Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

104 In order to explain more fully the proper meaning of the Divine Thomas, the fact that what he understands by matter marked with quantity, of which he says that it is the principle of individuation, will not contribute little to this question; this must therefore first be considered in our present doubt: whether matter marked with quantity means matter in some substantial manner which, by its very nature, is distinct from matter and is determined toward having this quantity rather than that one. Thus, in order to proceed more clearly and distinctly, we have chosen to treat this doubt first separately and briefly.

§ I. The first view is proposed.

105 Certain authors defend the part affirming this, among whom Suarez is cited in the first volume of his Metaphys., disp. 5, section 3, num. 22. The basis is as follows. Prime matter, considered under the aspect of the first principle and of the cause of individuation, is not pure act, but rather pure potency; therefore, in order actually and in act to be the cause and root of individuation, at least some mode must be superadded to it; thus this mode must be something substantial, distinct from matter by its very nature, through which matter is determined toward having this quantity rather than that one, and by reason of which it is said to be marked with quantity. This second inference clearly follows from the first. For that which, as such, must be superadded to matter so that matter actually be the principle of individuation cannot be something accidental, since otherwise the individual formed from it—that is, the substantial composite—would be a being by accident. As was shown in the preceding doubt, so likewise, it must be distinct from matter by the very nature of the thing; for if it came to matter really and perished without matter perishing, it would not be such. Finally, it cannot fail to determine that same matter toward having this quantity rather than that one, or, equivalently, to mark matter with quantity, insofar as, through the aforementioned determination, matter is marked and determined toward having the aforementioned quantity; for this mode cannot serve any other purpose with respect to individuation, as will be clear to the reader, and as follows from the two preceding doubts.

The first inference, however, from the antecedent and from what our Complutens. say in the Book of Physics, disp. 6, num. 21 and following, seems to follow. For this is why matter needs a mode of union superadded to it in order actually to cause form; and conversely, form needs a mode of its own in order actually to cause existence and a positive appearance of matter; and finally, an efficient cause needs an action, at least a certain desired mode, in order to produce its effect, because none of these is pure act, but something mixed with potency. Thus, in order that they may be in second act, they need at least some mode to be superadded.

106 It is confirmed. For matter marked with quantity cannot be understood as matter intrinsically constituted through quantity, as though through an inherent form, as is clear from what was said in the preceding doubt; therefore, matter is understood as determined, at least through some substantial mode, toward this quantity rather than that one. The inference is clear: because quantity, insofar as it is actually possessed through the mode of an inherent form, does not concur either in individuation or therefore, according as matter is thus marked, the matter understood to be the principle of individuation must, through the aforementioned matter, be understood as in some way seeking this quantity rather than that one, as appears from itself; therefore, since matter of itself does not seek this quantity more than that one, it must necessarily be determined through some substantial mode through which it seeks it; and consequently, matter marked with quantity must also be understood as demanding it by reason of the aforementioned mode.

§ II. According to the mind of Aristotle and the Divine Thomas, the doubt is decided.

107 Nevertheless, it must be said that matter marked with quantity, insofar as it possesses the aforementioned substantial mode determining it toward having this quantity rather than that one, is not the first root of the individuation of the complete material substance, or of its substantial form. Thus Aristotel., et Div. Thom. in the passages cited in the preceding doubts, as we shall immediately explain. D. Thom. taught this most especially in the passages cited from number 55 through 58, all of which the Doctors cite under number 116.

The fundamental basis of this assertion, however, was touched upon by D. Thom. in his opuscul. On the Nature of Matter, chapter 3, and can be proposed in the following form. Matter is the first principle of the individuation of the whole composite, and consequently of the substantial form, insofar as it has the character of the first subject, neither received nor receivable in another; therefore, matter marked with quantity, which is posited as the principle of individuation, cannot be understood as possessing the aforementioned mode. The antecedent is clear from what was said at number 5 and following. The first inference from the antecedent, however, is clear. For it would be of the character of the aforementioned mode to actualize matter and be received in it; therefore, the aforementioned mode could not confer upon matter its being the first root of individuation; for the mode would have the character opposed to that by which matter is the first root of individuation, namely, its irreceptibility in another as in a subject. The second inference from this prior one plainly follows.

Hence D. Thom. concludes in the same place that quantity itself, taken formally according to its being, insofar as it has the character of an inherent form, cannot be the first root of individuation: because, according to this character, it is in another as in a subject; and what is the first principle of individuation cannot be such as to be in another as in a subject.

108 First, it is confirmed. Because this mode could not be a singular and physical mode, as is clear from itself; therefore, it could not fail to be received in singular matter and to presuppose that matter as singular; and consequently, matter would not be singular by reason of it, nor the first root of singularity. This last inference follows from the prior one; the prior inference in turn follows from the antecedent. For this is the difference between a metaphysical act and a physical act: although a singular metaphysical act does not presuppose a singular metaphysical potency, but makes that potency singular by acting, and therefore presupposes, for example, only a specific potency—namely, human nature—and not a singular potency; just as a specific and metaphysical difference presupposes only generic potency and constitutes specific potency; nevertheless, a physical and singular act, if really received according to its formal being, cannot fail to presuppose a physical and singular potency.

Again, because this follows by induction. And likewise because the informing, which is between physical potency and physical act, is real and actual; and therefore, it must exist in reality and actuality between the extremes, and be really distinct on the side of the thing; and consequently, between extremes each of which is truly singular insofar as it is distinguished from the other; for a distinction on the side of the thing—that is, a real and actual distinction—cannot fail to be between singulars. The action by which a metaphysical act actualizes its metaphysical potency, however, is only action according to reason, with a foundation in the thing; this action does not require that the extremes be actually distinct on the side of the thing, but only according to reasoned distinction; and consequently, it does not require extremes each of which is singular, but rather allows that one of them, insofar as it is in itself, be universal and the other singular; for in this way universals can be distinguished from their singulars.

