Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Philosophiae Naturalis

Threefold subject or threefold account of subject can be distinguished in generation. For there is the subject of change; the subject of production, which can rather be called the object, because it is that toward which generation tends; and finally the subject of denomination, namely, the thing denominated generated. In generation, then, matter is changed from privation to form, but it is not denominated produced or generated. Rather, the form that is drawn out is called produced, or the composite that newly receives being. The supposit itself is denominated generated, insofar as it regards the generator as what is generated.

Among these subjects we inquire which of them is the subject of inherence, in which generation inheres. The difficulty arises from the difference between alteration and generation: alteration, both on its own side and on the side of its term, which is quality, presupposes as its subject a complete substance in act, capable of accidents; but generative action presupposes only prime matter, which is not capable of an accident before it has substantial form. Yet this form is produced through generation itself, and so is not presupposed to it as a subject. On the other hand, prime matter is the subject of change, because it alone, and not the whole composite, is changed from one form to another; substantial form is received in it and is immediately united to it. Therefore generation must be in matter, since an action is in the subject in which its term is; action or change is not received apart from its term. The authorities of St. Thomas and the Philosopher to be cited below also support this.

I say, first: The subject of change in substantial generation is prime matter alone; but the subject of inherence is neither prime matter alone nor prime matter insofar as it is subject to the form of corporeity, but the whole composite, which is generated through that action.

There can be no doubt about the first part of the conclusion. St. Thomas speaks in this sense when he assigns prime matter, and not substance in act, as the subject of generation. For he expressly speaks of generation as change and of the subject of change, as is clear at the end of On Generation and Corruption I, lecture 10,¹ where he says: “He compares the aforesaid changes according to their subject, which is being only in potency, and says that prime matter is the most proper subject capable of generation and corruption.” He speaks in the same way in Summa Theologiae I, q. 45, a. 1, ad 2, where he speaks only of change, and more clearly in On the Power of God, q. 3, a. 3, ad 4,² where he says that “in generation there is both a change and a relation by which the generated thing is related to the generator. Therefore, by reason of the change, the generated thing itself is not its subject, but its matter; by reason of the relation, however, the generated thing itself is the subject. In creation there is a relation but no change, and therefore the case is not similar.” In the immediately preceding reply to objection 3 he had said that the relation of creation, insofar as it is an accident, inheres in a subject and is posterior to it. It will be proved below, q. 9,³ that, generally speaking of every accident, the subject of inherence as that which is the composite.

The reason for this first part is that the subject of change or motion is the subject of the term or terms of the motion, between which the motion takes place. But it is clear that the terms between which generation takes place, insofar as it is change, are form and privation. Both have prime matter as their subject. For matter is deprived of substantial form, and it is also immediately informed by substantial form. Therefore matter is the subject of this change, which is generation. Thus Physics I⁴ assigns three principles, namely matter, form, and privation, for the natural thing in process of becoming, or for generation itself. Matter is a principle of generation only as subject of this change, because the subject of change must be a principle of the mobile thing not only in its completed state, but also in its becoming and in generation itself. In this it is distinguished from creation, which proceeds through the change of some subject. Therefore matter must be a principle of generation as its subject, not the composite itself, since the latter is what is caused, not a principle.

The second part of the conclusion, namely, that prime matter, insofar as it underlies the form of corporeity, is not the subject in which generation itself inheres, is manifest if we presuppose what will be explained more fully in the books On the Soul⁵: in every substantial composite there is only one substantial form, which gives all specific and generic grades. It is not that one form gives the grade of corporeity, another of life, and another of sensation. St. Thomas treats this especially well in On Generation and Corruption I, at the end of lecture 10,⁶ and we shall prove it in On the Soul, q. 1.⁷ Given this, it rightly follows that the subject of generation is not prime matter insofar as it underlies the form of corporeity. For no substantial form accompanies matter in such a way that matter is never stripped of it. Rather, precisely when one substantial form is corrupted, all its grades are corrupted, since all of them are one and the same entity of the form. Therefore, when the form is corrupted, matter does not remain under any form or grade of corporeity to receive a newly generated form; it is only bare matter that receives it. The form gives matter every grade, not only the first and most remote, such as the grade of corporeity, but also the ultimate and specific grade; thus it removes every grade that the corrupted form had provided.

