a word is always present, as will be explained below. This interpretation accords with the context. For there St. Doctor does not intend to adduce an argument efficacious in itself to prove that a word exists in divine things, since this cannot be demonstrated from natural reason. Rather, he merely brings forward an agreement with what occurs in all natural cognitions, by which the intellect is led, faith being presupposed, toward assent to the aforesaid truth, namely, the generation of the divine Word. For this purpose, it suffices that a word is always found in every natural cognition, because the argument for agreement is drawn more fittingly from that (being better known), than from other intellections known only by the light of faith, such as supernatural intellections. Hence, since St. Thomas brings forward several other agreements by which other mysteries of faith are declared and, the same faith being presupposed, are somehow urged, he uses examples of natural, but not supernatural things. For these also require faith for their certain knowledge, and thus his meaning cannot be effectively gathered from those places in 1 Contra Gentiles and q. 4 De veritate, that a word must be formed in every created intellection. His meaning, as given by St. Thomas, is only that it is universally true that a word must be formed in every intellection of the natural order.

24 It can also be added (so that a tacit objection is thereby met) that from the fact that the blessed do not form a word, it cannot be argued that a word is not generated in divine things. For the beatific vision is not a participation in the notional intellection of the Father, as it is notional (as will be clear from what follows), but in the essential divine intellection, insofar as it is such. But the essential intellection, precisely insofar as it is such, produces no Word; otherwise the Son and the Holy Spirit would produce it, but rather the intellection insofar as it is notional. Therefore, the Word is produced by the Father alone, in whom alone notional intellection, or dictio, is found.

What was drawn from Hericeus in the last place will be clear from what we shall say in the last difficulty of this disputation.

After we have examined the view of D. Thom. and have seen in accordance with it that no created intelligible species is given in the order of the clear vision of God, and consequently that the divine essence is not united under the form of an intelligible species with the intellect of the blessed, we must say what is to be thought concerning this point, setting aside the authorities and the testimonies of D. Thom. and attending to the thing itself alone.

§ I. The first opinion is proposed.

25 The first opinion denies that God is united under the form of an intelligible species with the intellect of the blessed, and consequently affirms that in fact an intelligible species, impressed and created, is given in order for God to be seen through his essence. This is the opinion of Aureolus, as cited by Capreolus in 4. dist. 49. quaest. 5. artic. 2. and of Vazquez in the present disputation, disp. 43. cap. 6. Though led by a different principle, he cites in its favour Richard of St Victor, in 3. dist. 14. art. 1. quaest. 3.

It is proved, first. For the chief causality of an intelligible species lies in the genus of formal cause; but God cannot supply this genus of cause. Therefore neither can he be united with the intellect of the blessed under the form of an intelligible species, and consequently a created intelligible species must be given, through which the union is made. The minor, together with both consequences, is clear from itself. The major is also evident. For the principal function of an intelligible species is to determine the intellect and to impart a species to the intellection, to which it serves; but these two things belong to the genus of formal cause.

26 Secondly. The reason of an intelligible species is that it constitutes the intellect in its first act and gives it the power to act; but this cannot be supplied by the divine essence except through an intrinsic information. Therefore, since this is repugnant to it, it cannot be united under the form of an intelligible species. The major, as regards 1. part., is sufficiently clear. For the intellect, considered in itself and precisely taken, is pure potentiality in the intelligible genus, and is reduced to act through an intelligible species. As regards 2. vero part., however, it is clear from the first point. For since everything operates according to that which it is in act, it follows that if the species constitutes the intellect in act, it gives it the power to act and to understand. The minor is also clear. For if the divine essence is not intrinsically united, and therefore not through information, the intellect remains intrinsically as it was before, and consequently, just as it was not before intrinsically constituted in act, nor endowed with the power to act, so neither is it afterward.

27 It is confirmed, first, that the divine essence cannot be present under the form of potentiality with respect to the beatific vision. Therefore it cannot constitute the intellect in its first act either. The antecedent is evident, for such a potentiality conflicts with the infinite actuality of the essence of God. The consequence is also clear, because the first act is in potentiality to the second act and is perfected through it.

It is confirmed, secondly, because the divine essence cannot of itself produce any formal effect upon the intellect of the blessed. Therefore it can neither constitute it in its first act, and consequently neither can it be united with it under the form of an intelligible species. This last consequence is clear from what has been said. The first point, however, is also clear, because nothing can constitute another in act without giving it some formal effect. The antecedent, however, is proved. For that effect cannot be purely uncreated, since it begins in time; nor purely created, because it involves the divine essence as the form from which it proceeds; nor mixed of created and uncreated, because that created being, in order to be mixed with it, would have to be something substantial, since substantial being cannot be given to the intellect, it being an accident; nor yet something accidental, otherwise there would be given some accident mediating between the divine essence and the intellect, on account of which God would be seen clearly, and so would be seen and not seen immediately, as will be clear from what has been said above and will be said below. Therefore, and so on.

28 Thirdly. From the union of an intelligible species with the intellect there must result something one per se; but from the divine essence and the intellect of the blessed there cannot result this one thing. Therefore the divine essence will not be able to be united with it under the form of an intelligible species. The consequence is sufficiently obvious. The minor, however, seems open to view. For from the divine essence and the intellect there cannot coalesce one substance or one accident, as is clear from itself. Therefore, and so on. The major is also clear. For from pure potentiality in one order, and from the actuality of that same order, there cannot fail to result something one per se, as may be seen in matter and substantial form. Therefore, since the intellect is pure potentiality in the intelligible order, and the impressed species is the proper actuality of that order, it will follow that the two must coalesce into something one per se.

29 It is confirmed. For if the divine essence were united under the form of a species with a created intellect, and something resulted from the two, it could not fail to come about through some new action; but this is repugnant. Therefore, and so on. The major is clear, because a new effect resulting from the union of several things must be produced through a new action, even if one of the extremes be uncreated, as is established in the mystery of the Incarnation.

The minor is also evident, because this action cannot be a productive action of the intellect, since that is of an inferior order, nor a productive action of the light of glory. For just as the production of the light of faith cannot be the production or the union of the intelligible species which are required for believing, so neither can the production of the light of glory be the productive action of the union of the divine essence, or of any third thing resulting from this union. Nor, finally, can it be any other action terminating in that whole conjunction. For in this conjunction there is found only the divine essence itself and its union with the intellect, and then the intellect with the light of glory. Yet no action can be found producing the divine essence, since that is of itself improducible, nor its union, because this union is not distinct from that same essence, in as far as the essence is an extreme capable of union through the form of a most pure act, and therefore is itself the thing unifiable and the union with itself; nor, finally, can it produce the intellect or the light, in such a way that this action have a necessary connection with the other component of this conjunction, namely with the divine essence and its union, for the reasons we have just given. Therefore neither can any action terminating in the aforesaid conjunction be given, since no action produces any whole, or conjunction, unless it produce whatever is in it, or something with which all the other things are necessarily connected.

30 Fourthly. An intelligible species must be received in the intellect; but God cannot be received in it. Therefore neither can he be united with it under the form of the aforesaid species. The consequence is evident. The major is clear, because an intelligible species has the form of form with respect to a created intellect; but a form must be received in that of which it is the form. The minor is also clear, both because the divine essence is the total form and subsists in itself, and therefore is repugnant to being received in another; and also because otherwise the same essence would be limited by the created intellect, since a form received in a subject is terminated and limited by that subject, as our Complutensians show from D. Thom. in 3. Phys. disp. de infinito.

31 Nor will it suffice to say that, although a natural form must be received, inhere, or intrinsically inform that of which it is the form, the intelligible form is different, as appears in the essence of an Angel, which is an intelligible form with respect to its proper intellect, yet does not inhere in it or intrinsically inform it. Whence it accrues to a species, or intelligible form, that it is either substance or accident, and it is enough for it to declare its union in intelligible being with the intellect, apart from imperfections, and therefore without inherence and intrinsic information. And so, although God cannot be united under the form of a natural form with the intellect of the blessed, he can indeed be united under the form of an intelligible form.

Against this, however, is the fact that it is repugnant for anything to be united under the form of an intelligible form without there also being admitted at the same time its union in entitative and natural being. Therefore, if God cannot be united with the intellect of the blessed under the form of a natural form and in entitative being, he will likewise not be able to be united with it intelligibly. The consequence is evident. The antecedent, however, is proved inductively. For in the union of the divine essence under the form of an intelligible species with its intellect, a greater union in natural being is superadded, namely through complete identity; and in the intelligible union of the essence of an Angel with its proper intellect another natural union is mixed in, namely through the form of essence and property. Likewise, with the union in intelligible being of the other species of any created intellect there is mixed a union of the same by inherence and information, which accompanies the union in intelligible being.

It is confirmed, first, because the divine essence, insofar as it pertains to the entitative order, and the same insofar as it is considered with respect to the intelligible order, and has the reason of an intelligible species, is not yet virtually distinguished, but is altogether the same formality. Therefore it cannot be united with the created intellect of the blessed, according to that whereby it has the reason of an intelligible species, unless it be also united with the same according to that whereby it pertains to the entitative order, or under the form of a natural form and in entitative being. The antecedent will be established both from what is to be said in this same dubium, and also from those things which we shall assert in the tractate de scientia Dei, disp. 3. num. 17. and thereafter, and in the tractate de volunt. Dei disp. 2. num. 34. The consequence is also evident. For in order that the divine essence should be united with the intellect of the blessed according to one of those two reasons, and not according to the other, it was necessary that there should be another reason, at least virtually distinct. Therefore, precisely because entitative and natural being on the one part, and intelligible being, or the reason of an intelligible species, on the other, are not virtually distinguished, that is, not distinguished with foundation in the thing in the divine essence, it is necessary that it likewise be unable to be united with the intellect of the blessed in the reason of an intelligible species, and insofar as it pertains to the intelligible order, unless it be also united with the same according to that whereby it pertains to the entitative and natural order.

32 It is confirmed, secondly, because the union of the species in intelligible being is more intimate and greater than the union of matter with substantial form. Therefore it must be by identity, or at least by information and inherence, and consequently in entitative and natural being. The antecedent is established from that common axiom taken from Averroes, 3. de Anima text. 37., namely, that from the intellect and the thing understood there comes a greater unity than from matter and form. For where there is a greater unity coalescing from two things, there a greater and more intimate union must intervene, as is clear from itself. Therefore, and so on. The first consequence, however, is proved. For otherwise that union would be far less and in no way intimate, since it would be only by an extrinsic assistentia and by the non-distinction of one from the other, and consequently by an extrinsic union.

The second consequence, however, is sufficiently evident. For union by inherence and by information, excluding identity between the form and the informed thing, pertains to the entitative and natural order; whereas union by identity with a form in which intelligible being is really the same as entitative and natural being, as occurs here, is a union and an identification both in intelligible being and in entitative and natural being.

33 It is confirmed, thirdly, because if the union in intelligible being, precisely taken, did not demand at least inherence or information, there would follow from this that for the union of the divine essence with the intellect of the blessed under the form of an intelligible form, only a certain most intimate presence by an influx would be required. But this is plainly false. Therefore, and so on. The consequence is clear from the major itself. The minor is also evident, both because the union of the divine essence through mere influx is only in the being of nature and for the effect of preservation, so that it is not sufficient for a union in the supernatural order under the form of an intelligible species; and also because the divine essence cannot be united under the form of an intelligible species with the intellect of the blessed before the light of glory, as will be clear from what is to be said in art. 4 and 5. For if union by influx were sufficient, it would be united before the aforesaid light, because before its coming the influx of God is present in the intellect. And finally, because otherwise the divine essence would remain united to every intellect, even one not blessed, since it makes an intimate influx into every intellect whatever.

§ II. The second opinion is reported.

34 The second opinion in part agrees with the preceding one, and in part indeed differs from it. It agrees, to the extent that it denies that God is united under the form of an intelligible species with the intellect of the blessed, on the ground that to the reason of the aforesaid species inherence is indispensably required. It differs, however, because it denies that in fact another impressed and created species is given. For it believes that it is enough that the divine essence have a peculiar concurrence in the reason of the object together with the created intellect, co-effecting with it the clear vision of God, even though on account of the aforesaid defect it is not an intelligible species with respect to it. Thus Suarez, vol. 1 of the Summa Theologiae, lib. 2. cap. 12.

This opinion, as regards that in which it agrees with the preceding one, seems sufficiently established from the arguments adduced in its favour. As regards that which it adds in the second place, namely, that another created species is not given, this will be clear from what is to be said in support of our own opinion.

The last point, however, can be urged in the following way. For a sufficient reason cannot be given, why an influx other than this should be necessarily required for the intellection, unless it be that the object itself is non-distinct from the intellect and effects the intellection together with it. Therefore in that case an intelligible species will not be necessary, whether as standing in the place of the object, or as meaning that the object is united under the form of a species. The consequence is clear. For both of these require inherence, and that the intellect be constituted in its first act by a species or by the object. And so there will not be only an influx in the genus of a cause co-operating with the intellect in the intellection. The antecedent is also clear. For intellection is a certain intellectual birth, and the word has the reason of offspring in intelligible being, and therefore the object is compared to the intellection after the manner of the male, while the intellect bears itself like the female in parturition, according to that common dictum, namely: from the object and the power knowledge is brought forth. Therefore, just as in a natural birth so much alone is required, namely that the male co-effect together with the female, and not that it constitute her in her first act; and if the male could of itself achieve what it achieves by means of the seed, the seed would not be required, so likewise in an intentional birth. For since this one is of that kind by analogy with the former one, it will be enough to find in it those things which are required of themselves, and indispensably, for a natural birth.

