Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Philosophiae Naturalis

Many try to draw St. Thomas into the contrary opinion, relying chiefly on the authority we have already explained above¹, where he says in II–II, q. 24, a. 4, ad 3, and De virtutibus, q. 1, a. 11, that those who say a quality is intensified by being more deeply rooted, and not according to its essence, do not understand their own words. Thus St. Thomas intends that intensification occur through the addition of entity, not through rooting alone. But we have already explained this authority above², and one should also consult St. Thomas, Quodlibet IX, a. 13³, where he says: “When we say that charity is increased according to its essence, an increase of the subject is denoted, so that the sense is that the essence of charity itself is increased, just as when we say that something white is increased according to its essence. But this does not designate the form specifying the motion, as if the sense were that it is increased according to its essence—that is, that its increase is a motion in being or in essence; in this way increase is said to be according to quantity.” See how St. Thomas interprets what it means to be increased according to essence: not by adding a new entity to the prior entity, as though the motion of increase had a new entity as its terminus, but because the essence itself is the thing that is increased. Nor is it an objection that St. Thomas sometimes denies that charity is the subject of increase. He denies that charity is called the subject of increase as though it were the subject of inherence, that is, the thing that supports and sustains it; he does not deny that it is the subject of modification, since the form itself is what is communicated to the subject in a distinct mode and is thus modified by that communication.

The argument from St. Thomas, Summa theologiae III, q. 7, a. 12, is even less weighty. There he expressly admits that there are degrees in heat; consequently, intensification would occur by adding a degree, not by rooting. Finally, they add the testimony of Aristotle, Physics IV, text 84⁴, where he says that “just as the cold becomes hot, and conversely, because the same thing that was in potency [becomes so], so too from something hot comes something hotter.” If Aristotle thus equates the emergence of something hotter from something less hot with the emergence of something hot from something cold, then, just as the latter occurs through the production of a new entity, so does the former. Nor is it enough to posit the emergence of a new mode, since this cannot be understood in real forms except through a new entity dependent on the subject. Therefore, wherever there is a greater emergence of form, there is production of an entity.

To this it is readily answered that, in the first passage, St. Thomas does not mean by “degree” a new entity added to the preceding entity, but a new participation of the same form in the subject. It is aptly called a degree because, just as the soul expresses itself in matter in different ways through the degrees it possesses, while its entity remains the same and it does not confer the same degree and formal effect on all parts, so a quality expresses its actuality to the subject in different ways. A different degree is not a different entity of the form, but the same form communicating itself and producing effects in a different way.

As to the second passage, it is said that something hotter comes from something less hot just as something hot comes from something cold—not with respect to the entity produced, but with respect to the entity of producing, since in both cases something new comes to be and there is a terminus a quo and a terminus ad quem. Yet when something becomes hot simply, it passes from potency to heat; when something less hot becomes hotter, it is not in potency to the form, but to a mode of participation in the form, as St. Thomas says in Summa theologiae I–II, q. 52, a. 2, ad 3. As for the claim that there is no emergence unless there is production, I distinguish: emergence of a form with respect to its entity cannot occur without production of an entity—I concede; emergence of a form with respect to its new expression and mode of participation in a subject cannot occur without production of an entity—I deny. What occurs is only an improvement of the form that has emerged, and only the production of a mode, not of the form’s entity.

The second argument is based on reason: intensification is a motion really distinct from the first production of a quality and is a true alteration; therefore it ought to produce a reality distinct from the first quality, and not merely some mode, because alteration is primarily and per se toward a quality, not toward a mode. Moreover, an intensified power, precisely insofar as it is intensified, has greater power to produce than one that is not intensified, since it produces more perfect effects. But a mode is neither a power nor something that produces real effects corresponding to it in a special way. Finally, a new mode of inherence or union cannot be given unless a new inhering entity is added; otherwise the same entity would inhere through two inherences. Therefore, what is added must be a distinct entity, just as the motion is distinct. Where motions are really distinct, their termini must also be really distinct; otherwise, if the entity were the same, the motions too would be identified with one another, since things that are really identical with a third are identical with one another.

This is confirmed by the following: otherwise, if intensification produced not a quality but a mode, the quality could be produced by the production of a mode alone. This is clear because the motion of intensification has no minimum, but begins successively, not through a first instant of being changed, but through a last instant of not being. Therefore, if intensification produces not an entity but a mode, a quality could begin through intensification from the last nonbeing of a degree, and so the whole quality would begin through modes.

