Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

Salmanticenses

Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

Salmanticenses

Collegii Salmanticensis Cursus Theologicus, tomus I

First published 1870

The Cursus Theologicus of the Discalced Carmelites of Salamanca (the 'Salmanticenses'), tomus I, in the 1870 Paris reprint. Contains the Prooemium and the three great treatises of this volume: De principio individuationis (a digression on the principle of individuation), De Visione Dei (in quaest. 12), and De Scientia Dei (in quaest. 14, including the extended rejection of middle knowledge). The edition prints St Thomas's Prima Pars text alongside; that text is not republished here.


Prooemium, and the Division of the whole Work

Num. 1. Since the Prooemium and the division of the whole work not a little conduce to the understanding of it, we therefore treat of both in the first place.

§ I. Why this whole work is titled Cursus Theologicus?.

Deservedly is this work titled Cursus Theologicus Summam Theologicam Angelici Doctoris D. Thom. complectens. For as the course of the arts is called Cursus, the metaphor being drawn from the act of running, by which we hurry forward and complete our journey in a short time; and it is called a course of Arts, that name being taken in the broader sense, according as it comprehends certain parts of philosophy, and therefore, so that this nomenclature be not dissonant from the thing which is designated by it, everything that is discussed in it ought to be treated briefly and succinctly, as far as is conveniently possible: so too this whole work is titled Cursus Theologicus. Theologicus, indeed, because treatises about God, or Theological treatises, are contained in it. Cursus, however, because the aforesaid treatises (although various and different, and elsewhere sufficiently diffuse, in which more than twelve volumes might deservedly be consumed), setting aside both many opinions of adversaries of little weight, and also not a few reasons of trifling weight against the true opinion, which are not drawn from the very entrails of D. Thomas, are distributed, briefly and succinctly as far as the matter treated of and its due division allow, into six volumes, just as that course of the arts is distributed into four, in this work: so that in this way this whole theological journey, which is otherwise the longest, and much longer, broader, and deeper than the journey of the arts, may be completed and run through in no long time: and thus this whole work may deservedly be marked with the name of a theological course, just as that course of the arts is marked with the title of a course.

Hence, just as in the course of the arts only those disputations are raised which are commonly circulated in the schools, although their guide, Aristotle, touched upon many others; so too this course, Theologicus, comprehending the Summa Theologica of the Angelic Doctor, will satisfy its office, if it has explained, out of the whole Summa Theologica of the same D. Thomas, all those questions and articles which are commonly treated of in the schools and usually dictated to students, and has raised those treatises and disputations needed for their more exact understanding, although the Prince of Theology, D. Thomas, has brought forward many others in his Summa Theologica. For as in the aforesaid course of the arts (let us persist in the example already adduced), the more difficult things having been discussed and explained, others are omitted, either because they are easy in themselves, or because, even if they would present difficulty in themselves, yet from the other, more difficult things already explained and accepted by the master, they can easily be learned, either by applying a little own effort and moderate labor: so too in the theological course, when all the more difficult questions of D. Thomas which are commonly circulated in the schools have been treated and explained, then deliberately the others will be omitted, either because they are easy in themselves, or because, even if they are difficult in themselves, yet once discussed, and submitted to examination along with all the others already treated, one can come to an understanding of them with easy effort, or with their own and moderate labor, and without the help of the master.

§ II. That this theological course and the course of the arts of our Complutensian College will be consonant with each other, and will mutually foster one another.

2 Now, since the course of the arts and the theological course are so coordinated with each other that the former precedes and prepares the way for the theological course, while the latter follows and is, as it were, the complement and the form of the former; let the former be as the morning star announcing the latter, and the latter, because it is theological and not because it is ours, be (so to speak) the sun following upon its own morning star: yet so that the one fosters the other, though under a different relation, and that each of them is necessary to the learned theologian, as it were to one who is being formed; the former indeed in the manner of a disposition, the latter in the manner, as it were, of a form: therefore this theological course, which the course of the arts of our Complutensian College of our Religion anticipated and levelled the way for, will be so joined with it, and they will mutually foster one another, as to be wholly consonant with each other and to have peace: and whatever has been explained and treated in the course of the arts, from which other theological difficulties either remain entirely evident or are deduced with the very greatest ease, will not be called again to examination in the theological course. Just as also those things which pertain to the course of the arts and were there omitted for just reasons, and which would greatly contribute to the theological treatises, will be discussed in this theological course.