§ III. The true opinion of the Angelic Doctor.

35 Nevertheless it must be said that the divine essence is in fact united under the form of an intelligible species with the intellect of the blessed, in the order of the clear vision of God. Thus the disciples of D. Thom. and almost all the theologians have followed the same Saintly Doctor, both in the places cited in the preceding dubium, and also in 3. cont. Gen. cap. 51., where he says: It is therefore clear that the divine essence can be compared to a created intellect as an intelligible species, because it understands. And in 3. part. quaest. 9. art. 3. ad 3., where he says: The divine essence is united to the blessed mind, as the intelligible to the understanding. And in this same quaestio, art. 5., in these words: But when any created intellect sees God through his essence, the divine essence itself becomes the intelligible form of the intellect. And although this assertion could be sufficiently established from the impossibility of an impressed and created species in the order of seeing God, which we shall show below in this same disputation from D. Thom. and from reasons drawn from him from dub. 4 up to 9.; nevertheless, from the fundamental reason, drawn from its own principles and from the same Saintly Doctor in this art. and in quaest. 56., as well as from other places already cited, it is shown as follows.

36 For whenever an object is intelligible in itself and proportioned to the intellect, and finally united with it, it does not need an intelligible species distinct from itself, but is united in the reason of a species by itself. But the divine essence is intelligible in itself, and proportioned to the intellect bathed in the light of glory, and finally intimately united with it. Therefore it does not need a species distinct from itself, but is united in the reason of an intelligible species by itself. The major is proved. For an intelligible species is given only on account of the defect of one of the three conditions enumerated in the object. Whence, since none of those is lacking to the essence of an Angel with respect to its proper intellect, it does not need a species distinct from itself, but the essence itself is united in the reason of a species in the order of the knowledge of itself.

The minor, as regards 1. part., is sufficiently clear. For since intelligibility arises from immateriality and from the actuality of the object, it follows that the divine essence, which is the most pure act and is most immaterial, inasmuch as it is its own being, without any potentiality at all, is also intelligible through its own essence, indeed most intelligible.

As regards 2. vero part., however, that is, as regards proportion, this is also evident. For the intellect illuminated with the light of glory becomes of the divine order. Whence, just as by this reason the intellect is made divine, so also between it and the divine essence, as the intelligible object, there is a sufficient proportion.

37 As regards the last part, however, it is proved. For precisely because the divine essence is intelligible in itself, and in the reason of an intelligible object proportioned to the intellect as bathed in the light of glory, it must be conferred with it under the form of a species and of an intelligible form, proportioned to it and unifiable with it. Therefore, precisely because it is non-distinct from it by its own and peculiar non-distinction of the divine essence, that is, by the most intimate influx into it, as it is bathed in the light of glory, it will be necessary that it be itself united with the intellect so taken by another union in intelligible being. This consequence is clear. For whatever extreme capable of union, which in the reason of such a thing is a pure act, has in that order, in which it is unifiable and a pure act, its own most actual union with the other extreme, precisely because it is non-distinct from it by its own non-distinction, and on the part of it all the requisites for such a union are present. But this will be treated again expressly in the tractate on the Incarnation, quaest. 1. art. 1., where we shall also show how well these things cohere with those which our Complutensian College teaches in 1. Phys. disp. 6. quaest. 2.

§ IV. Gabriel Vazquez's evasion, and how it is to be precluded.

38 In many ways do adversaries occur to this argument. For in the first place Vazquez answers that in it it is supposed that a special concurrence of the object in the being of the object is necessarily required for the vision, and thus that, whenever the object possesses the assigned conditions, it has in itself the reason of an intelligible species. Yet such a concurrence is not necessarily required for the vision. And therefore the divine essence only concurs under the form of a universal cause. And likewise the intellection by which an Angel knows himself is brought about only by the Angelic intellect, without any special concurrence of the essence itself in the reason of the object or of an intelligible species.

But against this. For (as is established by that common axiom of the theologians and philosophers) from the object and the power knowledge is brought forth. Therefore the object specifically influences the intellection. The consequence is clear. Both because for this reason D. Aug., lib. 9. de Trin., cap. 10. and lib. 14. cap. 17., says that the intellect is passive potentiality, whose active principle is the object. And D. Thom., below, quaest. 77. art. 3., says: The object is compared to the act of passive potentiality as the principle and the moving cause. And also because, since in intellection there intervenes a certain birth, or as it were a birth, it is necessary that the female be present there, namely the intellective power, and at the same time something which bears itself like the fecundating male, namely the object. Therefore, just as the intellect has a special concurrence, because it concurs under the form of the female, so also the object will have an influence through a special influx, and under the form of the active principle that fecundates and moves the power, in as far as it bears itself like the male.

39 Furthermore. Because a word produced of itself necessarily has to be assimilated to the object whenever it is produced through intellection. Therefore the object has a special concurrence with it under the form of the principle by which, and consequently with the intellection. The antecedent is obvious. For a word of itself necessarily has to be representative of the object. Therefore it will necessarily be like IT. Whence in divine things the Word, according to its formal reason, is an image and a likeness of the Father, and is assimilated to IT in that essence which is the object of the Father's knowledge, by which it is produced. The first consequence is also clear. Because a word is necessarily assimilated only to its formal principle by which, which produces it. Therefore, if from its formal reason it is necessarily assimilated to the object, it follows that it therefore has a special influx into it, namely under the form of the productive principle by which, or at least under the form of the formal principle determining it to its production.

40 It is confirmed. Because the object has a special concurrence with respect to volition, whether this be in the genus of an efficient cause, as several Thomists hold, or in the genus of a final cause. Therefore it will also have that concurrence with respect to intellection. The antecedent is clear from itself. The consequence is also evident. Because it is proper to the intellect to draw things intelligible to itself, as theologians and philosophers commonly admit, just as the will is borne towards things willed. Therefore, just as for this reason the willed object has a special influx with respect to volition, so also for that reason the known object, or the intelligible, will specifically concur in the intellection. Otherwise, to what end would the intellect draw things intelligible to itself, if it did not specifically need them, at least as a principle acting inwardly in the order of intellection?

It is confirmed, and is at last explained. For just as the willed object specifies the volition, so, on the testimony of Aristotle, 11. Metaphys., whom Cajetan cites below, quaest. 14. artic. 1., the known object is the specifying principle of cognition. Therefore it is specifically united with the intellect in the order of such a specification, and consequently in the reason of the object it will have a special influx with respect to it. This last consequence is clear. Both from what has been said thus far, because if it did not have a peculiar influx, its union would not be peculiarly required in the order of intellection. And also because the intellection, as an action, is specified by its proximate principle eliciting it, as our Complutensians noted in their Logic, in the chapter on action. And thus, if the object specifies it, as it is an action, it will already have a special influx of a proximate and active principle with respect to it. The first consequence is also clear. Because the known object cannot be the specifying principle of cognition unless, as united, it is one with the knower. Otherwise the knower would not have in itself a sufficient principle of its own operation, which is against the nature of a perfect agent, and one belonging to the highest order of agents, such as the knower itself is.

§ V. Francis Suarez's solution, and how it is to be overturned.

41 Secondly, Suarez occurs, maintaining that in fact no created species is given in the order of the intellection of any object whenever this possesses the conditions enumerated by us. Yet it is falsely supposed that such an object must be united under the form of an intelligible species. Because inherence, or information in entitative being, is indispensably required for this. Wherefore then the special concurrence of the object in the being of the object will suffice, and will be required, insofar as it co-effects the intellection together with the intellect, without there intervening there the reason of an intelligible species, whether created or uncreated.

42 Yet this solution fails in two points among others. The first is that inherence, or information in entitative being, or any other imperfection whatsoever is formally predicated of the essence of an intelligible species taken formally. Its falsity is shown as follows. For in God the most formal reason of an intelligible species is found. But nothing involving intrinsically inherence, or information in entitative being, or any other imperfection whatsoever, can be formally found in him. Therefore the reason of an intelligible species, taken of itself and formally, does not necessarily involve inherence or any other imperfection. The consequence, with the minor, is sufficiently established. For otherwise God would not be a most perfect being, and consequently he would not be God.

The major, however, seems open to view. Both because it is commonly taught by theologians when they say that the divine essence truly and formally has the reason of an intelligible species with respect to the production of the Word. And also because it is stated by D. Thom., 3. cont. Gent. cap. 51. de verit. quaest. 2. art. 2. 1. part. quaest. 14. art. 2., where he says that: In God, because there is nothing of potentiality, therefore in him the intellect and the intellection are the same, so that he does not lack an intelligible species: as our intellect when it understands is in potentiality: nor is the intelligible species other than the substance of the divine intellect, but the intelligible species itself is the intellect itself, and so he understands through himself.

43 It is confirmed, first, that the expressed species, namely the word, is a perfection absolutely simple, and does not necessarily involve the imperfection of inherence or any other whatsoever. Therefore neither does the impressed species. The antecedent is clear. For otherwise the reason of the word would not be formally found in divine things. The consequence is also evident, both from the parity of the reason, and because the impressed species is a principle by which, whether formal only or active with respect to the word. Therefore, if this does not necessarily include an imperfection, neither will the impressed species involve it. The consequence is clear. For otherwise the imperfection of the impressed species would shine forth in the word, since every imperfection of a productive or formal principle, necessarily involved by it, must shine forth in the thing produced.

It is confirmed, second, and at the same time it is explained how the divine essence can be united in the reason of a species without inherence. For an intelligible species does not impart the first and essential power of understanding, which is required on the part of the intellective power. But it only completes, on the part of the object, the aforesaid power, and that in a manner which will be explained more fully immediately below. Therefore, since the divine essence is its own intelligibility under the form of a pure act, and is a true intelligible form, it will be able to be united not only with the divine intellect, but also with a created intellect. The antecedent is commonly admitted by theologians. The consequence is proved. For from it we infer that the divine subsistence can be united under the form of a terminus, without any imperfection of inherence or of information, not only with the essence of God, but also with a created essence, because it has the true reason of a terminus, and is itself subsisting under the form of a pure act, and the reason of subsisting completes nature, but does not impart the first essential reason as holding to it on its own part. Therefore, since the reason of an intelligible species has precisely this, proportion being preserved, and the divine essence is its own intelligibility under the form of a pure act, it will be able, without any admixture of inherence or any other imperfection whatsoever, to be united under the form of a species both with the divine and with the created intellect.

44 It is confirmed, finally, and this very thing is explained at the root by the reasoning of D. Thom. in this art., in the solution to objection 3, and often elsewhere. For the divine essence of itself is a species, or an intelligible form, and over and above it is all its own being, both in the genus of being and in the genus of intelligible, because it is its own intelligibility. Therefore, just as it can itself be an intelligible form with respect to the divine intellect, so also it can, without inherence or the imperfections of information, constitute the created intellect under the form of an intelligible form in its first act for understanding. The antecedent is established from what has been said. The consequence is proved. Because the cause, for which a form which has the true reason of a form in the natural and entitative order cannot constitute in act a subject proportioned to itself except through a middle inherence or information connoting imperfection, is that it necessarily demands that it, insofar as it constitutes the subject in act, not be that being which it gives, and therefore, in order to give such a being, needs some formal causality which is inherence, or information connoting and supposing imperfection. Therefore, where the form can be that being which it constitutes in act and which it gives to the subject, as in the intelligible form that is most perfect, namely in the divine essence, it happens that it will not need the causality of inherence or of the information already mentioned in order to constitute it in act, but will be able to achieve this through the immediate union of itself without any connoting or supposing imperfection of inherence or information.

45 From this also it is clear that the second head contained in this solution is false, namely, that the object, or the divine essence, displays a special and active concurrence in the reason of the object in the order of the clear vision of God, and at the same time does not have the reason of an intelligible species. For these two things do not seem to cohere with each other, as the following argument sufficiently shows.

Because precisely because the object concurs effectively in the reason of the object towards the vision of God, it is necessary that it be in some way united with the intellect under the form of a single principle, not indeed according to natural being, but according to intelligible being. Yet the object thus united with the intellect itself determines, actuates, completes and perfects it in the order of the aforesaid vision. Therefore precisely by this it will have the reason of an intelligible species with respect to it. The consequence seems certain. For by the name of an intelligible species we understand nothing else than the object, or something else standing in its place, which concurs effectively together with the intellect towards the intellection, and which perfects, actuates, completes and determines it in the order of that intellection. The major, however, needs no proof, since it is clear from itself that, whenever the concurrence of two things in the second act is required for some operation, it is necessary that, just as they are united in the second act, so in the first act they should in some way be presupposed as united. Otherwise there would be given a whole second act without a whole and complete first act, which is plainly repugnant.

