Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

65 In the three doubts that follow, our controversy and dispute are not with outsiders—that is, with those outside the school of St. Thomas—but with Thomists and disciples of the same holy Doctor. Although all Thomists agree that matter marked in some way by quantity is the principle of individuation, as is clear from the preceding doubt, there is nevertheless no little disagreement among them about what is meant by matter marked by quantity: whether it means the matter of that composite of which the title of the doubt speaks, or whether it means matter involving quantity in some other way. We shall examine this in the three following doubts.

§ I. The affirmative position is proposed.

66 Some disciples of St. Thomas of no lesser authority defend the affirmative part, such as Ferrara, Contra gentiles, ch. 21; Soncinus, 7 Metaphysic., q. 34; and Nazarius, Prima pars, q. 3, a. 2, unique controversy. They explain it by distinguishing two things in an individual: namely, to be undivided in itself by the ultimate division, or to be incommunicable in the same way in which something superior is communicated to something inferior; and to be divided in the same way from every other thing. They say that the first of these proceeds from matter, whereas the latter proceeds from quantity, as from a form actually inhering and constituting the composite in the said sense of division. Thus the first principle sufficient and adequate for the individuation of the substantial composite would be both matter and quantity, as an actually inhering and informing form, at least as informing matter as a whole; and consequently the aforesaid composite arising from matter and quantity in the explained sense.

This is proved first by various testimonies of St. Thomas. For, above all, as is clear from the places cited in the preceding doubt, he often says that by matter marked by quantity is understood matter under certain dimensions; matter under certain dimensions, he says, actually receives those dimensions and actually informs and inheres in them. Otherwise it could not be under them; and therefore matter marked by quantity, as St. Thomas posits it to be the principle of individuation, is said to be a certain composite arising from matter and quantity, as from a form actually inhering.

67 And then, because the same holy Doctor, in the opusculum On the principle of individuation, and in opusculum 32, ch. 3, asserts that the thing in which the reason of the first, or of the material individual in the genus of substance, is preserved cannot be found without quantity. If quantity did not give the aforesaid substance its being individual, at least as divided from others, and not in any way, but by the mode of a form actually inhering, there would be no reason why the substance could not be separated from it and, once separated, remain separated, as it can be separated from other accidents in this way. Therefore, for this reason, the same St. Doctor, Quodlibeta 7, a. 10, on whiteness and other material qualities, says that they are inseparable from quantity, in these words: It is possible to imagine two separated lines of the same species, distinct in number according to their different position: one line would not be divisible merely by reason of its genus; for a line is not divided except into lines; but it is impossible to imagine several whitenesses of the same species without a subject; and thus it is clear that whiteness is not individuated except by its subject, and therefore it could not be individual unless it were in some subject, at least in quantity.

This is confirmed first. For St. Doctor, Third Part, q. 77, a. 2, and in 4, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, q. 3, says that since two things belong to the individual, namely incommunicability and distinction from others, matter is the principle of one of these, whereas quantity is the principle of the other, namely distinction; and thus the total principle of individuation is matter marked by quantity. Therefore, just as matter actually communicated in its composite genus, and in no other way, is the first root of individuation insofar as it is incommunicable, because this is its proper effect, so quantity actually communicated in its genus, namely in the genus of a formal cause informing matter as a whole, and in no other way, will be the cause and first root of the same individuation insofar as it is divided from others; since individuation insofar as it is the aforesaid being is its proper effect, as of the first root. Just as incommunicable being, and being undivided in itself by the ultimate division, is attributed to matter as to the first root.

68 This is confirmed secondly from Aristotle, 10 Metaphysics, ch. 3, text 4, where he establishes only a twofold kind of distinction: one according to form, by which things are essentially distinguished, and another according to quantity, by which things are numerically distinguished. Therefore, just as essential distinction proceeding from form must arise from it as from an informing cause, so numerical distinction proceeding from quantity must also proceed from it as from an inhering and informing form, as appears from the parity of reason. Especially because quantity does not seem to be more efficacious than any other form in producing its proper effect, namely numerical distinction, than the corresponding effect produced by any other form. Thus, if other forms need inherence, or information, to cause essential distinction, quantity will also need it to produce numerical distinction. Consequently, precisely because matter marked by quantity is the first root of individuation insofar as it is divided from another, it will certainly be the root of that individuation through quantity inhering in it as a whole and constituting with it the aforesaid accidental composite.

69 Secondly, it is proved from reason. Because matter cannot be this and individual, and therefore cannot be the root of individuation insofar as it is divided, unless it is divided from another part of matter, as appears from the terms themselves. But matter is divided into parts according to quantity, as an accidental form inhering and informing it in its substantial whole. Therefore, that matter is the root of individuation insofar as it is divided from every other thing agrees with it according to quantity, as an inhering form. Consequently, when it is said that matter marked by quantity is the first principle of individuation, it must be understood as matter and quantity, from which, as from a subject, and from which, as from an accidentally inhering form, a certain accidental composite results.

The reason adduced by St. Thomas in favor of his opinion in De Trinitate, opusculum 70, q. 4, a. 2, is this: Form becomes this by being received in matter; but since matter considered in itself is indistinct, it cannot individualize the form received in it except according to its being distinguishable. For form is not individuated by being received in matter, except insofar as it is received in this or that distinct and determined matter; but matter is not divisible except by quantity. Hence the Philosopher says in 1 Ethics that, quantity being removed, an indivisible substance remains; and therefore matter becomes this and is marked according as it is under dimensions.

This is also repeated by St. Thomas in several places, especially 1 part., q. 50, a. 2, and 2, d. 3, q. 1, a. 4, and 2 Contra gentiles, chs. 49 and 50, as well as On spiritual creatures, a. 1, and often elsewhere.

70 Thirdly, when it is said that matter marked by quantity is the first root of individuation, either because it is marked by the aforesaid quantity a form or some mode distinct from matter itself, namely quantity inhering in it, is posited in matter; or nothing is added to it by the aforesaid marking. If the first, the intended meaning is attained. If the second, it follows that just as matter considered in itself, precisely taken without the aforesaid marking, could not be a sufficient principle and root of individuation, so it cannot be sufficient with the marking. For this marking adds nothing to matter itself, and therefore does not change it; consequently, just as without it matter was an insufficient principle and root of individuation, so it is with it.

