Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

Because material substance precedes its accidents in dignity, and its individuation is the root of the individuation of those same accidents, we therefore treat in the first place the principle of individuation of the aforesaid substance.

1 For an understanding of the title, it must be noted, with Nazarius, 1 parte, quaest. 3, art. 2, controvers. unica; Gonzalez, quaest. 11, disp. 23, num. 12, and with the common school of the Thomists, that we can speak twofold concerning the principle of individuation of material substance: first, of the total and adequate first principle, namely of everything that concurs essentially and directly to constitute the material individual as such, namely this form, this union, and likewise this matter and its union with this form; and accordingly, in the opinion of St. Thomas, concerning matter in some way determined by a quantity, through which matter itself becomes this, as will be seen below. Secondly, concerning the radical principle, which is the first root to which all individuation is ultimately reduced.

The title of this question, and also of the entire disputation, is therefore understood not as concerning the former principle, but as concerning this latter principle of individuation and of purely individual distinction, by which one composite is distinguished from another; because this principle, when compared with all the others, has the stronger claim to be the first and radical principle, as is evident from the terms themselves and will appear more fully below. We have said: of purely individual distinction; because here we are not speaking of individual distinction mixed with specific distinction and arising in some way from it—as, for example, this man and this horse are distinguished—nor of individual distinction that does not contain specific distinction mixed with it, and therefore rests purely within the range of individual distinction.

Accordingly, we are not speaking of the principle of individuation taken metaphysically. First, because it is certain that every material individual is individuated metaphysically by its individual difference, which constitutes it under a species and distinguishes it from every other thing that partakes of that species atomically. Secondly, because it is sufficiently established that the difference, or the individual principle understood in this way, must be derived from some physical principle that is the first origin and first root of the metaphysical reason of individuality, so that the aforesaid individuation is ultimately reduced to it. Thus, to investigate the first principle absolutely so understood is the same as to investigate the principle of the individuation of matter considered in the physical order.

2 Accordingly, neither Scotus, 2 Sententiarum, dist. 3, quaest. 3, nor Fonseca, 5 Metaphysic. cap. 6, quaest. 5, sect. 1, touched on the point of difficulty debated throughout this entire disputation by the Doctors while settling it; they merely say that haecceity, or the metaphysical individual difference, is the principle of individuation. For, as we said a moment ago, the controversy and the point of difficulty concern only the first and fountainhead principle of individuation, into which individuation itself is entirely resolved; and accordingly they concern the first principle and physical root, as we recently said.

We have nevertheless added to the title that qualifying term, intrinsic, so as to indicate that the present discussion is not about the first extrinsic principle, such that an efficient cause, and particularly God, is the first principle of the individuation of any creature, but about the first intrinsic principle of the individuation of the entire substantial composite.

§ I. The first opinion is proposed.

3 The first opinion asserts that substantial form is itself the individual and the first, or principal, radical principle of individuation. Thus Nimphus, 5 Metaphys., disput. 5; Sebastian. Perez, Episcopus Oxomens., 3 de anima, conclusione 1; Zimara, theoremate 97; Suarez, disput. 5 Metaphysic., sect. 4. In support of it are also cited: Averroës, 1 de anima, cap. 7 and 3, Physicor. comment. 60, and lib. 4, comm. 38; Avicena, 6 naturalium. parte 1.

It is proved first. For the first and radical principle (of which we are speaking) of the individuation and purely individual distinction of a substantial composite must have two properties: first, that it be intrinsic to the composite itself; secondly, that it be most proper to it as this, individual being; therefore this principle will be substantial form and not something else. The antecedent is evident. For just as the first principle of the specification of the same composite cannot fail to be intrinsic and most proper to it as constituted in its species, so the first principle of the individuation of the aforesaid composite must intrinsically constitute it in the being of an individual and must be very proper to it as considered in the being of such. The consequence, however, is proved and explained as follows. Form, as will be evident to the observer, has these two properties, and nothing except form possesses them, because neither accidents can be intrinsic to the aforesaid composite as this, individual being; otherwise it would not be one per se in the being of such, as is clearer from itself and from what will be said below. Nor can matter, although intrinsic to the composite, be most proper to it; for the very matter that now constitutes one substantial individual can immediately constitute another.

4 It is confirmed first. For that is the first and radical principle of the individuation of a substantial composite which is the first principle with respect to its being; accordingly D. Thom., quaestione unica de anima, artic. 1 ad secundum, said: each thing has the same being and individuation; therefore form will have the character of the aforesaid principle. The consequence is evident, because form alone is the first and radical principle of existing; hence matter does not have its own existence from itself, but only by reason of form, as our Complutensians teach in libro Physicor., disp. 3, num. 70.

It is also confirmed and explained secondly. For something to be the principle of individuation, and therefore of individual distinction, actually first, presupposes that it be a being first in actuality; therefore the character of such a principle will belong to substantial form alone. The antecedent is evident. For just as being the principle of anything whatsoever presupposes an entity of the principle, so being the principle first in actuality presupposes that it be a being first in actuality. The consequence, however, is proved because, insofar as matter is from itself, it is only a being in potency, since it has only pure potency as its being; form alone, on the contrary, is a being first in actuality, since form alone is in itself and essentially an act, just as matter alone is essentially pure potency.

5 Secondly, and principally. For the first and radical principle of specific unity is form alone; therefore form is likewise the principle of individuation. The antecedent is commonly accepted by philosophers and dialecticians and follows from what our Complutensians assert in Logica, disput. 5, num. 75. The consequence, however, is proved as follows. Specific unity in a substantial composite is taken from form as from the first and radical principle because, although it cannot exist without matter, it nevertheless presupposes matter as something potential and indifferent; form, however, removes this indifference and gives the ultimate essential and specific complement. Therefore, since the same form gives the ultimate substantial complement to the substantial composite as this, individual being—and hence Aristotle, 1 de anima, capite 1, said that form is what constitutes this something—and presupposes matter as something potential and indifferent, the conclusion follows that it is likewise the first and radical principle of individuation. Otherwise, under the specific concept an objective substantial concept common to many individuals of that species and to no others could be given, which appears absurd.

6 Thirdly. For this determinate form does not regard this determinate matter in such a way that, insofar as its own power is concerned, it could be naturally received in it alone; therefore it is not this and individual by reason of that matter, but by reason of itself; therefore it will itself be the first and radical principle of the individuation of the entire composite. This final consequence is evident from the previous one. For otherwise form might be denied the character of the aforesaid first and radical principle, because it would not be individual by reason of itself but by reason of matter; accordingly matter would have to be the first root of individuation. The first consequence, however, follows from the antecedent. For if form were individual by reason of matter and not by reason of itself, form would for that reason be this, because it seeks to be received in this determinate matter and not in another; accordingly, if the very same form can naturally be received in another matter, this is a sign that it is not this and individual by reason of matter, but by reason of itself.

The antecedent, however, is proved as follows. First, because the very same determinate matter which is under the form of an embryo is afterward under an animal form, for example, that of a horse; accordingly, the very same form that is now in this matter could, insofar as the form’s power is concerned, be in other matter; for act and potency, insofar as they are from themselves, must correspond to one another. Secondly, because if this soul—for example, a horse’s soul—were fit by itself to inform only this numerically individuated matter, then all horse souls that could inform that numerically individuated matter at different times would have among themselves some real correspondence that they would not have with horse souls informing other matters; for all of them would have the aptitude to inform this numerically individuated matter, which other horse souls cannot inform; and—

7 It is confirmed. For if the same numerically identical substantial form informs different matter at different times, the composite resulting from it would be numerically identical with that which previously consisted of other matter and the same form; therefore this is a sign that form is the first and most powerful principle of the individuation of the entire composite, according to whose change or invariance the individuation of the aforesaid composite changes or remains the same. The consequence requires no proof. The antecedent, however, is proved. For in the general resurrection individual men rise again with their numerical unity, because although by chance two may have had the same matter, and that matter is bestowed on only one of them, as occurs among those who feed on human flesh, nevertheless each receives his own rational soul, and this soul will draw whatever matter to its own proper unity.

8 Fourthly. For if for some reason form were not the first principle of the individuation and purely individual distinction of the entire composite, especially because form itself is limited by matter, this reason would be null; therefore, and so forth. The major appears manifest. For since the individual difference is intrinsically limiting and determinative of the specific reason arising from form itself, it will be inferred most fittingly that the aforesaid form is not the first principle of that difference if it is not intrinsically limited, but must be limited by matter as by the first principle. The minor, however, is proved. For otherwise neither matter, and consequently nothing else, could be the first principle of the aforesaid individuation. For just as matter limits form, so form limits matter, and so with regard to the other things concurrent in individuation, as is sufficiently clear from themselves and from what St. Thomas teaches, 1 p. part., quaest. 7. Lastly, because at least the intellectual soul is individuated from itself and is the first principle of individuation; accordingly D. Thom., 2 contra gentes, c. 75, in the solution to the first reason, and c. 81, says that just as the being of the intellectual soul is not caused by matter itself, so neither is its unity or individuation.

§ II. The opinion of Aristotle and St. Thomas is more acceptable.

9 Nevertheless, it must be said that substantial form is not itself individuated in such a way as to be the first and radical principle of the individuation and purely individual distinction, whether with respect to itself or to the entire composite; and accordingly, it is not such that the entire aforesaid individuation and distinction is ultimately reduced to it. Thus Aristotle, 5 Metaphysic., cap. 6, in fine, where he says that the distinction of individuals within the same species proceeds from the divisibility of matter. In lib. 12, cap. 8, he asserts that things which are many in number have matter; and from this he concludes that the first mover is one not only in reason but also in number, because, being an act, it has no matter. If, on the contrary, substantial form were individuated in itself, such that it had the character of the first and fountainhead principle of individuation and individual distinction, whether with respect to itself or to the entire composite, then numerical distinction would proceed from form itself rather than from matter and its divisibility. Likewise, when Aristotle speaks in the same way of physical matter, as is clear from the context and as Nazarius has shown well, 1 part., quaest. 50, art. 4, controversia 1; Ferrara, 2 contra gentes, cap. 93, ratione secunda, [he] would not correctly infer that the first mover cannot be multiplied numerically from the fact that it has no physical matter, namely first matter, as is clear from the context. For if substantial form is once numerically one in itself, so that it is for itself as well as for the composite the first reason of unity and purely numerical distinction, then with stronger reason a complete form subsisting per se, such as the first mover, would have this property with respect to itself. The Philosopher asserts the same, 10 Metaphysic., text. 25, where, assigning the first and fountainhead principle of unity and of specific and individual distinction, he says that form is the first principle of unity and specific distinction, but matter is the principle of individual distinction; and thus he says: For this is the reason and this is the matter: whatever oppositions are in the reason make a difference of species; but those which are in the concept together with matter do not. St. Thomas explains these words in the same place, lect. 11: For in the composite there are matter and form; the former is the reason, that is, form, which constitutes the species; the latter is matter, which is the principle of individuation. Whatever oppositions are in the reason, that is, on the part of form, make a difference of species. But those on the part of matter, which are proper to the individual that is assumed together with matter, do not make a difference of species.

10 The holy Doctor taught this very point also in secundo contra gentes, capite 93, ratione secunda, in these words: Whatever things are the same in species but differ in number have matter; difference, however, which proceeds from form produces diversity of species; but that which is from matter produces diversity according to number. The same Doctor teaches this also in prima parte, quaest. 50, artic. 4, de ente, et essentia, capit. 6, and in 2 distinct. 3, quaest. 1, artic. 4, where, to give the reason why Angels cannot be distinguished by number alone on account of their being immaterial, he says: For if they are supposed to be immaterial, since neither form nor nature can multiply number except through diversity of matter, it follows that a simple, immaterial form not received in any matter can be only one. Therefore, whatever is apart from it is of another nature, because it differs from it according to form, not according to a material principle, which is absent there. Finally, D. Thom. very often repeats this same doctrine, as will be clear from the places cited at num. 43. Accordingly, both Aristotle’s disciples and the Angelic Doctor’s, together with many others whom we shall mention at num. 44, commonly follow him.

§ III. The opinion of Aristotle and St. Thomas is explained, and the first reason in support of it is discussed.

11 But because this assertion requires some explanation, it must be explained briefly before it is proved. The qualifying clause was deliberately added to it, namely: such that it be the first and radical principle of purely individual distinction, whether with respect to itself, etc. By this it was to be indicated that the assertion does not deny that form is individuated in itself and through its intrinsic entity; for in itself and through its intrinsic entity, form regards this matter immediately and not that other matter, and by reason of this relation it is immediately and proximately singular. What we deny, however, is that the aforesaid form is individuated from itself as from the first and radical principle, or that it individuates the composite; and accordingly, that this whole thing derives its origin elsewhere, as from a first source and root.

Although this assertion, thus explained, can be proved sufficiently effectively from that second reason of St. Thomas which we shall present in the following question, no. 52, to prove that matter determined by quantity is the first root of the individuation already mentioned, nevertheless in this and the following section we shall demonstrate it by another twofold reason.

12 The prior and fundamental reason was given by the Philosopher and the Angelic Doctor in the places cited, and can be proposed in the following form. Since unity and distinction proceeding from form, as from the first and radical principle, are specific unity and distinction; therefore they are not the purely individual unity and distinction of which alone we are speaking; and accordingly, form will not be the first and fountainhead principle of precisely individual unity and distinction. This second consequence clearly follows from the first. The first, however, follows from the antecedent. The antecedent, besides being expressed by St. Thomas in the places cited, can be proved from the fact that specific unity and distinction is formal unity and distinction, because it is distinction according to essence, which is the formal something in each thing; numerical unity and distinction, however, is material unity and distinction. Therefore, since the distinction proceeding from form as first principle is formal rather than material—especially since numerical distinction arises from matter as from its first root—it follows that the unity and distinction proceeding from form as from the first root are specific unity and distinction.

13 This reason is so efficacious that, rightly developed, it easily overturns all the evasions by which our opponents meet it. For in the first place, some answer that not every unity and distinction proceeding from form is formal. For just as two acts and forms, or two rational souls, can be distinguished as acts and forms, and yet that distinction is not formal but material; likewise, two Angels, who are separate forms having nothing of matter, are individually distinguished. Thus some things can be distinguished on account of form, and by reason of it, and yet are not formally but materially distinguished.

This answer, therefore, easily collapses if the argument is rightly developed. For, on close inspection, it is repugnant that unity and distinction proceeding from form should not be formal, and accordingly specific. This can indeed be declared and explained as follows. Since distinction proceeding from matter, insofar as it is matter and is taken as the first and radical principle, cannot, insofar as it proceeds from matter, be formal or specific; therefore distinction proceeding from form, insofar as it is form and is taken as the first root, cannot be material either; but it must necessarily be formal, and consequently specific.

14 The consequence appears to follow from an equality of reason, and likewise from the example of a distinction proceeding from whiteness or heat. Since it proceeds from them as such, it cannot fail to be in the notion of whiteness or heat, because these effects are the proper formal effects of whiteness or heat; just as the proper formal effect of substantial form is to give substantial formal being. The antecedent is found in St. Thomas in the place cited from 10 Metaphysic., lect. 11, where he says: Therefore, if it is asked whether matter in any way makes things diverse in species, it seems that it does, because this horse is diverse in species from this man; yet it is manifest that the reason of each is together with individual matter, and thus it seems that matter somehow makes them differ in species. Nevertheless, it is manifest that this does not occur on account of the diversity of matter, but because the opposition is on the part of form. Thus it appears that the opposition on the part of form itself makes them differ in species, but not that which is on the part of matter. Thereafter the same antecedent can be urged as follows. First, because an effect cannot exceed its cause; and therefore formal unity and distinction cannot proceed as from a first root except from form. Secondly, because in material substances, although the generic reason can proceed from matter insofar as the aforesaid reason has potentiality and materiality, it cannot proceed from matter insofar as it retains actuality and formality; since according to this latter reason it proceeds from substantial form as such. Therefore this is a sign that being, or formal distinction, cannot proceed from matter as such.

15 It is confirmed and explained as follows. It is one thing for distinction to be exercised in forms, and another for it to proceed from those forms as such. Just as it is one thing for the possession of entitative parts to be exercised and found in material substance, and another for that possession to proceed from the same substance as such. Accordingly, it is not repugnant that the aforesaid parts be found, exercised, and communicated to substance by another thing as from a first root, namely quantity; and that nevertheless they be not formally but quantitatively substantial, as our Complutensians teach at length and learnedly in libro de Generatione, disput. 5, num. 58 and afterward. It is otherwise, however, if the aforesaid parts are exercised in substance and proceed from the substance as from a formal cause, for then they cannot fail to be formally substantial. The due proportion, however, being preserved, although it is not repugnant that a distinction exercised in substantial forms, proceeding elsewhere, namely from matter, should not be formal but material, it is otherwise if it is exercised in the aforesaid forms and proceeds from them; for then such distinction must be similar to its cause, and accordingly must be formal.

16 We have said: the due proportion, however, being preserved, so that a certain objection drawn from the example offered, which might have arisen here, remains answered. For we now compare only the matter at hand with the aforesaid example in this respect: just as the entitative parts of substance would have to be formally substantial if they proceeded from substance, and did not merely exist in it; but otherwise if they existed only in it, so distinction proceeding from form cannot fail to be formal, although a distinction exercised in it and proceeding from elsewhere, namely from matter, can fail to be formal and be material.

Nevertheless, it remains true that there is a disparity between the example and the matter under discussion, arising from the fact that the aforesaid distinction exercised in forms proceeds from matter as from a term that is in some way extrinsic, namely one that does not essentially constitute form; and therefore form is individuated and is proximately distinguished from another form by itself, that is, by the relation it has to matter. The entitative parts of substance, however, proceed from quantity as from an intrinsic formal cause, in the same way that being white proceeds from whiteness. Thus substance does not have parts, nor a distinction of its parts, by itself, that is, through the mere relation to quantity as to an extrinsic formal cause, but precisely insofar as it is subject to quantity and is informed by it.

Nor does the first example, which will be offered in this answer concerning two rational souls, establish anything. For two rational souls can differ materially even though they are acts and forms, because they are individuated through matter as through the first and radical principle of their individuation. Accordingly, although that distinction is exercised in substantial forms, it does not proceed from them; and thus it can fail to be formal and specific and instead be material and purely individual.

17 Nor does the second example concerning two Angels numerically distinguished on account of their individual differences prove anything. First, because, as we shall say below, the distinction between two Angels on account of their individual differences is not a purely individual distinction arising from purely individual differences; for in them specific and individual unity and distinction are not distinguished virtually, or on the basis of something in reality, but only on the part of our mode of conception, as we shall say in the treatise on Angels created by God. Thus that very individual distinction, so to speak, is specific distinction, and accordingly can and must arise from form insofar as form is form. Here, however, as we have already noted, we are speaking only of purely individual unity and distinction, which precisely because it is such must be material and proceed from matter. Secondly, because even if it is granted without qualification that in Angels the individual difference is virtually distinguished from the specific difference, this nevertheless does not weaken the force of our reason, as will appear more fully from what we shall say below at nn. 56 and 57, where we shall clarify this matter with the testimony of St. Thomas.

From what has been said, another solution employed by the opponents also collapses, namely that the distinction proceeding from form is formal and specific when it arises from form according to what is formal in form, but not when it proceeds from it according to what is material in it, although both are proper to such form and accord with it insofar as it is such. Nevertheless, because the individuation of the entire composite must proceed from substantial form according to what is material in it, not according to what is formal in it, distinction proceeding from form in this respect, namely according to the individual difference, or haecceity of form, can be material and numerical, but not formal and specific.

Thus, from what has been said, this evasion collapses no less than the preceding one. ¹ To understand this more clearly, it should be recalled what we said at no. 1, namely that we are not speaking of the individual difference, or of the material reason or principle of individuation, taken metaphysically, but of individuation, or the material reason and principle of individuation, taken physically; because every metaphysical reason must be founded in a physical entity, accepted as physical, and derived from it as from its first root.

18 Hence a fuller development of St. Thomas’s reason is drawn from this source, by which the aforesaid evasion vanishes. For either substantial form, accepted physically and according to what it is physically individual and the principle of individuation, says something material physically beyond itself, as it is the first principle of specification and specific distinction, or it adds nothing real, physically material beyond itself as it is physically form, and says only that it is physically formal being, as quod? If the latter is said, then form, according to what pertains to the physical order and has the character of a physical principle with respect to the composite, will be only the root of formal specific distinction; for in this order it adds nothing beyond itself that is physically material, but whatever is found in it is physically something formal, namely quod. If, however, the former is asserted, then that which is materially such must arise as from the first root, from matter; and accordingly, although it may be exercised and found in the substantial form itself (the only form of which we speak in this question), it must not proceed from it, but from matter; for just as formally being, and physically such, cannot proceed from anywhere except form, so material being, which has the character of such physically, cannot derive its order from anything as first principle except matter.

19 This is confirmed and explained from what we recently said, considered now in this form. Since something material and metaphysical with respect to metaphysical composition—that is, genus—is found in material substances, then, insofar as it is something material, it must arise as from the first root from matter itself and not from form, as Aristotle and St. Thomas, by an efficacious reason in Logica, disp. 5, num. 75 and afterward, show, as do our Complutensians. Therefore, since some other material reason is found in substantial form, and likewise in the composite arising from it, in the metaphysical order—that is, the purely individual difference of such form and composite from another of the same species—the aforesaid difference cannot fail to arise as from the first principle from matter and not from form itself. Thus every difference arising from form insofar as form is such, and thus as from the first physical principle to which such an effect is ultimately reduced, must arise from the same form according to what physically says being formally, namely quo; and consequently such a difference cannot fail to be at once formal and specific.

Finally, it is confirmed. For although a material form has material being in itself, as our Complutens. hold in 1 and 2 Physic., and likewise matter; nevertheless, when the two are compared, the first source, so to speak, of the materiality of the aforesaid form is matter itself, and not conversely. Therefore this is a sign that the entire material being of the substantial form and of the composite, and accordingly the individual difference of each, must arise from matter as from the first root. The consequence seems legitimate. The antecedent, however, is proved. For this causal statement is true: Because form is produced by matter, or because according to its being it depends on matter, the aforesaid form is material; but not conversely. Because material being is being potential, insofar as it is opposed to actuality and formality, it must proceed as from a first root, from the first in this genus, namely from first and pure potency, that is, from matter, according to that Aristotelian axiom: the first in each genus is the cause of those which are after it in that genus.

§ IV. A second reason is proposed for the Aristotelian and Thomistic doctrine,

20 The second and principal reason supporting the assertion, by which the solutions previously employed are more thoroughly refuted in answer to the preceding reason, can be reduced to this form. Since a form subsisting by its very nature, entirely separated from matter as from a receptacle, cannot be otherwise than one numerically—or cannot fail to possess the whole species fully—and therefore one cannot assign to it anything metaphysically or physically material on account of which it might be the root of its purely individual distinction from any other; therefore, precisely because a form is of such a condition that it can be multiplied numerically and can be in some way the principle of the individuation and multiplication of the composite, and therefore there is in it something material physically or metaphysically on account of which it can in either order be in some way the principle of purely numerical and individual distinction, this must arise as from the first principle, namely from the fact that that form is not entirely separated from matter as from a receptacle, but is ordered to it as to a receptacle and the first reason and root of such multiplication and purely individual distinction. Accordingly, the aforesaid receptacle will be the first reason for such multiplication. Just as, because sight is such insofar as it regards the visible, the visible is the first root and origin of all other things belonging to the visible order; and hence this causal statement is true and a priori: Because the visible is given, sight and vision are given. The antecedent is evident in Angels, who, because they are forms subsisting from themselves and entirely separated from matter as from a receptacle, possess everything mentioned in the same antecedent. This itself can be explained by the example of whiteness given by St. Thomas, 1 part., quaest. 50, artic. 4. Whiteness could not be otherwise than one numerically if it were separated from its subject both in actuality and in aptitude, such as in no way to bear a relation to it; for then it would have nothing from which it could be multiplied numerically.

The first consequence, however, clearly follows from the antecedent. For whenever the negation is the adequate cause of a negation, the affirmation is likewise the adequate cause of an affirmation. Thus, if the negation of purely individual multiplication in some form—and therefore that it can be only one numerically—is adequately inferred from its lack of matter and receptacle, there is no reason why its purely individual multiplication should be inferred as from the first root from the presence of matter and a receptacle in such form, or from the fact that form has matter and a receptacle in which it is received.

21 This reason is taken from St. Thomas in the place cited and in 1 part., quaest. 41, art. 6; e quaest. 44, art. 1; and quaest. 75, art. 3 de anima, lect. 8, which he himself derives from Aristotle in the same place, text. 8, in these words: The nature of a species is individuated through matter; hence individuating principles and individual accidents are beyond the essence of the species. Thus it happens that several individuals are found under one species which, although they do not differ in the nature of the species, nevertheless differ according to individuating principles. For this reason, in all things having form in matter, the thing itself and its quiddity are not altogether the same; Socrates, for example, is not his humanity. But in things which do not have form in matter, such as simple forms, nothing can exist beyond the essence of the species, because the form itself is the whole essence; and therefore several individuals of one species cannot exist in such things, nor can the thing and its quiddity differ in them.

This whole argument can be clarified further from the same holy Doctor. Individuals of the same species agree in a perfection intrinsically considered with respect to specific essence, such that the whole of that perfection is found in each of them, and they differ only with respect to diverse substantial modes of having it. But where the specific nature subsists by its very nature and is entirely—or both in actuality and in aptitude—separated from matter and a receptacle, no plurality or diversity of modes of having it can exist; therefore neither can there be plurality or distinction of individuals. Accordingly, whenever this occurs, it is a sign that the form constituting such a nature is not entirely separated from matter and a receptacle, but can be multiplied numerically through its order to diverse matters and receptacles as to the first roots of such multiplication.

This final consequence is evident from the first and from what has recently been said. The first, however, is also clear from both premises. The minor, in which the difficulty lies, can be explained and proved as follows. Diversity of those modes requires that each of those individuals participate in the specific nature in a limited manner, that is, not adequately, and only so far as participation is possible on the part of the mode of participating; otherwise those modes could not be mutually distinct and unequal. But where the specific nature has a being entirely separated from matter, nothing is found from which such limitation can proceed; for since each thing is limited by its opposite, as act by potency, the limitation and constriction of the act—which the specific nature is with respect to individuals—must likewise be effected by an opposite, namely by potency or matter. Therefore neither can a multiplicity of the aforesaid modes be found there. On these matters, see what our Complutensians teach about the limitation of potency by its act in libris Physic., disput. 9, num. 15 and 16, and also what we shall say below at no. 28.

22 It is finally confirmed and explained.

Since being itself, that is, self-subsistent existence, cannot be otherwise than numerically one, because it is entirely irreceptible and consequently unlimited; and therefore, because the divine nature is its self-subsistent existence, it cannot be multiplied numerically. For the same reason, any form entirely irreceptible cannot be multiplied numerically. Consequently, if a form can be multiplied numerically and participates in it inadequately by reason of diverse individual modes of participating in it, this arises from the subject and receptacle on account of which it is limited and constricted, so that it is not had adequately but only insofar as possible on the part of the mode of having it.

This second consequence clearly follows from the first. The first, however, follows from the antecedent, as will be evident to the observer. Hence for this reason the Angelic Doctor often asserts that every individual of the angelic nature has a weakness within its species, and that therefore no other can exist within it. The sense of these words is not that within the range of that species something can be so perfect as to have positively infinite perfection, in the way in which Scotus and others understand the holy Doctor; but only that it has the specific nature in an infinitely negative way with respect to the mode of having it, that is, adequately and without determination to some mode, a mode of participation limited in the manner just described; because it does not have form received in matter. It is proper to matter to be the root of the aforesaid limitation and individual multiplication. Thus, whenever a form is distinguished purely individually from another, such a distinction, and accordingly individuation, cannot fail to proceed from matter and the receptacle as from its radical receptacle.

23 It makes no difference if one objects that specific differences in forms subsisting per se and entirely separated from matter, such as Angels, have a being limited in themselves and are able to limit and contract generic nature; therefore, for the same reason, the aforesaid individual modes will be possible in them, since they are limited in themselves and by their own properties, and are consequently able to limit and determine specific nature even though it is entirely separated from matter. Consequently, in those natures that have form in matter, there will arise no distinction or limitation of individual modes from the matter in which the aforesaid form is received as from the first and radical principle of its limitation and individuation.

The answer is to grant the antecedent and deny both consequences; and the reason for the disparity is this. For the specific differences in Angels can be assigned a sufficient root, or foundation, of their limitation, namely their own actual essence, since it accords with the aforesaid differences that, like the angelic essence, they be formal and actual. With respect, however, to the aforesaid modes, or individual differences, no similar foundation can be given; for it would belong to them to be limited through the mode of matter and potency, as has been shown; and the same specific nature, being entirely separated from matter and therefore not including form receivable in the potency of matter, cannot be the root or foundation of so different a limitation.

This same disparity can be clarified further from the fact that, as we have just indicated, a specific difference in Angels is intelligible as limiting and contracting the generic degree because it restricts that degree through the mode of act and form; and accordingly it can be conceived as received in it and actuating it, as is clear from itself. The mode, or individual difference, however, unless it has material being, derived from matter or the receptacle, cannot be conceived as constricting specific nature; for when it is compared with nature as with act and form, it cannot limit it except through the mode of passive potency, or as its condition, or as something holding itself on the part of matter and the receptacle and deriving its origin from it as from its first root. Thus is preserved the principle that each thing is limited by its opposite, as act by potency, or by something that derives its origin from potency and the receptacle as from the first principle.

§ V. The arguments of the first opinion are refuted except the last.

24 To the first argument, the antecedent having been granted, the consequence must be denied. To prove this, it must be denied that substantial form, as it is this, is most proper to the composite as this, because form is this by reason of matter; and accordingly it is proper to the entire composite by reason of the same matter, as it is this. Thus matter, as this, is most proper to the aforesaid composite insofar as it is this, according to that Aristotelian axiom: That by which each such thing is, is more especially so. Hence the statement made there is false, namely that the very matter which now constitutes one substantial individual can immediately constitute another, if it is understood of first matter, as it is this positively, as will be explained below; in this respect it is the first and radical principle of individuation, even though it is granted that the same matter, as numerically one negatively, but positively diverse, can successively constitute diverse substantial individuals.

25 To the first confirmation, the antecedent must be denied; because existence, being a second and very perfect act, belongs to the composite by reason of form, whereas individuation must belong to it by reason of matter, as has been shown. St. Thomas means neither the opposite of this in the place cited above, but only that the same thing is receptive of existence and is the individual, namely quod, although individuation and purely individual distinction arise from a different root.

