Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

51 The particle “essentially repugns” has deliberately been placed in the title so that it is clear that the question is not concerned merely with repugnance in relation to God's ordinary power, but also with absolute power. But another particle has been added, namely “to a merely numerical distinction of accidents,” so that the title is to be understood universally concerning all accidents that differ only in number precisely insofar as they are such, and not merely peculiarly concerning some of them considered according to their peculiar reason.

§ I. The position that denies it.

52 The position that denies the thesis is held by Aureolus in 1, dist. 7, quaest. 2, art. 1; Scotus, as reported by Capreolus, ibidem, art. 2, and by Caietanus, 3. part., quaest. 35, art. 5; Suarez, 1. tom. of his Metaphys., disput. 5, sect. 8; and others whom he reports there.

This is proved first. For one and the same efficient cause can elicit several actions at once that differ only numerically, as when fire heats several logs simultaneously; likewise, the same end (provided that this is said in its proper sense) then gives finality to those actions simultaneously; and finally, the same substantial form can inform at once, at least supernaturally, a twofold matter differing only numerically, because the substantial form, considered in itself, does not regard this matter more than that matter; and therefore, by God's absolute power, it can be present in both simultaneously. Thus, for the same reason, the same material cause of accidents, namely the subject, can receive at once two accidents differing only numerically; and consequently there will be no essential repugnance to their purely individual distinction from the fact that they are received simultaneously in the same subject. This last consequence clearly follows from the preceding one. The first, however, follows from the parity of reason between its consequent and its antecedent: the material cause is not of lesser power in its own genus than the other causes in theirs; therefore, if those causes can at least supernaturally produce several effects simultaneously that differ only in number, the material cause will also be able to produce them simultaneously, or (which is equivalent for the present purpose) to receive them simultaneously.

53 This is proved secondly by several examples belonging to the order of knowability. For visible species representing two whites that differ only numerically cannot be distinguished further than by number: their objects, from which they derive their unity and distinction, are distinguished only individually, yet the species are simultaneously in the same eye, and therefore both whites can be seen simultaneously through visions differing only numerically. Likewise, the said species are simultaneously in the same part of the medium through which they are conveyed from the object to the eye; consequently, when the eye is applied to any part of the medium, it is affected through the species of each white, which could not happen unless each species were present in every part of that same medium.

Again, innumerable species of many and diverse individuals differing only numerically are preserved in the imagination, and several of them are ordinarily perceived by the same imagination at once, although the said species and these actions of the imagination must, for the reason just noted, be distinguished only numerically; then, once the intellect has cognized one singular through a species abstracted from the phantasms, another intelligible species is produced in it representing that same singular, as our Complutensian College says in disput. 18, numero 99, in lib. de Anima. Accordingly, when another singular is afterward cognized through that former species abstracted from the phantasms, a new species is also produced in the same intellect representing this same singular, while it is simultaneously in the intellect together with the preexisting species representing the former singular, and differs from it only numerically. Finally, the same intellect is accustomed to understand several things differing only in number, and consequently through intellections differing only numerically, as when it cognizes Peter and John simultaneously.

54 This is confirmed. Although accidents having the same function, such as two whitenesses, cannot be simultaneously present in the same subject by God's ordinary power, because when one of them performs that function, the other is superfluous for its performance, and nature abhors superfluity; nevertheless, whenever accidents differing only numerically differ in function and office, and what is performed by one of them cannot be caused by the other, they can be simultaneously present in the same subject, since none of them is superfluous. Yet all the accidents mentioned in the preceding argument, although differing only numerically, simultaneously differ in function and office. Consequently, the species of one white represents only that white and not another; likewise, its vision, as such, is only the perception of itself and not of another, and so of the rest. Thus, they can well be simultaneously and naturally present in the same subject. Likewise, any other accidents can supernaturally be found simultaneously in the same subject even if they do not differ in function and office, because they may be placed there by God for other reasons and have no contrariety or opposition among themselves, as is evident in the case of two whitenesses.

