Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

Whether the subject is the first root and principle of the individuation of accidents, and of their pure individual distinction? The decision of this difficulty follows almost entirely from what we have said in the preceding disputation, difficulties 1 and 2. However, so that the mind of St. Thomas may be made more evident and a fuller answer may be given to certain objections that press their adversaries, we therefore raise this difficulty separately.

§ I. The negative position is proposed.

2 The negative position is defended by Durandus in the place cited above, and by Suarez, Metaphysics, his disputation 5, section 7, and by many others. From this they think that the a priori reason, and the first root of the individuation of an accident, is the accident itself as it is such an entity in act, or aptitude.

Suarez reduces the foundations of this position to this form in the same place, no. 4. First, because each thing is formally and intrinsically one in number (which is the foundation of unity, or of what he calls the one) by that through which it is an entity in act in the nature of things, or apt to become such: because every such entity is singular; but every thing is intrinsically and formally such an entity in act through its own entity; therefore it is singular and individual through that same thing; therefore accidents have this as well.

And this is confirmed. Because the subject cannot be the principle individuating accidents; therefore it can only be an intrinsic principle of this kind belonging to the accidents themselves. The antecedent is clear: because in the first place the subject cannot be called an intrinsic principle of the individuation of an accident, as though it intrinsically and per se composed the accident; because we are not now speaking of the composite of subject and accident, but of the accidental form itself: which plainly is not intrinsically composed from the subject itself; nor can the subject in this way be its intrinsic principle. Again, the subject cannot be called the principle individuating an accident, as the relational terminus, or aptitude, of such an accident to inform such a subject: because with respect to the same subject, two accidents numerically distinct can have an aptitude to inform it; therefore those aptitudes cannot be distinguished numerically from the subject; therefore they are from themselves.

3 Secondly, this seems to be established most strongly from certain accidents which, according to their own condition, subsist in a subject but refer it, or somehow lead it, to something else: such as relations, acts, habits, and the like. For if an accident is said to be individuated by the subject because it naturally looks to it, why should these accidents not rather be said to be individuated by the ultimate terms to which they naturally look, especially since they take their essential specific reasons from them?

Thirdly, because it is said without foundation that this accident has a natural coadaptation and relation to this subject alone. For although perhaps it can come to be in that subject alone through natural causes, nevertheless it is in itself apt to inform any subject capable of such an accident: just as conversely it can happen that this subject naturally has, for example, only this whiteness or this quantity; and yet its capacity is not thereby understood to be so limited and determined from itself to this accident that it is not sufficient in itself to receive similar accidents.

4 Fourthly, this position might be urged from the fact that otherwise all accidents which succeed one another in the same subject would at least successively be numerically the same; and thus heat that is now in water and perishes, and heat that will afterward be introduced into it, would not be distinguished in number, which is certainly contrary to the common opinion of the philosophers. The consequence is proved. First, because where there is the same root and the same reason of at least successive individuation, individuation must also be the same in the same way. Then also: because things having the same form at least successively cannot fail to have the same specific unity at least in the same way; since the form just mentioned is the first root of specific unity; therefore, if the subject is the first root of the individuation of accidents, the consequence will be that accidents having the same subject at least successively will likewise be numerically the same.

Finally, because if accidents were individuated by their subjects, two inconveniences would follow. The first is that quantity could not be individuated from itself, but from the subject, since it is a true accident no less than the other accidents; yet this cannot be reconciled with what we said in the preceding disputation: for material substance is individuated by matter designated by quantity, because quantity is individuated among material things from itself; and so whatever among those things is individual must either be quantity or in some way participate quantity. The second is that two accidents differing only numerically could not exist at the same time in the same subject, as is evident from itself and will be clearer from what is said at no. 57: just as matter designated by quantity is the root of the individuation of substantial form; therefore two forms cannot exist at the same time in the same matter; yet this is false, since several visible species of different colors exist at the same time in the same pupil; and so on.

§ II. According to the mind of Aristotle and St. Thomas the difficulty is decided.