To the second confirmation, the antecedent must be denied. To prove this, it must be said that it is one thing for the first principle and root of individuation and purely individual distinction to be an actually first principle, or a principle in actuality, and an actually existing being; but another thing for it to be truly in itself the principle from which individuation itself arises, and finally for it itself to have a true entity, even though it is a principle, and an entity which is potency. We say, therefore, that if we speak properly and in the strict sense, the latter of these belongs to the first principle of individuation, but not the former, as is clear from what our Complutensians assert in 1. ib. Physicor., disput. 3, num. 18, and from what we have noted in this question and shall say below. Hence it is no wonder that the character of the first principle and root of individuation belongs to first matter; and that, for this reason, because it is pure potency and because it does not have existence, from which the reason of being is usually derived, it is called a being in potency, as our Complutensians explain in loco cit. num. 19 and 20.

26 To the second and principal argument, the antecedent having been granted, the consequence must be denied. To prove this, it must be said that form is the first root of the positive specification of matter and of the entire composite, not merely because it completes matter, but because it first gives matter the aforesaid species; since matter, as presupposed to form as precisely giving such specification, is indifferent and has only a negative specific unity. Nevertheless, the same form, as it is this, in the respect in which it could be the root of the individuation of matter, merely completes matter; it does not first give individuation either to matter or to the composite. For matter, as this, determinate and appropriated to this form and composite rather than to another, is presupposed to them as the root of both; because, as we recently said, individuation and purely individual distinction is material unity and distinction, whereas specification and specific distinction is formal unity and distinction. Therefore the former proceeds from matter; the latter, however, must proceed from form as from the first principle.

27 To the third argument, the antecedent must be denied if it is understood of matter as this positively and numerically. For form, as this, is fitted to this numerically individuated matter, as this positively—that is, as determined numerically by this matter or to this matter by quantity—so that it cannot be received in matter which is numerically another and positively individuated. To the first proof to the contrary, the antecedent must be denied when understood of the very same matter as numerically the same and positively individuated, although the very same matter, by identity and negative unity, is under the form of an embryo and afterward under an animal form, for example, a horse, as our Complutensians teach in lib. Physicor., disput. 3, num. 34, and disput. 6, num. 11, and in lib. de Generatione, disput. 5, num. 38. Hence the consequence must be denied in the same proportional sense.

From this, with regard to the second proof, what seems to be presupposed in it must be denied, namely that there is some collection of horse souls that can be received in this numerically individuated matter, as this positively. For although all substantial forms under the lunar heaven can be received in this numerically individuated matter—precisely, as has been said, by negative numerical unity, because all sublunar matter is only numerically one in a negative way—nevertheless, if matter is considered as numerically one positively, any matter, as this, seeks this form and not another; and it cannot regard another unless the aforesaid matter becomes another through a distinct determination to another, diverse quantity.

28 To the confirmation, it is sufficiently clear from what our Complutensians say in lib. Physic., disput. 6, num. 9 and afterward, where they explain how it is not enough for the same man to rise again numerically that the same numerically individuated soul alone be given to him; and in what way matter is distributed among those who feed on human flesh, so that each rises again with his own matter and form.

To the fourth argument, the major is to be granted in accordance with what we have so often indicated, and the minor denied. To prove this, the inference must also be denied. To prove the denial, one must deny that just as matter limits form, so form limits matter—not indeed in the sense that form in no way limits matter, but in the sense that there is complete parity between the two with respect to the aforesaid function. For matter limits form through the mode of potency and of the first subject, which is not receivable in another as in a subject; and therefore the limitation whereby form is limited must be referred back to it as to the first principle, with respect to individual being. This is because the opposite that limits in this manner is adapted to limit another opposite with respect to individual being and purely individual distinction, as is clear from what has been said and will be developed at length below. Form, however, limits in a different way, namely through the mode of act and of communicable form. Thus it cannot limit its opposite with respect to individual being, but with respect to specific being communicable from itself to another, as one superior to its inferior, as will be explained more fully there.

29 Therefore, since in a substantial composite, as we have indicated above, being is limited both according to species and according to number, and since these two are so mutually opposed that they differ according to these two reasons and in the manner just indicated, there must be two limiting principles of different kinds, and two opposites, into which the aforesaid limitation is ultimately referred as into its first root. Accordingly, since these mutually limiting opposites can be only two, namely first act, that is, substantial form, and first potency, namely matter; and one of them, namely first potency, cannot by its limitation be the first root of specific unity, as the Doctors commonly hold, it follows that the limitation of form with respect to matter entails only that the aforesaid form be limited to specific being; and accordingly it remains to matter alone to limit itself to numerical being.

§ VI. The last argument of the first opinion is solved.

30 To the last argument, it must be admitted that each thing is an individual insofar as it is a being and has being. Accordingly, just as the rational soul is not a being, nor has being, dependently on the body as a material cause from whose potency it is brought forth, so neither does it have individuation dependently on the same body, or matter, as a material cause from whose potency it is brought forth. Nevertheless, because the same rational soul, although not brought forth from the potency of matter, is nevertheless, like that soul, an essential part of man, and intrinsically regards matter, not as that from which it is made, but in which it is received; and likewise, although it is not brought forth, it is nevertheless occasioned by the body and matter, as our Complutensians teach in lib. Physicor., disput. 4, num. 20. Naturally, at least, it cannot be created unless occasion is taken from the body, because it cannot exist unless received in it. Accordingly, its individuation is taken as from its first root from the same matter, or body, as from the term of its relation and its pure receptacle and limiting principle, considered per se and as always indispensably accompanying it. Moreover, this same individuation is occasioned by the same body, and naturally, at least, it cannot begin unless occasion is taken from it. Although, because it has absolute being, or being independent of the body insofar as considered in itself, since it subsists per se, its being and individuation, once produced, do not depend on the body as an occasion except with respect to their beginning, not their end. In other words, it does not depend on the body so that, when the body perishes, the soul itself and its individuation also perish.

31 This answer, in each of its two parts, is taken from St. Thomas. The Angelic Doctor taught the first part, namely that the rational soul is individuated through its relation to matter and a singular body, and accordingly from that same body as from the first root and term of the aforesaid relation, in his question on spiritual creatures, art. 9, in these words: It must be said that although the body is not of the essence of the soul, nevertheless the soul according to its essence has a relation to the body insofar as it is essential to it to be the form of the body; and therefore the body is included in the definition of the soul. Just as therefore, it belongs to the reason of a soul that it be the form of a body, so it belongs to the reason of this soul, insofar as it is this soul, that it have a relation to this body.

With respect, however, to the second part, namely that the same rational soul is individuated by the body as by an occasion in the manner just described, the Angelic Doctor taught the same answer in de ente, et essentia, cap. 6, where, speaking of the individuation of the aforesaid soul, he says: Although its individuation depends on the body occasionally with respect to its beginning, because it does not acquire its being individuated except in the body, of which it is the act, nevertheless it need not depend on the body once the body is destroyed. For since it has absolute being, from which it acquired its being individuated, namely from having become the form of this body, that being always remains individuated; and therefore Avicenna says that the individuation and multiplication of souls depends on the body with respect to its beginning, but not with respect to its end.

32 It makes no difference if one says that, just as the rational soul has self-subsistent being with respect to its end, so it has it with respect to its beginning; yet, notwithstanding this, a body is required for its individuation with respect to its beginning; therefore likewise with respect to its end. Accordingly, just as its individuation and being depend on the body with respect to their beginning, as on an occasion, so likewise with respect to their continuance and end; or, if they do not depend on it with respect to their continuance, neither do they with respect to their beginning.

The answer is to deny both consequences; for there is a disparity between the reason St. Thomas introduced in de potentia, quaest. 3, art. 10, namely that the soul was made by creation. Thus he says: Created things are made by God in their natural perfection, for what is perfect naturally precedes what is imperfect, according to the Philosopher, etc. The soul, however, does not have the perfection of its nature outside the body, because it is not of itself a complete species of any nature, but a part of human nature; otherwise soul and body would not become one except accidentally. Therefore the human soul was not created outside the body. Yet, when the soul was once created with its natural perfection, which accrues to it through union with the body, it is not incongruous that it afterward lose that perfection, because it is united to a corruptible body and a union that can be lost, and because it does not fill the entire capacity of matter; hence it can lose this perfection. And because the soul always has self-subsistent being, even after losing that perfection ², it remains with its being and individuation.

33 From what was said in the preceding difficulty, it is sufficiently established that matter is the first and radical principle of the individuation of the whole composite, and consequently also of the substantial form. But once this has been explained, the question immediately presents itself: whether matter, taken in itself and precisely speaking, or matter marked by quantity, possesses the character of the aforementioned first and radical principle? Once this too has been explained, the entire question will remain clear. For although, in producing the determinate individuation of a composite, the union of matter and form also concurs directly, it is nevertheless certain that, in this union, individuation cannot ultimately be resolved, whether that of the whole itself or of matter or form: for the singular and individual union, insofar as it rests on the side of matter, certainly presupposes matter to be individual. Likewise, the individual union of form cannot fail to suppose form—and consequently matter also—to be singular and individual: for the union is this rather than that precisely because it is the form of this; and it is the form of this because this is the form of this matter, as was shown above. We therefore raise no further difficulty concerning the union. Since, however, the title of the difficulty involves some ambiguity, we must explain it before stating the opponents’ view.

§ I. Explanation of the title.

34 From the explanation of the title, it must be noted that three things can be understood by “matter marked by quantity.” First, a certain accidental composite arising from matter and from quantity itself, here taken in actuality and in act. Second, matter itself—not quantity taken formally, as the formal principle, and directly, but a certain mode superadded to that same matter, by reason of which it is determined or marked by a certain quantity, that is, by this quantity and not that one. Thus it entails a certain concrete, or quasi-concrete, arising from the aforesaid mode, seal, and glazing together with matter itself, by reason of which matter is said to be marked by the aforesaid quantity. Thus, although this mode and the determination or marking caused by it, and consequently matter, may be introduced directly as marked, quantity is nevertheless said to be marked by means of it, because quantity itself is introduced obliquely and cannot, without being so introduced, render matter marked with respect to a certain determinate substantial form and a certain determinate quantity. The whole question is therefore best explained by the fact that matter marked by quantity is the first principle of individuation, for in this complex both matter and the mode and marking are introduced directly, while quantity is introduced obliquely.

Third, matter itself insofar as it means pure and bare materiality, apart from the aforesaid mode superadded to it and naturally distinct from it, yet with something conjoined to it: namely, insofar as it means matter itself as having this quantity, and not that one, by the mode of the first root; or, as many hold, insofar as, by the mode of the first and radical principle, it means its connection or relation to this quantity rather than that one. For by reason of this it is designated and determined for this form and this composite rather than that one.

35 The title of the difficulty is therefore not understood to concern matter marked by quantity in the precise sense of any one of the markings just enumerated. Rather, abstracting from all of them, it means matter marked or determined by quantity, whether this determination occurs in the first or the second of the modes just described. In the following difficulties, however, we shall explain by which of those modes matter must be marked in order to be the first and radical principle of individuation, so that we may separate what is more certain and generally accepted from what is not so certain and accepted. For that matter marked by quantity is the principle of individuation is a point more certain and universally accepted among Thomists, even though it is not equally certain and accepted by which of the aforesaid modes it is marked or determined by quantity so as to be the first radical principle of individuation.

It follows that one can understand why St. Thomas and his disciples use the complex expression matter marked by quantity when investigating whether matter, insofar as it bears quantity in one of the ways described, possesses the character of the first and radical principle of individuation. Clearly, as we shall say below and have already touched upon, it is peculiar to matter, insofar as it imports quantity in one of the ways described, to be rendered apt, determinate, and marked for having this form rather than that one, for being a part of this composite rather than that one, and thus for being the root both of this form and of this composite as this and individual.

36 This can be explained further: for to ask whether matter marked by quantity is the first root of individuation is the same as to ask whether matter, insofar as it is this and is singular by its due mode, is altogether through quantity the principle of the aforesaid individuation. For being altogether singular and being matter marked are the same: since only singular matter can of itself and apart from anything else be designated as singular, and therefore the Dialecticians use the term “marked individual” to signify something wholly determinate to be singular or individual. Hence, if matter, insofar as it bears quantity in one of the ways described, can be the principle of individuation, it must be so: for by importing that quantity it becomes this and wholly singular, and consequently matter marked; and therefore, when investigating whether matter, insofar as it bears or involves quantity in one of the explained modes, is the first root and principle of individuation, St. Thomas and his disciples use this manner of investigation excellently: namely, whether matter marked by quantity—which is the same as matter made this, determinate, and singular by its due mode and designated through a determinate quantity—is the first principle of the aforesaid individuation.

§ II. The first opinion is introduced.

37 The first opinion asserts that matter, taken in itself and precisely speaking, but not matter sealed by quantity, is the first and radical principle of the individuation of the whole substantial composite. Thus Albertus, as cited by Flandria, 7 Metaphysic., quaest. 22, art. 1; Suarez and others agree in part, as is clear from what was said in the preceding difficulty.

First, it is proved. For St. Thomas absolutely affirms that matter is the first principle of the individuation of the substantial composite, without any mention of quantity or intervening marking: in 1 part., quaest. 3, art. 2 ad tertium, and in several other places cited under individuum in the Tabula aurea, num. 21, and especially in his little treatise On the Principle of Individuation, in these words: Therefore, whatever is the first subject of all things in the process of generation, and is incomplete insofar as nothing of that genus is predicated of it, namely matter, must necessarily be the first principle of being incommunicable, which is the first individual.

First, it is confirmed. For in the same treatise he not only said absolutely that matter is the first principle of individuation, but added that this pertains to matter alone insofar as it preserves the character of a first principle; and thus he says: For matter alone is in the principle of individuation insofar as it preserves the character of the first

Second, it is confirmed from the same holy Doctor, part. 1, quaest. 29, art. 1, where he establishes a distinction between the individuation of accidents and that of substance, according to which substance is individuated through itself rather than through accidents; and thus he says: Although the universal and the particular are found in all genera, the individual is nevertheless found in the genus of substance in a special way: for substance is individuated through itself, but accidents are individuated through their subject, which is substance; for this something is said insofar as it exists in this subject. Accordingly, the individuals of substance also appropriately have a special name in comparison with the others. As he also taught in q. 9, De potentia, art. 1 ad 8, saying: Accidents, however, are not individuated except through their subjects; but substance alone is individuated through itself and through its proper principles, and therefore the particular has an appropriate name of its own in the genus of substance alone. Therefore, if matter is once the first principle of the individuation of the whole material substance, as we said in the preceding difficulty, it cannot have the character of such a principle as accidents have, but only insofar as it is taken in itself and precisely speaking.

38 Secondly, it is proved from reason. Since matter, taken in itself and precisely speaking, is the first part and first root of the substantial composite, it will likewise be the first part, first root, and principle of its individuation. The antecedent seems evident, because, as our Complutensians teach in lib. Physicorum, disput. 15, num. 19 and thereafter, from a comparison between matter and form, which alone are the parts of the substantial composite, matter precedes form insofar as it is what has the potency to be produced into the other. Consequently, it is proved. For since each thing is one and individual in itself, as being is, it follows that whatever, taken precisely, is the first part and first root of the substantial composite must also be the first part and first root of individual unity, and consequently of its individuation.

Third, because specification is derived from form, so also individuation is derived from matter, as is clear from what was said in the preceding difficulty. Thus the individuation of the substantial composite is to be derived from the first root in matter taken in itself, not from matter insofar as it bears quantity in some way, or as matter marked by quantity. The consequence is evident. Because specification, precisely insofar as it is derived from form as from the first root, is derived from form alone according to what it bears of itself viewed precisely and by its proper merits, so also, precisely because individuation is derived from matter as from the first root, it must be derived from matter itself and according to what it bears of itself precisely viewed in its proper merits, not insofar as it bears quantity in some way.

39 Fourth, because generic unity is derived from matter alone as from the first root, according to what our Complutensians teach excellently in Logic, disput. 5, num. 75. Thus also individuation, or individual unity—the reason why one individual differs from another by number alone—is derived in the same way. The consequence is evident from the parity of reason. For generic unity is derived from matter alone as from the first root because such unity is material insofar as it is predicated exactly of a thing that stands in the place of matter and of potency with respect to specific differences. Thus, since individual unity is also material, it follows that it too is derived from matter alone. Especially because individual unity is more material than generic unity: for the genus is counted among the formal degrees with respect to species, even though it stands in the place of matter with respect to specific difference; individuation and individual unity, however, have being only through a mode of condition or material determination with respect to species.

It is confirmed. For matter is of itself incommunicable to anything in the same way in which the superior reason is present in inferiors: because it is of itself irreceptible into any other. Thus, of itself and according to its proper merits viewed precisely, it will be the first root of individuation. The consequence is evident. For what is most powerful in the individual as such is the reason of the altogether incommunicability just described. Thus, for the present purpose of a first root, what belongs to matter according to its proper merits and is incommunicable in the manner indicated suffices.

40 Fifth.

40 Fifth, because before matter actually receives this quantity rather than that one, or is determined by some mode naturally distinct from quantity to this one rather than that one, or has this one radically within itself, or bears a relation to it, it must be understood to be singular and individual. Thus matter itself, taken in itself and precisely speaking, will be individual and the first root of the individuation of the whole composite. The antecedent seems evident from itself. For this quantity rather than that one—or, equivalently, singular and individual quantity—cannot be received except in singular matter. Neither can common matter, but only singular matter, be determined or bear a relation to this quantity rather than that one, or contain it by the mode of a root; for common matter is of itself indifferent to any quantity.

The consequence in its first part follows from the antecedent. For precisely because matter is presupposed to be individual before it in some way imports singular quantity, it cannot in any way be rendered singular by it, just as neither can it be rendered singular by this substantial form rather than that one, or by any other singular accident: for substantial form and all singular accidents are likewise received in singular matter and consequently presuppose it as singularized. Matter must therefore be individual of itself.

In its second part, the same consequence is likewise clear. For matter is the first part of the substantial composite; and thus, precisely because it is of itself, rather than marked by quantity, individual, it cannot fail to be the first root of the composite’s individuation, just as by its own character it is the first root of its materiality.

41 Lastly, because matter cannot be the first root of the composite’s individuation insofar as it is actually affected by quantity and includes it, nor insofar as by some superadded mode naturally distinct from quantity it is determined to this quantity rather than that one, nor finally insofar as it in some way contains this numerical quantity, it can in no way be the principle of individuation insofar as it is sealed by quantity. The consequence needs no proof once the matters explained in the exposition of the title are posited: for, as is clear from itself and from what was said there, matter can be marked by quantity only in these three ways, and only thus marked can it be the first root of individuation.

The antecedent in its first part, however, seems certain. For no accident can be required for the individuation of a substantial composite as something actually and actively present, or intrinsically included either in the individual itself or in the principle of its individuation. Thus, even if God separated quantity and the other accidents from Peter, he would still remain with his individuation. Just as the accidents of bread can be separated from the bread itself in the sacrament of the Eucharist, those accidents nevertheless remain individual and singular. With greater reason, the same must be said of substance itself when separated from those accidents: for it depends on them less than they depend on it.

In its second part, too, the point is clear. For beyond matter, form, and union, no other entity or substantial mode is found in a substantial composite, as will be clearer from what is to be said in dub. 4. The same antecedent also holds for the third part. Because the numerical substantial form is introduced in matter before numerical quantity, as is clear from what our Complutensians teach in lib. De generatione, disput. 2, num. 68 and 76; for quantity is not received in matter alone, but in the whole composite. Thus matter will contain this substantial form by the mode of a root before this quantity; and consequently, since matter cannot fail to be singular in that same antecedent in which it contains this numerical form, it cannot be individuated by having this numerical quantity rather than that one.

42 It is confirmed. For if matter, insofar as marked by quantity, were the principle of individuation, it would follow that both matter and form, as actually and in execution conferring the first degree, namely substantial being, would be something not singular but merely common. This, however, is absurd; therefore, etc. The minor follows from itself, because whatever is actually and actively given on the part of a thing must be something singularized. The sequence, however, is proved. For, as St. Thomas teaches from Aristotle in 1 part., quaest. 76, art. 6, form is immediately united to matter with respect to the first degree it confers on matter, such that quantity is not required even by the mode of disposition or in the genus of material cause. This is because matter is of itself determined to receive the first degree that can come to it from substantial form, namely substantial being. Thus, if matter is not individual except insofar as sealed by quantity, it will not be able to be singular in that antecedent in which it actually receives form according to the degree just stated. Consequently, neither will form conferring being upon it in that same antecedent be singular.

§ III. The true and ancient opinion of Aristotle and St. Thomas.

43 It must nevertheless be said that matter sealed by quantity in one of the three modes enumerated in the explanation of the title from num. 34 through num. 37 is the first and radical principle of the individuation of the whole substantial composite, and consequently the principle of its substantial form. Thus Aristotle, 5 Metaphysic., text. 12, in these words: Moreover, some things are one according to number, others according to species, others according to genus, and others according to analogy: according to number, indeed, those whose matter is one, etc. St. Thomas explains these words as follows in ibid., lect. 8: He posits another division of the one: some things are one numerically, some in species, some in genus, and some by analogy. They are one according to number whose matter is one. For matter, insofar as it stands under marked dimensions, is the principle of the form’s individuation, and therefore the singular belongs to it from matter, insofar as it is one numerically as divided from others.

The Angelic Doctor likewise explains the same testimony of the Philosopher in his commentary on Boethius, De Trinitate, q. 4, art. 2 ad primum, in these words: When the Philosopher says that things are one numerically whose matter is one, this must be understood of matter marked by quantity, which underlies dimensions; otherwise he would have to say that all generables and corruptible things are one numerically, since their matter is one.

The Angelic Doctor teaches the same in De ente et essentia, cap. 2, letter H, where he speaks as follows: Therefore it should be noted that matter is not the principle of individuation when taken in just any way, but only matter marked by quantity. By matter marked by quantity I mean matter considered under determinate dimensions. This matter, however, is not included in the definition of man as man, but would be included in the definition of Socrates, if Socrates had a definition; whereas in the definition of man, unmarked matter is included. For this bone and this flesh are not included in the definition of man, but bone and flesh absolutely, which are the unmarked matter of man. In the cited treatise on Boethius, q. 4, art. 2, in the answer to the second, he says: Since dimensions are accidents in themselves, they cannot be the principle of the individual unity of substance; rather, matter insofar as it underlies such dimensions is understood to be the principle of such unity and multiplicity. In the answer to the fourth he asserts: Those things that differ numerically in the genus of substance do not differ only accidentally, but also in form and matter. But if it is asked why this form differs from that one, no other reason will be found except that it exists in this marked matter; nor is any other reason found why this matter is divided from that one except quantity. Thus matter subjected to dimension is understood to be the principle of this diversity.

44 The Angelic Doctor also taught this in 4 sentent., dist. 12, q. 1, art. 1, q. 3 ad tertium, and 3 part., q. 77, art. 2, where he requires two things for the individuation of a material thing: namely, the subject, or matter, and quantity. Finally, he defends this very point in 1 part., q. 3, art. 2 ad tertium; q. 30, art. 3; q. 50, art. 4; q. 54, art. 3 ad secundum; q. 56, art. 1 ad secundum; qq. 75 and 85, art. 1 ad secundum, and 1 contra gent., cap. 21, and 2 contra gent., cap. 92, and q. De malo, art. 1 ad octavum, and very often elsewhere. Thus both Aristotle and St. Thomas are followed by Capreolus in 2, dist. 3, q. 1, art. 2, concl. 2, and art. 3, in the answer to Scotus’s arguments, second in order, against the same conclusion; Cajetan, De ente et essentia, cap. 2, q. 5; Soncinas, 7 Metaphysic., qq. 33 and 34; Ferrara, 1 contra gent., cap. 21; Flandria, 7 Metaphys., q. 22, art. 3; Javellus, 5 Metaphysic., q. 15; Abulensis, 2 tom., on cap. 23; Exodi, q. 60, near the middle; Báñez, 1 part., q. 3, art. 2 ad secundum, and 1 De generat., cap. 5, q. 3, art. 8, asserting that our proposition as it stands must be accepted by all who profess themselves disciples of St. Thomas. The same is defended by Nazarenus, 1 part., q. 3, art. 2, unique controversy; González, q. 11, art. 1 ad 2, disput. 23, § 2, concl. 9; Ripa, q. 3, art. 2; Petrus a Jesu Maria, otherwise Serna Hispalensis, in his Logic, disput. 3, sect. 5, q. 5, q. 3, art. 1, asserting that this is the indisputable opinion of Aristotle and St. Thomas, and finally by very many others.

45 It makes no difference if, with Suarez, one answers that Aristotle never seems to have investigated and declared professedly and metaphysically the principle of individuation, but taught only in the physical manner, and as from a sign, that one material individual is distinguished numerically from another by quantity and other sensible accidents, that is, by matter marked by quantity. Thus the aforesaid matter has the character of the principle only insofar as it is known and perceived, not insofar as it is. In this same sense, it must be understood that St. Thomas says that matter itself marked by quantity is the first principle of individuation of material substance so many times.

It therefore makes no difference. First, because it would be strange that Aristotle in the same text should have treated at once both analogical, generic, and specific unity, on the one hand, and numerical unity, on the other, and that he should have assigned to the former their proper principle and root insofar as they are, while assigning to numerical unity alone a principle only insofar as it is known, not insofar as it is. Second, because Aristotle treated unity in the Metaphysics and in a metaphysical way, according as it stands in the place of a passion with respect to being, which is the proper object of metaphysics. Then, because the character of unity in this sense becomes very well known from recognizing the different modes of unity—namely, analogy, genus, and species—he also treated them in the same Metaphysics and in a metaphysical way, assigning to each its proper principle insofar as it is. Thus, when in the same place he also speaks of numerical unity and assigns its principle, he likewise treated it and its principle both insofar as it is and in a metaphysical way. For knowledge of this unity insofar as its being and its root no less contributes to an exact understanding of unity than knowledge of the other modes of unity. Especially because, as we saw from Aristotle in the preceding difficulty, the proper principle of the aforesaid unity insofar as it is cannot be form, but matter determined to this individual, or substantial composite, which, as will be clear from what is said immediately below, is nothing else than matter marked by quantity in one of the aforesaid modes.

46 It follows also that Suarez’s exposition cannot be adapted to the testimonies of St. Thomas. First, because Aristotle and the Angelic Doctor speak in the same way. Second, because the arguments we brought from Aristotle and St. Thomas in the preceding difficulty either prove nothing or merely suggest that matter marked by quantity is the principle of individuation insofar as it is, not only insofar as it is known, as will be clear to those considering them. Then, because the holy Master, both in the cited place from 3 part., q. 77, art. 2, and in treatise 70, q. 4, art. 2, and often elsewhere, concludes from this that matter, not taken in just any way but marked by quantity, is the first principle of the individuation of the whole substantial composite. For quantity in itself, as though from the first root, has a kind of individuation of its own. Thus matter insofar as it underlies quantity (in the manner explained at num. 116 and thereafter) must rightly be the first principle of individuation, according to the common maxim: nothing is such unless it is such of itself or subsists in it in some way something that is such of itself. This argument (as is clear from itself and will be clearer from what will be said at num. 49, 91, and 92, and in the following disputation from num. 21 through 27, and also at num. 38) proves that matter insofar as it underlies quantity, or is marked by quantity, has the character of the first principle of individuation, not only insofar as it is known, but also insofar as it is.

Finally, because Suarez’s exposition openly contradicts several testimonies of St. Thomas cited at num. 9 and 10, as is clear to the reader. Above all, however, it contradicts the testimony of the same holy Doctor in tract. 70, q. 4, art. 2, where he says: Matter considered in itself is neither the principle of diversity according to species nor according to number. But just as it is the principle of diversity according to genus insofar as it underlies a common form, so it is the principle of diversity according to number insofar as it underlies determinate dimensions. Thus, since these dimensions belong to the genus of accidents, numerical diversity is sometimes reduced to diversity of matter and sometimes to diversity of accidents, precisely by reason of the aforesaid dimensions. Other accidents, however, are not the principle of individuation; rather, they are the principle by which the distinction of individuals is known. In this way, too, individuation is attributed to the other accidents.

47 But if matter marked by quantity, and consequently quantity, were not in some sense—the sense explained below at num. 116 and thereafter—the principle of the individuation of material substance insofar as it is, there would be no such diversity as St. Thomas established in the place recently cited between quantity and the other accidents. For the other accidents also are signs by which the individuation of a substantial composite is known a posteriori, and the composite can be demonstrated through them. Accordingly, the two testimonies from St. Thomas, tract. 32, De natura materiae et dimensionibus interminatis, cap. 3, and tract. 29, De principio individuationis, which Suarez cites in disp. 5 of his Metaphysics, sect. 3, on his own behalf, do not press against this position; rather, as will be clear from what we shall cite below at num. 75, they strongly favor us, as will appear even more clearly from what will be said at num. 139.

§ IV. The opinion of Aristotle and St. Thomas is supported by a fundamental reason.

48 Because Francis Suarez says in the cited place, disput. 5, sect. 3, num. 4, concerning our assertion—which we have shown to be the very mind of Aristotle and St. Thomas by testimonies drawn from them—that he scarcely finds any foundation for it that can be reduced to Aristotle’s authority, after we have established the aforesaid assertion by testimonies of Aristotle and St. Thomas, and at the same time explained in what way the expositions adduced by Suarez to prevent an appearance of opposing the Philosopher and the Angelic Doctor are not correctly adapted to them, we have chosen to expound and explain from their roots a twofold fundamental reason in this and the following section, so that it may be clear whether the opinion of Aristotle and St. Thomas is established on solid foundations or not.

The first, therefore, and fundamental reason for the assertion is drawn from St. Thomas in the cited place on Boethius, De Trinitate, art. 2, and can be stated as follows. Because form cannot be the first root of the individuation of the whole substantial composite, and this must necessarily pertain to matter; but matter taken in itself and precisely speaking cannot possess the character of the aforesaid principle and root, matter itself, therefore, insofar as marked by quantity, will be the first principle and root of such individuation. The major follows from what we said at num. 11 and thereafter. The minor, however, is also clear. For matter taken in itself and precisely speaking is common to all forms and to all sublunar composites, and therefore cannot be proper to one individual rather than another. Thus it cannot be the first root of the individuation of this composite rather than that one.