55 This is proved thirdly by other examples belonging to the entitative and natural order. For several lights differing only numerically can be present simultaneously in the same medium, as when a twofold luminous object illuminates the same medium from either side. The sign of this is that, if an opaque body is placed between one light and another, two shadows are caused; yet this would not happen, and only one shadow would appear, if a light numerically different from the other were not produced there. Similarly, if Peter has one relation of paternity to his first son and afterward has a second son, he is referred to that second son by a new relation of paternity, existing simultaneously with the former relation. Indeed, precisely because each is a son, the relation cannot fail to refer simultaneously to each; and precisely because the said relation is of such a condition that it is founded on a distinct having begotten, namely this second son and not another, it cannot fail to be distinct from the preexisting relation of paternity founded on a distinct having begotten, namely the first son and not another. Above all, because otherwise the same relation could perish and not perish simultaneously, as when the first son dies while the second remains: the relation to the first would perish while the relation to the second would remain, whereas on the contrary position the relation would be the same in relation to each.

56 Fourthly. For a subject can receive at once several accidents distinct in number which are otherwise also different in species; therefore, it can likewise receive at once several accidents differing only numerically. The antecedent is evident of itself. The consequence, however, is proved thus: whether the individual unities of whiteness and blackness are joined simultaneously to the specific unities and differences of those same things, or are not joined to them, they do not change in the being of individual unities. Consequently, through that very individual difference by which this whiteness differs individually from this blackness, it can also be distinguished numerically from another whiteness. Thus, just as a subject can receive at once several accidents differing numerically, which are otherwise distinguished by species, and can consequently be the simultaneous root of their individual being, so too it can receive those accidents and be the root of their singular being even if they differ only numerically.

§ II. The position of Aristotle and D. Thomas is preferred.

57 It must nevertheless be said that it essentially repugns to the individuation of accidents, insofar as several accidents differing only numerically, whatever they may be, are received simultaneously in the same subject, and consequently that this cannot be done by God's absolute power. This assertion is gathered from Arist., 5 Metaphys., text. 15, where, after setting out the various ways in which things are said to differ in species, he adduces in the fifth place the specific distinction of several accidents precisely insofar as they are simultaneously in the same subject; and therefore he concludes: “And whatever things have a difference in the same substance.” D. Thom. explains this testimony ibidem, lect. 12, in these words: “Here he shows in how many ways things are said to differ in species, etc. And the fifth mode is when some accidents are in the same subject and nevertheless differ from one another, because it is impossible for several accidents of one species to be in the same subject.”

The Holy Doctor teaches the same thing in 3. part., quaest. 35, art. 5, where, from the fact that several accidents differing only numerically cannot be simultaneously in the same subject, he proves that several paternities of the same kind cannot be simultaneously in one father; and thus he says: “Because several forms of the same species cannot simultaneously be in the same subject, it is not possible for several paternities to be in one who is the father of several sons by natural generation; otherwise it would be so if he were the father of one by natural generation and of another by adoption.”

58 He also taught this in 4, dist. 12, quaest. 1, art. 1, q. 3, where, arguing against those who said that after the consecration of the bread, its dimensions and the other accidents were founded in the air as in a subject, and consequently that the dimensions of the air and of the consecrated bread, ceasing to exist, were received simultaneously as in a subject in the air itself, he says: “Since all dimensions are of the same species, whatever matter they are in, because matter does not enter into their definition, if the dimensions of the bread are again in the air as in a subject, it follows that two accidents of the same species are in the same subject, which is a contradiction to their being simultaneous, because the number of accidents of the same species is derived only from the subject. Hence, if the subject is one, it follows that those accidents are several, and not several.”

Therefore the disciples of the Holy Doctor follow him: Capreol. in 1, dist. 7, quaest. 2, art. 3; Caietan., 3 part., quaest. 35, art. 5; Hervaeus quodlib. 3, quaest. 9; Palud. in 3, dist. 8, quaest. 2; Flandria, 5 Metaphysic.; Soncin., 7 Metaphysic., quaest. 4; Navarrete, Nazar., Gonzal.; and many others.

59 The fundamental reason for the assertion is none other than the reason adduced by D. Thomas in the places cited, namely: if two accidents differing only numerically could be simultaneously in the same subject, they would be two and yet not two: they would indeed be two, as is supposed, but they would not be two, because they would be distinguished neither essentially nor formally—otherwise they would not be of the same species—nor numerically, since the first principle and root of a purely numerical distinction is the subject. Thus, if the subject were not multiplied in the event in which this occurred, those accidents could not be multiplied numerically. Just as two things cannot be distinguished essentially and specifically unless the first principle and root of that distinction, namely form, is essentially multiplied, because it universally repugns that two things should be distinguished in any way without a proportional multiplication of the diverse principles and roots causing such a distinction.

