Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

Although the decision of this difficulty is not difficult to collect from what was said above, nevertheless, in order to explain it more fully, something must be added, and some objections answered; therefore, both because of the points noted above and on account of those just mentioned, we treat it separately.

§ I. The negative view is presented.

113 The negative part is defended by Suarez, disp. 5 of his Metaphys., sect. 3, and by all the Doctors whom we cited under num. 3 for the contrary view. The principal foundation of this view has already been touched upon, but it can be pressed and explained further. For matter contains this particular substantial form as a root rather than that one, and contains this particular quantity rather than that one; therefore, before matter contains this particular quantity rather than that one, it will be singular, individual, and the root of the individuation of the whole composite; consequently, it will not possess the character of the aforementioned root insofar as it is matter marked with quantity, which signifies matter as radically containing this quantity rather than that one. This second inference is clear from the first; the first follows from the antecedent. The antecedent is also clear, because effects are precontained in a material cause in the same order in which it causes and receives them: for it causes them only in the way in which it precontains them. But matter has this particular substantial form to cause and receive before this particular quantity; therefore, it precontains the former before the latter.

It is confirmed. Since matter regards this particular form before this particular quantity, it therefore contains that form in itself before that quantity. Thus, since matter, insofar as in the former priority it precontains this particular form, is individual—as is clear from itself—and therefore the first root of individuation, it cannot have of itself first this, namely, that it contains this particular quantity. This last inference seems to follow from the first. The first follows from the antecedent, because effects are precontained in a cause in the order in which that cause regards them.

The antecedent is proved. First, because matter regards form as its most perfect act; and it is clear that the most perfect act of a power is regarded by it before any other act. Secondly, because things belonging to the predicament of substance primarily regard those that complete them within their own predicament rather than those outside it: for the things by which they are completed within their own predicament are more intimate to them, and therefore regarded first. Substantial form, however, completes matter within its own predicament, whereas quantity does not. Finally, matter does not regard this particular quantity except on account of this particular form and by reason of it: for it does not regard¹ that form except so as, through it, to receive this particular substantial form; therefore, it regards the latter before the aforementioned quantity.

114 Secondly, the same view is proved. For if matter marked with quantity—that is, insofar as it precontains this particular quantity as the first root—were the root of individuation, would it have this character insofar as it precontains this quantity as terminated or as unterminated? In neither way. Therefore, etc. The major is clear, since the inferences are sufficiently evident. The minor, as to the first part, is that of the Divine Thomas, opusculum 70, quaest. 4, art. 2, where he says that matter is this matter, marked, and thus individuated by form, by unterminated dimensions, not by terminated dimensions. This is proved from the fact that otherwise Peter the boy and the same Peter the man would not be one and the same numerically individual: for the cubit measure in Peter the boy does not remain in the same man, but becomes two cubits.

The same minor is also clear as to the second part. For quantity is certain and determinate only by reason of form. As Aristotle teaches in the first book of Physics, cap. 4, and as the Divine Thomas adduces in the first part, q. 7, this quantity is so much, and therefore certain and determinate, because matter has this form rather than that one; and therefore, when this form changes, the amount of quantity changes. Therefore, matter will not be individual, nor the root of individuation, insofar as it precontains quantity as so much and determinate: for the amount and determination of quantity comes not from matter, but from form.

115 Thirdly, the point urged by this view is that which was touched upon above, namely, that matter has nothing whereby it could precontain this quantity rather than that one unless it is already this individual and the root of individuation; therefore, it will not be individual, and consequently will not be the root of individuation insofar as it precontains this quantity rather than that one. The inference from the antecedent is clear. The antecedent is proved: for matter of itself is indifferent to this quantity and that one; otherwise it could receive only this particular quantity. Therefore, of itself it has nothing whereby it could precontain this quantity rather than that one; but if it precontains it, this is by reason of this form, which it receives first; consequently, it will precontain it only after it is already individual and the first root of individuation.

§ II. The true view of Aristotle and the Divine Thomas is preferred.

116 Nevertheless, it must be said that matter marked with quantity, insofar as it contains this quantity rather than that one as a root, is the first root of the individuation of complete material substance, and consequently of its substantial form. Thus Aristotle and the Divine Thomas in the places cited for our view in doubts 1 and 2, as we shall immediately explain. The Saintly Doctor teaches this especially in opusculum 70, q. 4, art. 2: after saying in the answer to the second that dimensions, insofar as they are accidents per se or according to their formal being, cannot be the principle of the individuation of substance, he immediately adds in the answer to the third that matter is the root of individuation by reason of dimensions preconceived in it, that is, contained in it as a root; otherwise dimensions, as accidents, would be the cause and root of the individuation of substance, which the Saintly Doctor expressly denied in the answer to the second. Accordingly, both Aristotle and the Angelic Doctor are followed by Caietan., 1 part., q. 29, art. 1; Gonzalez, 1 part., q. 11, disp. 23; Javellus, 5 Metaphys., q. 15, and very many other later Thomists; finally Bannez, 1 de Generat., c. 5, q. 3, art. 8, confesses that this view is highly subtle, highly probable, and sufficiently in accord with the mind of the Divine Thomas.