Regarding the third part of the conclusion, namely, that the subject of inherence is the whole composite, generation is taken not as the preceding alteration—which plainly is received in the antecedent composite that is corrupted—but as that substantial action distinct from alteration, as we now presuppose from what was said above, article 3. On this point the difficulty is greater, even among Thomists. For several think that its subject of inherence is prime matter itself, as Cajetan seems to hold in Summa Theologiae III, q. 25, a. 1,⁸ and others cited and followed here by the Carmelite Course, disputation 2, q. 5, § 2. Others, with Master Báñez, On Generation and Corruption I, ch. 4, q. 11, say that the whole composite is the subject of inherence with respect to generation itself.

We therefore say that, given two principles—the first, which we admitted and proved above,⁹ that generation is an action distinct from alteration and is not a mere, bare result; the second, which will be proved and admitted below,¹⁰ namely, that prime matter is not immediately and per se capable of the inherence of an accident, such that the accident itself is sustained in being through matter—it must be said that generation, insofar as it is an action in the category of action, cannot have prime matter alone as its subject of inherence.

Hence the Carmelite Course, in the place cited above,¹¹ § 4, n. 61, admits that substantial generation, taken as an instantaneous change apart from alteration, is not an accident but something substantial, as a mode. Rubio¹² and others, however, admit that some accident, if incomplete and as it were in passage, can be in matter and not in the whole.

Our view, which we shall establish below, affirms that no accident can be subject to inherence in matter as a subject which; it must be in the whole composite. But this is either the generator, or that which is corrupted, or that which is newly generated. The generator is not the subject of generation, since generation is not an immanent action, unless perhaps one says that the agent itself is the subject of a transitive action. It remains to inquire about the subject of generation insofar as it is a passion, since on every account a passion is not in the agent. Thus it remains to explain whether matter or rather the composite itself is the subject of this generation, taken passively. Then a difficulty remains for the opinion that an action is subjectively in the patient and not in the agent: how does generation inhere in the agent, if on this view generation is in the patient? Another subject must therefore be assigned. It cannot be the thing that is corrupted, because at the instant when it is true to say “now there is generation,” it is true to say “now the corrupted thing is not,” since it ceases at its first nonbeing. Therefore the generation that first exists at that instant cannot inhere in the corrupted substance itself. It remains, then, that it inheres only in the generated substance.

How the term of generation can be the subject in which it inheres is explained by the fact that the subject changed through generation itself is prime matter, which is a part composing the term, namely, the whole. Since an action inheres only through the term produced or attained by the action, with which the action is identified, and since the total term itself is composed of matter and form, or has matter as one of its parts, the subject and term coincide. For the term is a substance and thus has no other subject in which the action might inhere than that which is the total term, with which the action itself is identified. The subject of accidents, however, must always be distinguished from the term itself when an accident is produced, because by such an action an actual subject is not produced but presupposed. But through substantial generation an actual subject is produced, namely the composite. Although prime matter is presupposed, and is also a principle for receiving accidents, it is not the principle which receives them, but the principle by which—that is, the account through which—the composite itself, as the subject which, is able to receive accidents. Nor is matter itself the principle that sustains accidents in being, since the principle that sustains them must be presupposed to have existence that it can provide to the accidents. Prime matter has existence only through form, as we showed in Physics III,¹³ and above, article 1.¹⁴ Matter is nevertheless the subject with respect to substantial form, because form is not sustained in matter presupposing existence; rather, it is received so that from it and matter a composite that has being may be constituted. St. Thomas distinguishes subject from matter in this way at the beginning of Opusculum 31.¹⁵ Since generation, insofar as it is an action, is an accident, its subject of inherence and support must therefore be the composite, and not prime matter alone, although matter is the principle by which it is received and is also the subject of change, as was said.

I say, second: Creation and generation differ both on the side of the formal term and on the side of the mode of production. This applies to both complete and adequate creation, which is simply called creation, and inadequate and incomplete creation, which is called “concreation,” such as the production of prime matter or the production through creation of a form dependent on matter. Nevertheless, in the total term taken materially, generation and complete creation agree.