The consequence plainly follows from both premises. First, because it is probable that by “quantity,” through which matter is marked, quantity is not understood mathematically but physically, that is, together with the qualities and sensible accidents by which it is affected. It is clear, however, that if the individuation of a substantial composite cannot be taken from the substantial form itself as from the first root, nor from matter itself taken precisely, then nothing else remains from which it can be taken except from matter as marked by accidents that dispose it to this substantial form rather than that one; or, equivalently, matter marked by sensible quantity understood physically.

49 Furthermore, and most importantly, because, as we shall explain in the following disputation at num. 24 and thereafter, quantity has this peculiarity among the other accidents: that in some way it has being as the root of its proper individuation. Thus matter, which taken in itself and precisely speaking is not the first root of individuation unless something is superadded to it, can possess the character of the aforesaid root if it is determined and marked through quantity. For just as, because fire is hot of itself and by nature, nothing can be hot unless it either is fire, contains fire, or in some way participates in it, so as to have a connection or order toward it, so quantity in itself in some way has material individuation and in some way is its first root. Therefore, nothing in material things has the character of an individual, or of its first root, unless it either is quantity, contains it, or bears a connection or relation to it—which amounts to the same thing—with matter marked by quantity in some way, as is clear from what was said at num. 34.

Finally, because the first root of the individuation of a substantial composite must be matter and not matter taken bare, it must be this same matter insofar as it imports some material accident on its part and concurs in a certain way with the reception of form, so that what is thereby preserved is that the first root of individuation is not substantial form but matter as such. For nothing except the aforesaid accident can be material on the part of matter and concur in a certain way with the aforesaid reception, as will be explained below at num. 116. And since quantity is the first material accident that holds on the part of matter (as was explained meanwhile by our Complutensians in the books De generatione, disput. 2, num. 97 and thereafter, and as we shall say from num. 119 through num. 124), it is necessary that matter, insofar as it in some way imports the aforesaid quantity and is marked by it, be the first root and principle of the individuation of the whole material composite.

50 It is confirmed and explained by a reason hinted at by the same Angelic Doctor. That which is the first root of the individuation of a substantial composite, when posited, first posits individuation; but when matter is marked through quantity, or—which is equivalent for the present purpose—marked by this quantity and not that one, the individuation of the whole composite is first posited. Thus matter, insofar as marked by the aforesaid quantity, will be the first root of such individuation. The major and its consequence are sufficiently clear. The minor, however, also follows from what was just said. For precisely when matter marked by this quantity is posited, matter is first posited as determined to this form and this composite rather than that one. But matter first determined to this form and composite rather than that one is that by which the individuation of the substantial form and the aforesaid composite is first posited. Consequently, matter insofar as marked by the aforesaid quantity will be that by which such individuation is first posited.

It makes no difference if one objects to this reason that if it proves anything, it proves quantity indeed to be the first and most powerful root of individuation, rather than matter, which is marked by quantity. This, however, seems absurd, because the first and most powerful root of substantial individuation cannot fail to be something substantial. Therefore, etc. The sequence is proved. For although matter marked by quantity may be the principle of individuation, when quantity and matter marked by it are compared, matter (as it is called in this reason) does not have being as the first root of individuation insofar as it is taken in itself, but insofar as it is marked by quantity. Thus it will have this by reason of quantity, and consequently quantity will be the most powerful root of the aforesaid individuation.

51 We answer that, if it is true that matter marked by quantity means matter insofar as it radically contains this quantity rather than that one, then the major concerning quantity so understood must be conceded, which, in the manner explained below at num. 133, is the same as matter itself insofar as it contains it. For when matter is considered in itself and insofar as it radically contains this quantity rather than that one, matter as containing it concurs more principally with individuation than matter itself taken in itself, as we shall say from num. 116 and thereafter. For matter insofar as it contains the aforesaid quantity is positively one numerically; taken in itself, however, it is at most one numerically in a negative sense.

Nevertheless, if matter marked by quantity means matter as actually affected by quantity and as informed by it through the mode of an inhering form, then it must be denied. For if it were true (as is considered in the following difficulty) that matter marked in this sense were the root of individuation, quantity actually present would either concur only obliquely, while matter would concur directly and thus more principally; or, if quantity concurred directly, it would not influence of itself what is prior and more essential in individuation, but what is posterior and bears the character of a property. Quantity actually inhering would thus have less principal influence, as will be clear from what will be said in the following difficulty.

§ V. The same opinion is established by another fully sufficient reason.

52 The second and most powerful reason for the same assertion is drawn from St. Thomas in the cited places, especially from the treatise On the nature of matter, and can be reduced to this form. Because material primary substances have from matter marked by quantity, as from the first root, the fact that they are material primary substances insofar as they are such, matter, insofar as marked by quantity, will be the first root of their individuation. The consequence seems evident, because the character of a material primary substance insofar as such consists in this, that it is individual and singular substance, as is clear from Aristotle’s Categories, in the chapter on substance. Thus, whatever was the first root of their primacy will also have the character of the first root of their individuation. The antecedent, however, is proved and explained. For material primary substances are constituted as primary because they are neither in a subject nor predicated of a subject. This occurs in them from the first root, namely, matter marked by quantity, according to the Philosopher’s words in 2 Metaphys., text. 30: The first in each genus is the cause and root of those that are after it in that genus. For matter marked by quantity is that to which it first belongs neither to be in a subject nor to be predicated of any subject, because it is itself the first subject and the first potency altogether irreceptible into anything else.

53 It is confirmed and explained by the reason touched upon above from St. Thomas, now, however, applied in this way. Because the generic character of material substance consists in a certain metaphysical character, holding by the mode of metaphysical potency with respect to the character of the difference, the generic character in them is therefore derived as from the first root from primary matter, which is primary and pure physical potency. Thus, because the individual and metaphysical character of the same material substance, or its character insofar as it is a primary substance in its own order, consists in this, that metaphysically speaking it is neither in a subject and hence is not predicated of a subject, it follows that it should be derived as from the first principle and physical root, from primary matter marked by quantity. For it is itself that to which it first belongs physically to be the first subject and first potency. By its being precisely such, it is repugnant of itself and essentially that it should be in any way in a subject, and hence that it should be predicated of any subject.

Second, it is confirmed, and this very point is explained more fully. Because that is the individual which is incommunicable to similar inferiors; but matter marked by quantity is the first foundation of this incommunicability. Thus it will also be the first foundation of individuation. The consequence together with the major is sufficiently clear. The minor, however, is proved. For form, because it is act, is communicable of itself; matter, because it is first potency, is of itself incommunicable. Thus, when form is received in matter marked by quantity, it is restricted through this reception so that it cannot in any way be communicated to anything else.

54 This confirmation is taken from St. Thomas in his commentary on Boethius, De Trinitate, q. 4, art. 2, in these words: No form, insofar as it is such, is this of itself. I say “insofar as it is such” on account of the rational soul, which in some way is this something of itself, but not insofar as it is form. Intellect, however, is naturally able to attribute to several things any form that can be received in something, whether in matter or in a subject, which is contrary to its character as this something. Thus form becomes this by being received in matter, and matter becomes this and marked insofar as it underlies dimensions.

This reason, together with its confirmations, is so efficacious that from it alone, when rightly expounded, the answers adduced against it by the opponents vanish. In the first place, from its exposition easily falls the answer that Suarez offers against this second principal reason in the cited disputation, sect. 3, num. 7, saying that it lacks efficacy because the reason of the subject of inherence is very different from the reason of the subject of predication or of inferiority. Although some proportion can indeed be conceived between these two subjects, since the superior is compared with the inferior subject to it, as form giving being, they are nevertheless simply not of the same character, nor is one founded upon the other. Thus, in simple and separated substances, such as the Angels, there is subjection or subordination of inferiors to superiors without a subject of inherence or information. Hence it is badly inferred from the fact that a primary substance, as such, is not in another as in a subject of inferiority or predication, or in the way in which the universal exists in its inferiors, that its individuation is derived as from the first root from matter, or the first physical subject marked by quantity.

55 This answer therefore easily falls if what has been said is rightly expounded. For just as the metaphysical potentiality of a genus, despite the different character of its metaphysical or potential reason and that of its physical genus or primary matter, is nevertheless taken as from the first root from the physical potentiality of matter, as our Complutensians explain excellently in Logic, disput. 5, num. 75, so, although the character of the first subject and first physical potency differs from that of the subject of inferiority or predication, because of the character posited for a material primary substance, consisting in this, that it has a substantial character so incommunicable that it is not in another as in a subject of inferiority or predication, it must nevertheless be derived as from the first root from matter marked by quantity. Its character is to be the first physical subject, and consequently that it is in no way physically in another as in a subject.

Therefore, in tract. De natura materiae, cap. 3, St. Thomas, expounding the character of a material primary substance and emphasizing that it is neither in a subject nor predicated of a subject, or equivalently that such a substance is the subject-side part of a substantial species, admits that this arises from primary matter, which is the first subject in the physical order, in these words: For when the subject in a certain species, or the subject-side part of a species, is the primary substance called the individual, that which holds the character of the first subject is the cause of individuation and of the division of the species into suppositia. The first subject, however, is that which cannot be received into another.

56 Nor does what Suarez adduces in favor of his position concerning the individuation of simple substances, namely God or the Angels, support him. The Angelic Doctor answers this point excellently in the cited treatise. After establishing the distinction between individuals of composite or received substance, which is received according to its form in something else, as in a subject, and individuals of simple or separated substance, and after the words just cited, in which he asserted that the first subject is that which cannot be received into another, he continues: Thus separated forms, precisely because they cannot be received into another, have the character of the first subject, and therefore they are individuated by themselves. Since there is in them nothing except form, there is form in them according to the character of form. Thus, when the same suppositum and the form by which they are individuated insofar as they have the character of the first subject are in them, with regard to the multiplication of suppositia, form is multiplied in them according to the character of form, of itself and not through another thing, because they are not received into another. For every such multiplication multiplies the species. Thus, in these there are as many species as there are individuals. In other forms, however, where there is a multiplicity of form through reception into another that has the character of the first subject and not according to the character of form, the same species remains in diverse suppositia. The recipient, however, is matter, not taken in just any way, as was stated, but insofar as it has the character of the first subject.

57 Divus Thomas also explained this elegantly in 1 part., q. 3, art. 2 ad tertium, in these words: It must be said that forms which are receivable in matter are individuated through matter, which cannot be in another because it is the first subsisting subject. Form, however, insofar as it is of itself, can be received by several things unless something else prevents it, but that form which cannot be received in matter, but subsists of itself, is individuated by the fact that it cannot be received into another. Such a form is God. Therefore, it does not follow that it has matter.

Likewise, the answer that Suarez gives to the second confirmation of this reason easily falls from what has been said. He says that it is badly inferred that matter is the root of the incommunicability required for individuation and consisting in this, that the individual is incommunicable to another in the way in which the superior is communicable to its inferior, simply because the aforesaid matter is the first subject and consequently is not in another as in a physical subject. He gives the following reason. Substantial and accidental forms are individual and singular, yet they are communicable to another as to a physical subject. Primary matter, however, is common and universal with respect to all matter, even though it is incommunicable to another as a physical subject. Thus, the aforesaid incommunicability or communicability makes no difference to, and poses no obstacle to, universality or singularity, or to their root.

58 Thus the answer easily falls from what has been said. For in answer to the first argument, it is clear, as we hinted from the Angelic Doctor, that although incomplete forms are singular and individual, they do not have this of themselves, but because they are received or are receivable in matter. The forms themselves, insofar as received or receivable in this numbered matter, cannot be received in another as in a subject. Consequently, they are incommunicable to another as a subject. Thus precisely by this they really and physically possess that physical incommunicability required to found formally the incommunicability sought for metaphysical singularity, namely, that they cannot be communicated to another in the way in which the superior is communicated to its inferior; yet they could found no other incommunicability. For just as any form that is singular and incomplete, and therefore receivable in a subject, looks to this subject rather than that one because it is commensurate with this one and not with that one, so, precisely because the aforesaid form does not look to any determinate subject, such as that in which it is received or is receivable, it will not be a singular form as such. In itself, however, it will be common and universal and able to found the character of the universal, as stated. On these matters, let those who wish consult what is said at num. 7 in the following disputation.

59 Second, regarding the second argument concerning primary matter, it is sufficiently clear that although matter according to its essence is in some way common (as was meanwhile explained in 1 Physicorum, disput. 3, num. 34, and disput. 6, num. 11, by our Complutensians), and likewise pertains (as already noted) to the common character of the substantial composite, this same matter is not positively individual. Consequently, according to its essence thus taken precisely, it is not of itself sufficient as the first principle of individuation, which alone concerns us at present, but only according to another special character, namely, according to its being marked by quantity. For it does not have the character of the aforesaid principle, into which all other principles are reduced, except insofar as it is this determinate first subject and not that one; or except insofar as it has a positively singular character, such that of itself and physically it is not in another as in a physical subject. It is clear, however, from what has been said, that matter does not have the aforesaid character except insofar as it is in some way marked by quantity. Thus, as often as it is the principle of diverse successive individuations, it concurs with a diverse relation toward them, namely, by being marked in different ways through different quantities.

Thus form is distinguished from matter in this, that form, both according to its essence and according to its relation to the line of form, as such and as proceeding from that same line, has being common and universal in itself. For insofar as it is of itself, it is communicable to another as a subject, and it becomes incommunicable and singular only as from the first root, through its participation in the line of the subject, because the subject receives it, as has been explained. In matter, however, its essence is one thing and can be common to several matters; its character, or its characters, through which it is the root of a peculiar individuation or of several successive individuations is another thing. These characters consist in some way in the precontainment of diverse quantities (as will be said from num. 116 onward), which, though they are certified a posteriori by quantities, are not taken as precontained but according to their formal being and as actually inhering in those individuals. Nevertheless, if considered in themselves, they pertain to the line of matter, as we shall explain more fully in this disputation at num. 118 and 133 and thereafter. And none of them can be common and universal.

60 This answer is taken from St. Thomas, tract. 29, De principio individuationis. When the holy Doctor had raised the objection that matter is common by its nature, just as form is, since the same matter can exist under several forms, and thus this community could prevent matter from being the principle of individuation, he answers in these words: But it must be noted that form cannot be united to matter unless it be particular, and unless a determinate quantity follow it, in which respect matter is not further communicable to any other form. For this quantity cannot be found with another form with the same determination. Thus matter is not communicable according to the same determination, just as form is, as was stated. For the character of matter under one form differs from its character under another, because its character is determined through quantity, which is required in a different proportion and dimension for different forms. The essence of matter, however, is not diversified under different forms, just as its character—that is, the character according to which it is the root of individuation, namely, matter itself as marked by quantity—diversifies. For the character of matter is not one and common, as its essence is. The character of form, indeed, is one in diverse matters, although it differs of itself. Thus community only according to the essence, which is that of matter itself, and not according to character, does not prevent matter from being the first principle of individuation.

§ VI. The arguments of the first opinion are answered.

61 To the first argument and its confirmation drawn from St. Thomas, what we shall say at num. 91 through num. 98 will give the answer. Add that, if it is true that matter marked by quantity does not mean matter insofar as affected by quantity, but only insofar as it radically contains this quantity rather than that one (which is considered in dub. 5), then saying that matter is marked by quantity signifies nothing really distinct from matter itself, but the same matter insofar as it radically contains it. For an effect, insofar as it has being in its cause, is not really distinguished from it. Thus he says most excellently that matter alone is the root of individuation, even though matter marked by quantity is its principle. For by this it is understood that nothing really distinct from matter itself is, at least directly, the root of such individuation. How this is consistent with quantity itself being in a certain way reduced to the first root, or individuation of material substance being attributed to it insofar as it is and is divided by the ultimate division from any other, will be explained below at num. 91 and 92, as cited above.

By this, too, the answer to the second confirmation is clear. For once the aforesaid supposition is made, namely, that matter marked by quantity is understood as matter radically containing this quantity and not that one, and consequently thus taken is the first root of individuation—which we shall show to be true in dub. 5—it is most easily reconciled how, even if matter marked by quantity in this sense is the principle of individuation, this does not prevent substance from being individuated through itself as through the first root, that is, as through something of its own kind, as has been explained. All accidents, however, are individuated through something extrinsic to their proper genus, namely, through a subject; although between quantity taken according to its formal being and the other accidents there is, as will be explained in the following disputation, such a disparity, as noted.

62 To the second, although matter taken in itself and precisely speaking, that is, insofar as it is not marked by this quantity rather than that one, is the first part of the substantial composite according to its species and considered in the abstract, it is nevertheless not a part of it as it is, this and individual, except insofar as it has being this and is marked in some way through quantity, for the reasons stated. Accordingly, in accordance with these points, the antecedent must be conceded and the consequent denied. Its proof convinces of nothing once we have posited what we have just said, as will be clear to the reader.

To the third, the antecedent must be conceded, provided the due proportion between the extremes mentioned there is preserved. The consequent must then be denied. In answer to its proof, it must be said that there is a disparity between the reasons. For form, of itself and taken precisely, is determined to confer this specification rather than that one, because it is naturally able to confer only one and the same specification. Matter, however, if taken in itself and precisely speaking, does not have sufficient determination to confer this individuation rather than that one, because as taken it can be found in several individuals. Thus it must in some way be determined and marked through quantity in order to be the principle and root of this individuation rather than that one.

63 To the fourth, once the antecedent is granted, the consequent must be denied. In answer to its proof, the antecedent must be denied. For the reason on which generic unity of material substance is taken from matter alone as from the first root (as was meanwhile explained by our Complutensians in Logic, disput. 5, num. 75 and thereafter) is not that this unity is material insofar as it denotes precisely a thing standing in the place of matter and potency; rather, it is because this is the unity of metaphysical potency, which is of itself indifferent but is contracted and determined through this specific difference rather than that one. Thus, it does not demand matter determined in some way through this quantity rather than that one. Individual unity, however, is the unity of a material thing ultimately determined and divided by the ultimate division. Hence it is no wonder that it demands as its first root not matter that is indifferent and undetermined, or matter taken in itself and precisely as stated above, but that very matter insofar as it is in some way marked and determined by quantity. By this, what suffices for the other points brought in the same argument is clear.

To the confirmation, the antecedent must be conceded if incommunicability is understood negatively, but not if it is understood positively. For the incommunicability spoken of in the antecedent, being the same as numerical unity and the individuation of something said to be incommunicable, means that matter, which according to itself and with the precision already stated is only one by negative unity, must likewise be incommunicable in the same way, namely, by negative incommunicability. The consequent must then be denied. For what is most powerful in the individual as such is not negative incommunicability but positive incommunicability. Therefore, positive incommunicability cannot proceed from matter as from the first root and principle unless matter is itself presupposed to be one by positive unity and positive incommunicability, and consequently to be in some way marked by quantity.

64 To the fifth, what will be said in dub. 5 will give the answer. For now, however, the antecedent must be denied, at least as regards its final part. In answer to the proof, it must be said that, although this quantity rather than that one cannot actually be received except in singular matter, and neither common matter but only singular matter has a connection with this quantity and not that one, or precontains this quantity rather than that one, nevertheless a difference intervenes here. For matter insofar as it actually receives quantity is presupposed to be singular and individual; but it does not become singular through the aforesaid reception actually exercised. Rather, it becomes singular through having the connection explained below at num. 116, or through precontaining this quantity rather than that one by the mode of a first root. It is not presupposed to be singular and individual. Consequently, it is shown to be, not presupposed to be, the first root of individuation. Thus matter taken in itself and precisely speaking, that is, insofar as we abstract from its being in some way marked by quantity, can never be positively singular or the first root of individuation.

The last argument asks us to explain by which of the three modes in which, in the explanation of the title of this difficulty, we said matter can be marked by quantity, it must be marked in order to be the first root of individuation. But since this must be explained exactly, several difficulties must be touched upon whose exact resolution is not without considerable difficulty. We shall therefore discuss in the three following difficulties by which of the three aforesaid modes matter is marked by quantity in order to be the first and sufficient root of the individuation both of the substantial form and of the whole composite; and consequently in order that, in a proportionate manner, it be positively this and individual.

65 In the three doubts that follow, our controversy and dispute are not with outsiders—that is, with those outside the school of St. Thomas—but with Thomists and disciples of the same holy Doctor. Although all Thomists agree that matter marked in some way by quantity is the principle of individuation, as is clear from the preceding doubt, there is nevertheless no little disagreement among them about what is meant by matter marked by quantity: whether it means the matter of that composite of which the title of the doubt speaks, or whether it means matter involving quantity in some other way. We shall examine this in the three following doubts.

§ I. The affirmative position is proposed.

66 Some disciples of St. Thomas of no lesser authority defend the affirmative part, such as Ferrara, Contra gentiles, ch. 21; Soncinus, 7 Metaphysic., q. 34; and Nazarius, Prima pars, q. 3, a. 2, unique controversy. They explain it by distinguishing two things in an individual: namely, to be undivided in itself by the ultimate division, or to be incommunicable in the same way in which something superior is communicated to something inferior; and to be divided in the same way from every other thing. They say that the first of these proceeds from matter, whereas the latter proceeds from quantity, as from a form actually inhering and constituting the composite in the said sense of division. Thus the first principle sufficient and adequate for the individuation of the substantial composite would be both matter and quantity, as an actually inhering and informing form, at least as informing matter as a whole; and consequently the aforesaid composite arising from matter and quantity in the explained sense.

This is proved first by various testimonies of St. Thomas. For, above all, as is clear from the places cited in the preceding doubt, he often says that by matter marked by quantity is understood matter under certain dimensions; matter under certain dimensions, he says, actually receives those dimensions and actually informs and inheres in them. Otherwise it could not be under them; and therefore matter marked by quantity, as St. Thomas posits it to be the principle of individuation, is said to be a certain composite arising from matter and quantity, as from a form actually inhering.

67 And then, because the same holy Doctor, in the opusculum On the principle of individuation, and in opusculum 32, ch. 3, asserts that the thing in which the reason of the first, or of the material individual in the genus of substance, is preserved cannot be found without quantity. If quantity did not give the aforesaid substance its being individual, at least as divided from others, and not in any way, but by the mode of a form actually inhering, there would be no reason why the substance could not be separated from it and, once separated, remain separated, as it can be separated from other accidents in this way. Therefore, for this reason, the same St. Doctor, Quodlibeta 7, a. 10, on whiteness and other material qualities, says that they are inseparable from quantity, in these words: It is possible to imagine two separated lines of the same species, distinct in number according to their different position: one line would not be divisible merely by reason of its genus; for a line is not divided except into lines; but it is impossible to imagine several whitenesses of the same species without a subject; and thus it is clear that whiteness is not individuated except by its subject, and therefore it could not be individual unless it were in some subject, at least in quantity.

This is confirmed first. For St. Doctor, Third Part, q. 77, a. 2, and in 4, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, q. 3, says that since two things belong to the individual, namely incommunicability and distinction from others, matter is the principle of one of these, whereas quantity is the principle of the other, namely distinction; and thus the total principle of individuation is matter marked by quantity. Therefore, just as matter actually communicated in its composite genus, and in no other way, is the first root of individuation insofar as it is incommunicable, because this is its proper effect, so quantity actually communicated in its genus, namely in the genus of a formal cause informing matter as a whole, and in no other way, will be the cause and first root of the same individuation insofar as it is divided from others; since individuation insofar as it is the aforesaid being is its proper effect, as of the first root. Just as incommunicable being, and being undivided in itself by the ultimate division, is attributed to matter as to the first root.

68 This is confirmed secondly from Aristotle, 10 Metaphysics, ch. 3, text 4, where he establishes only a twofold kind of distinction: one according to form, by which things are essentially distinguished, and another according to quantity, by which things are numerically distinguished. Therefore, just as essential distinction proceeding from form must arise from it as from an informing cause, so numerical distinction proceeding from quantity must also proceed from it as from an inhering and informing form, as appears from the parity of reason. Especially because quantity does not seem to be more efficacious than any other form in producing its proper effect, namely numerical distinction, than the corresponding effect produced by any other form. Thus, if other forms need inherence, or information, to cause essential distinction, quantity will also need it to produce numerical distinction. Consequently, precisely because matter marked by quantity is the first root of individuation insofar as it is divided from another, it will certainly be the root of that individuation through quantity inhering in it as a whole and constituting with it the aforesaid accidental composite.

69 Secondly, it is proved from reason. Because matter cannot be this and individual, and therefore cannot be the root of individuation insofar as it is divided, unless it is divided from another part of matter, as appears from the terms themselves. But matter is divided into parts according to quantity, as an accidental form inhering and informing it in its substantial whole. Therefore, that matter is the root of individuation insofar as it is divided from every other thing agrees with it according to quantity, as an inhering form. Consequently, when it is said that matter marked by quantity is the first principle of individuation, it must be understood as matter and quantity, from which, as from a subject, and from which, as from an accidentally inhering form, a certain accidental composite results.

The reason adduced by St. Thomas in favor of his opinion in De Trinitate, opusculum 70, q. 4, a. 2, is this: Form becomes this by being received in matter; but since matter considered in itself is indistinct, it cannot individualize the form received in it except according to its being distinguishable. For form is not individuated by being received in matter, except insofar as it is received in this or that distinct and determined matter; but matter is not divisible except by quantity. Hence the Philosopher says in 1 Ethics that, quantity being removed, an indivisible substance remains; and therefore matter becomes this and is marked according as it is under dimensions.

This is also repeated by St. Thomas in several places, especially 1 part., q. 50, a. 2, and 2, d. 3, q. 1, a. 4, and 2 Contra gentiles, chs. 49 and 50, as well as On spiritual creatures, a. 1, and often elsewhere.

70 Thirdly, when it is said that matter marked by quantity is the first root of individuation, either because it is marked by the aforesaid quantity a form or some mode distinct from matter itself, namely quantity inhering in it, is posited in matter; or nothing is added to it by the aforesaid marking. If the first, the intended meaning is attained. If the second, it follows that just as matter considered in itself, precisely taken without the aforesaid marking, could not be a sufficient principle and root of individuation, so it cannot be sufficient with the marking. For this marking adds nothing to matter itself, and therefore does not change it; consequently, just as without it matter was an insufficient principle and root of individuation, so it is with it.

This is confirmed. Because no potency is limited and determined except by some act informing it; consequently, it is not appropriated to anything except by that act, since by this appropriation it is limited and restricted. But first matter is simply potency; therefore it receives no determination or appropriation except by some act informing it. Therefore, since matter is the principle of individuation only when marked by quantity determining and appropriating it to this composite rather than that one, it follows that quantity, by determining it, gives this to matter by the mode of an informing form; from which, together with matter, one accidental composite arises. Each of the two consequences appears clear, at least the minor. The major follows as well. As long as potency is informed and actualized by an act in a particular way, it is indifferent and undetermined with respect to all things, and cannot be appropriated to this composite in preference to that one.

71 Nor does it matter if one says that matter marked by quantity means matter itself, not indeed as actually informed by quantity, but as having an order toward this quantity rather than that one, or as radically containing it, or as having a connection with this quantity more than with that one. For in order that one matter be considered divided from another and limited to this composite rather than that one, the aforesaid order, containment, or connection suffices. From Aristotle’s statement that the act is what distinguishes or limits, we understand this to refer either to an act or to an order toward an act.

The opposite, however, is urged. First, matter is indifferent with respect to this quantity rather than that one to be preferred; therefore, if nothing is added to it, there is no reason why it should prefer one quantity to another. Secondly, as Nazarius argues, for quantity, or any other accident, to be in the mere potency or causality of matter is to be indistinctly in it, and therefore to be there in a manner disproportionate to causing distinction.

72 Finally, quantity is in a certain sense from itself and by its own proper merits, as from the first root, the principle of material individuation, at least insofar as it is divided from every other thing, as we shall say in the following disputation, no. 24. Therefore matter cannot be the root of the individuation of the composite, at least insofar as it is divided, unless it participates in quantity and is actually informed by it. The consequence is clear. Because what is such from itself and by its own proper merits has the reason of what is such, so that either it itself or that which actually participates in it must be such.

Nor will it suffice to say that quantity is in a certain sense the first principle of individuation insofar as it is divided, and that matter marked by quantity, as it is said to contain this quantity rather than that one by the mode of a first root, is the first root of individuation, even if it is not actually informed by it. For by that very fact the entire series of the principles of individuation is reduced to quantity itself insofar as the aforesaid effect is concerned.

73 Against this it is urged that a substantial composite has the reason of the individual not virtually but formally. Therefore its first and fundamental principle of individuation must be formally singular, and formally have the reason of such a principle, not merely virtually. Thus, if quantity is once the first source of individuation insofar as it is divided, this must belong to it according to its formal being and according to its being a form actually informing the thing that is individuated by it, or divided from every other thing. The antecedent appears clear. The first consequence follows from the antecedent. Because although what is formally such can arise in the genus of an efficient cause from a principle virtually such, it cannot do so in the genus of a material or formal cause, as happens here. Thus, because man is formally vegetative, the rational soul is formally that by which he is vegetative.

The last consequence follows from the preceding one. Because just as, from the fact that fire is hot by nature and all other things are hot by participation from it, nothing can be formally hot unless it either is fire or participates in what formally makes it hot according to formal being, namely formally such heat actually informing it; so, if quantity is once the first root of individuation insofar as it is divided, whatever is formally material and formally singular, and formally divided from another, not merely virtually, must be quantity, or have quantity, whereby something is formally quantitative, namely actually inhering quantity.

§ II. The negative position, more conformed to Aristotle and St. Thomas, is preferred.

74 Nevertheless, it must be said that matter marked by quantity, understood as a composite arising from matter and quantity itself, as from an actually inhering and informing form, is not the first principle and root of the individuation of form, or of the substantial composite; and consequently that this individuation does not include quantity according to its formal being, as something intrinsically constituting a substantial individual. Thus Aristotle in the Predicaments, where, having compared first substance, or the substantial individual, with second substances, calls it most truly substance. If the aforesaid individual included quantity in its concept as an intrinsically constituting form, then first substances, especially when compared with second substances, would not be called most truly substances, but rather the contrary; for second substances do not include in their concept any accident as an inhering and constituting form, whereas first substances do.

The Angelic Doctor also holds this in opusculum 70 on Boethius, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2. Having objected to himself: The Philosopher says, 4 Metaphysics, that the same thing is the cause of the substance and of unity; but accidents are not the cause of the substance of an individual; therefore neither are they the cause of unity or of numerical plurality. He replies: In answer to the second, dimensions, since they are accidents per se, cannot be the principle of the individual unity of substance; but matter, insofar as it is subject to such dimensions, is understood to be the principle of such unity and multitude. If quantity were the root of the individuation of the whole substantial composite, by the mode of an inhering form intrinsically constituting it, then quantity itself, taken according to its formal being, would be called the cause of individual substance; and, by itself, or with greater right than matter itself insofar as it is subject to such dimensions, or, which is the same as will appear more fully from what follows, insofar as it is laid beneath it as a root or radically contains it, would be called the principle of purely numerical unity and multitude.