46 The minor, in which the difficulty seemed to lie, is shown as follows. Because the intellect, as long as it is united with the object, is in essential potentiality with respect to its intellection. And thus the natural light of our intellect in its first production is in pure potentiality in the intelligible order, because it is not united with any object. And likewise, if the natural light of the Angelic intellect were not united with one of its objects, or with the species of them, it would be in essential potentiality with respect to them. Therefore, precisely because the object is united under the form of an active principle, it will be compared to such a light under the form of an act, of complement, and of determination of that same light. The consequence is clear. Because precisely, without any other act, it draws that light out of essential potentiality. And thus there is involved there that it must necessarily be compared under the form of an act, of complement, and of determination with respect to it.

47 It is confirmed, and is explained by the reasoning of D. Thom., 3. con. Gent. cap. 51. and in 4. dist. 49. quaest. 2. art. 1., from the difference which intervenes between a created essence, for example that of an Angel, and the divine essence. For that which concurs actively and is a form in natural and entitative being can be united with any subject capable of constituting it in its first act. On the other hand, that which is composed of matter and form, as is clear from itself, cannot. Therefore that which is pure form in intelligible being, and consequently is intelligibility itself, and influences actively, will be able to be united with another under the form of a form constituting it in this order in its first act, and consequently under the form of an intelligible species. Therefore, since God, as the intelligible object, influences actively, and is intelligibility itself, and consequently pure form in the intelligible genus, he will be able in this way to be united with any intellect that is elevated and proportioned to him. On the other hand, the essence of an Angel, which is not intelligibility itself, but that which is intelligible, cannot. And thus, since it includes intelligibility, it can be to itself the reason of being understood, just as that which includes a natural form can be to itself the reason of existing and operating. Yet because it involves potentiality, and is not intelligibility itself under the form of a pure act and of pure form, but that which has it, it cannot be united under the form of an intelligible form with a foreign intellect. But these matters will be treated more fully in the solution to the last objection for the first opinion.

§ VI. A certain objection is dissolved, from whose solution many things said so far are elucidated.

48 But you will object. From the fact that the divine essence and its attributes are a form in natural and entitative being with respect to God, and at the same time are their own being in this order, and are absolutely simple perfections, it is correctly inferred that they can be united without inherence or information under the form of a natural form with God himself, but not with any created thing. Because by this very fact inherence, or the imperfection of information, is involved there. Otherwise a creature could be, for example, created wisdom uncreated. Therefore, although from the fact that the divine essence is an intelligible form and its own being in the intelligible order, and consequently that the reason of a species is an absolutely simple perfection, it is inferred that it can be united without the aforesaid imperfection under the form of such a form with the uncreated intellect, yet not with a created one, as seems sufficiently clear from the parity of the reason.

49 And you will confirm. Because from the fact that quantity is its being quantitative, and so that it is also extended in itself, it is not correctly inferred that it can constitute a substance without inherence in the reason of an extended thing. Rather, it is inferred only that it can be to itself the reason of having parts. Therefore, from the fact that the divine essence is its own intelligibility, it will be inferred only that it can constitute the divine intellect, with which it is identified, in its first act. On the other hand, this is not true of the created intellect, from which it is really distinguished.

50 It will be answered, first, that what has been gratuitously admitted in God under the form of a natural form, and in entitative being with respect to himself, is nevertheless not granted, because it involves the greatest imperfection, as we shall say immediately. Nevertheless, neither the divine essence nor any other attribute can be united under the form of a natural form with any created thing. It can, however, be united under the form of an intelligible form. Because the latter is limited according to its entity by that in which it is received, whereas this one is not. And therefore this does not inhere; that one, however, does, as we shall weigh more fully immediately below.

51 It will be answered, second, that although the divine essence is the most pure act, and subsists in itself in natural and entitative being, and at the same time has the reason of an intelligible form, yet, if we speak properly and in a strict sense, it is not, nor can be, of itself a natural form in entitative being. And so it cannot constitute a creature, for example a wise one, in being, because by this very fact it would have the reason of a natural form. Whence an Angel, because he is neither a natural form nor can be, cannot by displaying his own entity communicate to another that natural and radical power which he himself has in entitative and natural being within himself. On the contrary, the rational soul can do so precisely because it is a true natural form.

52 Why, then, the reason of a natural form is repugnant to the divine essence, but not the reason of an intelligible form, is sufficiently clear from D. Thom., 1. part. quaest. 8., and from the three reasons, which are sufficiently efficacious, that can be seen there in the same place. Moreover, it can be declared according to the doctrine of the same Saintly Doctor, from the difference which intervenes between a natural form and an intelligible form. For a natural form is limited and terminated by the subject in which it is received, as the Angelic Doctor showed above, quaest. 7., and as our Complutensians do in the same place, 3. Phys. disp. 18. quaest. 2. On the other hand, an intelligible form is not.

The reason of which is taken from those things which we shall say in the aforesaid tractate on the knowledge of God, disp. 2., almost throughout its whole length. For as knowing things are distinguished from non-knowing things, as D. Thom. teaches in quaest. 14., cited above, in this, that just as the nature of a non-knowing thing is more compressed and limited, because it has much of potentiality and of matter, which is the root of compression, and therefore non-knowing things cannot become other things. On the contrary, the nature of a knowing thing is unlimited and broader, insofar as it can become all things in some way, as Aristotle says, 3. de Anima text. 37. So likewise a form which is received not in intelligible being, but in entitative and natural being, is terminated and limited according to its entity by its subject, because it is received in a less perfect way, and consequently the aforesaid form is united by a middle inherence or information, which alone demands limitation. On the contrary, a form which is received intelligibly, and under the form of an intelligible form, need not be limited, at least according to its entity, by that in which it is received in a more elevated and more perfect way, that is, in a very immaterial way, and consequently without any imperfection of limitation. Because materiality is the root of limitation, or of inherence, which from its own force demands limitation. And so, if it be precisely received in intelligible being, without any admixture of reception in entitative and natural being, it is not limited according to its entity by that in which it is received, nor is it in it by a natural information or inherence.

Whence, although it is repugnant to the divine essence to be united under the form of a natural form in entitative being, so that its entity should be terminated and limited by that in which it would be received, and consequently so that it should not inhere in it or itself inform it in entitative being, it is nevertheless not repugnant to be united under the form of an intelligible form, and purely intelligibly. Because this form is not limited, by that to which it is united, according to its entity and the reason of an intelligible form, and consequently it neither inheres in it nor informs it in entitative and natural being, because such an information demands limitation.

53 This can also be explained from those things which we shall say in the aforesaid tractate on the knowledge of God, in the place cited above, from the doctrine of D. Thom., 1. part. quaest. 50. art. 2. ad 2. For there the Saintly Doctor says that an intelligible form is received in the intellect according to the reason of form, that is, as Bannez well explains in the same place, according to the whole amplitude and universality which is proper to it in intelligible being. And therefore, when the species representing human nature, for example, informs the human intellect, then although it is limited in entitative and natural being, and becomes this in number and not that, nevertheless in intelligible and representative being it remains as universal and ample as the reason of such a form demands in its whole amplitude. And consequently it does not demand that, as regards its intrinsic perfection in intelligible being, it be terminated and limited by the intellect which it actually informs in intelligible being. A natural form, however, in entitative being, as such, precisely because it informs actually on the part of the thing, cannot remain with the whole amplitude and perfection which its species demands. Rather it is limited, and becomes this and not that, and it has this mode of participating its species, and not that one which is proper to another form of the same species, as is established in all natural forms which are properly and strictly such. And therefore D. Thom. in the cited quaestio, and often elsewhere, says that the nature, for example, of Michael the Archangel, cannot be multiplied in number. Rather, his one single individual, namely Michael, contains the whole species, and perfection, and amplitude of it, because it does not have the true reason of a natural form, but is an act subsisting in itself, and not receivable in matter, and consequently has nothing by which the amplitude of its species is limited. But these things will be treated again, and more at length, in the tractate cited.

54 Add, first, that an intelligible species, or intelligible form, holds itself on the part of the object rather than on the part of the other thing, and therefore, if the object is infinite, it represents infinitely and is not limited by the other, as we shall treat more fully below in this same disputation. On the other hand, a form in natural and entitative being holds itself on the part of the subject rather than on the part of the other thing, and so it must have its entity limited by a finite subject.

Add, second, that if we speak particularly of a form considered in natural and entitative being, holding itself on the part of the agent, and giving it that it be the principle of operating in a vital way, then such a form has a peculiar reason of being subordinated, for example in a man, to the first principle of his life and of all his operations, namely the soul. Because nothing holding itself on the part of that very thing can live unless it be that very thing or be subordinated to it. And therefore the light of glory, found in fact in the blessed and holding itself on the part of their intellect, and finally influencing the vital act of the beatific vision, is subordinated to the intellect and to the soul. Therefore from this head also it will be repugnant to the divine essence to be united under the form of a natural form with respect to the aforesaid actions. Because such a form holds itself on the part of that to which it is united, and demands a subordination repugnant to God.

Add, third, that a form properly and strictly taken, which as such is in entitative and natural being, is always something incomplete, or something accidental, as is clear inductively. And therefore it demands inherence, or information in natural and entitative being. A form in intelligible being, on the contrary, is the more a form the more complete it is in the reason of being. Indeed, if it be infinite in the genus of being, the more will it be able to be a form in the intelligible order. Because everything is the more intelligible the more it is a being. Whence, that which has more of entity will have also more of intelligibility. And so an intelligible form does not necessarily demand inherence, or the imperfection of information, in natural and entitative being.

55 From this also it will follow that a natural form in entitative being cannot eminently, or radically, possess the whole entity of its effect taken absolutely. As is established by those who teach, our Complutensians, 2. Phys. disput. de causis formali, et materiali. On the other hand, an intelligible form can, as is established in God and in the essence of an Angel, which has the reason of an intelligible species, and contains in fact, at least radically, the intellect and the intellection themselves, and consequently the whole of that which is required for the first act. Whence also on this account it will be repugnant to find in God the reason of a natural form in entitative being. It will not, however, be repugnant to find in him the reason of an intelligible form.

56 All of which D. Thom. explained elegantly, 3. cont. Gent. cap. 51., where, speaking of the divine essence, he says as follows: Nevertheless it cannot be the form of another thing according to natural being. For it would follow that, being united at the same time with some one thing, it would constitute one nature, which cannot be. Since the divine essence is perfect in itself in its own nature, whereas an intelligible species united to the intellect does not constitute any nature, but perfects the intellect itself for understanding, which does not conflict with the perfection of the divine essence. See, therefore, how, according to the mind of the Saintly Doctor, the concept of a natural form is the concept of an imperfect form, and one having a being diminished, inasmuch as it is ordered to the constituting of some nature. The concept of an intelligible species, on the other hand, can be the concept of a total form, and one altogether perfect, inasmuch as it has only to perfect, and not to be perfected. And so it is not strange that the intelligible form is found in God, and not the reason of a natural form.

From this also that which was adduced concerning quantity falls. For although we grant that quantity is, in its own way and with respect to itself, how much, as well as by which, and as that which, about which our Complutensians can be seen in their Logic, disputat. 4. num. 40., nevertheless the disparity is still manifest. Because precisely because it is not an infinite form, it cannot be its being quantitative, that is, that which it gives to a substance. On the other hand, since the divine essence is an intelligible form, and the reason of this form can, as we were saying a moment ago, be altogether complete, indeed infinite, it can therefore contain through the form of a pure act all intelligibility, and consequently be also that intelligible being which it gives to the created intellect.

§ VII. An answer is made to the three previous grounds of the first opinion.

57 To the first point, then, in favour of the first opinion, it must be said that the chief causality of an intelligible species does not lie in the reason of a natural form, which intrinsically demands inherence, or information connoting imperfection. Rather, it lies in the reason of an intelligible form, which only demands to complete and determine, that is, to impart to the intellective power, that in intelligible being the object itself is. And which, if it be united precisely in intelligible being, does not demand inherence, or the imperfection of an intrinsic information in entitative and natural being, but rather actuality, and being form in the intelligible order, pure of all imperfection. And therefore it is not strange that the divine essence, which is united only in intelligible being, can perform this office. Let our Complutensians be consulted, in the book on the soul, disp. 18. quaest. 4. and 5.

58 To the second point, the minor must be denied. And to the argument it will be answered that, although the divine essence is not united by an intrinsic and natural information in entitative being with the created intellect, it is nevertheless intrinsically united under the form of an intelligible form, completing and determining it, and informing it intelligibly, that is, giving it that it have the divine essence united to it, insofar as it has the reason of an intelligible form. And so it is united to it, and precisely corresponds to a created intelligible species representing it as it is in itself, if this were possible, and consequently gives the created intellect that God should be truly in the intelligible order.