5 Nevertheless, it must be said that the first root and principle of the individuation and pure individual distinction of accidents is the subject itself, taken formally; and consequently that accidents having a formally different subject are numerically different, just as if they had the same subject taken in the said way, they would not be numerically distinct. Thus Aristotle, in the places cited in the preceding disputation, difficulties 1 and 2, and Metaphysics V, text 15, where St. Thomas also says, in First Part, q. 29, a. 1: Accidents are individuated through the subject: for this whiteness is said to be such insofar as it is in this subject; and q. 39, a. 3, where, speaking of unity and individual multiplicity, he says: But accidents, just as they have being in a subject, so they receive unity and multiplicity from the subject; and in opusculum 29, where he says: But it must be noted that accidents are not individuated through prime matter, but through their proper subject, which is being in act, [through which] they are individuated: as substantial forms also are individuated through prime matter, which is their subject.

The same is taught by the Holy Doctor: then in Third Part, q. 77, a. 2, saying: Since the subject is the principle of the individuation of accidents, what is posited as the subject of some accidents must in some way be a principle of individuation. Then also in many other places listed in the golden table under the word accidens, no. 24, where all Thomists defend this opinion in common; and therefore it would be superfluous to cite them in particular.

6 The most powerful reason for this assertion, however, is none other than those which we brought forward in the preceding disputation, difficulty 1. For as those arguments prove that the individuation of substantial form, and of the composite constituted through it, must be taken from matter designated by quantity, as from the first root, because purely individual distinction is material distinction, and therefore is taken from matter; so for the same reason, the individuation and purely individual distinction of accidents, since it is material, cannot fail to be taken from their matter, namely from the subject taken formally, as from the first root; otherwise, as we expounded there in reasons 1 and 2, such a distinction, precisely because it would be formal and proceed from form as such, would be specific and not purely individual.

This can also be explained and confirmed from what we touched on from St. Thomas in the preceding disputation. For accidents have from the subject their individual being in themselves by the ultimate division, or being that is incommunicable to another, as to the subject of inferiority and predication; and they are also thereby distinguished from other accidents of the same species; therefore they will also receive individuation from that same subject, as from their proper principle.

7 The consequence is evident. The antecedent, however, as regards the first part, is proved and explained. Because accidents, as such, are acts and forms, and thus are communicable from themselves to another, as to a subject of inherence; and therefore, according to this reason taken most formally, they cannot found that negation which is proper to an individual, namely, that it cannot be in another, something in some way distinct from it on the part of the thing conceived, as in a subject of inferiority and predication; because this reason presupposes that the thing which grounds it, considered as its foundation, has in some way not to be received in another, as in a subject of inherence or information, as we said from no. 53 through no. 61 of the preceding disputation and shall touch on below. But precisely because the said accidents are connaturally, whether in act or by aptitude, in this subject rather than that one, according to the common course of their order, they are altogether irreceivable, at least connaturally, in another subject of inherence; and thus, according to this sole reason (with the qualification concerning quantity to be explained in the following difficulty), they are incommunicable to another in some way distinct from them, in the way in which a universal is communicated to another in some way different from itself, as to a subject of inferiority and predication.

From this also the same antecedent is sufficiently established as regards the second part. First, because, as we expounded in the preceding disputation, no. 79 and following, precisely by that through which something is incommunicable to another, in the way just indicated, as by a principle and first root sufficient in itself for such individuation, it must in fact be different from every other thing of the same species. Then also: because in the common notion of accident the subject is posited in common by way of a difference: as when we say, Evenness is the curvature of the nose, as our Complutensians explain at length in Logic, disputation 5, q. 2, so if an accident were to be defined in the singular, its subject in the singular would have to be posited by way of a difference: as if we should say, This evenness is this curvature of this nose; therefore the sign is that the first root of the individuation of the same, and of the division of being, is their subject insofar as the same subject is also, by the ultimate division, distinct from every other, according to which relation we are speaking of it here.

§ III. An objection is noted, and its solution.

8 But you will object that this does not fit well with what was said in the preceding disputation concerning the individuation of material substance. For if substance, as individual and divided by the ultimate division from every other thing, is the first root of the individuation of accidents, and this [substance] is individual by reason of matter designated by quantity, as by the first root, the consequence will be that matter itself designated [by quantity] ought rather to be called the first root of the individuation of those accidents, according to the dictum: Because of which each such thing, and that more.