This is confirmed. Because no potency is limited and determined except by some act informing it; consequently, it is not appropriated to anything except by that act, since by this appropriation it is limited and restricted. But first matter is simply potency; therefore it receives no determination or appropriation except by some act informing it. Therefore, since matter is the principle of individuation only when marked by quantity determining and appropriating it to this composite rather than that one, it follows that quantity, by determining it, gives this to matter by the mode of an informing form; from which, together with matter, one accidental composite arises. Each of the two consequences appears clear, at least the minor. The major follows as well. As long as potency is informed and actualized by an act in a particular way, it is indifferent and undetermined with respect to all things, and cannot be appropriated to this composite in preference to that one.

71 Nor does it matter if one says that matter marked by quantity means matter itself, not indeed as actually informed by quantity, but as having an order toward this quantity rather than that one, or as radically containing it, or as having a connection with this quantity more than with that one. For in order that one matter be considered divided from another and limited to this composite rather than that one, the aforesaid order, containment, or connection suffices. From Aristotle’s statement that the act is what distinguishes or limits, we understand this to refer either to an act or to an order toward an act.

The opposite, however, is urged. First, matter is indifferent with respect to this quantity rather than that one to be preferred; therefore, if nothing is added to it, there is no reason why it should prefer one quantity to another. Secondly, as Nazarius argues, for quantity, or any other accident, to be in the mere potency or causality of matter is to be indistinctly in it, and therefore to be there in a manner disproportionate to causing distinction.

72 Finally, quantity is in a certain sense from itself and by its own proper merits, as from the first root, the principle of material individuation, at least insofar as it is divided from every other thing, as we shall say in the following disputation, no. 24. Therefore matter cannot be the root of the individuation of the composite, at least insofar as it is divided, unless it participates in quantity and is actually informed by it. The consequence is clear. Because what is such from itself and by its own proper merits has the reason of what is such, so that either it itself or that which actually participates in it must be such.

Nor will it suffice to say that quantity is in a certain sense the first principle of individuation insofar as it is divided, and that matter marked by quantity, as it is said to contain this quantity rather than that one by the mode of a first root, is the first root of individuation, even if it is not actually informed by it. For by that very fact the entire series of the principles of individuation is reduced to quantity itself insofar as the aforesaid effect is concerned.

73 Against this it is urged that a substantial composite has the reason of the individual not virtually but formally. Therefore its first and fundamental principle of individuation must be formally singular, and formally have the reason of such a principle, not merely virtually. Thus, if quantity is once the first source of individuation insofar as it is divided, this must belong to it according to its formal being and according to its being a form actually informing the thing that is individuated by it, or divided from every other thing. The antecedent appears clear. The first consequence follows from the antecedent. Because although what is formally such can arise in the genus of an efficient cause from a principle virtually such, it cannot do so in the genus of a material or formal cause, as happens here. Thus, because man is formally vegetative, the rational soul is formally that by which he is vegetative.

The last consequence follows from the preceding one. Because just as, from the fact that fire is hot by nature and all other things are hot by participation from it, nothing can be formally hot unless it either is fire or participates in what formally makes it hot according to formal being, namely formally such heat actually informing it; so, if quantity is once the first root of individuation insofar as it is divided, whatever is formally material and formally singular, and formally divided from another, not merely virtually, must be quantity, or have quantity, whereby something is formally quantitative, namely actually inhering quantity.

§ II. The negative position, more conformed to Aristotle and St. Thomas, is preferred.

74 Nevertheless, it must be said that matter marked by quantity, understood as a composite arising from matter and quantity itself, as from an actually inhering and informing form, is not the first principle and root of the individuation of form, or of the substantial composite; and consequently that this individuation does not include quantity according to its formal being, as something intrinsically constituting a substantial individual. Thus Aristotle in the Predicaments, where, having compared first substance, or the substantial individual, with second substances, calls it most truly substance. If the aforesaid individual included quantity in its concept as an intrinsically constituting form, then first substances, especially when compared with second substances, would not be called most truly substances, but rather the contrary; for second substances do not include in their concept any accident as an inhering and constituting form, whereas first substances do.

The Angelic Doctor also holds this in opusculum 70 on Boethius, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2. Having objected to himself: The Philosopher says, 4 Metaphysics, that the same thing is the cause of the substance and of unity; but accidents are not the cause of the substance of an individual; therefore neither are they the cause of unity or of numerical plurality. He replies: In answer to the second, dimensions, since they are accidents per se, cannot be the principle of the individual unity of substance; but matter, insofar as it is subject to such dimensions, is understood to be the principle of such unity and multitude. If quantity were the root of the individuation of the whole substantial composite, by the mode of an inhering form intrinsically constituting it, then quantity itself, taken according to its formal being, would be called the cause of individual substance; and, by itself, or with greater right than matter itself insofar as it is subject to such dimensions, or, which is the same as will appear more fully from what follows, insofar as it is laid beneath it as a root or radically contains it, would be called the principle of purely numerical unity and multitude.

75 The holy Doctor taught the same in opusculum 29, where, speaking of those things that belong essentially to the individual and those that belong to it by reason of quantity according to its formal being and its comparison as an inhering form intrinsically constituting the accidental composite already mentioned, he says: For the individual among sensible things is itself the ultimate in the genus of substance, predicated of no other thing; indeed, it is itself first substance according to the Philosopher in the Predicaments, and the first foundation of all others. For matter alone—though this will be explained more fully below at no. 91 onward—is the principle of individuation insofar as the reason of the first in the genus of substance is preserved in it; but this cannot be found without body and quantity. And therefore determined quantity is called the principle of individuation, not because it causes its subject, which is first substance, in any way, but because it accompanies it inseparably and determines it here and now; what therefore falls under the particular reason is this something by the nature of matter, whereas what falls under the external sense is by quantity.

St. Thomas asserted this same point in opusculum 32, ch. 3, where, speaking of matter marked by quantity as a composite arising from matter as subject and dimensions as an intrinsic formal cause intrinsically constituting it, he says: It is said that matter under certain dimensions is the cause of individuation, not because dimensions cause the individual, since an accident does not cause its subject; but because through certain dimensions the individual is demonstrated here and now, as by its proper sign, inseparable from it. Yet, as is clear from what has been said, quantity is not taken in this way when matter marked by quantity is said to be the first and radical reason of individuation, and not merely its sign; this will be explained in doubt 5.

The same was taught by the holy Doctor: When form is received in matter with all dimensions circumscribed by the intellect, something results that exists in the genus of substance and is ultimate, having complete reason of an individual in substance, but it cannot be demonstrated here and now without determined and certain dimensions.