§ III. Two solutions of the opponents and their refutation.

60 The opponents first meet this argument by saying that it does not demonstrate the thesis universally concerning all accidents, but only at most concerning accidents connatural to some subject, not concerning others that would be connatural to other subjects and would be supernaturally united and received simultaneously in another: for example, if two whitenesses, one connatural to Peter and the other to Paul, were supernaturally received simultaneously in John in a manner beyond nature. For these could be distinguished most perfectly from one another numerically, even if they were simultaneously in the aforementioned subject, because they would not be individuated or distinguished by it, but by their proper subjects, in which they seek to be connatural, and each would always bear a relation to them as principles of individuation and distinction.

61 But against this. Although we grant that a whiteness connatural to Peter can be supernaturally received in John, as many hold probably, nevertheless this cannot occur unless, on the part of John and of its union with the whiteness, there corresponded to it that proper and peculiar mode of union and reception which is proper to John; not, indeed, those modes by which it can be connatural in Peter, but those by which it ought to be connatural in John. Consequently, if a twofold whiteness were to be posited simultaneously in him, it could not fail to be received on John's part through unions and receptions connatural to him, each of which would be individuated by him. Thus, if these cannot be multiplied simultaneously in the same subject, neither could those whitenesses be received simultaneously in it; but it repugns for those receptions, insofar as they hold from John's part, to be simultaneously in the same subject and to be multiplied numerically. Therefore, it will also repugn for those two whitenesses to be subjected simultaneously in John.

The consequence seems certain, especially because otherwise those whitenesses received in John would be two, as supposed, and yet not two, since it repugns for whitenesses to be received as two and for their reception to be one. The minor premise, however, follows clearly enough from the reason of D. Thomas and from what this solution admits: those receptions, insofar as they hold from John's part, would be of the modes that are connaturally individuated by John, and consequently, the unity of the subject and its simultaneity in him not being multiplied, they cannot be multiplied numerically.

The major premise is proved from the peculiar nature of a mode, universally accepted by philosophers. For although a form having its own true entity, insofar as it is distinguished from a mode, can be separated from its subject by divine power and (as we now admit according to the probable opinion of many) received in another subject, a mode cannot. First, because it belongs to the essence of a mode actually to modify the thing of which it is the mode. Second, because, as philosophers commonly hold, this is the point distinguishing a properly entitative distinction from a modal distinction: in the former, either extreme can be separated (so far as the force of the distinction is concerned) and exist without the other; in the latter, however, this is not so. Consequently, it repugns for Peter's session to exist except in Peter. Therefore, it also repugns for those whitenesses to be received in John through modes of union connatural to Peter or Paul; but they must necessarily be united through unions or receptions connatural to John. Thus, if these repugn to being multiplied simultaneously in the same subject, in the same way it follows that the said whitenesses are received, since they cannot be received without modes of union and reception in a subject.

62 Furthermore. Although it is probable, as our Complutensian College touches on in lib. de Generat., disput. ultima, num. 15, that Peter's whiteness can be supernaturally received in John, the opposite is more probable; therefore, the reason of D. Thomas concerning these accidents will not remain infirm. The consequence is sufficiently clear.

The antecedent is proved from what our Complutensian College teaches in lib. Physic., disput. 15, num. 50. For as not every efficient cause—for example, not every fire—can produce every other fire, but a certain infinite collection of individuals in a syncategorematic way must be designated for each fire, which that fire can produce; and therefore it even repugns by divine power that one fire produce another fire by its native power, unless it belongs to those contained in the collection corresponding to it, as is shown more broadly in the cited place. Similarly, distinct collections must be designated for each subject, beginning in potency in a syncategorematic way with diverse accidents, so that none of them can receive an accident by its native power, or by reason of its entity, unless it belongs to those contained in the series or collection corresponding to it. For just as an efficient cause by the force of its power or entity cannot extend beyond its adequate object, so neither can the material cause by the force of its native power and entity extend beyond its own; because in every genus of cause there must be a complete commensurability between cause and object.