75 The holy Doctor taught the same in opusculum 29, where, speaking of those things that belong essentially to the individual and those that belong to it by reason of quantity according to its formal being and its comparison as an inhering form intrinsically constituting the accidental composite already mentioned, he says: For the individual among sensible things is itself the ultimate in the genus of substance, predicated of no other thing; indeed, it is itself first substance according to the Philosopher in the Predicaments, and the first foundation of all others. For matter alone—though this will be explained more fully below at no. 91 onward—is the principle of individuation insofar as the reason of the first in the genus of substance is preserved in it; but this cannot be found without body and quantity. And therefore determined quantity is called the principle of individuation, not because it causes its subject, which is first substance, in any way, but because it accompanies it inseparably and determines it here and now; what therefore falls under the particular reason is this something by the nature of matter, whereas what falls under the external sense is by quantity.

St. Thomas asserted this same point in opusculum 32, ch. 3, where, speaking of matter marked by quantity as a composite arising from matter as subject and dimensions as an intrinsic formal cause intrinsically constituting it, he says: It is said that matter under certain dimensions is the cause of individuation, not because dimensions cause the individual, since an accident does not cause its subject; but because through certain dimensions the individual is demonstrated here and now, as by its proper sign, inseparable from it. Yet, as is clear from what has been said, quantity is not taken in this way when matter marked by quantity is said to be the first and radical reason of individuation, and not merely its sign; this will be explained in doubt 5.

The same was taught by the holy Doctor: When form is received in matter with all dimensions circumscribed by the intellect, something results that exists in the genus of substance and is ultimate, having complete reason of an individual in substance, but it cannot be demonstrated here and now without determined and certain dimensions.

Accordingly, this position is followed by Flandria, 7 Metaphysics, q. 29, a. 4; Capreolus, 2, d. 3, q. 1, a. 3, insofar as he asserts that substance without actually inhering quantity is individual even insofar as it is divided; though not having individuation in the way it now has it, namely sensibly; although in the same article he also inclines toward the opposite opinion. Ægidius, Quodlibeta 1, q. 5, a. 1; Javellus, 5 Metaphysics, q. 15; Zumel, 1 part., q. 3, a. 2, De principio individuationis, conclusion 2; Gonzalez, 1 part., q. 11, a. 1, d. 23; Báñez, 1 part., q. 3, a. 2; Suárez, 1 tomus Metaphysicae, d. 5, sect. 3, no. 10 and following; Cajetan, 1 part., q. 29, a. 1, where he strongly attacks the opposite position, saying that it is chimerical to separate in reality those acts that constitute and distinguish a substantial and material individual from every other thing. Finally, several disciples of St. Thomas defend this, as Ferrara and Nazarius report in the places cited, and many others.

76 This assertion could be proved from St. Thomas by a twofold reason. But because the first also proves that, in St. Thomas’s way, matter marked by quantity cannot be understood as matter actualized by some still substantial mode, distinct from matter by its very nature, through which it is determined toward this quantity rather than that one; and because there will be a special difficulty about this in the following doubt, we shall adduce it in the preceding doubt. We shall recommend this assertion by the sole reason touched by St. Thomas in the cited opusculum 32, reduced to this brief form. Because material first substance is one per se posited in the category of substance as the foundation of the others in this category, it is not constituted in the being of first substance, or substance, by any accident, namely quantity as an inhering form intrinsically constituting it in the being of an individual. The consequence is clear, because otherwise first substance would be being by accident, since it would consist of things of different categories, namely substance and quantity as an inhering and constituting form.

77 This is confirmed and explained. Because what belongs to a category, especially if it is the foundation of the others in that category, cannot be constituted by something outside the category; otherwise it would both be and not be outside that category, because the thing constituted cannot fail to belong to the category of its constitutive principle. Since first substance, as such, belongs to the category of substance as the foundation of the whole category, it is repugnant for it to be constituted in its being as such, or in the being of first substance, by something outside its proper category, namely by quantity.

This is confirmed secondly. Because in the former account, in which matter is presupposed for the actual reception of substantial form and actually existing quantity, the aforesaid matter must be singular and individual, so that it is this and not that. For those singular forms are not received in common matter, but in singular matter, namely this and not that. Therefore matter will not have the being this, and consequently will not be the root of individuation, even insofar as it is divided, insofar as it is actually subject to quantity, or actualized by quantity as an inhering form intrinsically constituting a substantial individual, or matter itself as individual and the principle of individuation. The consequence is clear, because what belongs to something by reason of another, as an inhering form intrinsically constituting it, cannot belong to it in the former account, in which it is presupposed for such a form.

§ III. The evasions of adversaries and their exclusion.

78 Ferrara first meets this reason, both its first argument and its second confirmation. To the first reason and its first confirmation, he says that two things belong to individual unity: to be undivided in itself by the ultimate division, or to be incommunicable; and to be divided in the same way from every other thing. The first belongs to the essence of the said unity and individual, whereas the latter has the character of a property of it. Therefore, from the fact that quantity constitutes the said unity and individual, insofar as it is divided from every other thing, by the mode of an inhering and intrinsically constituting form, it does not follow that a substantial individual, taken essentially, is not one per se, but merely lacks the said unity insofar as it is constituted together with its properties.

In answer to the second confirmation, he says that causes are causes of one another. Thus, although in the former account quantity is not presupposed in the genus of a material cause first receptive per se, it is presupposed in the genus of a formal cause disposing it for the reception of this form and not that one. Thus matter and the whole composite can be the cause of individuation insofar as it is divided in the same genus.

79 Nevertheless, neither solution satisfies. Not the first. Because the fact that it is undivided in itself by the ultimate division belongs to the constitution of the individual as such means that it cannot fail in reality to belong to that same constitution insofar as it is divided in the same way from every other thing, although the former reason precedes the latter in some way. The antecedent is proved. Because, as the Philosophers commonly teach with Aristotle and St. Thomas, the constitutive and the distinctative of a thing are the same in reality. Therefore, the fact that being individual belongs in reality to the intrinsic constitution of the individual as such means that it cannot fail to belong in reality to the same constitution, namely being divided from every other thing. Thus, if quantity gives being divided through the mode of an inhering form, it will belong to the intrinsic constitution of that same individual. Indeed, quantity itself will be what gives in reality the being undivided in itself, or incommunicable, through which the individual is constituted, at least inadequately, in the first place.

This is confirmed first. Because belonging to the intrinsic constitution of essential and specific unity cannot fail to belong to constituting the species and distinguishing it specifically from every other thing. Thus, whatever specifically distinguishes an essence from every other thing also in reality constitutes it. Therefore, the same proportional reasoning must be applied to individual unity, as appears from the parity of reason. Consequently, if quantity distinguishes material substance numerically through the mode of an inhering form, it will constitute it in the same way; and by that very fact such unity will be accidental unity, as has been shown.

80 This is confirmed and explained secondly. Because that which makes the individual incommunicable and constitutes matter itself as incommunicable to another form and composite, either can, considered in itself and precisely, be in another matter and composite apart from this, namely insofar as it makes the individual and incommunicable; or it cannot. If the first, it therefore cannot intrinsically constitute this individual and this matter in the being of one numerically such; for what can be found in another individual and constitutes it as such cannot in the first place constitute that individual in the being of an individual; otherwise that individual reason would both exist and not exist as proper to its individual, which plainly involves a contradiction. If the second is said, then that which makes matter and the individual incommunicable makes them distinct from every other thing, since an individual has something real constitutive of itself which cannot be found in anything else, and therefore cannot fail to be distinguished from every other thing by its own proper merits. For we infer nowhere else that specific differences are sufficient reasons for being one species rather than another, except because one of them belongs to one species as its intrinsic constituent, so that it cannot be found in another. Therefore, preserving proportion, we shall infer the same concerning the incommunicable being that constitutes one individual, for the reason just stated.

Moreover, even if we grant that individual unity insofar as it is divided has the character of a property of the individual insofar as it is undivided, and that it in the former sense proceeds from another principle really distinct, it still could not arise from quantity as from an inhering and intrinsically constituting form. Thus, being divided, if it proceeds from quantity, could not fail to come to individual and substantial unity accidentally, since it would presuppose that unity completely, both insofar as it is incommunicable and insofar as it is divided.

81 The reason why, even in that event, the said unity insofar as it is divided could not proceed from quantity as the first principle of which we speak, is this. Because two substantial individuals, as such, cannot fail to be distinguished by a formally substantial distinction, that is, a distinction exercised not only in substance, and therefore substantial in the material, in the common sense in which substance has substantial entitative parts from quantity, but substantial in the formal. But a distinction formal as well as substantial cannot proceed from an accident as from an inhering form and the intrinsic reason of such distinction. The major is proved. Otherwise there would be no formally substantial distinction between those individuals, and thus, considered formally as to substances, the individual substance of Judas the traitor’s humanity and of Christ the Lord’s humanity would be exactly the same; and thus exactly the same individual substance, considered precisely as to substances, although not as to quantities, would be crucified in hell and blessed in heaven, and united to the person of the Word and to the created person of Judas. Just as material substance under one quantity has only substantial entitative parts formally from quantity, as from an inhering form intrinsically constituting it in the being divisible into such quantitative parts, so the same substance, considered precisely as to substances, is not actually formally substantially distinguished from itself under different parts of quantity; but precisely in reality, actually, and substantially, it is under the aforesaid parts of quantity, from which it has parts not formally substantial, but formally quantitative and materially substantial, as our Complutensians teach more fully in On Generation, d. 5, from no. 32 to no. 95, especially no. 57. Our Complutensians teach this very keenly.

The minor follows clearly from what the cited disputation from On Generation, no. 58, adduces. Because quantity is an accident, it cannot through the mode of an intrinsic or inhering formal cause give any formally substantial effect; for an intrinsic or inhering formal cause causes nothing except by giving itself. Consequently, if it is an accidental form, it can give only accidental being; and therefore cannot give a formally substantial distinction.

82 Therefore, the solution employed by Nazarius in the cited controversy also falls, namely that the major proposition, that the constitutive and the distinctive are the same in reality, must be understood of the formal rather than the radical principle, which quantity is insofar as concerns the present. This solution easily falls from what has just been said. First, because the fact that a radical principle constitutes something in such a way that it cannot constitute anything else means that it cannot fail to distinguish that thing from every other thing which cannot be constituted by such a principle. Secondly, because in this manner of speaking no substantial principle is assigned from which the formally substantial distinction of individuals proceeds.

83 Ferrara’s solution to the second confirmation likewise does not satisfy. First, because, as our Complutensians teach in On Generation, d. 2, from no. 105 to no. 108, matter insofar as it receives this form rather than that one is prior simpliciter and absolutely to the fact that this numerical quantity is actually received and informs it. For this actually received and informing quantity is not required in order that this form be received simpliciter, but in order that matter receive the aforesaid form connaturally. Therefore, in the former account, in which precisely all requirements for receiving this numerical substantial form absolutely and simply, and not another, are presupposed, and in which the individual and singular is presupposed, it cannot have its individuation from quantity as from an informing and actually inhering form. Consequently, the aforesaid individuation cannot in any way be derived from that same quantity considered in the said way.

Secondly, because even supernaturally a substantial individual can be separated from quantity and subsist in the nature of things; therefore, with greater reason, there can be something prior in which matter is pre-intelligible as receiving this numerical form and not that one, and in which this substantial composite and not that one is pre-intelligible as absolutely and simply independent of this quantity rather than that one, as actually received and informing. The consequence appears clear. The antecedent follows from the fact that the rational soul is individuated through matter marked by quantity, as we said at no. 16, and is sufficiently clear from what was said in favor of our position in difficulty 1 of this disputation. Yet it is not required that the aforesaid matter be actually informed by the numerical quantity by which it is said to be marked.

84 Secondly, there are other arguments that press our fundamental reason in order to prove it to the utmost: that a composite arising from quantity and matter, actually receiving it as a whole, is not the root of individuation, if the composite is taken so as to mean quantity directly, actually inhering and received; otherwise, however, if it means it indirectly. For nothing prevents a thing posited in the direct and substantial category from being one per se, even though it includes something outside its proper category indirectly. Thus, although being divided from every other thing intrinsically belongs to a substantial individual, the aforesaid being can, despite the per se unity of that same individual, proceed from quantity in the said way.

Nevertheless, this solution does not weaken St. Thomas’s reason. Although it does not remove the per se unity of a thing belonging to one category, while concerning it indirectly and as connoting something extrinsic belonging to another category, it is otherwise if it brings that thing as an indirect and intrinsically connotated term, at least by which it is intrinsically constituted indirectly. Therefore, it is repugnant for a substantial composite to be one per se if, at least indirectly, it is constituted in the being of an individual by actually inhering quantity. The consequence is clear, because quantity cannot fail to be, according to this mode of speaking, an intrinsically connotated and indirect term constituting this substantial individual in the being divided from every other thing.

The antecedent is proved. First, because accidents in the abstract belong per se directly to their proper categories, and each of them has its unity per se, because although they say something outside their proper category, at least indirectly, namely substance, insofar as they are things of being, that is, of substance, they nevertheless bring it as an indirect extrinsic term, and one that, even indirectly, does not intrinsically constitute them. Thus accidents are something constituted, or formed, from substance as from an indirect intrinsic term, and from the accidents themselves in the proportional way in which a person is said to be intrinsically constituted by personality directly and by nature indirectly. Likewise, therefore, the same accidents in the concrete do not belong directly to their proper category, as our Complutensians teach in Logic, d. 5 and d. 11, no. 60, because whiteness, for example, is said on the part of the mode of signification to imply a subject as an indirect intrinsic term.

Secondly, because what involves two whole and complete essences directly directed to different categories cannot be one per se, whether it brings both directly or one directly and the other indirectly. The reason why things of different categories cannot be one per se is that two whole and total things cannot coalesce into one per se intrinsically constituted from them. It is clear that by importing something indirectly, nothing is removed from its own totality and integrity.

85 Moreover, if quantity, imported indirectly and as actually inhering, can once be the root of individuation through the mode of an intrinsic, indirect term, much more can it be so through the mode of an extrinsic indirect term, which can really inhere but does not actually inhere or inform. The reason appears clear. Because it is prior that matter should radically be able to receive this quantity rather than another, or should radically contain it rather than actually receive it and be informed by it. Matter, according to what it has precisely from that prior, then first has the being this and singular; for by nothing else prior to itself can it first be singular and individual in radical potency toward this quantity rather than that one, or, as the root of this quantity rather than that one. Therefore, precisely from the force of that prior, it will be the root of individuation with greater right; and consequently it will have the reason of such a root with greater right, connoting the aforesaid quantity as an extrinsic term which can really inhere but does not actually inhere.

The first consequence from both premises is clear. For matter is the root of individuation with greater right from the force whereby it is first understood as this and positively singular, which indeed belongs to it from the force it has in that prior. The second consequence clearly follows from this prior. Because matter, from the force it has in that prior, connotes quantity, not indeed as an intrinsic and actually inhering term, but as extrinsic, and one that can really inhere; therefore, if it is the root of individuation with greater right according to what it has in that prior, it will consequently be the root of that individuation with greater right by connoting quantity as an extrinsic rather than intrinsic term, in the said way.

§ IV. The first argument in favor of the first position is solved.

86 Because the first argument in favor of the first position, and its confirmation by difficult testimonies, it seemed good, in honor of Aristotle and the holy Doctor and so that their meaning might be clearer, to solve those arguments separately.

To the first testimony of the aforesaid argument, it is answered that, as will be clear from what we shall adduce at no. 116, when the holy Doctor says in the first testimony that matter marked by quantity is understood as matter under certain dimensions, he is not speaking of it insofar as it is actually subject to them, but insofar as it is their foundation and root, and insofar as by the mode of a root it contains these dimensions rather than those. Thus, it is not necessary that the aforesaid matter be actually informed by quantity, but it is enough that it have a radical potency through which it demands to be informed by this quantity rather than that one. Why matter, prior to the aforesaid quantity and to the substantial form itself, should contain these dimensions rather than those by the mode of a root has already been explained by our Complutensian College in On Generation, d. 2, from no. 88 to no. 92, and will be explained more fully in this same disputation at no. 133 and following.

To the second testimony of the same argument, it is clear from what has been said how the holy Doctor is not speaking of quantity actually possessed, but contained in matter as in a root. For although without it the individuation of the substantial composite cannot be found, nevertheless it can well be found without it.

87 To the third testimony in favor of the same first argument, with Capreolus in 2, d. 3, q. 1, a. 3, it must be denied that St. Thomas intended there that whiteness, for example, could not be separated from quantity insofar as its individuation is considered precisely and intrinsically; but only that the same whiteness, insofar as it is this whiteness sensibly, could not exist without quantity, as will be clear from the following explanation of the holy Doctor’s context.

For, having asked there whether whiteness, or another bodily quality, could be separated by God from every quantity, he replies that, in order to know this, it must be presupposed that in whiteness, and in every other bodily quality, two things are to be considered: its own nature, by which it has its species, and its individuation, insofar as it is this perceptible whiteness distinct from another perceptible whiteness. With this presupposed, he says that by divine miracle the nature of whiteness could subsist without any quantity; yet that whiteness would not be like this perceptible whiteness.

This, therefore, is his meaning. First, this whiteness can be separated from quantity insofar as its intrinsic and indispensable individuation is concerned; otherwise it could not according to its nature subsist by divine miracle without quantity, since, according to the common opinion of the Philosophers, and especially of St. Thomas, whatever can subsist on the part of the thing by divine power must be something singular. Secondly, it cannot be separated from quantity insofar as the extrinsic individuation of that same whiteness is concerned, namely insofar as its singularity in the reason of perceptible singularity, or as externally perceptible sense. For nothing can be perceived by that sense unless it be quantitative. Thus, although in the words quoted in the argument it seems to be said absolutely that whiteness cannot be individual unless it be in some subject, at least in quantity, he is speaking of the individuation of whiteness as explained. In this way all that the holy Doctor teaches there are mutually consistent, and the decision of the article corresponds to what he presupposed for its decision.

88 Nor does it matter that St. Thomas immediately added that whiteness thus separated would be a certain intelligible form, after the manner of the separated forms posited by Plato. This is irrelevant. Because the holy Doctor’s meaning is not to equate separated whiteness in every respect with those ideas, so as to be universal in being as they are; since, according to his own opinion, he asserted that whiteness can according to its nature subsist by divine miracle without any quantity; and, as we said recently, in St. Thomas’s way only singular things can subsist, even supernaturally. But he equated whiteness existing and individual in that event with those ideas only insofar as it is not a perceptible form and is abstracted from perceptible, though not from intelligible, matter, as those Platonic ideas were abstracted from intelligible, not from perceptible, matter. For the same reason and in the same sense, the same holy Doctor said in the answer to the first that if whiteness were without quantity, it would no longer be a bodily quality, but a spiritual one, namely a spirituality precisely opposed to sensible materiality; because quantity actually underlying whiteness is required only to make it individual by sensible individuation. Therefore the holy Doctor immediately said: But this perceptible whiteness cannot be individual without quantity.

89 Nor does it matter if, secondly, one objects that St. Thomas there distinguishes quantity from whiteness because quantity is in a certain sense individuated from itself, that is, in a certain sense not through substance, as will be explained below; whereas whiteness is not individuated from itself, but from its subject. Therefore, since quantity can remain individual for this reason, insofar as it is intrinsic and indispensable to individuation, it follows that, for the opposite reason, whiteness cannot remain individual even insofar as it is necessary to individuation considered absolutely, if separated from quantity; and thus it cannot be separated from it.

This is therefore irrelevant. For St. Thomas intended only to establish a distinction between sensible quantity and its sensible individuation, and between the sensible individuation of whiteness, in that the sensible individuation of whiteness cannot be found without its subject, namely quantity. Because whiteness can be seen by the bodily eye only when it is divisible; and since it becomes divisible only by reason of quantity, in which it actually is, it follows that it can be perceived only when it is in quantity. Consequently, it cannot have sensible individuation in any other event.

90 Nevertheless, quantity is divisible into parts from itself; and therefore, even when separated from substance, it can have sensible individuation and be informed by accidents that make it perceptible. Thus, the holy Doctor did not conclude at the end of the passage that this quantity could exist by miracle without a subject; he said that this sensible quantity could exist by miracle even without a subject, as is clear in the body of Christ. Nevertheless, because quantity cannot in any event have individuation as perceptible unless it first has individuation absolutely such as to render it perceptible, although the latter is not sufficient even though it is prerequisite to the former, St. Thomas presupposed that prior distinction between quantity and whiteness according to which quantity is in a certain sense individual from itself, whereas whiteness is not. Not that he denied that whiteness could be individual by an absolutely such individuation even if separated from quantity, though not from the order toward quantity; but in order to show how quantity, because it has individuation in a certain sense from itself, that is, in a certain sense neither through substance nor through order toward it, insofar as it has parts having position, can be separated from substance so as to remain individual by sensible individuation; whereas whiteness cannot.

§ V. The two confirmations of the first argument are met.

To the first confirmation it is answered, first, that the meaning of the holy Doctor’s words is not that the distinction from others belonging to the substantial composite, as this and as individual, proceeds from quantity as actually possessed and informing, but from quantity as contained. This will be clear from what we shall say at no. 116. Thus quantity, as actually communicated to the composite—not indeed according to its formal being, but as contained in matter—is required for the individuation of that same composite as such, and insofar as it is divided.

91 Nor does it matter if one objects that this solution cannot be reconciled with the context of the holy Doctor, in which, just as he attributes to quantity that it is the root of the individuation of the composite insofar as it is divided, so he attributes to matter that it is the radical principle of the same individuation insofar as it is incommunicable. The antecedent seems certain. For if quantity, according to its formal being and as actually possessed, is not the root of the aforesaid distinction, but only as contained in matter as from its first root, then matter will be the root of such distinction only insofar as marked by the aforesaid quantity, or insofar as containing it. For matter containing this quantity, or quantity contained in it, is nothing other than matter marked by quantity, with the marking required for individuation. Therefore nothing remains as the root of this individuation insofar as it is incommunicable except matter itself according to itself. Since this openly conflicts with the nature of matter taken in itself—which, according to this reason, is no more proper to this individual than to that—St. Thomas’s assertion in the context of the aforesaid testimony cannot be saved: namely, that just as being divided proceeds from quantity, so being incommunicable, or being undivided in itself by the ultimate division, proceeds from matter.

The answer is that in reality both functions are performed by matter marked by quantity, and indeed by the same really existing principle, namely matter itself as radically containing quantity within itself, as is clear from the reasons adduced in favor of the assertion. Nevertheless, it may be that being incommunicable can be attributed absolutely to matter by a certain accommodation, and being divided to quantity. The reason for this accommodation and attribution of being incommunicable to matter follows from what has been said. For individuation insofar as it is incommunicable means the negation of its incommunicability, by which a universal is communicated to something else as to a subject of inferiority and predication; and thus it means the negation of being in another as in the said subject. Hence, when this reason is to be attributed by accommodation to something else as the first physical principle, it is rightly attributed absolutely to first matter. It belongs to its reason that it is in no way in another as in a prior subject, because it belongs to its reason to be the first subject, although in reality it is not the root of the aforesaid incommunicability unless it contains this numerical quantity rather than that one.

The reason for the accommodation and attribution of being divided from others to quantity is this. In matter marked by quantity, or containing this quantity by the mode of a root, quantity itself is included as radically contained. Because it is proper to quantity to have, in a certain sense, being individual from itself, and to have being divided from itself, insofar as by its own proper merits it has distinction and division of parts, and being divisible in the pure sense of the same, as we shall explain at no. 21 and following, d. 2, therefore quantity is attributed absolutely speaking the condition of being the root of the individuation of the substantial composite insofar as it is divided from others. In reality, however, it does not at present produce the effect necessarily required for individuation except as contained in matter itself; and consequently it does not give that effect except insofar as matter contains it as its root.

92 Caietan explained this very well in 1 part., q. 29, a. 1. After saying that matter containing this quantity rather than that one is the root of individuation insofar as it is undivided in itself, or incommunicable, and likewise insofar as it is divided from others, he immediately added, in order to explain how quantity is nevertheless attributed absolutely the condition of being the root of individuation insofar as it is divided: Nevertheless I deny that any of the greatest statements of Aristotle and St. Thomas is thereby denied, namely that numerical material distinction first belongs to quantity, and consequently to the others through it, according to the doctrine of the Posterior Analytics; for participating in the nature to which something first belongs can occur in many ways. Nor need that nature be formally preserved in all its participants, as we showed in the first book of the Posterior Analytics. Matter, which is the root and foundation of quantity, is not in that former state even an external participant in the nature of quantity; indeed, to speak more accurately, it quasi-contains the nature of quantity. Since containing is greater than participating, those that quasi-contain a nature can produce its effect so much more than those that merely participate in it. For every effect first belonging to something must be produced by it in itself, or by its participants or quasi-containers. Or, as Báñez says in explaining these words of Cajetan, 1 On Generation, ch. 5, q. 3, a. 8, for an effect to be preserved in something, it suffices that it be reduced to it according to formal being, or to those formally participating in it, or finally to something in which it is radically and virtually contained.

93 Nor does it matter if, to show the insufficiency of the foundation assigned in the order of attribution and accommodation, one urges that, because the light of glory and the created intellect produce the beatific vision by the mode of one indivisible principle, and nevertheless vision is attributed absolutely to the intellect according to the common reason of intellectual vision, and the vision of God as it is in itself is attributed absolutely to the light, the intellect must have in itself a power toward the common reason of intellectual vision, and the light must also have in itself a power toward the same vision as it is God’s. If once they did not have the aforesaid power, the aforesaid effects could not be attributed to them absolutely through that attribution and accommodation. Therefore, since matter taken precisely in itself cannot be the root of individuation insofar as it is incommunicable, it follows that it cannot be granted absolutely, even through the explained attribution and accommodation, that it is the root of the aforesaid incommunicability.

The answer is, first, that the attribution and accommodation of effects are not always made to their causes on the same basis. Therefore, granting that for the attribution made with respect to the intellect and the light of glory the foundation mentioned in the objection must be found, it does not follow that this is true for every attribution whatsoever; for the present, the foundation and reason we have given for each of these attributions suffices, as is clear from what we have adduced from Cajetan. Likewise, speaking universally of attribution and accommodation, we see that in some chapters some things are attributed to different things, even though the thing possessed is altogether the same. Thus we see that, because of a foundation very different from those enumerated, omnipotence is attributed to the Father in the divine Trinity, essential wisdom to the Son, and essential love also to the Holy Spirit, although the same omnipotence, wisdom, and love belong essentially to all three persons.

Add that although the vision of God is attributed absolutely to the intellect according to the common reason of vision or intellection, the intellect is not by itself a sufficient principle of that vision considered in the said way. It necessarily requires, first, an intelligible species for causing it according to the aforesaid reason, as will be clear from what we shall say in the treatise On the vision of God, d. 2, no. 83; and, secondly, the light of glory, because no reason in the vision of God is not supernatural, and consequently none can be without a supernatural principle.

94 Secondly, in answer to the same confirmation—by which the whole preceding solution, especially its explanation of the reply just adduced, is further clarified—it is answered that, speaking not of those things which at present occur by the attribution and accommodation already explained, but of reality itself, without considering that accommodation, matter taken precisely, or considered without its containment of this quantity rather than that one, is not a sufficient principle and root of individuation insofar as it is incommunicable, or indivisible in itself by the ultimate division. Nevertheless, according to this reason it has the condition of the first root, although insufficient in itself with respect to the aforesaid incommunicability, because even according to this consideration it is one numerically in a negative way. Thus, although insofar as it is one by negative specific unity it is not even the first insufficient principle of individuation or specification, nevertheless, insofar as it is one numerically in a negative way, it can be the first, though insufficient, root of individuation.

95 This is explained. For numerical unity of the whole composite differs from specific unity because specific unity begins from positive specific unity and from the first and foundational principle of that unity, namely substantial form, since it is formal unity. Consequently, it must begin from a formal principle, although it must terminate in matter, which is one by negative specific unity, insofar as the latter is attributed positive specific unity.

Nevertheless, radical numerical unity begins from negative numerical unity. Because this numerical unity is material, it must arise as from the first root, although insufficient in itself, from matter according to what it has from itself, insofar as it is one numerically in a negative way. Therefore, it is not surprising that being incommunicable proceeds from matter according to the distinction and mode already explained, although it does not proceed from matter as from a sufficient principle; and that from the same matter, as containing this quantity rather than that one, there arises the same individuation insofar as it is divided. This solution is taken from St. Thomas, opusculum 32, ch. 3, and is indicated by Capreolus in 2 Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 3, against Scotus’s argument, and by Durand in the third place against the second conclusion.

96 The whole account can be clarified by the example of intellection used in the preceding solution. Intellection, as intellection, proceeds from the first principle, the intellect; and according to its specification it derives its origin as from the first root, the intelligible species. Not that the intelligible species alone is sufficient to influence the aforesaid specification without the intellect; nor that the intellect alone without the species is sufficient to produce the same intellection as intellection. Rather, the first root, so to speak, of reaching intellection as such is the intellect, although insufficient by itself; and the first root of reaching it according to its specification is the intelligible species. Nor does it matter if one urges that, if this were so and St. Thomas had spoken in this sense in the aforesaid testimony, he could have said for the same reason that being divided from others by the ultimate division also proceeds from matter. In reality, matter is the first, though insufficient, root of that distinction by which one substantial individual is purely numerically substantially distinguished from another; for something is distinguished from another in the same mode in which it is constituted.

97 The answer concedes the consequence. Nevertheless, St. Thomas spoke more appropriately when, in the first part of that testimony, he expressly assigned only the insufficient principle of incommunicability; and in the second part he adduced the first and sufficient principle of distinction from every other thing, into which all other principles are reduced. Since in his doctrine the constitutive and the distinctive are the same, it follows that in this artificial manner of speaking he expressly assigned in the first part of the testimony the insufficient principle of indivision in itself, or incommunicability, through which the individual is primarily constituted, and implicitly and virtually also the insufficient principle of distinction from another. Similarly, in the second part of the same testimony, he expressly adduced the sufficient principle already mentioned of distinction from every other thing, and implicitly and virtually also the sufficient principle of incommunicability, or of ultimate indivision, primarily constitutive of the individual.