§ III. Why in this work we do not begin from the explanation of the first and second question, 1 par., of D. Thomas, but from the third.

3 Hence a sufficient reason is given for several things. First indeed, why in this theological course we leave the prior and proemial question of the Angelic Doctor, and also the second annexed to it, untouched and unexplained. For what is principally usually discussed in that first question is this: what is the object of theology? whether it is itself a science? and whether it is one according to species? whether it is one simple quality? or whether it is subalterned to the science of the blessed? and what is required for this subalternation? and then how, with the subalternation to it and in the evidentness of the principles which it has, it is truly a science? and things of this kind. But these are quite clearly evident from those things which our Complutensian College has brought forward throughout, clearly and diffusely, in its Logica, disp. 19, and has applied in particular to Sacred Theology, explaining how God is its object and has an atomic unity. And therefore this theological course will abstain from discussing them again. Just as also those things which D. Thomas adduces in q. 2 are quite easy in themselves and do not require exposition, especially if we suppose those which are treated in the aforesaid disputation by our Complutensian College, and those which will be said by us in this volume 4; therefore we will not linger here.

4 Second, indeed, from what has been said a reason is given why this theological course should begin from the explanation of q. 3 of the Angelic Doctor, and this indeed for the two reasons already touched upon. First, because after the two prior questions, which we leave untouched for the reason stated, this third question follows in due order. And therefore, those having been set aside, the first place was due to this one, which introduces a special difficulty and demands a peculiar treatise for its explanation. Then, because in it is touched upon that greatest controversy about the principle of the individuation of material substance and of its accidents, and consequently about the principle of the purely individual distinction of any entity: which was deliberately omitted by our Complutensian College for just reasons, and in order to consult brevity; and which contributes greatly to many and very serious difficulties, and is usually treated of in the schools. And therefore this course, which ought to foster that course of the arts and to be fostered by it, could not but explain this third question of D. Thomas at least somewhat fully.

§ IV. Whence this whole work is to be divided, and what will be contained in its first and second volume?.

5 Third, then, from what has been said, it is deduced why and how this theological course, which is to be completed in six volumes, ought to be divided and cut into, as it were, distinct members. For, as we were saying recently, its object is God; and because the participation of knowledge must be according to the partition of the object, or its diverse consideration, therefore according to the diverse relations which we can discern in God, this course is to be divided. God therefore can be considered either in Himself, or, as they say, in the order, or quasi-order, to creatures, in such a way indeed that the consideration of God in Himself precedes the consideration of Him as He is, as it were, with respect to creatures; and therefore in the first place in our theological course we shall treat of God in Himself. Since, however, He in Himself can be taken in two ways, either as He is One or as He is Three; and those things which pertain to God as One are prior to those which pertain to Him as Three; therefore the discourse will be instituted first about God as One than about Him as Three. And so we shall give this first volume of our theological course to God as One, and in it we shall append five treatises. And in the first, on the Principle of the individuation of material substance and of the purely individual distinction of any entity, around the third question of this 1 par. of D. Thomas, there will be a disputation, so that thus it may be established that the divine is one, simple, and spiritual. For, as D. Thomas explains all these things, as it were by antithesis, He sets them before the eyes by explaining how in this the spiritual substance, most of all the divine, is distinguished from material substance, in that the latter is individuated from matter, as from the first root; the former, however, from itself: and the arguments which press to show that the material mode of individuation is sought from matter convince, by their opposite, that the immaterial substance, most of all God, is to be individuated in a more spiritual way. In the second, on the visibility of God as He is in Himself to the created intellect, or on the vision of God, together with the Angelic Doctor, q. 12. In the third, on the knowledge of God, around q. 14 of the most holy Preceptor. In the fourth, on the will of God, explaining question 19 of the same D. Thomas. In the fifth, finally, on predestination, together with the Angelic Doctor, quaest. 23 suae 1 part. a discourse will be woven. And the other divine attributes will not be treated in particular in this volume 1, both because in the schools this is not usually discussed in particular and dictated to students, and also because whatever difficulty the other attributes would bring will entirely follow from what will be said about these attributes of God already intimated.