Accordingly, this position is followed by Flandria, 7 Metaphysics, q. 29, a. 4; Capreolus, 2, d. 3, q. 1, a. 3, insofar as he asserts that substance without actually inhering quantity is individual even insofar as it is divided; though not having individuation in the way it now has it, namely sensibly; although in the same article he also inclines toward the opposite opinion. Ægidius, Quodlibeta 1, q. 5, a. 1; Javellus, 5 Metaphysics, q. 15; Zumel, 1 part., q. 3, a. 2, De principio individuationis, conclusion 2; Gonzalez, 1 part., q. 11, a. 1, d. 23; Báñez, 1 part., q. 3, a. 2; Suárez, 1 tomus Metaphysicae, d. 5, sect. 3, no. 10 and following; Cajetan, 1 part., q. 29, a. 1, where he strongly attacks the opposite position, saying that it is chimerical to separate in reality those acts that constitute and distinguish a substantial and material individual from every other thing. Finally, several disciples of St. Thomas defend this, as Ferrara and Nazarius report in the places cited, and many others.

76 This assertion could be proved from St. Thomas by a twofold reason. But because the first also proves that, in St. Thomas’s way, matter marked by quantity cannot be understood as matter actualized by some still substantial mode, distinct from matter by its very nature, through which it is determined toward this quantity rather than that one; and because there will be a special difficulty about this in the following doubt, we shall adduce it in the preceding doubt. We shall recommend this assertion by the sole reason touched by St. Thomas in the cited opusculum 32, reduced to this brief form. Because material first substance is one per se posited in the category of substance as the foundation of the others in this category, it is not constituted in the being of first substance, or substance, by any accident, namely quantity as an inhering form intrinsically constituting it in the being of an individual. The consequence is clear, because otherwise first substance would be being by accident, since it would consist of things of different categories, namely substance and quantity as an inhering and constituting form.

77 This is confirmed and explained. Because what belongs to a category, especially if it is the foundation of the others in that category, cannot be constituted by something outside the category; otherwise it would both be and not be outside that category, because the thing constituted cannot fail to belong to the category of its constitutive principle. Since first substance, as such, belongs to the category of substance as the foundation of the whole category, it is repugnant for it to be constituted in its being as such, or in the being of first substance, by something outside its proper category, namely by quantity.

This is confirmed secondly. Because in the former account, in which matter is presupposed for the actual reception of substantial form and actually existing quantity, the aforesaid matter must be singular and individual, so that it is this and not that. For those singular forms are not received in common matter, but in singular matter, namely this and not that. Therefore matter will not have the being this, and consequently will not be the root of individuation, even insofar as it is divided, insofar as it is actually subject to quantity, or actualized by quantity as an inhering form intrinsically constituting a substantial individual, or matter itself as individual and the principle of individuation. The consequence is clear, because what belongs to something by reason of another, as an inhering form intrinsically constituting it, cannot belong to it in the former account, in which it is presupposed for such a form.

§ III. The evasions of adversaries and their exclusion.

78 Ferrara first meets this reason, both its first argument and its second confirmation. To the first reason and its first confirmation, he says that two things belong to individual unity: to be undivided in itself by the ultimate division, or to be incommunicable; and to be divided in the same way from every other thing. The first belongs to the essence of the said unity and individual, whereas the latter has the character of a property of it. Therefore, from the fact that quantity constitutes the said unity and individual, insofar as it is divided from every other thing, by the mode of an inhering and intrinsically constituting form, it does not follow that a substantial individual, taken essentially, is not one per se, but merely lacks the said unity insofar as it is constituted together with its properties.

In answer to the second confirmation, he says that causes are causes of one another. Thus, although in the former account quantity is not presupposed in the genus of a material cause first receptive per se, it is presupposed in the genus of a formal cause disposing it for the reception of this form and not that one. Thus matter and the whole composite can be the cause of individuation insofar as it is divided in the same genus.

79 Nevertheless, neither solution satisfies. Not the first. Because the fact that it is undivided in itself by the ultimate division belongs to the constitution of the individual as such means that it cannot fail in reality to belong to that same constitution insofar as it is divided in the same way from every other thing, although the former reason precedes the latter in some way. The antecedent is proved. Because, as the Philosophers commonly teach with Aristotle and St. Thomas, the constitutive and the distinctative of a thing are the same in reality. Therefore, the fact that being individual belongs in reality to the intrinsic constitution of the individual as such means that it cannot fail to belong in reality to the same constitution, namely being divided from every other thing. Thus, if quantity gives being divided through the mode of an inhering form, it will belong to the intrinsic constitution of that same individual. Indeed, quantity itself will be what gives in reality the being undivided in itself, or incommunicable, through which the individual is constituted, at least inadequately, in the first place.

This is confirmed first. Because belonging to the intrinsic constitution of essential and specific unity cannot fail to belong to constituting the species and distinguishing it specifically from every other thing. Thus, whatever specifically distinguishes an essence from every other thing also in reality constitutes it. Therefore, the same proportional reasoning must be applied to individual unity, as appears from the parity of reason. Consequently, if quantity distinguishes material substance numerically through the mode of an inhering form, it will constitute it in the same way; and by that very fact such unity will be accidental unity, as has been shown.

80 This is confirmed and explained secondly. Because that which makes the individual incommunicable and constitutes matter itself as incommunicable to another form and composite, either can, considered in itself and precisely, be in another matter and composite apart from this, namely insofar as it makes the individual and incommunicable; or it cannot. If the first, it therefore cannot intrinsically constitute this individual and this matter in the being of one numerically such; for what can be found in another individual and constitutes it as such cannot in the first place constitute that individual in the being of an individual; otherwise that individual reason would both exist and not exist as proper to its individual, which plainly involves a contradiction. If the second is said, then that which makes matter and the individual incommunicable makes them distinct from every other thing, since an individual has something real constitutive of itself which cannot be found in anything else, and therefore cannot fail to be distinguished from every other thing by its own proper merits. For we infer nowhere else that specific differences are sufficient reasons for being one species rather than another, except because one of them belongs to one species as its intrinsic constituent, so that it cannot be found in another. Therefore, preserving proportion, we shall infer the same concerning the incommunicable being that constitutes one individual, for the reason just stated.