This union, however, taken most formally, and still according to that which it imports directly, is sufficient really to change the intellect in intelligible being. Because this mode of changing does not argue any imperfection in the divine essence, and that intelligible being truly is something real. Yet, granted that this holds, namely, that the aforesaid union is not sufficient under the aforesaid precision, taken strictly, to change the created intellect in natural and entitative being, since this mode of changing connotes imperfection, and in this order it is not united with IT. We have said, under the aforesaid precision, because, if it be considered according to those things which it connots, it is able to change that same intellect in entitative being, because it requires the light of glory, as the disposition of itself in intelligible being taken in that sense. Which, indeed, as we shall say immediately, is produced in the intellect from the force of the unitive action of the divine essence, and through it the intellect is really and intrinsically changed in physical and natural being.

59 To the first confirmation, the antecedent must be granted, and the consequence denied. And to the argument it must be said that it does not follow from this, that the divine essence constitutes the created intellect in its first act by completing it and determining the activity of it, elevated as it is by the light of glory, that the same essence is in potentiality to the second act, that is, to the beatific vision. Because it acts and completes, setting aside imperfections. Wherefore the intellect alone, bathed in the light of glory, which is otherwise completed, and is intelligibly actuated by the divine essence, as by an intelligible form, is in potentiality to the vision. Just as the divine subsistence and existence complete the humanity of our Lord Christ, both in the being of being, and in operative being, in as far as the actions are those of supposita. Nevertheless, the divine personality is not in potentiality to receive actions, or to be thereby perfected. Because it completes and determines through the form of a most pure act, and therefore without any imperfection.

To the second confirmation, the antecedent must be denied. And to the argument it must be said that the formal effect which the divine essence gives to the intellect involves something infinite and uncreated, because it imports the divine essence as it is its own intelligible being, and gives to the intellect, already elevated, that it be God intelligibly. Although it at the same time connotates the light of glory, as the disposition necessarily required for such a union. And therefore it is not strange that this effect begins in time. Because, although that intelligible form is eternal, it is nevertheless united temporally. Since it connotes things which are given in time, and not from eternity, as will be more fully explained immediately below.

60 To the third point, it will be answered, first, with Ferr., 3. cont. Gent. cap. 51. §. ad 3. dubium, by distinguishing the major. And if it be understood of something that is one per se in entitative and natural being, it must be denied. On the other hand, if it be understood of something that is one per se in the intelligible order, and resulting from the intellect and the divine essence, as being intimately united, it is so. And in the same way the minor must be distinguished. For, although nothing one per se results from the divine essence and the intellect elevated by the light of glory in entitative and natural being, it does indeed result in intelligible being. Because it follows from this that the created intellect has the reason of one whole principle in itself with respect to the eliciting of the clear vision of God. Nor does the argument for the minor there adduced have force against this. For that from the intellect and the divine essence one accident does not become, or one substance, proves that one does not become from them in entitative being. It does not prove this in intelligible being. Because, as we were saying a moment ago, for this it is only necessary that a principle one per se of intellection should coalesce from them.

61 Secondly, and better, it will be answered with Cajetan, and with our Complutensians, in the book on the soul, disp. 18. quaest. 4. and 5., and with very many others of the disciples of D. Thom., that from the intellect and the intelligible species there does not result anything third, but that one extreme becomes the other, and so the intellect through the species becomes in a certain way, that is, in the intelligible order, the species itself, and moreover the object understood itself, considered in the same order. And in the way in which our Complutensians explain it in the place cited, and as we shall pursue more fully in the tractate on the knowledge of God, disp. 3. There also we shall dissolve all the objections that fight against this mode of speaking. From this there arose that common dictum taken from the Commentary on 3. de Anima text. 37., namely, that from the intellect and the thing understood there comes a greater unity than from matter and form. For matter does not become form, whereas the intellect in a certain way, that is, in intelligible being, becomes the object itself, as that which, and the intelligible species itself becomes, in the aforesaid order, the object itself, as that by which.

62 Whence, in answer to the argument for the minor, insofar as it can serve against this mode of speaking, it must be said that by this union and information in intelligible being the intellect bathed in the light of glory becomes the same, not indeed most formally, but identically through a certain identity, that is, in intelligible being, with the substance and essence of God, as it is the intelligible form, although not in entitative and natural being, because this union is not made with the divine essence according as it pertains to the entitative and natural order, but according as it is considered with respect to the intelligible order, or as it corresponds to a created intelligible species representing God as he is in himself, if this were possible, and were considered precisely in the intelligible order.

We have said, that by this union and information in intelligible being the intellect bathed in the light of glory becomes the same, not indeed most formally, but identically, etc., with the essence of God, as it is the intelligible form, in order to signify, first, that this identity is not so great as to be incompatible with a formal or virtual distinction in itself, and moreover with a real distinction, not indeed actual, but potential, as our Complutensians explain in the place cited. And secondly, that one extreme is not converted into the other, that is, does not lose its own and most formal reason, even though it is identified with the other. Just as, although an action and a passion, according to the probable opinion of many, are really and actually identified with each other, and are only virtually distinguished, nevertheless neither of them on that account has lost its own most formal reason.

Now, although it be granted that this identity in intelligible being is possible between the intellect and the species, nevertheless, after all things have been weighed, and speaking absolutely and simply, will the union of matter and substantial form be greater and more intimate than that of the species with the intellect? And likewise, will the personal union of the Word with the humanity of our Lord Christ be greater and more intimate than the union of the divine essence with the created intellect? This will be clear from what is to be said in the tractate on the knowledge of God, disp. 2. num. 102.

63 To the confirmation, the minor must be denied. And to the argument it must be said that the action by which the light of glory is infused is also a union of the divine essence under the form of an intelligible species. For an action which reaches the last disposition towards some form is extended so as to reach that form itself, with respect to which such a disposition is, when that action proceeds from an agent containing the whole perfection of both. And so such an action is subordinated not to that form in any way whatever, but as containing the whole of that perfection. And therefore an action reaching the last disposition towards the form of fire also reaches that form, as subordinated to the fire generating it.

Wherefore, since the light of glory holds itself under the form of the last disposition towards the reception, or as it were the reception, of the divine essence under the form of an intelligible form, as we shall show in art. 5., it follows that the infusion of it is also a union of that same essence. And consequently, that the divine essence remaining united with the created intellect will come about as it were through a natural emanation, in that proportional manner in which, the last disposition towards fire being posited, the form of fire results, as our Complutensians show, 2. Phys. disp. 10. num. 67., and thereafter.

Nor does the argument adduced there concerning the light of faith have force against this. Because this light does not hold itself under the form of the last disposition towards the acquiring of natural species, which serve for the act of faith. On the other hand, the light of glory does so with respect to the reception of the divine essence under the form of an intelligible form. Whence, in the will to infuse the light of glory, the will to unite the aforesaid essence is contained. Because such a will is freely required necessarily, on account of the eminence of this form for this union and communication, since, being an infinitely perfect form, it is not necessarily communicated even under the form of a form ad extra, but dependently on the free will of God. Just as for the same reason it cannot be communicated freely, but necessarily, ad intra. Otherwise it is just as it occurs in the divine subsistence, which also, by the form of a terminus, cannot fail to be necessarily communicated ad intra on account of its most eminent perfection, nor can it terminate created nature ad extra except freely, or by connoting the aforesaid free act of God.

§ VIII. An objection is made to the last ground of the first opinion, and to its first confirmation.

64 To the last point of the same opinion, because it expounds a longer discourse, it must be met point by point, granting the solution assigned there insofar as it denies that the union and information of the species in entitative being is indispensably required. And to the first objection, it will be answered that, although other essences, or intelligible species, cannot be united with a created intellect purely in intelligible being without there also being mixed in a union in entitative being, and although the divine essence also cannot be united with its divine intellect without there also being present a union in entitative and natural being, nevertheless the same essence of God, according as it has the reason of an intelligible species, will be able to be united purely in intelligible being with the created intellect.

65 The reason for the disparity, however, will be established by traversing in its own order the intelligible species which are set forth in this objection. For in the first place, if we speak of the divine essence as compared under the form of an intelligible species with its own intellect, it is compared with it as with an intellect which is the most pure act. Yet precisely because it is such, it cannot be distinguished from the intelligible species through which it understands, namely from the divine essence, whether this be considered in entitative and natural being, or in intelligible being. And therefore they must be united, according to both reasons, by an intimate and strictest union, namely by identity. Otherwise such an intellect would not be a pure act. Indeed, such an identity must be not just any identity, but complete, excluding any still virtual distinction between the aforesaid intellect and the essence of God.

Also, because, since the divine intellect is a pure act within its own line, it demands to identify without any virtual distinction all those things which pertain to its own line. And therefore, just as in this way it identifies its own intellection with itself, because these pertain to its own line, so also it identifies the divine essence, both according as it has the reason of essence and of nature, according to which reason it pertains to the entitative order, and according as it has the reason of an intelligible species. Because all these things pertain to the same line, as will be established more fully from those things which we shall say in the tractate on the knowledge of God, disp. 3. num. 17., and in the tractate on the will of God, disp. 2. num. 34. Also, because in the divine essence entitative and intelligible being is not yet virtually distinguished. And so, since it has the highest adequation and commensuration with its own intellect, as with its own first, so to speak, perfectible intellect, it cannot be united by complete identity according to that former reason unless it be also united according to this latter reason, which is distinct only on the part of our mode of conceiving.

Wherefore, since these things do not hold in the created intellect of the blessed, as is clear from itself, it follows that, from the divine essence and the intellect of God being compared with each other, neither can it be inferred that, just as between them there intervenes a union both in entitative being and in intelligible being, so also there is one between the divine essence and the created intellect of the blessed.

66 Furthermore, if we speak of the essence of an Angel, according as it has the reason of an intelligible species with respect to its proper intellect, then they are therefore united in natural and entitative being, or, which amounts to the same for the present, under the form of subject and property. Because the essence of an Angel is an intelligible form that is finite and limited. And by reason of this it is so compressed that it cannot be united under the form of an intelligible form except with its own proper intellect. And likewise its subsistence, because it is finite, is so commensurated and compressed to its nature that it cannot terminate another. And therefore it is necessary that the intellect with which the aforesaid Angelic essence is united be its own intellect, and therefore be united with it under the form of subject and property, or under the form of nature and root for understanding, and of proximate power for the same intellection. Because the intellect of an Angel, just like any other vital power, cannot have such a reason unless it be united with its own proper nature, from which it emanates, as our Complutensian College noted in the books of the Physics, disp. 10. num. 66.

Wherefore, since this reason has no place in the divine essence compared with the created intellect of the blessed, because, as is clear from itself, it is itself a certain infinite intelligible form, and the aforesaid intellect does not hold itself under the form of property with respect to the divine essence, and consequently is not rooted in it as a property and proximate vital power is in its nature and radical principle of life, it follows that, from the union in natural and entitative being, which must necessarily be mixed into the union of the Angelic essence under the form of an intelligible species with its own intellect, it cannot be inferred that the same is to be said of the divine essence compared under the form of an intelligible species with the intellect of the blessed. Rather, on the contrary, because the aforesaid essence has the reason of an infinite intelligible form, it will be able to be extended to act intelligibly upon any created intellect. Just as, because the divine subsistence in the reason of a terminus of nature is infinite, it is able to be extended to terminate created nature. And then, because the aforesaid created intellect is not compared with the divine essence under the form of a property emanating from it, and the essence itself cannot have the reason of a natural form in entitative being by reason of its own infinitude, therefore it will not be able to be united in this way, but only purely intelligibly, with the aforesaid intellect.

67 By these things also it is established with respect to another argument adduced in this objection, concerning the other intelligible species, which are accidents. For these, precisely because they are such, their intelligible being must be identified with their natural and entitative being, which is an accident. And consequently they must inhere in the intellect and be united with it in natural and entitative being, as with their subject. This reason, as is established, cannot have place in an infinite intelligible species, such as the divine essence is. Since this must be free from all imperfections, and consequently from inherence, which essentially connotes imperfection.

Add, that from this example of intelligible species which are accidents a not unimportant argument can be derived to urge the possibility of the union of the divine essence under the form of an intelligible form, even though no other union in entitative and natural being be mixed in there. For since those species are united in entitative and natural being, because they must inhere under the form of the entitative being of an accident which they possess, it follows that, if God were to supply supernaturally this inherence, as occurs in the accidents of the Eucharist, then it would be very probable that the aforesaid species could be united under the form of a pure intelligible form, without being united actually and formally in entitative being. Even if according to this being they should have to be non-distinct from the intellect to which they would be united intelligibly, and could not be freed from that which it is to be unifiable according to the aforesaid entitative being. Much more, therefore, will the divine essence be able to be united precisely in intelligible being.

68 To the first confirmation, it will be answered by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. And to the argument it must be said that, in order that the divine essence may be able to be united under the form of an intelligible species, and according as it pertains to the intelligible order, but not according as it pertains to the entitative and natural order, it is not necessary that these two reasons be virtually distinguished in the essence itself. Rather, it is enough that the divine essence, with this complete identity which excludes the aforesaid distinction, be the most eminent form, performing by reason of this eminence the office of entitative and natural being, and the office of intelligible being, which in creatures are distinguished either really or virtually.