6 Since, however, as we said, in the consideration of God in Himself, immediately after God as One, He Himself as Three follows, for that reason the second volume of our theological course will institute a discourse about God as Three, together with D. Thomas, from question 27 to question 43 of his 1 par. Nor will it stop there, but it will proceed, together with the Most Holy Preceptor, to the treatise on the Angels, from q. 50 of the same 1 par. to q. 64, and from q. 106 to q. 108.

The reason, however, for which after the treatise on God as Three we shall append that treatise on the Angels is this, because, as we asserted above, after the concept of God in Himself, as One and as Three, one comes in due order to Him Himself, as they say, in the quasi-order to creatures. And because this quasi-order is twofold, either that of the efficient cause or that of the final cause, and the order, or quasi-order, of the efficient cause is prior as regards being an existence simply such, namely as regards being a natural existence, and not only an intentional one: therefore God is treated of first as He is the efficient cause of creatures. And although God can be considered either according as He is the cause of creatures without determining it in the particular, of which of them He was the cause, or according as He is the cause of creatures in the particular, namely of those which in fact He produced; since, however, the former of these is prior, and it is not usually treated of in the schools in the common way, nor, if we suppose those things which our Complutensians have said in the book Physic., and the others which we shall assert about God as He is the cause of creatures in the particular, does it require a new exposition: therefore, although D. Thomas treated of this before the questions on the Angels, we shall nevertheless not raise special disputations about this matter in our volume 2; but we shall treat only of God as He is the efficient cause of creatures in the particular, namely of the Angels, and consequently of the Angels themselves proceeding from Him. And although several disputations could also be moved about man and his soul, and a special treatise on him instituted, so as to explain the mind of D. Thomas in this 1 par., from question 75 to question 90; since, however, our Complutensian College has treated of many things quite clearly in its course of Arts in the book de Anima: therefore nothing will be said on this point of set purpose in our theological course.

§ V. What will be treated in the third and fourth volume.

7 Then we shall give the third volume to the consideration of God as He is the last end of the rational creature, and to its beatitude; and also to the human acts, whether good or evil and sinful, considered in general, by which one arrives at God the last end, or recedes from Him; and finally to the supernatural principle of good acts, by which we merit eternal life, namely grace. And so this volume will comprise: first the treatise on the last end and beatitude, around those things which Divine Thomas discusses from question 1 of his First-Second to question 5, although we shall linger little on these; because very many things contained there will be evident from those which we shall treat of in this volume 1 in the treatise on the vision of God. Then also the treatise on human acts in general, around certain questions in which the Angelic Doctor treats of them in the same First-Second. Then, the treatise on sins, comprising those things which the most holy Preceptor discusses there from question 73 to 89. Then, finally, the treatise on grace in general, on sanctifying grace, or on justification, and merit, and consequently containing and explaining those things which the Angelic Doctor adduces from question 109 to the last question of his First-Second, namely question 114.

Perhaps, however, we shall also append another treatise on the laws before the treatise on grace.

8 Since, however, after the consideration in general of those things by which one arrives at God the last end, or recedes from Him, there remains the consideration of those in particular by which this very thing is done: therefore the fourth volume of our theological course will dispute of this point of set purpose. And although to accomplish this exactly it would be necessary to treat of all the virtues and vices in particular, nevertheless in this volume 4 a discourse will be woven only about the three theological virtues, namely faith, hope, and charity: because it is only about these that treatises and disputations are commonly held in the schools and dictated to students. Especially because, supposing those things which will be said in volume 3 around the First-Second of D. Thomas, and those which will be brought to light in particular in this volume 4 around these three theological virtues, a knowledge of the rest can easily be had without the help of the master. And therefore this fourth volume of our theological course will comprise and explain those things which D. Thomas treats of around these virtues in his Second-Second, and which are commonly taught and dictated in the schools.

§ VI. What will be discussed in the fifth and sixth volume.

9 Now, because our Redeemer Christ, who came to save sinners, and who was given as Leader and Teacher of the nations, has demonstrated to us in Himself this way of the virtues, by which one goes in a straight path to the heavenly fatherland, and from which we have receded by sinning; and because through Him all the benefits and gifts of grace are derived from God to us: therefore, for the consummation of the whole Summa Theologica, it was necessary that the Angelic Doctor should treat of this our Savior and of His peculiar benefits. And therefore, together with him, we shall give the fifth volume of our theological course to this author of so great a salvation as ours, and in it, through diverse treatises, we shall explain the whole matter of the Incarnation, from question 1 of the third part of D. Thomas to question 26.