Moreover, even if we grant that individual unity insofar as it is divided has the character of a property of the individual insofar as it is undivided, and that it in the former sense proceeds from another principle really distinct, it still could not arise from quantity as from an inhering and intrinsically constituting form. Thus, being divided, if it proceeds from quantity, could not fail to come to individual and substantial unity accidentally, since it would presuppose that unity completely, both insofar as it is incommunicable and insofar as it is divided.

81 The reason why, even in that event, the said unity insofar as it is divided could not proceed from quantity as the first principle of which we speak, is this. Because two substantial individuals, as such, cannot fail to be distinguished by a formally substantial distinction, that is, a distinction exercised not only in substance, and therefore substantial in the material, in the common sense in which substance has substantial entitative parts from quantity, but substantial in the formal. But a distinction formal as well as substantial cannot proceed from an accident as from an inhering form and the intrinsic reason of such distinction. The major is proved. Otherwise there would be no formally substantial distinction between those individuals, and thus, considered formally as to substances, the individual substance of Judas the traitor’s humanity and of Christ the Lord’s humanity would be exactly the same; and thus exactly the same individual substance, considered precisely as to substances, although not as to quantities, would be crucified in hell and blessed in heaven, and united to the person of the Word and to the created person of Judas. Just as material substance under one quantity has only substantial entitative parts formally from quantity, as from an inhering form intrinsically constituting it in the being divisible into such quantitative parts, so the same substance, considered precisely as to substances, is not actually formally substantially distinguished from itself under different parts of quantity; but precisely in reality, actually, and substantially, it is under the aforesaid parts of quantity, from which it has parts not formally substantial, but formally quantitative and materially substantial, as our Complutensians teach more fully in On Generation, d. 5, from no. 32 to no. 95, especially no. 57. Our Complutensians teach this very keenly.

The minor follows clearly from what the cited disputation from On Generation, no. 58, adduces. Because quantity is an accident, it cannot through the mode of an intrinsic or inhering formal cause give any formally substantial effect; for an intrinsic or inhering formal cause causes nothing except by giving itself. Consequently, if it is an accidental form, it can give only accidental being; and therefore cannot give a formally substantial distinction.

82 Therefore, the solution employed by Nazarius in the cited controversy also falls, namely that the major proposition, that the constitutive and the distinctive are the same in reality, must be understood of the formal rather than the radical principle, which quantity is insofar as concerns the present. This solution easily falls from what has just been said. First, because the fact that a radical principle constitutes something in such a way that it cannot constitute anything else means that it cannot fail to distinguish that thing from every other thing which cannot be constituted by such a principle. Secondly, because in this manner of speaking no substantial principle is assigned from which the formally substantial distinction of individuals proceeds.

83 Ferrara’s solution to the second confirmation likewise does not satisfy. First, because, as our Complutensians teach in On Generation, d. 2, from no. 105 to no. 108, matter insofar as it receives this form rather than that one is prior simpliciter and absolutely to the fact that this numerical quantity is actually received and informs it. For this actually received and informing quantity is not required in order that this form be received simpliciter, but in order that matter receive the aforesaid form connaturally. Therefore, in the former account, in which precisely all requirements for receiving this numerical substantial form absolutely and simply, and not another, are presupposed, and in which the individual and singular is presupposed, it cannot have its individuation from quantity as from an informing and actually inhering form. Consequently, the aforesaid individuation cannot in any way be derived from that same quantity considered in the said way.

Secondly, because even supernaturally a substantial individual can be separated from quantity and subsist in the nature of things; therefore, with greater reason, there can be something prior in which matter is pre-intelligible as receiving this numerical form and not that one, and in which this substantial composite and not that one is pre-intelligible as absolutely and simply independent of this quantity rather than that one, as actually received and informing. The consequence appears clear. The antecedent follows from the fact that the rational soul is individuated through matter marked by quantity, as we said at no. 16, and is sufficiently clear from what was said in favor of our position in difficulty 1 of this disputation. Yet it is not required that the aforesaid matter be actually informed by the numerical quantity by which it is said to be marked.

84 Secondly, there are other arguments that press our fundamental reason in order to prove it to the utmost: that a composite arising from quantity and matter, actually receiving it as a whole, is not the root of individuation, if the composite is taken so as to mean quantity directly, actually inhering and received; otherwise, however, if it means it indirectly. For nothing prevents a thing posited in the direct and substantial category from being one per se, even though it includes something outside its proper category indirectly. Thus, although being divided from every other thing intrinsically belongs to a substantial individual, the aforesaid being can, despite the per se unity of that same individual, proceed from quantity in the said way.

Nevertheless, this solution does not weaken St. Thomas’s reason. Although it does not remove the per se unity of a thing belonging to one category, while concerning it indirectly and as connoting something extrinsic belonging to another category, it is otherwise if it brings that thing as an indirect and intrinsically connotated term, at least by which it is intrinsically constituted indirectly. Therefore, it is repugnant for a substantial composite to be one per se if, at least indirectly, it is constituted in the being of an individual by actually inhering quantity. The consequence is clear, because quantity cannot fail to be, according to this mode of speaking, an intrinsically connotated and indirect term constituting this substantial individual in the being divided from every other thing.

The antecedent is proved. First, because accidents in the abstract belong per se directly to their proper categories, and each of them has its unity per se, because although they say something outside their proper category, at least indirectly, namely substance, insofar as they are things of being, that is, of substance, they nevertheless bring it as an indirect extrinsic term, and one that, even indirectly, does not intrinsically constitute them. Thus accidents are something constituted, or formed, from substance as from an indirect intrinsic term, and from the accidents themselves in the proportional way in which a person is said to be intrinsically constituted by personality directly and by nature indirectly. Likewise, therefore, the same accidents in the concrete do not belong directly to their proper category, as our Complutensians teach in Logic, d. 5 and d. 11, no. 60, because whiteness, for example, is said on the part of the mode of signification to imply a subject as an indirect intrinsic term.

Secondly, because what involves two whole and complete essences directly directed to different categories cannot be one per se, whether it brings both directly or one directly and the other indirectly. The reason why things of different categories cannot be one per se is that two whole and total things cannot coalesce into one per se intrinsically constituted from them. It is clear that by importing something indirectly, nothing is removed from its own totality and integrity.