To the second confirmation initially adduced, once the antecedent is granted absolutely insofar as its first part and its second part in the explained sense, namely concerning quantity as radically contained in matter, the consequence must be denied. For the consequence to be true, it would be necessary that the antecedent be true insofar as its second part, even if quantity were understood according to its formal being and as an inhering form. Thus, it is sufficient for the individuation of the composite that matter containing this quantity rather than that one be communicated to it. By this, the remaining points brought in the same confirmation are sufficiently established.

§ VI. The other arguments for the contrary position are dissolved.

98 To the second argument drawn from reason, the major must be distinguished virtually: Unless it itself is divided from another part of matter—that is, unless it is distinguished from it in the mode by which one integral or entitative part of the same reason is distinguished from another, or two integral wholes are distinguished and divided from each other—must be denied; unless it itself is divided from another part of matter—that is, unless it is distinguished from another in the mode by which a subjective or quasi-subjective part is distinguished and divided from another—must be granted. And then the minor, understood in the former sense, must be granted, but denied in the latter. Finally, both consequences must be denied, because for both to be true it would be necessary that the major be true in the first sense and the minor in the second.

This is explained. For there is a twofold kind of parts and wholes. Some are entitative and integral parts of the same reason, corresponding to a continuous whole; others are subjective or quasi-subjective parts of the same reason, corresponding to a universal or quasi-universal and atomic whole. These parts are nothing else than several individuals, or singular parts of one individual differing only numerically, contained atomically under a species or quasi-species. They are called subjective parts because a whole, or quasi-universal whole, is divided into them as into things inferior to it and subjects participating in the same, or at least in some way the same, atomic nature. Although it may happen that each part, or each of these inferior or quasi-inferior things, is an actual whole in itself, it may nevertheless lack entitative and integral parts of the same reason. Thus, two things can be distinguished either in the mode by which one integral part is distinguished from another, and consequently, after division, can be distinguished and divided as two integral wholes; or in the mode by which one subjective part of the same reason, contained under some species or quasi-species, is co-distinguished and divided from another.

99 Therefore, although matter may be distinguished from another part of matter by the mode of an entitative and integral part, or may be divided from another matter—which is otherwise a quasi-subjective part—in the mode by which one integral whole containing a plurality of integral parts continuous with one another is distinguished and divided from another similar whole, this may proceed from quantity as from an inhering and informing form. Because substance has no entitative or integral parts from itself, except only by reason of quantity, as an intrinsic form, as our Complutensians explain in On Generation, d. 5, no. 32 through no. 95. Nevertheless, that one matter is distinguished from another in the mode by which one subjective or quasi-subjective part is distinguished and divided from another similar subjective or quasi-subjective part is not the formal effect of quantity as an inhering form. Thus, neither such a part nor the distinction and division of it from another requires that the part so distinguished and divided contain within itself a multitude of entitative parts composing one and the same entitative whole. That would, however, be necessary if such a subjective part were divided from another by quantity as an actually inhering form. The condition of such a part can be found without determined inhering and actually possessed quantity, although not without a certain and determined quantity that is at least radically contained. For example, if God separated the substantial whole from quantity, as is clear is possible from what was said at nos. 87 and 88. Nevertheless, because for matter to be the principle and root of individuation, it is not required that it be distinguished from another part of matter as an integral part, or that the two be divided as a whole and an integral whole arising from the aforesaid parts in its substantial whole by reason of actually inhering quantity, as we shall explain more fully in the next number, and as is clear from what was said in favor of the assertion; but it is sufficient that those two matters be distinguished and divided as parts, whether subjective or quasi-subjective. Therefore, matter itself as the root of individuation does not mean quantity as an inhering form, nor that prior division, but only quantity as contained, and that latter division arising from the same matter containing this quantity rather than that one, or arising from the aforesaid quantity as contained.

100 To what St. Thomas adduces there, it must be said that it does not follow from the fact that matter is not the principle of individuation unless it is distinguishable, as the holy Doctor admits there, that is, unless according to the fact that it is this subjective or quasi-subjective part and not that one; and from the fact that matter is not divisible or distinguishable into entitative parts except by reason of quantity as an inhering form, as the Angelic Master also admits there and Aristotle’s testimony confirms, that matter becomes this and marked, and consequently this quasi-subjective part and not that one, according as it is under dimensions actually possessed and informing it in its substantial whole. Rather, this follows only according as, by the mode of a root, it has the force and radical potency to be under these dimensions rather than those.

The reason is clear from what has been said. From the fact that matter is not divisible into entitative parts of the same reason except by reason of quantity as an inhering form, it follows only that quantity is divisible from itself and according to its own reason into the aforesaid parts; and consequently that it is from itself, according to its own reason, in a certain sense individual, and according to another consideration of itself is the root of individuation with respect to material substance and its physical parts, as we touched on at no. 91 and shall explain at no. 21 and following in the following disputation. But from the fact that quantity itself, according to another consideration, is the first root of individuation with respect to the aforesaid substance and its physical parts, it does not follow that matter becomes this and marked, or this rather than that subjective or quasi-subjective part, according as it is actually informed by quantity and has entitative parts by its reason as an inhering form. It does not follow that, through quantity so taken and through the entitative parts it has from it, it is constituted as a part or quasi-part subjective under the species or quasi-species of sublunar matter, so as to become this and not that. Since, as is clear, the root of substantial individuation must be substantial, as the composite itself, this and individual, is substantial. It follows only that it becomes this and marked, and consequently this and not that subjective or quasi-subjective part, according as it radically contains quantity and, by the mode of the first radical potency, seeks this quantity rather than that one. Because, as we were saying, from the principle that quantity, insofar as it is the first reason for having entitative parts, must be the first reason for the individuation of matter, it is necessary that quantity in some way, whether actually possessed or contained, influence matter by the mode of a root. Since that individual is something substantial, it cannot be quantity as actually possessed, which is an accident, but as contained, according to which condition it is something substantial. By this, St. Thomas’s other testimonies there are sufficiently established in proportion. But these matters are explained more fully below.

101 From what will be said at no. 133 and following, it is clear how matter marked by quantity, according to what it necessarily imports insofar as it is the root of individuation, is not understood as matter to which something really distinct from matter is added directly. Rather, only something is added as a connotated and indirect term, namely this quantity rather than that one, not indeed actually received and possessed, but sought and owed, and not so that the aforesaid quantity is an intrinsic connotated term, but an extrinsic one. For just as, because God is the cause of creatures, virtually containing them, the creatures themselves are involved there, not as intrinsically but extrinsically connotated terms, with whom God as omnipotent has a connection; nor are the aforesaid creatures involved as actually made, but according to the reason of possibles, so must we philosophize in the present case, preserving proportion and having already indicated it.

The proof adduced there against this has no force. Because it is enough that an extrinsic connotated term be added to matter, sought and owed, and consequently future by the force of natural causes, though not indispensably, in order that matter may indeed be the root of individuation with it, although it cannot be the root without it. Because matter itself contains this quantity rather than that one, and consequently seeks to be under this substantial form and not that one. But this will be clearer from what will be said at the number recently cited and following, where it will be explained expressly how the same matter, without being intrinsically changed, can first contain this quantity and not that one according to what it has directly, and afterward that one and not this one.

102 The confirmation is answered well there. To the first argument to the contrary, what we said in the preceding number and shall say at no. 133 is clear. To the second argument, namely that an effect is precontained in its efficient cause in such a way that it is not more contained in this one than another, the mode of indistinct containment is expressed; but to be precontained in it as determined toward this effect rather than that one means that such an effect is in the aforesaid cause in a somewhat distinct, or determined, way. Thus, to say that quantity is precontained as in a root in first matter in such a way that it is no more contained there in this quantity than in that one expresses the mode of existing in it indistinctly or indeterminately. But to say that the aforesaid quantity is in it so that this quantity rather than that one is precontained in it and sought from it means that the aforesaid quantity is in the same matter in a somewhat distinct and determined way, as appears from the terms themselves.

The final objection is likewise answered well. To the argument to the contrary, it must be said that it would prove the intended conclusion if the individuation, so to speak, formally such as belongs to matter as the first root of individuation by reason of quantity—though this will be explained at no. 116 and following—and to the substantial composite, were not only formally such, but were also of the same atomic reason as the individuation of quantity itself. For then, once it were granted to quantity that it is the first root of the aforesaid individuation, matter could not fail to be this and individual by reason of quantity as an inhering form.

103 Nevertheless, although both matter and the substantial composite are, so to speak, formally something individual and singular—for formally is opposed to having the reason of individuation only virtually—nevertheless, they have an individuation of a different reason from the individuation of quantity itself, even though it is attributed to them, as to the first root, in the said sense and caused by it. Therefore, they ought not to be individual by reason of quantity as an inhering, formally, and intrinsically constituting form, but by reason of quantity as radically contained. Thus, the individuation of quantity according to its formal being and the individuation of matter and the composite are of different reasons. As if, impossibly, we were to give two heats formally such and specifically different, one of which would be such insofar as it virtually contains the other; then the contained heat could not formally and by the mode of an inhering form constitute the containing heat, otherwise they would not be specifically different; but at most it could belong in some way to the other insofar as it is virtually contained in it.

104 In order to explain more fully the proper meaning of the Divine Thomas, the fact that what he understands by matter marked with quantity, of which he says that it is the principle of individuation, will not contribute little to this question; this must therefore first be considered in our present doubt: whether matter marked with quantity means matter in some substantial manner which, by its very nature, is distinct from matter and is determined toward having this quantity rather than that one. Thus, in order to proceed more clearly and distinctly, we have chosen to treat this doubt first separately and briefly.

§ I. The first view is proposed.

105 Certain authors defend the part affirming this, among whom Suarez is cited in the first volume of his Metaphys., disp. 5, section 3, num. 22. The basis is as follows. Prime matter, considered under the aspect of the first principle and of the cause of individuation, is not pure act, but rather pure potency; therefore, in order actually and in act to be the cause and root of individuation, at least some mode must be superadded to it; thus this mode must be something substantial, distinct from matter by its very nature, through which matter is determined toward having this quantity rather than that one, and by reason of which it is said to be marked with quantity. This second inference clearly follows from the first. For that which, as such, must be superadded to matter so that matter actually be the principle of individuation cannot be something accidental, since otherwise the individual formed from it—that is, the substantial composite—would be a being by accident. As was shown in the preceding doubt, so likewise, it must be distinct from matter by the very nature of the thing; for if it came to matter really and perished without matter perishing, it would not be such. Finally, it cannot fail to determine that same matter toward having this quantity rather than that one, or, equivalently, to mark matter with quantity, insofar as, through the aforementioned determination, matter is marked and determined toward having the aforementioned quantity; for this mode cannot serve any other purpose with respect to individuation, as will be clear to the reader, and as follows from the two preceding doubts.

The first inference, however, from the antecedent and from what our Complutens. say in the Book of Physics, disp. 6, num. 21 and following, seems to follow. For this is why matter needs a mode of union superadded to it in order actually to cause form; and conversely, form needs a mode of its own in order actually to cause existence and a positive appearance of matter; and finally, an efficient cause needs an action, at least a certain desired mode, in order to produce its effect, because none of these is pure act, but something mixed with potency. Thus, in order that they may be in second act, they need at least some mode to be superadded.

106 It is confirmed. For matter marked with quantity cannot be understood as matter intrinsically constituted through quantity, as though through an inherent form, as is clear from what was said in the preceding doubt; therefore, matter is understood as determined, at least through some substantial mode, toward this quantity rather than that one. The inference is clear: because quantity, insofar as it is actually possessed through the mode of an inherent form, does not concur either in individuation or therefore, according as matter is thus marked, the matter understood to be the principle of individuation must, through the aforementioned matter, be understood as in some way seeking this quantity rather than that one, as appears from itself; therefore, since matter of itself does not seek this quantity more than that one, it must necessarily be determined through some substantial mode through which it seeks it; and consequently, matter marked with quantity must also be understood as demanding it by reason of the aforementioned mode.

§ II. According to the mind of Aristotle and the Divine Thomas, the doubt is decided.

107 Nevertheless, it must be said that matter marked with quantity, insofar as it possesses the aforementioned substantial mode determining it toward having this quantity rather than that one, is not the first root of the individuation of the complete material substance, or of its substantial form. Thus Aristotel., et Div. Thom. in the passages cited in the preceding doubts, as we shall immediately explain. D. Thom. taught this most especially in the passages cited from number 55 through 58, all of which the Doctors cite under number 116.

The fundamental basis of this assertion, however, was touched upon by D. Thom. in his opuscul. On the Nature of Matter, chapter 3, and can be proposed in the following form. Matter is the first principle of the individuation of the whole composite, and consequently of the substantial form, insofar as it has the character of the first subject, neither received nor receivable in another; therefore, matter marked with quantity, which is posited as the principle of individuation, cannot be understood as possessing the aforementioned mode. The antecedent is clear from what was said at number 5 and following. The first inference from the antecedent, however, is clear. For it would be of the character of the aforementioned mode to actualize matter and be received in it; therefore, the aforementioned mode could not confer upon matter its being the first root of individuation; for the mode would have the character opposed to that by which matter is the first root of individuation, namely, its irreceptibility in another as in a subject. The second inference from this prior one plainly follows.

Hence D. Thom. concludes in the same place that quantity itself, taken formally according to its being, insofar as it has the character of an inherent form, cannot be the first root of individuation: because, according to this character, it is in another as in a subject; and what is the first principle of individuation cannot be such as to be in another as in a subject.

108 First, it is confirmed. Because this mode could not be a singular and physical mode, as is clear from itself; therefore, it could not fail to be received in singular matter and to presuppose that matter as singular; and consequently, matter would not be singular by reason of it, nor the first root of singularity. This last inference follows from the prior one; the prior inference in turn follows from the antecedent. For this is the difference between a metaphysical act and a physical act: although a singular metaphysical act does not presuppose a singular metaphysical potency, but makes that potency singular by acting, and therefore presupposes, for example, only a specific potency—namely, human nature—and not a singular potency; just as a specific and metaphysical difference presupposes only generic potency and constitutes specific potency; nevertheless, a physical and singular act, if really received according to its formal being, cannot fail to presuppose a physical and singular potency.

Again, because this follows by induction. And likewise because the informing, which is between physical potency and physical act, is real and actual; and therefore, it must exist in reality and actuality between the extremes, and be really distinct on the side of the thing; and consequently, between extremes each of which is truly singular insofar as it is distinguished from the other; for a distinction on the side of the thing—that is, a real and actual distinction—cannot fail to be between singulars. The action by which a metaphysical act actualizes its metaphysical potency, however, is only action according to reason, with a foundation in the thing; this action does not require that the extremes be actually distinct on the side of the thing, but only according to reasoned distinction; and consequently, it does not require extremes each of which is singular, but rather allows that one of them, insofar as it is in itself, be universal and the other singular; for in this way universals can be distinguished from their singulars.

109 Secondly, it is confirmed and explained by that reasoning of Divus Thom. which we have just adduced at the numbers cited. For from the communication by which form or act is communicated to matter, there follows, in its own way, the communication of the superior to its inferior; therefore, from the fact that some mode is superadded to matter and informs it, matter will not thereby become singular or the first root of singularity; but, to the extent of the force of that communication, it will become capable of being made universal. The inference from the antecedent seems to be clear. The antecedent, however, is proved in two ways. First, because for this reason Divus Thom., at num. 54 cited, said that form, insofar as it is communicable to another as to a subject, is in itself universal and common to many. Secondly, because from the fact that something is in another there arises the fact that it can be predicated of that other—in the manner elsewhere indicated—and thus it has the character of a form with respect to its inferior. This is so true that even if a genus is predicated through the mode of a material part, that materiality is attributed to the difference, of which it is not predicated, and not to the inferior considered as that whose character causes it to be subjected to the superior and, as it were, to receive it within itself.

110 Nor does it matter if one says that this substantial mode, through which matter would be determined toward this quantity rather than that one, must be identified with matter: and thus, like matter, would be irreceptible, and could not presuppose a positively singular matter. For because of this identification, metaphysical singularity does not presuppose its potency—that is, its species—as something singular. And finally, just as matter is not said to inform itself insofar as it is identical with itself, so neither would the aforementioned mode actualize or inform that same matter.

It therefore makes no difference. For what follows from this is that this mode does not differ really and entitatively from matter, but that it does not differ really and formally—or at least, by the very nature of the thing and abstracted by the intellect—from matter, as is clear from what has already been said in the heading of this doubt, and from what our Complut. say in the Logic, disp. 14, num. 48 and following, and in the Book of Physics, disp. 19, num. 27 and following. Thus, although identically considered and by reason of matter it has those conditions mentioned in this evasion, it nevertheless does not have them formally and by its own proper characteristics; but rather, from itself and by its own proper characteristics, it will have from the very nature of the thing and abstracted by the intellect, that it is received in matter, that it is a physical act, and that it informs matter by the mode of an act. Thus, matter will not, by reason of the aforementioned mode, be the individual and the first root of individuation; but if matter has that character at that point, it receives it from elsewhere, or from its own proper characteristics.

§ III. An objection to the foundation of the first view is met.

111 Granting the antecedent proposed by the opponents, the first inference must be denied if it is understood to concern some mode really superadded to matter, through which matter formally and directly has, in reality and in act, its being as the first root of individuation. In proof, it must be said that the reasons are unequal. For the actual causation of matter with respect to form, and conversely, as well as the causality of an efficient cause, are second acts in their own genus. Thus, no form and no efficient cause can actually cause without at least a new mode, unless such a form and such an efficient cause be pure acts; consequently, if matter actually caused form without any superadded mode—that is, without a union naturally distinct from it—matter would be pure act insofar as this consideration is concerned. But matter actually and in act having its being as the first root of the individuation of the material substance, and consequently as the first root of this material causality rather than of the other, is not directly and in its own genus a second act; rather, in its own genus it has the character of pure potency wholly irreceptible in another, although it has a nexus with first and second act. Therefore, it does not follow from the fact that matter of itself—that is, without some mode really superadded through which it formally and directly has its being as the first root of individuation—can be the first root of the aforementioned individuation, that matter will be pure act; but rather, that it must have the character of pure potency.

We have said: without some mode really superadded through which it formally and directly has, in reality and in act, its being as the first root of individuation. For just as, in order that the aforementioned matter should be, in reality and in act, the root, it is required that it actually compose the whole and be subjected to form, since it cannot exercise the aforementioned function unless form and the substantial composite composed from that matter as from the first root of individuation are present; so likewise, a mode of union is required on the part of matter and form, which is to be individuated together with the aforementioned whole from that same matter. Although neither form, nor the composite, nor the aforementioned mode is required as conferring upon matter its being as the first root of individuation, they are required only as effects that have a connection with matter, such that matter is in reality and in act the first root of individuation. So completely, however, is matter, in reality and in act, the root first of this union insofar as it is sustained on the part of that other, and then of this form; and conversely, it is first the root of this form and then of this composite. But concerning these matters, let them consider what our Complut. teach in the lib. Physic., disp. 6, quaest. 2.

112 This can also be explained in another way: first, by the example of the same matter, which, as they say, has an appetite or desire with respect to form not yet possessed, although it can have that form naturally. For in order actually to have the aforementioned appetite, it is not necessary that it have it directly by reason of something superadded, but by reason of its own potentiality, while concomitantly connoting the privation of that same form, as is clear from what our Complut. state in 1 Physicorum, disp. 3, num. 94; for such an appetite is not a second act in its own genus and directly. And likewise from what will be said in the following doubt. For matter, by reason of its own potentiality and while connoting something else to be suggested there, contains this quantity rather than that one in advance, in reality and in act. It is nevertheless clear that, precisely because matter contains this quantity rather than another in advance, it is in reality and in act the principle of the individuation of this composite and not of another; for precisely on that account it seeks to compose this composite and not another, and this seeking is sufficient for it to be, in reality and in act, the root of the individuation of this composite and not another.

For confirmation, the antecedent must be granted and the inference denied. In proof, what has already been said makes it clear, as will what will be said at number 133. For although matter of itself does not seek this quantity more than that one, it is nevertheless not necessary that any substantial mode be superadded to it, by reason of which it formally and directly has its being as the first root of individuation; but matter itself suffices, while connoting those things that we have indicated there and shall mention at the place cited, in order that it be able to possess this quantity rather than that one.

Although the decision of this difficulty is not difficult to collect from what was said above, nevertheless, in order to explain it more fully, something must be added, and some objections answered; therefore, both because of the points noted above and on account of those just mentioned, we treat it separately.

§ I. The negative view is presented.

113 The negative part is defended by Suarez, disp. 5 of his Metaphys., sect. 3, and by all the Doctors whom we cited under num. 3 for the contrary view. The principal foundation of this view has already been touched upon, but it can be pressed and explained further. For matter contains this particular substantial form as a root rather than that one, and contains this particular quantity rather than that one; therefore, before matter contains this particular quantity rather than that one, it will be singular, individual, and the root of the individuation of the whole composite; consequently, it will not possess the character of the aforementioned root insofar as it is matter marked with quantity, which signifies matter as radically containing this quantity rather than that one. This second inference is clear from the first; the first follows from the antecedent. The antecedent is also clear, because effects are precontained in a material cause in the same order in which it causes and receives them: for it causes them only in the way in which it precontains them. But matter has this particular substantial form to cause and receive before this particular quantity; therefore, it precontains the former before the latter.

It is confirmed. Since matter regards this particular form before this particular quantity, it therefore contains that form in itself before that quantity. Thus, since matter, insofar as in the former priority it precontains this particular form, is individual—as is clear from itself—and therefore the first root of individuation, it cannot have of itself first this, namely, that it contains this particular quantity. This last inference seems to follow from the first. The first follows from the antecedent, because effects are precontained in a cause in the order in which that cause regards them.

The antecedent is proved. First, because matter regards form as its most perfect act; and it is clear that the most perfect act of a power is regarded by it before any other act. Secondly, because things belonging to the predicament of substance primarily regard those that complete them within their own predicament rather than those outside it: for the things by which they are completed within their own predicament are more intimate to them, and therefore regarded first. Substantial form, however, completes matter within its own predicament, whereas quantity does not. Finally, matter does not regard this particular quantity except on account of this particular form and by reason of it: for it does not regard¹ that form except so as, through it, to receive this particular substantial form; therefore, it regards the latter before the aforementioned quantity.

114 Secondly, the same view is proved. For if matter marked with quantity—that is, insofar as it precontains this particular quantity as the first root—were the root of individuation, would it have this character insofar as it precontains this quantity as terminated or as unterminated? In neither way. Therefore, etc. The major is clear, since the inferences are sufficiently evident. The minor, as to the first part, is that of the Divine Thomas, opusculum 70, quaest. 4, art. 2, where he says that matter is this matter, marked, and thus individuated by form, by unterminated dimensions, not by terminated dimensions. This is proved from the fact that otherwise Peter the boy and the same Peter the man would not be one and the same numerically individual: for the cubit measure in Peter the boy does not remain in the same man, but becomes two cubits.

The same minor is also clear as to the second part. For quantity is certain and determinate only by reason of form. As Aristotle teaches in the first book of Physics, cap. 4, and as the Divine Thomas adduces in the first part, q. 7, this quantity is so much, and therefore certain and determinate, because matter has this form rather than that one; and therefore, when this form changes, the amount of quantity changes. Therefore, matter will not be individual, nor the root of individuation, insofar as it precontains quantity as so much and determinate: for the amount and determination of quantity comes not from matter, but from form.

115 Thirdly, the point urged by this view is that which was touched upon above, namely, that matter has nothing whereby it could precontain this quantity rather than that one unless it is already this individual and the root of individuation; therefore, it will not be individual, and consequently will not be the root of individuation insofar as it precontains this quantity rather than that one. The inference from the antecedent is clear. The antecedent is proved: for matter of itself is indifferent to this quantity and that one; otherwise it could receive only this particular quantity. Therefore, of itself it has nothing whereby it could precontain this quantity rather than that one; but if it precontains it, this is by reason of this form, which it receives first; consequently, it will precontain it only after it is already individual and the first root of individuation.

§ II. The true view of Aristotle and the Divine Thomas is preferred.

116 Nevertheless, it must be said that matter marked with quantity, insofar as it contains this quantity rather than that one as a root, is the first root of the individuation of complete material substance, and consequently of its substantial form. Thus Aristotle and the Divine Thomas in the places cited for our view in doubts 1 and 2, as we shall immediately explain. The Saintly Doctor teaches this especially in opusculum 70, q. 4, art. 2: after saying in the answer to the second that dimensions, insofar as they are accidents per se or according to their formal being, cannot be the principle of the individuation of substance, he immediately adds in the answer to the third that matter is the root of individuation by reason of dimensions preconceived in it, that is, contained in it as a root; otherwise dimensions, as accidents, would be the cause and root of the individuation of substance, which the Saintly Doctor expressly denied in the answer to the second. Accordingly, both Aristotle and the Angelic Doctor are followed by Caietan., 1 part., q. 29, art. 1; Gonzalez, 1 part., q. 11, disp. 23; Javellus, 5 Metaphys., q. 15, and very many other later Thomists; finally Bannez, 1 de Generat., c. 5, q. 3, art. 8, confesses that this view is highly subtle, highly probable, and sufficiently in accord with the mind of the Divine Thomas.

117 The prior and fundamental reason for this assertion is derived from what we said in the preceding doubts from Aristotle and the Divine Thomas; it can be proposed in this form. For although the individuation of matter and of the whole composite is very different from the individuation of quantity, nevertheless the first root of the individuation of the composite must be matter marked in some way by quantity, as we showed in doubt 2. But it cannot be matter marked by quantity in the way in which the composite is said to consist of matter and quantity, as though quantity were an inhering form intrinsically constituting it in the being of the aforementioned root; nor, as has been shown in doubt 3, insofar as the same quantity is said to be actually possessed and connoted intrinsically. Nor, finally, can it be marked by some superadded mode distinct from matter by its nature, through which it is determined toward this quantity rather than that one, as is asserted. Therefore, matter marked by quantity is to be understood as containing this particular quantity rather than that one as the first root.

The inference is clear. First, because no other mode of signification by quantity remains through which matter could be the first root of individuation. Secondly, because among all conceivable modes by which matter can be marked by this quantity rather than that one, this one is prior and more fitting. It is prior because it is prior that matter contain this particular quantity as a root than that it import it by any other mode. It is more fitting because whatever is first used to mark matter with this particular quantity must be individual and the root of individuation, if matter, once marked by quantity, has this character. Most of all, because matter, insofar as thus marked, is not drawn beyond the reason of matter and pure potency, absolutely irreceptibility in another, nor beyond the reason of substance; and thus it is most fitting that it be the first root of the individuation of the substantial whole composite.

118 The second reason for the same assertion, which we hinted at several times above, is derived from the Divine Thomas, 3 part., q. 77, art. 2, and fourth Contra gentes, cap. 65, as well as opusculum 70, q. 4, art. 2, answer to the third, and elsewhere. It can be reduced to this form. For quantity² is in a certain way individual of itself, and thus in a certain way is its own first root of individuation, as we shall show in the following disputation, num. 21 and afterward; therefore, matter will be individual and the first root of individuation insofar as it contains this quantity rather than that one as a root. The inference is clear: because precisely because matter, taken according to itself and precisely, cannot be the sufficient root of its own individuation and of the substantial whole composite, and otherwise must of necessity itself be individual and the first root of individuation, as has been shown, this office is most excellently attributed to it insofar as it contains what is in itself in a certain way individual and is its own first root of individuation, namely this particular quantity; most especially because it cannot have that character insofar as it is actually and formally informed by it, as was proved in the third doubt.

§ III. An answer is made to the prior argument and its confirmations adduced for the first view.

119 To the first, it is clear from the preceding numbers that the antecedent must be denied. For when matter does not contain this particular substantial form rather than that one, except insofar as matter itself is this and individual, and has this individuation only insofar as it contains this particular quantity rather than that one, it follows that the same matter contains this particular quantity before this particular form. To the proof to the contrary, an answer will be given when we reach Bannez, 1 part., q. 3, art. 2, Gonzalez, and many other later Thomists: that major proposition, understood as it is truly understood, concerning matter compared with its effects taken absolutely as singular, must be distinguished. The proposition That effects are precontained in a material cause in the order in which it causes and receives them is denied in the genus of a purely receptive material cause; the proposition That it causes and receives them is granted in the genus of a dispositive and determinative material cause, or with respect to its remaining first disposed and determined by a self-permanent disposition and determination. What is added there in support of this major will be clear from what we shall bring forward in this same difficulty. Then the minor must also be distinguished proportionally. If its meaning is that matter first causes this particular form rather than this particular quantity in the genus of a purely receptive material cause, it must be granted; otherwise, if its meaning is that it first causes this particular form rather than this quantity in the genus of a dispositive material cause, or with respect to its remaining disposed or determined to this particular substantial form rather than another, the inference must nevertheless be denied: because, as it is legitimate, it would be necessary that the consequent be true in this latter sense.

120 These matters are explained. For as our Complutensians touched upon in the book On Generation, disp. 2, num. 111, just as in the probable opinion of many a final cause can be divided into different genera, namely the end whose and the end for whom; and one thing can be prior to another in the genus of an end whose and posterior in the genus of an end for whom, as was explained there; so the material cause can be divided into different genera of material causality: the purely receptive material cause, in which it is not considered whether the receptive potency is disposed and determined or not, for by a purely precise abstraction it prescinds from this and considers only those things in which form is immediately received; and the dispositive or receptive material cause, whereby the receptive potency remains disposed and determined for its most perfect act. In this latter genus, whether the form itself has first been received, and whether this disposition depends on it, is not considered: for the disposition and determination toward form, insofar as it depends on form, does not belong to the genus of a dispositive cause, but is in a certain way an effect of form already received, and belongs to another genus of material cause. Only what matter has from the force of the disposition is considered, whether that disposition depends, as to its being received, on the prior reception of form or not.

121 And one and the same thing can be caused and received first in one genus of this cause, and received and caused later in another, as occurs in substantial form and quantity. Of these, form is caused first in the genus of a purely receptive material cause than quantity, for substantial form is immediately received in matter, whereas quantity only mediately and after form has been received, insofar as it is received immediately in the substantial whole composite. Conversely, in the genus of a dispositive and determinative material cause, or with respect to matter's remaining disposed and determined to receive its most perfect act, namely form, quantity is received before form itself. For matter's being disposed does not depend on form as a disposition and determination toward being received in this effect. In this genus, whether form itself has first been received and this disposition depends on it is then not considered.