10 Since, however, the special organs by which Christ the Lord communicates His grace to us are the sacraments, therefore Divine Thomas treats of them in general, from question 60 to 65 of his third part, and afterwards of Baptism, from question 66 to 71. Of Confirmation, however, question 72; of the Eucharist, from question 73 to 83. The questions on Penance, indeed, he began from question 84 and continued to question 90, which is on the parts of Penance, although, being prevented by death, he was unable to complete them: but those which were lacking up to the consummation of the work were added by his disciples from his other writings; which for this reason are called the additions to the third part: and in them, from question 1 to 28, are treated those things which were needed for a complete treatise on Penance. Then, from question 29 to 33, Extreme Unction is treated of, and Ordination from question 34 to 40. And finally, Matrimony is treated of from question 41 to 68.

Hence this sixth volume of our theological course will be entirely devoted to the explanation of the Sacraments, through which divine grace is derived from Christ into us as through certain heavenly organs and instruments. Yet we shall not for that reason treat in this last volume of all the Sacraments, but only of the Sacraments in general, of the Sacrament of the Eucharist, and of Penance: because it is not customary in the schools to discuss commonly about Baptism, Confirmation, Ordination, and Extreme Unction, nor are treatises on these Sacraments dictated by masters to students. Just as neither is a treatise commonly instituted on Matrimony among the scholastic theologians, although not a few discussions concerning it are raised among the moral theologians. We, however, intend to deliver the course of scholastic rather than moral theology; and therefore about the Eucharist and Penance, in which the very greatest number of scholastic questions are involved, we shall treat in this our theological course in an individual way. And so it is no wonder that we do not weave discussions about Matrimony, in which few things, or none, that present a new difficulty and pertain to scholastic theology are contained, especially since, as we have often said, once the other treatises already treated of, which are contained in this whole theological course, have been delivered, all things pertaining to moral theology will easily be added and drawn out of Divine Thomas.

11 From which it also follows that, when this last volume is brought to light by us, no other will be needed for those things which in 3 par. of D. Thomas are treated of after the questions on the Sacraments. For although the Most Holy Preceptor, from question 69 to 99, which is the last of the additions, in which all the questions of his whole Summa Theologica end, treated of those things pertaining to the resurrection of bodies and the final state, and also of death, which precedes the resurrection, and of the final judgment, which follows, of the rewards and punishments of those rising again; nevertheless, because some of these will be evident from those things which will be said in this volume 1 in the treatise on the vision of God, and in volume 3 in the treatise on beatitude; and the others are not usually called up to the scholastic schools: therefore we will abstain from making a discourse about them, and in this volume 6 our whole theological course will end.

§ VII. The guides of this our course are assigned, and at the same time it is explained more fully why it does not depart from the course of the arts of our Complutensian College.

12 In that course, however, as we have already hinted, we shall always have two things before the eyes. First indeed, that the voice of the Holy Fathers, and especially of Augustine and D. Thomas, may always sound and resound in it itself; that it may always pour forth their copious and abundant doctrine; that it may always drink from their most limpid and sweetest fountain, and pour out again the waters once drunk from it. For no one can cross this most deep sea of theology except with them as guides. Second, however, that all things which will be discussed in this theological course be always most consonant with those which the Complutensian College of our sacred Order has lately published in its course of Arts. Since, indeed, both this course and that one are drawn from the very entrails of Divine Thomas, and the entrails of the Angelic Doctor do not contradict themselves, but cohere mutually with a wonderful bond; so likewise the course of the arts and this theological course do not contradict each other, but will kiss each other with a friendly covenant and the kiss of an intimate peace.

Quaestio I: On the Simplicity of God

Tractatus I: On the Principle of the Individuation of Material Substance and of Its Accidents

Disputatio I: On the Principle of the Individuation of Material Substance

Dubium I: Whether the substantial form is itself individuated, and the first principle of the individuation and of the purely individual distinction of the whole composite?

Dubium II: Whether matter, taken by itself and precisely, or matter marked by quantity, is the first and radical principle of the individuation of the whole substantial composite

Dubium III: Whether matter marked by quantity, insofar as it is said to constitute a composite of matter and quantity as an inhering and constituting form, is the first root of the individuation of the composite

Dubium IV: Whether matter determined by quantity, insofar as it denotes a certain substantial mode, is by the very nature of the thing distinct from matter and determines it toward having this quantity rather than that, is the first root of the individuation of material substance and of its substantial form?