For just as this eminence is sufficient for this, that it be able to be united with the created intellect of the blessed under the form of an intelligible species, and not under the form of an intellection, although these two are not yet virtually distinguished in the divine essence, as will be clear from what is to be said in the tractate on the knowledge of God, disputat. 3. num. 17., and in the treatise on the will of God, disput. 2, num. 34. And likewise, this same eminence is enough for this, that the same essence be united with the humanity of our Lord Christ under the form of an existence, but not under the form of nature and essence, as we shall say in the treatise on the Incarnation, although the reason of nature and of existence are not distinguished in God by a virtual distinction, as will be clear from those things which will be said in the aforesaid tractate on the knowledge of God, disput. 4. dubio 2. So likewise in the present case, proportion being preserved, one must philosophize. And the reason is the same in all of these. Because neither the humanity of our Lord Christ nor the created intellect is capable of union with the divine essence according as it has the reason of nature, or of intellection. Nor can the divine essence have the reason of a natural form in entitative being.

69 Although you inquire how this eminence and the faculty of exercising several things, no less than if they were several, can cohere in the divine essence with a complete identity, and with the exclusion even of a virtual distinction. Since, indeed, the divine essence and the relation are not virtually distinguished for any other reason than because that same formality exercises its own proper things, several no less than if they were several in act.

To this it must be said that, for a formal and even virtual distinction of one formality from another, it is not enough to exercise the proper things of several things in any way whatever. For from this alone it is inferred that there is an eminence of one and the same, so to speak, most formal reason. But over and above this, it is necessary to exercise the proper things of several things which pertain to distinct lines, and not of those which look to one and the same line. And the reason is that then the proper things of several are exercised as of several. And so from such an exercise a plurality, at least a virtual one, is inferred in the agent. On the other hand, when the proper things of several are exercised which pertain to one and the same line, they are not exercised as of several, but as of those which are one, that is, insofar as they pertain to one and the same line. And therefore in God the essence and the relation are virtually distinguished, because the absolute and the relative look of their own nature to distinct lines. On the other hand, the intellection and the intellect are not, because the line of the intellect in its purity reaches as far as the second act inclusively.

70 Whence, because the line of entitative and natural being, if it be considered in its purity, reaches as far as intelligible being also, because entitative and natural being in its purity is the most immaterial being, and under the form of a most pure act, and this very thing imports intelligible being, therefore, from the fact that the divine essence exercises with respect to God the offices of entitative and intelligible being, which in material things are distinct, a virtual distinction of several formalities does not follow. Rather, it follows that the same formality altogether is the most eminent, and that without that distinction it possesses those things which in others are distinct, and that, since it is one, it exercises distinct offices pertaining to the same line.

§ IX. An answer is made to the two later confirmations of that same last argument.

71 To the second confirmation of that same last argument, it is clear from what was said in num. 61. how the union of the intellect with the intelligible species is in a certain way greater and more intimate than the union of matter and substantial form. For although a third thing results from these by composition, yet matter does not itself become form, as has already been hinted. On the other hand, the intellect, namely, and the intelligible species are in a certain way, that is, in intelligible being, identified. And therefore the intellect becomes identically, though not most formally, the object itself, precisely because it is united with it. But let those things be seen which will be said in the treatise on the knowledge of God, disput. 2. num. 66 and 95, and thereafter.

72 To the third confirmation, some answer by granting the consequence and denying the minor. And to the first argument they deny the antecedent, because the divine essence can be united both under the form of an agent intimately influxing, for the effect of preservation, and also under the form of an intelligible form which is intimately influxed into the intellect as it is bathed in the light of glory. And consequently this latter union, taken formally, will be supernatural. On the other hand, the former will not. From this, to the second argument, they say that the divine essence before the light of glory is united with the intellect under the form of an agent operating intimately in it and preserving its natural entity. Yet not under the form of an intelligible form. And so it is not formally influxed into the intellect, according as it has the reason of the aforesaid form, but materially, and in the being of the agent conserving it.

From this also, to the last objection, they answer that just as visible species are received in a mirror in entitative and qualitative being, and not formally in visible being, because the mirror does not have visual power, and the aforesaid species are only receivable in visible being in visual potency, so the divine essence under the form of an intelligible form is only quasi-receivable in the divine intellect, or in what pertains to the divine order, and consequently in the intellect as elevated by the light of glory. Because the intellect, so elevated, alone has that it be the intellective of God as he is in himself. Whence in an intellect that is not elevated it is only materially, and not as an intelligible form, but under the form of an intimate agent, with which otherwise the reason of an intelligible form is conjoined.

73 Yet this solution does not please. For although the Divine Thomas teaches, quaest. 28. de veritate art. 2. ad octavum, that the union of the divine essence through an intimate influx is more intimate than the union of other created things through information or inherence, on the ground that, as the Saintly Doctor teaches there, that which is united through an intimate influx is within the substance of the thing, whereas that which is united through information, so to speak, surrounds that with which the union is made. Nevertheless, such a union, taken most formally, is not a union of a form with an informed thing, but a union of an intimate agent with its effect, from whom whatever is in it, however intimate, is caused in such a way that the aforesaid agent is present to it only in as far as it causes its whole intimate essence. And therefore, although the divine essence is intimately influxed into any creature, and into its most intimate natural entity, it is not on that account in it in the way in which a form is in an informable thing, but in the way in which an agent is present to its effect, or in the way in which that which is immense demands to be in all things.

74 Wherefore a better and clearer solution of this argument is established from what has been often said, namely, that although for the union of the divine essence under the form of an intelligible form with a created intellect it is required that the same essence, on the part of the thing conceived, be non-distinct from the intellect as elevated by the light of glory, by its own proper non-distinction, which consists in an intimate influx, yet this union does not formally consist in the aforesaid non-distinction. Rather, the divine essence, according as it has the reason of an intelligible form, is united with that same intellect by another union, and therefore it itself informs the aforesaid intellect by an intelligible information. Yet in such a way that at the same time it is form and information in this order. Also because it is an extreme capable of union, and an intelligible form under the form of a pure act. And therefore it is the union of itself. Also because this union and information is most formal in the intelligible order, and consequently it is of such a condition that through it the informed thing and the informing form are in a certain way, that is, in intelligible being, and in the way explained in the treatise on the knowledge of God, identified. And for this reason too, no intermediate mode of union, distinct from the nature of the thing, is required between the essence and the intellect bathed in the light of glory, by which they may remain united. Because such a union is exercised precisely within the intelligible order, and not within the entitative and natural order.

75 We have said that for the union of the divine essence under the form of an intelligible form it is required that the same essence, on the part of the thing conceived, be non-distinct from the intellect as elevated by the light of glory, by a non-distinction consisting in an intimate influx. Because, although this is proper to that same essence, so that it cannot itself be formally united with the created intellect unless it first produce the light of glory in it, and therefore unless it be non-distinct from that same intellect, in as far as it is so elevated by the proper non-distinction of the aforesaid essence, that is, by an entitum¹ influx. Nevertheless, it is not necessary that the same essence, insofar as it expresses the reason of an intelligible species, should cause the light of glory effectively. Yet, because the divine essence, insofar as by the form of the first root it causes it, and insofar as it expresses the reason of an intelligible form, is distinguished only on the part of our mode of conceiving, and not virtually, that is, on the part of the thing conceived, therefore the same essence on the part of the thing conceived must first be non-distinct through an intimate influx, and then be united under the form of an intelligible form. Whence, according to these things, those things which we said above in num. 37. must be understood.

§ X. The ground of the second opinion is dissolved.

76 Finally, to the ground of the second opinion, to its last part, it will be answered by denying the antecedent, as is clear from what has been said. The consequence, however, must be denied. The reason for the disparity is clear from those things which we have already said. Because the divine essence, which concurs under the form of the male, also has in the intelligible order the reason of form, as has been shown, and therefore it must concur in both ways, which is what we say also of the other intelligible species. On the other hand, that which concurs under the form of the male in natural generation, and is distinct from intentional generation, does not hold itself under the form of a natural form with respect to the female. And therefore it does not concur under the form of a form, and in the genus of a formal cause. Wherefore, if there is any analogy between generation or the intentional birth, understood by attribution, and that which is purely natural, of which we have spoken elsewhere, it will be only as regards the reason of effecting, and not as regards the mode of causing in the genus of a formal cause. Because this influx is not found in purely natural generation on the part of the male with respect to the female.

77 In the title, the qualifier insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species has rightly been added. For we do not doubt that, according to the general reason of a first cause, [the divine essence] concurs actively in vision, and this not somehow or otherwise, but insofar as it is the first cause of the supernatural order; since it is certain that every action of a secondary cause depends proportionately upon its nature on the first cause: namely, that if it belongs to the natural order, it depends on God as its natural author; but if it belongs to the supernatural order, it requires the general influx of God himself as supernatural author. The title of the difficulty therefore concerns another peculiar concurrence, namely, concurrence that is active in the character of an intelligible species. By this kind of concurrence, the divine essence does not influx into all other things: because this mode of concurrence belongs specifically to the object of a cognitive power insofar as it is the object that moves it; and thus only the object just mentioned possesses this peculiar mode of influx.

§ I. The dissenting opinion is proposed.

78 Some younger Thomists distinguish two functions in an intelligible species. The first is to unite the object to the power and, by this union, to determine that power formally with respect to intellection. The second, however, is to concur actively with it. Of these, they judge the former to be altogether indispensable and, according to its own kind, free from imperfections; but not the latter. Accordingly, they deny this concurrence to the divine essence insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species with respect to created intellect. Thus Bannez in the present question, and other younger Thomists. Zumel also regards this opinion as probable in this article, and it seems to be suggested by St. Thomas there, insofar as on the part of the power he posits the light of glory, by which the intellect is made efficacious to see God, while on the part of the object he posits the divine essence under the form of a species. For if the divine essence, as united in the character of a species, possessed any activity by which it might complete and strengthen the active power of the intellect, it would already belong to that power on its own side; for the light does not belong on the part of the intellect for any other reason except that it strengthens the intellect to see.

79 It is proved first by reasoning. An impressed species that concurs actively with intellection inflows insofar as it is subordinated to the intellect; therefore the divine essence cannot concur actively in the character of a species together with created intellect. The consequence is evident. Because to inflow by the mode of a principle subordinated to another implies imperfection and dependence. The antecedent is also evident. Because a species, which is the efficient cause of intellection, inflows by the mode of a principle by which it determines the intellect to understand; but an active principle by which is subordinated to the active principle which, as is clear from itself.

It is confirmed. Because otherwise the concurrence of the species would not be vital, and consequently neither would the specification of intellection proceeding from it be vital; but this is false; therefore, etc. The consequence is evident. For an impressed species, considered in itself, is not a vital principle, since it can arise from a principal cause absolutely without life, as is clear from sensible species. Hence, unless it is subordinated to a vital principle, namely, to a vital power, it cannot provide a vital influx. The falsity of the consequent follows from this. For since intellection is vital of itself and intrinsically, it cannot fail, according to its own species and essence, to have intellectual vitality.

80 Second, because otherwise the divine essence would concur immediately in vision through its own substance, and consequently naturally and insofar as it is such, but not insofar as it wills; yet this is absurd; therefore, etc. The consequence is proved. For it belongs to an object that is actually intelligible in itself, such as the divine essence, to inflow naturally and insofar as it is such into vision, but not freely. For just as through its own substance it is the complete object and determines immediately, so through that same substance it ought to act immediately. The absurdity of the consequent follows from this. First, because the proper and perfect mode of God's operation ad extra is through the intellect and the will, as is sufficiently established from what the theologians teach commonly in q. 25 of this first part. Secondly, because otherwise the influx of the divine essence in the character of a species would be necessary, and therefore infinite: since an infinite power, such as that in the divine essence, which inflows necessarily inflows as far as it can, and therefore infinitely.

81 Third, because on the contrary it would follow that the divine relations, according to their proper characters, concur actively together with created intellect in the vision of God; yet this cannot be said; therefore, etc. The consequence is evident. For, according to the opposite opinion, the divine essence inflows in this way for no other reason than that it is united in the character of an intelligible species, insofar as it is its own being, and has entered intimately into the intellect elevated by the light of glory, and is therefore proportionate to it. Thus, when these conditions are found in the divine relations when considered according to their proper formal reasons, as is evident in itself, it would follow that these relations also would inflow actively into vision according to their proper characters.

The falsity of the consequent is also evident. For although the divine relations can inflow ad extra according to their proper characters as a cause, or quasi-cause, of a formal kind, and thus filiation terminates Christ's human nature according to its proper character, but paternity does not, because this mode of termination is reduced to the genus of a formal cause, or quasi-formal cause; nevertheless they cannot, according to this reason, display any active influx with respect to created vision. For, as the theologians teach commonly, the works, or efficient activity, of the Trinity ad extra are undivided; and thus they always act ad extra through what is common, not through what is proper.

§ II. The difficulty is resolved according to the mind of St. Thomas.