63 Second, others answer that the Holy Doctor's reason proves the point at most concerning absolute, not relative, accidents: since these do not regard anything other than the subject, it is necessary that, precisely because they are simultaneously in one and the same subject, they have nothing from which they can be distinguished. Yet these, however simultaneously they may be in the same subject, regard diverse terms, and hence they can be distinguished by reason of the said term considered by itself.

Yet this solution does not diminish the force of the Angelic Doctor's reason, but remains sufficiently refuted by what we have adduced from the same author in this disputation, no. 6, and in the preceding [disputation], no. 12. Numerical distinction, being material, must be derived from the part of the subject and of those things which hold from its part, not from the part of form; otherwise it would be formal and specific. But terms considered by themselves, as pertaining to relative accidents distinct from the subjects in which they are received, concur in the genus of a cause formally extrinsic to their being, and do not hold from the part of the subject but rather from the part of those same accidents. Therefore numerical distinction of them cannot be derived from the terms.

§ IV. The opponents' final solution and its refutation.

64 Others object that the force of the Holy Doctor's reason does not refute the claim when the two accidents naturally seek to be at different times. For since the unity of an accident requires not only unity of subject but also unity of time, the said accidents can be distinguished from one another from a different time considered naturally, or, better said, from the same subject connoting that different time. Above all, because according to our position, the same subject under a different time is the same only in the being of the thing, but diverse formally in the being of the subject; and thus the multiplicity of those accidents existing simultaneously in it can be derived from this.

But against this. For it repugns that one and the same subject entirely, and by the same formally considered power in the being of the thing, should connote those diverse times simultaneously in the solution just proposed, and should become formally multiple in the reason of the subject, since time concurs toward individuation only as connoted by the subject.

65 The reason for this essential repugnance is as follows. Since one and the same subject entirely in the being of an entity should connote those diverse times simultaneously and become multiple in the reason of the subject, this exceeds its natural power, so that by the force of its own natural entity it cannot have this property. But nothing can be added to it that would make it capable of connoting those distinct times simultaneously and becoming multiple in the reason of the subject; therefore, by no means can it connote them even supernaturally and become multiple.

The major premise seems certain. For if the same subject in the being of the thing could, by its own power, connote those diverse times simultaneously and become multiple in the reason of the subject, without exceeding its natural power, there would be no reason why the subject's power—for example, its power to be heated, namely with six degrees—should be fulfilled naturally by one heat of six degrees, so that it could not simultaneously receive another altogether similar heat naturally. For it could by its own power connote those two times simultaneously and become multiple in the reason of the subject; and consequently, by reason of that other power formally considered, it would naturally become capable of receiving another heat simultaneously in the same subject, as we shall explain more fully below. Above all, since neither of those heats is intrinsically incompossible with the other, and the multitude and abundance of heats would not be superfluous but could in some way contribute to more vigorous action, just as a multiplicity of matter contributes to that end. Yet this is repugnant to evident experience and philosophical reason, as is clear from what the Complutensian College says in lib. de Generat., disput. 8, num. 5, and subsequently. Therefore, and so forth.

The minor premise is also clear. For the subject can connote those two times simultaneously and become multiple only by reason of its natural entity, since it must connote them and become multiple by that by which it is the root of individuation; but by its natural entity it has the being of that root. Therefore, whatever is added to it beyond its intrinsic natural entity does not make it more capable of connoting those two times simultaneously and becoming multiple in the reason of the subject than if nothing were added to it.

66 This is confirmed and explained. For among the other reasons why the same prime matter in the being of an entity cannot simultaneously become multiple in the reason of the subject with respect to several substantial forms received simultaneously in it, one is this: prime matter, as this singular matter, cannot naturally be one and the same in the being of an entity and become formally multiple in the reason of the subject, and consequently neither can it supernaturally do so. And thus it cannot receive those forms simultaneously, as our Complutensian College teaches in lib. Physic., disp. 4, num. 66, because matter receives form only by the display of its own natural entity. Therefore, if naturally, so far as the force of its natural entity is concerned, it cannot receive those forms simultaneously and become multiple in view of this, neither can it do so supernaturally. Thus, since this same reason urges in the present case, the same must be affirmed in proportion.