117 The prior and fundamental reason for this assertion is derived from what we said in the preceding doubts from Aristotle and the Divine Thomas; it can be proposed in this form. For although the individuation of matter and of the whole composite is very different from the individuation of quantity, nevertheless the first root of the individuation of the composite must be matter marked in some way by quantity, as we showed in doubt 2. But it cannot be matter marked by quantity in the way in which the composite is said to consist of matter and quantity, as though quantity were an inhering form intrinsically constituting it in the being of the aforementioned root; nor, as has been shown in doubt 3, insofar as the same quantity is said to be actually possessed and connoted intrinsically. Nor, finally, can it be marked by some superadded mode distinct from matter by its nature, through which it is determined toward this quantity rather than that one, as is asserted. Therefore, matter marked by quantity is to be understood as containing this particular quantity rather than that one as the first root.

The inference is clear. First, because no other mode of signification by quantity remains through which matter could be the first root of individuation. Secondly, because among all conceivable modes by which matter can be marked by this quantity rather than that one, this one is prior and more fitting. It is prior because it is prior that matter contain this particular quantity as a root than that it import it by any other mode. It is more fitting because whatever is first used to mark matter with this particular quantity must be individual and the root of individuation, if matter, once marked by quantity, has this character. Most of all, because matter, insofar as thus marked, is not drawn beyond the reason of matter and pure potency, absolutely irreceptibility in another, nor beyond the reason of substance; and thus it is most fitting that it be the first root of the individuation of the substantial whole composite.

118 The second reason for the same assertion, which we hinted at several times above, is derived from the Divine Thomas, 3 part., q. 77, art. 2, and fourth Contra gentes, cap. 65, as well as opusculum 70, q. 4, art. 2, answer to the third, and elsewhere. It can be reduced to this form. For quantity² is in a certain way individual of itself, and thus in a certain way is its own first root of individuation, as we shall show in the following disputation, num. 21 and afterward; therefore, matter will be individual and the first root of individuation insofar as it contains this quantity rather than that one as a root. The inference is clear: because precisely because matter, taken according to itself and precisely, cannot be the sufficient root of its own individuation and of the substantial whole composite, and otherwise must of necessity itself be individual and the first root of individuation, as has been shown, this office is most excellently attributed to it insofar as it contains what is in itself in a certain way individual and is its own first root of individuation, namely this particular quantity; most especially because it cannot have that character insofar as it is actually and formally informed by it, as was proved in the third doubt.

§ III. An answer is made to the prior argument and its confirmations adduced for the first view.

119 To the first, it is clear from the preceding numbers that the antecedent must be denied. For when matter does not contain this particular substantial form rather than that one, except insofar as matter itself is this and individual, and has this individuation only insofar as it contains this particular quantity rather than that one, it follows that the same matter contains this particular quantity before this particular form. To the proof to the contrary, an answer will be given when we reach Bannez, 1 part., q. 3, art. 2, Gonzalez, and many other later Thomists: that major proposition, understood as it is truly understood, concerning matter compared with its effects taken absolutely as singular, must be distinguished. The proposition That effects are precontained in a material cause in the order in which it causes and receives them is denied in the genus of a purely receptive material cause; the proposition That it causes and receives them is granted in the genus of a dispositive and determinative material cause, or with respect to its remaining first disposed and determined by a self-permanent disposition and determination. What is added there in support of this major will be clear from what we shall bring forward in this same difficulty. Then the minor must also be distinguished proportionally. If its meaning is that matter first causes this particular form rather than this particular quantity in the genus of a purely receptive material cause, it must be granted; otherwise, if its meaning is that it first causes this particular form rather than this quantity in the genus of a dispositive material cause, or with respect to its remaining disposed or determined to this particular substantial form rather than another, the inference must nevertheless be denied: because, as it is legitimate, it would be necessary that the consequent be true in this latter sense.

120 These matters are explained. For as our Complutensians touched upon in the book On Generation, disp. 2, num. 111, just as in the probable opinion of many a final cause can be divided into different genera, namely the end whose and the end for whom; and one thing can be prior to another in the genus of an end whose and posterior in the genus of an end for whom, as was explained there; so the material cause can be divided into different genera of material causality: the purely receptive material cause, in which it is not considered whether the receptive potency is disposed and determined or not, for by a purely precise abstraction it prescinds from this and considers only those things in which form is immediately received; and the dispositive or receptive material cause, whereby the receptive potency remains disposed and determined for its most perfect act. In this latter genus, whether the form itself has first been received, and whether this disposition depends on it, is not considered: for the disposition and determination toward form, insofar as it depends on form, does not belong to the genus of a dispositive cause, but is in a certain way an effect of form already received, and belongs to another genus of material cause. Only what matter has from the force of the disposition is considered, whether that disposition depends, as to its being received, on the prior reception of form or not.