122 Moreover, although, after comparing the aforementioned receptions and causalities, an order is assigned among them in the different genus of cause just described, and even after comparing them simply with respect to priority and posteriority, the reception of substantial form is prior to that of the quantity disposing it toward form, as our Complutensians show in the book On Generation, disp. 2, num. 105, nevertheless, after comparing the precontaining of this substantial form and this disposition and determination, which is first per se with respect to that form—that is, this quantity—the order must be reversed. For in judging whether matter first precontains this particular effect taken absolutely, namely this particular substantial form, rather than that effect also taken singularly, namely this particular quantity, it is not enough to ask whether it first receives the former in the genus of a purely receptive material cause, or whether it simply receives it first; but one must ask whether it receives the former in the genus of a dispositive, determinative material cause, or with respect to its remaining first disposed and sufficiently determined by the disposition and determination just described, to receive its most perfect act, namely substantial form.

The reason is clear from what has been said. Since matter of itself is not determined in the genus of material causality to precontain this particular substantial form rather than the other, as is clear from what we asserted in doubt 2, it must therefore first precontain something that determines it toward this containing of substantial form rather than another. This can be nothing other than that by whose reception matter is disposed and first determined by a self-permanent determination, to have this substantial form rather than that one.

123 Wherefore, since quantity is that which is first received in the genus of a self-permanent dispositive material cause, or through the mode of a cause permanently dispositive and determinative, and consequently, according to this consideration, is precisely what is received insofar as it disposes and determines matter in the way described; because quantity of its own proper reason has the being of the first and permanent disposition and determination of matter, and is itself in a certain way determined and individual, this particular quantity is therefore precontained in matter before this particular substantial form, even though in the genus of a purely receptive material cause substantial form is received in matter before quantity. For quantity, precisely insofar as it is a received effect, is received in the whole, even though, insofar as it is a disposition, it does not exercise its causality toward that whole, but precisely toward matter, as if it were received in it alone.

124 From all this it follows that, speaking universally, it is not absolutely true that effects are precontained in their cause in the order in which they are caused by it, so that what is caused first is precontained first. For this rule fails,³ whenever the precontaining of one effect, namely the last effect caused, is of such a condition that it in some way completes the cause for precontaining and causing the effect that proceeds from it first. This occurs when an efficient cause is compared with an effect first produced per se and intended by it together with the means or dispositions toward it. For although the effect first intended per se is later entrusted to execution, nevertheless it is first contained in the cause than the means or dispositions. Thus this causal proposition is true: Because an efficient cause is able to produce the effect first intended per se, it therefore has the power to produce the means and dispositions toward it. No more potent reason exists than that already mentioned, namely that the precontaining of an effect first intended per se in a certain way completes the cause for precontaining the means. In the present case too: for matter precontains this particular form only insofar as it is positively individual, and it does not become individual except through the radical precontaining of this quantity.

Nevertheless, it is established that although matter does not cause and receive its effects according to its formal being in the order in which it precontains them, yet, speaking of complete and adequate precontaining, it causes and receives them, according to their formal being, only in the order in which it precontains them in the genus of a purely receptive cause. Thus the effects first contained in matter, as in a purely receptive potency, prescinding from whether it is or is not actually disposed by an actually possessed disposition and considered according to its formal being, are first received rather than those which are precontained in it in the genus of a dispositive material cause, or with respect to its remaining disposed and determined to have this form rather than another, taken according to its formal being. Although, as we said, after comparing the precontaining of this substantial form, as such, and this quantity and determination, as such, the precontaining of the aforementioned quantity is prior to that of the aforementioned form, and consequently, speaking of the complete and adequate precontaining of effects in their material cause, namely matter, the effects are not caused and received according to their formal being in the order in which they are precontained in that same matter.

125 Hence (thus an objection is silently met) quantity itself, insofar as it is radically contained and received according to its formal being and actually possessed, is compared with substantial form in one way and another. For insofar as it is radically contained, it has a certain identified relation with matter, determining it and, so to speak, disposing it not only for the pure reception of substantial form, but also for precontaining it as this form; consequently, it is prior absolutely and simply to substantial form itself and to its reception, even these being taken absolutely, provided they are considered as singular things. Quantity itself, however, according to its formal being and as actually possessed, is really distinguished from matter, is received in the whole, and disposes and determines matter toward form as this form, not indeed absolutely, but as naturally receivable: for by divine power it can be received absolutely without it; and thus its reception is posterior in the genus of a purely receptive material cause; indeed, simply, it is posterior to the reception of form, because otherwise it does not make matter individual, but supposes the same matter to be individual by reason of the radical precontaining of the aforementioned quantity.

126 We have said that quantity, insofar as it is radically contained, is a certain relation that, so to speak, disposes matter not only for the reception of substantial form, but also for precontaining it as this form, because quantity, insofar as it is contained, is not distinguished from matter, and consequently neither from the precontaining of substantial form in the same matter; it cannot therefore be a proper disposition toward the aforementioned precontaining. For a disposition properly so taken involves, at least by the nature of the thing, a distinction between it and the thing disposed, and with respect to that to which it disposes. Thus the aforementioned quantity, insofar as it is contained, has only a kind of disposition toward the precontaining of substantial form: for, after comparing matter insofar as it expresses the precontaining of this quantity with matter insofar as it expressly asserts the precontaining of this particular substantial form, matter is then understood to be determined by that prior inadequate relation to have this later relation. Thus that prior relation makes matter ultimately and proximally capable of having this ultimate relation; consequently, it is in a certain way analogous to a proper disposition, which makes the subject ultimately capable of having something else.

127 It makes no difference if one urges that matter contains this particular quantity only as a second form, namely an accidental form; therefore, it first contains in itself this particular substantial form, which is the first act. The inference is clear, because the containing of a second form, as such, necessarily presupposes the containing of the first form, namely substantial form.

This therefore makes no difference. For although quantity, in its own reason, implies that it is a second form, namely accidental, this is not its adequate reason: for insofar as it is a second form, it calls itself second precisely insofar as it depends on and presupposes the first form, namely substantial form. But in addition to the dependence just mentioned, quantity has its own peculiar reason, according to which it has the being of the first disposition and determination of matter and is itself in a certain way individual; consequently, it is that upon which matter itself, as well as substantial form, depends. Wherefore the same quantity, insofar as it is a second form secondarily receivable and subsequent to substantial form in matter, is precontained in the same matter later in nature than substantial form. For according to this reason, if we speak most formally, we do not consider the same quantity insofar as it is the first disposition and determination of matter and is individually determined of itself, but the same quantity insofar as it is still, according to its ultimate reason (though inadequate), a second form susceptible in matter after the first. The aforementioned quantity, however, according to another inadequate reason, also conformable to its ultimate reason, is the first disposition and determination of matter and is in a certain way individual of itself; accordingly, it is precontained in the same matter before this particular substantial form, as has been said.

128 This can be explained by the example of contrition and sanctifying grace, if these are compared with God, insofar as he contains them as first cause. For contrition, as a disposition toward grace that altogether justifies the soul, is first precontained in God than the same grace, insofar as it altogether justifies and grants participation in the divine nature after the manner of nature and in a state of rest; although the same contrition, as formed, terminated, and finally meritorious according to strict desert of eternal reward, is later precontained than the same grace insofar as it possesses the character of nature, forms contrition, and grants it the aforesaid strict desert.

It is also established from what our Complutensians hinted in the book of Physics, disput. 10, num. 23 and 28, that the antecedent must be granted. The consequent, however, must be denied. For, as we recently said, matter regards this particular substantial form rather than another because matter itself is this and not that, and has this from the precontaining through which it contains this quantity rather than that one. Hence, in the former respect, in which matter is understood to contain this particular quantity, with nothing conceived concerning the precontaining of this particular substantial form, matter is not conceived with a relation to this particular quantity, although it is conceived as connected with it. For although quantity may be capable of the passive precontaining just described, it does not of itself first terminate matter's relation to it: because the substantial relation of matter, insofar as it is its relation, must of itself first be terminated toward something proper to its predicament.

To prove this same inference, it must be said that it is at least true in effects which are of themselves capable of first terminating the relation of their cause to them. This does not occur here, because of the things that our Complutensian College taught very well in the place cited from the book Physics. How, moreover, can one thing be connected with another, or be precontained in it, without being, absolutely or speaking of a prior respect, the relation of the cause to it? This has already been explained by our Complutensian College in Physics, disp. 23, num. 17.

129 Nevertheless, because those two later proofs of the antecedent in this confirmation can be turned back to prove that matter does not contain this particular quantity before this particular form—since things proper to the genus and predicament of substance, as being more intimate, seem to be prior in matter to things foreign and of a foreign predicament, and consequently this particular substantial form seems to have to be precontained in matter before this particular quantity; and likewise, because this quantity is contained on account of substantial form itself, and as a determination toward it, the form itself seems to have to be contained first—therefore, the first of these proofs, insofar as it can be urged against our view, must be answered from what has been said: priority or posteriority in the aforementioned precontaining is not considered to depend on whether the things precontained are, according to their formal being, more intimate or not; for all things, insofar as they are contained and are viewed as such among the things contained, are identified with matter precontaining them and are viewed under the genus of substance. But among other things, account is at least taken of the fact that one of the contained things is of itself, according to its formal being, the first determination and disposition toward something else; for then a precontaining thing, without the prior containing of such determination, cannot precontain anything else. Since quantity is of itself the determination of matter toward this form, and the precontaining of quantity is in its own way a determination toward the precontaining of form, the former must be precontained before the latter.

To the second proof, it is answered that it makes no difference that these two precontainings, namely that of this quantity rather than another and that of substantial form rather than another, are really distinct in matter, and are so compared with each other that the precontaining of this particular quantity rather than another is in a certain way ordered toward the precontaining of this particular substantial form. For from this it follows at most that the aforementioned precontaining of this particular substantial form is in a certain way quasi-prior in the genus of a final cause, or quasi-final cause, to the precontaining of this particular quantity, but not in the genus of a material cause.

§ IV. The second argument of the same view is met.

130 To the second principal argument, the major is granted as to its latter part, namely, that matter as containing this particular unterminated quantity is the first root of individuation. For quantity, as terminated, supposes the whole composite to be already individual, because it is not understood to be terminated except as it is in a certain way an effect of substantial form already received in matter. Therefore, as the Divine Thomas taught in opusculum 70, this quantity, as terminated, is in a certain way individuated from itself, as preconceived in matter, according to the respect in which it is not understood to be terminated.

This will be understood more clearly if one notes that by unterminated quantity we do not understand quantity that has no terminus in reality, and is therefore infinite, but quantity insofar as it is not understood to be terminated and, so to speak, formed by substantial form, which is its terminus and complement; but it is understood to precede it. For just as contrition, for example, because it is a disposition toward grace, is not understood to be formed and terminated except insofar as it is posterior to grace, and insofar as it is understood to be prior to grace, it is not conceived to be terminated and formed, because the terminus and complement of a disposition is form toward which it is disposed; so, because quantity is a disposition toward substantial form, it is not understood to be terminated, nor, so to speak, formed, except after substantial form is understood, and through it is understood to be terminated, completed, and, as it were, informed. Therefore, D. Thom. in 4, dist. 11, q. 1, art. 1, q. 3, answer to the fourth, said: ‘The dimension preconceived before substantial form in matter does not have complete being: because it is not a terminated dimension; the termination of a dimension is through form.’

131 Therefore, as quantity, in the former respect in which it is preconceived according to its formal being before substantial form in matter—that is, it is presupposed to dispose and determine matter before form itself is understood to be received in it, in the manner elsewhere explained—is understood simultaneously to have this special characteristic, that it is not understood to have a determinate amount or figure, although in reality it has them; for in that former respect and in that genus of cause, no consideration is made of whether it has or lacks a terminus. For that priority and that genus of causality are only the priority of dispositive causality insofar as it adheres on the part of matter, not the priority of the causality of substantial form, from which that disposition—namely quantity—has a determinate amount, that is, the amount owed to it within the latitude of the maximum, thus sought from it by the particular substantial form, all circumstances being considered. Thus quantity, insofar as it is contained in that former respect, is not understood to be contained under a determinate terminus and figure; it is prescinded from this by a purely precise abstraction. Only the precontaining of this quantity rather than another is considered, by reason of which matter itself is determined toward this particular form rather than another and has the being of an individual and the root of all individuation. Thus everything brought forward in the argument is sufficiently clear.

Hence also it makes no difference that a certain later author objects that terminated and unterminated quantity are really one and the same; for as that quantity supposes the whole composite to be individual, so this quantity, whether terminated or unterminated, is essentially accidental.

It is answered from what has been said that although it is really the same quantity that is terminated and unterminated, nevertheless in different genera of cause it is prior and posterior to substantial form, and by reason of this priority and posteriority it is called terminated or unterminated. Likewise, by reason of this priority and posteriority that it has according to its formal being when compared with form, it arises that it is precontained in matter before or after form itself, as has been explained. Hence it is not inconvenient, but necessary, that in the former respect in which it is not considered terminated but unterminated, it does not suppose an individual substance; yet when considered terminated, it does, because then it is posterior to that.

Add that, as we said, quantity, as unterminated, is in a certain way individual of itself, so that the same quantity, as terminated, is in a certain way individuated from itself as unterminated. Thus, according to its being unterminated, it does not suppose the substantial whole to be individual, but is a root in the way described, that is, as contained in matter as the root of its individuation.

132 It finally makes no difference if you object that the Divine Thomas said in the opusculum on the principle of individuation that matter marked by determinate quantity is the principle of individuation.

This therefore makes no difference. For determinate quantity is one thing, and terminated quantity another. Determinate quantity means quantity as this numerically, rather than that one, without considering whether it is terminated and completed by substantial form, or whether it has this amount or that one; and thus it is the principle of individuation insofar as it is contained in matter. Terminated quantity, however, means the same quantity as posterior in nature to substantial form, through which it is terminated and formed; likewise, according to this reason it involves having a determinate amount, for example two cubits; and thus, so taken, it is not the principle of individuation.

That these two reasons of quantity are in a certain way distinct is clear. For while quantity remains unchanged, the fact that it is determined—that is, that it is this and not that one—can vary, as can the fact that it is actually terminated and completed by substantial form: as if it were separated from it by divine power, or if precisely its amount and figure were changed, as if, for example, a living thing were increased a little according to the same numerical quantity, or changed its figure a little according to it.

§ V. The last argument of the same view is met.

133 To the third, the antecedent must be denied. And if the antecedent is granted in the proof, the consequent must be denied as to its second part. For another reason remains whereby matter precontains this particular quantity rather than that one, namely the pure and naked potency of matter; with the connotation, however, that if that composite is made by generation, these particular dispositions and no others immediately preceded it in time; consequently, they were introduced by this agent rather than that one, in this time and in this composite, and not in the other. But if it is made by creation, it is subjected to God actually creating through the infinite acts of his intellect and will, virtually and eminently containing this composite rather than that one. With these connoted conditions, matter has, so to speak, such a natural capacity that of itself, without anything intrinsic superadded to its being, it contains this quantity rather than that one. Because precisely by being determined through these antecedent dispositions rather than those, and consequently introduced in this composite and not another, and by this agent in this time, etc., with which this quantity is to be introduced again by a natural connection, a sufficient concomitant is given whereby matter itself, without anything else added to its being, contains this quantity rather than that one. But let those concerned see what our Complutensians say in the book On Generation, disp. 2, num. 87 and following.

This can be clarified further by the example of the relation of paternity residing in Peter: as our Complutensians teach very well in Logic, disput. 14, num. 92 and 93, and in the book On Generation, disput. 4, num. 167, its terminus is what is of itself in relation to all sons begotten by the same Peter. Once the generation of the first son, and not another, is posited, it is terminated toward him rather than another; and conversely, when this son dies and another is born in the same instant by the generation of a second son, it is then terminated toward the second son without the addition of any other intrinsic thing superadded to its being, because this new concomitant is posited. And so with the others. Likewise, the angelic species represents an actually exercised existence of this particular individual rather than another, although it did not represent it before, since nothing is added to its being and only the new concomitant of the production and exercise of the existence of that represented individual is posited. Finally, the same prime matter now desires by an appetite of desire these forms rather than those, namely those it never received but can still receive; now, however, it desires those by an appetite of concupiscence, not by one of desire, namely while it actually has them, although for this it is necessary only that new concomitants be added to it, as is clear from our Complutensians in the book of Physics, disp. 3, num. 94.

134 It also follows that it makes no difference that a certain later author objects that if antecedent dispositions determine toward the precontaining, and afterward the having, of this quantity rather than that one, it will follow that the aforementioned dispositions, at least together with the other recently enumerated determining dispositions, will be the root of individuation rather than the quantity that must be produced anew and previously contained in the first nature. For, after comparing the quantity itself, which otherwise follows the form to be generated, with the form itself, the quantity considered in the way described has the stronger claim to be the root of individuation, because it determines matter toward the same substantial form.

It is answered from what has been said by denying the sequel. First, because the antecedent dispositions, together with the others recently enumerated, are considered only as concomitant; whereas the subsequent quantity, if considered as previously contained in matter, is stated directly, because it is matter itself as determined toward this particular form, without the addition of any new reality inhering in it. For it is clear from what has been said that the first root of the individuation of material substance must be, at least directly, pure and naked potency, irreceptible in another as in a subject, and not involving form itself as received; the contrary is found both in the dispositions and in the other things recently enumerated. Secondly, because all the aforementioned things determine matter only extrinsically, not intrinsically as quantity, insofar as it is previously contained. Yet the first root of individuation must be matter intrinsically determined, as is clear from what we have so often indicated. Thirdly, because the determination made through the subsequent quantity as previously contained is of itself permanent and in act, whereas that made through the other things enumerated is not; but the determination per se and directly required from the first root of individuation must be of this latter condition, so that the determination may be proportionate to the thing it determines and the root of individuation may fit exactly the substantial individual itself and its self-permanent, actual individuation. Finally, because the other dispositions are not in a certain way individual of themselves, whereas quantity is; hence matter is more fittingly made determined and individual, and the root of individuation, by being subjected in the way described to quantity than by being subjected to other things. Thus, if other things are desired in their own way for such individuation and for the root of the individuation of the whole composite, they do not influence it in the way quantity, as previously contained, does, but in another, inferior way: namely, insofar as they are the concomitant required for the precontaining of this quantity rather than another; consequently, in this way the same quantity...

135 It finally makes no difference if you urge that prime matter of itself is only one by negative unity, as is clear from what our Complutensians teach in the book of Physics, disp. 3, from num. 27 through num. 45; therefore, unless something is added directly to it, it cannot be one by positive unity. As if the relation of paternity residing in Peter had only the negative force of extending itself to several sons—that is, it had nothing whereby it could extend itself to them—while there were nothing in it by reason of which such extension would be opposed, it could not extend positively toward a son again begotten by the same Peter unless something were added directly to it.

This therefore makes no difference. For this is, so to speak, the proper character of matter, as is clear from what our Complutensians state very well in the book On Generation, disp. 2, num. 89: that in actual being it has whatever is required on the part of the direct in order to have positive numerical unity, according to which it is the root of this particular substantial individual rather than another. That is, it has all the reality required directly in being for the direct numerical positive unity according to which matter is the root of this particular substantial individual rather than another; although this is not there actually exercised and under the concept of the direct, that is, although it is not there exercising the relation of the direct, and consequently is not under the concept of the direct unless it is posited obliquely and in the way described as what is desired as a concomitant, or one of the aforementioned concomitants, which we enumerated under num. 133. For in order that the reality of matter, having whatever is desired in being directly for its aforementioned numerical unity, may exercise the relation of the direct, the aforementioned concomitant is required. Such a concomitant is also required so that it may be under the concept of the direct, because the direct under the concept of the direct must bring with it directly what expresses its relation to another, namely what is imported from it obliquely, or have a connection with it as something imported by the mode of a concomitant. Thus prime matter is said of itself to be one by negative unity, because, taken precisely of itself, it is not connected with such a concomitant; and so, precisely because the aforementioned concomitant is posited, matter will have this exercise and the relation of the direct under the concept of the direct positive unity and of the root of the individuation of the whole composite.

136 Why, so to speak, do we attribute this character to matter? It follows from the reason recently given, namely, because matter is one numerically in a negative way, insofar as it is not more connected with this numerical quantity than with that one. Wherefore, when the aforementioned concomitant is posited, matter itself, without any addition in being, is directly more connected with this quantity than with that one; hence it has of itself whatever, with respect to that quantity, is otherwise to have the relation of the direct, and is desired under the concept of the direct.

This can be clarified further because the positive unity of matter, though individual, must be the unity of pure potency and of the first subject, irreceptible in another, as is clear from what has been said. Thus it cannot directly import anything added to matter in being, because this could not fail to have the character of an act received in matter itself, which precisely would not be sufficient for the relation of the direct of such unity, as we asserted above; consequently, whatever is desired in being for that which is to be direct with respect to the aforementioned unity must always precede in matter, not indeed so that it is always there under the concept of the direct and exercises the relation of positive unity that is the root of the individuation of this substantial composite rather than another, for example Peter's; but so that it is always there in actual being. For, as we hinted, for the aforementioned exercise and for the concept of the direct under the relation of the direct, one of the two aforementioned concomitants is required.

We have said many times that nothing intrinsic in being is added to matter that was not previously there in the same way now explained; for although nothing is added to it within this line, it is well within the direct line under the concept of the direct in this limited sense, namely that something is added to it so that it now has the relation of the direct under the concept of the direct, or the direct actually exercised; not however previously: for it is not necessary for this unless one of the two aforementioned concomitants enumerated under num. 133 is added. For precisely by this, the potentiality of matter remains determined and under the concept of the direct of this positive unity rather than another, because the direct line under the concept of the direct does not necessarily demand any further addition in order that the direct under the concept of the direct be said to exist and be exercised again.

All these matters can be explained further. First, by examples of the relation of paternity in the angelic species and the appetite of prime matter, adduced under num. 133 of this difficulty, in which one must philosophize proportionally. Secondly, by another higher example, namely the generative power in divine things, which directly denotes the divine essence and obliquely paternity. And although the aforementioned essence, of itself, has whatever in being is directly required for the direct generative power, nevertheless, of itself taken precisely, it does not exercise the relation of the direct, nor is it in the Father under the concept of the direct unless the oblique, namely the relation of paternity, and its concomitant are added. Consequently, from the defect of this concomitant the divine essence does not have in the Son the character of generative power. Thus, although when paternity is added nothing is added to the essence that gives it anything in being directly required in order that it have the character of the direct with respect to generative power, nevertheless something is added to it directly that belongs to the direct line, insofar as it is precisely denoted through it that it is added to it so that it have the character of the direct under the concept of the direct, or the direct actually exercised. For the concept of the direct under the concept of the direct, or the direct actually exercised, must bring with it directly what expresses its relation to another, namely what is imported from it obliquely, or its connection with that, as with something imported by the mode of a concomitant; although this relation or connection in being says nothing other than no other reality or formality besides the divine essence taken according to its absolute being and the relation of paternity; otherwise there would be in God some other formality or reality in being required for the relation of generative power. We shall say what the Divine Thomas teaches against this in the treatise On the Trinity.

§ VI. Corollaries worthy of notice, and not without great necessity for reconciling several passages of the Divine Thomas, are adduced.

137 From what has been said throughout this entire disputation, it is sufficiently clear how several passages of the Divine Thomas concerning the principle of the individuation of material substance, which at first seem to conflict with one another, are to be reconciled; in reality, however, they cohere by a wonderful connection. Although in the course of this entire disputation they have been explained by us in the order in which necessity urged, it was nevertheless pleasing, for the honor of the Saintly Doctor and so that it might be certain how clearly and transparently we followed his own mind, to collect all these matters together in this section and to present their true understanding at once.

From what has been said, first, it is collected what the Saintly Doctor means when he sometimes absolutely asserts that matter is the first principle and root of individuation, as in 1 part., q. 54, art. 3, answer to the second, and in several other places listed in the golden table under the word individuum, num. 25, indeed in opusculum 32, where he says that matter alone is the principle of individuation. At other times, however, he says that prime matter and dimensional quantity are the principle of the aforementioned individuation, as in 3 part., q. 77, art. 2, and in 4, dist. 12, q. 1, art. 1, q. 3, answer to the third, and often elsewhere.

In the former places he is speaking of the first principle of individuation, which, within the line of that principle, is absolutely first, although of itself it is not absolutely sufficient, as we explained from num. 94 through 98. In the latter places, however, he speaks of the principle that is first and of itself absolutely sufficient within the latitude of the first principle of the aforementioned individuation, as we hinted there; yet he is not speaking of quantity in just any sense, but of quantity as previously contained in matter, as we said under num. 86 and 116.

138 Add that the Saintly Doctor can also be explained otherwise, and this not without great agreement with his mind. In the former testimonies he speaks of the first principle of individuation, to which the individuation itself—that is, the being that is incommunicable, or the being undivided in itself by the ultimate division through which accommodation and attribution are absolutely granted—is attributed; although in reality it proceeds from quantity radically contained in matter, as we showed from num. 91 through 94. In the latest, however, he speaks of the principle of individuation to which that same individuation, that is, the being divided by the ultimate division from anything else, is attributed proportionally in the same way, as we said there.

Finally, in the first places the Angelic Doctor simply means that matter alone is directly the first principle of individuation, although, according to what he teaches in the later testimonies, quantity is desired obliquely, not indeed as possessed, but as sought, and in the following respect, insofar as it is from the force of secondary causes, although it is not absolutely necessary that it follow, as we explained from num. 133 through 135.

139 Secondly, it is deduced how the same Saintly Doctor is to be understood when he says once that matter marked by quantity, or as existing under dimensions, is not the principle of individuation, and consequently neither is quantity itself that marks it; but rather it is only an inseparable sign of it and the principle by which that same individuation is known and demonstrated, because quantity, insofar as it is an accident, does not cause its subject, as in opusculum 32, cap. 3, and the opusculum On the Principle of Individuation. Yet once, indeed many times, he means that matter marked by quantity is itself truly the first and fountainhead principle of individuation insofar as its being is concerned, as in the body of the opusculum On Being and Essence, and opusculum 70, q. 4, art. 2, in the answers to the arguments, as well as in other places which we brought forward from num. 43 through 48.

From what has been said, therefore, it is clear that these two things cohere very strongly with each other. For matter marked by quantity, understood in different ways, is and is not the first principle of individuation insofar as its being and its being known are concerned. For matter itself, insofar as it is marked by quantity, insofar as through this marking it is designated as containing, as a root and foundation, this quantity rather than that one, and consequently the aforementioned quantity, not as possessed nor as taken through the mode of an intrinsic formal cause, or as actually inhering, but as previously and radically contained, is the first root of individuation insofar as its being is concerned, as was explained from num. 86 and from num. 116 through 137. But the same matter marked by quantity, insofar as by this it is designated as matter itself actually having and exercising quantity and being informed by it, is not the first principle of individuation insofar as its being is concerned, but insofar as it is demonstrated and known, and this means that it depends on certain circumstances, place, etc., as we said there and from num. 74 through 86. Consequently, quantity itself according to this reason is a principle of individuation only in the way explained in the place cited.

140 Thirdly, it is collected how the passages of the same Holy Teacher are to be reconciled in some of which he seems to mean that unterminated dimensions, and consequently matter marked by them, not terminated dimensions or matter as marked by them, are the first principle of individuation, as in opusculum 70, q. 4, art. 2; but in others that determinate dimensions and matter marked by them are the first root of individuation, as in opusculum 29, at its end, and elsewhere.

It is answered from what has been said that to say unterminated dimensions is to say dimensions insofar as they are not understood to be completed and terminated by form, which is their terminus and complement, and consequently insofar as they are not precontained in that form nor are anything posterior to it, but rather precede it according to the precontaining in matter. Accordingly, they are not understood, in that former respect, to be terminated, nor to have a determinate measure and figure. By determinate dimensions, however, is understood the same quantity insofar as it is a certain determinate singular, that is, this particular quantity rather than that one, without considering the termination by form explained above. It is clear, however, that there is no contradiction in this: that quantity is in the one way unterminated and in the other way determinate, and is the first root of individuation, as was shown under num. 131; indeed, that this is necessary is clear from what we asserted from num. 130 through 133. For precisely because matter is the first root of individuation, quantity, insofar as it concurs with the reason of the aforementioned root, must be taken as depending on and previously contained by matter, not as depending on and previously contained by form itself; otherwise the root of individuation would first have to be reduced not to matter but to the aforementioned form, the contrary of which has been shown.

141 Fourthly, it is inferred how the Saintly Doctor is to be understood when he sometimes seems to mean that individual material substance cannot be separated from quantity, but at other times that it can. In the testimonies denying this, he is speaking of ordinary power; in those affirming it, of absolute power. Or in the former he is speaking of quantity as radically contained, and in the latter of the same as actually possessed; or in the former of material substance as individuated by sensible individuation, and in the latter according to the respect in which it is precisely individuated, according to those things required for its absolute individuation, as we touched upon from num. 87 through 90. By all these matters many other testimonies of the Divine Thomas are easily reconciled.

Finally, from what has been said it is deduced that our view, which we explained in the preceding doubts concerning the first root of the individuation of material substance, and consequently of substantial form, is itself the view and the mind of the Angelic Teacher; for according to it, as we have declared, all the statements, indeed places and testimonies, of the same Saintly Doctor, which at first seemed to conflict with one another, cohere most excellently and by a wonderful connection, and thus clearly elucidate the same view; indeed, it is established that this view is to be preferred to all the other views proposed so far.

1 Once the individuation of material substance, and its root, have been explained, the mind is immediately prompted to inquire into the principle of the individuation of its accidents: and as, in the disputation concerning the first root of the individuation of the entire substantial composite, it is not expressly and formally discussed whether substance itself is in very truth and intrinsically individual, because this is sufficiently evident; nor whether it is the metaphysical principle by which substances are rendered individual, because, as is certain and admitted by all, metaphysical individual differences must be given, at least distinguished in reason from specific differences, which in this order are the principle of those same substances in their individual being and which constitute them in the being of such substances; but only concerning the first principle and physical root of the aforesaid individuation, into which all the other things are resolved: so, namely, that we take the individuation of the accidents to be, on the part of the thing, individual and to have its own metaphysical principle, that is, its own metaphysical individual differences, through which they are constituted in this order. And therefore we institute this disputation only concerning the first principle and the physical foundation of that same individuation. Wherefore, since this is clear from what was said in the preceding disputation, num. 1, and as Suarez most rightly points out, disput. 5 of his Metaphysics, sect. 7, num. 1, there is for us, as regards the present controversy, no controversy with Scotus, who thought that this disputation should be brought to a close by his haecceities, which are nothing else than metaphysical individual differences. For we, since we admit those same individual differences, proceed further, and investigate their physical root.