82 Nevertheless, it must be said that the divine essence, insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species, inflows actively together with the intellect of the blessed into the clear vision of God. Thus St. Thomas, below, q. 56, a. 1, where he teaches this generally concerning every species, in these words: In an action that remains in the agent, the object must be united to the agent insofar as the action proceeds; just as the sensible must be united to sense insofar as it actually feels, and thus the object united to a power stands to an action of this kind as the form that is the principle of action in other agents. And speaking particularly of the divine essence, he sufficiently suggests this very point in the present question, particularly in his answer to the third, as well as in 4, d. 49, q. 2, a. 1, in the text near the end; in De veritate, q. 8, a. 1, ad quintum; and in 3 contra Gentes, c. 51, as we shall examine more closely below. And so very many of his disciples follow the Holy Doctor in the present question: Caieta, Nazarenus, Zumel, and others. Ferrarius, 1 contra Gentes, c. 53, and 3 contra Gentes, c. 51; and our Complutensian College, in the De Anima, disp. 18, q. 4.

83 It is proved first by the reason suggested by the same Holy Doctor in the cited places. Because the divine essence is united in the character of the object with the blessed intellect in order to determine it with respect to the specification of cognition, namely, so that it would be of such an object and not another; therefore, it concurs efficiently in the specification of that same cognition. The consequence is evident. Because the determination of an active power with respect to the specification of an act cannot occur except through the active power by which the power is constituted in the first act with respect to the specification of that same act. For just as the active power concurs in the specified determination insofar as it has the character of an active power, as our Complutensian College noted in its Logic, in the chapter on action, and as will be clearer from what must be said below, so whatever determines, completes, and, as it were, ultimately gives its formal character to that power with respect to the determination in question must belong to the same line of active power; and consequently it must also be an active principle, or an active determination with respect to the specified determination.

The antecedent is also evident. First, because an intellectual power is intrinsically indeterminate with respect to the specified determination of cognition, which is that of God clearly seen and not of another object, and it is determined through the union with the specified object; therefore, such a union is required for this determination of the power. Secondly, because the divine essence, insofar as it is its own being, can of itself, without any adherence or imperfection of information when taken in entitative being, constitute the created intellect in act and permanently complete it, and therefore through union with it will determine it with respect to the specification of the act. Because a form that permanently constitutes and completes the active power, and is necessarily required for acting, is united with it in order to determine it with respect to the specification of the act, as may be seen in the deduction made concerning other forms.

84 Nor is it necessary to attack again the solution that some of the younger Thomists use against this reasoning, saying that the created intellect together with the light of glory is sufficiently determined with respect to the specification of the act in relation to the clear vision of God; since by the force of such light the intellect cannot produce another species of intellection. Hence, although the force of the reasoning just made establishes the necessity of active concurrence on the part of the object in many other acts of intellection because of the indifference of the intellect, it does not establish it in this one.

Therefore, it will not be necessary to overturn the proposed solution again by several arguments. First, because, as is clear from what has been said, by the force of the light of glory the power is determined only by a determination on the part of the power, not on the part of the object. But in order to elicit intellection, it must be determined on the part of each; and thus an intellect infused with prophetic light can be sufficiently determined by that light on the part of the power with respect to some particular object, and nevertheless, because it is not determined on every side, it requires species that inflow actively, as the opponents themselves admit. Secondly, because, as we have already asserted, intellection is of the kind of an intellectual birth. Hence some seed must proceed in some way from the masculine side to determine the feminine, namely, the intellectual power, toward this birth of intellection rather than another.

85 First, there is a further reason for more thoroughly refuting this solution: it does not agree with what St. Thomas teaches in this article. Since the divine essence, precisely insofar as it is its own being, constitutes the created intellect in act through the form of an intelligible form, it must inflow efficiently into intellection as the clear vision of God itself rather than of another object, and therefore determine it in the specified manner with respect to that vision. Because each thing acts insofar as it is in act, that which has the character of an act with respect to intelligibility must also, in the way now stated, be the reason of operation and an active power in that order.

Second, intellection, insofar as it is an action, is specified by the object insofar as it is an object; and therefore it is of this species and not another, because it is concerned with this object and not another. Therefore, the object, insofar as it is the moving object, inflows actively into intellection. The consequence is evident. Because, as St. Thomas teaches below, q. 14, a. 5, at the end, and 1–2, q. 1, a. 3, intellection, insofar as it is an action, and generally every other action insofar as it is such, is specified by the active principle from which it proceeds; because it is essentially an egress or emanation from the agent. Therefore, if the object, insofar as it is an object, is not an active power with respect to intellection, it cannot specify it as such, and consequently cannot determine the power with respect to its specification.

86 Second, the assertion is proved principally by a reason drawn from various places in St. Thomas. Because every perfection simpliciter found in creatures must be found in God, as St. Thomas teaches above, q. 4, a. 2; otherwise God would not be a most perfect being, and consequently would not be God. But in us an intelligible species concurs actively in intellection, and this belongs to a perfection simpliciter; therefore, this perfection of active power is found in the divine essence insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species, both with respect to divine intellect and to created intellect. The consequence with the major is sufficiently evident. The minor is St. Thomas, q. 56, cited above, and 3 contra Gentes, c. 53, and elsewhere frequently; the philosophers likewise acknowledge, explain, and prove it, as do Aristotle and St. Thomas; as well as by the reasons adduced by our Complutensian College in the cited questions and discussions in the De Anima. The second part is also evident: because the genus of an efficient cause necessarily involves no imperfection, and therefore is found formally in God, as the same Holy Doctor teaches throughout.

87 It makes no difference if one agrees with the opponents that the active concurrence of the intelligible species together with created intellect involves the perfection necessarily accompanied by the imperfections of subordination and dependence upon the aforementioned intellect; and therefore it is no wonder that it is not found in the divine essence insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species with respect to that intellect.

This therefore makes no difference. For although the intelligible species, which is an accident, possesses the said dependence and subordination, the form that is a subsistent form and a complete act nevertheless does not. Therefore, when the divine essence, insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species with respect to the blessed intellect, is a form subsisting in itself and a most perfect act, it will be free from the said imperfections, however actively it may inflow into intellection. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is also evident. Because a principle by which is subordinated to, and depends upon, a principle which insofar as it is sustained by it and receives some being from it in its own way; since, according to the common axiom of the philosophers, the mode of operation follows the mode of being. Therefore, an intelligible species, which is an accident and is sustained as to its being by the operating principle, as that which it depends upon, will depend upon and be subordinated to it with respect to its operation (using the phrase as explained presently), but not insofar as it is a subsistent form and a complete act, since as to its being it does not depend upon it.

88 This doctrine must be understood even though the principle which is not absolutely and simpliciter of that kind, but only in a certain respect, as happens in our intellect, which in a certain respect has the character of a principle by which with respect to intellection; the cause of which is called in a certain sense intelligible, but does not absolutely and simpliciter have the character of a principle which: because it completes the whole suppositum, namely, a human being or an angel; for the suppositum is precisely that which absolutely and simpliciter is called intelligible.

89 Nor does it tell against this that the principle quo cannot proceed into operation without the principle quod, just as it does not tell against the first cause, which concurs with the second cause by general concurrence, that it cannot (as many think, as discussed elsewhere) produce an effect without the concurrence of that same second cause, so that the latter may depend on the former. Because in both cases the same reason applies, namely, that the second cause does not confer power upon the first to act; quite the contrary is true. Similarly, the principle which does not confer force and the reason of acting, as such, upon the principle by which; least of all when the principle of acting quo subsists in itself, as does the divine essence, even when considered in the character of an intelligible species, as happens. Quite the contrary, the principle of acting quod has such being from the principle that constitutes it.

90 Finally, even if it is admitted that in other things the formal principle by which is subordinated to the principle which, this should nevertheless not be admitted in the intellect and the intelligible species; and the difference between the two cases is drawn from the proper nature of the intellect and the intelligible object, as was explained in the preceding doubt, n. 61. For in other things the formal principle which does not pass into the nature of the principle by which, or (which amounts to the same here) is not identified with it, but remains altogether distinct from it, so that a third thing arises from both. In the intelligible order, however, the intellect in some way passes into the intelligible object: because the intellect becomes identically the very thing understood, and this is in a certain way poured into the very nature of the intellect insofar as it is identified with the object. Therefore, although the intellect may in its own way inflow as a principle which, the object nevertheless will not be subordinated to it: because the intellect is intelligibly the object itself, and nothing is subordinated to itself.

91 Nor does it tell against this that the identity of the created intellect with the understood thing is an identity in a certain sense only, not an identity of every kind that excludes a real actual distinction in esse entitativo, et naturale between the two, and consequently does not appear incompatible with a real subordination of one to the other.

This therefore does not tell against it. Because although the same identity is present there, involving a real distinction in esse entitativo, what must chiefly be considered in the intellect and the intelligible object, if they are considered in the intelligible order and intelligible being, is that identity in the intelligible order of one with the other and the real distinction in entitative being involved there, which is imported materially (although almost always indispensably), whether through the imperfection of the power, or of the species, or of both, as happens in us—not by reason of the fact that an intelligible species of itself and indispensably demands it from the force of its own line. Therefore, attention must chiefly be given to this identity, and the intellect and object must be philosophically considered in the intelligible order as if they were not distinguished in entitative being. And thus, if there is any material subordination there in entitative and material being, it need not be found in this most perfect species; indeed, not even in other species when they are considered precisely with respect to the formal character of their proper line.

92 Hence, when it is said that the intellect becomes in a certain sense the thing understood, the term quodammodo excludes the claim that one necessarily becomes another in esse entitativo, but not in esse intelligibili. Because becoming one with another in esse intelligibili alone demands, at least necessarily and indispensably, the identity explained in the cited place and to be explained more fully in the treatise De scientia Dei, disp. 2, nn. 83–92; and the diversity that intervenes there (which can arise only from information, or from accidental being, or from the substantial mode of being of the species itself) does not arise formally from the intelligible order, but is materially imported from esse entitativo, however indispensably it may be joined there. The reason for the present, at least, is this. For just as a human being and a lion are the same in the character of an animal, because although they are distinguished by their proper differences, they are not distinguished by the reason of animality; and therefore, if those differences did not lie within the proper line, a human being and a lion would be positively the same in the character of an animal, so too, because the diversity intervening between object and intellect, once the union of one with the other is posited, does not arise from the intelligible order but from information, or from adherence in esse entitativo, or from the fact that an intelligible species has its esse entitatively under the mode of a subject with respect to the intellect, or from the imperfection of the power. For all of these stand in a material relation to the intelligible order; whereas the intellect, by reason of the species, has numerically the same nature as the object, albeit under another mode of being, namely, intelligible, as we shall say in the aforementioned treatise De scientia Dei, disp. 2, n. 14. Therefore, with this qualification, namely, in the intelligible order, the intellect must itself become the thing understood. See our Complutensians in the De Anima, disp. 18, q. 4, and what we shall assert in the recently cited disp. 2, nn. 83–92.

§ III. A difficult objection and its first answer.

93 But you will object: The essence of an angel, insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species with respect to its own intellect, does not concur actively with respect to its own knowledge; and this for no other reason than that the said intellect is determined on its own side with respect to the knowledge of the angel itself. Therefore, the fact that a power is determined on its own side with respect to the knowledge of some object removes its need for active concurrence on the part of the object insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species. Consequently, since the intellect infused with the light of glory is determined on its own side with respect to the clear vision of God, it will not need an active influx from the divine essence insofar as it has the character of a species. The major is evident. Because the essence of an angel, which is a created substance, cannot be immediately operative, and consequently cannot inflow actively through the mode of a species: because this concurrence is provided immediately by the species. The minor is also evident. Because the fact that an angel's intellect does not need the active concurrence of another with respect to the said knowledge must arise from its being sufficiently determined within the order of an efficient cause. Hence, if it is not determined actively in this order on the part of the object, it must arise solely from a determination on every side by itself.

94 It is confirmed. For either the reason of a species necessarily requires the reason of an active principle, and not one in just any manner, but one free from the imperfections of subordination and dependence; or else it requires that reason involved together with those imperfections. If the first, there will be no reason why this reason, free from the said imperfections, would not be found in the essence of an angel insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species, since it is a subsistent form and a most perfect act, and therefore, even if it is a substance, it will nevertheless be immediately operative; otherwise it will not have the character of a species. If the second, therefore the reason of an intelligible species will not be found in the divine essence with respect to created intellect.

95 This objection can be answered by denying the major. Against this, nothing follows from the proof. Because for the reason of an intelligible species and its active concurrence, it is enough that it concur actively at the radical level through itself, and proximately through its power, as occurs here.

This is explained. For the angelic intellect arises from the essence of the angel, both insofar as it is an intellectual act and insofar as it is actually intelligible, and therefore has the character of an object, because its essence by the reason of its immateriality has both. And the said intellect proceeds from it at the same level of immateriality; and when it thus proceeds from it according to these reasons, so as to be rooted in it according to both, or so as to be intimately united with it, it can by the peculiar right arising from this rooting or union flow from it through the mode of that power insofar as it is intellectual and insofar as it is an actually intelligible object. Consequently, it does not need a new proximate concurrence of that same essence insofar as it is intellectual, distinct in some way from the proximate influx of the intellect as subordinated to the radical active principle. The radical concurrence of the essence of the angel and the proximate concurrence already mentioned of its intellect are enough, as our Complutensians show in 2 Physic., disp. 10, q. 4, and q. 6. Likewise, it does not require a new proximate concurrence insofar as it is an intelligible object: because the said intellect is its proximate power of acting, considered under both reasons.