67 It makes no difference if you object that a certain subject can supernaturally receive an accident once corrupted, such as sight, and can therefore connote simultaneously the present time in which the subject exists and the past time in which that accident naturally existed, to which it has a natural relation. Therefore, it is not inconvenient that the same subject in the being of the thing should be simultaneously multiple formally in the being of the subject; and consequently that it should receive simultaneously several accidents differing only numerically, even if these are individuated by their subject.

For the answer is made by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. The reason for the disparity is twofold. First, because in that event one of these times is connoted by the subject considered in the being of the thing; the other, however, only by the same subject formally considered in the being of the subject, so that it has the character of such only insofar as it is subject to the aforesaid time. Consequently, such a subject remains the same in whatever time it exists, provided that it connotes that time, formerly past, though not as past. But for the same subject to receive simultaneously two accidents differing only numerically, and to be the root of their diversity, it is required that in the reason of the subject it connote diverse times simultaneously: for the subject is not formally multiplied in the being of the subject unless it connotes the aforesaid times, and a subject not formally multiplied in the being of the subject cannot sustain a multiplicity according to the number of the aforesaid accidents in it, as is clear from what has been said.

68 We have said that when a subject receives supernaturally an accident once corrupted, it formally connotes only one time in the being of the subject, namely the time formerly past; it does not connote that time as past, because although the subject, insofar as the force of its natural entity is concerned, regards it in the former way, it does not regard it in the latter way, namely as past. For as by the force of its natural entity it does not regard sight as restored, but regards the sight that has been restored, and consequently does not regard by the force of that same entity the sight as formerly extinguished and afterward recovered, so also it does not connote that time as past, although it connotes the same time that is past. Yet this suffices for that very accident once extinguished to be received by it. For that time does not concur toward individuation because it is past; otherwise, while it was present, it could not have concurred toward the individuation of the number of the accident that was extinguished and is afterward reproduced. Instead, it acts according to that numerical entity which formerly was past. By this, too, a certain tacit objection that could have arisen here remains resolved.

69 The second reason for the disparity, by which the preceding [reason] is further illustrated, is this. Although something supernatural is required on the part of the principle for the reception of an accident once corrupted, because in natural causes there is not sufficient power to make a return from privation to habit, or to reproduce what has once been corrupted, nevertheless, on the part of the subject considered according to its entity, the power that it has of itself and naturally is sufficient for receiving it. For sight, for example, acquired supernaturally and produced naturally, if considered by itself, is altogether of the same reason; thus, precisely considered from the part of the subject and of the accidental form, or of the time, it requires no greater power than the natural power of the same subject, nor does the subject exercise a double or greater influx than it would if the accident were produced naturally. Accordingly, just as the aforesaid subject, insofar as the force of its natural entity is concerned, has (in the manner indicated) the power to receive all and every sight corresponding to it—not indeed so as to receive all or any of them simultaneously, but only successively—so, in the same proportional manner, by the force of that same natural entity, it has the power to connote all those times in which they are naturally to be received. Thus, although it may regard them simultaneously as properly connoted, it cannot regard them as simultaneous, but only as successively connotable. Just as, for two contraries in the highest degree to be simultaneously in the same subject, something supernatural is required on the part of the principle, this does not occur because the subject, insofar as it is its own power, lacks sufficient natural power to receive either, or because a double influx, greater than that necessary for naturally receiving two accidents different in species but compatible with one another, is demanded from it; rather, this alone repugns because of the incompossibility between them, insofar as they hold from their own part. Therefore, when supernatural power overcomes and defeats that incompossibility, one and the same subject can simultaneously subsist under those two mutually contrary accidents possessing the highest degree of intensity.

70 Furthermore, insofar as the subject is considered according to its own nature and native power, it cannot receive a twofold accident differing only numerically or become naturally multiple; and finally, it cannot, by the force of its own natural entity, exercise that double influx, as has been said. Thus, even if something supernatural is posited on the part of the principle, or even if divine power is posited, it cannot be done.