This conclusion is drawn from the teaching of St. Thomas in Summa Theologiae I, q. 45, aa. 2–4, and On the Power of God, q. 3, aa. 1–2.¹⁶

For its explanation, note two things. First, although creation is one and indivisible action that attains the whole and produces its parts, not everything is denominated created in the same way. The whole itself is properly called created as a subsisting thing having being as that which; the parts are called created as principles constituting the whole and having being not as that which, but as that by which. Hence arises the distinction between creation that is adequate and complete, and creation that is not. The first is said with respect to the whole attained by creation, as an absolute, subsisting thing having being. The second is said with respect to the parts, which are attained as having being in and with another, on which they depend and to which they are subordinate in order to be; therefore they are said to be “concreated.” This is St. Thomas’s teaching: in many places he teaches that only subsisting things, or the whole and composite itself, are properly created, while matter and form are not properly created or made but “concreated.” This is clear in Summa Theologiae I, q. 45, a. 4; q. 44, a. 2; q. 7, a. 2, ad 3; and On the Power of God, q. 3, a. 1, ad 12.¹⁷

The second point we presuppose is that creation and substantial generation agree in producing the whole composite, that is, in making a subsisting and complete thing to which being belongs per se. They differ, however, because generation presupposes the things of which this whole is to be composed, either all of them or at least prime matter. The generation of a human being neither makes matter nor form, but joins the two; other generations at least presuppose prime matter, though they draw out and produce the form. Creation, by contrast, produces the whole composite in such a way that it presupposes none of the things of which the composite consists, whether parts or whole, but makes whatever entity there is in the thing. Creation therefore has such power that by virtue of its formal account it attains in the created thing every account of being, whether matter or form, potency or act. Generation must therefore presuppose creation; things could not have begun first through motion.

Some ancient philosophers, and Aristotle himself, were mistaken on this point. Thinking that there was no way to produce things other than through motion and generation, they fell into the difficulty of the eternity of the world, finding no beginning at which things were first produced, if all were produced through motion. For in this way something was always presupposed from which change or motion would proceed. If something were produced without presupposing anything else from which it came to be, it would be produced without change, because it would come from nothing, not from a subject. Therefore, to avoid positing an infinite regress and an eternity of generations in motions, one must arrive at the production of matter not from another subject but from nothing, and consequently through creation. Since matter does not exist alone and without form, but under and dependent on form, as it did in fact exist when God created heaven and earth in the beginning, creation is always of subsisting things and composites, while the part is “concreated.”

From these points the stated conclusion can be established, and the difference between creation and generation explained both on the side of the formal term and on the side of the mode of proceeding. On the side of the formal term, generation has only the specifying form as its formal term, whether as drawn out or as united. Creation, however, has as its formal term the whole account of being found in the composite, whether on the side of form or of matter; thus the adequate and formal terms coincide in creation. Hence St. Thomas, explaining the axiom from the Book of Causes, “The first of created things is being,” says in Summa Theologiae I, q. 45, a. 4, ad 1, that “being” does not signify a created substance, but the proper account of the object of creation. For something is said to be created because it is a being, not because it is this being, since creation is the emanation of the whole of being from universal being. Therefore the formal account or term of creation is not the form that informs and gives species to a nature, but the whole account of being found in such a thing. In this way generation and creation differ greatly on the side of the formal term, since what is total in generation is formal in creation.

Generation and creation also differ by their distinct modes of proceeding, both on the side of the term toward which and on the side of the term from which. On the side of the term toward which, creation makes the whole itself by producing everything in it; generation makes the whole by uniting its parts, not by producing them—or at least not all of them—since it presupposes matter. On the side of the term from which, creation proceeds from pure negation, or from nothing, because it presupposes no subject; generation, however, proceeds from privation, because it presupposes a subject lacking the form.

Whether creation is of the same character in simple and composite things

From these points it follows that creation is of the same character whether it produces a simple entity, such as an angel, or a composite one, such as heaven or earth.