Dubium V: Whether matter marked by quantity, insofar as it is said to possess by a radical mode this quantity rather than that, is the first root of the completed material substance and therefore of its substantial form

Disputatio II: On the Principle of the Individuation of Accidents

Dubium I: Whether the subject is the first root and principle of the individuation of accidents and of their purely individual distinction

Dubium II: Whether quantity claims for itself a peculiar principle, so that it is individuated from itself as though it were the first root

Dubium III: Whether essential repugnance exists between purely numerical distinction of accidents, as such that two of them differ only numerically in the same subject

Tractatus II: In quaest. 12 of the First Part of St. Thomas: On the Vision of God

Quaestio I: How God is known by us

Disputatio I: On the Possibility and Appetitability of the Vision of God by Essence

Dubium I: Whether the clear vision of God by essence is possible to the created intellect?

Dubium II: Whether the Holy Fathers knew that vision of God by essence is possible to a created intellect

Dubium III: Whether the possibility of vision of God by essence can be clearly known to a created intellect by the light of nature

Dubium IV: Whether the intellectual nature considered by itself has an innate appetite for the vision of God by essence

Dubium V: Whether an elicited and natural appetite is given in the intellectual creature considered by itself with regard to the clear vision of God

Disputatio II: On the Likeness, or Form, Required for a Clear Vision of God

Dubium I: Whether, according to the mind of St Thomas, some created likeness is admitted in order to elicit the clear vision of God

Dubium II: Whether the divine essence is in fact united to the intellect of the blessed man by way of an intelligible species, with a view to the clear vision of God?

Dubium III: Whether the divine essence, as it has the character of an intelligible form, actively concurs to the clear vision of God

Dubium IV: Whether by divine power a created impressed species is possible, through which God may be seen in a quidditative way, such as He is in Himself?

Dubium V: Whether the first reason which D. Thom. adduces in this article sufficiently proves the impossibility of an impressed species representing God quidditatively and clearly?

Dubium VI: Whether from the second reason of St. Thomas the impossibility is sufficiently inferred of an impressed form representing God quidditatively, and clearly, as He is in Himself

Dubium VII: What specially stands against the second reason of St. Thomas, and how it is to be solved

Dubium VIII: Whether the last reason of the article proves the impossibility of a created intelligible species representing God quidditatively: where the arguments also are dissolved which we brought from the opponents in dub. 4 of this disputation?

Dubium IX: Whether in the blessed there is necessarily and indispensably given a word, or expressed form, representing God quidditatively, as He is in Himself

Dubium X: Whether the impossibility of a created word representing God clearly and quidditatively is rightly proved from the fact that God is essentially itself the being quidditatively understood, and thus cannot be quidditatively understood through a created word?

Disputatio III: On the Impossibility of the Vision of God, As He Is in Himself, by Created Powers of the Natural Order, or Such as Are Connatural to Some Created Intellect

Dubium I: Whether by the absolute power of God there is possible some intellect which by the powers proper to it of the natural order could see God as He is in Himself

Dubium II: Whether by divine power there can be possible some substances and some intellects for which the light of glory is connatural, and which can see God by essence by their own powers?

Disputatio IV: On the Necessity of the Light of Glory for Seeing the Divine Essence As It Is in Itself

Dubium I: Whether the light of glory concurs to the vision of God, as He is in Himself, after the manner of an impressed form

Dubium II: Whether the light of glory is a necessary disposition, in order that the divine essence, in the ratio of form or of intelligible species, be united to the intellects of the blessed?

Dubium III: Whether the light of glory is necessarily desired for the receiving of the vision of God?

Dubium IV: Whether by the absolute power of God the created intellect can, without the light of glory, by its own obediential power alone, though with a concomitant influx superadded in the vision, but not by any other previous [influx], elicit that vision in the same intellect

Dubium V: Whether by divine power the divine essence can be united, in the ratio of light, to the created intellect, and thus constitute it, without a created light, in the first act for seeing God as He is in Himself?