We have said, in order thus to dispel another tacit objection, that the subject, with the limitation aforesaid—namely, insofar as it is considered precisely on the part of the subject and of the accidental form, or of the time—has sufficient natural power to receive an accident once corrupted and to connote the aforesaid time, because, considering everything and in the composite sense of the pastness of such an accident or time, it does not have an absolute and simple connatural power to receive that accident and connote that past time. This natural power, understood in the manner indicated, regards the efficient cause as operating according to the ordinary course; it does not regard it as operating on the part of the principle in a supernatural mode of operation, as our Complutensian College says in lib. Physic., disp. 3, num. 93. Nevertheless, even supernaturally and by a supernatural mode of operation, the efficient cause could not introduce the aforesaid natural accident into the subject unless, with the mode and limitation indicated, the subject had sufficient power from the force of its natural entity to receive it.

71 It makes no difference if you press from this direction that, if a subject can supernaturally receive a past accident, although it does not have the power and capacity, absolutely and simply considered natural, to receive it in that way, then for the same reason it can receive simultaneously through divine power two accidents differing only numerically, although it does not have natural power to receive them in that way.

For the answer follows from what has been said. In order for a subject to receive an accident as past through divine power, nothing further is required on the part of the subject than is required for receiving it absolutely; only something on the part of the efficient principle and mode of producing it is required. But in order for it to receive at once two accidents differing only numerically, the proper entity of the subject is not sufficient. For otherwise it could naturally have a whiteness, for example, which according to the ordinary course is to be had today, and, retaining that one, receive tomorrow another whiteness which according to the same course was then to be produced; and consequently, naturally speaking, it would connote simultaneously on the following day the present time as such, and simultaneously the past time in which the prior whiteness began to exist; and consequently, naturally speaking, and according to the same numerical receptive power, it would also be multiple in the reason of the subject. For, as we touched on in no. 65, there would be no reason why something supernatural should be required on the part of the efficient cause, as is required for the restoration and reproduction of the same accident; rather, all the conditions required for such reproduction would be naturally possible, as will be evident to the one considering the matter.

§ V. The arguments of the first position are answered.

72 To the first [argument], granting the antecedent concerning the efficient and final causes, it must be denied concerning the formal cause, as is clear from what N. Complutens. says in lib. Phys., disp. 4, num. 61; for the formal cause also causes by reason of its intrinsic natural or native entity, just as the material cause does. Therefore, here too, the reason that we touched on against prime matter in no. 66 urges. Nor does its opposite proof establish the contrary, as is clear from what has been said. The consequence must therefore also be denied.

The reason for the disparity is derived from what has been said. For that numerical diversity of effects is not taken from the other causes, namely from the efficient and final causes, as from the first root and in a sense intrinsic principle; indeed, it is not even taken from the first source, namely the formal cause; but it is taken from the subject. Thus, it does not require a multiple efficient cause, for example formally considered; but it does require a subject formally accepted as multiple, so that into it the said numerical distinction of the effects may simultaneously be poured. Therefore, since the corresponding subject cannot be formally, though badly, multiple simultaneously, as has been shown, it follows that that numerical distinction cannot be derived simultaneously from it into the said accidents. The proof of the consequence adduced there establishes no further point: each cause must be powerful in its own genus, according to the nature of that proper genus. But the nature of the proper genus of the material cause demands this multiplicity in order to produce effects distinct in number; the nature of the proper genus of a cause, for example the efficient cause as such, does not, because their numerical distinction is not taken through relation to it.

73 To the second, it is answered, with Caietanus, in the cited 3. part., question, that all those accidents are distinguished by species. Because the specification and nature of the visible species representing this particular white consists in representing it insofar as it is also this [object], so that it is essentially commensurated to represent it and not another, numerically different object. Consequently, the aforesaid white, insofar as it is this [object], enters into the formal object of that same species; and consequently, the aforesaid species, being distinct by formal objects, are distinguished not only numerically but also by species. And although the aforesaid singulars are distinct in the being of the thing only numerically, they are nevertheless distinguished essentially in the being of the sensible object that seeks and desires for itself that visible species having the aforesaid essence commensurated with itself and not with another. The same must be said, in proportion, of the other examples there enumerated (if it is true that all those accidents can be simultaneously in the same subject).