121 And one and the same thing can be caused and received first in one genus of this cause, and received and caused later in another, as occurs in substantial form and quantity. Of these, form is caused first in the genus of a purely receptive material cause than quantity, for substantial form is immediately received in matter, whereas quantity only mediately and after form has been received, insofar as it is received immediately in the substantial whole composite. Conversely, in the genus of a dispositive and determinative material cause, or with respect to matter's remaining disposed and determined to receive its most perfect act, namely form, quantity is received before form itself. For matter's being disposed does not depend on form as a disposition and determination toward being received in this effect. In this genus, whether form itself has first been received and this disposition depends on it is then not considered.

122 Moreover, although, after comparing the aforementioned receptions and causalities, an order is assigned among them in the different genus of cause just described, and even after comparing them simply with respect to priority and posteriority, the reception of substantial form is prior to that of the quantity disposing it toward form, as our Complutensians show in the book On Generation, disp. 2, num. 105, nevertheless, after comparing the precontaining of this substantial form and this disposition and determination, which is first per se with respect to that form—that is, this quantity—the order must be reversed. For in judging whether matter first precontains this particular effect taken absolutely, namely this particular substantial form, rather than that effect also taken singularly, namely this particular quantity, it is not enough to ask whether it first receives the former in the genus of a purely receptive material cause, or whether it simply receives it first; but one must ask whether it receives the former in the genus of a dispositive, determinative material cause, or with respect to its remaining first disposed and sufficiently determined by the disposition and determination just described, to receive its most perfect act, namely substantial form.

The reason is clear from what has been said. Since matter of itself is not determined in the genus of material causality to precontain this particular substantial form rather than the other, as is clear from what we asserted in doubt 2, it must therefore first precontain something that determines it toward this containing of substantial form rather than another. This can be nothing other than that by whose reception matter is disposed and first determined by a self-permanent determination, to have this substantial form rather than that one.

123 Wherefore, since quantity is that which is first received in the genus of a self-permanent dispositive material cause, or through the mode of a cause permanently dispositive and determinative, and consequently, according to this consideration, is precisely what is received insofar as it disposes and determines matter in the way described; because quantity of its own proper reason has the being of the first and permanent disposition and determination of matter, and is itself in a certain way determined and individual, this particular quantity is therefore precontained in matter before this particular substantial form, even though in the genus of a purely receptive material cause substantial form is received in matter before quantity. For quantity, precisely insofar as it is a received effect, is received in the whole, even though, insofar as it is a disposition, it does not exercise its causality toward that whole, but precisely toward matter, as if it were received in it alone.

124 From all this it follows that, speaking universally, it is not absolutely true that effects are precontained in their cause in the order in which they are caused by it, so that what is caused first is precontained first. For this rule fails,³ whenever the precontaining of one effect, namely the last effect caused, is of such a condition that it in some way completes the cause for precontaining and causing the effect that proceeds from it first. This occurs when an efficient cause is compared with an effect first produced per se and intended by it together with the means or dispositions toward it. For although the effect first intended per se is later entrusted to execution, nevertheless it is first contained in the cause than the means or dispositions. Thus this causal proposition is true: Because an efficient cause is able to produce the effect first intended per se, it therefore has the power to produce the means and dispositions toward it. No more potent reason exists than that already mentioned, namely that the precontaining of an effect first intended per se in a certain way completes the cause for precontaining the means. In the present case too: for matter precontains this particular form only insofar as it is positively individual, and it does not become individual except through the radical precontaining of this quantity.

Nevertheless, it is established that although matter does not cause and receive its effects according to its formal being in the order in which it precontains them, yet, speaking of complete and adequate precontaining, it causes and receives them, according to their formal being, only in the order in which it precontains them in the genus of a purely receptive cause. Thus the effects first contained in matter, as in a purely receptive potency, prescinding from whether it is or is not actually disposed by an actually possessed disposition and considered according to its formal being, are first received rather than those which are precontained in it in the genus of a dispositive material cause, or with respect to its remaining disposed and determined to have this form rather than another, taken according to its formal being. Although, as we said, after comparing the precontaining of this substantial form, as such, and this quantity and determination, as such, the precontaining of the aforementioned quantity is prior to that of the aforementioned form, and consequently, speaking of the complete and adequate precontaining of effects in their material cause, namely matter, the effects are not caused and received according to their formal being in the order in which they are precontained in that same matter.

125 Hence (thus an objection is silently met) quantity itself, insofar as it is radically contained and received according to its formal being and actually possessed, is compared with substantial form in one way and another. For insofar as it is radically contained, it has a certain identified relation with matter, determining it and, so to speak, disposing it not only for the pure reception of substantial form, but also for precontaining it as this form; consequently, it is prior absolutely and simply to substantial form itself and to its reception, even these being taken absolutely, provided they are considered as singular things. Quantity itself, however, according to its formal being and as actually possessed, is really distinguished from matter, is received in the whole, and disposes and determines matter toward form as this form, not indeed absolutely, but as naturally receivable: for by divine power it can be received absolutely without it; and thus its reception is posterior in the genus of a purely receptive material cause; indeed, simply, it is posterior to the reception of form, because otherwise it does not make matter individual, but supposes the same matter to be individual by reason of the radical precontaining of the aforementioned quantity.