109 Secondly, it is confirmed and explained by that reasoning of Divus Thom. which we have just adduced at the numbers cited. For from the communication by which form or act is communicated to matter, there follows, in its own way, the communication of the superior to its inferior; therefore, from the fact that some mode is superadded to matter and informs it, matter will not thereby become singular or the first root of singularity; but, to the extent of the force of that communication, it will become capable of being made universal. The inference from the antecedent seems to be clear. The antecedent, however, is proved in two ways. First, because for this reason Divus Thom., at num. 54 cited, said that form, insofar as it is communicable to another as to a subject, is in itself universal and common to many. Secondly, because from the fact that something is in another there arises the fact that it can be predicated of that other—in the manner elsewhere indicated—and thus it has the character of a form with respect to its inferior. This is so true that even if a genus is predicated through the mode of a material part, that materiality is attributed to the difference, of which it is not predicated, and not to the inferior considered as that whose character causes it to be subjected to the superior and, as it were, to receive it within itself.

110 Nor does it matter if one says that this substantial mode, through which matter would be determined toward this quantity rather than that one, must be identified with matter: and thus, like matter, would be irreceptible, and could not presuppose a positively singular matter. For because of this identification, metaphysical singularity does not presuppose its potency—that is, its species—as something singular. And finally, just as matter is not said to inform itself insofar as it is identical with itself, so neither would the aforementioned mode actualize or inform that same matter.

It therefore makes no difference. For what follows from this is that this mode does not differ really and entitatively from matter, but that it does not differ really and formally—or at least, by the very nature of the thing and abstracted by the intellect—from matter, as is clear from what has already been said in the heading of this doubt, and from what our Complut. say in the Logic, disp. 14, num. 48 and following, and in the Book of Physics, disp. 19, num. 27 and following. Thus, although identically considered and by reason of matter it has those conditions mentioned in this evasion, it nevertheless does not have them formally and by its own proper characteristics; but rather, from itself and by its own proper characteristics, it will have from the very nature of the thing and abstracted by the intellect, that it is received in matter, that it is a physical act, and that it informs matter by the mode of an act. Thus, matter will not, by reason of the aforementioned mode, be the individual and the first root of individuation; but if matter has that character at that point, it receives it from elsewhere, or from its own proper characteristics.

§ III. An objection to the foundation of the first view is met.

111 Granting the antecedent proposed by the opponents, the first inference must be denied if it is understood to concern some mode really superadded to matter, through which matter formally and directly has, in reality and in act, its being as the first root of individuation. In proof, it must be said that the reasons are unequal. For the actual causation of matter with respect to form, and conversely, as well as the causality of an efficient cause, are second acts in their own genus. Thus, no form and no efficient cause can actually cause without at least a new mode, unless such a form and such an efficient cause be pure acts; consequently, if matter actually caused form without any superadded mode—that is, without a union naturally distinct from it—matter would be pure act insofar as this consideration is concerned. But matter actually and in act having its being as the first root of the individuation of the material substance, and consequently as the first root of this material causality rather than of the other, is not directly and in its own genus a second act; rather, in its own genus it has the character of pure potency wholly irreceptible in another, although it has a nexus with first and second act. Therefore, it does not follow from the fact that matter of itself—that is, without some mode really superadded through which it formally and directly has its being as the first root of individuation—can be the first root of the aforementioned individuation, that matter will be pure act; but rather, that it must have the character of pure potency.

We have said: without some mode really superadded through which it formally and directly has, in reality and in act, its being as the first root of individuation. For just as, in order that the aforementioned matter should be, in reality and in act, the root, it is required that it actually compose the whole and be subjected to form, since it cannot exercise the aforementioned function unless form and the substantial composite composed from that matter as from the first root of individuation are present; so likewise, a mode of union is required on the part of matter and form, which is to be individuated together with the aforementioned whole from that same matter. Although neither form, nor the composite, nor the aforementioned mode is required as conferring upon matter its being as the first root of individuation, they are required only as effects that have a connection with matter, such that matter is in reality and in act the first root of individuation. So completely, however, is matter, in reality and in act, the root first of this union insofar as it is sustained on the part of that other, and then of this form; and conversely, it is first the root of this form and then of this composite. But concerning these matters, let them consider what our Complut. teach in the lib. Physic., disp. 6, quaest. 2.

112 This can also be explained in another way: first, by the example of the same matter, which, as they say, has an appetite or desire with respect to form not yet possessed, although it can have that form naturally. For in order actually to have the aforementioned appetite, it is not necessary that it have it directly by reason of something superadded, but by reason of its own potentiality, while concomitantly connoting the privation of that same form, as is clear from what our Complut. state in 1 Physicorum, disp. 3, num. 94; for such an appetite is not a second act in its own genus and directly. And likewise from what will be said in the following doubt. For matter, by reason of its own potentiality and while connoting something else to be suggested there, contains this quantity rather than that one in advance, in reality and in act. It is nevertheless clear that, precisely because matter contains this quantity rather than another in advance, it is in reality and in act the principle of the individuation of this composite and not of another; for precisely on that account it seeks to compose this composite and not another, and this seeking is sufficient for it to be, in reality and in act, the root of the individuation of this composite and not another.

For confirmation, the antecedent must be granted and the inference denied. In proof, what has already been said makes it clear, as will what will be said at number 133. For although matter of itself does not seek this quantity more than that one, it is nevertheless not necessary that any substantial mode be superadded to it, by reason of which it formally and directly has its being as the first root of individuation; but matter itself suffices, while connoting those things that we have indicated there and shall mention at the place cited, in order that it be able to possess this quantity rather than that one.