Disputatio V: On the Quality and Inequality of the Visions in the Blessed

Dubium I: Whether an inequality is found among the beatific visions

Dubium II: Whether the inequality found among the beatific visions is not only intensive and extensive, but also essential and specific

Dubium III: Whether an intellectual power that is better, with equal light of glory, sees the divine essence more clearly

Disputatio VI: On the Incomprehensibility of God to the Created Intellect

Dubium I: Whether by divine power the created intellect can comprehend God?

Disputatio VII: On Those Things Which, God Having Been Seen, Are Seen in Him, or Can Be Seen

Dubium I: Whether those who see God see everything absolutely which is formally and of necessity contained in Him

Dubium II: Whether the divine essence can be seen without the persons, or one person without another?

Dubium III: Whether the blessed can, by the force of the vision of the divine essence, see, and in fact see, the free decrees of God?

Dubium IV: Whether from the force of the vision of the divine essence the effects existing under some difference of time can, or ought to, be seen

Dubium V: Whether by the force of the vision of the divine essence possible creatures can be seen?

Tractatus III: In quaest. 14 of the First Part of the Angelic Doctor: On the Knowledge of God

Quaestio I: De Scientia Dei

Dubium I: Whether those things which St. Thomas teaches in the Prooemium of this question are true

Disputatio I: De scientia Dei, quoad an est?

Dubium I: Whether intellectual knowledge is formally in God?

Dubium II: Whether from the fact that God is most immaterial the Angelic Doctor rightly proves that He is most intelligent?

Dubium III: Whether there is in God knowledge strictly so called and formally, and with respect to things

Dubium IV: Whether the knowledge of God is an attribute of Him?

Disputatio II: On the Twofold Distinction Which D. Thom. Constitutes in This Article Between Things Known and Things Not Known

Dubium I: Whether the first distinction which St. Thomas assigns between things that know and things that do not know is true, namely that these have only their own form, whereas those have also the forms of other things

Dubium II: Whether knowing things have not only the form of another thing, but also become by identity other things in being knowable, that is, representatively?

Disputatio III: On the Intellection and Knowledge of God with Respect to Its Primary Object

Dubium I: Whether God understands Himself primarily

Dubium II: Whether the object per se, first and specificative of the essential intellection of God is the divine essence, as distinguished from the attributes and the relations: or whether all these are formally and expressly meant?

Disputatio IV: On Understanding by God with Respect to the Power It Has to Constitute the Divine Essence and Nature

Dubium I: Whether the constitutive [element] of the divine essence, or nature, is the sole reason of a spiritual substance in itself, or of such by essence, as distinct virtually from the reason of a subsisting intellectual substance, whether radically and in the first act, or in the second act

Dubium II: Whether what constitutes the divine essence, or nature, is the ratio of substance alone, essentially and per essentiam intellectual, as virtually distinct from intellection by essence, or whether without any virtual distinction it is intellection itself?

Disputatio V: On the Knowledge of God with Respect to Its Causality toward Creatures

Dubium I: Whether divine knowledge is in some way the cause of things

Dubium II: What the knowledge of God is as cause of things

Dubium III: Whether just as the knowledge of God, taken formally, is the cause directing toward the production of creatures, so too it is the immediate effective principle and the executor of their production?

Disputatio VI: On Divine Knowledge Collated with Evils

Dubium I: Whether God knows evils?

Dubium II: Whether God necessarily knows evils through created goods?

Disputatio VII: On Whether There Is Knowledge of God with Respect to Absolute Future Contingents, and on Those Things Which Cannot Be Certainly Known by Him

Dubium I: What, and how manifold, the future contingent is

Dubium II: Whether God certainly knows absolutely future contingents?

Dubium III: Whether God certainly knows absolute free future things, by His essence and divine ideas, as they represent the truth of those things antecedently to the decree of His will

Dubium IV: Whether God certainly knows absolutely future contingents in the free decree of His will, not indeed as present, but as future?

Dubium V: Whether God certainly knows absolutely future contingents which in some way depend on created freedom, in the comprehension of secondary causes, antecedently to the free determination of the divine will?

Dubium VI: Whether God certainly knows absolute future contingents in their objective truth, antecedently to the divine decree

Disputatio VIII: On the knowledge of God with respect to absolutely future contingents, as regards those of which He is certainly known to be aware

Dubium I: Whether God certainly knows all absolutely future contingents in the decree put into execution of His will, antecedently to any infallible futurehood of them, or whether they are determined in their essence by such a decree?