The answer is that intensification is a motion really distinct from the first production of a quality, since it can proceed from a different agent and over a different period of time. It is likewise per se terminated at a quality, as a true alteration, but not at a quality absolutely and as to its entity; rather, it terminates at a quality under a certain mode, namely, as something to be perfected and improved. In this respect it is like transubstantiation, which is an action toward the body of Christ, although it does not produce that body absolutely, but under a new mode. Intensification differs from other motions in this: in the others, something distinct from what was already present is acquired, such as a new part in increase, a new “where” and place in local motion; but in quality, what was already present is improved and perfected. Hence it is not required to produce a new form, but to attain the same form under a more perfect mode. For motions or actions to be really distinct, their termini need not be really and entitatively distinct as though materially; it suffices that they be distinct formally. Otherwise, every mode produced in a subject, such as sitting or a “where,” would have to be produced by a distinct real action. When it is said that things identical with a third are identical with one another, this is understood, first, when they are identical with the third at the same time, and not at different times; second, when they are identical with the third both in thing and in account—that is, under the same account and formality—not when they are identical with it as it were materially and under different formalities, or insofar as something is virtually multiple, as St. Thomas understands in Summa theologiae I, q. 28, a. 3. Otherwise, that axiom would have many counterexamples.

As for the further claim that a quality, insofar as it is intensified, has more real effects corresponding to it, the answer is that these effects correspond neither to the quality considered in itself nor solely to the added mode of intensification, but to the real entity of the form itself as it is subject to that mode. Therefore, for a power or form to produce new effects, the addition of an entity is not required; the same entity under a different formality and communication of itself suffices. The same soul, for example, produces different real effects according to its sensitive degree than according to its vegetative degree, yet it does not require a new entity to be added for those effects; rather, the same soul is communicated in matter in a different way.

As for the claim that a new inherence requires a new entity, the answer is that a new inherence of a form not previously present in a subject does require a new entity of the form. But a form already present in a subject does not require a new entity; it communicates the same form to the subject in a new mode of participation. Thus it does not so much give a new inherence absolutely as a new termination of inherence, as will be said in the final argument.

To the confirmation, the answer is that if intensification does not find a quality in the subject but produces it there for the first time, it produces not only a mode but also an entity. But if it finds the quality already produced, it adds only a new mode and not a new entity, just as transubstantiation would produce the body of Christ substantially if it did not presuppose that body as existing in reality; as matters stand, however, it does not produce it, but converts bread into it under a new mode.

The third argument is this: where there is real separation, there is real distinction. But one degree is separated from another—for example, the second from the third or fourth—as is evident in the remission of a quality. Therefore these degrees are really distinct, especially since we see that the continuation of heating resembles the first production and is of the same species, and is a true and proper action and change. It therefore requires a real terminus and entity, for there is no change without novelty and no action without a produced terminus.

This is confirmed as follows: the activity of an agent’s power becomes greater by the addition of parts and by an increase in the quantity of the form, just as glowing iron acts more actively than a flame of straw. Therefore intensification too occurs by the addition of parts, since that is what makes a power more active.

The answer is that degrees are never separated from a quality; rather, the quality is separated from them—that is, from each one taken separately, though not from the whole collection. This is a sign of modal distinction, as a body is separated from each position or “where,” but no “where” is separated from the body. As to what is said about the continuation of heating, the answer is that it is continued by reason of the quality or form itself as participated, and so it is an action of the same account as the first production of the quality. It is nevertheless different on the part of the mode of participation, and a distinct real action and change are required to produce such a mode. For modes too are produced by real action, as we have said—for example, “where,” position, and similar things. Thus such a change occurs with a newness of being, at least in the mode that is the produced terminus.

To the confirmation, we shall answer in the next question, when treating action and reaction⁵, and in question 7, when treating density⁶, where we shall show that there is no greater intensification of a quality by reason of density—that is, by reason of the multitude of parts—unless the agent, by occasion of those parts, produces a more intense quality. In itself, the multitude of parts contributes only to the conditions of activity, namely, that the agent acts more quickly or through a more perfect application. Once these conditions are in place, however, the agent can produce a more perfect and more intense quality, as we shall explain there at greater length.

The fourth argument is that intensification cannot occur according to a more perfect mode of union or inherence; therefore it must consist in the addition of some new entity.

The antecedent is proved as follows. The union and inherence of a quality is not divisible but always the same, because it inheres naturally in its subject, and so it inheres as much as it can. Likewise, it inheres and is united as a whole. Therefore it is not apparent how this union could grow, especially when the entity of the quality is indivisible—as in a spiritual quality—and it is intensified in the very same indivisible subject. Moreover, in remission itself it is not apparent what produces the lesser union or rooting of heat. When heat of degree six is remitted down to degree two, there is no source from which the union of heat of degree two might be produced. It is not produced by the agent that remits it—for example, water remitting the heat—since this is rather a contrary agent, which cannot produce heat of degree two. Nor is it produced by some other agent, such as fire or air, because they do not contribute to that remission, if the case is one in which no fire is nearby and only water remits the heat. Besides, if each gradual mode—for example, degree two or degree four—were indivisible, then, when it is remitted, either the whole union would perish or nothing would perish. If the whole union perishes, remission will be corruption, because when the whole union perishes, the whole united form perishes. If nothing perishes, the quality remains intensified.