Whether the subject is the first root and principle of the individuation of accidents, and of their pure individual distinction? The decision of this difficulty follows almost entirely from what we have said in the preceding disputation, difficulties 1 and 2. However, so that the mind of St. Thomas may be made more evident and a fuller answer may be given to certain objections that press their adversaries, we therefore raise this difficulty separately.

§ I. The negative position is proposed.

2 The negative position is defended by Durandus in the place cited above, and by Suarez, Metaphysics, his disputation 5, section 7, and by many others. From this they think that the a priori reason, and the first root of the individuation of an accident, is the accident itself as it is such an entity in act, or aptitude.

Suarez reduces the foundations of this position to this form in the same place, no. 4. First, because each thing is formally and intrinsically one in number (which is the foundation of unity, or of what he calls the one) by that through which it is an entity in act in the nature of things, or apt to become such: because every such entity is singular; but every thing is intrinsically and formally such an entity in act through its own entity; therefore it is singular and individual through that same thing; therefore accidents have this as well.

And this is confirmed. Because the subject cannot be the principle individuating accidents; therefore it can only be an intrinsic principle of this kind belonging to the accidents themselves. The antecedent is clear: because in the first place the subject cannot be called an intrinsic principle of the individuation of an accident, as though it intrinsically and per se composed the accident; because we are not now speaking of the composite of subject and accident, but of the accidental form itself: which plainly is not intrinsically composed from the subject itself; nor can the subject in this way be its intrinsic principle. Again, the subject cannot be called the principle individuating an accident, as the relational terminus, or aptitude, of such an accident to inform such a subject: because with respect to the same subject, two accidents numerically distinct can have an aptitude to inform it; therefore those aptitudes cannot be distinguished numerically from the subject; therefore they are from themselves.

3 Secondly, this seems to be established most strongly from certain accidents which, according to their own condition, subsist in a subject but refer it, or somehow lead it, to something else: such as relations, acts, habits, and the like. For if an accident is said to be individuated by the subject because it naturally looks to it, why should these accidents not rather be said to be individuated by the ultimate terms to which they naturally look, especially since they take their essential specific reasons from them?

Thirdly, because it is said without foundation that this accident has a natural coadaptation and relation to this subject alone. For although perhaps it can come to be in that subject alone through natural causes, nevertheless it is in itself apt to inform any subject capable of such an accident: just as conversely it can happen that this subject naturally has, for example, only this whiteness or this quantity; and yet its capacity is not thereby understood to be so limited and determined from itself to this accident that it is not sufficient in itself to receive similar accidents.

4 Fourthly, this position might be urged from the fact that otherwise all accidents which succeed one another in the same subject would at least successively be numerically the same; and thus heat that is now in water and perishes, and heat that will afterward be introduced into it, would not be distinguished in number, which is certainly contrary to the common opinion of the philosophers. The consequence is proved. First, because where there is the same root and the same reason of at least successive individuation, individuation must also be the same in the same way. Then also: because things having the same form at least successively cannot fail to have the same specific unity at least in the same way; since the form just mentioned is the first root of specific unity; therefore, if the subject is the first root of the individuation of accidents, the consequence will be that accidents having the same subject at least successively will likewise be numerically the same.

Finally, because if accidents were individuated by their subjects, two inconveniences would follow. The first is that quantity could not be individuated from itself, but from the subject, since it is a true accident no less than the other accidents; yet this cannot be reconciled with what we said in the preceding disputation: for material substance is individuated by matter designated by quantity, because quantity is individuated among material things from itself; and so whatever among those things is individual must either be quantity or in some way participate quantity. The second is that two accidents differing only numerically could not exist at the same time in the same subject, as is evident from itself and will be clearer from what is said at no. 57: just as matter designated by quantity is the root of the individuation of substantial form; therefore two forms cannot exist at the same time in the same matter; yet this is false, since several visible species of different colors exist at the same time in the same pupil; and so on.

§ II. According to the mind of Aristotle and St. Thomas the difficulty is decided.

5 Nevertheless, it must be said that the first root and principle of the individuation and pure individual distinction of accidents is the subject itself, taken formally; and consequently that accidents having a formally different subject are numerically different, just as if they had the same subject taken in the said way, they would not be numerically distinct. Thus Aristotle, in the places cited in the preceding disputation, difficulties 1 and 2, and Metaphysics V, text 15, where St. Thomas also says, in First Part, q. 29, a. 1: Accidents are individuated through the subject: for this whiteness is said to be such insofar as it is in this subject; and q. 39, a. 3, where, speaking of unity and individual multiplicity, he says: But accidents, just as they have being in a subject, so they receive unity and multiplicity from the subject; and in opusculum 29, where he says: But it must be noted that accidents are not individuated through prime matter, but through their proper subject, which is being in act, [through which] they are individuated: as substantial forms also are individuated through prime matter, which is their subject.

The same is taught by the Holy Doctor: then in Third Part, q. 77, a. 2, saying: Since the subject is the principle of the individuation of accidents, what is posited as the subject of some accidents must in some way be a principle of individuation. Then also in many other places listed in the golden table under the word accidens, no. 24, where all Thomists defend this opinion in common; and therefore it would be superfluous to cite them in particular.

6 The most powerful reason for this assertion, however, is none other than those which we brought forward in the preceding disputation, difficulty 1. For as those arguments prove that the individuation of substantial form, and of the composite constituted through it, must be taken from matter designated by quantity, as from the first root, because purely individual distinction is material distinction, and therefore is taken from matter; so for the same reason, the individuation and purely individual distinction of accidents, since it is material, cannot fail to be taken from their matter, namely from the subject taken formally, as from the first root; otherwise, as we expounded there in reasons 1 and 2, such a distinction, precisely because it would be formal and proceed from form as such, would be specific and not purely individual.

This can also be explained and confirmed from what we touched on from St. Thomas in the preceding disputation. For accidents have from the subject their individual being in themselves by the ultimate division, or being that is incommunicable to another, as to the subject of inferiority and predication; and they are also thereby distinguished from other accidents of the same species; therefore they will also receive individuation from that same subject, as from their proper principle.

7 The consequence is evident. The antecedent, however, as regards the first part, is proved and explained. Because accidents, as such, are acts and forms, and thus are communicable from themselves to another, as to a subject of inherence; and therefore, according to this reason taken most formally, they cannot found that negation which is proper to an individual, namely, that it cannot be in another, something in some way distinct from it on the part of the thing conceived, as in a subject of inferiority and predication; because this reason presupposes that the thing which grounds it, considered as its foundation, has in some way not to be received in another, as in a subject of inherence or information, as we said from no. 53 through no. 61 of the preceding disputation and shall touch on below. But precisely because the said accidents are connaturally, whether in act or by aptitude, in this subject rather than that one, according to the common course of their order, they are altogether irreceivable, at least connaturally, in another subject of inherence; and thus, according to this sole reason (with the qualification concerning quantity to be explained in the following difficulty), they are incommunicable to another in some way distinct from them, in the way in which a universal is communicated to another in some way different from itself, as to a subject of inferiority and predication.

From this also the same antecedent is sufficiently established as regards the second part. First, because, as we expounded in the preceding disputation, no. 79 and following, precisely by that through which something is incommunicable to another, in the way just indicated, as by a principle and first root sufficient in itself for such individuation, it must in fact be different from every other thing of the same species. Then also: because in the common notion of accident the subject is posited in common by way of a difference: as when we say, Evenness is the curvature of the nose, as our Complutensians explain at length in Logic, disputation 5, q. 2, so if an accident were to be defined in the singular, its subject in the singular would have to be posited by way of a difference: as if we should say, This evenness is this curvature of this nose; therefore the sign is that the first root of the individuation of the same, and of the division of being, is their subject insofar as the same subject is also, by the ultimate division, distinct from every other, according to which relation we are speaking of it here.

§ III. An objection is noted, and its solution.

8 But you will object that this does not fit well with what was said in the preceding disputation concerning the individuation of material substance. For if substance, as individual and divided by the ultimate division from every other thing, is the first root of the individuation of accidents, and this [substance] is individual by reason of matter designated by quantity, as by the first root, the consequence will be that matter itself designated [by quantity] ought rather to be called the first root of the individuation of those accidents, according to the dictum: Because of which each such thing, and that more.

It will be answered that this objection is intended to refute the first principle in itself insufficient for the individuation of accidents; but not the first principle in itself sufficient, of which we are speaking here, about which the place is St. Thomas's opusculum on the principle of individuation, when he denied to the aforementioned principle the reason of prime matter and granted it to the subject of those accidents. For since accidents are second forms, and as such must be individuated by a subject, they must presuppose as the first root of their own individuation a subject at least including form, namely substantial form, through which they are first in act simpliciter; since being according to what, which is to be supplied by accidental form, cannot be of that kind unless being simpliciter proceeding from substantial form is presupposed; otherwise it would truly be being simpliciter and substantial, as our Complutensians teach very well in the book On Generation, disputation 2, no. 78.

9 Nor does it matter if, against this solution, you urge that a sufficient reason is given from prime matter designated by quantity why these accidents rather than those ought to be given: so that the entire individuation of them is resolved into that same matter as into a sufficient root; and so on. The antecedent is proved. For from the fact that this matter designated by this quantity is given, this substantial form must be given, and not that one; and this composite, not that one; and ultimately these accidents, not those. Hence, if it is asked why these accidents are given, it will be answered that this happened because this composite is given, which is their subject, and not another; and therefore this composite, and not another, is given, and consequently these accidents, and not those, because this matter designated [by quantity], and not that one, is presupposed; and therefore, that being presupposed, other accidents cannot naturally speaking be received in the same composite for the time being, and therefore not in the same [composite] taken formally, as we shall explain below; and so on.

It will be answered that the antecedent is true if it is understood as a sufficient reason within the order of inference, or a sufficient reason based on the goodness and infallibility of the consequence, but not as a sufficient reason within the order of reality, or based on the sufficiency of the antecedent in the reality of the thing. And in answer to the proof, the antecedent will be distinguished in the same proportional way, and the consequence denied.

10 This is explained. For just as, from the denial of efficacious assistance toward an act falling under a precept, a sufficient reason is given within the order of inference for the sin committed by the person to whom that assistance is denied: since it is deduced by the best consequence that he would sin if such assistance were once denied him; nevertheless, it cannot from this be given as a sufficient reason in the reality of the thing, or based on the sufficiency of the antecedent in the reality of the thing, namely on the denial of the said assistance; indeed, not any reason that could in this order be in some way the root of sin formally taken, from the fact that God is incapable of this concurrence. Thus, from the positing of matter designated by quantity, a sufficient reason is given within the order of inference, or a sufficient reason based on the goodness of the consequence: for (at least speaking naturally) it is deduced by a good consequence that if prime matter is designated by this quantity, and not that one, these accidents, and not those, will be given in the composite; nevertheless, a sufficient reason is not posited within the order of reality, or based on the sufficiency of the antecedent alone in the reality of the thing, for the reason touched on in the preceding number.

Therefore, just as that sin cannot follow unless a creature acts and it is attributed to it, as the first principle and source of the sin, so this accident, and not that one, cannot be given unless its subject, namely the whole composite, is given; and that, in the reality of the thing, as a principle sufficient in itself, is attributed to be the first root of its individuation. And just as the denial of efficacious assistance has a connection sufficient for that goodness of consequence concerning sin, because when God denies assistance, the creature immediately fails through its own fault, and not through a defect in God who gives sufficient assistance, so that connection will be sufficient for the goodness of the consequence by which, from the positing of matter designated [by quantity], it is rightly inferred that these numerical accidents, and not those, ought to be given in the composite: namely, the connection between this principle insufficient in itself in the reality of the thing and the other principle, from which the whole sufficient principle, namely the entire composite, will be constituted.

11 Add that it is not improbable that the prior objection and its reply can be answered differently from the fact that, at least very probably, prime matter designated by quantity is the first principle by which, and the first root in this order, of the individuation of accidents, but not the first principle which; for we are speaking here of the first principle which, not of the first principle by which. For in things having a first principle which in fact distinct from the principle by which, as happens here, when their principle is investigated absolutely, recourse is had to the principle which, not to the principle by which. As in efficient causes, when we speak absolutely of the principle and cause of an action proceeding from them, recourse is usually had with greater reason to the principle of acting which than to the principle by which. Therefore it is commonly said that actions are those of supposita, not of forms: because the former are the principle which, while the latter are the principle by which, of the same actions.

§ IV. Solution of the arguments of the first position.

12 The first [argument] is clear from what was said in the preceding disputation, concerning how it proves that accidents are individuated most proximately through their own entities, such as these: because they are individuated from the fact that they look to this subject, formally taken, and not to another; and this regard is not really distinguished from their entity; nevertheless, they are not individuated by themselves, as by the first and radical principle: rather, from the fact that the subject is this [subject], it follows that the accidents are these; and from the fact that the said accidents are numerically such, and numerically distinct only by the said relation, it follows very well that the subject is the first root of such individuation and distinction. As is commonly said in the analogous case of substantial form: which is proximately this form, with respect to matter designated [by quantity], but radically with respect to the same prime matter designated by quantity. For from the fact that matter is this matter, it follows a priori that the form will be this form; and from the fact that this matter, and not that one, is looked to by this form, it is collected a priori that such a form is this form numerically, and that matter also, considered by way of the terminus inspected in itself, is the first root of such individuation, as we said in difficulties 1 and 2 of the preceding disputation.

In confirmation, the antecedent must be denied. And in answer to the proof, having granted the antecedent as regards its first part, it must be denied as regards its second part, according to what we have just said. Nor does the opposite prove the objection: for it is true only when speaking of the same subject materially and taken in the reality of the thing, because this can be looked to by several numerically different accidents; but not of the same subject formally, and within the line of the subject formally taken; and consequently, as it connotes in the being of the subject this time rather than that one, etc. For a subject taken in this way is looked to by one and the same numerical accident; and thus, however many accidents there are, there correspond to them so many subjects inspected by themselves, which can be the same materially and in the reality of the thing, but not formally and in the being of the subject, as we shall explain more fully from no. 15 through no. 18.

13 To the second [argument], it will be answered that accidents which do not subsist in a subject, but somehow refer it to something extrinsic, such as natural powers and operative habits, take their individuation from the subject, although they receive their specific reason from those extrinsic terms. The reason for this disparity is clear from what was said at nos. 5 and 6 of this difficulty and in the preceding disputation, no. 12 and following. For the said extrinsic terms are compared by way of an extrinsic formal cause with respect to those same accidents, taken according to their species; and thus they are fit to give them a species, which can arise from a formal cause, whether intrinsic or extrinsic; but not to give them individuation, whose first and most powerful root must, in the genus of a material cause, concur with them; and therefore such individuation is best given to the subject of the accidents, as to the first source and origin of it.

14 To the third [argument], the antecedent must be denied. And in answer to the proof, it must be said that although we grant that this numerical accident naturally, or according to the common course of its order, looks to this numerical subject formally taken, and can be received by divine power in another numerical subject; nevertheless, not in such a way that the said accident has a connatural aptitude, or one according to the common course of its order, to be received in this subject: and thus, even while existing in an extraneous subject, it always looks to, and always seeks, a connatural subject, or that which according to the common course of its order is at least owed to it in some way; and from this relation it immediately receives its individuation, and remotely, as from the first root, it takes it from the subject.

We have said that it always seeks a connatural subject, or that which according to the common course of its order is at least owed to it in some way, so that a distinction of what is owed is established between accidents of the natural and supernatural orders. For to the former a connatural subject which can be assigned; but not so to the latter; although in reality they at least in some way require, according to the common course of their order, a peculiar subject which; and therefore charity received in Michael under this number cannot, according to the common course of its supernatural order, be received in Gabriel.

15 As to what is added there, namely, that this numerical subject does not naturally look to this numerical accident alone, but can connaturally receive several and different accidents, and consequently conversely this numerical accident can be connaturally received in different subjects, is clear from what was said in the preceding disputation. For although the antecedent can be true of the same subject materially and taken in the reality of the thing, and in the way just mentioned elsewhere; nevertheless, not of the same subject formally and accepted in the being of the subject, and as it connotes this difference of time rather than that one, etc. For according to this reason, subject and accident are mutually adapted and measured so that neither this subject can be naturally terminated toward another accident, nor this accident toward another subject: as we said in the analogous case when comparing matter designated by this quantity with substantial form, and as will be clearer from what is said in the three numbers immediately following.

But since it is settled that the subject, taken in the reality of the thing and materially, and the accident itself considered in this same order, do not have the said mutual commensurability: because this numerical subject, so taken, has from its peculiar reason greater amplitude and indifference. This is sufficiently collected a posteriori from experience, namely, that the same subject materially, at least successively, can naturally receive several numerically different accidents; whereas the same numerical accident, even materially accepted, cannot be received according to the common course, even successively, in different subjects.

16 The consequence must be denied in answer to the fourth [argument]. And in answer to the first proof, it must be said that it is true of the same root formally and taken in the being of a root; but not of the same root materially and accepted in the reality of the thing, as happens here. From this, in answer to the second proof, it is clear that if it were possible for the same form in species, materially and accepted in the reality of the thing, successively to inform, so nevertheless that it would be different in species in the being of the form and of the root of specific unity, then it would not give the same specific unity successively either. And so nothing is proved against us from this: for, when several numerically different accidents are received successively in the same subject materially and taken in the reality of the thing, we give several numerical subjects formally, accepted in the being of the root of their individuation.

This is explained. For numerical unity of an accident requires not only that it be in this subject, materially and accepted in the reality of the thing, but also identity of time: no otherwise, proportion being preserved, than is desired for the numerical unity of motion, according to the doctrine of Aristotle commonly accepted and taught by our Complutensian College in Physics, disputation 23, no. 22, the unity of the terminus and of the same time; and thus, when time varies, the individuation of the accident is inferred to vary, and although the subject may be the same in the reality of the thing, it is not the same when formally taken in the being of the subject. Because the very subject in the reality of the thing varies formally in the being of the subject insofar as it underlies different circumstances of time. And thus, as often as Peter's only whiteness ceases and Peter becomes white again, so often whiteness varies and another whiteness numerically is produced anew and successively. For although Peter remains the same in the reality of the thing, he does not remain the same in the being of the subject formally taken, or in the being of the right of such a subject: because he underlies or connotes a different circumstance of time.

17 This can be further elucidated by the example of a surface with respect to place, together with the relation of distance from the center of the earth and the poles of the world. Although these may not often vary in the reality of the thing, as if a located body were moved around with the same surface in the reality of the thing, nevertheless they often vary in the being of the material reason of place formally taken, as happens in the example just given; and consequently place itself varies, because the said surface underlies different relations of distance, and it, insofar as it underlies such a distance, is said to be the material reason of place in the most formal sense. Thus, for the present, proportion being preserved, it must be philosophized: although, as will be evident to the observer, there intervenes a difference between the example offered and the matter under discussion.

Nor does it follow from what was said in the preceding disputation, no. 134, that the individuation of accidents must be reduced, as to its first root, to time itself: because, as we said in the analogous case of quantity concerning the individuation of substance, time concurs only by way of connoting something extrinsic; the subject, however, although it is not included directly in the accident itself, is nevertheless that which directly individuates the accident in the being of a root. For this office does not require being intrinsically and essentially included in it; it is enough that it be the first material root of the accident itself, irreceivable in another, as in a prior subject; and that it be of such a condition that, according to this reason, it is intrinsically, that is, by the reception of the accident itself, unifiable with it; and these two things accord to the subject of accidents, not to time, as is evident from itself.

18 This itself can also be explained, and at the same time a certain objection that might have been made here can be solved, by the example of the efficient cause of this numerical accident, say of this numerical heat produced by this fire, which cannot be produced by another fire, according to what our Complutensians teach in Physics, disputation 15, no. 50. For although precisely because it is produced by that numerical fire, it cannot fail to be distinguished from another heat produced by another fire, nevertheless neither of these fires concurs in the genus of a material cause, but of an efficient cause, and therefore altogether extrinsically. For this reason, and for other reasons which will be obvious to each from what has just been said and will be touched on in this same disputation, we reduce the individuation of the said heat, considered in the said way, not to the producing fire, but to the receiving subject, as to its first root. For here we are not speaking of any root at all, namely an altogether extrinsic root by relation to which individuation is not taken; but of a root in some way intrinsic, and therefore of that by relation to which individuation is taken.

Finally, it must be said that [this argument] touches on a twofold difficulty: namely, whether quantity has this peculiar property among the other accidents, and whether the substantial forms that can be received in matter are in some way individuated from itself; and whether two accidents differing only numerically can exist at the same time in the same subject. But since each of these difficulties is sufficiently grave in itself, and several things are needed for its decision, as will be clear from what follows, we shall give each of them a separate doubt.

From an exact understanding of this difficulty, and from its resolution, almost everything that we have said about the individuation of material substance depends, together with many other things that are customarily said on Thomas’s way in very serious difficulties; and therefore, both because of what has recently been said and because of that reason, we raise this difficulty in detail.

§ I. Opinion denying it.

19 The negative position is defended by Durandus; Aureolus in Capreolus, In 2, dist. 3, q. 1, a. 2; Scotus, q. 4; Suárez, disp. 5 of his Metaphysics; and others. The principal foundation of this opinion, however, is what was touched on above concerning other things: whatever can be reduced to this form, namely, that quantity is not more being from itself than many other accidents, therefore will not be more individuated from itself than they are. The antecedent seems clear. Rather, accidents are more perfect from themselves than quantity, and have more being from themselves than quantity: because being is the root of perfection, and whatever is more being from itself is also more being from itself. The consequence is likewise evident. For each thing is one in whatever real unity it possesses insofar as it is being; therefore, what does not have more being from itself than other things will not be more one from itself by real, namely individual, unity than they are.

The same opinion is proved secondly. Substantial form does not in any way have being individuated from itself as from the first root, as was established in the preceding disputation, dub. 1; much less therefore will quantity have it. The consequence is evident. Then, because substantial form is nobler than quantity, and so, this nobility notwithstanding, it could not be raised above matter so as to be individuated from itself in some way as from the first root, but only from matter, much less can this befitting quantity. Then also: because substantial form is not individuated from itself as from the first root, because it is a form receivable in matter, since this form is common from itself and communicable to several, as we said in the preceding difficulty; but quantity too is a form receivable in a subject; therefore, and so on.

20 Thirdly. For either this belongs to quantity because it is an accident, or because it is such an accident; but by neither of these modes: therefore by none. The antecedent, as to the first part, requires no proof; otherwise all accidents would be individuated from themselves in the same way, the contrary of which we proved in the preceding difficulty. As to the second part, however, it is proved. Since quantity, insofar as it is an accident with a specific character, says that it is the extension of substance, and insofar as it is an accident with numerical character, it imports this extension and not that one, with respect to this substance and not with respect to that one; therefore, according to either reason, it takes its whole being from the substance that it regards as its first root: since for this reason other accidents cannot be individuated from themselves as from the first root, because, in order to be these, they cannot fail to regard their determinate subject.

Finally. Since otherwise there would be no inconvenience in the fact that, at least supernaturally, two quantities could exist simultaneously in the same subject; but this cannot be admitted, as will be evident from what we shall say in no. 57; therefore, and so on. The consequence is evident. For if quantity is individuated from itself, and its numerical unity is not derived from the unity of the subject, there is no reason why, when only one subject exists, two quantities could not supernaturally exist there: for in that event nothing would oppose this except the impenetrability of one quantity with another. Yet that opposition exists only with respect to God’s ordained power, not with respect to absolute and supernatural power, as is evident from what was said in the Physics, disp. 19, no. 56, by our Complutensian College.

§ II. The true opinion of Aristotle and D. Thomas.

21 Nevertheless, it must be said that this is peculiar to quantity among all other accidents, and among all other forms receivable in matter: that it is individuated from itself in some way as from the first root. This is Aristotle’s view in the places cited in the preceding disputation. For precisely because quantity is quantity, in the way there indicated, the root of the individuation of material substance, it must itself be in some way individuated from itself, as was there explained and as we shall say with the Divine Thomas.

The same was taught by D. Thomas, Opusculum 70, q. 4, a. 2, on the third, in these words: The reason of an individual is that it is intrinsically indivisible and divided from others by the last division; but no accident has in itself a proper reason of division except quantity; whence dimensions have in themselves a certain reason of individuation according to a determinate position, since position is the difference of quantity, and thus it has a double reason of individuation: one from the subject, as every other accident; and another from itself insofar as it has position, on account of which, abstracted from sensible matter, we imagine this line and this circle.

22 The same Saintly Doctor maintains this very thing in 3 part., q. 11, a. 2, where also, from the fact that quantity is the root of the individuation of other forms, though in the way explained above, he concludes that it is in some way individuated from itself; and therefore it is not individuated from the subject according to the reason previously stated. Thus, after saying that this belongs to the reason of an individual, so that it cannot exist in several, he immediately adds: This happens in two ways: in one way, because it is not naturally able to be in anything, and in this way immaterial forms that subsist separately through themselves are also individuated through themselves. In the other way, because a substantial or accidental form is indeed naturally able to be in something, but not in several: as this whiteness which is in this body. As to the first, then, matter is the principle of individuation of all forms inhering in it: because forms of this kind, insofar as they are from themselves, are naturally able to be in something as in a subject, from which any one of them is received in matter, which is not in another, already the form itself thus existing cannot be in another. As to the second, it must be said that quantitative dimension is the principle of individuation: for something is naturally one only by this, that it is intrinsically indivisible and divided from all others; division, however, occurs in substance by reason of quantity, as is said in the first book of the Physics; and therefore quantitative dimension itself is a certain principle of individuation for forms of this kind, insofar as forms of the same species are numerically different in different parts of matter. Whence quantitative dimension itself has a certain individuation in itself; so that we can imagine several lines of the same species differing in position, according to what falls under the reason of this quantity: for it belongs to dimension to be quantity having position.

23 The Holy Preceptor finally asserted this very thing, 4 contra Gentes, ch. 65, in 4, dist. 12, q. 1, a. 1, q. 2, and Quodlibet 7, a. 10, in these words: Quantity is individuated not only from the subject, as other accidents, but also from position, which belongs to the reason of quantitative dimension itself, which is quantity having position; and therefore it is possible to imagine two separated lines, of the same species, numerically different, according to their different positions. Otherwise a line would not be divisible by its very reason as such: for a line is divided only into lines; but it is impossible to imagine several whitenesses of the same species without a subject; and thus it is clear that whiteness is individuated only from the subject.

Whence the Holy Doctor is followed by Capreolus in 2, dist. 3, q. 1, a. 3; Cajetan, 1 part., q. 29, a. 1; Ferrara, 4 contra Gentes, ch. 65; Báñez, De Generatione 1, ch. 5, q. 3, a. 8, in the first solution to the third; González, 1 p., disp. 23, no. 13; and many other Thomists.

§ III. The opinion of D. Thomas is explained and proved.

24 Nevertheless, because this assertion needs explanation owing to the word “in some way” contained in it, it must first be explained before it is proved. For, as is commonly said in the matter of the Trinity, q. 40, a. 2, and especially in the school of D. Thomas, a divine relation, for example Fatherhood, considered according to its ultimate reason, can be divided into two unequal concepts: into itself insofar as it has the reason of a hypostatic form; and into itself insofar as it expresses being toward, namely toward the Son. According to the former reason it exercises a function which according to the latter it cannot exercise: for, the person of the Father being constituted by divine Fatherhood according to an analogy with the constitution of created persons (which constitution is what we are discussing now), the person of the Father is constituted through divine Fatherhood considered according to its quasi-atomic reason as the being of the first person, insofar as the said Fatherhood has the reason of a hypostatic form, but not according to what it expresses as being toward, namely toward the Son, because that function and that unequal concept of referring the Father to the Son is conceived in some way as later than the active and passive generation of the Son; and the reason of the person of the Father, already constituted, must in some way be conceived as prior itself to the active generation of the Son: since actions or productions belong either to supposita or to persons already constituted; and therefore that relation cannot constitute the Father in the way stated, but can well refer the same Father, already constituted, to the Son.

25 Thus, quantity considered not according to the common reason of an accident, but according to its own proper reason, can be divided into two unequal concepts: first, into itself as extension, and this extension of this substance and not another, and consequently as expressing this relation to this substance rather than that one; and then also into itself insofar as it expresses that it has a determinate position arising from the partial positions of its parts; and consequently insofar as those parts are so coordinated with it that they preserve the reason of matter, or material principle, with respect to it; and therefore it consists of them as from its own matter, not from just any matter, but a matter which gives it that, by reason of those very parts, it has a peculiar position or situation. And although quantity thus taken cannot altogether be separated from the order to the subject, nevertheless, when it is considered under this explicit and unequal reason, it is concerned (at least in the first and proper sense) not with that order, but with the order which the aforesaid parts have to that total quantity, and with quantity itself insofar as it precisely expresses the being of a certain thing having the condition and nature of possessing the aforesaid parts and being coordinated with it in the aforesaid way; and it is not concerned (at least in the first and proper sense) with whether the same quantity, as it consists from those parts, expresses a relation to this substance rather than that one.

What therefore, in one assertion with the Holy Doctor, we wish to say is that quantity has this peculiarity among other accidents and any forms receivable in matter: that, divided in some way into two unequal concepts of itself, it has in some way being individuated from the subject and in some way individuated from itself, as from the first root. The former belongs to it according to the first concept just reviewed; the latter, however, belongs to it according to the second. And therefore D. Thomas, in the places cited for this assertion, used such a sequence of words that this itself is clearly denoted, as will be evident to one considering it.

26 Thus the assertion, explained as to what it indicates, namely that quantity, insofar as it expresses the reason of extension and of this extension of substance, and consequently according to that first unequal concept, is individuated from the subject as from the first root, is established by what was said in the preceding difficulty. For, considered according to this reason, it is considered by the mode of form, but not of just any form, but of a form communicable to its subject no less than other accidents; and therefore it cannot be individuated from anywhere else than from its subject, as from the first root, as is evident from the same statements.