126 We have said that quantity, insofar as it is radically contained, is a certain relation that, so to speak, disposes matter not only for the reception of substantial form, but also for precontaining it as this form, because quantity, insofar as it is contained, is not distinguished from matter, and consequently neither from the precontaining of substantial form in the same matter; it cannot therefore be a proper disposition toward the aforementioned precontaining. For a disposition properly so taken involves, at least by the nature of the thing, a distinction between it and the thing disposed, and with respect to that to which it disposes. Thus the aforementioned quantity, insofar as it is contained, has only a kind of disposition toward the precontaining of substantial form: for, after comparing matter insofar as it expresses the precontaining of this quantity with matter insofar as it expressly asserts the precontaining of this particular substantial form, matter is then understood to be determined by that prior inadequate relation to have this later relation. Thus that prior relation makes matter ultimately and proximally capable of having this ultimate relation; consequently, it is in a certain way analogous to a proper disposition, which makes the subject ultimately capable of having something else.

127 It makes no difference if one urges that matter contains this particular quantity only as a second form, namely an accidental form; therefore, it first contains in itself this particular substantial form, which is the first act. The inference is clear, because the containing of a second form, as such, necessarily presupposes the containing of the first form, namely substantial form.

This therefore makes no difference. For although quantity, in its own reason, implies that it is a second form, namely accidental, this is not its adequate reason: for insofar as it is a second form, it calls itself second precisely insofar as it depends on and presupposes the first form, namely substantial form. But in addition to the dependence just mentioned, quantity has its own peculiar reason, according to which it has the being of the first disposition and determination of matter and is itself in a certain way individual; consequently, it is that upon which matter itself, as well as substantial form, depends. Wherefore the same quantity, insofar as it is a second form secondarily receivable and subsequent to substantial form in matter, is precontained in the same matter later in nature than substantial form. For according to this reason, if we speak most formally, we do not consider the same quantity insofar as it is the first disposition and determination of matter and is individually determined of itself, but the same quantity insofar as it is still, according to its ultimate reason (though inadequate), a second form susceptible in matter after the first. The aforementioned quantity, however, according to another inadequate reason, also conformable to its ultimate reason, is the first disposition and determination of matter and is in a certain way individual of itself; accordingly, it is precontained in the same matter before this particular substantial form, as has been said.

128 This can be explained by the example of contrition and sanctifying grace, if these are compared with God, insofar as he contains them as first cause. For contrition, as a disposition toward grace that altogether justifies the soul, is first precontained in God than the same grace, insofar as it altogether justifies and grants participation in the divine nature after the manner of nature and in a state of rest; although the same contrition, as formed, terminated, and finally meritorious according to strict desert of eternal reward, is later precontained than the same grace insofar as it possesses the character of nature, forms contrition, and grants it the aforesaid strict desert.

It is also established from what our Complutensians hinted in the book of Physics, disput. 10, num. 23 and 28, that the antecedent must be granted. The consequent, however, must be denied. For, as we recently said, matter regards this particular substantial form rather than another because matter itself is this and not that, and has this from the precontaining through which it contains this quantity rather than that one. Hence, in the former respect, in which matter is understood to contain this particular quantity, with nothing conceived concerning the precontaining of this particular substantial form, matter is not conceived with a relation to this particular quantity, although it is conceived as connected with it. For although quantity may be capable of the passive precontaining just described, it does not of itself first terminate matter's relation to it: because the substantial relation of matter, insofar as it is its relation, must of itself first be terminated toward something proper to its predicament.

To prove this same inference, it must be said that it is at least true in effects which are of themselves capable of first terminating the relation of their cause to them. This does not occur here, because of the things that our Complutensian College taught very well in the place cited from the book Physics. How, moreover, can one thing be connected with another, or be precontained in it, without being, absolutely or speaking of a prior respect, the relation of the cause to it? This has already been explained by our Complutensian College in Physics, disp. 23, num. 17.

129 Nevertheless, because those two later proofs of the antecedent in this confirmation can be turned back to prove that matter does not contain this particular quantity before this particular form—since things proper to the genus and predicament of substance, as being more intimate, seem to be prior in matter to things foreign and of a foreign predicament, and consequently this particular substantial form seems to have to be precontained in matter before this particular quantity; and likewise, because this quantity is contained on account of substantial form itself, and as a determination toward it, the form itself seems to have to be contained first—therefore, the first of these proofs, insofar as it can be urged against our view, must be answered from what has been said: priority or posteriority in the aforementioned precontaining is not considered to depend on whether the things precontained are, according to their formal being, more intimate or not; for all things, insofar as they are contained and are viewed as such among the things contained, are identified with matter precontaining them and are viewed under the genus of substance. But among other things, account is at least taken of the fact that one of the contained things is of itself, according to its formal being, the first determination and disposition toward something else; for then a precontaining thing, without the prior containing of such determination, cannot precontain anything else. Since quantity is of itself the determination of matter toward this form, and the precontaining of quantity is in its own way a determination toward the precontaining of form, the former must be precontained before the latter.

To the second proof, it is answered that it makes no difference that these two precontainings, namely that of this quantity rather than another and that of substantial form rather than another, are really distinct in matter, and are so compared with each other that the precontaining of this particular quantity rather than another is in a certain way ordered toward the precontaining of this particular substantial form. For from this it follows at most that the aforementioned precontaining of this particular substantial form is in a certain way quasi-prior in the genus of a final cause, or quasi-final cause, to the precontaining of this particular quantity, but not in the genus of a material cause.