This is confirmed by the following: if intensification consists in a greater union, then an intensified quality will not be able to be separated from its subject, since, while the union remains, it cannot be separated, and it can be separated only when the union is removed. Therefore, if intensification consists in union as intensified, it will not be separable. Thus, if God were to separate the whiteness of snow and the whiteness of a human being, the former would not be more perfect than the latter.

The answer is that this union has some latitude, as was shown above by several examples. When it is said that a quality inheres naturally as much as it can, I distinguish: as much as it can according to the requirement of the subject and the disposition of the agent—I concede; as much as it can absolutely by the force of the form—I deny. Since such dispositions are required for a quality to be intense, natural union always does as much as it can according to the requirement of the subject and its capacity. But when all impediments are removed and the disposition required on the part of the agent and patient is in place, the quality cannot fail to be intensified. This intensification then does not occur without an intrinsic perfection of the quality, because the very ordering of participation to a subject disposed in this way is something intrinsic to the quality.

To the other part of the argument—what produces a degree of remission when the intensifying agent has been removed—I say that it proceeds from two causes. One is per accidens: the cause that impedes that more perfect and intense mode of union, insofar as it renders the subject indisposed and unfit, just as one who removes the dispositions required for the soul to be in the body kills a human being. The other cause is per se: the form itself, from which the more remiss mode emanates by virtue of the prior action by which the agent that produced it united it to the subject. Although the producer’s action is not formally present now, it remains virtually as long as the produced form remains, since that form was its terminus. The form was united to the subject by that stronger and more perfect union in such a way that it virtually retains a lower, more remiss union if the dispositions for the more perfect union are removed, because the less perfect is virtually contained in the more perfect. It is like removing the point that terminates a line, whereupon another point results by virtue of the prior production of the quantity. These modes of intensification are like certain terminations by which the form more fully terminates and subjects the subject’s potentiality to itself. Which degree results—two or three, for example—is determined by the greater or lesser impediment from the contrary agent and the disposition of the subject.

Finally, as to what is added about that mode, if it is indivisible, the answer is that this union is indivisible entitatively, just as the form itself is, but divisible virtually. As we said above⁷, in respect of the unity that the form makes with the subject and the actuality by which it reduces the subject to its own likeness, the union admits of more and less. For although the form is united as a whole, it is not united totally. Thus it is consistent for it to be indivisible entitatively but divisible relatively, or virtually, since the form is not united under every relation and formality in which it can be participated, even if it is united as a whole; we shall explain this more fully in the next argument.

To the confirmation, the answer is that an intensified quality can be separated. It is called intense not because of its actual union with the subject—for this is destroyed when separation takes place—but because of its ordering and aptitude toward the subject, in which it seeks to inhere not just anyhow but with this or that mode of participation, which pertains to the quality’s intensification. Thus, just as inherence does not remain actually in a separated accident, but remains as an aptitude by which it regards the subject to which it is due—and this relation is actual, not potential, in the separated accident itself, even though inherence itself is not actual—so too there remains the relation of this or that mode of inherence, according to which intensification takes place. Although the quality does not actually have that union, it does actually have the relation and aptitude to be united in that way. By reason of this, it is called actually intense in relation to the subject—not the subject to which it is actually united, but the subject it actually regards and to which it is due—to be united as a single actuality in that mode.

The final argument is this: by explaining intensification through this rooting, we do not avoid the difficulties of the other opinion, which posits intensification through the addition of parts. For either we posit many unions in the same form, which is thus rooted and expressed in the subject, or one union. If many, then we already admit in the same subject many modes numerically distinct, something the other opinion intended to avoid when it refused to posit many numerically distinct accidents in the same subject. If one, it is either divisible or indivisible. If indivisible, then, when intensification or remission occurs, every union will be corrupted, since intensification consists in a greater union and consequently corrupts the lesser. If divisible, the whole union is corrupted. But when the union is corrupted, the united form is corrupted; thus we fall into the opinion that said intensification occurs by the corruption of one part and the addition of another.

Furthermore, if each motion of intensification is indivisible, then it cannot terminate a motion of intensification, since motion requires not only indivisibles but also parts, being itself divisible.