Dubium II: Whether according to Scripture and the Fathers, but especially St. Thomas, absolute future contingents are from eternity really and physically present to God in the measure of eternity, and by reason of this presence are certainly known by Him

Dubium III: Whether with a sufficient reason it is proved that absolutely future contingents were from eternity, and are now really and physically present to God in the measure of eternity, and by reason of this presence are certainly known by Him?

Dubium IV: Whether eternity, and the presentiality of the future already explained in it, is altogether necessary for this, so that God may certainly and infallibly know absolutely future contingents before they are present in their own and adequate measure, or so far as we are concerned?

Disputatio IX: On the Knowledge of Conditioned Future Things, Which God Has in His Efficacious Yet Conditioned Decree

Dubium I: On the multiple division of the future contingent, and which of them belong to the present disputation

Dubium II: Whether according to holy Scripture God certainly knows conditioned future contingents, whether they be disparate, yet depending both as to the condition and as to the event on free causes, or be not disparate, but having only a probable, or conjectural, connection with the condition?

Dubium III: Whether according to the mind of the holy Fathers God knows with perfect certainty and infallibly conditioned future contingents, whether they be disparate in the manner just described, or have a probable connection with the future event

Dubium IV: Whether with a sufficient reason it is shown that God certainly, and altogether infallibly, knows both future contingents that are conditioned and disparate, and those which have only a probable and conjectural connection on the part of the object with the condition?

Dubium V: Whether in God conditioned, positive, and efficacious decrees about all conditioned future contingents are to be posited, and whether, these being set aside, the aforesaid futures can in any case be certainly and infallibly known by God?

Disputatio X: On the Impossibility of Middle, or Conditional, Knowledge Drawn from Authority

Dubium I: Whether according to holy Scripture middle knowledge, or conditional knowledge, is to be admitted?

Dubium II: Whether from St. Augustine's mind, as gathered from His testimonies, it is concluded that middle knowledge, or conditional knowledge, is to be given?

Dubium III: Whether either according to the principles of the opponents, or absolutely and simply speaking, it is inferred from the effects of Augustine's doctrine, or from other signs, that according to his mind middle, or conditional, knowledge is to be rejected

Dubium IV: Whether, according to the mind of the Angelic Doctor as drawn from His testimonies, middle knowledge, or conditional knowledge, is to be given in God?

Dubium V: Whether from certain other signs it is concluded that, according to the mind of St. Thomas, middle knowledge is not to be given?

Dubium VI: Whether middle knowledge has flowed down continually from the time of Augustine to the present, and has been approved by theologians both more recent and more ancient, and especially by those who were present at the Council of Trent

Dubium VII: Whether middle knowledge remained hidden from St. Augustine and the ancient Fathers up to the year 1560 and the older Scholastics, and was drawn forth by the later theologians from the doctrine of those same Fathers, or whether it was known and reprobated by the aforesaid ancient theologians and Scholastics?

Dubium VIII: How from what has been said it may be deduced that the doctrine denying middle knowledge is to be preferred to that asserting it: where in particular the Doctors denying the aforesaid middle knowledge are recounted

Disputatio XI: On the Impossibility of Middle Knowledge from the Defect of Its Necessity, and from Its Incompossibility with the Other Things Presupposed in God

Dubium I: Whether middle knowledge is necessary to God, in order that He may certainly predestinate, or efficaciously predefine the consent of created will without injury to its freedom, or whether it removes both of these?

Dubium II: Whether from yet another head middle knowledge is incompatible with divine predestination with regard to adults?

Disputatio XII: On the Impossibility of Middle Knowledge, Both a Priori, or Quasi a Priori, and Drawn from Various Inconveniences

Dubium I: Whether the impossibility of middle knowledge is sufficiently shown by a priori, or quasi a priori reasoning?

Dubium II: Whether middle knowledge is impossible, from the fact that through it the reason of the first cause and of the first author of grace is removed from God?

Dubium III: Whether middle knowledge is impossible on the ground that it follows from it that God cannot fulfil what He promises concerning the faith, or the conversion, of the rational creature by the power of His omnipotence, but only from the foreknowledge of our future consent

Dubium IV: Whether middle knowledge is repugnant, from the fact that from it is gathered that God concurs to our free acts in a blind and ignorant way, and without intention of them in particular?

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