§ IV. The second argument of the same view is met.

130 To the second principal argument, the major is granted as to its latter part, namely, that matter as containing this particular unterminated quantity is the first root of individuation. For quantity, as terminated, supposes the whole composite to be already individual, because it is not understood to be terminated except as it is in a certain way an effect of substantial form already received in matter. Therefore, as the Divine Thomas taught in opusculum 70, this quantity, as terminated, is in a certain way individuated from itself, as preconceived in matter, according to the respect in which it is not understood to be terminated.

This will be understood more clearly if one notes that by unterminated quantity we do not understand quantity that has no terminus in reality, and is therefore infinite, but quantity insofar as it is not understood to be terminated and, so to speak, formed by substantial form, which is its terminus and complement; but it is understood to precede it. For just as contrition, for example, because it is a disposition toward grace, is not understood to be formed and terminated except insofar as it is posterior to grace, and insofar as it is understood to be prior to grace, it is not conceived to be terminated and formed, because the terminus and complement of a disposition is form toward which it is disposed; so, because quantity is a disposition toward substantial form, it is not understood to be terminated, nor, so to speak, formed, except after substantial form is understood, and through it is understood to be terminated, completed, and, as it were, informed. Therefore, D. Thom. in 4, dist. 11, q. 1, art. 1, q. 3, answer to the fourth, said: ‘The dimension preconceived before substantial form in matter does not have complete being: because it is not a terminated dimension; the termination of a dimension is through form.’

131 Therefore, as quantity, in the former respect in which it is preconceived according to its formal being before substantial form in matter—that is, it is presupposed to dispose and determine matter before form itself is understood to be received in it, in the manner elsewhere explained—is understood simultaneously to have this special characteristic, that it is not understood to have a determinate amount or figure, although in reality it has them; for in that former respect and in that genus of cause, no consideration is made of whether it has or lacks a terminus. For that priority and that genus of causality are only the priority of dispositive causality insofar as it adheres on the part of matter, not the priority of the causality of substantial form, from which that disposition—namely quantity—has a determinate amount, that is, the amount owed to it within the latitude of the maximum, thus sought from it by the particular substantial form, all circumstances being considered. Thus quantity, insofar as it is contained in that former respect, is not understood to be contained under a determinate terminus and figure; it is prescinded from this by a purely precise abstraction. Only the precontaining of this quantity rather than another is considered, by reason of which matter itself is determined toward this particular form rather than another and has the being of an individual and the root of all individuation. Thus everything brought forward in the argument is sufficiently clear.

Hence also it makes no difference that a certain later author objects that terminated and unterminated quantity are really one and the same; for as that quantity supposes the whole composite to be individual, so this quantity, whether terminated or unterminated, is essentially accidental.

It is answered from what has been said that although it is really the same quantity that is terminated and unterminated, nevertheless in different genera of cause it is prior and posterior to substantial form, and by reason of this priority and posteriority it is called terminated or unterminated. Likewise, by reason of this priority and posteriority that it has according to its formal being when compared with form, it arises that it is precontained in matter before or after form itself, as has been explained. Hence it is not inconvenient, but necessary, that in the former respect in which it is not considered terminated but unterminated, it does not suppose an individual substance; yet when considered terminated, it does, because then it is posterior to that.

Add that, as we said, quantity, as unterminated, is in a certain way individual of itself, so that the same quantity, as terminated, is in a certain way individuated from itself as unterminated. Thus, according to its being unterminated, it does not suppose the substantial whole to be individual, but is a root in the way described, that is, as contained in matter as the root of its individuation.

132 It finally makes no difference if you object that the Divine Thomas said in the opusculum on the principle of individuation that matter marked by determinate quantity is the principle of individuation.

This therefore makes no difference. For determinate quantity is one thing, and terminated quantity another. Determinate quantity means quantity as this numerically, rather than that one, without considering whether it is terminated and completed by substantial form, or whether it has this amount or that one; and thus it is the principle of individuation insofar as it is contained in matter. Terminated quantity, however, means the same quantity as posterior in nature to substantial form, through which it is terminated and formed; likewise, according to this reason it involves having a determinate amount, for example two cubits; and thus, so taken, it is not the principle of individuation.

That these two reasons of quantity are in a certain way distinct is clear. For while quantity remains unchanged, the fact that it is determined—that is, that it is this and not that one—can vary, as can the fact that it is actually terminated and completed by substantial form: as if it were separated from it by divine power, or if precisely its amount and figure were changed, as if, for example, a living thing were increased a little according to the same numerical quantity, or changed its figure a little according to it.

§ V. The last argument of the same view is met.