96 It makes no difference if one objects to this answer. First, because if this is sufficient for the essence of an angel to have the character of a species with respect to its own knowledge, then it will follow that the same is also sufficient for the divine essence, insofar as it is an intelligible species with respect to the blessed intellect, to perform the function of a species. Thus, it itself will inflow only by radical active concurrence, and not proximately; but the light of glory, flowing from it insofar as it is intellectual and insofar as it is actually intelligible, will supply this proximate concurrence. Because what is granted to the angelic intellect cannot be denied to the light of glory, which is of a superior kind.

Secondly (as follows from the proposed answer), the angelic intellect has of itself, primarily and directly, the character of an intelligible species with respect to the knowledge of that same angel, and therefore the essence itself cannot be an intelligible species with respect to that knowledge. The consequence of this latter incongruity seems certain as to the first part. Because just as that which flows immediately and by natural emanation from the essence of the angel insofar as it has the character of an intellectual nature, and therefore of the primary and radical power of understanding, cannot fail to be a power that is proximately intellectual and makes the angel proximately intellectual on the part of power, so that which proceeds from it insofar as it has the radical character of an intelligible object cannot fail to be proximately intelligible and confer on that same essence the property of being proximately intelligible. Therefore, it will of itself have, primarily and directly, the character of an intelligible species with respect to the said essence, since this, and nothing else, is the proper function of an impressed species, as may be seen in sensible species. The second part is also evident. Because it is repugnant that, with respect to one and the same indivisible knowledge of one object, nature should confer a twofold intelligible species, as is evident in itself and is clearly inferred from what our Complutensians teach in Physic., disp. 15, q. 3, n. 97.

97 This therefore makes no difference. For in answer to the first objection, it must be said that the reasons differ. Because the light of glory arises from the divine essence insofar as it is clearly intelligible to itself, but not insofar as it is an object actually intelligible in itself to itself: because although the divine essence by the reason of its infinite immateriality has both, nevertheless, so that the light of glory may arise from it precisely¹, insofar as it is intellectual and through the mode of the elevation of the created intellect, it need not agree with it at the same level of immateriality; otherwise, when it proceeds from that same divine essence insofar as it also has the character of an object, it agrees with it at the same level of immateriality. Because what proceeds from it according to this second character holds itself according to the same character on the object side, and is therefore commensurate with it at the same level of immateriality, as we shall examine in the following doubts; just as what arises from it according to the former character, namely, insofar as it is clearly intelligible to itself, holds itself on the power side through the mode of that elevation, and therefore need not be commensurate in immateriality with the object. Since, therefore, it is repugnant for the light of glory, or for any other creature, to have the same level of immateriality as the divine essence, it follows that it is likewise repugnant for it to arise from that essence insofar as it has the said character of an intelligible object, and therefore through the mode of that power considered according to this character. Thus, either the divine essence does not inflow actively through the mode of an intelligible species, which we have disproved, or it inflows proximately: because nothing inflows radically in any order unless the proximate power of influx arises from it in that same order.

Moreover, the intellect of an angel arises from its essence, both insofar as its power is intellectual and insofar as it is actually intelligible. First, because it agrees with it at the same level of immateriality; and thus on this point nothing prevents it from flowing from it insofar as it is actually intelligible through the mode of its own power. Secondly, because the essence of an angel, insofar as it is an object actually intelligible in itself, must inflow actively into its own intellection, as is clear from the reasons given above for the assertion, applied proportionately. And since it cannot be immediately operative insofar as it is a created substance, it must inflow radically active, and consequently a proximate power must arise from it according to this character, namely, the intellect, by which it acts immediately. Thus the said essence can of itself have a radical influx, and can act proximately through its intellect, and consequently can concur of itself by the proper concurrence of a species: because for this purpose any active influx is sufficient, whether proximate or radical.

98 For the second objection, however, the consequence must be denied as to both parts. In answer to the proof of the first part, on which the proof of the second depends, once the antecedent is granted as to the first part, the consequent must be distinguished in the final part. It must be denied that conferring on the same essence the property of being proximately intelligible means having the power, through the mode of an object, or of an intelligible form, and within the genus of a formal cause or quasi-formal cause in the intelligible order, of determining the intellect proximately. It can be granted that there is a proximate power of actively concurring through the mode of an intelligible object. The consequence must then also be denied. And in answer to the proof that the proper and indispensable function of an intelligible species is nothing else, this is the root of the latter claim. Nor does the instance from sensible species demonstrate anything. For those species formally have the character of such species because they perform that function prior to the species, although on the later account they must also perform it for the reason that will now be assigned.

99 This is explained. Just as the intellect flowing from the essence of the angel insofar as it is intellectual flows only to confer on it what it lacks itself, and therefore confers on it only that by which it may inflow immediately and proximately, because this alone was lacking to the said essence on its own side, so also the same intellect, insofar as it flows from the said essence as an intelligible object, arises from it only by natural emanation in order to confer on it what, according to this character, the said essence does not have. Since the essence itself formally and proximately determines the intellect, within the already-mentioned genus of a formal cause, with respect to the specification of the act, because it is itself formally and proximately united with the intellect through the reason of its immateriality in the character of a proximately intelligible object; and because by the reason of that same immateriality it has the same nature under the immaterial and intelligible mode of being that it itself retains as intellectual under the natural mode of being; and because the same essence has the radical active power to inflow through the mode of an object into its own intellection, the intellect therefore does not arise from it so considered in order to confer on it the function of determining and uniting itself in the specified manner with that intellect, or of concurring radically in intellection. Rather, because the essence itself, by the general reason of created substance, is only radical in any order and is the root of operating powers both in the natural and intelligible orders, as we have already said, the intellect alone arises from it through the mode of that power considered as proximate, making it the object proximately intelligible. Since that function consists only in proximately active influx, while the prior function of determining and at least influencing radically must first be required and suffices for the character of a species, the essence of the angel, and not its intellect, therefore possesses the character of the said intelligible species.

From this also it is clear why a power proceeding from a sensible object, insofar as it is such, has the character of a sensible species. For such objects are not of themselves actually sensible because of the maximum materiality they contain; and because they cannot be united immediately to sense for the reasons advanced in the preceding doubt (applied proportionately here), and therefore a power arising from them in order to confer what they lack must confer on them the property of being proximately sensible, both the power of uniting itself to sense and determining it and the proximate power of concurrence. Thus it will possess the true character of an impressed species.

From all these considerations the confirmation of the principal objection is sufficiently established.

§ IV. A second answer to the same objection.

100 Second, and better still, the principal and difficult objection proposed above, as well as its confirmation, are answered by holding that the essence of an angel, insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species, inflows of itself actively and proximately into intellection, and not merely formally, or with radical active influx, as the graver disciples of St. Thomas commonly infer from the cited place. In answer to the proof, it must be said that although the substance of an angel cannot be the immediate principle of operation through the mode of an active power, and consequently cannot be so in esse entitativo, et naturale, it can nevertheless be so through the mode of a species and in intelligible being: because an intelligible species is not an active power, but a determination in intelligible being of the proximate active power, namely, the intellect, with respect to the specification of the act, as we have already shown. And although it is repugnant for a substance to be immediately operative through the mode of an active power, it is not repugnant through the mode of such a determination, not in just any manner, but in the intelligible order. The essence of an angel must therefore be distinguished in itself insofar as it has the character of nature, namely, an intellectual nature, and insofar as it is an actually intelligible object, or insofar as it has the character of a species. According to this latter character, some immediate activity must be granted to it, but not according to the former.

101 But you will say that, because St. Thomas below, q. 54, a. 2, shows that the substance of an angel is not immediately operative through the mode of an active power—since in creatures being (or substantial existence) and operating are really distinguished, and consequently the power toward being (namely, substance) and the power toward operating are really distinguished—yet this reason also proves that the essence of an angel cannot be the immediate principle of operation through the mode of a species and of the determination of an intellectual power. Therefore, the said activity must be granted in both cases or denied in both. The major is certain. The minor is also evident. Because the being of the essence of an angel insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species and its operation (namely, intellection) are also really distinguished, and thus even supernaturally the substance of the angel insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species could remain with its being without its intellection. Therefore, its substance and the power of acting through the mode of the active operation determination of the intellect will be really distinguished: because they regard the said acts as their proper specific difference, and consequently the angel cannot in any way be an immediate active power with respect to intellection.

102 It is confirmed. Because created intellection must necessarily be an accident, as St. Thomas shows in the cited q. 54; therefore, the essence of an angel, which is a substance, cannot primarily regard it of itself, and therefore cannot in any way be the immediate reason of acting with respect to it. This final consequence follows sufficiently from the first. Because every reason of acting that inflows proximately and actively into an operation regards that operation primarily, since it is considered primarily by nature as such an operating reason. The first consequence is also evident. Because, as our Complutensians show in 2 Physic., disp. 10, q. 4, substance cannot primarily regard anything outside its own category, because it is ordered to itself, and therefore St. Thomas proves that to be immediately operative is implied in substance; otherwise it would not primarily regard the operation for the reason just stated, while regarding it simultaneously, because the whole reason of proximate acting is for the sake of operation. Therefore, it primarily posits a transcendental relation to operation.

103 It is answered that, even granting that the being or existence of the angel insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species and most formally belongs to the intelligible order is distinguished from intellection (the contrary of which we shall show from St. Thomas in the treatise De scientia Dei, disp. 3, n. 7, and in the treatise De voluntate Dei, disp. 2, n. 34), the objection nevertheless proves nothing. Because the substance of an angel, insofar as it has the character of nature, and its immediately operative power, are not really distinguished simply because the substance in some way regards substantial being and the operative power operation, but because the former primarily of itself regards its own being through the mode of a receptive power, whereas the latter of itself tends toward its operation through the mode of an active power, as the cited discussion and question show in the Complutensian College. Yet the same angelic substance, insofar as it is an intelligible object, although it regards both its substantial being, using the qualification just stated, and intellection, nevertheless, when considered according to this character, is not distinguished from itself as regards these two things: because it primarily regards intellection and secondarily its own being. Therefore, insofar as it has the character of an object and of an intelligible species, it can of itself be the immediate reason actively eliciting intellection. The same is true, with proportion preserved, of heat, which although it regards being and operating nevertheless, because it primarily regards operation and secondarily being, as the cited question of the Complutensian College explains in q. 5, can of itself be an immediately operative power.

Why the essence of an angel, insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species, primarily regards operation alone is sufficiently inferred from the nature of that same species. For since a species is of itself primarily instituted to actualize, complete, and perfect the intellectual power, and since the intellectual power of the angel already has, according to this mode of speaking, its own being, and only objective activity and determination are lacking to it, it follows that the object, insofar as it has the character of a species, is primarily instituted for intellection. For just as the same essence, insofar as it has the character of essence and nature, already possesses the being that it primarily regarded and merely needs a power that is immediately operative, the intellect therefore is primarily instituted through the mode of its active power for operation, and secondarily regards being. But on these matters, see the Complutensian College in the cited place.

104 Nor does it tell against this a tacit reply hidden in this same objection, which can be put as follows. Although, from this premise, that the essence of an angel insofar as it has precisely the character of an object and species is not really distinguished from itself when considered according to this character, insofar as it regards being and operating—because it primarily regards operation and secondarily being—this is otherwise when it is considered according to both characters, namely, insofar as it is nature and insofar as it is an intelligible object, because insofar as it is an intelligible object it primarily regards operation, whereas as nature it primarily tends toward being, or toward its existence; and it is not for any other reason that the same essence and its immediately operative power are really distinguished, except that the said essence primarily regards being, whereas the immediately operative power primarily tends toward operation.

This therefore does not tell against it. Because the reason for which the substance of the angel, insofar as it has the character of essence and nature, is really distinguished from its immediately operative power is not that, according to its essence, it in some way primarily regards being or substantial existence and that its operative power primarily tends into operation; but that this is proper to each in the same entitative order. Therefore, when the essence of the angel, insofar as it has the character of nature, primarily regards in the entitative order its being and existence, and insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species it primarily tends in another order, namely, in intelligible being and, in the manner now explained, toward operation, no real distinction between itself considered as nature and itself considered as an intelligible species can be inferred: just as, although it is repugnant for the same intellect to be simultaneously an act, a form, and a mere potency in entitative being, it is not repugnant that it be an act in entitative being and a mere potency in the intelligible order.

105 This is explained. For the essence of an angel, insofar as it is an intelligible object, is a determination of the intellect, not in just any manner, but in the intelligible order; and therefore, insofar as it has the character of an object, or of an intelligible species, it does not regard operation except as founded in, and identified with, the esse entitativo, et naturale of the same essence. Because it belongs to intelligible being, at least created intelligible being, to be founded in, and identified with, in the manner suggested above, some esse entitativo, et naturale, as is evident in itself and as St. Thomas teaches in 2 De Anima. Hence, in this intelligible determination, an entitative, or real, distinction is not taken from that same root, nor is its proper formal reason: because an entitative, or real, distinction is taken from entitative and natural being, and therefore the essence of one angel, insofar as it is an intelligible object, cannot be really distinguished from itself insofar as it has entitative and natural being, but can certainly be distinguished from any other essence of another angel. Its most formal reason, however, is drawn from intelligible operation, which it primarily regards through the mode of active determination, placed in the intelligible order. On the other hand, immediately active power, for example the intellect, as well as the receptive power of substantial being, namely, the same angelic substance, claim for themselves their proper formal reason and their proper entity from the same source: because each has its own through a relation to its proper entitative, or natural, act, primarily regarded as such. And therefore, when this is multiplied, those things are multiplied as well.