85 Moreover, if quantity, imported indirectly and as actually inhering, can once be the root of individuation through the mode of an intrinsic, indirect term, much more can it be so through the mode of an extrinsic indirect term, which can really inhere but does not actually inhere or inform. The reason appears clear. Because it is prior that matter should radically be able to receive this quantity rather than another, or should radically contain it rather than actually receive it and be informed by it. Matter, according to what it has precisely from that prior, then first has the being this and singular; for by nothing else prior to itself can it first be singular and individual in radical potency toward this quantity rather than that one, or, as the root of this quantity rather than that one. Therefore, precisely from the force of that prior, it will be the root of individuation with greater right; and consequently it will have the reason of such a root with greater right, connoting the aforesaid quantity as an extrinsic term which can really inhere but does not actually inhere.

The first consequence from both premises is clear. For matter is the root of individuation with greater right from the force whereby it is first understood as this and positively singular, which indeed belongs to it from the force it has in that prior. The second consequence clearly follows from this prior. Because matter, from the force it has in that prior, connotes quantity, not indeed as an intrinsic and actually inhering term, but as extrinsic, and one that can really inhere; therefore, if it is the root of individuation with greater right according to what it has in that prior, it will consequently be the root of that individuation with greater right by connoting quantity as an extrinsic rather than intrinsic term, in the said way.

§ IV. The first argument in favor of the first position is solved.

86 Because the first argument in favor of the first position, and its confirmation by difficult testimonies, it seemed good, in honor of Aristotle and the holy Doctor and so that their meaning might be clearer, to solve those arguments separately.

To the first testimony of the aforesaid argument, it is answered that, as will be clear from what we shall adduce at no. 116, when the holy Doctor says in the first testimony that matter marked by quantity is understood as matter under certain dimensions, he is not speaking of it insofar as it is actually subject to them, but insofar as it is their foundation and root, and insofar as by the mode of a root it contains these dimensions rather than those. Thus, it is not necessary that the aforesaid matter be actually informed by quantity, but it is enough that it have a radical potency through which it demands to be informed by this quantity rather than that one. Why matter, prior to the aforesaid quantity and to the substantial form itself, should contain these dimensions rather than those by the mode of a root has already been explained by our Complutensian College in On Generation, d. 2, from no. 88 to no. 92, and will be explained more fully in this same disputation at no. 133 and following.

To the second testimony of the same argument, it is clear from what has been said how the holy Doctor is not speaking of quantity actually possessed, but contained in matter as in a root. For although without it the individuation of the substantial composite cannot be found, nevertheless it can well be found without it.

87 To the third testimony in favor of the same first argument, with Capreolus in 2, d. 3, q. 1, a. 3, it must be denied that St. Thomas intended there that whiteness, for example, could not be separated from quantity insofar as its individuation is considered precisely and intrinsically; but only that the same whiteness, insofar as it is this whiteness sensibly, could not exist without quantity, as will be clear from the following explanation of the holy Doctor’s context.

For, having asked there whether whiteness, or another bodily quality, could be separated by God from every quantity, he replies that, in order to know this, it must be presupposed that in whiteness, and in every other bodily quality, two things are to be considered: its own nature, by which it has its species, and its individuation, insofar as it is this perceptible whiteness distinct from another perceptible whiteness. With this presupposed, he says that by divine miracle the nature of whiteness could subsist without any quantity; yet that whiteness would not be like this perceptible whiteness.

This, therefore, is his meaning. First, this whiteness can be separated from quantity insofar as its intrinsic and indispensable individuation is concerned; otherwise it could not according to its nature subsist by divine miracle without quantity, since, according to the common opinion of the Philosophers, and especially of St. Thomas, whatever can subsist on the part of the thing by divine power must be something singular. Secondly, it cannot be separated from quantity insofar as the extrinsic individuation of that same whiteness is concerned, namely insofar as its singularity in the reason of perceptible singularity, or as externally perceptible sense. For nothing can be perceived by that sense unless it be quantitative. Thus, although in the words quoted in the argument it seems to be said absolutely that whiteness cannot be individual unless it be in some subject, at least in quantity, he is speaking of the individuation of whiteness as explained. In this way all that the holy Doctor teaches there are mutually consistent, and the decision of the article corresponds to what he presupposed for its decision.

88 Nor does it matter that St. Thomas immediately added that whiteness thus separated would be a certain intelligible form, after the manner of the separated forms posited by Plato. This is irrelevant. Because the holy Doctor’s meaning is not to equate separated whiteness in every respect with those ideas, so as to be universal in being as they are; since, according to his own opinion, he asserted that whiteness can according to its nature subsist by divine miracle without any quantity; and, as we said recently, in St. Thomas’s way only singular things can subsist, even supernaturally. But he equated whiteness existing and individual in that event with those ideas only insofar as it is not a perceptible form and is abstracted from perceptible, though not from intelligible, matter, as those Platonic ideas were abstracted from intelligible, not from perceptible, matter. For the same reason and in the same sense, the same holy Doctor said in the answer to the first that if whiteness were without quantity, it would no longer be a bodily quality, but a spiritual one, namely a spirituality precisely opposed to sensible materiality; because quantity actually underlying whiteness is required only to make it individual by sensible individuation. Therefore the holy Doctor immediately said: But this perceptible whiteness cannot be individual without quantity.

89 Nor does it matter if, secondly, one objects that St. Thomas there distinguishes quantity from whiteness because quantity is in a certain sense individuated from itself, that is, in a certain sense not through substance, as will be explained below; whereas whiteness is not individuated from itself, but from its subject. Therefore, since quantity can remain individual for this reason, insofar as it is intrinsic and indispensable to individuation, it follows that, for the opposite reason, whiteness cannot remain individual even insofar as it is necessary to individuation considered absolutely, if separated from quantity; and thus it cannot be separated from it.

This is therefore irrelevant. For St. Thomas intended only to establish a distinction between sensible quantity and its sensible individuation, and between the sensible individuation of whiteness, in that the sensible individuation of whiteness cannot be found without its subject, namely quantity. Because whiteness can be seen by the bodily eye only when it is divisible; and since it becomes divisible only by reason of quantity, in which it actually is, it follows that it can be perceived only when it is in quantity. Consequently, it cannot have sensible individuation in any other event.

90 Nevertheless, quantity is divisible into parts from itself; and therefore, even when separated from substance, it can have sensible individuation and be informed by accidents that make it perceptible. Thus, the holy Doctor did not conclude at the end of the passage that this quantity could exist by miracle without a subject; he said that this sensible quantity could exist by miracle even without a subject, as is clear in the body of Christ. Nevertheless, because quantity cannot in any event have individuation as perceptible unless it first has individuation absolutely such as to render it perceptible, although the latter is not sufficient even though it is prerequisite to the former, St. Thomas presupposed that prior distinction between quantity and whiteness according to which quantity is in a certain sense individual from itself, whereas whiteness is not. Not that he denied that whiteness could be individual by an absolutely such individuation even if separated from quantity, though not from the order toward quantity; but in order to show how quantity, because it has individuation in a certain sense from itself, that is, in a certain sense neither through substance nor through order toward it, insofar as it has parts having position, can be separated from substance so as to remain individual by sensible individuation; whereas whiteness cannot.