Nor can one say that the union is indivisible entitatively and divisible virtually. For since the quality is said to be intensified with respect to its modes and not with respect to its entity, and we say that these modes are unions, we must posit divisibility and latitude in the modes themselves. But if we posit that they are indivisible entitatively and divisible virtually, another mode of such union will remain by which it is made divisible, and the same argument will again be made about that mode—whether it is divisible or indivisible—and so on to infinity. If instead one says that the union is divisible into parts, the foundation of our opinion collapses. For we now posit parts in the union; if this is not incompatible with its individuation in the same part of the subject, why would it be incompatible for distinct parts of the quality to be present in the same part of the subject? Indeed, an argument against our opinion follows from this, because through the motion of intensification not only indivisibles but also parts are acquired, in accordance with the distance and latitude it has. Therefore, after it has acquired a degree of two, for example, it cannot immediately afterward acquire something indivisible, but something divisible. That divisible thing is either a part of the mode or of the quality. If it is of the quality, we have what we intended to prove; if it is of the mode, then the mode is divisible and, consequently, so are the things united.

The answer is that the union of an intensifiable quality is one and the same entitatively, just as the form united by it is one and the same, to which it is altogether proportioned; but it is divisible terminatively and relatively, insofar as it makes a greater or lesser unity of the subject with the form, because the subject is more assimilated to the form and the confusion of potentiality in the subject is removed, reducing it to greater subjection to the form itself. This is to make a greater unity and agreement with the form.

For, as we said above⁸, the form obtains two effects through union. The first is to have existence dependently on the subject to which it is united. In this respect, as we said, the union does not vary, because existence follows the very entity of the form, which entity remains indivisibly the same, as was said. The second effect is to make unity and agreement with the subject. In this respect it admits of latitude—not in the entity of the union itself, which is not distinct from the form, but in the termination and relation of greater agreement. Nor does this posit a mode of a mode or lead to infinity; rather, the united quality itself is perfected in different ways in the unity made by the union, with respect to its termination, by which its agreement with the subject is made greater as the confusion of potentiality is reduced to the unity of the form. Thus no further mode of union remains, but only another effect of the union itself, according to a different termination toward the subject and a different unity it makes with it. The union is divisible in this termination, or effect of participation and agreement; this is to be divisible virtually—that is, by reason of its effect and termination—whereas to be divisible entitatively is to be divisible on the part of the entity, or united form. These effects or terminations are not many at once in the subject, but occur successively, because when the quality is intensified, the preceding termination of the remiss degree is destroyed and a new, more perfect one is acquired, which contains the whole account of the preceding degree. It is like a quadrilateral containing a triangle, or a six-sided figure containing a three-sided one; and like a quantity that grows, where the prior termination is destroyed and a new one introduced. Two terminations are not present at once, nor are two figures. Thus it is never the case that two modes or two terminations distinct only numerically are present at once in the same part of the subject.

To the objection based on the motion of intensification, the answer is that, although each gradual termination is indivisible, passage from one termination to another occurs by way of latitude and distance in becoming—not because there are parts of the quality to be acquired between one mode and another, but because the mode being acquired, while it is in the process of becoming, is in a divisible mode, whereas in its completed state it is in an indivisible mode. In local motion, for example, the instant of being moved is indivisible, and between two such instants there are no permanent parts, but rather a flow and process of becoming, terminated and constituted in its completed state by the instant of being moved. The passage is not immediately from one indivisible to another; it is mediated by a flow and process of becoming that has a latitude to be traversed. Therefore, neither in local motion nor in alteration is it necessary to assign several partial unions or several permanent parts of a quality simultaneously existing in its completed state. There is only the process of becoming and tendency by which one passes from one terminus and instant of being moved to another through a flow and tendency. When an alteration occurs in a quality from one extreme to another, or from a quality of one species to a quality of another, and passage occurs through several intermediate species, there is motion between each pair of intermediate species, and yet intermediate parts are not acquired; rather, passage is made from one species to another. The intermediate is not a partial species found there; instead, the very process of becoming of the quality and the flow tending from one extreme to another is the latitude to be traversed by motion, because between every completed state there is a process of becoming. If, then, it is not necessary in intensification to identify indivisibles and permanent entitative parts, with one added to another and composing with it, but it suffices to posit a successive passage and flow or process of becoming from one termination to another, then just as, when one terminating surface in a quantity is removed and passage is made to another, immediately afterward one does not find a termination—for a part follows immediately afterward—but rather a tendency toward a termination, that is, toward another surface. What the proponents of the contrary opinion say about permanent parts of a quality and indivisibles joining them makes the quality like a continuum and like the mode of extensive increase in quantity. St. Thomas said that those who think a quality is increased by addition imagine it in this way, in I Sentences, d. 17, q. 2, a. 2⁹.