It will be answered that this objection is intended to refute the first principle in itself insufficient for the individuation of accidents; but not the first principle in itself sufficient, of which we are speaking here, about which the place is St. Thomas's opusculum on the principle of individuation, when he denied to the aforementioned principle the reason of prime matter and granted it to the subject of those accidents. For since accidents are second forms, and as such must be individuated by a subject, they must presuppose as the first root of their own individuation a subject at least including form, namely substantial form, through which they are first in act simpliciter; since being according to what, which is to be supplied by accidental form, cannot be of that kind unless being simpliciter proceeding from substantial form is presupposed; otherwise it would truly be being simpliciter and substantial, as our Complutensians teach very well in the book On Generation, disputation 2, no. 78.

9 Nor does it matter if, against this solution, you urge that a sufficient reason is given from prime matter designated by quantity why these accidents rather than those ought to be given: so that the entire individuation of them is resolved into that same matter as into a sufficient root; and so on. The antecedent is proved. For from the fact that this matter designated by this quantity is given, this substantial form must be given, and not that one; and this composite, not that one; and ultimately these accidents, not those. Hence, if it is asked why these accidents are given, it will be answered that this happened because this composite is given, which is their subject, and not another; and therefore this composite, and not another, is given, and consequently these accidents, and not those, because this matter designated [by quantity], and not that one, is presupposed; and therefore, that being presupposed, other accidents cannot naturally speaking be received in the same composite for the time being, and therefore not in the same [composite] taken formally, as we shall explain below; and so on.

It will be answered that the antecedent is true if it is understood as a sufficient reason within the order of inference, or a sufficient reason based on the goodness and infallibility of the consequence, but not as a sufficient reason within the order of reality, or based on the sufficiency of the antecedent in the reality of the thing. And in answer to the proof, the antecedent will be distinguished in the same proportional way, and the consequence denied.

10 This is explained. For just as, from the denial of efficacious assistance toward an act falling under a precept, a sufficient reason is given within the order of inference for the sin committed by the person to whom that assistance is denied: since it is deduced by the best consequence that he would sin if such assistance were once denied him; nevertheless, it cannot from this be given as a sufficient reason in the reality of the thing, or based on the sufficiency of the antecedent in the reality of the thing, namely on the denial of the said assistance; indeed, not any reason that could in this order be in some way the root of sin formally taken, from the fact that God is incapable of this concurrence. Thus, from the positing of matter designated by quantity, a sufficient reason is given within the order of inference, or a sufficient reason based on the goodness of the consequence: for (at least speaking naturally) it is deduced by a good consequence that if prime matter is designated by this quantity, and not that one, these accidents, and not those, will be given in the composite; nevertheless, a sufficient reason is not posited within the order of reality, or based on the sufficiency of the antecedent alone in the reality of the thing, for the reason touched on in the preceding number.

Therefore, just as that sin cannot follow unless a creature acts and it is attributed to it, as the first principle and source of the sin, so this accident, and not that one, cannot be given unless its subject, namely the whole composite, is given; and that, in the reality of the thing, as a principle sufficient in itself, is attributed to be the first root of its individuation. And just as the denial of efficacious assistance has a connection sufficient for that goodness of consequence concerning sin, because when God denies assistance, the creature immediately fails through its own fault, and not through a defect in God who gives sufficient assistance, so that connection will be sufficient for the goodness of the consequence by which, from the positing of matter designated [by quantity], it is rightly inferred that these numerical accidents, and not those, ought to be given in the composite: namely, the connection between this principle insufficient in itself in the reality of the thing and the other principle, from which the whole sufficient principle, namely the entire composite, will be constituted.

11 Add that it is not improbable that the prior objection and its reply can be answered differently from the fact that, at least very probably, prime matter designated by quantity is the first principle by which, and the first root in this order, of the individuation of accidents, but not the first principle which; for we are speaking here of the first principle which, not of the first principle by which. For in things having a first principle which in fact distinct from the principle by which, as happens here, when their principle is investigated absolutely, recourse is had to the principle which, not to the principle by which. As in efficient causes, when we speak absolutely of the principle and cause of an action proceeding from them, recourse is usually had with greater reason to the principle of acting which than to the principle by which. Therefore it is commonly said that actions are those of supposita, not of forms: because the former are the principle which, while the latter are the principle by which, of the same actions.

§ IV. Solution of the arguments of the first position.