§ V. The two confirmations of the first argument are met.

To the first confirmation it is answered, first, that the meaning of the holy Doctor’s words is not that the distinction from others belonging to the substantial composite, as this and as individual, proceeds from quantity as actually possessed and informing, but from quantity as contained. This will be clear from what we shall say at no. 116. Thus quantity, as actually communicated to the composite—not indeed according to its formal being, but as contained in matter—is required for the individuation of that same composite as such, and insofar as it is divided.

91 Nor does it matter if one objects that this solution cannot be reconciled with the context of the holy Doctor, in which, just as he attributes to quantity that it is the root of the individuation of the composite insofar as it is divided, so he attributes to matter that it is the radical principle of the same individuation insofar as it is incommunicable. The antecedent seems certain. For if quantity, according to its formal being and as actually possessed, is not the root of the aforesaid distinction, but only as contained in matter as from its first root, then matter will be the root of such distinction only insofar as marked by the aforesaid quantity, or insofar as containing it. For matter containing this quantity, or quantity contained in it, is nothing other than matter marked by quantity, with the marking required for individuation. Therefore nothing remains as the root of this individuation insofar as it is incommunicable except matter itself according to itself. Since this openly conflicts with the nature of matter taken in itself—which, according to this reason, is no more proper to this individual than to that—St. Thomas’s assertion in the context of the aforesaid testimony cannot be saved: namely, that just as being divided proceeds from quantity, so being incommunicable, or being undivided in itself by the ultimate division, proceeds from matter.

The answer is that in reality both functions are performed by matter marked by quantity, and indeed by the same really existing principle, namely matter itself as radically containing quantity within itself, as is clear from the reasons adduced in favor of the assertion. Nevertheless, it may be that being incommunicable can be attributed absolutely to matter by a certain accommodation, and being divided to quantity. The reason for this accommodation and attribution of being incommunicable to matter follows from what has been said. For individuation insofar as it is incommunicable means the negation of its incommunicability, by which a universal is communicated to something else as to a subject of inferiority and predication; and thus it means the negation of being in another as in the said subject. Hence, when this reason is to be attributed by accommodation to something else as the first physical principle, it is rightly attributed absolutely to first matter. It belongs to its reason that it is in no way in another as in a prior subject, because it belongs to its reason to be the first subject, although in reality it is not the root of the aforesaid incommunicability unless it contains this numerical quantity rather than that one.

The reason for the accommodation and attribution of being divided from others to quantity is this. In matter marked by quantity, or containing this quantity by the mode of a root, quantity itself is included as radically contained. Because it is proper to quantity to have, in a certain sense, being individual from itself, and to have being divided from itself, insofar as by its own proper merits it has distinction and division of parts, and being divisible in the pure sense of the same, as we shall explain at no. 21 and following, d. 2, therefore quantity is attributed absolutely speaking the condition of being the root of the individuation of the substantial composite insofar as it is divided from others. In reality, however, it does not at present produce the effect necessarily required for individuation except as contained in matter itself; and consequently it does not give that effect except insofar as matter contains it as its root.

92 Caietan explained this very well in 1 part., q. 29, a. 1. After saying that matter containing this quantity rather than that one is the root of individuation insofar as it is undivided in itself, or incommunicable, and likewise insofar as it is divided from others, he immediately added, in order to explain how quantity is nevertheless attributed absolutely the condition of being the root of individuation insofar as it is divided: Nevertheless I deny that any of the greatest statements of Aristotle and St. Thomas is thereby denied, namely that numerical material distinction first belongs to quantity, and consequently to the others through it, according to the doctrine of the Posterior Analytics; for participating in the nature to which something first belongs can occur in many ways. Nor need that nature be formally preserved in all its participants, as we showed in the first book of the Posterior Analytics. Matter, which is the root and foundation of quantity, is not in that former state even an external participant in the nature of quantity; indeed, to speak more accurately, it quasi-contains the nature of quantity. Since containing is greater than participating, those that quasi-contain a nature can produce its effect so much more than those that merely participate in it. For every effect first belonging to something must be produced by it in itself, or by its participants or quasi-containers. Or, as Báñez says in explaining these words of Cajetan, 1 On Generation, ch. 5, q. 3, a. 8, for an effect to be preserved in something, it suffices that it be reduced to it according to formal being, or to those formally participating in it, or finally to something in which it is radically and virtually contained.

93 Nor does it matter if, to show the insufficiency of the foundation assigned in the order of attribution and accommodation, one urges that, because the light of glory and the created intellect produce the beatific vision by the mode of one indivisible principle, and nevertheless vision is attributed absolutely to the intellect according to the common reason of intellectual vision, and the vision of God as it is in itself is attributed absolutely to the light, the intellect must have in itself a power toward the common reason of intellectual vision, and the light must also have in itself a power toward the same vision as it is God’s. If once they did not have the aforesaid power, the aforesaid effects could not be attributed to them absolutely through that attribution and accommodation. Therefore, since matter taken precisely in itself cannot be the root of individuation insofar as it is incommunicable, it follows that it cannot be granted absolutely, even through the explained attribution and accommodation, that it is the root of the aforesaid incommunicability.

The answer is, first, that the attribution and accommodation of effects are not always made to their causes on the same basis. Therefore, granting that for the attribution made with respect to the intellect and the light of glory the foundation mentioned in the objection must be found, it does not follow that this is true for every attribution whatsoever; for the present, the foundation and reason we have given for each of these attributions suffices, as is clear from what we have adduced from Cajetan. Likewise, speaking universally of attribution and accommodation, we see that in some chapters some things are attributed to different things, even though the thing possessed is altogether the same. Thus we see that, because of a foundation very different from those enumerated, omnipotence is attributed to the Father in the divine Trinity, essential wisdom to the Son, and essential love also to the Holy Spirit, although the same omnipotence, wisdom, and love belong essentially to all three persons.