133 To the third, the antecedent must be denied. And if the antecedent is granted in the proof, the consequent must be denied as to its second part. For another reason remains whereby matter precontains this particular quantity rather than that one, namely the pure and naked potency of matter; with the connotation, however, that if that composite is made by generation, these particular dispositions and no others immediately preceded it in time; consequently, they were introduced by this agent rather than that one, in this time and in this composite, and not in the other. But if it is made by creation, it is subjected to God actually creating through the infinite acts of his intellect and will, virtually and eminently containing this composite rather than that one. With these connoted conditions, matter has, so to speak, such a natural capacity that of itself, without anything intrinsic superadded to its being, it contains this quantity rather than that one. Because precisely by being determined through these antecedent dispositions rather than those, and consequently introduced in this composite and not another, and by this agent in this time, etc., with which this quantity is to be introduced again by a natural connection, a sufficient concomitant is given whereby matter itself, without anything else added to its being, contains this quantity rather than that one. But let those concerned see what our Complutensians say in the book On Generation, disp. 2, num. 87 and following.

This can be clarified further by the example of the relation of paternity residing in Peter: as our Complutensians teach very well in Logic, disput. 14, num. 92 and 93, and in the book On Generation, disput. 4, num. 167, its terminus is what is of itself in relation to all sons begotten by the same Peter. Once the generation of the first son, and not another, is posited, it is terminated toward him rather than another; and conversely, when this son dies and another is born in the same instant by the generation of a second son, it is then terminated toward the second son without the addition of any other intrinsic thing superadded to its being, because this new concomitant is posited. And so with the others. Likewise, the angelic species represents an actually exercised existence of this particular individual rather than another, although it did not represent it before, since nothing is added to its being and only the new concomitant of the production and exercise of the existence of that represented individual is posited. Finally, the same prime matter now desires by an appetite of desire these forms rather than those, namely those it never received but can still receive; now, however, it desires those by an appetite of concupiscence, not by one of desire, namely while it actually has them, although for this it is necessary only that new concomitants be added to it, as is clear from our Complutensians in the book of Physics, disp. 3, num. 94.

134 It also follows that it makes no difference that a certain later author objects that if antecedent dispositions determine toward the precontaining, and afterward the having, of this quantity rather than that one, it will follow that the aforementioned dispositions, at least together with the other recently enumerated determining dispositions, will be the root of individuation rather than the quantity that must be produced anew and previously contained in the first nature. For, after comparing the quantity itself, which otherwise follows the form to be generated, with the form itself, the quantity considered in the way described has the stronger claim to be the root of individuation, because it determines matter toward the same substantial form.

It is answered from what has been said by denying the sequel. First, because the antecedent dispositions, together with the others recently enumerated, are considered only as concomitant; whereas the subsequent quantity, if considered as previously contained in matter, is stated directly, because it is matter itself as determined toward this particular form, without the addition of any new reality inhering in it. For it is clear from what has been said that the first root of the individuation of material substance must be, at least directly, pure and naked potency, irreceptible in another as in a subject, and not involving form itself as received; the contrary is found both in the dispositions and in the other things recently enumerated. Secondly, because all the aforementioned things determine matter only extrinsically, not intrinsically as quantity, insofar as it is previously contained. Yet the first root of individuation must be matter intrinsically determined, as is clear from what we have so often indicated. Thirdly, because the determination made through the subsequent quantity as previously contained is of itself permanent and in act, whereas that made through the other things enumerated is not; but the determination per se and directly required from the first root of individuation must be of this latter condition, so that the determination may be proportionate to the thing it determines and the root of individuation may fit exactly the substantial individual itself and its self-permanent, actual individuation. Finally, because the other dispositions are not in a certain way individual of themselves, whereas quantity is; hence matter is more fittingly made determined and individual, and the root of individuation, by being subjected in the way described to quantity than by being subjected to other things. Thus, if other things are desired in their own way for such individuation and for the root of the individuation of the whole composite, they do not influence it in the way quantity, as previously contained, does, but in another, inferior way: namely, insofar as they are the concomitant required for the precontaining of this quantity rather than another; consequently, in this way the same quantity...

135 It finally makes no difference if you urge that prime matter of itself is only one by negative unity, as is clear from what our Complutensians teach in the book of Physics, disp. 3, from num. 27 through num. 45; therefore, unless something is added directly to it, it cannot be one by positive unity. As if the relation of paternity residing in Peter had only the negative force of extending itself to several sons—that is, it had nothing whereby it could extend itself to them—while there were nothing in it by reason of which such extension would be opposed, it could not extend positively toward a son again begotten by the same Peter unless something were added directly to it.

This therefore makes no difference. For this is, so to speak, the proper character of matter, as is clear from what our Complutensians state very well in the book On Generation, disp. 2, num. 89: that in actual being it has whatever is required on the part of the direct in order to have positive numerical unity, according to which it is the root of this particular substantial individual rather than another. That is, it has all the reality required directly in being for the direct numerical positive unity according to which matter is the root of this particular substantial individual rather than another; although this is not there actually exercised and under the concept of the direct, that is, although it is not there exercising the relation of the direct, and consequently is not under the concept of the direct unless it is posited obliquely and in the way described as what is desired as a concomitant, or one of the aforementioned concomitants, which we enumerated under num. 133. For in order that the reality of matter, having whatever is desired in being directly for its aforementioned numerical unity, may exercise the relation of the direct, the aforementioned concomitant is required. Such a concomitant is also required so that it may be under the concept of the direct, because the direct under the concept of the direct must bring with it directly what expresses its relation to another, namely what is imported from it obliquely, or have a connection with it as something imported by the mode of a concomitant. Thus prime matter is said of itself to be one by negative unity, because, taken precisely of itself, it is not connected with such a concomitant; and so, precisely because the aforementioned concomitant is posited, matter will have this exercise and the relation of the direct under the concept of the direct positive unity and of the root of the individuation of the whole composite.