Father Vazquez, Summa Theologiae I, part 2, disputation 174, ch. 4, n. 17, and others who follow him hold the opposite. He says, first, that creation is not only of things that subsist simply and totally; it suffices that it produce something which by its nature can subsist and not inhere in another, but depend on another, as a rational soul does.

Second, he adds that in every composite thing there are separate productions of each part and another production of the whole, since the whole is formed from the composition of its parts. A composite, insofar as it is distinguished from its parts, cannot be created, however, because its being comes from something, namely, the parts, which are prior by nature; therefore it is not from nothing, as creation requires. For creation does not require that nothing precede in time, as is clear if things were created from eternity: they would truly be made through creation, yet nothing would have preceded them in time.

Third, he adds that matter is made by true and proper creation, since it comes from nothing. Although it depends on form, it does not depend on it according to its entity; otherwise, if the form changed, matter would change in being and entity. Indeed, any agent introducing a form into matter would make matter exist, because one who produces the form not only makes it be, but also makes that which has being through it; for producing a form and producing its formal effect are the same. Furthermore, if God preserves matter through form as a principle, and matter comes from form, then matter would not be created by God whenever it is produced as conjoined to form. Thus no composite except a human being would be made through creation: every other thing is properly produced according to its first form, which is not drawn out of matter; according to the account of the composite it comes from its parts, not from nothing; and according to matter it comes from form, since it is made dependent on form. Finally, he compares the creation of matter with the creation of a rational soul, because the former naturally occurs with conjunction to form and the latter naturally with infusion into matter, although by absolute power each could be made separately.

Nevertheless, one must say that in the creation by which composite things are created there are not several actions by which each part is created partially, and another action that produces the whole from the parts. Rather, by one action the whole and its parts are produced. Thus creation of a simple, total thing and of a composite thing are of the same character, because in both what is intended is being insofar as it is being; the fact that one is composed of parts and the other is not is material to the case.

Hence St. Thomas consistently excludes matter, form, and parts from the proper account of creation, saying that they are only “concreated,” while the whole subsisting thing is properly created. This can be seen in On the Power of God, q. 3, a. 1, ad 12,¹⁸ and Summa Theologiae I, q. 7, a. 2, ad 3, where he expressly affirms that matter and form are not properly made or created, but “concreated.” In particular, regarding matter—which Vazquez says is created while the composite is not—St. Thomas directly opposes him. In Summa Theologiae I, q. 44, a. 2, he presents the argument that matter is not created because it does not have being in act, whereas through creation only a being in act is made. He replies that the argument proves not that matter alone is not created, but that matter is created only under form, since even that which belongs to the side of potency in a creature is from God. Again, in q. 45, a. 4, he presents the opposite argument: what is presupposed in a second emanation is properly produced by the first; matter is presupposed in generation; therefore matter is properly created and not the composite. This is certainly Vazquez’s foundation. St. Thomas replies with the same solution as before: “That reasoning does not prove that matter alone is created, but that matter exists only through creation; for creation is the production of the whole of being, not of matter alone.” St. Thomas therefore holds that the being of the whole, as distinguished from the account of matter taken partially, terminates creation. It is false, then, to say that the composite cannot be created and that only the part which is not from something else, such as matter, can be.

The basis of this, which also reveals the error in the opposing view, is that two things enter into creation. One is on the side of the mode of production: the thing is made not from something presupposed, but from nothing. The other is on the side of the term produced: the whole account of being, or the whole and integral being of some thing, is produced. Creation therefore necessarily requires that the being of the thing not come about through the transformation of one part and the joining of the parts into one; that properly belongs to generation. Creation does not, however, exclude making something from its parts by providing the whole with all its constituents and parts, even though it presupposes none of them as something to be transformed in order to arrive at the whole.

Vazquez’s foundation is highly equivocal and defective at this point, because he confuses coming to be from something merely as a constitutive part with coming to be from something as a principle of transformation, which is the principle of the very process of coming to be. That something comes to be as constituted from something—as from a part or constitutive predicate—does not prevent it from coming to be simply from nothing, provided that it presupposes no principle through whose transformation it comes to be. This alone is opposed to creation insofar as creation is from nothing.