As to the second part, however, it must be proved by no other reason than that which the Holy Doctor supplied in the cited testimonies; and this can be proposed in the following form. Since quantity has from itself, as from the first root, a being divisible into several parts of the same reason, or into several entitative parts differing only numerically, therefore it has from itself, as from the first root, being individuated in some way. The antecedent is established by what our Complutensian College said in the Logic, disp. 13, no. 30 and following, and in the De Generatione, disp. 5, no. 32 and following, where they show how it belongs to quantity, insofar as it is quantity, to have entitative parts such that it has them only by itself or by its reason. The consequence is proved. Then because quantity has from itself parts of the same reason, or differing only numerically, it also has from itself whence it is numerically one. Then also: because it has the aforesaid parts, it certainly has them according to a distinct position, and they can thus be distinguished from one another numerically from that distinct situation and position; likewise, one quantity can differ numerically from another by the determinate situation and position that it has. And therefore, if two lines separated from every subject were given, they could be understood and be numerically different, because one would have a situation distinct from the other.

§ IV. Objections of opponents against the reasoning of D. Thomas.

27 Nevertheless, opponents first object against this reasoning that it is incorrectly inferred from the fact that quantity has from itself parts of the same reason that it is in some way individuated from itself and is the first root of its own individuation; therefore, and so on. The antecedent is proved. For all this belongs to its specific concept, as distinguished from its individuation and root; and therefore all quantities agree specifically in this, that they have parts of the same reason; therefore on this ground quantity cannot be individuated from itself, nor be the root of its individuation and of purely individual distinction, since whatever belongs to the specific concept of a form, as distinguished from its individuation, cannot thereby be individuated or be the root of unity and purely individual distinction.

28 This is confirmed firstly. For from the fact that a vague individual cannot be from itself a determinate individual, and singular in the strict sense, but only by reason of something else, namely a first root, since it is said to possess from itself the reason of the singular taken in the common sense, follows only that quantity has those different parts by numerical diversity taken in the common sense, since all quantities agree in this; therefore, from its having parts in this way, it cannot be inferred that it is individuated from itself by the determinate individuation in question.

This is confirmed secondly. For otherwise, in quantity the specific unity would not yet be distinguished virtually, or with a foundation in the thing, from numerical unity, nor could two quantities be distinguished merely numerically; but this is plainly false; therefore, and so on. The consequence is proved. For therefore, in the Angels the specific unity of anything is not distinguished from its numerical unity, nor can they be distinguished from one another merely numerically, because they are certain forms individuated from themselves, as we indicated in the preceding disputation, no. 17, and as we shall say at greater length from D. Thomas in the treatise on the Angels; therefore, if quantity is individuated from itself, that specific unity cannot be virtually distinguished in it from numerical unity, nor will it be numerically distinguishable from another quantity of the same species.

29 Secondly, they object. For whatever belongs to quantity, and to it according to what belongs to it as such, whether it is to have from itself entitative parts or any other intrinsic reason of quantity, can be only the proper reason of such a form and directed to the line of form; therefore, on that very ground it will be unsuitable that quantity should be individuated from itself, or be the root of individuation, by that reason. The antecedent seems certain. For since quantity, according to its higher reason, is a certain form, it cannot, according to its peculiar constitutive reason, import anything that is not the proper reason of such a form and directed to the line of form. For example, because substantial form, such as a lion’s, according to its higher reason, has the reason of form, it therefore cannot, according to its peculiar reason fitting it, import anything that is not the proper reason of such a form and directed to the line of form. The consequence is proved. For, as is evident from the preceding disputation, the substantial form of a lion, as such, according to no one of its reasons can be from itself, as from the first root, individuated, because whatever belongs to it according to this reason can be only the proper reason of such a form.

30 Thirdly. For the reason of the whole integral and of its parts is far different from the reason of the universal whole, such as the atomic species and its subjective parts, namely individuals; therefore, from the fact that quantity is from itself a certain integral whole consisting in integral parts, it is incorrectly inferred that it also has from itself a foundation for the reason of a universal whole, namely the atomic species, and can at the same time, without anything else, be divided into different subjective parts contained under the said whole. The consequence seems certain. For from the fact that something has the property of one whole, it does not follow that it will have from itself the property of another whole of a different reason. The antecedent, however, is proved. Since an integral whole is of such a condition that it must really be distinguished from its parts, whereas the universal whole is not, and therefore it cannot be predicated of its part, but this is false: Half a forearm is a forearm; but the universal whole is so; and therefore this proposition is true: This quantity here is a quantity; therefore, and so on.

Fourthly. From the fact that quantity enjoys parts having diverse positions, and consequently that diverse parts of the same quantity and diverse total quantities can be distinguished from one another, just as diverse lines, it is incorrectly inferred that quantity is in some way the root of its own individuation; therefore, and so on. The antecedent seems certain. For since position belongs to a distinct category, it cannot be inferred from it that quantity is individuated from itself but from something else, and consequently that something else is the root of its individuation.

§ V. Solution of objections against the reasoning of D. Thomas.

31 To the first, the antecedent must be denied. In proving it, the antecedent must be distinguished. If its meaning is that that whole, taken in the common sense, belongs to the specific concept of quantity, it must be granted; but otherwise, if its meaning is that that whole, taken in particular and altogether determinately, refers to the specific concept of the same quantity, the consequent must be denied in the same proportional way. For although quantity cannot be the first root of its own individuation precisely because it has parts of the same reason in the common sense, it can nevertheless be so because it has those parts in particular and altogether determinately.

Thus quantity and the other accidents agree in some respects with regard to individuation and differ in others. They agree because, just as whiteness is individuated proximately and intrinsically by that same thing by which it has its species, but taken in a particular way, and therefore only a certain individual difference virtually distinct from its specification is added to it, namely that it is this whiteness and not that one, so too is it with quantity. And therefore only an individual difference is added to it in the same way, namely that it is this quantity and not that one, and consequently it has these parts and not those.

32 But they differ, because the fact that whiteness is this whiteness, and that its individual difference arises from another thing, namely from the subject, as from a first root: and therefore the aforesaid individual difference is not the first root of its proper function; rather, the subject is that which, in the first and proper sense, is the first source and root of it. In quantity, however, its being this quantity and not that one arises in some way from the quantity itself, as from the first root; and thus that same individual difference, considered physically, is at least in the proper sense the first root of its proper function, constituting quantity in the being of this quantity.

And the reason is this. For just as, because matter, not indeed according to itself (for that belongs to the specific concept of the entire substantial composite, as our Complutensians indicated in the Physics, disp. 6, no. 8), but insofar as it in some way imports quantity in the common sense, is the first root of individuation, so the same matter, insofar as it imports the same quantity taken vaguely in the same way, must be the first root of that same individuation considered vaguely; otherwise matter itself, insofar as it brings the same quantity to be this and not that, could not be the first root of this completely determinate individuation. Likewise, since quantity itself, by reason of its specific difference, while connoting its subject by the common reason of subject, is the first root of having parts that differ only numerically, it must, by reason of its individual difference taken in the same vague way and under the connotation of the subject taken in the same way, also be the first root of having those same parts numerically distinct. Finally, by reason of its individual difference considered altogether in a particular way, while connoting this subject and not that one considered altogether determinately, it will be the first reason for having these parts and not those, and for their being diverse by this numerical diversity and not that one; and consequently it will also be the first root of this, namely that the quantity is this and not that. And therefore, precisely because the aforesaid quantity connotes the aforesaid subject, nothing will be lacking for it to exercise, in some respect, the office of being the root of its own individuation and purely individual distinction.

33 Therefore, just as it is not removed from prime matter that it is the first root of the individuation of the composite, although it requires something connotated, namely that it was disposed by these dispositions and not those, and consequently those accepted in this numerical composite and not that one, so likewise we must philosophize in the present case (preserving, however, the proportion already indicated).

It is added that, precisely because matter, as presupposing this quantity and not that one, connotes only the aforesaid dispositions, and is therefore the first root of the individuation of material substance, quantity itself, considered according to its formal being, can also, while connotating the same dispositions, become in some way, for the reason stated, the root of its own individuation.

34 From this, the first confirmation is sufficiently established. For it proves only that a vague individual cannot be a determinate individual unless something virtually distinct from it is superadded, namely a certain individual and marked difference; not that this difference must be derived from something else as from a first root, but from that very line (in the way recently explained) from which the individual difference, taken in the common sense, is derived: as we say concerning the individuation of the entire substantial composite and of accidents. Hence this confirmation serves us rather than harms us.

The second confirmation is also evident from what has been said: the consequence must be denied, and the reasons are unequal. For Angels are subsistent forms, irreceivable in another as in a subject; and therefore they can be individuated neither from a subject as from a first root nor from it as from what is connoted, and consequently cannot have a purely individual distinction; but quantity is otherwise: insofar as it is from itself, it is in some way individuated, connoting its subject, as was explained.

35 To the second, the antecedent must be granted, taking the line of form to mean that it has from itself a multiplicity of entitative parts, of the same specific reason, diverse however according to number, or seeking a distinct position in its whole. Then the consequence must be denied. Its proof is evident from what was said. For the proper reason of a lion’s form considered in itself does not belong to the line of a form having from itself the aforesaid parts, as quantity does; and therefore it cannot, according to any of its reasons, be the first root of its own individuation.

Thus quantity is distinguished from other forms in that, since it has from itself entitative parts of the same reason, or parts precisely diverse according to number, it must have from itself whence it can be distinguished specifically and numerically. Numerically, indeed, because the aforesaid parts, as they dispose it, have themselves by the mode of matter with respect to it, and consequently there is in it something by the mode of a material principle, from which, as from a first root, its numerical unity and purely individual distinction, in the way stated, are derived. Most especially, because such parts are not just any parts, but parts having a distinct position or situation, and consequently are of such a condition that although they are of the same reason or species, they are nevertheless distinguished in some way; and thus by this reason, as we have already noted, they can be in some way the first root of the aforesaid individuation.

Likewise it must have from itself whence it can be distinguished specifically, namely insofar as it is a form directly belonging to its own category, by reason of which it has more sufficiently the formal character from which its specification is derived.

Nevertheless, since other forms do not have from themselves the aforesaid distinction of parts, and consequently do not belong of themselves to the line of a form having those parts, there is not in them a sufficient root from which, as from a first principle, their specific and individual unity can be taken.

36 To the third, although those two wholes are distinct, they are nevertheless so joined together that that accident which has from itself that entitative totality can, from itself and in the stated way, be divided by the division of the universal whole into its subjective parts; so that, without anything else belonging to a third category and being directly imported, the aforesaid division can occur (as is evident from the statements made for the assertion), although other accidents cannot according to any of their reasons be thus divided by the division of the universal whole into subjective parts; rather, they have them from their subjects as from first roots.

To the last, the antecedent must be denied. For in this reasoning we are not speaking of positions formally taken and belonging to the category of position, but of position insofar as it is the difference of quantity, as is said to consist in parts having position, which otherwise are best explained a posteriori by the fact that they have diverse positions. This solution is taken from D. Thomas, Opusculum 70, q. 4, a. 2, in the solution to the third, and elsewhere often.

37 It makes no difference if one urges that quantity at least thus becomes, through its parts, virtually possessing distinct positions directed to the peculiar category of position, in some way the first root of the individuation of that quantity, and thus that the whole matter must be reduced, as it were, to a first root in the category of position; since quantity can be numerically distinguished from another quantity only if it establishes distinct positions, as was urged.

The answer is given by denying the consequence. In proving it, the antecedent must be denied. For although the same quantity has a distinct position of its parts with respect to itself, and also a distinct position of them with respect to place, or a distinct position belonging to the category of position, and the former reason demands the latter and establishes it, just as it demands and establishes other properties or affections of quantity, nevertheless quantity is not in some way the first root of its own individuation because it specially virtually possesses the aforesaid positions; but rather insofar as, per se and formally, it has a distinct position of its parts with respect to itself. For since these positions do not have from themselves a distinction of entitative parts, or of the same reason, even with respect to place, since they enjoy only the category of quantity, it follows that they cannot be in some way the first root of its own individuation; and consequently neither can quantity, insofar as it virtually possesses them as it were in a root, be in some way the first source of its own individuation; rather, conversely, the positions themselves, having parts of the same reason, or diverse only numerically, are in some way individuated from it by reason of quantity. Although, because the distinct position of parts with respect to the whole is very clearly known through distinct positions, it can for that reason be best explained through them.

§ VI. Corollaries worthy of notice.

38 From all these things it is first inferred, with Nazarius, 1 part., q. 3, a. 2, sole controversy, and very many other serious Thomists, that some (though few) do not philosophize according to the mind of D. Thomas, who reduce the root of the individuation of material substance both to matter and to substantial form, each indeed as the first root in its own genus, without mentioning quantity: so that matter, connoting form, is the first root of individuation in the genus of material cause; whereas form, connoting matter, has that same office in the genus of formal cause; and, comparison being made between the two, no resolution is made into either as into a root absolutely and simply prior, since matter is this and the root of individuation because it regards this form; and conversely form is this because it regards this matter; so that neither has its being as this by reason of being determined by quantity.

The reason for this corollary is deduced from what has been said. For precisely because quantity has from itself entitative parts, and consequently is from itself, as from a first root, individuated in the stated way, prime matter, for example, cannot be individuated on Thomas’s way, and consequently cannot be the first root of individuation unless, in the way recounted in the preceding disputation from no. 34 through no. 36, it is determined by quantity. For, as the Holy Doctor concludes excellently, Opusculum 70 on Boethius, De Trinitate, q. 4, a. 2 on the third, from the fact that quantity has from itself parts of the same reason, and thus is from itself in some way individuated, it is rightly inferred that matter individuates other forms because, in the way explained above, they are subject to that form, namely quantity, which has from itself the reason of individuation.

39 It is added that, as is evident from the preceding disputation, no. 9 and following, substantial form on Thomas’s way cannot be the first root of individuation. Because, as we shall explain more fully from the same source, unity and distinction arising from substantial form, as from a first root, and consequently from it, at least considered directly, are specific unity and distinction. From this, and from what was said in the preceding disputation, a stronger confirmation of the same corollary is deduced. For precisely because form is not individuated from itself, nor is the root of individuation, and matter considered in itself and precisely cannot have this, since under this consideration it belongs only to the concept of the species, it follows that matter, insofar as it presupposes something else, must be the first root of individuation; and consequently insofar as it presupposes this quantity: since no other thing’s presupposition in matter is better adapted to this function than that of quantity, which from itself and in the way explained is individuated.

40 Secondly, it is inferred that one cannot proceed so completely, following the traces of the Angelic Doctor in this matter of the principle of the individuation of material substance and of quantity, nor so defend to the letter the reasons by which the Holy Doctor is led, those who ascribe to material substance its own proper entitative parts and their distinction with respect to itself, such that they do not arise from quantity, as from a form inhering and intrinsically constituting the same substance in the reason of the entitative whole consisting of the aforesaid parts. For they cannot so completely defend that quantity, in the way explained, is in some way the reason of its own individuation, and that matter determined by quantity is the first root of individuation.

And the reason is this. For, as our Complutensian College excellently teaches in De Generatione, disp. 5, from no. 39 through 42, precisely because material substance would have from itself proper entitative parts of the same reason, and consequently diverse only numerically, the first root of having them would not be quantity, as is evident from the very terms; but rather quantity would have them by reason of substance, as the first root of the same; because in that event material substance would have parts of the same reason prior to quantity. And the reason why quantity and the other material accidents would have them would be because material substance, and prime matter, from which, as from the first principle from which quantity flows, they receive them, would have them prior to quantity. And thus neither would quantity be from itself the first root of its own individuation, nor would material substance be individuated in prime matter determined by quantity. For the strongest reason and foundation on which the Angelic Doctor relies continually to assert that quantity is individuated from itself in the way stated, and that the first root of the individuation of material substance is prime matter determined by quantity, and not merely prime matter, is precisely that quantity has from itself, as from a first root, parts of the same reason, as is evident from the places cited in no. 22, from what the Holy Doctor taught in 4 contra Gentes, ch. 65, and from the reason we deduced from them in favor of our assertion.

41 It is added that D. Thomas is constant in this: that he ascribes to quantity in a proper way that it is individuated from itself in the stated way, but not to the other accidents, as is evident from the places recently cited. But if material substance had entitative parts from itself, then the other material accidents would also enjoy those parts from themselves, as is commonly taught by all those who ascribe to material substance its own proper entitative parts belonging to it from itself; so that one part of the aforesaid accidents could be received in one part of substance and quantity, and another in another, so that (as they themselves say) a material accident would not inhere indivisibly, that is, by inhering according to itself as a whole in the whole substance and quantity, and according to itself as a whole in any part of each and indivisible in both; and consequently the aforesaid accidents would have from themselves, no less than quantity, individuation in some way. For on the way of the Holy Doctor the sole foundation whereby quantity has this peculiarity, namely that it is individuated from itself in some way, is that it has from itself parts of the same reason, or (which comes to the same for the present) that it has diverse partial positions, since position is the difference of quantity, as is evident from all the places in which the Holy Doctor treats this matter.

From all these things it follows that it makes no difference if one says that not just any entitative parts, but specifically entitative parts belonging to the genus of quantity, can be the first root of individuation; and therefore D. Thomas mentioned none except entitative parts having a distinct position. For these alone are both entitative and quantitative parts; whence it is rightly said that these parts, being variously situated (or seeking distinct positions, in which numerical distinction especially shines), are the first root of individuation, and not other parts.

42 It is therefore evident from what has been said that this makes no difference. First, because D. Thomas, wishing to explain why it belongs to quantity alone among material forms to be individuated from itself by reason of its parts, mentioned entitative parts having a distinct position, which belongs to the reason of quantity. For according to his opinion, nothing other than quantity can in any way have entitative parts and their distinction; but whatever enjoys them must receive them from quantity, as from a formal cause and inhering principle, as our Complutensian College has shown at length from the same Holy Doctor in De Generatione, disp. 5, no. 32 and following. Then also: because, as we said from D. Thomas, Quodlibet 7, a. 10, and 4 contra Gentes, ch. 65, this position and their diversity is not position and diversity of the category of position, but position and diverse position of parts in the whole. It is evident, however, that if substance had from itself entitative parts composing one and the same entitative and substantial whole, then the aforesaid parts would have position in the whole; otherwise they would not compose it, and precisely because they would be distinct with respect to themselves and to the whole, they could not fail to have a distinct position or union both among themselves and with respect to the same whole.

43 Finally. Because the Angelic Doctor, 4 contra Gentes, ch. 65, concludes precisely from the fact that quantity enjoys parts having position in the whole that it is individuated from itself, since it is repugnant for something to have parts of the same species and thereby not to be an individual from itself or by the force of its proper line. Thus, after he said, Quantity has this peculiarity among the other accidents, that it is individuated according to itself¹, and that therefore this is so because position, which is the order of parts in the whole, is included in its reason; for it is quantity having position, he immediately, in order to give the reason for this, attended precisely to the diversity of parts of the same species, and therefore added only: Wherever the diversity of parts of the same species is understood, individuation must necessarily be understood: for things of one species are not multiplied except according to the individual; and hence many whitenesses cannot be apprehended except according as they are in different subjects (understand actually or in aptitude), but many lines can be apprehended even if they are considered in themselves.

Whence, for him, to enjoy parts having diverse position is not indeed of the genus and category of position, but, as he says, to have parts of the same species having position precisely in the whole, or (which is the same) to place themselves in it through a numerically distinct communication both with respect to the whole and with respect to one another. This is strictly the same as having parts precisely of the same species; otherwise, since being individuated from oneself belongs to the reason of a form having parts of the same species, he would attend only to the immediately related words and would not give a sufficient reason why quantity, enjoying parts having position, is individuated from itself.

And certainly the Angelic Doctor rightly attended only to this, namely that quantity precisely has parts of the same species, and consequently parts diverse only numerically, in order that it might be sufficiently inferred from this that it is in some way individuated from itself: for, as we showed in no. 32, what is numerically one in the first sense, and vaguely one numerically, and finally altogether determinately one numerically, must arise from the same real principle and first root. It is evident, however, that precisely because something is conceived as having parts in the first sense which are distinct and at the same time of the same species, and consequently distinguishable only numerically, it is conceived as numerically one in the first sense, and as the root of its numerical unity in the first sense; otherwise it would not have from itself parts distinct only numerically in the first sense; therefore that same reality will be precisely that by which, because the individual exists from a part of the thing, the determinate individual and the root of its individuation exists.

44 Thus, what this solution adduces in its own favor, namely that numerical distinction shines most in parts seeking a distinct position of the category of position, and consequently that only these parts can be the first roots of its individuation, is of no help to it. For by the same reasoning it would prove against its own authors that quantity alone has entitative parts, but not substance from itself and by the force of its proper line: for only the parts of quantity seek those distinct positions in which the distinction of entitative parts shines most. It is added that the aforesaid positions, as category and genus of position, neither according to themselves nor as presupposed, can be the root of individuation, as we said in no. 36. And therefore, from the fact that quantity seeks them, it cannot have this special property, namely that it is the root of its own individuation.

Hence also remains refuted another solution, which could be offered against our corollary by the reasons adduced, namely that quantity is individuated by reason of its parts from its own reason, even if substance has entitative parts from itself, because although substance does not have them from quantity as from what is received, it nevertheless has them from that same quantity as from what is presupposed at the root; and thus the fact that it is individuated by reason of its parts does not prevent it from being in some way individuated by quantity as by a first root, and quantity itself from being the first root of its own individuation.

45 Therefore this solution collapses from what has been said. First, because if quantity were repugnant, the possibility of material substance would nevertheless remain; nevertheless the aforesaid substance in the opinion of the opponents would have entitative parts of the same reason: for in their opinion, precisely because it would not be spiritual, it would not be intrinsically indivisible. Then also: because other material accidents do not presuppose quantity intrinsically; yet they have parts of the same reason, as the opponents admit; therefore it is a sign that substance does not have entitative parts from itself because it would presuppose quantity intrinsically: for it has those parts from itself no less than the other material accidents. Then, next (which follows from the preceding): because whatever belongs to things of diverse categories does not belong to them by a peculiar reason of any one of those categories, but by a reason common analogically to all of them, as is evident from themselves and from induction; therefore, since this—namely, having proper parts of the same reason—belongs both to material substance and, according to the opponents, to quantity and the other material accidents, the consequence follows that it does not belong to one of them by the reason of another, but by some general reason, and therefore whatever has the aforesaid material entity also enjoys entitative parts from itself.

Finally: because just as it would follow that matter, as presupposing quantity, is the first root of the individuation of material substance; if it had from itself, according to its species or quasi-species, and according to what it formally expresses, a foundation from which it would be the first root of the aforesaid individuation, as is evident from what we said in the preceding disputation, dub. 2 and 5; so, because material substance according to its essence and according to what it expresses, obtains whence it has entitative parts of the same reason, namely the reason of a material thing as distinguished from a spiritual thing, it follows that it also implies having the aforesaid parts from quantity itself, virtually or radically presupposed, but precisely from what it expresses from itself, namely the reason of a material thing; and therefore whatever is material must, on the contrary opinion, enjoy proper entitative parts.

46 It is added that, precisely because having proper parts, or parts of the same reason, or entitative parts, belongs to substance and quantity by reason of a material thing, it cannot but belong to them by reason of matter, which is the first root of materiality. Therefore, since the being material of matter is found prior in the genus of substance according to its (let us say thus) formal or expressed character, than according to its presupposing being material as such among the other genera, it follows that parts are found prior in the genus of substance, if it has them in this genus as its own proper parts, than in the genus of quantity.

Finally, it is added that, when a comparison is made between the entitative parts of substance and quantity, insofar as they precisely say parts of the same reason and are in some way mutually distinct, namely numerically, without considering whether they are or are not impenetrable with respect to place, the parts of substance are from themselves nobler and more perfect than the parts of quantity; therefore there is no reason why the latter should belong to substance from quantity, as virtually presupposed, but from the force of its essence and of what it expresses, according to which it otherwise virtually presupposes the aforesaid parts.

§ VII. The arguments proposed for the first opinion are satisfied.

47 To the first, the antecedent should be passed over and the consequence denied. In proving it, the antecedent must be distinguished. If its meaning is that each thing is one proximately and immediately insofar as it is being, it must be granted; and consequently, whatever has more being, or is nobler in the reason of being, will also be more one proximately and immediately numerically, that is, it will have a somewhat nobler numerical unity. If, however, its meaning is that whatever has more being will have more fundamental unity, to the point that it does not suppose something else as the first root of its numerical unity, it must be denied: because this mode of being more one numerically does not follow from nobility merely insofar as it is nobler. And therefore, although substantial form is nobler than matter, it is nevertheless not in this way more one than matter, as is evident from what was said in the preceding disputation, dub. 1 and 2; but the conclusion follows with respect to a peculiar mode of being, namely being that is from itself the first subject, or is a form not receivable in a subject, or finally has from itself and by the force of its proper line entitative parts of the same reason and species, which therefore have from within themselves a difference among themselves solely numerically.

48 To the second, the antecedent being granted, the consequence must be denied. From what was recently said, it is clear that being an individual from oneself as from the first root does not follow from being nobler, but from a peculiar mode or reason of having being by one of the modes recently recounted. As to the second proof, however, the major proposition must be distinguished: Because it is a form receivable in matter, in any sense, must be denied; because it is a form receivable in matter, in such a way that it does not have from itself and from its proper line any intrinsic material principle composing it and belonging to it by the mode of matter, must be granted. The minor proposition must likewise be distinguished in the same proportional way. For although quantity is from itself a form receivable in a subject, it nevertheless has as predicate both a material principle, namely entitative parts of the same reason; and although a form is common insofar as it is receivable in this respect, if it nevertheless has from itself entitative parts which are compared by the mode of matter with respect to it, and which further connotate this subject rather than that one, it has from itself, directly and according to the reason already stated, a kind of individuation, as was explained.

Whence that greatest principle taken from D. Thomas in the work cited above, namely that a form receivable in a subject is not individuated from itself as from a first root, is understood to concern an individuation that proceeds adequately and solely from it as from a first root. This does not belong to quantity, because quantity is from itself, as from a first root, singular only in a certain way and in the sense explained. Or it can be understood to concern an individuation that in some way also proceeds from the aforesaid form as from a first root, without connotating this determinate subject rather than that one; otherwise, if such a form had in itself a sufficient material principle and connotated the aforesaid subject, [the principle would apply].

49 To the third, the major proposition must be granted as to its second part and in the sense explained, and the minor must be denied as to that same part. In proving it, the antecedent must be distinguished. If its meaning is that the adequate reason of quantity, insofar as it is such by a specific or numerical character, is to be from itself an extension, or this extension of substance, or of this substance, insofar as this precisely signifies per se and directly a relation to substance or to this substance, it must be denied; otherwise, if its meaning is that the relation already stated and explained is only an unequal reason of the same quantity insofar as it is such by a specific or numerical character, it must be granted. Then the consequence must be denied if it is understood to concern either reason according to what it is adequately said, and not only according to the unequal reason recently stated. In proving it, the antecedent must be distinguished in the same proportional way. For therefore other accidents are not individuated from themselves as quantity is, because their adequate reason, insofar as they are these things, is per se and directly in relation to their subject; but this does not belong to quantity, as we said in no. 25.

These matters are explained. For quantity, insofar as it is this thing, is distinguished from other accidents, insofar as they too are these things, in that the whole reason of these things, insofar as they are these, does not express a relation to something else from which they are intrinsically and really composed, such as a material principle, but only to the subject; and therefore they do not have being individuated from themselves, as from a first root, but from the subject. But the whole reason of quantity, insofar as it is this thing, is not only to regard the subject, but also, as regards a material principle, in such a way that it does not regard something else from which it is composed as the principle of its materiality. For since it consists from itself and intrinsically from parts of the same reason, and consequently numerically diverse, and having a distinct position in the whole, which are compared by the mode of matter with respect to it, it follows that beyond the unequal reason of regarding the subject, it also has this other unequal reason through which it regards the aforesaid parts by the mode of a material principle. And although this relation, as we noted above, cannot altogether be separated from the relation to the subject, nevertheless, when it is conceived unequally under this explicit and unequal reason, it is concerned in the first and proper sense not directly with that order, but with that which the aforesaid quantity imports to its parts as the principle of its materiality. And therefore quantity can be in some way individuated from itself, and in some way from the subject: from itself in a certain way insofar as it regards its parts and the parts compatible with it, as its matter—these parts and not those—while connotating the altogether determinate subject; from the subject, however, in a certain way as from a first root, insofar as, according to another unequal concept, it must still according to its ultimate reason express per se and directly the relation of extending this substance and not that one, and consequently expresses explicitly and directly a relation to this subject.

Whence the other accidents seek their subject only once for their own individuation, namely in order to influence it by the mode of a first root; but quantity demands it once by the mode of a first root and again by the mode of the connotated. For since quantity is in some way individuated by the subject and in some way by itself, as from a first root, the subject must concur once by the mode of a first root and once by the mode of the connotated; and therefore, unless the aforesaid connotated [subject] is posited, quantity cannot exercise the office of being in some way the root of its own individuation with respect to that unequal reason according to which it is itself individuated.

50 We have said that, when quantity is conceived unequally under the explicit and unequal reason under which it is individuated from itself, it is not concerned expressly, per se, and directly with the order to the subject, because although quantity can be expressed and conceived unequally as a certain thing consisting in its parts, as from a matter from which it is composed, without expressly conceiving a relation to the subject as to the matter in which it is received or from which it is produced, as will be evident to the observer, it nevertheless cannot altogether be separated from such a relation, but must still then implicitly and obliquely involve that relation and the subject. For just as Fatherhood, constituting the first divine person by analogy with the constitution of a created person, does not expressly express another concept of being toward, namely expressly regarding the Son, it nevertheless always implicitly expresses an order to him, so that by none of its unequal reasons can it be altogether separated from him.

From this it is also more clearly understood why D. Thomas, in the final testimony adduced for the assertion, established a distinction between two quantities and two whitenesses: the former can be imagined separated from subjects, of one species and numerically distinct, whereas two whitenesses cannot. For his meaning is not that neither whitenesses nor quantities can be separated in fact from the subject by divine power, as is evident from what was said in the preceding disputation, no. 87; but that, two quantities being conceived without their subject being expressly conceived, and without an order to it, and so in some way separated from it, both actually and in aptitude, they can by reason of their eminent reason, which this possession gives them, be conceived expressly as precisely distinct according to number, because they are conceived with the foundation and root, already stated and explained, of their own individuation and numerical distinction, and are in the same proportional way separated from subjects; whereas, two whitenesses being conceived without their subjects, actually and in aptitude, it is impossible to imagine them as two of the same species and distinct according to number: for they have their individuation from the relation to the subject alone. But another explanation of this testimony is also to be found, as we gave it in the preceding disputation, no. 87 and following.