74 This is explained further. For the objects of sight, for example, can be taken in two ways. First, in the being of the thing: thus this white and that white are of the same species. Second, in the being of the sensible object: thus they are of diverse reasons and are distinguished by species. First, for the reason just stated, because the essence of that species also consists in the representation of the individual difference of the object; for, as our Complutensian College says in lib. de Anima, disp. 9, num. 24, and disp. 18, num. 104, sense differs from intellect in this: the former has a singular for its object, whereas the latter has the universal. Second, because, just as in the being of nature only those things are said to be of one species in which whatever has one essentially has another essentially, so in representation only those things will be said to be of the same species or essence in which whatever represents one according to its atomic reason and the same formality represents that very same other in the manner stated. And such are the two visible species that are sent from the same white toward a double eye; consequently, these will be of the same species, because they do not differ in representation. But two species that are sent from two individuals necessarily differ in representation, because one of them, according to its atomic reason and exactly the same formality, represents this particular white, reaching as far as its numerical being; the other represents another in the same way. Therefore, whatever one represents according to the same atomic formality, the other cannot represent.

It is therefore also clear with respect to the other examples contained there. For although the visions of two whites are not formally representative of them, as will be clear from what we shall say in the following treatise, disput. 2, no. 215, and afterward, nevertheless they are specified by intentional species, the means through which they are elicited. Thus, when these are essentially multiplied, the visions themselves cannot fail to be essentially multiplied. The same must be said in proportion concerning the several intellections that concern several individuals differing only numerically. For these either arise through means that are essentially and really distinct, or through one means that is really one in species but, considering everything it connotes, is eminently several (as is clear from what the Complutensian College says in lib. de Anima, disp. 18, quaest. 6, et disp. 21, quaest. 6); consequently, it specifies them according to their diverse formal reasons. Capreolus may also be consulted on this at the place cited.

75 To the confirmation, the antecedent must be denied concerning the second part, concerning those accidents there recounted and distinguished in function and office. Because that same distinction in function and office is material and numerical; and therefore it cannot come from anywhere except the subject, yet it could not originate from the subject if those accidents were received simultaneously in it, as has been shown.

Moreover, there is no accident, however similar to another, that is not distinguished from it in function and office. For one whiteness, for example, which appeared not to be distinguished in this way from another whiteness, is in fact distinguished from it: the function and office of that whiteness is not just to make the subject white in any way, but to be determinately white as what it is and not through something else. Thus, just as this diversity of function and office does not entail that two whitenesses can be received simultaneously, because this entire diversity does not exceed the force of a material and numerical diversity, so too any other diversity in function and office, provided that it entails only a diversity contained within the latitude of material and numerical diversity, will not be sufficient for the said accidents to be received simultaneously in the same subject.

76 To the third, the first of its examples is established by what our Complutensian College says in lib. Physic., disp. 15, num. 42 et 43. The second is clear from what they assert in Log., disp. 14, num. 92 et 93. For the formal terminus of this paternity is not this son because he is here, but because he is the son of this father; and the reason grounding it is not this, namely “has begotten,” because he is this son, for example, the firstborn, but because he is “having begotten” by this father, whether this numerical son or another is produced through that act of “having begotten.” Consequently, the very same paternity can extend to any son whatever, provided that he was begotten by this father; and when one of two already-begotten sons dies, the relation does not perish with respect to the one who remains, because its formal terminus remains the same. Thus, it does not follow that the same relation can perish and not perish simultaneously; rather, by connoting the generation and existence of the first son, it terminates with respect to him; and by connoting the generation and existence of the second son, together with the corruption of the preexisting relation, the same paternity, without any change in itself and solely through the change of the diverse connotes that are inadequately connotated by it, can extend to the second son and not terminate with respect to the first.

77 To the last, it is answered that the reason is disparate. For the subject individuates accidents distinct in species through diverse powers formally considered in the being of the thing, so that one formal power in the being of an entity corresponds to all whitenesses, and another to all blackness, and so of the rest. Consequently, it is not surprising that, existing at the same time, they can receive those accidents simultaneously in a subject diverse formally (even in the being of the thing) and distinguish them from one another numerically.

The reason why the aforesaid powers, formally and as stated, must be given is this: since the subject, insofar as it is the principle of individuation, regards only the individuation itself and the purely individual distinction of accidents, it follows that through one formally considered power (even in the being of the thing) it regards only accidents of the same species, and through another it regards those which, when compared with one another, are not distinguished by species. Whether the aforesaid powers, distinct in the being of an entity, can be distinguished simultaneously from the nature of the thing apart from the intellect, or only virtually, is another question to be discussed elsewhere, God willing.