12 The first [argument] is clear from what was said in the preceding disputation, concerning how it proves that accidents are individuated most proximately through their own entities, such as these: because they are individuated from the fact that they look to this subject, formally taken, and not to another; and this regard is not really distinguished from their entity; nevertheless, they are not individuated by themselves, as by the first and radical principle: rather, from the fact that the subject is this [subject], it follows that the accidents are these; and from the fact that the said accidents are numerically such, and numerically distinct only by the said relation, it follows very well that the subject is the first root of such individuation and distinction. As is commonly said in the analogous case of substantial form: which is proximately this form, with respect to matter designated [by quantity], but radically with respect to the same prime matter designated by quantity. For from the fact that matter is this matter, it follows a priori that the form will be this form; and from the fact that this matter, and not that one, is looked to by this form, it is collected a priori that such a form is this form numerically, and that matter also, considered by way of the terminus inspected in itself, is the first root of such individuation, as we said in difficulties 1 and 2 of the preceding disputation.

In confirmation, the antecedent must be denied. And in answer to the proof, having granted the antecedent as regards its first part, it must be denied as regards its second part, according to what we have just said. Nor does the opposite prove the objection: for it is true only when speaking of the same subject materially and taken in the reality of the thing, because this can be looked to by several numerically different accidents; but not of the same subject formally, and within the line of the subject formally taken; and consequently, as it connotes in the being of the subject this time rather than that one, etc. For a subject taken in this way is looked to by one and the same numerical accident; and thus, however many accidents there are, there correspond to them so many subjects inspected by themselves, which can be the same materially and in the reality of the thing, but not formally and in the being of the subject, as we shall explain more fully from no. 15 through no. 18.

13 To the second [argument], it will be answered that accidents which do not subsist in a subject, but somehow refer it to something extrinsic, such as natural powers and operative habits, take their individuation from the subject, although they receive their specific reason from those extrinsic terms. The reason for this disparity is clear from what was said at nos. 5 and 6 of this difficulty and in the preceding disputation, no. 12 and following. For the said extrinsic terms are compared by way of an extrinsic formal cause with respect to those same accidents, taken according to their species; and thus they are fit to give them a species, which can arise from a formal cause, whether intrinsic or extrinsic; but not to give them individuation, whose first and most powerful root must, in the genus of a material cause, concur with them; and therefore such individuation is best given to the subject of the accidents, as to the first source and origin of it.

14 To the third [argument], the antecedent must be denied. And in answer to the proof, it must be said that although we grant that this numerical accident naturally, or according to the common course of its order, looks to this numerical subject formally taken, and can be received by divine power in another numerical subject; nevertheless, not in such a way that the said accident has a connatural aptitude, or one according to the common course of its order, to be received in this subject: and thus, even while existing in an extraneous subject, it always looks to, and always seeks, a connatural subject, or that which according to the common course of its order is at least owed to it in some way; and from this relation it immediately receives its individuation, and remotely, as from the first root, it takes it from the subject.

We have said that it always seeks a connatural subject, or that which according to the common course of its order is at least owed to it in some way, so that a distinction of what is owed is established between accidents of the natural and supernatural orders. For to the former a connatural subject which can be assigned; but not so to the latter; although in reality they at least in some way require, according to the common course of their order, a peculiar subject which; and therefore charity received in Michael under this number cannot, according to the common course of its supernatural order, be received in Gabriel.

15 As to what is added there, namely, that this numerical subject does not naturally look to this numerical accident alone, but can connaturally receive several and different accidents, and consequently conversely this numerical accident can be connaturally received in different subjects, is clear from what was said in the preceding disputation. For although the antecedent can be true of the same subject materially and taken in the reality of the thing, and in the way just mentioned elsewhere; nevertheless, not of the same subject formally and accepted in the being of the subject, and as it connotes this difference of time rather than that one, etc. For according to this reason, subject and accident are mutually adapted and measured so that neither this subject can be naturally terminated toward another accident, nor this accident toward another subject: as we said in the analogous case when comparing matter designated by this quantity with substantial form, and as will be clearer from what is said in the three numbers immediately following.

But since it is settled that the subject, taken in the reality of the thing and materially, and the accident itself considered in this same order, do not have the said mutual commensurability: because this numerical subject, so taken, has from its peculiar reason greater amplitude and indifference. This is sufficiently collected a posteriori from experience, namely, that the same subject materially, at least successively, can naturally receive several numerically different accidents; whereas the same numerical accident, even materially accepted, cannot be received according to the common course, even successively, in different subjects.