136 Why, so to speak, do we attribute this character to matter? It follows from the reason recently given, namely, because matter is one numerically in a negative way, insofar as it is not more connected with this numerical quantity than with that one. Wherefore, when the aforementioned concomitant is posited, matter itself, without any addition in being, is directly more connected with this quantity than with that one; hence it has of itself whatever, with respect to that quantity, is otherwise to have the relation of the direct, and is desired under the concept of the direct.

This can be clarified further because the positive unity of matter, though individual, must be the unity of pure potency and of the first subject, irreceptible in another, as is clear from what has been said. Thus it cannot directly import anything added to matter in being, because this could not fail to have the character of an act received in matter itself, which precisely would not be sufficient for the relation of the direct of such unity, as we asserted above; consequently, whatever is desired in being for that which is to be direct with respect to the aforementioned unity must always precede in matter, not indeed so that it is always there under the concept of the direct and exercises the relation of positive unity that is the root of the individuation of this substantial composite rather than another, for example Peter's; but so that it is always there in actual being. For, as we hinted, for the aforementioned exercise and for the concept of the direct under the relation of the direct, one of the two aforementioned concomitants is required.

We have said many times that nothing intrinsic in being is added to matter that was not previously there in the same way now explained; for although nothing is added to it within this line, it is well within the direct line under the concept of the direct in this limited sense, namely that something is added to it so that it now has the relation of the direct under the concept of the direct, or the direct actually exercised; not however previously: for it is not necessary for this unless one of the two aforementioned concomitants enumerated under num. 133 is added. For precisely by this, the potentiality of matter remains determined and under the concept of the direct of this positive unity rather than another, because the direct line under the concept of the direct does not necessarily demand any further addition in order that the direct under the concept of the direct be said to exist and be exercised again.

All these matters can be explained further. First, by examples of the relation of paternity in the angelic species and the appetite of prime matter, adduced under num. 133 of this difficulty, in which one must philosophize proportionally. Secondly, by another higher example, namely the generative power in divine things, which directly denotes the divine essence and obliquely paternity. And although the aforementioned essence, of itself, has whatever in being is directly required for the direct generative power, nevertheless, of itself taken precisely, it does not exercise the relation of the direct, nor is it in the Father under the concept of the direct unless the oblique, namely the relation of paternity, and its concomitant are added. Consequently, from the defect of this concomitant the divine essence does not have in the Son the character of generative power. Thus, although when paternity is added nothing is added to the essence that gives it anything in being directly required in order that it have the character of the direct with respect to generative power, nevertheless something is added to it directly that belongs to the direct line, insofar as it is precisely denoted through it that it is added to it so that it have the character of the direct under the concept of the direct, or the direct actually exercised. For the concept of the direct under the concept of the direct, or the direct actually exercised, must bring with it directly what expresses its relation to another, namely what is imported from it obliquely, or its connection with that, as with something imported by the mode of a concomitant; although this relation or connection in being says nothing other than no other reality or formality besides the divine essence taken according to its absolute being and the relation of paternity; otherwise there would be in God some other formality or reality in being required for the relation of generative power. We shall say what the Divine Thomas teaches against this in the treatise On the Trinity.

§ VI. Corollaries worthy of notice, and not without great necessity for reconciling several passages of the Divine Thomas, are adduced.

137 From what has been said throughout this entire disputation, it is sufficiently clear how several passages of the Divine Thomas concerning the principle of the individuation of material substance, which at first seem to conflict with one another, are to be reconciled; in reality, however, they cohere by a wonderful connection. Although in the course of this entire disputation they have been explained by us in the order in which necessity urged, it was nevertheless pleasing, for the honor of the Saintly Doctor and so that it might be certain how clearly and transparently we followed his own mind, to collect all these matters together in this section and to present their true understanding at once.

From what has been said, first, it is collected what the Saintly Doctor means when he sometimes absolutely asserts that matter is the first principle and root of individuation, as in 1 part., q. 54, art. 3, answer to the second, and in several other places listed in the golden table under the word individuum, num. 25, indeed in opusculum 32, where he says that matter alone is the principle of individuation. At other times, however, he says that prime matter and dimensional quantity are the principle of the aforementioned individuation, as in 3 part., q. 77, art. 2, and in 4, dist. 12, q. 1, art. 1, q. 3, answer to the third, and often elsewhere.

In the former places he is speaking of the first principle of individuation, which, within the line of that principle, is absolutely first, although of itself it is not absolutely sufficient, as we explained from num. 94 through 98. In the latter places, however, he speaks of the principle that is first and of itself absolutely sufficient within the latitude of the first principle of the aforementioned individuation, as we hinted there; yet he is not speaking of quantity in just any sense, but of quantity as previously contained in matter, as we said under num. 86 and 116.