106 In answer to the confirmation, it is said that the essence of an angel, insofar as it is formally a substance, never primarily regards an accident as such. For if we speak of it insofar as it is a substance in the intelligible order, that is, insofar as, in an intelligible manner and through the mode of a first act in this order, it unites the object, namely, the essence of the angel as belonging to the intelligible order, with an intellectual power, then intellection itself, insofar as it terminates the relation of the said species, is not formally an accident, but only materially, although otherwise it necessarily has the character of an accident from other principles, and so it terminates most formally, under the character of a union through the mode of a second act of the same object with the intellect. Thus, in God the most formal character of intellection and of actual union with the object is found, but not the character of an accident.

But if we speak of it insofar as it is a substance in the entitative and natural order, then, just as insofar as it most formally has the character of an intelligible species, it is something material and accidental that it is a substance in esse entitativo, so too, from the fact that insofar as it is taken in the character of an intelligible species it primarily regards operation, it does not follow that, insofar as it has the character of a substance in esse entitativo, it primarily regards that operation; because according to that precise and most formal character of an intelligible species, it is not a substance in esse entitativo, et naturale.

107 The reason why a species, insofar as it is taken in the most formal sense of a species, is something material and accidental that it is either a substance or an accident in esse entitativo, et naturale is sufficiently clear from what has been said, and can moreover be explained as follows: because, as the Thomists note very well, a created species abstracts both from a created species that is an accident in esse entitativo and from a created species that is a substance in that same entitative being, insofar as the essence of an angel can be said univocally of both. Thus, the essence of Gabriel, insofar as it serves as an intelligible species with respect to its own intellect, and an intelligible species that is an accident in esse entitativo and that naturally represents that same essence of Gabriel, are of the same atomic essence in the character of an intelligible species. Because although, in the being of a thing, or in esse entitativo, substance and accident agree only by analogical essential agreement, they can nevertheless agree univocally in intelligible being, with respect to which these two characters in esse entitativo are material and accidental.

108 This can be declared and established even more clearly from the fact that, for two intelligible species to be of the same atomic character, two things are considered: first, that they have the same immateriality in entitative being; and second, that intelligibly, or in intelligible being, they unite the same object with a power—whether both are required formally of themselves, or one is required materially of itself and the other formally of itself alone, as will be explained later. Now, an intelligible species representing the nature of Gabriel that is in the intellect of Michael, and which in entitative being is an accident, and the essence of that same Gabriel, which in entitative being is a substance, can on the one hand agree in entitative being at the same level of immateriality (as will be clear from what we shall say in this same disp., dub. 6, because accidents can be of the same immateriality as substance, as is clear in the angelic intellect, which has the same immateriality as the substance of an angel), and on the other hand each species intelligibly unites one and the same intelligible object with a power. For just as the essence of Gabriel is itself intelligible by the reason of its immateriality, and therefore intelligibly unites itself with its own intellect, so the intelligible species of that essence remaining in the intellect of Michael, which is an accident in entitative being, is of the same nature in intelligible and representative being with that same angelic essence of Gabriel, as we shall say in this disputation and shall pursue more fully in the treatise De scientia Dei, disp. 2; and therefore [the intelligible species] intelligibly is one and the same essence of Gabriel with the intellect of Michael. Consequently, they can agree in the character of an intelligible species by univocal and atomic, or (better said) numerical, agreement, as will be clear from what is said in num. 31 of the cited treatise De scientia Dei, where this same point will be elucidated further.

109 From this it also follows that a certain objection which greatly troubles some is of no importance, namely, that the created intelligible order is formally something real, and consequently is formally either a substance or an accident, because created real being is formally and within its own line divided into being of itself or being in another.

This objection therefore easily collapses from what has been said. For at most it follows from it that being a substance or an accident in intelligible being is of itself and formally with respect to the character of an intelligible species; that is, that, among differences contracting the character of an intelligible species within its own line, it is either being a substance in this order or being an accident in this same order, so that a species representing, or uniting, a substance with the intellect is a substance in the intelligible or representative order, whereas one uniting an accident is an accident; but if it unites only the reason of being as such, then it is only being in the intelligible order, not being a substance or accident.

Hence, the division of created being into being of itself or being in another according to entitative being is at most formal and within the proper line with respect to being as entitative and natural, as is said; but otherwise, with respect to the line and order of intelligibility, it says this character only materially and accidentally, while of the formal it says what has been stated about the union of object and power, and, at least materially (though formally in itself), of the real immateriality in esse entitativo. And that immateriality is of such a condition that a species representing something quidditatively agrees with it in esse entitativo at the same level of immateriality, according to what we shall say in disp. 7 of this same treatise. Consequently, of itself and within its proper line, it is divided at least in the manner now suggested, by a distinct immateriality insofar as it belongs to the entitative order.

110 We said ut pertinentem ad ordinem entitativum. For whether an intelligible species, insofar as it belongs to the intelligible order, is divided not only materially of itself, but also formally of itself, by immateriality as it pertains to the intelligible order (of which something will be touched in this treatise) will be clear from what will be adduced below in this treatise and in De scientia Dei. For now, however, we assert only that, if such immateriality as pertains to the intelligible order formally divides an intelligible species within its line of itself, then precisely because a species unites some object in esse intelligibili and agrees with it in immateriality in esse entitativo, it must also have the same immateriality as that object insofar as it pertains to the intelligible order.

From all these considerations, the distinction clearly appears between other things, for example created wisdom and even a created intelligible species. For although created wisdom, insofar as it is created wisdom as such, may in its own way be either a substance, or a quality resting in such a thing, or such a species of quality, yet as created wisdom it formally and within its own line bears the character of the said quality in esse entitativo. A created intelligible species, however, for example the species of the highest angel, says that it is an accident, or a quality, in esse entitativo only materially and accidentally, not formally and within its own line. But this will be treated at length in the treatise De scientia Dei, disp. 2, dub. 1, § 5, and dub. 2, § item 5, and frequently elsewhere in these same doubts.

§ V. The argument of the first opinion is satisfied.

The first is clear from what was said from n. 84 through n. 92.

111 In answer to its confirmation, however, the consequence must be denied. In answer to the proof, it must be said that the species, considered in the formal character of species, is identified in esse cognoscibili with the intellect, as is clear from what was said in the preceding doubt and from what will be said in the recently cited disputation; and thus, although considered in itself it does not equal the perfection of cognition, yet, insofar as it is identified with the intellect, it equals it in the same way as the intellect itself. Hence, just as if in² entitative and natural order they were identified, that entity, as though composed from both characters, could actively elicit vital intellection in the same order without real subordination, so likewise, precisely because they are identified in the intelligible order, that same entity, as though coalescing from the power of knowing and the species, can inflow actively into that very intellection without the said subordination.

However, although the said species and intellect are really identified in the specified order, they are nevertheless distinguished in that same order virtually, or formally, and also really potentially, as we shall say in the treatise De scientia Dei, disp. 3, nn. 84 and 94. Therefore, it is necessary to explain how, insofar as thus distinguished, they can inflow actively into vital cognition.

112 We say, therefore, that the species, still considered as virtually and really potentially distinguished from the power of knowing with which it is identified in knowable being, has a kind of vitality insofar as it intrinsically has the being of a determination of the vital power as such, and cannot concur otherwise except through the mode of that determination. This is sufficient so that, in its own order and through the mode of the said determination, it can inflow actively together with the power into cognition, even insofar as that cognition is vital. First, because a determination of the vital power, formally considered, intrinsically has a concurrence toward the operations of that power insofar as they are such, and consequently also toward their vitality. Secondly, because, in order that a cause coalescing from diverse reasons of acting, one of which is the determination of another, should inflow, it is not necessary that each contain the effect in a completely adequate way according to the reason toward which it concurs; but it is enough that, if the effect in question is, for example, vital, each reason of acting, namely, the vital power and its determination on the part of the object, have something of vitality, and that in both the whole perfection of the effect be equally encompassed. Because although then neither by itself alone is sufficient, nevertheless each is sufficient (using the expression) in its own order, since a vital determination through the species is required together with the vital power; yet this determination does not itself concur through the mode of a power, nor does the power as such through the mode of an object determination.

This answer can be applied in proportion to the present confirmation, even if it is said that the species and intellect are not really identified even in intelligible being: because for a species really distinct from the intellect in any order to concur actively in vital intellection, it is enough that it intrinsically be a determination of the vital power and that it concur as such.

113 Nor does it tell against this that in the same confirmation it is argued that sensible species cannot have any kind of vitality because they do not proceed from a principle of life. Because in order to possess vitality in the manner explained, it is enough that they be determinations of formally considered vital powers, and that, just as they proceed from material things insofar as they have some participation in immaterial and separated substances, as our Complutensians assert in the books On Generation, so too they proceed from them insofar as, under the character of a knowable object, they are also vital determinations of their powers.

This entire answer can be clarified from the fact that the radical and proximate powers of understanding, as well as the intelligible species and intellection, belong to one and the same line of intellectual life; and therefore, wherever this line is found in all its purity and through the mode of a most pure act, as happens in God, there all these things are one and the same, even in formal identity without even a virtual distinction, as will be clear from what we shall say in the treatise De scientia Dei, disp. 3, nn. 17, 46, and 47, and in the treatise De voluntate Dei, disp. 2, n. 34.

114 Therefore, just as for this reason both the radical power and the proximate power of understanding, as well as intellection itself, express in God their own, so to speak, peculiar mode of life, so also an intelligible species must express its own peculiar vitality in him; otherwise, it would not belong to one and the same line of intellectual life. And since this peculiar vitality cannot subsist in anything other than this, namely, that the intelligible species is a vital determination that holds itself on the object side with respect to the intellect, through which it is fecundated with respect to intellection, so that, although all these things are not even virtually distinguished in God, they are nevertheless truly found in him, and that very same formal identity performs all these functions, it follows that the divine essence, insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species and according to this character is united with created intellect, has its own peculiar vitality, and according to this character can inflow into the beatific vision as vital. We say the same thing, in proportion, of other intelligible or sensible species. Because all of these have their own proportionate vitality, already indicated and distinct from the vitality that is in the vital power.

115 The second is clear from what has been said: that the divine essence, insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species, formally concurs of itself, not however in just any manner, but as applied through the intellect and the free divine will, just as, with proportion preserved, the subsistent Word terminates the humanity of Our Lord Christ by the reason of its proper reality. Nevertheless, because of its eminence, it is fitting that it be applied through the intellect and the divine will, as we explained in the preceding doubt. Moreover, the very same essence, insofar as it formally concurs by general concurrence, inflows through an executive power, namely, through its practical knowledge, as through the power of acting that is proximate in its own way. How this is to be understood will be touched upon in the treatise De voluntate Dei, and will be explained more fully below, q. 14, disp. 5, n. 43.

116 In answer to the third, the consequence must be denied. In answer to the proof, it must be said that the divine essence, of itself and by its own reason, is united in the character of an intelligible species, and consequently of itself and by its own reason inflows actively into vision, because without a virtual distinction it is its own being of existence in the intelligible order, and consequently in the natural and entitative order: since in the divine essence these two orders are so identified that they are not even virtually distinct, as we noted in n. 70, and as we shall say in the treatise De scientia Dei, disp. 3, n. 23, and disp. 4, nn. 15–19. The divine relations, however, are not their own being in intelligible being without a virtual distinction, and consequently neither are they in entitative being: because divine intellection, which is the existence of the intelligible order, as we shall say in the treatises De scientia Dei, disp. 4, n. 7, and De voluntate Dei, disp. 1, n. 21, and thereafter, and the very existence of God in entitative being is likewise without a virtual distinction by the reason of its own eminence, as are all the other things found in God, must be wholly identified with the divine essence without a virtual distinction, but not with the divine relations.

117 The reason why, in order for something to be united of itself and by its own reason in the character of an intelligible species with respect to seeing God, it is required that it be its own being of existence in the intelligible order, and consequently in the entitative order, is sufficiently inferred from what we shall say in the treatise De scientia Dei, disp. 3, n. 36 and following, where we shall show that the divine relations are not united of themselves and by their own reason with divine intellect in the character of an intelligible species with respect to the vision of themselves, because they are not their own being of existence in the entitative and intelligible order. Hence, since the vision of the blessed is a participation in the uncreated vision of God, and is produced through the same species as that vision, as the theologians teach commonly and as will be clearer from what is to be said in the cited place, it follows that the divine relations are not united by their own reason with the intellects of the blessed with respect to the vision of themselves, but only by the reason of the essence; and consequently that, by their own reason, they do not have active influx into the said vision.