16 The consequence must be denied in answer to the fourth [argument]. And in answer to the first proof, it must be said that it is true of the same root formally and taken in the being of a root; but not of the same root materially and accepted in the reality of the thing, as happens here. From this, in answer to the second proof, it is clear that if it were possible for the same form in species, materially and accepted in the reality of the thing, successively to inform, so nevertheless that it would be different in species in the being of the form and of the root of specific unity, then it would not give the same specific unity successively either. And so nothing is proved against us from this: for, when several numerically different accidents are received successively in the same subject materially and taken in the reality of the thing, we give several numerical subjects formally, accepted in the being of the root of their individuation.

This is explained. For numerical unity of an accident requires not only that it be in this subject, materially and accepted in the reality of the thing, but also identity of time: no otherwise, proportion being preserved, than is desired for the numerical unity of motion, according to the doctrine of Aristotle commonly accepted and taught by our Complutensian College in Physics, disputation 23, no. 22, the unity of the terminus and of the same time; and thus, when time varies, the individuation of the accident is inferred to vary, and although the subject may be the same in the reality of the thing, it is not the same when formally taken in the being of the subject. Because the very subject in the reality of the thing varies formally in the being of the subject insofar as it underlies different circumstances of time. And thus, as often as Peter's only whiteness ceases and Peter becomes white again, so often whiteness varies and another whiteness numerically is produced anew and successively. For although Peter remains the same in the reality of the thing, he does not remain the same in the being of the subject formally taken, or in the being of the right of such a subject: because he underlies or connotes a different circumstance of time.

17 This can be further elucidated by the example of a surface with respect to place, together with the relation of distance from the center of the earth and the poles of the world. Although these may not often vary in the reality of the thing, as if a located body were moved around with the same surface in the reality of the thing, nevertheless they often vary in the being of the material reason of place formally taken, as happens in the example just given; and consequently place itself varies, because the said surface underlies different relations of distance, and it, insofar as it underlies such a distance, is said to be the material reason of place in the most formal sense. Thus, for the present, proportion being preserved, it must be philosophized: although, as will be evident to the observer, there intervenes a difference between the example offered and the matter under discussion.

Nor does it follow from what was said in the preceding disputation, no. 134, that the individuation of accidents must be reduced, as to its first root, to time itself: because, as we said in the analogous case of quantity concerning the individuation of substance, time concurs only by way of connoting something extrinsic; the subject, however, although it is not included directly in the accident itself, is nevertheless that which directly individuates the accident in the being of a root. For this office does not require being intrinsically and essentially included in it; it is enough that it be the first material root of the accident itself, irreceivable in another, as in a prior subject; and that it be of such a condition that, according to this reason, it is intrinsically, that is, by the reception of the accident itself, unifiable with it; and these two things accord to the subject of accidents, not to time, as is evident from itself.

18 This itself can also be explained, and at the same time a certain objection that might have been made here can be solved, by the example of the efficient cause of this numerical accident, say of this numerical heat produced by this fire, which cannot be produced by another fire, according to what our Complutensians teach in Physics, disputation 15, no. 50. For although precisely because it is produced by that numerical fire, it cannot fail to be distinguished from another heat produced by another fire, nevertheless neither of these fires concurs in the genus of a material cause, but of an efficient cause, and therefore altogether extrinsically. For this reason, and for other reasons which will be obvious to each from what has just been said and will be touched on in this same disputation, we reduce the individuation of the said heat, considered in the said way, not to the producing fire, but to the receiving subject, as to its first root. For here we are not speaking of any root at all, namely an altogether extrinsic root by relation to which individuation is not taken; but of a root in some way intrinsic, and therefore of that by relation to which individuation is taken.

Finally, it must be said that [this argument] touches on a twofold difficulty: namely, whether quantity has this peculiar property among the other accidents, and whether the substantial forms that can be received in matter are in some way individuated from itself; and whether two accidents differing only numerically can exist at the same time in the same subject. But since each of these difficulties is sufficiently grave in itself, and several things are needed for its decision, as will be clear from what follows, we shall give each of them a separate doubt.