138 Add that the Saintly Doctor can also be explained otherwise, and this not without great agreement with his mind. In the former testimonies he speaks of the first principle of individuation, to which the individuation itself—that is, the being that is incommunicable, or the being undivided in itself by the ultimate division through which accommodation and attribution are absolutely granted—is attributed; although in reality it proceeds from quantity radically contained in matter, as we showed from num. 91 through 94. In the latest, however, he speaks of the principle of individuation to which that same individuation, that is, the being divided by the ultimate division from anything else, is attributed proportionally in the same way, as we said there.

Finally, in the first places the Angelic Doctor simply means that matter alone is directly the first principle of individuation, although, according to what he teaches in the later testimonies, quantity is desired obliquely, not indeed as possessed, but as sought, and in the following respect, insofar as it is from the force of secondary causes, although it is not absolutely necessary that it follow, as we explained from num. 133 through 135.

139 Secondly, it is deduced how the same Saintly Doctor is to be understood when he says once that matter marked by quantity, or as existing under dimensions, is not the principle of individuation, and consequently neither is quantity itself that marks it; but rather it is only an inseparable sign of it and the principle by which that same individuation is known and demonstrated, because quantity, insofar as it is an accident, does not cause its subject, as in opusculum 32, cap. 3, and the opusculum On the Principle of Individuation. Yet once, indeed many times, he means that matter marked by quantity is itself truly the first and fountainhead principle of individuation insofar as its being is concerned, as in the body of the opusculum On Being and Essence, and opusculum 70, q. 4, art. 2, in the answers to the arguments, as well as in other places which we brought forward from num. 43 through 48.

From what has been said, therefore, it is clear that these two things cohere very strongly with each other. For matter marked by quantity, understood in different ways, is and is not the first principle of individuation insofar as its being and its being known are concerned. For matter itself, insofar as it is marked by quantity, insofar as through this marking it is designated as containing, as a root and foundation, this quantity rather than that one, and consequently the aforementioned quantity, not as possessed nor as taken through the mode of an intrinsic formal cause, or as actually inhering, but as previously and radically contained, is the first root of individuation insofar as its being is concerned, as was explained from num. 86 and from num. 116 through 137. But the same matter marked by quantity, insofar as by this it is designated as matter itself actually having and exercising quantity and being informed by it, is not the first principle of individuation insofar as its being is concerned, but insofar as it is demonstrated and known, and this means that it depends on certain circumstances, place, etc., as we said there and from num. 74 through 86. Consequently, quantity itself according to this reason is a principle of individuation only in the way explained in the place cited.

140 Thirdly, it is collected how the passages of the same Holy Teacher are to be reconciled in some of which he seems to mean that unterminated dimensions, and consequently matter marked by them, not terminated dimensions or matter as marked by them, are the first principle of individuation, as in opusculum 70, q. 4, art. 2; but in others that determinate dimensions and matter marked by them are the first root of individuation, as in opusculum 29, at its end, and elsewhere.

It is answered from what has been said that to say unterminated dimensions is to say dimensions insofar as they are not understood to be completed and terminated by form, which is their terminus and complement, and consequently insofar as they are not precontained in that form nor are anything posterior to it, but rather precede it according to the precontaining in matter. Accordingly, they are not understood, in that former respect, to be terminated, nor to have a determinate measure and figure. By determinate dimensions, however, is understood the same quantity insofar as it is a certain determinate singular, that is, this particular quantity rather than that one, without considering the termination by form explained above. It is clear, however, that there is no contradiction in this: that quantity is in the one way unterminated and in the other way determinate, and is the first root of individuation, as was shown under num. 131; indeed, that this is necessary is clear from what we asserted from num. 130 through 133. For precisely because matter is the first root of individuation, quantity, insofar as it concurs with the reason of the aforementioned root, must be taken as depending on and previously contained by matter, not as depending on and previously contained by form itself; otherwise the root of individuation would first have to be reduced not to matter but to the aforementioned form, the contrary of which has been shown.

141 Fourthly, it is inferred how the Saintly Doctor is to be understood when he sometimes seems to mean that individual material substance cannot be separated from quantity, but at other times that it can. In the testimonies denying this, he is speaking of ordinary power; in those affirming it, of absolute power. Or in the former he is speaking of quantity as radically contained, and in the latter of the same as actually possessed; or in the former of material substance as individuated by sensible individuation, and in the latter according to the respect in which it is precisely individuated, according to those things required for its absolute individuation, as we touched upon from num. 87 through 90. By all these matters many other testimonies of the Divine Thomas are easily reconciled.

Finally, from what has been said it is deduced that our view, which we explained in the preceding doubts concerning the first root of the individuation of material substance, and consequently of substantial form, is itself the view and the mind of the Angelic Teacher; for according to it, as we have declared, all the statements, indeed places and testimonies, of the same Saintly Doctor, which at first seemed to conflict with one another, cohere most excellently and by a wonderful connection, and thus clearly elucidate the same view; indeed, it is established that this view is to be preferred to all the other views proposed so far.