The reason is clear: in creation, being from nothing pertains to the term from which; in a composite, however, consisting of parts and being from them as constituents pertains only to the term toward which, since the parts belong to what constitutes that term. Therefore being from something as a constitutive part is not opposed to being simply from nothing as from the term from which, and consequently it is not opposed to creation. For creation is preserved precisely in being from nothing as from the term from which, and thus in not presupposing anything as a subject to be transformed. If the subject itself is made as a constitutive part of the whole, then the whole itself is made more than the part, since the whole is made not by presupposing the part as something to be transformed into the whole, but without such a transformation. If, however, the part is not presupposed so that the whole may be made through its transformation, but the part is simply made as constituting the whole, then the part is made for the sake of the whole and as something less than the whole. Therefore the whole is regarded primarily and the part less primarily. Hence through creation the composite itself is made directly, not the part, which is matter; matter is “concreated” as secondary to the creation of the whole, to which being directly belongs as to a subsisting thing, as that which, and consequently creation as that which, because creation directly regards being. Thus coming to be from something as a constitutive part belonging to the being of a thing neither removes creation nor constitutes generation. Rather, generation is constituted by coming to be from something as a presupposed principle through whose transformation the thing itself comes to be, because generation is a transformation.

You may object that St. Thomas says in Sentences II, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 3,¹⁹ that “being is through creation, while other perfections are added through informing; and in composites this is especially the being of the first part, namely matter.” Therefore St. Thomas presupposes that creation terminates first and directly in matter and that being belongs to matter. We reply that the being of this first part, namely matter, is the being of potency. It is said especially to be through creation insofar as it does not presuppose a subject from which it is made, not insofar as it has being absolutely and simply. For matter has being only dependently on form, and for this reason is said to be “concreated,” as is clear from St. Thomas’s passages: namely, by reason of the being it has through form, not absolutely in itself.

The objections raised by Father Vazquez are answered as follows. Regarding his claim that the composite comes from something, namely its parts, and thus does not come from nothing, we have already answered that it does not come from something as a principle of transformation, but from something as an intrinsic constituent. This does not remove creation or prevent the composite from coming from nothing as from the term from which, since a constituent part pertains only to the side of the term toward which.

Regarding the objections he brings to prove that matter is created first and per se, we reply that matter comes from nothing not as having being, but as a part in potency to the form of a thing that has being. It is not incongruous that matter be changed in its actual being, just as it is changed in being informed by passing from privation to act and from one form to another, and consequently from one being to another. This is not corruption except per accidens and with respect to succession in being, not with respect to total cessation, because the very entity of matter is capable of existing through any form it can receive. Thus existing now under one form and now under another is not a total cessation and loss of being, but a transformation of being: it leaves one inadequate mode of existing and acquires another within the range of the forms from which it receives being. It is as if my humanity were now assumed by a divine person: it would receive another being and subsistence, but would not be corrupted, because it would put off its own being in such a way that another was substituted in its place. In a word, to lose being adequately and totally is to be corrupted; to lose being inadequately, with another’s substitution and succession, is neither to cease nor to be corrupted. Likewise, a generator that introduces a form into matter is not said to produce or generate matter, although it makes matter exist. It does not make matter with respect to its potential entity, which is matter’s proper entity, nor does it draw matter out of some subject, as generation requires. Rather, by drawing out the form from matter, it transforms matter’s being. Thus it does not make matter exist absolutely, since matter’s entity is not limited to the being of one form but is capable of having being under any form. Therefore an agent that transforms forms in matter does not give matter being absolutely, but transforms it from one form to another. This is like something located in a place: however much the surfaces change, it is said to remain in the same place because it has the same effect of existing in a place, arising successively from different surfaces, one of which is substituted for another in locating it. An animal is likewise said to have the same body although different parts succeed one another, because they succeed under the same form, disposition, and order. Similarly, although different inadequate modes of being from different forms succeed one another in matter, they succeed in an order that preserves the same potential entity of matter, which is capable of all forms. Therefore the entity of matter remains the same under the succession of different existences and beings of forms. A generator of such forms, although it communicates to matter the formal effect and being of the form, is not said to corrupt or generate matter, because it does not give being first and adequately, but preserves matter’s entity through the succession of different beings. Conversely, one who successively adgenerates different parts of matter to an animal, although materially providing a different body, is not said to generate it, but to preserve it under the same body. Nor, because matter is made by God under a form, is it said to be made from that form as from a subject; rather, it is made dependently on the form as on an act. Therefore the creation of matter cannot in any way be assimilated to the creation of a rational soul. A soul is made as having being in itself and subsisting independently of matter, although communicable to matter; it is communicable, not supposital. Matter, however, is not made as having being independently of form, but as receiving being from form.