Add that although the vision of God is attributed absolutely to the intellect according to the common reason of vision or intellection, the intellect is not by itself a sufficient principle of that vision considered in the said way. It necessarily requires, first, an intelligible species for causing it according to the aforesaid reason, as will be clear from what we shall say in the treatise On the vision of God, d. 2, no. 83; and, secondly, the light of glory, because no reason in the vision of God is not supernatural, and consequently none can be without a supernatural principle.

94 Secondly, in answer to the same confirmation—by which the whole preceding solution, especially its explanation of the reply just adduced, is further clarified—it is answered that, speaking not of those things which at present occur by the attribution and accommodation already explained, but of reality itself, without considering that accommodation, matter taken precisely, or considered without its containment of this quantity rather than that one, is not a sufficient principle and root of individuation insofar as it is incommunicable, or indivisible in itself by the ultimate division. Nevertheless, according to this reason it has the condition of the first root, although insufficient in itself with respect to the aforesaid incommunicability, because even according to this consideration it is one numerically in a negative way. Thus, although insofar as it is one by negative specific unity it is not even the first insufficient principle of individuation or specification, nevertheless, insofar as it is one numerically in a negative way, it can be the first, though insufficient, root of individuation.

95 This is explained. For numerical unity of the whole composite differs from specific unity because specific unity begins from positive specific unity and from the first and foundational principle of that unity, namely substantial form, since it is formal unity. Consequently, it must begin from a formal principle, although it must terminate in matter, which is one by negative specific unity, insofar as the latter is attributed positive specific unity.

Nevertheless, radical numerical unity begins from negative numerical unity. Because this numerical unity is material, it must arise as from the first root, although insufficient in itself, from matter according to what it has from itself, insofar as it is one numerically in a negative way. Therefore, it is not surprising that being incommunicable proceeds from matter according to the distinction and mode already explained, although it does not proceed from matter as from a sufficient principle; and that from the same matter, as containing this quantity rather than that one, there arises the same individuation insofar as it is divided. This solution is taken from St. Thomas, opusculum 32, ch. 3, and is indicated by Capreolus in 2 Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 3, against Scotus’s argument, and by Durand in the third place against the second conclusion.

96 The whole account can be clarified by the example of intellection used in the preceding solution. Intellection, as intellection, proceeds from the first principle, the intellect; and according to its specification it derives its origin as from the first root, the intelligible species. Not that the intelligible species alone is sufficient to influence the aforesaid specification without the intellect; nor that the intellect alone without the species is sufficient to produce the same intellection as intellection. Rather, the first root, so to speak, of reaching intellection as such is the intellect, although insufficient by itself; and the first root of reaching it according to its specification is the intelligible species. Nor does it matter if one urges that, if this were so and St. Thomas had spoken in this sense in the aforesaid testimony, he could have said for the same reason that being divided from others by the ultimate division also proceeds from matter. In reality, matter is the first, though insufficient, root of that distinction by which one substantial individual is purely numerically substantially distinguished from another; for something is distinguished from another in the same mode in which it is constituted.

97 The answer concedes the consequence. Nevertheless, St. Thomas spoke more appropriately when, in the first part of that testimony, he expressly assigned only the insufficient principle of incommunicability; and in the second part he adduced the first and sufficient principle of distinction from every other thing, into which all other principles are reduced. Since in his doctrine the constitutive and the distinctive are the same, it follows that in this artificial manner of speaking he expressly assigned in the first part of the testimony the insufficient principle of indivision in itself, or incommunicability, through which the individual is primarily constituted, and implicitly and virtually also the insufficient principle of distinction from another. Similarly, in the second part of the same testimony, he expressly adduced the sufficient principle already mentioned of distinction from every other thing, and implicitly and virtually also the sufficient principle of incommunicability, or of ultimate indivision, primarily constitutive of the individual.

To the second confirmation initially adduced, once the antecedent is granted absolutely insofar as its first part and its second part in the explained sense, namely concerning quantity as radically contained in matter, the consequence must be denied. For the consequence to be true, it would be necessary that the antecedent be true insofar as its second part, even if quantity were understood according to its formal being and as an inhering form. Thus, it is sufficient for the individuation of the composite that matter containing this quantity rather than that one be communicated to it. By this, the remaining points brought in the same confirmation are sufficiently established.

§ VI. The other arguments for the contrary position are dissolved.

98 To the second argument drawn from reason, the major must be distinguished virtually: Unless it itself is divided from another part of matter—that is, unless it is distinguished from it in the mode by which one integral or entitative part of the same reason is distinguished from another, or two integral wholes are distinguished and divided from each other—must be denied; unless it itself is divided from another part of matter—that is, unless it is distinguished from another in the mode by which a subjective or quasi-subjective part is distinguished and divided from another—must be granted. And then the minor, understood in the former sense, must be granted, but denied in the latter. Finally, both consequences must be denied, because for both to be true it would be necessary that the major be true in the first sense and the minor in the second.

This is explained. For there is a twofold kind of parts and wholes. Some are entitative and integral parts of the same reason, corresponding to a continuous whole; others are subjective or quasi-subjective parts of the same reason, corresponding to a universal or quasi-universal and atomic whole. These parts are nothing else than several individuals, or singular parts of one individual differing only numerically, contained atomically under a species or quasi-species. They are called subjective parts because a whole, or quasi-universal whole, is divided into them as into things inferior to it and subjects participating in the same, or at least in some way the same, atomic nature. Although it may happen that each part, or each of these inferior or quasi-inferior things, is an actual whole in itself, it may nevertheless lack entitative and integral parts of the same reason. Thus, two things can be distinguished either in the mode by which one integral part is distinguished from another, and consequently, after division, can be distinguished and divided as two integral wholes; or in the mode by which one subjective part of the same reason, contained under some species or quasi-species, is co-distinguished and divided from another.