To the initial difficulty, offered to prove that the subject of generation with respect to inherence is not the generated thing, we reply from what has been said that the subject of change and the subject of inherence are not the same under the same formal aspect and account. A thing is the subject of change insofar as it is in potency to some form; it is the subject of inherence not only insofar as it receives, but insofar as it is in act, giving and sustaining being to the inhering form. Thus, by reason of matter, substance is in potency to substantial forms; by reason of the whole, it has existence, which matter itself does not have except as it is in the whole. Hence matter by itself is the subject of change, but is the subject of inherence only through the whole, in which alone existence and the capacity to sustain in being are found, as we shall explain below, q. 9.²⁰ But the thing that is corrupted cannot be the subject, because it ceases to be; therefore the subject is the thing that is generated.

But you will object: The subject of a form drawn out or united is matter, not the composite, not only with respect to change but also with respect to informing. Therefore matter is likewise the subject of drawing out, or of generation.

The antecedent is certain, because what can be informed by substantial form is nothing but prime matter; and that is called the subject of a form which can be informed by it. The inference follows because an action is identified with its term; therefore what is the subject of the term, or form, will be the subject of the action directed to it.

This is confirmed because in other motions the action is in the subject where the term is, since the subject in which change inheres must be common to both terms of the change. Therefore, since the subject of both terms, or of the form generated, is prime matter—for it receives both forms—matter too must be the subject of generation with respect to inherence.

Finally, the authorities of St. Thomas support this: On Generation and Corruption I, lecture 10,²¹ Metaphysics VIII, lecture 1,²² Summa Theologiae I, q. 45, a. 2, ad 2, On the Power of God, q. 3, a. 3, ad 4,²³ and Sentences II, dist. 12, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2.²⁴ In these places he consistently assigns prime matter as the proper subject capable of generation and corruption.

We reply by denying the inference with respect to the subject of inherence. To the proof, we answer that an action is identified with the form; I distinguish: inadequately, as with its formal term, I grant; adequately and as with its total term, I deny.

The argument can therefore be turned back against itself. Generation is identified with its total term; the total term is the composite; therefore generation is in the composite, not in matter alone. Thus the subject of inherence is not the subject of the form with which generation is identified only as with its formal term. Rather, the subject of generation with respect to sustaining it in being is the whole itself, to which the function of sustaining directly belongs; prime matter, however, is the subject by which it receives, not the subject which sustains.

To the confirmation, we reply that in other changes the subject that is changed is the composite itself, or a complete being in act, because those changes are toward accidents. Therefore the subject of inherence and the subject of change are the same. The case is different in substantial generation, which is toward substantial form, where the subject of inherence and the subject of change cannot be assigned under the same formal aspect. The subject of inherence is the whole itself, insofar as it takes on subsisting and sustaining being; the subject of change is matter by reason of its potentiality, which is changed toward form. The subject of inherence need not be common to both forms or terms. It suffices that a subject common to the change remain, even though the action inheres in the composite in which that subject of change is found. For prime matter is not sufficient to sustain accidents except dependently on the whole as the subject which; to inhere in it means this, as we shall explain more fully in q. 9.²⁵

To the authorities of St. Thomas we reply that they speak of the subject of generation insofar as it is a change, not of the subject of inherence to the exclusion of the composite. Indeed, in the cited place, On the Power of God, q. 3, a. 3, ad 4,²⁶ he expressly teaches that generation, according to its account as change, is in prime matter, but according to its relation is in the composite, as we cited above.²⁷