99 Therefore, although matter may be distinguished from another part of matter by the mode of an entitative and integral part, or may be divided from another matter—which is otherwise a quasi-subjective part—in the mode by which one integral whole containing a plurality of integral parts continuous with one another is distinguished and divided from another similar whole, this may proceed from quantity as from an inhering and informing form. Because substance has no entitative or integral parts from itself, except only by reason of quantity, as an intrinsic form, as our Complutensians explain in On Generation, d. 5, no. 32 through no. 95. Nevertheless, that one matter is distinguished from another in the mode by which one subjective or quasi-subjective part is distinguished and divided from another similar subjective or quasi-subjective part is not the formal effect of quantity as an inhering form. Thus, neither such a part nor the distinction and division of it from another requires that the part so distinguished and divided contain within itself a multitude of entitative parts composing one and the same entitative whole. That would, however, be necessary if such a subjective part were divided from another by quantity as an actually inhering form. The condition of such a part can be found without determined inhering and actually possessed quantity, although not without a certain and determined quantity that is at least radically contained. For example, if God separated the substantial whole from quantity, as is clear is possible from what was said at nos. 87 and 88. Nevertheless, because for matter to be the principle and root of individuation, it is not required that it be distinguished from another part of matter as an integral part, or that the two be divided as a whole and an integral whole arising from the aforesaid parts in its substantial whole by reason of actually inhering quantity, as we shall explain more fully in the next number, and as is clear from what was said in favor of the assertion; but it is sufficient that those two matters be distinguished and divided as parts, whether subjective or quasi-subjective. Therefore, matter itself as the root of individuation does not mean quantity as an inhering form, nor that prior division, but only quantity as contained, and that latter division arising from the same matter containing this quantity rather than that one, or arising from the aforesaid quantity as contained.

100 To what St. Thomas adduces there, it must be said that it does not follow from the fact that matter is not the principle of individuation unless it is distinguishable, as the holy Doctor admits there, that is, unless according to the fact that it is this subjective or quasi-subjective part and not that one; and from the fact that matter is not divisible or distinguishable into entitative parts except by reason of quantity as an inhering form, as the Angelic Master also admits there and Aristotle’s testimony confirms, that matter becomes this and marked, and consequently this quasi-subjective part and not that one, according as it is under dimensions actually possessed and informing it in its substantial whole. Rather, this follows only according as, by the mode of a root, it has the force and radical potency to be under these dimensions rather than those.

The reason is clear from what has been said. From the fact that matter is not divisible into entitative parts of the same reason except by reason of quantity as an inhering form, it follows only that quantity is divisible from itself and according to its own reason into the aforesaid parts; and consequently that it is from itself, according to its own reason, in a certain sense individual, and according to another consideration of itself is the root of individuation with respect to material substance and its physical parts, as we touched on at no. 91 and shall explain at no. 21 and following in the following disputation. But from the fact that quantity itself, according to another consideration, is the first root of individuation with respect to the aforesaid substance and its physical parts, it does not follow that matter becomes this and marked, or this rather than that subjective or quasi-subjective part, according as it is actually informed by quantity and has entitative parts by its reason as an inhering form. It does not follow that, through quantity so taken and through the entitative parts it has from it, it is constituted as a part or quasi-part subjective under the species or quasi-species of sublunar matter, so as to become this and not that. Since, as is clear, the root of substantial individuation must be substantial, as the composite itself, this and individual, is substantial. It follows only that it becomes this and marked, and consequently this and not that subjective or quasi-subjective part, according as it radically contains quantity and, by the mode of the first radical potency, seeks this quantity rather than that one. Because, as we were saying, from the principle that quantity, insofar as it is the first reason for having entitative parts, must be the first reason for the individuation of matter, it is necessary that quantity in some way, whether actually possessed or contained, influence matter by the mode of a root. Since that individual is something substantial, it cannot be quantity as actually possessed, which is an accident, but as contained, according to which condition it is something substantial. By this, St. Thomas’s other testimonies there are sufficiently established in proportion. But these matters are explained more fully below.

101 From what will be said at no. 133 and following, it is clear how matter marked by quantity, according to what it necessarily imports insofar as it is the root of individuation, is not understood as matter to which something really distinct from matter is added directly. Rather, only something is added as a connotated and indirect term, namely this quantity rather than that one, not indeed actually received and possessed, but sought and owed, and not so that the aforesaid quantity is an intrinsic connotated term, but an extrinsic one. For just as, because God is the cause of creatures, virtually containing them, the creatures themselves are involved there, not as intrinsically but extrinsically connotated terms, with whom God as omnipotent has a connection; nor are the aforesaid creatures involved as actually made, but according to the reason of possibles, so must we philosophize in the present case, preserving proportion and having already indicated it.

The proof adduced there against this has no force. Because it is enough that an extrinsic connotated term be added to matter, sought and owed, and consequently future by the force of natural causes, though not indispensably, in order that matter may indeed be the root of individuation with it, although it cannot be the root without it. Because matter itself contains this quantity rather than that one, and consequently seeks to be under this substantial form and not that one. But this will be clearer from what will be said at the number recently cited and following, where it will be explained expressly how the same matter, without being intrinsically changed, can first contain this quantity and not that one according to what it has directly, and afterward that one and not this one.

102 The confirmation is answered well there. To the first argument to the contrary, what we said in the preceding number and shall say at no. 133 is clear. To the second argument, namely that an effect is precontained in its efficient cause in such a way that it is not more contained in this one than another, the mode of indistinct containment is expressed; but to be precontained in it as determined toward this effect rather than that one means that such an effect is in the aforesaid cause in a somewhat distinct, or determined, way. Thus, to say that quantity is precontained as in a root in first matter in such a way that it is no more contained there in this quantity than in that one expresses the mode of existing in it indistinctly or indeterminately. But to say that the aforesaid quantity is in it so that this quantity rather than that one is precontained in it and sought from it means that the aforesaid quantity is in the same matter in a somewhat distinct and determined way, as appears from the terms themselves.

The final objection is likewise answered well. To the argument to the contrary, it must be said that it would prove the intended conclusion if the individuation, so to speak, formally such as belongs to matter as the first root of individuation by reason of quantity—though this will be explained at no. 116 and following—and to the substantial composite, were not only formally such, but were also of the same atomic reason as the individuation of quantity itself. For then, once it were granted to quantity that it is the first root of the aforesaid individuation, matter could not fail to be this and individual by reason of quantity as an inhering form.

103 Nevertheless, although both matter and the substantial composite are, so to speak, formally something individual and singular—for formally is opposed to having the reason of individuation only virtually—nevertheless, they have an individuation of a different reason from the individuation of quantity itself, even though it is attributed to them, as to the first root, in the said sense and caused by it. Therefore, they ought not to be individual by reason of quantity as an inhering, formally, and intrinsically constituting form, but by reason of quantity as radically contained. Thus, the individuation of quantity according to its formal being and the individuation of matter and the composite are of different reasons. As if, impossibly, we were to give two heats formally such and specifically different, one of which would be such insofar as it virtually contains the other; then the contained heat could not formally and by the mode of an inhering form constitute the containing heat, otherwise they would not be specifically different; but at most it could belong in some way to the other insofar as it is virtually contained in it.